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Britain and the Soviet Union: the Search for an Interim Agreement on West Berlin November 1958-May 1960

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Britain and the Soviet Union: the Search for an Interim Agreement on West Berlin November 1958-May 1960 Britain and the Soviet Union: The Search for an Interim Agreement on West Berlin November 1958-May 1960 A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Kathleen Paula Newman London School of Economics and Political Science October 1999 l UMI Number: U615582 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615582 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 F 7 7 5 8 733 363 Abstract Britain and the Soviet Union: The Search for an Interim Agreement on West Berlin November 1958-May 1960 This thesis analyses British and Soviet policy towards negotiations on an Interim Agreement on Berlin, from November 1958 until May 1960. It emphasises the crucial role played by the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan and the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, both of whom viewed the Berlin problem within the wider context of their mutual objectives of achieving detente and disarmament. The opening chapter analyses Soviet motivation for reactivating the Berlin question, and emphasises two factors behind Soviet policy: the maintenance of the status quo in Germany and Eastern Europe, and Soviet fears of the nuclearisation of the Bundeswehr. The next two chapters reassess Britain’s response to the Soviet Note of 27 November 1958, the impact of British \ policy on Berlin on the Western Alliance and the subsequent emergence of a British initiative on Berlin which culminated in Harold Macmillan’s visit to Moscow in February 1959. Fresh insights into Soviet policy on Berlin and European Security are offered. The fourth chapter reappraises Macmillan’s visits in March 1959 to Paris, Bonn and Washington to persuade his Allies of the benefits of his initiative. This chapter also deals with the British contribution both to the Allied debate on contingency planning for Berlin and to the discussions on Germany, European Security and Berlin, which took place in the Four Power Working Group from January until May 1959. The ensuing chapter analyses British and Soviet attitudes to the East-West negotiations on an Interim Agreement on West Berlin at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, May-August 1959, and considers whether the British Government was correct in its perception that the Soviet Government wished to establish a modus vivendi on Berlin. Chapter six traces the evolution of Soviet and Western policies towards the forthcoming summit conference from August 1959 until May 1960. The final chapter examines Soviet and Western reactions to the U-2 Incident of 1 May 1960 and seeks to demonstrate that Khrushchev left for Paris prepared to negotiate on an Interim Agreement on Berlin, and hopeful that he would achieve the East-West Detente for which he and Macmillan had striven. 2 Contents Acknowledgments 4 Introduction 5 Chapter 1 Soviet Policy on Berlin 10 November 195 8-February 1959 32 Chapter 2 The British Government’s Reaction to the Soviet Initiative on Berlin November 1958-February 1959 74 Chapter 3 The Prime Minister’s Visit to the Soviet Union 114 21 February-3 March 1959 Chapter 4 Britain Seeks to convert her Allies to the Macmillan Initiative 146 January-May 1959 Chapter 5 The Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference 11 May -5 August 1959 188 Chapter 6 East-West Negotiations on an Interim Agreement for 233 West Berlin September 1959-the Paris Summit May 1960. Chapter 7 The Impact of the U-2 Incident on the Paris Summit May 1960 274 Conclusion 300 Appendices 312 Bibliography 324 3 Acknowledgments This study owes a great deal to my two supervisors at the LSE, Professor D.C. Watt, in the initial stages, and thereafter to Dr. Anita Prazmowska both of whom have provided inspiration, advice and invaluable assistance at all stages. Two years of my research was sponsored by an LSE scholarship endowed by Mrs Zauberman to whom I am immensely grateful. I would also like to thank the staff of the following institutions for their assistance: the Public Record Office at Kew; the LSE Library; the British Library; the University of London Library; the Institute of Historical Research; the Institute of Contemporary British History; Ms. Patricia Methven and her staff at the Liddell Hart Centre at King’s College London; the Churchill Archive, University of Cambridge; and the Bodleian Library, Oxford. In Berlin, Frau Rauber, archivist at the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv was exceedingly helpful, as were the staff of the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the USSR, and the Storage Centre for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents, in Moscow. During my visits to the Soviet Union, Professor Chubarian and his colleagues at the Institute of Universal History: Russian Academy of Sciences, and the staff of the Institute of USA and Canada gave me every assistance in my research. My Russian friends, Irina Shishkova and Tanya Zhdanova were unstinting in their help and assistance in dealing with research problems and opportunities in Moscow, and Pam Schatkes, my friend and colleague at the LSE always encouraged me through difficult times. Finally, my work could not have been completed without the constant encouragement and understanding of my family, and above all my husband to whom I am deeply indebted. 4 Introduction Berlin, under quadripartite military occupation and four power status since 1945, was a focal point of Cold War Crises and a barometer of East-West relations.1 In the first Berlin Crisis of 1948-9, Stalin blockaded Berlin for eleven months as a means of protesting against currency reform in the Allied zones and with a view to incorporating West Berlin within the Soviet orbit. The Western Powers demonstrated the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) commitment to Berlin by mounting an air lift and forcing Stalin to climb down. This crisis led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 which committed the United States to the defence of Western Europe, and implicitly to that of West Berlin. Ultimately, it resulted in the emergence of the Federal German Republic (FRG), within the NATO Alliance, and the German Democratic Republic (DDR) within the Warsaw Pact. Henceforth, Berlin became the frontline of NATO’s Western defence in the Cold War. The second Berlin Crisis began in November 1958, when the Soviet Government sent Notes to the Allied Powers announcing that it considered the Four Power Agreement on Berlin to be ‘null and void’, and setting a deadline of six months for solving the Berlin problem. The Soviet Note proposed that West Berlin should be converted into a demilitarised ‘Free City’, but stated that no alteration would be made in access to the city for six months. However, if no agreement was forthcoming in that period, the Soviet Government intended to sign a peace treaty with East Germany whereby Soviet occupation rights on access to West Berlin would be transferred to the DDR. Western agreement to this course would have amounted to de facto recognition of the DDR and ultimately acquiescence in the ‘Two Germany’ solution and the preservation of the status quo in Eastern Europe. 1 For accounts of the origins of the Berlin problem, see T. Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (London, 1975); J. Smith, The Defence of Berlin (Baltimore, 1963); W. Burr, US Policy and the Berlin Crisis: an Overview, Essay in NSA The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962 (Washington, 1991). For works on British policy towards Germany, see D.C Watt, Britain looks to Germany (London, 1965); for the background to British policy towards Berlin, 1945-1958, see J. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis 1958-1962 ( London, 1998); and E Barker, ‘The Berlin Crisis: 1958-1962’ International Affairs (London. 1963). 5 However, Soviet aims on Berlin must be considered within the wider context of the German problem. At the Potsdam Conference, August 1946, the Four Powers agreed that the fate of Berlin and Germany would await the conclusion of an Allied Peace Conference. As a result of their suffering at German hands in the war, the Soviets’ nightmare scenario was the prospect of a rearmed economically resurgent Germany on the borders of her East European Empire, her protective glacis. The Soviet Note of 1950 stated that the Soviet Government would not tolerate the creation of a West German Army as it would be contrary to the Potsdam Agreement. Subsequent Soviet policy in the early fifties aimed at preventing German rearmament within the European Defence Community (EDC) whereas Western proposals for Germany’s future envisaged the emergence of a unified Germany based on free elections and freedom to join the Western Alliance. There were signs, particularly after the death of Stalin, that the Soviet Government was prepared to concede free elections if Germany remained neutral, but the West was not ready to accept that such offers were made in good faith. After the failure of the EDC in 1954, Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary in the Churchill Administration was largely responsible for the Paris Agreements which led to the emergence of the Federal Republic within the Western Alliance. Eden, like the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was mindful of the Rapallo scenario and his objective was to bind the FRG into the Western Alliance.4 At the Geneva Conference of 1955 there was no East-West consensus on Germany’s future, so the Soviets reverted to the ‘Two Germany’ solution.
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