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September 15, 1959 Mikihail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt)

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September 15, 1959 Mikihail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt) Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified September 15, 1959 Mikihail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt) Citation: “Mikihail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt),” September 15, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD Fond 5, Opis’ 30, Delo 307, Listy 49-79. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117030 Summary: Mikhail Zimyanin, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, reports to Khrushchev on the “new stage” in Sino-Soviet relations after the victory of the people’s revolution in China; China and the Soviet Union now share the common goal of developing socialist societies in their respective countries. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation The victory of the people’s revolution in China and the establishment of the Chinese People’s Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries. … When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People’s Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements signed between the Soviet Union and PRC, including, for example, agreements to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock companies, and to set the rate of exchange for the ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June 1950), as well as other such documents.[1] Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took measures to eliminate everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the successful development of Soviet- Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust.[2] Over time, the above- mentioned agreements were annulled or revised if they did not accord with the spirit of fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October 1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting relations. As a result of this visit, joint declarations were signed on Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation and on relations with Japan.[3] In addition, a communique and additional agreements were signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the Soviet stake in Soviet- Chinese joint-stock companies responsible for scientific-technical cooperation, the construction of a Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator railroad, and so forth. [4] The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations. It created an atmosphere conducive to a more frequent and more amicable exchange of candid views. The Chinese friends began to speak more openly about their plans and difficulties and, at the same time, to express critical comments (from a friendly position) about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations. The CPC CC [Communist Party of China Central Committee] fully supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences. It is worth noting, however, that the CPC CC, while not speaking about this directly, took a position different from ours when evaluating the activity of J. V. Stalin.[5] A bit later the Chinese comrades reexamined their evaluation of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in Mao Zedong’s pronouncements when he was visiting Moscow.[6] For example, he said: “…Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now have the same view as the CPSU.” In a number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. Stalin. Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a campaign was launched in China to combat dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to “let a hundred flowers bloom.” [7] In connection with this the Chinese press began, with increasing frequency, to express criticism of specific conditions and of works by Soviet authors in the fields of philosophy, natural history, literature, and art. This inevitably gave strong impetus to hostile statements by rightist forces who denounced the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing to uphold principles of equality and mutuality, and they alleged that Soviet assistance was self-interested and of inferior quality. They also asserted that the Soviet Union had not provided compensation for equipment taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that the Soviet Union was extracting money from China in return for weapons supplied to Korea, which were already paid for with the blood of Chinese volunteers.[8] In addition, they lodged a number of territorial demands against the USSR. The airing of these types of statements during the struggle against rightists can in no way be justified, even if one takes account of the tactical aims of our friends, who were seeking to unmask the rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against them for all their statements. It is also worth noting that the Chinese friends, despite crushing the rightist elements, did not offer any open condemnation of statements expressed by them about so-called “territorial claims on the USSR.” The Soviet government’s declaration of 30 October 1956 [endorsing the principle of equality in relations between the Soviet Union and other communist countries—ed.] was received with great satisfaction in China.[9] In January 1957 a government delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration.[10] The Declaration emphasized the complete unity of the USSR and PRC as an important factor in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched claims about a “struggle between the CPSU and CPC for the right to leadership of world Communism.” In accordance with the Declaration, the Soviet Union devised and implemented concrete measures aimed at the further development of Soviet-Chinese friendship and cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual interest, and complete trust. In 1957 a series of consultations took place between the CPSU CC and the CPC CC on common, concrete matters pertaining to the international situation and the Communist movement. The Chinese friends actively participated in the preparations and conduct of the Moscow conference of officials from Communist and workers’ parties in November 1957.[11] While the Chinese delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong spoke approvingly about the positive experience of such consultations and the constant readiness of the Chinese comrades to undertake a joint review of these and other matters. [12] The steps to reorganize the management of the national economy in the USSR were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The CPC CC fully supported the decisions of the June [1957] and other plenary sessions of the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press did not feature an official commentary or reactions to the decisions of these sessions. After details about the activity of the Anti-Party faction had been explained to the CPC CC, the friends began to speak more resolutely about these matters. “If Molotov’s line had prevailed within the CPSU,” Mao declared in Moscow, “that would have been dangerous not only for the USSR, but for other socialist countries as well.” [13] Taking account of the divisive activity of revisionists and the surge of imperialist propaganda, which tried to use several ideological campaigns in China in 1957—and, in particular, the campaign to “let a hundred flowers bloom” as well as the publication of a work by Mao Zedong “On the Question of Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among the People”—to provoke a schism in relations between the Soviet Union and PRC, the leadership of the CPC CC and the government of the PRC emphasized the close unity of the socialist camp and the leading role of the CPSU among Communist and workers’ parties. Mao Zedong stated this very definitively in his speech to Chinese students attending Moscow State University (November 1957), and he spoke about it at length with officials from Yugoslavia and also during meetings that PRC government delegations had with delegations from Poland and other countries of the socialist camp. [14] In 1959 the CPC CC, having reexamined the proposal of the CPSU CC to clarify its formula about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, again affirmed that this formula must be preserved in the future. The durability of Soviet-Chinese relations and the role of Soviet-Chinese friendship gained new strength as the international situation deteriorated in the Middle East and also in connection with the provocations by the USA around the Taiwan Straits in the summer of 1958. The most important political event that year in Soviet-Chinese relations, which had an enormously positive influence on the development of the whole international situation, was the July-August meeting in Beijing between Comrades N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. [15] During an exchange of views they considered a number of matters pertaining to Soviet-Chinese relations and, in particular, questions of military cooperation. [16] The speech by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, including his statement that an attack on the PRC would be regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union itself, was fervently greeted with expressions of gratitude and approval in China. [17] The government of the PRC displayed great satisfaction at our assurance about our readiness to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation for a nuclear strike against China.[18] In turn, the Chinese government declared that the PRC will come to the assistance of the USSR in any part of the globe if an attack is carried out against it.
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