Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies
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YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr. Kevin Cramer, my thesis and program advisor. From the moment I created this project, Dr. Cramer worked with me to see it come to fruition. Whether big, (editing my longwinded drafts), or small, (answering my numerous questions), he assisted in the creation of the project from start to finish. Without his guidance and expertise, this project would never have come to life. A big thanks to all the friends and relatives who in one way or another supported and encouraged the completion of this project, especially my fiancée, Kristine Weddell, who meticulously edited every word written. Finally, thank you to all the scholars cited throughout this work, without whom I would have been lost in a sea of diplomatic papers and argumentative recollections. All mistakes are mine and mine alone. Thank you all. iv Matthew M. Grossberg YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, Yalta exposes Britain’s impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference. This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes that aligned more favorably to British interests. A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy. Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair v Table of Contents Conferences of WWII ...................................................................................................................... viii Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 1 Prologue............................................................................................................................................. 1 Historiography ................................................................................................................................ 10 Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 20 Chapter One: Lessons of the Past ................................................................................................... 22 Churchill .......................................................................................................................................... 22 Stalin ................................................................................................................................................. 30 Roosevelt ......................................................................................................................................... 37 Chapter Two: Unequal Partners ....................................................................................................... 46 Lend-Lease ...................................................................................................................................... 46 Convoys ....................................................................................................................................... 51 Anglo-Soviet Treaty ....................................................................................................................... 54 Second Front .................................................................................................................................. 58 Operation Torch and the Free French ....................................................................................... 61 Stalingrad and Kursk ..................................................................................................................... 64 Italian Surrender Precedent .......................................................................................................... 66 Standing ........................................................................................................................................... 68 Chapter Three: Divergent Visions ................................................................................................... 71 Moscow Ministers’ Meeting .......................................................................................................... 75 Four-Power Declaration ........................................................................................................... 75 The Eden and Molotov Discussions ...................................................................................... 77 Cairo I .............................................................................................................................................. 82 Teheran ............................................................................................................................................ 87 The FDR and Stalin Talks ........................................................................................................ 88 Churchill Enters the Fray ......................................................................................................... 90 Cairo II ............................................................................................................................................ 93 Chapter Four: “When I Have to Choose” ..................................................................................... 97 Bretton Woods ............................................................................................................................ 100 The Joint Statement ................................................................................................................. 102 The Conference ........................................................................................................................ 103 vi The Russian Stage .................................................................................................................... 106 Dumbarton Oaks .......................................................................................................................