O. A. Rzheshevsky chief researcher, Institute of General history, RAS, doctor of historical Sciences, Professor, academician of the Russian Academy of natural Sciences

Problem of the second front and its decision

In the evening on May 19, 1942 the TB-7 bomber (Pe-8) piloted by the major E. Pusep started from Moscow region airfield of Ramenskoye96. The crew and passengers should cross a line of battle, to make landing in Great Britain, then in Iceland, Canada, at last, to the USA and to return back. The mission was important, the route (about 20 thousand km) was difficult and unprecedentedly risky even to today's measures. Aboard the aircraft there was Vice-Chairman of Council of People's Commissars and Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov going to meet Prime Minister of Great Britain W. Churchill and President F. Roosevelt for negotiations on the most important questions of joint fight of three leading powers of the Anti-Hitler Coalition against invasion of aggressors and opening of the second front. In the morning on May 20 the Soviet plane guided by the British radio navigational services landed in the Tilling airfield, E. Pusep had recently visited the airfield as the second pilot with aircraft commander captain A. Asyamov (tragicly lost) 97.

96 TB-7 - serial bomber, the Soviet «flying fortress.» Created in 1936 by designer VM Petlyakov, after whose death in a plane crash (1942) the plane was renamed the Pe-8. The crew of 8-12 people, four motors to 1850 liters. with., speed up to 440km / h, range 4.7 thousand. miles, bomb load of more than 2 tons. number of parameters exceeds the American long-range bombers B-17 (1935) and «The Liberator» (1940), but conceded «Super Fortress» B-29 (1942). During the war, there was built 79 bombers Pe-8. EK Pusep - Hero of the , Estonian by nationality. 97 To fly to the UK there were preparing two TB-7, the crew of which were Asyamov S. and E. Pusep. This training was conducted in secrecy and under Stalin's personal order, directed by the commander of long-range aviation, Lieutenant-General AE Golovanov, later Air Chief Marshal. At the end of April 1942, it was decided to send to the UK for the practical preparation of the upcoming talks and «break-in» route the delegation headed by the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs VN Pavlolvym (the translator of Stalin and Molotov on many meetings with senior government and military leaders of Western countries). The plane was piloted Asyamov, the co-pilot was Pusep. Flight to the British Isles was a success. In London, the British side expressed the desire to get acquainted with the Soviet aircraft. A group of British engineers and government representatives flew to the place of examination in English plane. Demonstrate TB-7 by lot had Asyamovu. The draw proved fatal. 200 miles from London English plane crashed, all the persons on board were killed. In Moscow, there were suspicions of guilt in the British side. On the way back to Moscow TB-7 was piloted by Pusep. The flight took place at an altitude of 8000 m. Near the front line aircraft was attacked by a German fighter. Firing of guns, the crew did not allow the German plane at close quarters from which to conduct sufficiently accurate fire. Nevertheless, one of the German shells reached the goal, damaging the antenna radio compass, but did not explode and the plane landed safely at the airfield near Moscow. — 181 — The People's Commissar and the accompanying his people left from Tilling to London by train. For the first time the question of opening of the second front was officially raised on July 18, 1941 in the personal message of the head of the Soviet government sent to the prime minister of Great Britain. Welcoming the establishment of the allied relations between the USSR and Great Britain and expressing confidence that both states will have enough forces for defeat of the general enemy I. V. Stalin wrote: «The martial law of the Soviet Union as well as Great Britain seems to be considerably improved if the second front against Hitler in the West (Northern France) and in the north (Arctic) was created. The front in the north of France could delay not only Hitler's strengths from the East, but also would make impossible Hitler's invasion into England»98. Churchill rejected the Soviet offers, referring to a lack of forces and threat of «bloody» defeat of a landing. In September 1941 in connection with serious complication of the war situation of the USSR Stalin raised a question of the second front again. «Germans consider danger in the West as a bluff, - it was told in the message - and with impunity relocate all the forces from the West on the East, being convinced that there is no second front in the West and will not be. Germans find it possible to beat quite the opponents one by one: at first Russians, then British»99. Churchill, having recognized that all weight of fight against fascist invasion laid down to the Soviet Union, nevertheless repeated the arguments about «impossibility» of opening of the second front 100. The occupied with the enemy territory of the USSR soon exceeded 1,5 million sq. kilometers. About 74,5 million people lived on it before War. The number of the Soviet citizens who were killed in the battles and appeared in captivity in Nazi concentration camps reached several million. It was explained first of all by the Nazi's superiority in forces and means of armed struggle. Fighters and commanders of Red Army did not possess experience of war of such scales yet. The General Staff Headquarters, Command of fronts and military leaders of different levels studied art of war in the extremely difficult situation, making sometimes almost inevitable mistakes. At the beginning of October 1941 the strategic front on the Moscow direction was broken through: the Wehrmacht began the operation «Typhoon» - approach to Moscow. Five armies of Soviet military were surrounded near Vyazma settlement. The danger of death hung Over Moscow. However in the developed fierce fight the impact of the enemy was resisted by determination of the Soviet people and its dedication at the front and in the home front, the military-economic capacity of the country was gaining strength.

98 Soviet-British relations during Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 . Documents. In 2 Volumes Т. 1 1941-1943. М.. 1983. P. 85. (further: soviet-british relations…) 99 Soviet-British relations… V. 1. P. 112. 100 Soviet-British relations… V. 1. P . 114. — 182 — The Soviet troops strongly resisted the enemy and held the line and then launched a counteroffensive. Every month their resistance intensified, art of the organization of defensive battles was improved. It deprived of the enemy of possibility at the planned rate of advance. If in the first three weeks of war fascist troops moved ahead on average on 20-30 kilometers per day, from the middle of July this speed decreased to 3,5-8,5 kilometers per day. During the period since August 8 to the middle of September the rate of advance of the enemy became slower. In October - November fascist troops moved ahead on average on 2,5-3 kilometers per day, and in the first of December were compelled to stop approach to Moscow. In September the enemy was stopped at Leningrad, and at the end of November was stopped at Rostov. The obvious failure of blitzkrieg against the USSR was the most important factor of the beginning of a change in fight against fascist invasion. During strategic defense the Soviet Armed Forces caused a huge loss to the enemy. From June to November 1941 Wehrmacht land forces lost on the Soviet-German front over 750 thousand people in killed, wounded and missing persons. Losses of fascist aircraft and on June 22 till November 10 made 5180 planes101. Attempts of fascists to crush Red Army and Navy, to liquidate the USSR, to destroy the Soviet political and social order were broken. The operation «Typhoon» aimed at «final» defeat of the main forces of Red Army and capture of Moscow completely failed. Thirty eight Hitlerite divisions were suffered defeat during counterattack of the Soviet troops near Moscow with the crushing blow struck to fascist group of Centre armies. Enemy tank divisions which played crucial role in war had the most heavy losses. By the end of March about sixteen tank divisions of East front had only 140 efficient cars left102. Losses in personnel of the Centre armies Group operating on the Moscow direction according to the German data were 772 thousand people103. By the end of April 1942 the total losses of Wehrmacht land forces on the Soviet front in killed, wounded and missing persons exceeded 1,5 million people. It almost by five times exceeded losses of Hitlerites in , Northwest and Western Europe and on the Balkans. During this time the Wehrmacht lost about four thousand tanks and artillery guns, about seven thousand planes (until the end of January 1942). For reinforcement of the groups fascist command had to redeploy on the East new sixty divisions and 21 brigades104. It is an unbiased historic fact that from the first days of war in the hardest border battles in the tragic summer of 1941 in the battle of Moscow on all thousand- kilometer front from Baltic to the Black Sea the Soviet Armed Forces conducted a deadly battle with fascism for freedom not only the country but also of all mankind.

101 WWII History 1939-1945. V. 4. М., 1975. P. 130. 102 Could War end in 1942 ?. Moscow News. 1986. 28 December. P. 12. 103 Reinguard K. Moscow Turnaround, Hitler strategy failure in winter 1941/1942 (German translated, М.1980. P. 279). 104 WWII History 1939-1945. V. 4. P. 483. — 183 — Those opportunities which would be opened by the blow to the enemy which is precisely calculated on time in the West will become obvious If to take into account the situation which developed on the Soviet-German front, strategic and moral and political importance of victories of the Soviet Army in 1941- 1942 which shook a fascist Reich. Lord Biverbruk, the Minister of supply and, one of the most influential members of the Cabinet, reported to the British Military Office: «Resistance of Russians gives us new opportunities … It created almost revolutionary situation in all occupied countries and opened two thousand miles of the coast for a landing of English troops. However Germans can redeploy with impunity the divisions on the East just because our Generals still consider the continent as a prohibited zone for English troops …»105. The British Office and the imperial General Staff did not share Biverbruk's views. On December 7, 1941 USA entered into the war. As a result of sudden attack of Japanese Armed Forces on Pearl Harbour, the main base of Navy on the Pacific Ocean, and the followed strikes against the British Malaya, Indochina, Thailand, Singapore, Guam, Hong Kong and Philippines, strategic positions of the USA and Great Britain in this region of the world were catastrophically undermined. Fascist Germany declared war to the USA. By spring of 1942 on the Pacific Ocean and in Southeast Asia Japanese military power dominated. In the appeal to the American troops shortly before their capitulation on the Philippine Islands the commander-in-chief of armed forces of the USA in the Far East general D. Makartur said that «hopes of a civilization are nowadays inseparably linked with actions of heroic Red Army, its valorous banners flying». Exactly by this time the USA Army Staff developed the strategic plan which intent proceeded from the need of prime mobilization of the American military potential against Germany and concentration of troops and equipment in England for invasion into Northern France. On April 1, 1942 the plan was discussed at the meeting in the White House and approved by Roosevelt who attached it great political value. The President considered necessary to give assurance to the Soviet ally in a question of the second front in connection with the coming new wide-front offensive of the German armed forces in the East. The plan considered opinion of considerable part of the population of the USA which supported opening of the Second front. In anticipation of the congressional elections which were coming at the end of 1942 this factor had important value for Democratic Party. The relation of the president and his team to the specified plan was defined by an assessment of the USSR as powerful military ally for defeat not only Germany, but also subsequently - Japan. The general J. Dean, the head of the American military mission in Moscow, in 1943-1945 wrote that «almost since the beginning of attack of Japan the President and chiefs of staffs gave the greatest importance to the Soviet participation in the Pacific War»106.

105 Sherwurd, Rosevelt, Hopkins by eyewitness. М., 1958. V. 1. P. 613. 106 Din J. Strange Union. М., 2005. P. 110. — 184 — Roosevelt made the decision to send for acquaintance with plans of the USA to London the special assistant G. Gopkins and the Chief of a Staff of Army of the USA general D. Marshall. In the message Rosevelt wrote to Churchill on April 3, 1942: « I completely support everything what Harry (Gopkins - O. R.) and J. Marshall will tell you. Your people and my people demand creation of the front which would weaken pressure upon Russians, and these people are rather wise to understand that Russians kill Germans more today and destroy more equipment, than you and I, together taken. Even if the full success will not be, the large objectives will be achieved»107. Gopkins and Marshall received a consent of the British government to opening of the second front in 1943 (operation «Raundap») and disembarkation of a limited landing of the western allies in 1942 (Operation «Sledzhkhammer»). On April 11 F. Roosevelt invited A.A. Gromyko, the adviser of USSR Embassy, and handed to him the personal message addressed to the head of the Soviet Government. Roosevelt suggested to send to Washington the Soviet delegation headed by the National Commissioner on Foreign Affairs for negotiations and discussion the opening of the second front. On April 20 F. Roosevelt was reported about a consent of the Soviet Government on V. M. Molotov's meeting with the U.S. President for an exchange of opinions on the organization of the second front in Europe. The message also said that the Soviet representatives will visit London for an exchange of opinions with the English Government. The U.S. President F. Roosevelt in the letter to U. Churchill proving need of opening of the second front in 1942 emphasized that because of weather conditions operation cannot be postponed until the end of the year»108. As a result of difficult and intense negotiations of V. M. Molotov with U. Churchill, F. Roosevelt, generals, other US and Great Britain officials the decision on creation of the second front was made. It was specified in joint official communiques (Soviet-American and Soviet-English): «the full agreement concerning urgent problems of creation of the second front in Europe in 1942 is reached»109.

Moscow understood that, despite defeat of fascist troops in winter campaign

107 Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. N. Y., 1975. P. 200. 108 Rzheshevski О. Stalin and Churchill. Meetings. Talks. Discussions. М., 2004. P. 232. 109 History of Diplomacy. V. 4, M., 1975, p 265 Western historians often argue that the United States and Britain allegedly did not give the Soviet Union a solid promise to open a second front in 1942 The reason for this statement is the memorandum from , presented to V. Molotov on June 10, 1942, in which British Prime Minister stipulated the obligation to open a second front by conditions (presence of special landing facilities, guarantees success of the operation, and others.). «However, the memorandum from the British Prime Minister was in the nature of a unilateral declaration, and can not be viewed separately from the agreed joint communiqué and the negotiations as a whole, during which the Soviet delegation in order to achieve an agreement on a second front has gone on a number of significant concessions (reducing supply, agreed to deletion of the Anglo-Soviet treaty issue of recognition of the western borders of the USSR) «(quoted. according Zemstvo I. Diplomatic History of the Second Front in Europe. M. 1982, p. 91). — 185 — of 1941-1942, forces of Germany were still strong and the Western allies should overcome considerable obstacles for opening of the Second front. But the Soviet Union had the right to expect that Great Britain and the United States of America which armies totaled at that time more than 10 million people, would develop military operations in Europe and partially distract Wehrmacht troops from the Soviet-German front. It could not only give essential help to the Soviet Union, but also accelerate defeat of the fascist block, reduce the war duration and number of its victims in general. The ambassador of the USA in the USSR reported to the White house: «Considering that the Soviet Government and the people apprehended it as the solemn obligation from the United States and Great Britain to create the Second front in 1942 I am convinced that if such front will not be realized quickly and on a large scale, these people will be so deceived in the belief in sincerity of our intentions and desires to take coordinated actions that the business of the United Nations will be unassessably damaged»110. Discussion about possibility of opening of the Second front in 1942 was especially actively conducted on pages of the Anglo-American press in the summer of 1942 during approach of Wehrmacht and its allies to Stalingrad. The part of periodicals sought to persuade society of need of not only the fastest increase in military financial support of the USSR, but also opening of the second front. Other part indicated difficulties of such operation and its big risk111. The plan of disembarkation of Anglo-American troops in 1942 in the northwest of France did not get necessary support at the western allies and caused, especially from W. Churchill, a number of serious objections112. Churchill directed to larger purpose: to change a course of the American policy concerning a problem of the second front. «I should have achieved the decision from the United States, - he writes down in July, 1942, - which - whether it is good, whether badly has crucial importance within the next two years of war - refusal of all types of invasion through English Channel in 1942 and occupation of the French North Africa …». «… The moment of a funeral of «Sledzhkhamer» (the plan of disembarkation in Northern France came. - Editor's note) which was already dead for some time». In the middle of July in London discussion of advantages and shortcomings of the operations «Sledzhkhamer» and «Torch» as a result of which disembarkation

110 Quoted. International Life. 1970. № 11. P. 115. 111 Mount Airy News. 1942. July 17. P. 8; Lawrence Daily Journal World. 1942. July 17. P. 4. 112 Breuer W. B. Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa. N. Y., 1985. Р. 13; Anderson C. R. Algeria-French Morocco 8 November 1942 – 11 November 1942. Wash, 1993. Р. 3–5; Watson B. Exit Rommel: The Tunisian Campaign, 1942 – 43. Mechanicsburg, 2007. Р. 19. — 186 — in North Africa was recognized as the priority took place113. On July 25 the president Roosevelt cabled Gopkins about the decision immediately to start implementation of the plan of disembarkation in North Africa which has to take place no later than October 30114. W. Churchill admitted: «I always repeated the idea stated in my memorandum in December, 1941, notably: 1. English and American liberation armies have to land in Europe in 1943 … 2. Meanwhile, when Russians conduct huge battles against the main striking powers of the German army day by day, we cannot remain in inaction … 3. Therefore, Anglo-American occupation of North Africa in combination with approach of British to the West through the Desert to Tripoli and Tunisia was the only way to fill a gap in time which had to pass before the mass of English and American troops could be entered into contact with Germans in Europe in 1943”115. Churchill's idea undermined the agreements reached by allies. The plan of disembarkation of Anglo-American troops in the north of France was changed for the plan of their disembarkation in North Africa without timely notice and consultations with the USSR. On July 18 Churchill in the veiled form reported about this decision of allies to Stalin. The Soviet leader answered: «Proceeding from the created situation which developed on the Soviet-German front I have to declare in the most categorical way that the Soviet Government cannot reconcile with postponement of the organization of the second front in Europe for 1943»116. On August 19, 1942 allies undertook large, but unsuccessful prospecting raid on the French coast of English Channel occupied by the German troops around Dyepp with the prospecting and diversionary purposes, and also for expeditious masking of the forthcoming operation in North Africa.117 After a failure of this operation in the north of France the prospect of opening of the second front in Europe in 1943 became unrealizable. Attempts to justify non-performance by the western allies of obligations about opening of the second front in 1942-1943 were made in English-speaking literature even in the years of war. The USA allegedly made all efforts for timely

113 W. Churchill, The Second World War. V.IV, M., 1955, pp. 447 This did not stop Churchill told the next day (July 27) Roosevelt: «We need to create a second front this year and attack as soon as possible»; Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force. 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945.Wash., 1946. (Далее – Report by the Supreme Commander). Р. 1–3. 114 W. Churchill, The Second World War. V. IV. P.432,433, 446. 115 W. Churchill, The Second World War. V. IV. P. 326 – 327. 116 Correspondence… М. 1986. P. 68 117 In a raid there were attended 5000 Canadians, 1000 British and 50 American soldiers. Because of the serious mistakes in the preparation of the raid its problems were only partially implemented with large losses (4350 people of Allies and 600 people of Enemy). — 187 — opening of the second front, but their actions were blocked by England. In the official American work «The Global home front and Strategy in 1943-1945.» (authors R. Koukli and R. Layton) it is told: «Churchill was really an initiator, and Roosevelt only a pawn in implementation of policy of a tightening of the second front»118. M. Howard in the book «Big Strategy» relating to official English works on stories of World War II estimated a position of the USA differently. It was quite convincingly shown that the American side, putting forward plans of opening of the second front in 1942 and 1943, in practice supported English policy in this question. Commenting on the American strategic programs for 1943 M. Howard notices: «The American resources intended earlier for implementation of the plan of «Bolero» (redeployment of US troops to the British Isles for opening of the second front - Editor's note) were directed to the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and even the Middle East and therefore the offer on invasion into Europe in 1943 was unreal... Now on ruins of former strategy it was necessary to create the new one»119. The discussion considerably became aggravated in recent years. The official biographer of Churchill sir M. Gilbert on the “churchill`s magazine” pages («Hour of triumph») declared the following: «it was Roosevelt, but not Churchill who detained opening of the second front for two years». Answering Gilbert's «attack» famous American historian U. Kimball was more close to the truth: «Eventually, the delay of opening of the second front was the result of the whole series of decisions of Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and their military advisers». The finally made decision was «the wisest» (It was the wisest decisions)120. But English and American «wise men» leave «behind scenes» the irrevocable losses of the Soviet troops during lack of the second front which exceeded 2,8 million people121. Non-fulfilment of agreed time frames of opening of the second front and fulfillment landing operations of troops in 1942 in North Africa instead of it (operation «Torch») became as result of negotiations of U. Churchill and F. Roosevelt in July 1942 which were conducted without USSR participation122. General D. Eisenhower (at that time the Deputy Chief of Staff of US Army), one of active participants of development of the American military plans wrote: «any operation in 1942 in Mediterranean Sea would eliminate possibility of

118 Coakley R. W., Leighton R. M. Global Logistics and Strategy 1943–1945. Wash., 1968. P. 272. 119 Howard M. Big Strategy. August 1942 – September 1943 / Translated. English. М., 1980. P. 161. 120 Finest Hour. The Journal of Winston Churchill. Autumn 2004. No. 124. Р. 31, 37; Winter 2012-13. No. 157. Р. 48 (British Quaterly Magazine «Star hour», devoted to W. Churchill and connected events to him). 121 Krivosheev H.F. Russia and USSR in wars of 20-th Century. Book of losses. М., 2010. P. 236. 122 2-nd Washington Conference of W. Churchill and F.Rosevelt (19-25 June 1942) — 188 — carrying out large approach through English Channel in 1943»123. It was necessary to resolve an issue how to report about it to the Soviet Union. It was agreed that U. Churchill himself would explain the decision made by allies to the Soviet government. In August 1942 U. Churchill arrived to Moscow for negotiations in which also the personal representative of the U.S. President A. Harriman took part. During conversation on August 13, 1942 I. J. Stalin handed to W. Churchill and A. Harriman the memorandum in which it was noted that 1942 represented «optimum conditions for creation of the Second front in Europe as almost all forces of the German troops, especially the best forces were distracted on East front …»124. Nevertheless W. Churchill declared refusal of England and the USA to open the second front in Europe in 1942. At the same time he gave assurance that broad invasion on the European continent would take place in 1943. A. Harriman completely supported U. Churchill. Soviet Union had a clear view on the valid aspirations of England and the USA and could not be satisfied with results of W. Churchill`s visit to Moscow. However being guided by interests of strengthening of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, the Soviet government considered necessary not to come to further strain of relations with the allies. Fascist command, having convinced that the USA and England were not going to fulfill the obligations taken in front of the USSR about disembarkation in 1942 of the armies on the European continent, threw against the USSR into approach the most powerful group of the troops on the southern wing of the front - over 90 divisions. In the middle of July the main forces of Wehrmacht broke in a big bend of Don river and its downstream. The Battle of Stalingrad began and captured the territory of 100 thousand sq. kilometers. The battle proceeded two hundred days and nights. At the same time the fight for the Caucasus began. Wehrmacht had the task to crush the Soviet Armed Forces on the southern front, to cut the most important arteries of supply of our country with oil and other strategic raw materials, to develop approach to Moscow and to finish in 1942 war in the East. Miscalculations of the Soviet command in definition the direction of primary strike of the opponent, unsuccessful Kharkov operation for the Soviet troops in May 1942, all this aggravated situation. The enemy assault on Stalingrad and the Caucasus was conducted with the increasing force. There was no shortage of gloomy forecasts for the Soviet Country. Militaristic Japan was made to a jump as asian predator. After the Soviet troops at the end of July left from Rostov the commander of 17th Field Army Colonel General R. Ruoff told military attache of Japan: «Gate to the Caucasus is open. Time is coming when the German troops and Emperor troops meet in India».

123 Eisenhower D. Europe Crusade. Military memoirs. English translated. М., 1980. P. 106. 124 Soviet-British relations. V. 1. P. 277. — 189 — The fight on Volga raised. Sacred appeals «To a step backwards!», «Victory or death!» were embodied in mass heroism, staunch firmness of fighters and commanders. Red Army stopped the enemy by persistent defense of the city and counterstrokes and then turned into strategic counterattack. In 1965 the author of this article had the opportunity to meet Marshall of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky who was in Stalingrad during the Battle and coordinated actions of fronts. The outstanding Soviet commander told about the most remembered days of fight: «The first day - on August 23, 1942. The city blazed the huge fire from fierce air attacks of the enemy. On one of sites his troops broke to the coast of Volga. It was difficult to keep composure in this situation. All of us clearly understood that falling of Stalingrad would bring danger of death to the Homeland. We directed all available reserves to the northern suburbs of the city. We addressed to the people with the appeal. It was a day of the greatest tension. People of Stalingrad stood. The second unforgettable day - on November 23, 1942, three months later after break of fascists to Volga. This day troops of Stalingrad and Southwest fronts connected at the Farm Sovetsky and closed a ring, having surrounded 330-thousand group of the enemy. It was day of our pleasure. People of all continents met enthusiastically the message about victory of Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad. The evidence can be found in numerous documents of that time, in remembrance of eyewitnesses, in thousands of letters expressed gratitude to Red Army for world-wide historical feat. The response of the Beirut newspaper of «Saut-ash-Shaab» was figurative: «Stalingrad guns not only mill Germans, but also shake walls of Berlin … The echo of gun shots in Stalingrad rushes further, flows round the earth, reaching Chongqing, New York, London and El-Alameyna. But here some guns burn down from shame of that their steel is cold … The city on Volga became a cemetery where gloomy forces of fascism find a grave». The appreciation of fight by the state and military officials of various countries of the world can serve as evidence of an enormous public response which was caused by Stalingrad victory. The British King George VI wrote in the telegram to M. I. Kalinin: «Persistent resistance of Stalingrad turned events and served as warning of crushing blows which seeded confusion among enemies of a civilization and freedom. To note the deep admiration experienced by me and the people of the British Empire I gave the order on production of the Honourable Sword which I will have pleasure to present to the city of Stalingrad». At the same time the political rights in the USA and Great Britain strengthened anti-Soviet propaganda. The American senator R. Taft conjured that «for the United States the world with Hitler is more favorable». Taft had many supporters. The Soviet ambassador M.M.Litvinov reported from Washington concerning a problem of the second front: «it`s no doubt that military estimations of both countries (the USA and Great Britain) are based on aspiration to the maximum exhaustion of forces of the Soviet Union and to reduce its role in resolving post-war problems. They will wait for development — 190 — of military operations on East front». Year 1943 came. On February 2, the Battle of Stalingrad came to the end, the Red Army defeated the perfect strategic group of fascist troops. The total losses of the enemy was 1,5 million people. It was the victory which had decisive impact on all course and an outcome of World War II. In May 1943 allies defeated large group of Italy-German troops in North Africa. Earlier the American troops achieved victory in fight for the Guadalcanal Island on the Pacific Ocean. Success of the Western allies in North Africa and Italy, stabilization of situation on the Pacific Ocean were directly connected with events on the Soviet-German front. Because of concentration of the main forces of fascist Germany and their defeat there, there was no any possibility for support of Italy-German troops doomed to capitulation in Africa. For the same reasons Germany which was at war with the USA could not assist Militaristic Japan. After the Battle of Stalingrad there was a new factor in Western Powers attitude to the USSR. Earlier they were afraid of Hitlerite Germany fast victory, then with the increasing alarm they considered consequences of premature defeat of Wehrmacht from their point of view. In May 1943 F. Roosevelt reported to Moscow about postponement of terms of opening of the second front for 1944 and about a temporary restriction of lend-lease deliveries to the USSR. After the followed exchange of messages the situation became tense - the Western Allies had no arguments justifying sabotage of opening of the second front. On June 24 in the middle of the Battle of Stalingrad, Stalin wrote Roosevelt and Churchill «I have to declare to you that this is not just about disappointment of the Soviet government, but about confidence to allies. Don`t forget that it is about saving of millions of lives in the occupied regions of Western Europe and Russia and about reduction of the enormous victims of the Soviet armies in comparison with which the victims of Anglo-American troops make small size»125. Using lack of the second front and having carried out total mobilization of all forces and means, Fascist Germany developed the third summer approach against the Soviet Union - on the Kursk Arch on July 5, 1943. Kursk fight (July 5 - August 23) often is called in the West as the largest tank battle of World War II. The plan of the German command in operation code-named «Citadel» first of all consisted of a massive attack of tank troops on narrow sites of break. Near Kursk fascist command prepared for approach with exclusive care. Hitlerites were seeking to take a revenge for Stalingrad and took emergency measures on total mobilization of material resources and achieved large results. The main types of military production increased approximately twice. The number of troops of Wehrmacht on the Soviet- German front increased from April to July 1943 more than by a quarter of one million people. As a result the fascist managed to concentrate for approach

125 Correspondence… V. 1. P. 166-167 — 191 — on the Kursk Arch large forces: over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2700 tanks and assault tools, more than two thousand planes. The collision blow was struck by tanks and assault tools of new modifications. The Soviet command was aware about the preparation of fascist troops for approach, and took on the defensive to weaken the enemy and then to develop strategic counterattack. Within eight days (on July 5-12) the enemy was exhausted by persistent and permanent defense of the Soviet troops, nazi forces are undermined. Around Prokhorovka where there was the largest in the world counter tank battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and suffered a big loss in staff. On July 12-15 the counterattack of the left wing of the Soviet troops began in the direction of Orel and on August 3 in the direction of Belgorod. In Kursk Battle the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks, over 3.7 thousand planes and finally lost a strategic initiative which until the end of war was in hands of the Soviet command. On August 5, 1943 at 24 o'clock Moscow saluted to the Soviet troops which released Orel and Belgorod, twelve artillery volleys from 120 guns. It was the first fireworks of war years. The events developed on the Kursk Arch undoubtedly helped allies to land successfully in Sicily, having ruined plans of the enemy to redeploy part of troops from the Soviet-German front to Italy. New Wehrmacht failure on the Soviet- German front and obvious inevitability of disembarkation of the Western allies on the territory of Italy led at the end of July 1943 to Mussolini's elimination from the power and in September to capitulation of Italy and its announcement of war of Germany that meant the crash of an axis «Berlin-Rome» which served as rod basis of the fascist militaristic block. The situation in Romania, Hungary and Finland became complicated and their leaders strengthened attempts to reach the agreement with the western powers. The Soviet troops moving to frontiers of the USSR demonstrated that war was coming to end. It became obvious that the Soviet Union was capable to free the people of Europe from a fascist yoke by oneself. In this situation the Western allies, being afraid of the Soviet armies coming to the Central and Western Europe before its troops intensified preparation of operation of invasion into France through English Channel. In May, 1943 F. Roosevelt sent the former ambassador of the USA in the Soviet Union J. Davies to Moscow with the personal message to agree with J. V. Stalin about the organization in the summer of that year «on your or on my side of the Bering Strait» the Soviet-American meeting126. According to the American president plan the meeting had to be informal as «a meeting of minds» in which State Department and military staffs representatives would not participate. Stalin showed to this proposal of Roosevelt bigger interest than to a Big Three meeting. He agreed to meet in July or August on Alaska127.

126 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division; Joseph Edward Davies Papers: A Finding Aid to the Collection in the Library of Congress. Box 2. 127 The Public Papers of F. D. Roosevelt. Vol. 12. Wash., 1970. P. 71. — 192 — The probability of a meeting only Stalin and Roosevelt caused concern of Churchill who declared that conference of representatives of all three powers is necessary. At the same time he told Roosevelt that he «considers important» to establish the contacts between leaders of the USA and the USSR. Roosevelt in the letter to the British Prime Minister considered it necessary to describe the situation as an initiative of the Soviet Union128. Aspiring not to allow further deterioration of the relations with the USSR in the created situation W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt and their chiefs of staffs at conference in Quebec (17-24.081943 g) discussed and approved the plan of disembarkation of a sea landing in Normandy (operation «Overlord») and in the south of France (the operation «Dragoon», before «Envil») by May 1944. But final decision should be made at the meeting of «the big three»129, scheduled on the end of the year in Tehran. At the Teheran conference during a breakfast (lunch) on November 30, Roosevelt informed Stalin that the British and American representatives decided to perform the operation «Overlord» in May 1944, having supported it by landing in Southern France. Roosevelt said: «… As we are planning today the most suitable time for operation will be the period from May 15 to May 20». In his reply Stalin declared that «Russians will undertake big approach in several places by May to hold the German divisions on East front and not to give to Hitlerites the chance to create any difficulties for «Overlord». This historical decision was fixed in the main final document of conference, not subject to the publication. In the open declaration of three powers it was told: «We agreed on our plans of destruction of the German armed forces. We came to the full agreement concerning scales and terms of operations which will be undertaken from the East, the West and the South. The mutual understanding reached here guarantees us a victory»130. However let`s back to the previous events. At the meeting with the American chiefs of staffs on November 19, 1943 onboard the battle ship «Iowa» on the way to Cairo to the Anglo-American-Chinese conference which preceded a meeting of heads of governments of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in Tehran, the president Roosevelt paid attention that Soviet troops are only 60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If it force a crossing over the Bug River, that can make in the next two weeks, they would appear on a border of Romania. The President indicated the need to use all efforts that together with Great Britain to occupy the most part of Europe. According to Rosevelt the British

128 FRUS. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. Wash., 1961. P. 10 – 12. 129 Shulman M. Defeat in the West. N. Y., 1948. Р. 91; Harrison A. G. Cross-Channel Attack. Wash., 1951, P. 54–55; Whitaker S. Dieppe: From Tragedy to Triumph. Toronto, 1992. 130 The Soviet Union at international conferences during the Great Patriotic War of 1941- 1945. V.2. of the leaders of the three Allied powers - the USSR. USA and the UK (28 November - 1 December 1943): Proc. documents. M., 1978, pp. 175 (hereinafter - the Tehran conference ...) — 193 — occupation zone should consist of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and also the Southern part of Germany - Baden, Bavaria and Wurtemberg. Rosevelt also said: « The United States had to occupy Northwest Germany. We can enter our ships into such ports as Bremen and Hamburg, and also into [ports] Norway and Denmark, and we have to reach Berlin. Then let Soviets occupy the territory to the East from Berlin. But the United States have to take Berlin»131. At the same time «The Balkan strategy» of W.Churchill was targeted to outrun Red Army in liberating the Central and Southeast Europe countries. A series of Anglo-American conferences of this period with participation of «top officials» came to the end in Cairo (on November 23-26, 1943) where the head of the government of China Chiang Kai-shek was also invited132. In Cairo the questions connected with war against Japan were considered. The important document accepted at the conference was the Cairo Declaration of three governments in which it was specified that allies set a goal to stop and punish Japan aggression and to expel it from all territories which it seized since 1914. The declaration was published on December 1, 1943 after the acquaintance with its text of the Soviet delegation in Tehran. At the same time W. Churchill and the British chiefs of staffs at discussion of a situation in Europe tried to achieve in various ways a disembarkation delay in Normandy133. The USA Defense Secretary H.Stimson stated in the diary: “W. Churchill wants to stick a knife into a back of «Overlord»”134. During further exchange of opinions between heads of three allied powers the agreement on meeting in Moscow for preparation of of conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of three countries K. Hal (USA), A. Iden (Great Britain) and V. M. Molotov (Soviet Union) was reached135. As one of participants of the the Ambassador academician S. L. Tikhvinsky remembered: «conference was called at the initiative of Stalin who responded to the invitation to participate in a meeting of heads of three states. He agreed but noted it is necessary to prepare previously necessary materials and the accurate agenda»136. The Moscow conference (on October 19 - 30, 1943) was opened by discussion of the question of reduction of terms of war offered by the Soviet delegation. The first resulting document of conference was «The declaration of

131 The Soviet Union at international conferences during the Great Patriotic War of 1941- 1945. V.2 The Tehran conference of the three Allied powers - the USSR, the USA and the UK (28 November - 1 December 1943): Proc. documents. M., 1978, pp. 11 (Next: Tehran Conference). 132 The Cambridge History of China: Volume 12, Republican China, 1912–1949. L., 1983. P. 341. 133 FRUS. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. P. 409, 413. 134 Erman J. Big strategy. August 1943 – September 1944 г. М., 1958. С. 145; Stoler М. The Politics of the Second Front. L., 1977. P. 133. 135 National Archives. Eden, Robert Anthony (1897–1977); GB/NNAF/P147899. NRA 19657 Aitken; Dutton D. . A Life and Reputation. L., 1997. P. 195. 136 Tehran – 43: Sight 60 years later. М., 2004. P. 15. — 194 — four states on mutual safety» signed by heads of delegations of three countries and the ambassador of China in Moscow Foo Bingchang137. The important result directly connected with war reduction terms was confidential Protocol on the second front according to which «the plan of invasion of Anglo-American troops into Northern France in the spring of 1944 should be carried out on time»138. However discussion about the second front showed to the Soviet delegation that for strong assurance in fulfillment of the obligations by allies and this time there are no sufficient bases. Detailed planning of military operations in Western Europe began after completion of work of the Teheran conference and appointment on December 24, 1943 of the general D. Eisenhower to a position of the Supreme Commander of allied expeditionary forces of West European theater. The British general B. Montgomery who won a victory over the field marshal E. Rommel at El- Alameyne accepted command of ground allied forces. The planning and preparation of the operation «Overlord» were accelerated. At the end of December the plan of operation was partially revised. The number of troops of the first echelon of a landing was increased from three to five divisions, the front of its disembarkation which included East partof the Cotentin Peninsula was broadened, forces of an air landing were increased, terms of creation of the base were reduced. Invasion into Western Europe required concentration of a huge number of land forces, fleet and aircraft and providing them with all necessary means for conducting military operations on continental part of Europe. Such relocations of troops and equipment draw attention of the German intelligence. F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill during the Teheran conference suggested J.V. Stalin to coordinate «with staffs the plan of mystification and deception of the enemy …»139, to misinform Hitler and the high command of the German armed forces about a place and time of allied landing of troops. The development and implementation of such comprehensive plan was new task for Anglo-American and Soviet commands. The American general O. Bradley wrote after the end of World War II: «Our plan of misinformation was aimed at deception of the enemy in big scales. The plan was based on skillful deception of enemy agents known to us, on false broadcast messages and creation of the false front of invasion»140. The plan was called - «Bodyguard».

137 The Soviet Union at international conferences during the Great Patriotic War of 1941- 1945. Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain (19 - 30 October 1943). Collection of documents. M., 1984, pp. 322, 321 (Next: Moscow conference ...) 138 Same source. p. 339. 139 The Soviet Union at the international conferences of the Great Patriotic War 1941- 1945's. In 3 vols. M., 1978, V. II. Tehran Conference of the leaders of the Allied powers - the USSR, USA and Great Britain. p. 173. 140 Bradley O. Notes soldier. M., 1957, pp. 375, Omar Nelson Bradley (1893-1987). In «Operation Overlord» commanded the 12th Army Group. In 1950 he was appointed to the highest military post United States - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States and chairman of the NATO Military Committee. — 195 — The scientific work devoted to this subject based on available documents141. The documents describe a complex of the large-scale measures developed by the General Staffs of Great Britain, the USSR and the USA which disoriented enemy intelligence, hid a place and time of landing of troops that provided suddenness and final success of the operation «Overlord» and opening of the second front. D. Eisenhower in the memories of disembarkation in Normandy lights in details the value of misinformation of the enemy and success of the operation «Bodigard», but does not mention joint participation in it of armed forces of the USSR. The modern literature of Western countries continues to forge history. In this regard it is necessary to notice that falsification of history as a component of modern information wars is put in a row of active means of fight against our country, and it demands deep knowledge of these questions and training of qualified personnel.

On June 6, 1944 the armada from 5 thousand vessels with a landing crossed English Channel. The preparation of this largest in World War II of landing operation took more than one and a half years. There were concentrated over 2,8 million people on the British Isles for invasion on the continent. Allies had overweight in the number of staff and tanks three times, in planes - more than by 60 times and completely had superiority in the seas. The success of disembarkation of allies was supported by approach of Red Army in the winter and spring of 1944. the Soviet approach in Belarus began on June 23 (operation «Bagration»). Over 4 million people, about 62 thousand tools and mortars, more than 7,5 thousand tanks and assault tools, 7,1 thousand planes participated in fight from both sides. As a result of the operation which came totheend on August 29, the Red Army crushed fascist group of Centre armies, finished liberation of Belarus and some other territories of the country. As a result of the Belarusian operation 17 divisions and 3 brigades of the enemy were completely crushed, including the divisions redeployed from Germany, Norway, Italy, Holland. It was brought down in air and destroyed on airfields about 2 thousand enemy planes. The Soviet Armed Forces completely fulfilled the obligations taken at the Teheran conference and gave big help to approach of troops of the Western allies. The famous English researcher M. Hastings writes «Fight for Normandy was the decisive battle of World War II in the West, the last stage when the German army142 had still some chances of Hitler's rescue from catastrophe. The post-war generation grew with a legend of campaign of allies in 1944-1945 as about the triumphal march through Europe which anyway is not connected with dreadful, but little-known fight which happened in the East. Today it is necessary to recognize that Russians made a decisive contribution to war in the

141 Lota V.I. Operation «Bodyguard» lost track. M. 2014. 240 p. 142 Hastings М. Operation «Overlord». As a second front was opened. — 196 — West, having crushed the best forces of the German army, having destroyed about two million soldiers before the allied soldier stepped on June 6, 1944 into the coast of France»

Chief researcher of Institute of general history of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of historical sciences, professor, academician of the Russian Academy of Native Sciences O. A. Rzheshevsky

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