Pragmatics2:3.35 5-37 5 InternationalPragmatics Association
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN EUROPEANNATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES'
Jan Blommaert & Jef Verschueren
1. Introduction
In his book on Natiorts and nationalismsince 1780, E.J. Hobsbawm concludesthat "the phenomenon[of nationalism]is past its peak." (p. 183)Before he gets to this conclusion(apparently written sometime in 1989,still before German reunification becamea realistic possibility and before the processof fragmentation in some countriesof the old Communist Bloc had gained momentum) he shows quite 'Europe convincingly,and almost prophetically, that a new of nations' in the Wilsoniansense (with independententities such as Catalonia,Corsica, Slovenia, 'a Estonia,etc.) could not produce stableor lastingpolitical system.'(p. 177) For one thing, "the first thing most such hypothetical new European stateswould do is, almostcertainly, apply for admissionto the European Economic Community, which would once again limit their sovereignrights, (p. 177) [...]." 'national Indeed,nation-states with highlyautonomous economies'probably belong to the past. However, it is far from clear that such a confrontation with economicreality, which will no doubt changethe historicalcontent and direction of nation-building processes,has any direct influence on nationalism from an ideologicalperspective. After all, as Hobsbawm demonstratesequally convincingly, the essenceof nationalismfrom the 19th century onwardshas been the definition 'objective of imaginedcommunities'along conceptual lines out of touchwith reality' (a theme also developedin Barth ed. 1982and by Anderson 1983). An assessmentof the ideologicalprocesses involved requires access to 'the view from below.' But,
'That view from below, i.e. the nation as seen not by governments and the spokesmen and activists of nationalist (or non-nationalist) movements, but by the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action and propaganda, is exceedinglydifficult to discover." (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 11)
This is further complicatedby the fact that
' This paperwas written in the contextof a researchprogram supported by the BelgianNational Fund for Scientific Research(NFWO/FKFO), the Belgian National Lottery and a Belgian governmentgrant (IUAP-ll, contractnumber 27). Thanks are due to Gino Eelen,who mllected the datawe needed,to l,ouis Goossens,Johan van der Auwera,Michael Meeuwis, Luisa Martin Rojo, BambiSchieffelin, Kit Woolardand PaulKroskrity for commentson an earlierversion, and to Susan Philips for the insightful remarksshe madeduring the discussionat the AAA meetingwhere this paperwas presented. 356 Jan Blommaert & Jef Vqschueren
"[...] national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods." (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 11)
Hobsbawm adds that "this is the area of national studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed today." (p.11) To counterbalancethe remark 'exceeding about the difficulty' of the researchin question, he observes:
"Fortunatelysocial historians have learned how to investigatethe history of ideas,opinions andfeelings at thesub-literary level, so that we are today less likely to confuse,as historians oncehabitually did, editorials in selectnewspapers with publicopinion.' (p. 11)
This paper is intended to contribute (i) to the further exploration of the topic identified in the above quotations, and (ii) to the development of an adequate methodology to approach the complexitiesof ideology research. As to its topic, this paper is to be situatedin the context of a wider research project intended to provide a historical snapshotof mainstream European thinking about nations and national identification. The main data base consists of a comprehensive collection of articles on ethnic conflicts (whether intra- or internationally), separatistand unificational movements,and other topics -- such as 'nationality,' minority politics -- involving issuesof group identity associatedwith from the mainstream daily press in at least 80Voof the countries of Europe (both East and West), over a three-month period in 1991.Though the period itself may not be long enough for observableideological changes to take place, the temporal demarcation will make it possible to draw historical comparisons with well- documented periods from the past; moreover,similar snapshotscan be taken at any time in the future. From a methodologicalpoint of view, the nature of the data base might raise some worries directly related to Hobsbawm'sremark concerningthe earlier habits 'to of historians confuse editorials in select newspaperswith public opinion.' There are three ways in which the project avoids this problem. First, the selection criterion for choosingthe newspapersto be investigated has been that they should be mainstream publications which, together, have a maximal readership, but each of which has a different target audience. Small- circulation publications have been avoidedbecause they are most likely to represent the opinions of a few people.z In practice, extremist texts (in any direction) have, as a result, rarely entered the corpus, though -- depending on one's perspective -- extremism of some kind may turn out to be the norm under certain circumstances and in some geographical areas. Second, the investigation pays equal attention to regular news reports and editorials (which are more openly subject to personal interpretation and bias); the character of the texts is fullv taken into account whenever conclusionsare drawn from examples.
2 This statementcan be correct only for a free-presstradition in which a wide range of publicationsis available.By now this is the casein mostof Europe,though in the countriesof the old communist bloc the situation is less stable than in the rest of Europe, and hence future repetitionsof the sameresearch design may revealmore rapid historicalchange there. The role of language in European nationalist ideologies 357
Third, and most importantly,more weight is attachedto the implicit frame of reference,the supposedlycommon world of beliefsin which the reports (or the editorialcomments) are anchored,than to the explicit statementsmade by the reporters(or commentators).This approachis crucialfor the investigationof widely shared ideologies.And fortunately modern linguistics,in particular linguistic pragmatics,provides us with fully adequate tools to undertake exactly this kind of study.Briefly, the basic assumptionsare (i) that the authors,just like any other languageuser in any other communicativecontext, are unable to expresswhat they want to communicate in a fully explicit way, (ii) that therefore their texts leave implicitmost of the assumptionsthey expecttheir readersto sharewith them, and (iii) that a carefulanalysis of thoseimplicit assumptionswill reveala common frame 'ideology.' of referenceor It follows that isolatedexamples are never sufficientas evidence:coherence -- manifestedeither as recurrenceor as svstematicabsence -- is necessaryto warrant conclusions.3 This article is based on a smaller pilot study in which some Northwest Europeandataa were scrutinizedin view of the specificrole which languageplays in the overallpicture of current nationalistideologies. It goeswithout sayingthat our findingswill have to be interpreted in the light of the regional restrictionson the corpus,a remark which shouldbe kept in mind wheneverwe use the qualification 'European'"
2. Languageas a distinctive feature
Thesigpificance of a non-issue
As a surfacetopic, worthy of an explicit treatment in its own right, languageis strikinglyabsent in our corpus of reports on interethnic conflicts or on issuesof 'national' identity or nation-building.But tar from undermining any attcmpt to reveala specificrole for languagein current nationalistideologies from the start, thisfirst observationhas turned out to touch the very essenceof popular linguistic ideology. Languageis raisedto the level of an individualissue almost exclusively when referenceis made to societiesother than the one in which the report in questionis itself to be situated.A case in point is a German report entitled Ameika wtd Einwandenury: Sc hme lztiegel oder S alatschiissel? [America and immigration: Melting
3 A more elaborate justification of this approach is to be found in J. Blommaert & J. Verschueren(1991).
o Most of the data used for this specific study date back to the first weeks of November 1990, but they are not strictly confined to that period. The investigated publications are: Die Zeit, Zeit Magazin, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Frankfuner Allgemeine Magazin; The Guardian, The Guardian Weekly; NRC Handelsblad; Le Monde, Le Nouvel Observateur; De Standaard. For the sake 'Western' of comparison, one non-European source (though clearly if not specifically American, and widely read in Europe), The Intemational Herald Tibune, was studied for the same period. As will be clear from the examples, the general tendency turned out to be very similar. 358 Jan Blommaeft & Jef Verschueren pot or saladbowl?], juxtaposedto an article on a disputeover voting rights at the municipal level for minority membersin Germany.Though the physicaljuxtaposition of the two articlesis clearlybased on a judgmentof topical relatedness,the German issue is phrased exclusivelyin terms of the sharing of political power and the possibleinfringement of ethnicGerman rights, whereas language is explicitlyfocused on as an issuein the US:
"Heute schon spielen sich harte Kiimpfe um die Sprache,um die Dominanz des Englischenab, dasvorldufig noch eine verbindendeKraft darstellt."(Die Zeit, 9 Nov. 1990,p. 7) [Alreadytoday difficult battles are fought over language, the dominanceof English,which -- for thetime being -- still presentsa uni$ingforce.]
The Official English movement is indeed a sufficientlyinteresting phenomenon to deservespecial mention in connectionwith the multiethnicityof the United States.s But implicit in this German report is the idea that the coherenceof a society strongly benefits from the existenceof just one language.It is not accidentalthat the quoted sentencefollows an explicit statement to the effect that
"Die ethnisch-rassischeKocxistenz scheint zu gelingensolanle die Wirtschaft einigermassenfloriert." lEthnic-racialcoexistence seems to work as long as the economy is somewhatsuccessful.]
Linguistic strife is presented as an important force towards social disintegration, triggered by a worseningeconomy. Because of the need for linguistic coherence, German as the only languageof Germany is taken for granted. The issue,which is in reality as acute as in the American case (though there is not one single 'threatening'alternative suchas Spanishin the US), doesnot needto be mentioned. Thus, treating languageas a non-issuein relation to German minority problems, only reveals how much is really taken for granted.
Ianguage: A marlur of identity
That languageis seen as a unifying force should be clear from the above. Language assumesthe characterof a clear identitymarker. Thus it appearsprominently in an article on Spanish Basque nationalism (entitled Der Heimat bewusst:Die Basken -- 'Heimat': gastfreundlichaber nicht servil [Consciousof the The Basques:hospitable but not humblel):
"Was steckt dahinter? Eine lange Geschichte der allerdings militanten Selbtstbehauptungeines Volkes, dessenHerkunft ebensowie die Herkunft seiner Sprache, des Euskara, den Ethnologen und Linguisten bis heute Riitsel aufgibt. [...] Diese Ursprache [...]." (Die ZeiL 16 Nov. 1990,p. 83) [What'sbehind it?
5 For furtherdiscussions of thisparticular movement which strongly relates national identity to language,see Adams & Brink (eds.)(1990). Therole of languagein Europeannationalist ideologies 359
Euskara,has until todaybeen a mysteryfor ethnologistsand linguists. <...> Thisancient language<...>.1
The languageof the Basques,of which not enoughmay be known to designateit 'Ursprache' as (if sucha designationhas any meaningat all), becomesthe romantic focusof the identity of the Basquepeople in a descriptionwhich is reminiscentof nineteenth-centuryscholarship.
Natural disc o ntin uit ics
Yet, languageis only one identity marker among others. Descent, history, culture, religion,and languageare treated as a feature cluster. Their identificational function impliesseparability, a natural discontinuityin the real world. These discontinuities 'nations' 'peoples,' are or i.e. natural groups, the folk perceptions of which conceptualizesthem in much the same way as speciesin the animal kingdom. If feathersare predictive of beaks, eggs,and an ability to fly, so is a specific language predictiveof a distinct history and culture.6 'distinct Thus the absenceof the feature language'tends to cast doubts on the legitimacyof claims to nationhood. Consider the following statementsfrom an 'russification' articleon the Ukraine. made in the context of referencesto the of the republic:
"The poor old Ukraine has had a bad press.Both the Poles,who dominated the towns of the westernpart, and the Russians,who dominatedthose of the eastand south,looked down on the Ukrainiansas peasants,speaking jargon. The languageitself varied greatly from region to region -- in the west quite close to Polish, in the east sometimesindistinguishable from Russian.[...] Politically.the Ukraine was underdeveloped[...]." (The Guardian Weekly, 4 Nov. 1990,p.9)
Here the lack of a clearly distinct languageis the first item in a list of indicators of culturalerosion or underdevelopment. 'group'; In some cases,language is offered as the only distinctive trait of a othersare not really needed, since a distinctive languageis predictive of a distinct group identity. This strategy is typically used when little-known ethnic groups are talked about. A case in point is the reporting on the Gagauzpeople in Moldavia:
"[...]the defiant Turkish-speakingGagauz districts [of Moldavia]" (Guardian Weekly,4 Nov. 1990,p.6)
6 Exactlythe sameideological phenomenon is observedby Uli Windisch(1990) in his studyof Swissnationalism and xenophobia. He callsit'essentialism' and describes it asfollows: 'Every system of politicaland socialrepresentation is organisedaround essences, natures or noumenawhich are regardedas, by nature, transcendent,unalterable and historical."(p. 40) What we call feature clusteringis identifiedby Windischas follows: 'This verycommon mechanism results in the creation of systemsof objects,properties and valueswhich can be definedas 'crystallised,'as eachelement in the systemis linked to anotherby ideologicalassociation: $ a7) 360 JanBlommaert & Jef Verschueren
"[...]the Turkish-speakingseparatist Gagauzminority [...]" (Guardian Weekly, 11 Nov. 1990,p. 6)
"[...] the Turkish-speakingGagauz [...]" (The Guardian, 1 Nov. 1990,p. 4; The Guardian, 12 Nov. 1990,p.4)
"[...] d" Gagaoezen,een Turkstaligeminderheid [...] (NRC Handelsblad,2 Nov. 1990,p. 5) [<...> theGagauz, a Turkish-speaking minority <...>]
The feature clustering underlying group identification is such a powerful cognitive mechanismthat knowledgeabout one feature is assumedto be enough,especially when it concerns language.As a result, groups that are distinguishedsolely on the basis of a distinct language are often treated as 'real' ethnic groups. And as such, they can be presented as being involved in inter-ethnic conflicts,even if their unity along the other parametersof the expectedfeature cluster does not stand up to scrutiny:
"[rs violencesentre Moldaves et russophones<...>." ([, Monde, 6 Nov. 1990,p. 8) pne violencebetween Moldavians and Russian-speakers <...>I 'Russian-speakers' In this report, (referred to alternatingly as minoit€ russe or minoritt russophone)are placed on a par with the Moldaviansand the Gagauz.Here we see the dynamics of feature clustering at work. Though 'Russians' (the least- preferred denominator in this report) could be reasonablyassumed to share some 'Russian-speakers' common aspectsof ethnicity, can obviously be no more than a residual category,an extremely heterogeneousgroup of people who may come from all over the Soviet Union, united only by the fact that they speak Russian (though it is certain that not all of them speakit as their mother tongue,and though even this feature does not clearly distinguish them from the other groups, as will be shown below), and by the fact that they cannot be labeled as ethnic Moldavians or Gagauz.But neverthelessthe'Russian-speakers' are presented,in direct opposition with Moldavians and Gagauz, as an equally solid ethnic unit. This misrepresentationof the socialformations involved in the conflict clearly hampers a fair understanding of what goes on in Moldavia: by applying familiar categories,the impression of clear understandingis createdwhile in fact neither the authors nor the readers of the articles have any familiarity with the people talked about. This is further illustrated by another characteristicof our data: after language has been introduced as a categorizing criterion, distinctive features other than language may be dragged in as soon as they are known, irrespective of whether in reality they play an identi$ing or distinguishingrole or not. This leads to strange descriptionssuch as the following.
"[...] de Gagaoezen-- een aan de Turken verwantechristelijke minderheid - - [...]." (NRC Handelsblad.5 Nov. 1990,p 4.) [<...> the Gagauz-- a Christian minorityrelated to theTurks -- <...>.1
Thus our data show the emergenceof religion as a further identiffing feature of the The role of language in European nationalist ideologies 36I
Gagauza few days after the first reports, though christianityin itself is preciselynot a minoritytrait in Moldavia. It may even be more surprising that this language-basedidentification is maintainedthough the distinguishingtrait is almost in the same breath denied or downplayed.
"They [the Moldavians] claim the Gagauz are strongly Russianised;most speak Russian rather than Turkish and support Russian interests."(The Guardian, 1 Nov. 1990,p. 4)
Thoughthis again castsdoubt on the legitimacyof a movement (centeredaround peoplewho have betrayed themselvesby adopting another language),we'll come backto this examplebelow to demonstratefurther aspectsof the linguisticframing of nationalism. Before going on, let us briefly point out that the clustering of language, descent,history, culture and religion,the strengthof which we have been trying to demonstrate,is evenextended to economicposition. Remember the followingquote:
"Die ethnisch-rassischeKoexistenz scheint zu gelingensolange die Wirtschaft einigermassenfloriert." (Die Zeit, 9 Nov. 1990,p.7) [Ethnic-racialmexistence seems to work as long as the economy is somewhat successful.]
The relationshipbetween (multi-)ethnicity and economicprosperity is a topic which deservesmore than the few lineswe can spendhere. In general,there seemsto be an intuitive, almost automatic, associationbetween the rise of nationalism and economic problems. Thus a weak economy is a much favored excuse for manifestationsof racism.But if economicfactors can trigger interethnic conflicts, ethnicgroups must be seenas socio-economicallyundifferentiated wholes which act and react en masseunder economic pressure.'The economy,which may soothe slumberinginterethnic conflicts in timesof generalprosperity, is seenas flexibleand unstable,whereas ethnicity is seen as a stable and timeless element of social stratification,a stratificationwhich largely coincides with socio-economicdifferences.
Thedffirent faces of homogeneism
Sincethe discontinuities-- to pursue the lexicalsemantics metaphor further -- are
t The main exceptionto this rule seemsto be the attempt,in official Europeanrhetoric, to explainaway racism and to preservethe Europeanself-image of toleranceby demonstratingthat expressionsof racism are restrictedto the lower socio-economicclasses and that a weak socio- economicstatus is itself the cause.(See Blommaert & Verschueren1991.) But this is just one manifestationof anotherrule: that it is easierto perceivesignificant distinctions in one'sown group thanin other groups.The phenomenonindicated here also explains the occurrence,in our restricted corpus,of a long article (liliderdie falschen Apostel,Die 7,eit,9 Nov. 1990,pp. 54-56)in which an attemptis madeto define 'normal nationalism,'and in which economicproblems are presentedas a risk factorwhich maytransform normal nationalism into xenophobia. Jan Blommaert & Jef Verschueren defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions which are so strongly clustered that even one of them may be sufficient to characterizea group entity, homogeneity (emphasizingthe necessityof the necessaryand sufficient conditions) 'nations' 'peoples') is the norm within the discontinuities(i.e. the or thus defined. Since such a view is so obviouslynaive, adherenceto it would be most passionately denied by the authors of most of the reports discussedwhen challengedabout this. But here we touch upon a deeply engrained dogma which is very coherently -- though mostly implicitly -- presentin discourseabout interethnic conflicts.Elsewhere (in Blommaert & Verschueren 1991)we have called it the dogma of homogeneism: a view of society in which differencesare seen as dangerousand centrifugal, and in 'best' which the society is suggestedto be one without intergroup differences. In other words, the ideal model of societyis mono-lingual,mono-ethnic, mono-religious,mono-ideological. Nationalism, interpreted as the struggleto keep 'pure' groups as and homogeneousas possible,is consideredto be a positive attitudewithin the dogmaof homogeneism.Pluri-ethnic or pluri-lingualsocieties are seen as problem-prone,because they require forms of state organizationthat run counter to the 'natural' characteristicsof groupingsof people.This dogma appears to dominate Belgian (and European) immigrant policies(again, see Blommaert & Verschueren 1991),and -- as will be further demonstratedbelow -- it is used as an interpretive frame (with the Soviet Union as evidence and example) even for situationsoutside of Europe in our corpus:
"Wie in die Sowjetunion stellt sich auch in Indien die frage, ob ein Riesenreich,das aus derartigvielen ethnischen,religiosen, sprachlichen und kulturellenSplittern zusammengesetzt ist, zusammengehalten werden kann." (Die Zeit,16 Nov. 1990,p. 11) [Asin theSoviet Union, the question also poses itself for Indiawhether a giantempire consisting of sucha plethoraof ethnic,religious, linguistic and cultural fragments can be held together.l
The conceptualsystematicity with which the norm of homogeneityturns language itself into an interethnic battlefieldwill be discussedin section3. of this paper. Though the norm of homogeneityis demonstrablypresent across Europe, the criteria along which homogeousnations are defined differ substantially.lrt us briefly look at some of the different forms of expressionthe norm can take. We find it in its purest ethnic form in the German press,where das Volk is systematically contrasted with die Bevolkerurg: the people vs. the population. For instance, the caption accompanyinga picture with Turkish immigrantsreads:
"Soll nur das Volk oder die Bevolkerungauf kommunaler Ebene politisch mitentscheidendi.irfen? Ttirken auf einem SPD-festin Berlin-Kreuzberg." (Die Zeit, 9 Nov. 1990,p.7) lSnouldonly the people or thepopulation participate in politicaldecisions at the municipallevel? Turks at a SPD-meetingin Berlin-Kreuzberg.l
Overtly, a clear position of toleranceis advocated:
"Deutschland wird, wie in der Geschichteschon oft, die Ausliinder, die 'integrieren."' gekommensind und bleibenwollen, (FranKurter Allgemeine, The role of language in European nationalist ideologies 363
'integrate' 2 Nov. 1990,p.1) [Germanywill, asoften before in history, foreignerswho havecome and want to stay.l
Yet this claim is embedded in a plea for preservingvoting rights at the municipal level for Staatsbilrger(citizens)and against giving them to Bewohner or Einwohner (inhabitants).That the plea is not so much intendedto protect all thosewho have acquiredGerman citizenship,but mostly ethnic Germans, is made abundantly -- if unwittingly-- clear:
"Mithin ist es konsequent, dass in Deutschland namcns des Begriffs der Demokratie [...] Versuche abgewehrtworden sind, die Begriffe Nation und Staat voneinander z! trennen und sie damit aufzulosen." (FranKurter Allgemeine, 2 Nov. 1990,p.1) [Thereforeit is logicalthat in Germany,in the name of democracy<... > attemptshave been thwarted to tearthe notions nation and state apart and hence to annihilate them.l
The author continues:
"Bisher is nichts Uberzeugendesgesagt worden dariiber, das die Verwischung des Begriffs der tiber die Staatsbiirgerschaftverfiigenden Angehorigen einer Nation, die in der HandlungseinheitStaat iiber sichselbstbestimmen, irgendwelche Vorteile habe. t...] Demokratie braucht fesst umrissene Einheiten." (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2 Nov. 1990, p.1) [So far, norhing convincinghas been said to showthat it wouldhave any advantages to eliminate the mncept of a 'nation'with dependentspossessing citizenship and determining their own fate within theaction unit 'state.'Democracy needs clearly defined units.l
In the context of this article, the author does not leave any doubt that those /essr umrisseneEinheiten are nation-states,the homogeneity of which should not be broken: to the extent that immigrants are tolerable as participants in social and political life, they have to be 'integrated.' But it is exactly at this juncture that the paradox -- or the deadly logic -- of a nationalistideology becomesclear. The definition of das Volk in terms of a feature 'integration'impossible, clustermakes as much as it requiresthat process.As soon as an Einwohner or member of the Bevolkerunghas adapted to one parameter of Germanhood, any other feature may be arbitrarily focused on to preserve the difference.Thus language is only one feature in the cluster. Just as German Jews (evenif indistinguishablein other respects)lacked the proper genetics,any migrant worker fluent in German and respectingall German laws and rules of public life, may still be stuck with the wrong descent,historical background,looks, religion: he or she cannot become a member of das Volk; his or her presenceinevitably breaks 'natural the groupings'of people,the homogeneityof nations,the strictlyseparable unitsneeded for democracy.Just considerthe categoriesintroduced in the following sentence:
"Nur gebiirtigeDeutsche und diejenigen,die ihnenkraft'Volkszugehorigkeit' oder durch spiiteren Erwerb des Staatsangehorigkeitgleichgestellt sind, 364 Jan Blomntaert & Jef Verschueren
dtirfen wahlen -- [...]."(Die Zeit,9 Nov. 1990,p. 7) lontythose born as Germans andthose who havebeen given the same rights on the basisof their 'membershipin the people'orlater naturalization, are allowed to vot€-- ....>.1
Of the two categorieswho have to be giventhe rightswhich thoseborn as Germans 'naturally,' have the first group (including the Aussiedler,descendants of earlier German emigrants)are immediatelydefined as belongingto das Volk. The second group will probably never make it: their children will be second-generation immigrants, not really gebilnigeDeutsche. In contrast to the German emphasison an ethnic definition of.das Volk (in terms of language,descent, culture, etc.), the French version of homogeneism stresses the importance of territoriality. The difference in emphasis has clear historicalroots. The German questfor a nation-statewas considerablyfacilitated by the spread of German dialects across a large part of Europe. Though only few people activelyused a commonlanguage of culture,politically the geographicalarea in question had been so fragmented that languagewas not only a useful, but virtually the only possible, focus for unity. Moreover, by the time of German unification in the secondhalf of the nineteenthcentury, European nationalismwas taking a linguisticturn (expressed,i.a., in the insertion of a languagequestion in national censuses).By contrast, when France needed to identify le peuple after the French revolution,the French languagewas no more than an administrativemeans for state-widecommunication, a languagewhich was shared (even in its dialectal variants) by less than 50 Va of the population. As a result, the search for self- identification led to a reification of France itself as a natural and indivisibleentity, 'people' the French consistingof everyoneliving in its territory. Though from the mid-nineteenthcentury onwards France has been'successful'in imposing the French languageand reducingthe size of all its linguisticminorities, even today 'linguistic nationalism'is seenas a distinct type of nationalismwith which the French do not ideologicallyassociate themselves. Thus a senseof bemusementis hardlysuppressed in an article on Les forcen€s du nationalisme linguistique slovaque [The fanatics of Slovak linguisticnationalism]:
"Gr6vistesde la faim, ils campentdevant le Conseilnational slovaque depuis le vote, jeudi 25 octobre, d'une loi drigeantle slovaqueen langue officielle de la Slovaquie."(1, Monde, 1 Nov. 1990,p. 7) gnesehunger strikers have been camping outside the Slovak national Council since the vote, on Thursday October 25, which made Slovak the official language of Slovakia.]
Thus having introduced the event ambiguously,leaving open the interpretation that the plusieursdizaines de jeunes (severaldozens of young people) who are conducting a hunger strike, are protesting the new law passedby the forcen4s (fanatics) of linguisticnationalism, the author then catchesthe reader by surprise:
"Pour eux, cette loi est trop laxiste: [...]." [For them, this law is too permissive:.<...t.l
The hunger strikers are themselvesthe fanatics.They do not only want Slovak to The role of language in European nationalist ideologies
be the official language,they want to take away any linguistic rights that the Hungarian,Gypsy, Polish, Ukrainian and German minoritieswithin Slovakiamight have. In spite of this expressionof astonishmentconcerning the lack of tolerance for linguisticdiscontinuity in the Slovakcase, the territoriallybased French version of nationalismhas as much trouble acceptingdiscontinuities: within its borders, Franceis one.This is clearlyexpressed in the debateover Corsicanseparatism, and 'Corsican in particularthe official acceptanceof the very notion of a people.' That a debateover the fact that Le gouvemementreconnatt I'existence d'un "peuplecorse" (Lr Monde, 2. Nov. 1990,p. 1) governmentrecognizes the existenceof a 'Corsican [The people'] is at all necessary,and is treated as front-pagenews, is already significant.But the phrasingof that recognitionis symptomaticof the Frenchversion of homogeneism:
"M. Mitterrand est intervenu pour que la notion de 'peuple corse' soit 'composante retenue en tant que du peuple franEais'."(lr Monde, 2 Nov. 'Ccrsican 1990,p. 1) [M. Mitterrandhas defended the acceptanceof the notionof a people'as a 'componentof theFrench people'.]
In spiteof this rhetorical attempt to avert discontinuity,questions are raisedabout the constitutionalityof the government decision, and even about its logical possibility;and it is ridiculed as le modClepolyndsien (the Polynesianmodel), with referenceto earlier decisionsconcerning French Polynesia. The French pressavoids anyreference to what the German pressidentifies an an underlyingproblem for thosewho are disturbedby the decision:
"Siesehen voraus, dass wo ein Volk ist, auch ein Staat sein mrisse,und sie befiirchten,dass nach dem korsischenauch ein 'bretonisches,'ein'baskisches' 'elsdssisches oder sogarein Volk'Anspriiche erhebenkonnte." (Frankfurter Allgemeine,2 Nov. 1990,p. 6) lfneyanticipate that where there is a people,there 'Bretonic,' 'Basque' must also be a state, and they fear that after the Corsicansalso a a or 'Alsatian even an people' c Corsicannationalists are reportedlysatisfied, while the most avid oppositioncomes from Le Pen's Front national: "Le Front national "souligne les responsabilit€ [sic] que prendraient les parlementaires,les fonctionnaires ou, mAme,Ies citoyensqui attenteraientoux liens instittrtionnels qui placent la Corse dans la R€publique et aw droits histoiques et morau^xde la patie franEaiseen Corse.""(Le Monde, 3 Nov. 1990, p. 8) [TheFront national "emphasizes the responsabilities that would be takenby those represenlatives, functionaies or even citizens who would make an attempt on the instiutional ties which place Corsica within the Republic and on the histoical and moral ights of the French fatherland in Corsica.") Here againwe find a fundamentalparadox of nationalism:though groundedin the 'existing' observationof differences,once a separate entity has been defined, Jan Blommaert & Jef Verschueren nationalism is unable to recognizethe legitimacyof any smaller-scale(or larger) group identities.8 The data from the British presscontain remarkably few referencesto ethnic or linguisticdiversity within Britain. Still, one smallarticle in The Guardian (entitled Welsh militants utge supportersto breed children 'for the cause') tells a lot. In this article, a meeting of Welsh nationalistsis reported.One of their leadersis said to have pleaded for Welshmen to have as many children as possible, so as to perpetuate the Welsh language,in the following terms: "If you cannot speak Welsh, you carry the mark of the Englishman with you every day. That is the unpleasanttruth." (The Guardian, 12 Nov. 1990,p. 1) Objectively,this is strong radicalstatement, revealing a degreeof fanaticismmostly associatedwith radical nationalists.The meeting could, therefore, easilybe taken seriously.But the oppositehappens. The tone of the entire article is mildly ironical. The proposal to breed children in order to perpetuate the Welsh language is ridiculed. Moreover, the article ends with the suggestionthat this proposal is 'Mutterkre\z' reminiscent of the German Nazi -- a suggestionwhich is strongly rejected by the speaker.But even this comparison,grave as it may sound on the surface,is basicallyironic. Nationalism (or even more generally,ethnic diversity), at least within the UK, is treated as folklore: it is not to be taken seriouslyas a political movementin Britain. Welsh activistsare sketchedas picturesque,romantic people, who cherishold customsand valuesin a harmlessway -- harmlessbecause of the strength of the centralized,English-speaking state. In Belgium, homogeneismis most manifest in the domain of immigrant politics.That the Flemishand the Walloonsrun their own business,quite separately, is taken for granted (to the point where even arms salescan become a regional matter). Real problems of diversity(and the resultingdestabilization) are caused only by the presenceof immigrantsfrom Maghrebineor Mediterranean descent. Although the presenceof these foreign elements in Belgian society is officially 'cultural declaredto be a form of enrichment'(invoking a suggestionof tolerance and openness from the Belgian side), a detailed analysis (see Blommaert & 'enriched' Verschueren 1991) reveals that Belgian society wants to be only in domainssuch as exotic cuisine,exotic music and dance-- in sum, folklore. Socially, culturally, and linguistically,if not religiously,immigrants should 'integrate' or de- ethnicizethemselves, to the point where,as one governmentparty's policy document on immigrantsstates, "Migrants shouldbecome Flemish." An intriguing side-effect, but one which cannot be elaborated within the scope of this paper, is the observationthat in the discourseabout immigrantsin Belgium,the age-olddivision between Flemish and Walloons seemsto vanish.The formulation of an attitude towardsimmigrant minoritieshas causedthe (re)constructionof a common Belgian " Uli Windisch(1990) reports that Swissnationalism has the sameprofile asFrench nationalism, being based necessarily-- becauseof the diversityof the people living in the country -- on territoriality. Thus Swiss nationalistscannot understandJura separatismbecause 'The only sociologicaldivision they recogniseis that basedon nationalfrontiers: '[within Switzerland]there aren'tany frontiers,we're all Swiss'.'(p. 57) Therole of languagein Europeannationalist ideologies 367 identity,thus allowingtwo clearlydefined (and supposedlyhomogeneous) groups to 'Belgians' form the core structure of a Belgian immigrant policy: as opposed to 'lmmigrants.' Needlessto say that neither is, or has ever been, a homogeneous group. Of nations and tribes 'nations' Very little disagreementseems to exist with regard to the reality of in Europe.As demonstratedabove, the'nation'is presentedas a natural,objective and almostbiological unit. People are divided on the basisof sex,age, and nation. In 'reality' spiteof the generaltendency in our data to acceptthe existence-- in -- of 'nations,' explicit statementson the subjectare rare. Treating this reality as self- evidenteffectively hides the fact that it rarely stands up to scrutiny. A potentially classicalexample to disprove the existenceof objective criteria of nationhood is a comparisonbetween the Serbsand the Croats on the one hand, and the Flemish andthe Dutch on the other. In the Serbian-Croatcase, existing linguistic differences (underscoredby a different orthography) have become highly symbolic for the discontinuity,whereas in the Flemish-Dutch case (where the linguistic differences are of almost exactly the same type and degree) language is the main symbol of culturalunity. On all other counts,the differencesare completely analogousas well: e.g.,history (Ottoman rule for Serbiavs. Spanishrule for Flanders,resulting in long periods of political separation from Croatia and Holland, respectively); religion (Orthodoxvs. Catholic in the one case,Catholic vs. Protestant/Calvinistin the other).In spite of its obviousness,not a singleobservation of this kind can be found in the corpus. Interestingly,in the two explicit statementson the reality of nationswhich we havebeen able to find (one inside, and one outside the restricted corpus which is the startingpoint for the discussionin this article), a comparisonis volunteered 'tribes.' between nations or peoples in Europe and Consider the following observationfrom a Belgian newspaper: "Tijdens zijn jongste bezoek aan Duitsland heeft PresidentMitterrand met die Franse hooghartigheid die niet zelden wortelt in een gebrekkige dossierkennis,minachtend gewaarschuwd voor een 'Europe destribus'. Maar of dat het Franse staatshoofdnu bevalt of niet, het is een feit dat die 'volksstammen'bestddn, erkenning,zeggenschap en een eigen plaats eisen in het Europa dat naar verenigingstreeft." (De Standaard,27 Sept. 1991,p. 10) [Duringhis recent visit to Germany,President Mitterrand, displaying that French sense of superioritywhich is not rarelybased on beingill-informed, has warned with disdain 'Europe . against a of tribes.' But whether the French Head of State likes it or not, it is a fact 'tribes'exist, that these that they demand recognition, political participation and a place of their own in the Europe which is trying to reach unity.l 'tribes' The term has a clear connotation of primitivism and naturalness in this context.And while Mitterrand's use of the term may be seenas ironic, the reaction from the journalist supports the view on nationalism as based on a need for identitiesanalogous to groupingswhich are supposedto have come about quite 368 Jan Blontntaert& Jef Verschueren naturally and instinctivelyin the lessdeveloped regions of the world. The resurgence of nationalismis therefore normal: "Overal in Europa zien miljoenenmensen de kans schoonom oude dromen van kultureel zelfbestuur,zelfbeschikking en staatkundigeonafhankelijkheid waar te maken. De verdwijningvan de loden mantel die de kommunistische regimesover landenen volkerenhadden gelegd, heeft politieke en kulturele krachten vrijgemaakt die de komende decennia de landkaart van het kontinent kunnen hertekenen. [...] t.ang vergeten haarden van onrust en gevaar blijken nooit helemaal gedoofd te zijn geweest."(De Standaard,27 Sept. 1991,p. 10) [Everywherein Europe millions of peoplesee the opportunityto realizeold dreamsof cultural independence, self-determination and state autonomy. The disappearance of the cloak of lead spread out over countries and peoples by the communist regimes, has released cultural and political forces which can redraw the map of the continent in the coming decades. <... > [-ong forgotten centers of unrest and danger seem never to have vanished.l The author useshistory as the ultimate argumentfor'the reality of the nations of Europe. These nations (Lithuania,Ukraine, Moldavia,Croatia etc.) do not emerge as responsesto concretepolitical or socio-economicsituations -- they were always there, but they were suppressedby totalitarianstate systems (see section 3. below). Their reality is historical, and therefore objectively real. The same comparison,though in the opposite direction, is made in the opinion columns of the NRC Handelsblad (7 Nov. 1990,p. 9). The author, a 'tribes' professor of anthropology, arguesagainst the European view of African as homogeneous,traditionalistic groups with rigid group boundaries. An explicit 'peoples'is comparisonwith Europeannations or not at all centralto this well-taken argument. In the text itself it is introduced only indirectly: "In Europa, zo zeggenAfrikanen, spreekt men van volken; als men het over Afrika heeft gebruikt men het woord stammen.Daarmee is weer bevestigd hoe primitief Afrika is." (NRC Handelsblad,T Nov. 1990,p. 9) [In Europa, Africanssay, peoples are talkedabout; but as soonas Africa is the subject,the word tribes is used.This servesto reconfirmhow primitive Africa is.l But, maybe as a result of editorial intervention, the comparison is presented as the main focus of attention in the title: 'volkeren'getypeerd." "Wat in Afrika stammen heet, wordt in Europa als [Whatis calledtribes in Africa,is characterizedas'peoples' in Europe.] Furthermore, by stressingthat the view of African tribes which he arguesagainst, 'European' is a decidedly view, the author implicitly communicatesthat the properties he rejectsfor those African tribes are genuineproperties of European 'peoples' 'nations.' 'nations' or Moreover, that similar exist in Africa is made abundantlyclear by stressingthe unity of Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda,in terms of a familiar feature cluster: The role of language in European nationalist i.deologies "Zij leven door elkaar als leden van €6n samenleving,bezitten 66n en dezelfdecultuur en spreken66n taal."[They live together in onesociety, possess one and the same culture and speak one language.] 'nations' Thusagain the objectivereality of is emphasised.Nowhere does it come to mind that groups -- whereverthey are to be found -- have a stronglysubjective 'nations'such basis,that as Lithuania or the Ukraine are defined territorially more thanethnically, and that they are therefore almost without exceptionmulti-ethnic in populationstructure. Obviousuniversality Such comparisonsbetween Europe and the rest of the world emphasize the universalvalidity of a nationalist ideology. When criticism of patriotism or nationalismis voicedand reported on, there are clear markersof distancebetween theopinions described and a more generalpublic opinion.E.g. in a review of Peter Glotz's"Der Irrweg des Nationalstaats"we read: "[According to Glotz] Das Geschichtsbild mtisse europdisiert und Mehrsprachigkeitzum Bildungsprinzipgemacht werden. Kess spricht er von einer'HollandisierungDeitschlands' --ein Nationalbewusstseinohne jeden Bezugzu volkischen, rassischenoder SprachlichenElementen. Schonwar's. Das soll kein Spott sein.Es sindsolche Argumente, die Glotz in seinemquerkopfigen, anregenden, eigensinnigen Essay auch dazu bringen, ftir Bonn als Regierungssitzzu pliidieren."(DieZeit, Nov 9 7990,p. 16) [our historical perspectiveshould Implicitin this is a perceptionof Holland as a nation untrue to itself becauseof lack of attentionto real national identity and language.Strangely enough, Belgians tend to sharethis perception with the Germans.Thus the Antwerp mayor Cools takes everypossible opportunity to explain that Dutch would have been taken over by Frenchby now if it had not been for the Flemish.And after a recent colloquium on "Dutchin the World", a prominent linguistwrites the followingin an opinion article in De Standaard: "Voor zijn taakultuur zal Ylaanderenzich nu en in de toekomst moeten blijven richten naar het noorden: 15 miljoen geeft meer gewicht dan 5 miljoen. Maar voor de taalpolitiekis het anders.Daar zal Vlaanderen de bescheidenvoortrekkersrol [...] zonder meer naar zich toe moetentrekken. In Vlaanderen ziet men de noodzaakin van d" [...] instandhoudingen verbreiding[van het Nederlands],voor Nederlandis dat nog altijd een dubieuze zaak." (De Standaard,22 Oct. 1991,p. 7) [Forits languageculture, 370 Jan Blommaert & Jef Verschueren Flandershas to look to the northnow and in the future:15 million carries more weight than5 million.But for languagepolicies the situation is different. There Flanders will simply haveto assumeits modestpioneering role. In Flandersone seesthe needfor the preservationand spread Needlessto saythat the perceptionreflected in the aboveGerman and Belgiantexts 'the bears only on Dutch official rhetoric. Our data show that view from below' is not so different after all, and that the Germansand the Belgianscan rest assured that nothing emanatingfrom Holland will disturb their universallyvalid principles of social and political organization.Unfortunately, this cannot be meant ironically either. 3. Languagein the Empire Language as a battlefield Our data indicate that languagecreates identity and discontinuity.It unites and it divides. In the context of conflicts involving nationalist groups in Europe (and elsewhere), these opposite tendenciesturn language into the target and the battlefield of interethnic strife. Since languageis a distinctivefeature of 'natural' groups, and since it is an element of divisivenessbetween such groups,language can also be used as an object of oppressionand discrimination in contexts where interethnic differencesare not (or no longer) tolerated. Dominant in the framing of this role of languageis the metaphor of the 'Empire' 'national,' in connectionwith tensionsbetween a centralgovernment and 'Empire,' linguisticgroups. The in our corpus,mostly refers to the Soviet Union or to state systemsbased on the Soviet model. In all the examplesfound in our data, 'Empire' the tensionsbetween the and national or ethnic groups are presentedas resultingfrom the systematicdenial by the empire of legitimatelinguistic, cultural, and political rights.These minority groupsclaim the right to usetheir own language (or orthography),or to restoreor introduceits official statusas 'national language.' Since languageis seen as a natural characteristicof these groups, such rights are held sacredeven if the claims are uncompromisingand radical in nature. Linguisticdiscrimination by the SovietGovernment is evokedas an example in statementssuch as: "Their [the Kazakhs'] culture has been so defiled by the Bolshevikhsthat many Kazakhs do not even know how to speak any other languagethan Russian"(Guardian Weekly, 11 Nov. 1990,p. 18) "[...] u native Russian,Gennadi Kolbin, a party apparatchikwho spoke not a word of the Kazakh languageand had never been to the republic [of Kazakhstan]"(Guardian Weekly, 11 Nov. 1990,p. 18) Soviet oppression is said to have resulted not only in the loss of local language competenceamong oppressedpeoples in peripheralrepublics. It also resultedin The role of language in European nationalist ideologies 371 changesin languageattitudes and political partisanship: "The done thing, in the Soviet Ukraine, was to speak Russianif you became educated."(Guardian Weekly, 4 Nov. 1990,p. 9) "They claim that the Gagauzare stronglyRussianized; most speak Russian rather than Turkish and support Russianinterests." (The Guardian, 1 Nov. 1990,p. 4) The samepattern occursin Soviet sattelites,or in regimesthat have adopted the Sovietmodel. Serbia'scentralist attitude towards the Albanian population of the Kosovoregion is such a case: "The Albanian-languagepress and radio havebeen abolished". (International Herald Tribune, 12 Nov. 1990,p. 4) When anti-Soviet nationalist groups, once they have gained autonomy or independence,stretch their nationalist fervor to the point of oppressingother minoritieswithin their (supposedly)national territories, this is explainedas a direct consequenceof the repression and discrimination they have suffered: "Moldawiens Hysterie [...] ist eine Folge des jahrzehntelangenMoskauer Diktats, das der rumdnische Sprache sogar ein Kyrillisches Alphabet aufzwang."(Die Zeit 9 Nov. 1990,p. 1) [TheMoldavian hysteria is a consequence of the decennia-longMoscow regulation, which even imposed a Clrillic alphabeton the Rumanianlanguage.] In other words, the radicalism of newly autonomousor independent nationalist governmentsis not a product of their own ideology,but rather an understandable, yetpotentially dangerous, reaction to generations-longoppression by the totalitarian imperial authorities. These hyper-nationalistreactions, however, threaten the possibilitiesof future collaboration among newly autonomous regions: "Lrs violences entre Moldaves et russophones rev€tent un aspect potentiellementexplosif pour I'ensembledu pays."(Le Monde 6 Nov. 1990, p. 8) lnre violencebetween Moldavians and Russian-speakers hides a potentiallyexplosive situationfor thecountry as a whole.] The new forms of oppression often take the shape of legislation in favor of the majoritylanguage, banning other languages: "In return, the republic's[: Moldavia's]government would softena law that made Moldavian the national languageand required people in dozens of occupations to pass tests in Moldavian. The language law has stirred resentmentamong Russian speakers and the Gagauz."(International Herald Tribune, 5 Nov. 1990,p. 5) 372 JanBlommaert & Jef Verschueren "Pour eux [the Slovakhunger strikers protesting against a new languagelaw], cette loi est trop laxiste:elle autoriseI'usage des languesminoritaires dans les bureauxet servicesdans les regionsou lesdiverses minorites de Slovaquie comptent plus de 207ode la populationlocale." ([, Monde, 1 Nov. 1990,p. 7) lnor them,this law is too permissive:it allows the use of minoritylanguages in offices andservices in regionswhere the various minorities in Slovakiamake up morethan zOVo of thelocal populationl These new forms of oppressionare supportedby standardnationalist arguments associatingnational territory with national language.These argumentsare, in our data, alwayspresented as direct quotations: "l-orsque je rentre dans un magasin dans le Sud [de la Slovaquie], on m'aborde en hongrois.Pourtant, je suissur ma terre natale."(k Monde, 1 Nov. 1990,p.7) [WhenI entera shopin theSouth "Maar waarom zijn er op de Israelischetelevisie wel programma'sin het Arabisch en niet in het Russisch?We zijn nu toch in ons eigenland?" (NRC Handelsblad, 7 Nov. 1990,p. 4) [Butwhy are there programs in Arabicon Israeli televisionand none in Russian?We are in our owncountry after all? Though the ultimate absurdity of this cycle of oppressionis not hidden by the reports,the underlyingassumption of the legitimacyof eachgroup's preoccupations is never challenged. Natural resistanceand democrac"t At an abstract level, these examplesinvoke the image of an empire, consistingof a wide variety of linguistic,ethnic, religious, and cultural groups,most of which are oppressedby the unitarianismof the centralstate. Because the empire is oppressive, and because its oppression is directed against features which are absolute, inalienablecharacteristics of natural groups,the resistanceof thesegroups is seen as necessarilylegitimate. The struggle can only be conceptualizedin terms of liberationor'freedom' movements. It is only natural that people revolt when they are deprived of their own languageand culture. Consequently,the natural,normal and desiredsociety is one in which these forms of oppressionare absent:the nation-statein which people sharing one language,culture, religion and historylive togetherwithin a sovereign state system.Here again,we find homogeneismas the underlyingpremisse. The argumentin favor of homogeneismremains complex and often obscure. In relation to Eastern Europe, it is blendedwith the discourseof anti-communism. 'natural The resistance' movements are directed against (the remnants of) communistrule. By a remarkableand largelyimplicit rhetoricaltwist, which defines communismas againsthuman nature,East-European nationalism thus becomesan equivalent of democratization.The linguisticand cultural liberation of the East- European peoplesis at the core of the political liberation of the communistworld, The role of language in European nationalist ideologies 373 becausenationalist revolt in the communist empire is aimed at liberating the 'natural'human group from unnaturalcommunist rule.e 'giant In other contexts(such as the empire' India, or minority problems in Belgium),the argumentis strippedof its anticommunistconnotations, and reduced 'normality.'The to its supposed'naturalness' or backboneof the argument is thus the sole assumptionthat different people do not like to live together, and that successfulsociety-building requires as high a degree of similarity as possibleamong the people. The conceptualproblems involved should be clear.First, homogeneismas a view of society rules out a number of social considerations. Class difference, socioeconomicstatus, or social mobility do not come up as factors of social coherenceor conflict, except as properties of complete groups which correspond to the 'natural' criteria for identifying and separatingthem in the building of a peaceful,harmonious society. This is, to saythe least,a partial picture obscuredby - - admittedlypersuasive but necessarilymistaken -- monocausalism.Second, the directassociation of (homogeneistic)nationalism with democracyand freedom is certainlynot warranted by the facts, neither synchronicallynor historically. Nationalismhas been a notorious causeof conflicts,and has led to some of the 'liberated'Moldavians worstevents in history.Also, the and Kazakhsor Slovaks,as well as the liberated East-Germans,seem to be building a track record of oppressionand racismagainst minorities. Every minorityhas its own minorities.And for membersof minority groups,be they immigrantsin WesternEurope, or Gagauz peoplein Moldavia, the 'national' government may be as bad as the empire, becausein both casesvery little attention is given to their linguistic,cultural or whateverrights. Only the structural level of the debate has shifted. Nothing has beenachieved to guaranteemore democracyin a pluralist sense. Multilingualism and tolerance Still,nationalism is seenas a'natural'development anchored in linguisticand ethnic identities,a powerful liberationmovement, the excessesof which are basedon anger andfrustration. Our data suggestan intriguingside-aspect of the role of language in this process.In three articles,two about the Israeli-Palestinianconflict in Israel andone on Serbiannationalism, reference is made to individualmultilingualism as the oppositeof fanaticism.The intriguingpoint is that this referenceis made in a negativesense: even tolerant individualswho speak several languagesfluently becomefanatics. The orthodoxbishop of Serbia,Amphilochios, a Serbianextremist, issaid to speakfluent German (FrankfurterAllgemeine 6 Nov. 1990,p. 16).So here is an educatedpolyglot who servesa causewhich is mostly associatedwith lower- o Some recent scholarship about the Soviet Union sharesthe same assumptions.Thus Diuk & Karatnycky(1990) say:'Yet all these current tensions [in the Soviet Union] arise from a common source--theimperial nature of the Soviet Union." (p. t6) Their book is a perfect example of 'hidden unshakablebelief in the fundamental reality of the Soviet Union's separableand authentic nations.'Their holy rights to self-determinationare strongly advocatedand "the idea that the non- Russiannational movements are anti-democratic and zenophobic" (p. 39) is discarded as a new Westernmyth-in-the-making. How could they be? 374 Jan Blommaert & Jef Verschueren class,poorly educatedmonomaniac masses. The samepoint is made with reference to some well-educatedPalestinian highschool students, and a Jewishbusinessman who has worked with Arab personnel for years.The schoolboyshave participated in the violent demonstrationsfollowing the Temple Mountain shootings;the Jewish shopkeeperdoes not trust his Arab employeesanymore. "Although such vows are extreme, these boys do not look or sound like 'Muslim fanatics'. Christian Brothers, they are polite and well spoken, able to express themselvesin English, French and Arabic." (International Herald Tribune, 6 Nov. 1990,p. 7) "Mr. Samar was born in Tel Aviv to parents who came from Iraq and he speaks fluent Arabic. In the last election he voted for a centrist party." (International Herald Tribune, 2 Nov. 1990,p. 5). The picture that emergeshere is the following. The strugglefor legitimate national 'intelligent'and rights is such a central human interestthat it eclipseseven practical solutions,such as learning the languageof one's counterpart.That means that a conflict between people based upon nationalist feelings is a fundamental conflict, one which cannot be remedied by slight forms of accommodation between the parties involved. In these referencesto the failure of individual multilingualism as a solution to interethnic conflicts residesa powerful suggestionabout the nature of nationalism.It appearsas both an emotionalirrational matter and as a respectable phenomenon. The shortcomingsof languagelearning, or education at large, as potential solutionsfor interethnicconflicts demonstrate that nationalismis basedon the fundamental,natural, need for a homogeneoussociety. Man's political instinct, so to speak, directs him towards homogeneism.Quid erat demonstrandum. 4. Conclusions Our corpus displaysa remarkable consistencywith regard to these assumptions. Homogeneismseems to be a widespreadideological premise, underlying much of the opinions reflected in or guided by the European newspaperpress. We find a primitive political theory underlying seeminglytrivial statements and suggestions about the role of language in nationalism. This theory revolves around the impossibilityof heterogeneouscommunities, and the naturalnessof homogeneous communities,the Volk. This theory also rationalizesanticommunism, not in terms of an ideologicalcritique, not even in terms of an economiccritique, but in terms of the supposedlyunnatural characterof the communistsystem. Nationalism thus provides the ultimate evidencefor the just causeof the Cold War. The Cold War did not concern political-economicdetails, it was about fundamental,natural rights such as the right to use one's mother tongue. The way in which the role of languagein nationalistideology is presentedis largely political. The role of language as an element in feature clusters, 'natural', correspondingto objectivepolitical units, which makesit a mobilizingforce The role of langtage in European nationalist ideologies 375 in interethnic conflicts, obliterates the primarily social dimension of language. language may equally characterizeall members of one ethnic group, within that ethnicgroup its resourcesmay be unevenlydistributed along sociallines, as so much empiricalsociolinguistic work has demonstrated.But the feature clusterof 'culture' or'ethnicity' functions as a powerful frame of reference.lrss romantic (and maybe lesseasily accessible) factors virtually disappearfrom the picture,or their relevance is gravelydownplayed. The way in which Ianguageis presentedin the overallreporting on nationalist ideologiesin Europe reveals a decidedly unsophisticatedfolli view. Although our analysisin this paper was basedon a relatively small set of data, we believe to have 'view demonstratedthe usefulnessof a systematicsearch for the from below' by meansof a pragmatic analysisof patterns of wording. If applied with methodological rigor to larger sets of data, w€ believe that this type of analysiscan provide an empiricaltool for the investigationof elusivephenomena such as ideologies,public opinion,and ideas. If nothing else, this brief study may have revealed a significant discrepancy betweenan aspect of popular languageideology and the way in which language ii usedin multilingual societies.As demonstratedby Woolard (1989) in connection with bilingualismin Catalonia, languagechoice is highly symbolicand languageshift is often motivated by the dynamicsof socialmobility. In popular ideology (no1 to be confusedwith public ideology) however, language tends to be a much more fundamental,even natural and inalienable,aspect of ethnicityor group identity in general. References Adams,Karen L. & Daniet T. Brink (eds.)(1990) Perspectives on Olftcial Engti:h: The campaignfor Englishas the oficial langtage of the LJSA.Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Anderson,Benedict (1983) Imagined communities: Reflections on the originand spreadof nationalism. lnndon: Verso. Barth,Fredrik(ed.) (1982)Ethnic groups and boundaies:The social organization of culrurediferences. Oslo:Universitetsforlaget. 'The Blommaert,Jan & Jef Verschueren(1991) pragmaticsof minority politics in Belgium." Languagein Sociery20(g:503-531. Diuk, Nadia & Adrian Karatnycky(1990) Thehidden nations: The peopte challenge the Sovietlhnion. NewYork: William Morrow and Company. Hobsbawm,E.J. (1990) Nations and nationalismsince 17E0: hogramme, myth, realiq'. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. Windisch,Uli (1990) Speechand reasoningin everydaytife. Cambridge:C:mbridge University press. Woolard,Kathryn A. (1989) Double talk: Bilingtalism and the politicsof ethniciryin Catalonia. Stanford:Stanford University Press.