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Problem of the Second Front and Its Decision

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Problem of the Second Front and Its Decision O. A. Rzheshevsky chief researcher, Institute of General history, RAS, doctor of historical Sciences, Professor, academician of the Russian Academy of natural Sciences Problem of the second front and its decision In the evening on May 19, 1942 the TB-7 bomber (Pe-8) piloted by the major E. Pusep started from Moscow region airfield of Ramenskoye96. The crew and passengers should cross a line of battle, to make landing in Great Britain, then in Iceland, Canada, at last, to the USA and to return back. The mission was important, the route (about 20 thousand km) was difficult and unprecedentedly risky even to today's measures. Aboard the aircraft there was Vice-Chairman of Council of People's Commissars and Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov going to meet Prime Minister of Great Britain W. Churchill and United States President F. Roosevelt for negotiations on the most important questions of joint fight of three leading powers of the Anti-Hitler Coalition against invasion of aggressors and opening of the second front. In the morning on May 20 the Soviet plane guided by the British radio navigational services landed in the Tilling airfield, E. Pusep had recently visited the airfield as the second pilot with aircraft commander captain A. Asyamov (tragicly lost) 97. 96 TB-7 - serial bomber, the Soviet «flying fortress.» Created in 1936 by designer VM Petlyakov, after whose death in a plane crash (1942) the plane was renamed the Pe-8. The crew of 8-12 people, four motors to 1850 liters. with., speed up to 440km / h, range 4.7 thousand. miles, bomb load of more than 2 tons. number of parameters exceeds the American long-range bombers B-17 (1935) and «The Liberator» (1940), but conceded «Super Fortress» B-29 (1942). During the war, there was built 79 bombers Pe-8. EK Pusep - Hero of the Soviet Union, Estonian by nationality. 97 To fly to the UK there were preparing two TB-7, the crew of which were Asyamov S. and E. Pusep. This training was conducted in secrecy and under Stalin's personal order, directed by the commander of long-range aviation, Lieutenant-General AE Golovanov, later Air Chief Marshal. At the end of April 1942, it was decided to send to the UK for the practical preparation of the upcoming talks and «break-in» route the delegation headed by the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs VN Pavlolvym (the translator of Stalin and Molotov on many meetings with senior government and military leaders of Western countries). The plane was piloted Asyamov, the co-pilot was Pusep. Flight to the British Isles was a success. In London, the British side expressed the desire to get acquainted with the Soviet aircraft. A group of British engineers and government representatives flew to the place of examination in English plane. Demonstrate TB-7 by lot had Asyamovu. The draw proved fatal. 200 miles from London English plane crashed, all the persons on board were killed. In Moscow, there were suspicions of guilt in the British side. On the way back to Moscow TB-7 was piloted by Pusep. The flight took place at an altitude of 8000 m. Near the front line aircraft was attacked by a German fighter. Firing of guns, the crew did not allow the German plane at close quarters from which to conduct sufficiently accurate fire. Nevertheless, one of the German shells reached the goal, damaging the antenna radio compass, but did not explode and the plane landed safely at the airfield near Moscow. — 181 — The People's Commissar and the accompanying his people left from Tilling to London by train. For the first time the question of opening of the second front was officially raised on July 18, 1941 in the personal message of the head of the Soviet government sent to the prime minister of Great Britain. Welcoming the establishment of the allied relations between the USSR and Great Britain and expressing confidence that both states will have enough forces for defeat of the general enemy I. V. Stalin wrote: «The martial law of the Soviet Union as well as Great Britain seems to be considerably improved if the second front against Hitler in the West (Northern France) and in the north (Arctic) was created. The front in the north of France could delay not only Hitler's strengths from the East, but also would make impossible Hitler's invasion into England»98. Churchill rejected the Soviet offers, referring to a lack of forces and threat of «bloody» defeat of a landing. In September 1941 in connection with serious complication of the war situation of the USSR Stalin raised a question of the second front again. «Germans consider danger in the West as a bluff, - it was told in the message - and with impunity relocate all the forces from the West on the East, being convinced that there is no second front in the West and will not be. Germans find it possible to beat quite the opponents one by one: at first Russians, then British»99. Churchill, having recognized that all weight of fight against fascist invasion laid down to the Soviet Union, nevertheless repeated the arguments about «impossibility» of opening of the second front 100. The occupied with the enemy territory of the USSR soon exceeded 1,5 million sq. kilometers. About 74,5 million people lived on it before War. The number of the Soviet citizens who were killed in the battles and appeared in captivity in Nazi concentration camps reached several million. It was explained first of all by the Nazi's superiority in forces and means of armed struggle. Fighters and commanders of Red Army did not possess experience of war of such scales yet. The General Staff Headquarters, Command of fronts and military leaders of different levels studied art of war in the extremely difficult situation, making sometimes almost inevitable mistakes. At the beginning of October 1941 the strategic front on the Moscow direction was broken through: the Wehrmacht began the operation «Typhoon» - approach to Moscow. Five armies of Soviet military were surrounded near Vyazma settlement. The danger of death hung Over Moscow. However in the developed fierce fight the impact of the enemy was resisted by determination of the Soviet people and its dedication at the front and in the home front, the military-economic capacity of the country was gaining strength. 98 Soviet-British relations during Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 . Documents. In 2 Volumes Т. 1 1941-1943. М.. 1983. P. 85. (further: soviet-british relations…) 99 Soviet-British relations… V. 1. P. 112. 100 Soviet-British relations… V. 1. P . 114. — 182 — The Soviet troops strongly resisted the enemy and held the line and then launched a counteroffensive. Every month their resistance intensified, art of the organization of defensive battles was improved. It deprived of the enemy of possibility at the planned rate of advance. If in the first three weeks of war fascist troops moved ahead on average on 20-30 kilometers per day, from the middle of July this speed decreased to 3,5-8,5 kilometers per day. During the period since August 8 to the middle of September the rate of advance of the enemy became slower. In October - November fascist troops moved ahead on average on 2,5-3 kilometers per day, and in the first of December were compelled to stop approach to Moscow. In September the enemy was stopped at Leningrad, and at the end of November was stopped at Rostov. The obvious failure of blitzkrieg against the USSR was the most important factor of the beginning of a change in fight against fascist invasion. During strategic defense the Soviet Armed Forces caused a huge loss to the enemy. From June to November 1941 Wehrmacht land forces lost on the Soviet-German front over 750 thousand people in killed, wounded and missing persons. Losses of fascist aircraft and on June 22 till November 10 made 5180 planes101. Attempts of fascists to crush Red Army and Navy, to liquidate the USSR, to destroy the Soviet political and social order were broken. The operation «Typhoon» aimed at «final» defeat of the main forces of Red Army and capture of Moscow completely failed. Thirty eight Hitlerite divisions were suffered defeat during counterattack of the Soviet troops near Moscow with the crushing blow struck to fascist group of Centre armies. Enemy tank divisions which played crucial role in war had the most heavy losses. By the end of March about sixteen tank divisions of East front had only 140 efficient cars left102. Losses in personnel of the Centre armies Group operating on the Moscow direction according to the German data were 772 thousand people103. By the end of April 1942 the total losses of Wehrmacht land forces on the Soviet front in killed, wounded and missing persons exceeded 1,5 million people. It almost by five times exceeded losses of Hitlerites in Poland, Northwest and Western Europe and on the Balkans. During this time the Wehrmacht lost about four thousand tanks and artillery guns, about seven thousand planes (until the end of January 1942). For reinforcement of the groups fascist command had to redeploy on the East new sixty divisions and 21 brigades104. It is an unbiased historic fact that from the first days of war in the hardest border battles in the tragic summer of 1941 in the battle of Moscow on all thousand- kilometer front from Baltic to the Black Sea the Soviet Armed Forces conducted a deadly battle with fascism for freedom not only the country but also of all mankind.
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