US Army, Berlin, 1961-1994
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COLD WARRIORS, GOOD NEIGHBORS, SMART POWER: U.S. ARMY, BERLIN, 1961-1994 Rex A. Childers A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2015 Committee: Beth A. Griech-Polelle, Advisor Marc V. Simon Graduate Faculty Representative Bill Allison Michael E. Brooks © 2015 Rex Childers All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Beth Griech-Polelle, Advisor The end of the Cold War and the manner in which it was “won” by the Allied nations ignited debate over the utility of military power as a source of American leadership in the new unipolar world. A popular theme arose, that a new form of state power, soft power, had the capacity to achieve America’s interests as it prepared to enter the 21st century. The idea that expensive and dangerous technologies could be replaced by investments in peaceful means of influence, wielded by America’s foreign policy professionals to foster a new cooperative spirit in the world, was naturally attractive. The United States could be relieved of much of its global military presence and reduce its military’s intrusions upon foreign people and their cultures. This dissertation challenges the assumption that the impact of military stationing in the Cold War was limited to hard power. In the case of the U.S. Army in Berlin, the unit and its members practiced civic, social, cultural, and political behaviors that meet the criteria of the post-Cold War branded term, soft power. In their daily interactions with Berliners, they exercised the full spectrum of foreign policy smart power tools, as Cold Warrior defenders of West Berlin and in compliance with U.S. Army, Europe’s directive for all soldiers and their family members to act as Good Neighbors to the Germans in the city. The unit’s command designed institutional structures to enhance its ability to project power, and these networks became the basis for intentional actions to improve its Social Capital in the isolated city. In fact, these networks, controlled by the Army in Berlin, changed the dynamics of the occupied-occupier relationship and provided West Berlin’s civic leadership its first formal step toward balancing the relational power calculations with its lawful occupiers. As a policy history case study, it may be useful to iv the U.S. military as a fresh perspective on the spectrum of power behaviors evident in its own historical records. The usefulness of this study is subject to the recognition that the experience in West Berlin, while ultimately successful, occurred in a particular period and cultural context. For U.S. policymakers seeking a broader range of choices in a future scenario requiring a hard power capability on the ground while offering a path to a soft power component possibility, Army Berlin’s critical crisis assessments and long-term practices might be instructive. Policymakers who restrict their choices in the early estimation process based upon the limitations assumed in modern power theory may benefit from a broader understanding that does not exclude the force that necessarily absorbs much of the foreign policy budget. Under certain circumstances and in the proper context, the manpower, social, and cultural strength of the United States military, through its leaders, members, and dependents, has advanced the national interest effectively and without resorting to its hard power capabilities. v This work is dedicated to my family. First, to my wife, Amy – We have shared our passions and supported each other throughout our life together. The work that follows became my passion and challenge, and was made possible only with your love and patience. What did I ever do…? To my daughter, Hope, and my son, Jon – Your words of encouragement always seem to come at just the right time in my day when it matters, and your smiles brighten my day. To my son, Jacob – We never said goodbye, always Love ya, see ya. Until I see you again. vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation is the result of the generous involvement of many individuals who offered their wisdom and support throughout the process. Dr. Beth Griech-Polelle, committee chair, has been a stalwart guide and friend from the start of my academic journey. She encouraged me to expand my research, deliver conference presentations, submit for publications, and ultimately shepherded this study to completion. Dr. Bill Allison provided not only wise counsel on the manuscript, but also acted as a mentor in research and conference venues that challenged my interests. In his service as departmental graduate coordinator and a member of the committee, Dr. Michael Brooks demonstrated his commitment to graduate student success at every moment of decision. As Charlemagne relied upon his righteous knights in faithful service, I was blessed with my own Paladin. Completing the committee, Dr. Marc V. Simon of the BGSU department of Political Science served as graduate faculty representative, and his comments also improved the work in its final form. I wish to thank Dr. Benjamin Greene for serving as a reader during the preparatory process, and for providing access to his forthcoming book chapter. While our shared interest in the U.S. Army in Berlin may reach different conclusions, his work is appreciated. Additionally, Dr. Ingo Trauschweizer provided timely draft comments that helped to refine the ultimate work, and his knowledge of the broader Cold War era U.S. Army provided context for the micro- history offered here. As a historian, the challenges of gaining access to fresh sources can be daunting. It was my great fortune to meet Louise Arnold-Friend, Supervising Archivist at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania in April 2011. Louise granted me the unique opportunity to review the unprocessed and non-public records of the final serving unit in Berlin, The Berlin Brigade. Over the next two years, as I inventoried the collection which made this vii dissertation possible, Louise and the staff at the Institute, including Tom Buffenbarger and Steve Bye, were more than a pleasure to work with. I offer many thanks to the BGSU history department for its support of my graduate studies and research agenda, and particularly to Dr. Scott Martin, department chair. The unique collection access I gained at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, the backbone of my work, was only made possible through the history department’s generous funding awards. Tina Thomas, departmental secretary, remains truly one of the treasures on campus. In regard to members of the history faculty who have shaped my academic path, I wish to thank the following additional members of my comprehensive exam committee: Dr. Gary R. Hess, Emeritus Distinguished Research Professor, Dr. Walter Grunden, and Dr. Larry Nelson. Dr. Douglas Forsyth, Dr. Don Rowney, Dr. Ed Danziger, Dr. Becky Mancuso, Dr. Judith Sealander, and Dr. Dwayne Beggs are all history professors who have also had a positive impact upon my development as a scholar and teacher. Additionally, Steve Charter and Dana Nemeth of the university library’s Center for Archival Collections were so very helpful in their support my first year as I returned to graduate school and interned at the center, and I am grateful for their kindness. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER 1. HISTORIANS AND U.S. ARMY, BERLIN IN THE COLD WAR ............ 19 CHAPTER 2. THE FRAMEWORK: THEORY AND POLICY ........................................ 59 The Evolutions of Nye’s Power Theories .................................................................. 66 Connecting Nye to Street-level Implementation by Army Berlin ............................. 82 Smart Power Implementation: Culture, Networks, and Trust as Power ................... 87 CHAPTER 3. ENFORCING U.S. RIGHTS IN BERLIN .................................................... 100 Presence, Access, and Viability ................................................................................. 103 The Consensual Allied Right of Presence ................................................................. 105 The Implied Allied Right of Access .......................................................................... 105 The Invented Right of Viability ................................................................................. 107 Army Berlin and the new Right of Viability ............................................................. 110 CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTING SMART POWER IN BERLIN, 1961-1963 ................... 129 Cold Warriors for a Viable West Berlin .................................................................... 139 Adapting Lethal Weapons to Protect Good Neighbor Social Capital ........................ 146 Army Berlin Demonstrates Presence at the Berlin Wall ........................................... 155 Army Berlin’s Soft Power Strategies ......................................................................... 165 Army Berlin’s Interpretation of the Right of Access ................................................. 174 President Kennedy’s Vital Right of Access: West Germany to West Berlin ............ 178 East Berlin: Army Berlin’s Vital Right of Access ..................................................... 184 The Death of Peter Fechter and the Allied Ambulance Plan ..................................... 189 ix Army Berlin’s Covert Humanitarian Operation in East Berlin ................................