Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
Susan Elizabeth Crangle Vdovichenko, M.A.
Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Languages and Literatures
The Ohio State University
Professor Ludmila Isurin, Advisor
Professor Brian Joseph
Professor Daniel Collins
Susan Elizabeth Crangle Vdovichenko
The people of Ukraine are divided by politics, culture, and language. The Dnipro river, which cuts through the country, separates not only east from west, but also a region with a Russian-speaking majority from one with a Ukrainian-speaking majority. This has been the situation for centuries, although in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union the politics of language have become more heated. In the west, nationalism is strong, and
Ukrainian tends to be seen as a part of the cultural history of the people. In the east,
Russian has been considered the language of the educated, while Ukrainian is often still perceived as a language suitable for only villages.
After nearly a century of widely varying linguistic policies and customs,
Ukrainian was declared the sole official language of Ukraine in 1991. Two decades later, language issues remain critical. Ukrainian had been perceived by many as substandard, and in some parts of Ukraine, negative stereotypes about Ukrainian and its speakers remain; conversely, positive ideology is increasing, connecting Ukrainian to patriotism and culture. In a highly bilingual society, communication is rarely at stake. Instead, the way an individual identifies himself affects his attitudes toward others. At the same time, the way that each language is treated, and the power inherently connected in that treatment, further complicates the way people perceive linguistic differences. Using the
ii results of 101 surveys solicited in Ukraine in 2009, this paper examines existing attitudes of native Russian speakers toward Ukrainian and its speakers; linguistic ideology and its affect on attitudes; and beliefs about the importance of maintaining Russian in an increasingly Ukrainian-speaking country. Results are compared across geography, age, basis of self-identification, and ideological beliefs. Quantitative and qualitative data are used to fully illustrate the current linguistic situation. Findings include heightened positive attitudes toward Ukrainian for younger speakers and those who live in Kyiv, and a strong correlation between the way that people identify themselves and the attitudes they hold toward language. Additionally, those who believe in the current ideology aimed at Ukrainian have increasingly positive attitudes toward Ukrainian, and there is some evidence of increasing pressure to speak Ukrainian on the youngest generation, which may lead to a risk of language loss.
Dedicated to my daughter, Sofia Jeanne Sergeevna Vdovichenko
I am continuously grateful for the exceptional intellectual support, encouragement, and enthusiasm that I receive from my advisor, Ludmila Isurin. Without her constant guidance, this dissertation would not have been possible. I thank her for her patience, her dedication, and her expertise in guiding my work. I thank committee members Brian Joseph and Daniel Collins for providing suggestions and support during my journey. They are extraordinary scholars, and have been wonderful resources.
The participants of my study were, of course, instrumental to this work, and I am grateful for their willingness to lend their time. I feel incredibly lucky to be surrounded by a cohort of graduate students which has always been supportive, and my time at OSU left me with a group of amazing colleagues, but perhaps more importantly, close friends.
My parents, Bob and Jeanne Crangle, have supported me every step of the way.
They instilled in me an intellectual curiosity at a young age, and pushed me to reach as far as I could imagine. My husband, Sergei Vdovichenko, has been my number one supporter, and I am thankful for his presence every day. Our daughter, Sofia, did everything that she could to help the process along, including being the impetus to travel to Ukraine a year earlier than expected.
I am tremendously fortunate, and I am grateful.
June 2001……………………………………B.A. Linguistics, Dartmouth College
June 2008……………………………………M.A. Slavic and East European Languages
and Literatures, The Ohio State University
Spring 2009….……………………………..Graduate Associate Teaching Award, The
Ohio State University
Spring 2009…………………………………Graduate Teaching Fellow, The Ohio State
Spring 2009.………………………………...Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award,
The Ohio State University
Winter 2010…………………………………Ray Travel Award, The Ohio State
Winter 2010…………………………………Arts & Humanities Small Grants recipient,
The Ohio State University
Fall 2010…………………………………….Post-Prospectus Research Award, The Ohio
Spring 2010…………………………………Talvi Endowment Fund Recipient, The Ohio
Spring 2010…………………………………2nd place, Edward F. Hayes Graduate
Research Forum, The Ohio State University
Fields of Study
Major Field: Slavic and East European Languages and Literatures
Table of Contents
Abstract ...... ii
Dedication ...... iv
Vita ...... vi
List of Tables ...... xiv
List of Figures ...... xviii
Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1
1.1 Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine ...... 3
1.2 Earlier Scholarship ...... 8
1.3 Research Question and Major Hypothesis ...... 11
Chapter 2: Pilot Study ...... 16
2.1 Methodology ...... 17
2.2 Prevailing Arguments and Stereotypes ...... 18
2.2.1 Argument #1: Ukrainian is a “peasant language” ...... 19
2.2.2 Argument #2: Ukrainian is simply a dialect of Russian ...... 21
2.2.3 Argument #3: Ukrainian sounds offensive ...... 23
2.2.4 Argument #4: Giving official status to Ukrainian causes a rift amongst
Ukrainians ...... 25
2.2.5 Argument #5: Ukrainian is not my native tongue, why should I have to use it?
2.3 Conclusion ...... 29
Chapter 3: Methodology ...... 32
3.1 Site of the study ...... 32
3.2 Materials: survey ...... 35
3.3 Procedure: Data collection ...... 36
3.4 Data analysis ...... 37
Chapter 4: Identity ...... 38
4.1 Identity ...... 39
4.1.1 Social identity theory ...... 39
4.1.2 The application of social identity theory ...... 41
4.2 Language and language attitudes in identity formation ...... 44
4.2.1 Language and social identity theory ...... 45
4.2.2 Language Attitudes and Identity ...... 47
4.3 Identity Negotiation in a Multilingual Context ...... 49
4.4 Stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes ...... 51
4.4.1 Stigma ...... 51
4.4.2 Language Discrimination ...... 54
4.4.3 Linguistic Stereotypes ...... 56
4.5 Language, identity, and the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine ...... 58
4.5.1 Relevant Research Questions ...... 58
4.5.2 Hypotheses...... 60
4.6 Research Findings ...... 62
4.6.1 Basis of self-identification ...... 62
4.6.2 Self-identification ...... 66
4.6.3 Qualitative findings ...... 70
4.6.4 Linguistic attitudes ...... 71
4.6.5 Stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian speakers ...... 77
4.6.6 Qualitative responses to questions of linguistic attitudes and stereotypes ...... 86
4.7 General Discussion ...... 88
4.7.1 Basis of self-identity: ...... 89
4.7.2 Self-Identity ...... 93
4.7.3 Summary of discussion on identity ...... 97
4.7.4 Stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes ...... 98
4.7.5 Language attitudes ...... 100 x
4.7.6 Stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian speakers ...... 104
4.7.7 Summary of discussion on linguistic attitudes and stereotypes ...... 109
4.7.8 Relevant research questions and hypotheses ...... 111
4.8 Conclusion ...... 113
Chapter 5: Ideology...... 115
5.1 Linguistic Ideology ...... 116
5.1.1 Theories of Linguistic Ideology ...... 117
5.2 Language and Power ...... 118
5.2.1 Linguistic ideology and nationalism...... 122
5.2.2 Linguistic ideology and purism ...... 126
5.2.3 Summary ...... 132
5.3 Linguistic ideology and the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine ...... 133
5.3.1 Relevant Research Questions ...... 135
5.3.2 Hypotheses...... 136
5.4 Research findings ...... 138
5.4.1 Ukrainian and the current linguistic situation ...... 138
5.4.2 Language and Power ...... 141
5.4.3 Linguistic Ideology and Nationalism ...... 153
5.4.4 Linguistic Ideology and Attitudes ...... 159
5.4.5 Linguistic Ideology and Purism ...... 167
5.5 General Discussion ...... 171
5.5.1 Ukrainian and the current linguistic situation ...... 172
5.5.2 Language and Power ...... 174
5.5.3 Linguistic Ideology and Nationalism ...... 180
5.5.4 Linguistic Ideology and Attitudes ...... 183
5.5.5 Relevant Research Questions and Hypotheses ...... 184
5.6 Conclusion ...... 185
Chapter 6: Language Maintenance ...... 187
6.1 Language Maintenance and Loss ...... 188
6.1.1 Individual language maintenance and loss ...... 189
6.1.2 Factors in individual language maintenance and loss ...... 189
6.1.3 Theories of societal language maintenance and loss ...... 193
6.2 Language maintenance and loss and the contemporary linguistic situation in
Ukraine ...... 202
6.3 Relevant Research Questions ...... 207
6.3.1 Hypotheses...... 209
6.4 Research Findings ...... 211
6.4.1 Overall linguistic information ...... 211
6.4.2 Change in linguistic situation ...... 221
6.4.3 Language pressure ...... 227
6.4.4 Language maintenance ...... 232
6.4.5 Qualitative responses to questions of language pressure and language loss .. 238
6.5 General Discussion ...... 239
6.5.1 Overall linguistic information ...... 239
6.5.2 Change in linguistic situation ...... 246
6.5.3 Language Pressure ...... 250
6.5.4 Attitudes to language maintenance ...... 255
6.5.5 Research questions and hypotheses revisited ...... 257
6.5.6 Overall trends and linguistic maintenance ...... 259
6.6 Conclusion ...... 261
Chapter 7: Conclusion...... 262
References ...... 267
Appendix A: Questionnaire ...... 277
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Overall basis of self-identity ...... 63 Table 4.2 Overall basis of self-identity (percent) ...... 63 Table 4.3: Basis of self-identity by region (percent) ...... 64 Table 4.4 Basis of self-identity by age (percent) ...... 65 Table 4.5 Overall national identity (percent) ...... 66 Table 4.6 Overall change in internal feelings (percent) ...... 67 Table 4.7 National identity by region (percent) ...... 67 Table 4.8 Regional change in internal feeling (percent) ...... 68 Table 4.9 National identity by age ...... 69 Table 4.10 Change in internal feelings by age (percent) ...... 69 Table 4.11 Overall linguistic attitudes (percent) ...... 72 Table 4.12 Overall impression of Ukrainian (percent) ...... 72 Table 4.13: Language attitudes by region (percent) ...... 73 Table 4.14 Regional impressions of Ukrainian ...... 73 Table 4.15 Language attitudes by age (percent) ...... 74 Table 4.16 Impressions of Ukrainian by age (percent) ...... 75 Table 4.17: Language attitudes by self-identification (percent) ...... 75 Table 4.18 Impressions of Ukrainian by self-identification (percent) ...... 76 Table 4.19 Overall stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 77 Table 4.20 Overall stereotypes about Russian speakers (percent) ...... 77 Table 4.21: Stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers by region (percent) ...... 78 Table 4.22 Stereotypes about Russian speakers by region (percent) ...... 79 Table 4.23 Stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers by age (percent) ...... 79 Table 4.24 Stereotypes about Russian speakers by age (percent) ...... 80 Table 4.25 Overall attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 81 Table 4.26 Overall attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 81 Table 4.27 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 81 Table 4.28 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 82 Table 4.29 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 83 Table 4.30 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 83 Table 4.31 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 84
Table 4.32 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers ...... 84 Table 4.33 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 85 Table 4.34 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) ...... 85 Table 5.1 Overall linguistic situation attitudes (percent) ...... 139 Table 5.2 Linguistic situation attitudes by region (percent) ...... 139 Table 5.3 Linguistic situation attitudes by age (percent) ...... 140 Table 5.4 Linguistic situation attitudes by self-identification (percent) ...... 141 Table 5.5 Overall discrimination under the Soviet Union (percent) ...... 142 Table 5.6 Overall discrimination after the Soviet Union (percent) ...... 142 Table 5.7 Regional discrimination under the Soviet Union (percent) ...... 143 Table 5.8 Regional discrimination after the Soviet Union (percent) ...... 143 Table 5.9 Discrimination under the Soviet Union by self-identification (percent) ...... 144 Table 5.10 Discrimination after the Soviet Union by self-identification (percent) ...... 144 Table 5.11 Overall language and personal situation (percent) ...... 145 Table 5.12 Language and personal situation by region (percent) ...... 146 Table 5.13 Language and personal situation by region (percent) ...... 146 Table 5.14 Language and personal situation by region (percent) ...... 147 Table 5.15 Overall language and politician attitudes (percent) ...... 148 Table 5.16 Regional language and politician attitudes (percent) ...... 148 Table 5.17 Language and politician attitudes by age (percent) ...... 149 Table 5.18 Language and politician attitudes by self-identification (percent) ...... 149 Table 5.19 Overall language and politics (percent) ...... 150 Table 5.20 Language and politics by basis of self-identification (percent) ...... 150 Table 5.21 National language preferences (percent) ...... 153 Table 5.22 National language preferences by region (percent) ...... 154 Table 5.23 National language preferences by age (percent) ...... 154 Table 5.24 National language preferences by self-identification (percent) ...... 155 Table 5.25 National language preferences (percent) ...... 156 Table 5.26 National language preferences by age (percent) ...... 156 Table 5.27 Overall attitudes about language use (percent) ...... 159 Table 5.28 Overall attitudes about language use (percent) ...... 159 Table 5.29 Regional attitudes about language use (percent) ...... 160 Table 5.30 Regional attitudes about language use (percent) ...... 160 Table 5.31 Attitudes about language use by age group (percent) ...... 161 Table 5.32 Attitudes about language use by age group (percent) ...... 161 Table 5.33 Attitudes about language use by self-identification (percent) ...... 162 Table 5.34 Attitudes about language use by self-identification (percent) ...... 162 Table 6.1 Overall Language Fluency and Bilingualism (percent) ...... 212 xv
Table 6.2 Regional Language Fluency and Bilingualism (percent) ...... 212 Table 6.3 Fluency and Bilingualism by age group (percent) ...... 213 Table 6.4 Overall Language reception preferences (percent) ...... 214 Table 6.5 Regional Language reception preferences (percent) ...... 214 Table 6.6 Language reception preferences by age group (percent) ...... 215 Table 6.7 Language reception preferences by gender (percent) ...... 215 Table 6.8 Overall Russian use (percent) ...... 216 Table 6.9 Overall Ukrainian use (percent) ...... 216 Table 6.10 Regional Russian use (percent) ...... 217 Table 6.11 Regional Ukrainian use (percent) ...... 218 Table 6.12 Russian use by age group (percent) ...... 218 Table 6.13 Ukrainian use by age (percent) ...... 219 Table 6.14 Overall language use with partner (percent) ...... 219 Table 6.15 Regional language use with partner (percent) ...... 220 Table 6.16 Overall fluency and mastery of Ukrainian before 1991 (percent) ...... 221 Table 6.17 Overall current mastery of Ukrainian and Russian (percent) ...... 222 Table 6.18 Regional fluency and mastery of Ukrainian before 1991 (percent) ...... 222 Table 6.19 Regional current mastery of Ukrainian and Russian (percent) ...... 223 Table 6.20 Fluency and mastery of Ukrainian before 1991 by age group (percent) ...... 223 Table 6.21 Current mastery of Ukrainian and Russian by age group (percent) ...... 224 Table 6.22 Overall language use with children (percent) ...... 225 Table 6.23 Regional language use with children (percent)...... 225 Table 6.24 Language use with children by age (percent) ...... 226 Table 6.25 Overall change in social and professional situation (percent) ...... 227 Table 6.26 Regional change in social and professional situation (percent) ...... 228 Table 6.27 Change in social and professional situation by age (percent) ...... 228 Table 6.28 Change in social and professional situation by gender (percent) ...... 229 Table 6.29 Change in social and professional situation by self-identification (percent) 230 Table 6.30 Change in social and professional situation by ideology (percent) ...... 230 Table 6.31 Overall pressure put on children to use Russian and Ukrainian (percent) .... 231 Table 6.32 Overall importance of preserving Russian (percent) ...... 232 Table 6.33 Overall importance of children speaking Russian (percent) ...... 232 Table 6.34 Importance of preserving Russian by region (percent) ...... 233 Table 6.35 Importance of children speaking Russian by region (percent) ...... 233 Table 6.36 Importance of preserving Russian by age (percent) ...... 234 Table 6.37 Importance of children speaking Russian by age (percent) ...... 235 Table 6.38 Importance of preserving Russian by self-identification (percent) ...... 235 Table 6.39 Importance of children speaking Russian by self-identification (percent) ... 236 xvi
Table 6.40 Importance of preserving Russian by ideology (percent) ...... 236 Table 6.41 Importance of children speaking Russian by ideology (percent) ...... 237
List of Figures
Map 3.1 2001 Census Data ...... 34
Map 3.2 2003 KIIS Survey ...... 35
Chapter 1: Introduction
“Девушки, я за своего так переживаю,” (Ladies, I am so worried about my husband,) says the wife of prominent Ukrainian politician Viktor Yanukovich, in a satirical sketch on Ukrainian politics by the comedy group Вечерный Квартал 95 (Evening Block 95). “Чего?” (Why?) the wives of the other politicians ask. “У него такие страшные знакомые – бывает с Азаровом закроются в кабинете.” (He has such strange acquaintances – sometimes he and Azarov lock themselves up in their room). The other wives look sympathetic. “Водку пьют?” (Are they drinking vodka?) they ask. “Если бы,” (If only) Mrs. Yanukovich responds. “Украинский учат.” (They are learning Ukrainian).
The people of Ukraine are divided by politics, culture, and language. The Dnipro river, which cuts through the country, separates not only east from west, but also a region with a Russian-speaking majority from one with a Ukrainian-speaking majority. This has been the situation for centuries, although in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union the politics of language have become more heated. In the west, nationalism is strong, and
Ukrainian tends to be seen as a part of the cultural history of the people. In the east,
Russian has been considered the language of the educated, while Ukrainian is still perceived as a language suitable for only villages.
In 1991, Ukrainian was made the official language, and it has since gained status as the language of schools, government offices, court proceedings, and other official
1 uses1. This has created more pressure both for and against the use of Ukrainian. For many speakers of Russian, the sudden prevalence of Ukrainian has brought out negative stereotypes toward the language and its speakers; twenty years after the change, some of these stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes still appear in public discourse. On the other hand, for many, the Ukrainian language has been strongly tied to patriotism and
“real” Ukrainian culture, providing increased pressure against the use of the Russian language. Regardless of a person‟s beliefs, their choice of language can and often does signify something more than simply a means of communication, but may portray information about the person‟s character.
Language and identity have long been found to be intertwined. In a bilingual country, the official status of just one language is often understood by speakers of the other language as an indication of their inferiority, and the fight for or against official status can be bitter.2 Today, the issue of language is consistently a part of politics and news in Ukraine, and it touches every Ukrainian. Because the majority of the country is bilingual, and communication is rarely at stake, the connection between language and identity is clear; the speakers of each language are fighting for the status of their group of speakers, rather than simply for the language itself.3 At this time, many Russian- speaking Ukrainians struggle with their own identity; as Russian speakers, some feel a strong connection to ethnic Russians, some feel a tie to the land in which they live, and
1 Article 10 of the Ukrainian constitution states: “The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language. The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.” 2 See Patten, 2001 3 See Fournier, 2002 2 some identify with the ethnicity of their parents, but a large number feel pulled in multiple directions.
As the first Ukrainians born in an independent Ukraine reach adulthood, the attitudes toward the Ukrainian language are changing. Once a language with the reputation of being used only by the peasantry, it has become the language of education; even in the easternmost, primarily Russophone parts of Ukraine, schoolchildren are fluent in Ukrainian as well as Russian. Researching internet forums and newspaper editorials, however, has shown that negative attitudes toward the use of Ukrainian as the official language of Ukraine remain4. In addition, those attitudes often extend to the Ukrainian language and its speakers in general. The fact that these stereotypes developed is not surprising, given the history of the language and the country. What is surprising, however, is that these attitudes continue to be found, nearly two decades after Ukraine‟s independence.
Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine
While the issue of a national language in Ukraine is currently an important subject for nearly all of the inhabitants of Ukraine, history shows that this has been a sensitive issue in Ukraine for centuries. One of the major reasons for this is that Ukraine has had such a troubled past, only emerging from under the rule of other nations in 1991.
Going back centuries, Ukraine has been alternately under the rule of Tatars,
4 Vdovichenko, 2008 3
Ukrainian language and culture, as something of a badge of honor. Czubatyj (1946) writes, “By six hundred years of effort to reassert and to rehabilitate themselves in the face of enormous odds, the Ukrainians preserved their nation” (104). The drive to preserve Ukrainian has often been associated with patriotism. However, now that
Ukrainian is the state language, there is a danger of disenfranchisement of Russian speakers. This complicates the issue – the current situation is not simply a contemporary struggle for comprehension or rights, but has been, in some way or another, a part of every Ukrainian‟s history.
With the advent of the Soviet Union, Ukrainians were able to speak their own language; originally, Ukrainianization was used under Lenin‟s rule as a means to justify
Soviet power. In the 1920s, the Communist Party worked within the individual nations to include non-Russians so as to strengthen the party (Liber, 1982). Because of this, there was a revival of Ukrainian in the early Soviet Union.
Ukrainianization was underway, the use of the Russian language was encouraged in
Ukraine (Chamberlin, 1945).
While basic instruction in the non-Russian republics is guaranteed in the local languages, Russian is the official language, and its study as a second language is compulsory in native schools. Moreover, upward mobility - especially in scientific and political arenas-depends on local elites' mastery of the Russian language and cultural norms, while Russians experience little pressure to master the languages of the republics in which they live and work. Shifts in language policy, which may have been intended to promote national integration, were interpreted as efforts at further Russification and have generated severe resistance and even massive demonstrations (Lapidus, 104).
Even when Ukrainian was recognized under the Soviet Union, there was general governmental pressure for the Soviet people to learn and operate in Russian.
As the political situation became more constricted in the Soviet Union, the linguistic environment in Ukraine shifted from one that supported Ukrainian to an increasingly strict support of Russian. Petherbridge-Hernandez and Raby (1993) write:
At this time, not only was the use of Ukrainian strongly discouraged, but Ukrainian itself was changed to become more like Russian. According to Bilaniuk (2005), under Stalin, not only did Russian become primary, but non-Russian Soviet languages were Russified; at this time, dictionaries were changed to include more Russian borrowings, and when there were two variants of words, the Russian variants were enforced.
Under Khrushchev, there was on one hand an increasingly liberal environment, while on the other, the promotion of Russian continued in more subtle ways. According to Bilaniuk (2005), the way that language was used in schools greatly contributed to the increase in the usage of the Russian language, and, perhaps more importantly, the connections between language and beliefs about education. There were Russian and
Ukrainian schools throughout Ukraine, but the teachers in the Russian schools were more highly qualified and the facilities were better, and it became clear that a Russian-speaking education was the key to a more successful life. This allowed for a strong connection to be made between Russian and a good education, and Ukrainian was increasingly associated with those of a lower education.
During the second half of the twentieth century, the divide between east and west in Ukraine became pronounced. “By 1970 east Ukraine had become more Russified, especially in the cities, but west Ukraine remained loyal to Ukrainian,” (Szporluk 1979:
93). Given the political situation, the use of language came to symbolize more than communication, but involved politics, identity, and ideology.
Towards the end of the Soviet Union, there was a resurgence in the popularity of
Ukrainian (Bilaniuk 2005). The Language Law of 1989 made Ukrainian the official language of the country, and helped to promote Ukrainian as a symbol of the soon-to-be independent country. After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, when the economic situation was dire, Russian gained popularity again, until the Orange Revolution of 2004.
During the presidential elections of 2004, there were two major candidates, Viktor
Yanukovich, who was closely connected with Russia, and Viktor Yushchenko, who was associated with Western Ukraine and Europe. Yanukovich was determined to be the winner, which sparked protests in Kyiv, as many believed that the results had been tampered with. The election was held again, and heavily monitored by international election observers, and Yushchenko was declared the victor.
The Orange Revolution symbolized more than one election, as the candidates were symbols of the different directions for Ukraine‟s future: to look east towards Russia or west towards Europe. Yushchenko, who represented anti-corruption and a more
European style of life, had chosen orange as his party color, and this time was named the
Orange Revolution. Patriotism ran high during this time, and for many Ukrainians (see
Bilaniuk 2005), there was a connection between the Russian language, Viktor
Yanukovich, corruption, and Russia; at the same time, Ukrainian was associated with
Yushchenko, national pride, and anti-corruption. It was at this time that the Ukrainian language was cemented as an emblem of Ukraine.
In recent years, there have been several policies toward language that have affected the usage of both Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine. Starting in 2004, national television and radio broadcasters were required to use Ukrainian5. This policy was adopted specifically to encourage Ukrainian, and was spread to broadcasters from Russia in 20086, both to promote the Ukrainian language and to assist in the development of
Ukrainian broadcast media. Because of this, media drastically changed in Ukraine in a relatively short period of time.
The 2010 election of Russian speaker Viktor Yanukovich has shifted the balance of power somewhat, and recent trends suggest that linguistic policy is going to be more supportive of Russian. Since the beginning of 2010, there has been a push to permit
Russian as a language of the court7, bills have been introduced to require all children to learn Russian8, and rumors abound of the potential for Russian to become a second state language.
Education in the primary and secondary schools has been of great importance to policy makers; just as Russian became associated with education, Ukrainian in schools has been increased in order to support the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian parents, by
5 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1052346.html, accessed on March 4, 2011. 6 http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-302857.html, accessed on March 4, 2011 7 http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/09/08/idINIndia-51365420100908, accessed on March 4, 2011 8 http://en.rian.ru/world/20100919/160643650.html, accessed on March 4, 2011 7 law, have the right to choose the language of instruction for their children, and between
1994 and 2004, the number of Ukrainian schools increased from 45% to 75.1%9.
Taken on the surface, the linguistic situation in Ukraine today seems to be simple: approximately half of the country speaks Ukrainian, and half speaks Russian as its native tongue. But coupled with the sociolinguistic values of national identity as well as the history of Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine, it soon becomes clear that the issue is complicated and delicate. Every Ukrainian is touched by this issue; as language is so closely intertwined with identity, it is a very personal matter. Language is shaping the politics of the country, and the politics are shaping language use.
1.2 Earlier Scholarship
The interplay between Ukrainian and Russian is a fascinating topic, and some scholarship has been devoted to it. In a previous project10 examining online sources, I found that many Russian speakers in Ukraine hold five prevailing negative stereotypes about Ukrainian:
that Ukrainian is a peasant language and insufficient for serious work;
that Ukrainian is simply a dialect of Russian or Polish and thus undeserving of
that the sound system of Ukrainian is unpleasant;
9 http://www.igpi.ru/info/people/malink/1111152776.html, accessed on March 4, 2011
10 Vdovichenko, 2008 8
that granting official status to Ukrainian divides Ukrainian speakers from Russian
and that, since Russian has been the official language of Ukraine for several
centuries, it should continue to be the official language.
Because Ukrainian has been the language of education and government for nearly two decades, these stereotypes cannot possibly be grounded in reality, but are instead examples of linguistic ideology.
Russian speakers had towards making Ukrainian the official language. She found that the most frequent reasons for resistance to a Ukrainian state language were 1) that it created an artificial division of people along linguistic lines, 2) general resistance to the
Ukrainian language, 3) protests against Russian being considered a foreign language, 4) fear of loss of the Russian language and culture in Ukraine, and 5) fear of linguistic definitions of groups in state laws (424). The public resistance towards using Ukrainian as the official language is just one result of the stereotypes speakers of Russian have towards the Ukrainian language; as with all stereotypes, they can affect many other aspects of life.
One way that the language question affects the daily lives of Ukrainians is in their political views. The political attitudes of the speakers of both languages is of interest to many scholars. Kubicek (2000) found that most people see Ukrainian speakers as being more content with the current direction of politics.
“This issue, of course, has been one of the major cleavages in the Ukrainian state, and various domestic manifestations of the 'Russian question', e.g. language, also are a prominent source of political cleavages. On domestic issues, one consistently finds those in the west relatively more satisfied with the current state of affairs, although there is no evidence that westerners are unequivocally more pro-market. Those living in central regions have views that do not greatly diverge from the mean, although in the last survey they were far closer to Westerners than in previous ones. Meanwhile, those in the east and the south have more pronounced negative assessments and are in general less supportive of a free market” (280).
According to Kubicek (2000), the political lines are clearly drawn between Ukrainian and
Russian speakers in Ukraine.
In his study on national identity and politics, Shulman (2005) found that the attitudes towards speakers of the two different languages do not always align with the actual values of the speakers. Most of the studies presented in his work show a belief that
Ukrainian speakers are more liberal and supportive of economic reform than Russian speakers. However, Shulman‟s study did not find this to be the case:
“Analysis of regional, ethnic, and linguistic cleavages with regard to reformist attitudes do not substantiate the view of those observers who believe western Ukrainians, whether because of their ethnic identity, linguistic patterns, historical ties to Europe, or national identity are consistently or substantially more democratic than their Russian and Russian speaking eastern or southern Ukrainian counterparts, and definitely do not support the contention that they are more capitalistic” (Shulman, 75).
Shulman‟s (2005) work finds that, while stereotypes exist about the speakers of the two different languages, there is little correspondence to actual political values.
Regardless of the study or results, scholars overwhelmingly agree that Ukraine is not a unified country. Language is consistently used to define the separate groups of people. The attitudes that each group has towards language and the other are defining the politics in Ukraine today. This dissertation, and its focus on the effect of language policy
10 on attitudes and stereotypes, is unique to the field, and will be useful for sociolinguists from other areas around the world.
Research Question and Major Hypothesis
I believe that further research into this topic will show that negative attitudes toward language come about because of the strong connection between language and identity; when language policy changes, speakers may feel personally attacked, and the resulting stereotypes arise from emotions rather than logic. On the other hand, in order to overcome these negative attitudes, the youth of the country may be attributing different, no more realistic, positive characteristics to Ukrainian and the people who speak it. A fundamental change in the way people communicate is almost certainly accompanied by a fundamental change in the way people view the means of communication itself.
My hypothesis is that changes in language policy affect not simply the use of language, but also issues of identity. The current situation in Ukraine gives a unique opportunity for the study of how language policy and identity interact. Given the mandatory use of Ukrainian for education and governmental purposes, many of the original arguments against Ukrainian have been disproven: Ukrainian is sufficient for serious work, Ukrainian‟s scientific vocabulary is not lacking, and education and government have survived and thrived while using Ukrainian. Logically, the negative stereotypes against Ukrainian should have disappeared as Ukrainian proves to be a multifunctional language. Nevertheless, according to research that I have done using internet forums and online print media, these stereotypes continue to exist and be
11 perpetuated. The most important question that comes out of this is: Why do such negative stereotypes linger?
On the other side of the coin are the new ideas that are being connected to the use of the Ukrainian language, many of which are replacing the earlier, negative stereotypes.
After the Orange Revolution of 2004, patriotism surged, and the feeling of national pride became tied up with the Ukrainian language. Russian-speaking Ukrainians have no less of a claim on the country, the history, and the culture, but many people, including
Russian speakers who identify as Ukrainians, have a sense that the “real” Ukraine belongs to those who speak Ukrainian. Where do these beliefs come from, and why are they so easily accepted, even by those who claim Russian as their native tongue?
Thus, there are two trends that are likely to be currently happening in Ukraine: certain negative stereotypes are being perpetuated by some parts of the population, and other parts of the population are connecting Ukrainian to national pride. Such positive stereotypes and attitudes are on the rise. This does not tell the entire story, though; an interesting aspect of this question is the issue of language purity. The nonstandard mixture of Ukrainian and Russian, while widely used, has long been seen as a substandard speech variant (Bilaniuk 2005). With the negative stereotypes about
Ukrainian diminishing, and Russian speakers becoming more and more disenfranchised in Ukraine, nonstandard usage has become an easy target for nearly everyone; it is my contention that, as power shifts between language groups, it becomes more important for each group to have clearly-defined boundaries. How do nonstandard language and the idea of linguistic purity fit into the current linguistic situation?
Beyond the existence of linguistic stereotypes, the demographics of speakers are critical to understanding the situation. How do the stereotypes play out across genders, ages, and geographic region? If young people are holding these negative attitudes, the situation is obviously complex; the youth of Ukraine have been using Ukrainian in schools for long enough that they should understand the sufficiency of Ukrainian. What do these attitudes mean for the future of Ukraine? What can they tell us about language policy and its effectiveness in general? What can we learn about the interaction of language and identity?
My expectation in this matter is that the negative attitudes toward Ukrainian will be less prevalent among youth than among the older generations. My hypothesis is also that geographic location will be very important to the way that people view Ukrainian, but that gender will make little difference in the quantitative results. Because each of these aspects can play a big role in the way that people relate to the language and the current policy of Ukraine, it is critical to include a sufficient number of speakers from each of the groups. In this way, it will be possible to analyze how language policy changes play out throughout various sectors of society.
Of further interest is how Russian is being maintained or lost with the increase in
Ukrainian, and how people are viewing this process. With Russia nearby, and many
Russian-speaking communities, the loss of Russian may not seem critical; on the other hand, many parents are sending their children to Ukrainian schools, and the current generation is likely to feel more comfortable using Ukrainian than Russian, which inevitably leads to loss. How has the current linguistic policy affected this process, what
13 role does identity play in the way Ukrainians view maintenance and loss of Russian, and what might we expect in the future?
I expect that many speakers will not be concerned about the loss of Russian, either because of the proximity of Russia or because they believe that the increase of
Ukrainian is more important than the decrease in Russian. Further, the older generation is more likely to worry about their children not being able to speak and understand
Russian, while those in the most highly speaking Russian areas may not perceive it as a threat. I also expect the younger generation to feel more comfortable in Ukrainian, and see more benefits to speaking to their children in Ukrainian.
Many scholars have studied language and identity; some have looked at the relationship between politics and geographical location in Ukraine. Few, if any, have looked at the issue of language attitudes in Ukraine, especially through the lens of linguistic ideology and identity. The language situation is critical for understanding the overall political situation, as language is so closely tied to identity. This is a unique time in the history of Ukraine; the official language has been Ukrainian for long enough that it has reached a critical point. What happens with the attitudes toward Ukrainian will bring insight into the way that politics affect language and the way that language shapes politics.
I hope to understand not only what is happening in Ukraine, but also to illuminate how language policy, in general, affects speakers and their attitudes. Languages and dialects are constantly being negotiated the world over, and it is critical that we understand the role that policy plays in these negotiations if we are to understand how
14 speakers think not only about their own languages but also about their own status in society. Through this study, I will answer the following research question: in which ways does changing language policy affect how speakers identify and interact with each other?
Chapter 2: Pilot Study
-Вы говорите: язык... Да разве существует малороссийский язык? Я попросил раз одного хохла перевести следующую, первую попавшуюся мне фразу: "Грамматика есть искусство правильно читать и писать". Знаете, как он это перевел: "Храматыка е выскусьтво правыльно чытаты ы пысаты... " Что ж, это язык, по-вашему? самостоятельный язык? Да скорей, чем с этим согласиться, я готов позволить лучшего своего друга истолочь в ступе...
(You say: language…as if the Little Russian language exists? One time I asked a [derogatory term for Ukrainian] to translate the following, the first phrase that came to me: “Grammar is an art of correctly reading and writing.” Do you know, how he translated it: “Khrammar is the yrt of corryctly ryding and wrytyng…” What, that is a language, in your opinion? An independent language? Sooner than agreeing with that, I would let my best friend be pounded in a mortar.) -Pigasiv, from Rudin by Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev
In 2008, I looked at the issue of language attitudes in Ukraine, taking into account online sources such as forums and online editorials. Of particular interest were types of stereotypes that Russian speakers had toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers, and how these stereotypes played out in public discourse. In this chapter, I will look at this pilot study, including existing scholarship at the time, methodology, findings, and how that study presented a foundation for the current research.
For this pilot study, I looked at print-media sources for evidence of attitudes that speakers of Russian have toward Ukrainian. Specifically, I examined internet forums, news articles, and letters to editors. These different types of print media provided a wide view of attitude towards Ukrainian as a language.
The three different types of media each had its own significance. Of particular interest were the internet forums – while the sample group was biased towards those with access to the internet, the informal and anonymous setting allowed people to freely express their opinions. Further, these forums are generally populated by youth, and their opinions of the linguistic situation in Ukraine reflected the current sentiment as well as that of the near future. The editorials and letters to the editors also reflected the sentiments of their writers, but, as they were more formal and not anonymous, they could show us what is generally acceptable to speak out about in society. The newspaper articles presumably gave an unbiased view towards happenings in society.
The three forums that I looked at are at ixbt.com, “В Украине "убивают"
русский язык!!!” (In Ukraine they are “killing” the Russian language) (140 pages‟ worth from 7/4/05 – 9/23/06); oboz.ua, “Зачем вообще, и мне в частности,
украинский язык” (What use in general, and for me personally, is the Ukrainian language) (38 pages of comments from 9/19/2007 – 10/19/2007); and lovehate.ru, “Про
Украинский язык” (About the Ukrainian language) (from 11/1/01 – 9/5/07, with 211 opinions in favor of Ukrainian and 94 opposed). The three forums covered roughly the same territory, and similar themes arose through all of them. Although only one of the 17 forums is registered as a Ukrainian website (oboz.ua), websites that are registered with
.ru and .com are very popular in Ukraine. It was not possible to determine exactly where the commenters were located, but as most of them wrote about direct experiences with the Ukrainian language, it is relatively safe to assume that most of them were located in
Ukraine. The stereotypes and arguments that run through the forums affect speakers of
Ukrainian regardless of where the commenter is located.
I also did internet searches for opinion pages and letters to the editor regarding negative stereotypes towards Ukrainian, and the resulting opinion page, entitled
“Держава или Трымава” (State (Russian) or State (Ukrainian)), by Aleksandr Nikhrist, posted on the website www.censor.net.ua on July 30, 2007, was similar in nature to the forums. Generally speaking, these types of editorials were much more difficult to find.
2.2 Prevailing Arguments and Stereotypes
The prevailing negative arguments and stereotypes through these media were 1) that Ukrainian is a peasant language, 2) that it is simply a dialect of Russian, 3) that it sounds terrible, 4) that granting political rights to one language divides the Slavic people, and 5) that in recent history Russian has been the language of Ukraine, so it should continue to be so.
While many of these arguments seem to have no merit, the fact remains that they were consistently brought up on these forums. The attitudes of some Russian speakers towards Ukrainian are decidedly negative; the same stereotypes ran through each medium, not just about the language, but about those who use it. 18
2.2.1 Argument #1: Ukrainian is a “peasant language”
The first theme that was covered by the forum was that Ukrainian is a language for peasants and is not serious. Forum member M. on August 20, 2002, wrote:
Не то что бы ненавижу, но не могу к нему серьезно относиться, ибо этот язык не универсальный в самом широком смысле этого понятия. На нем может быть и можно описывать жизнь крестьян, но там где требуется выразить то что требует максимального интеллектуального напряжения, он бессилен. Именно поэтому нет ни одного извес(т)ного укр-философа.
(It‟s not that I hate it, but I cannot approach it seriously, since this language is not universal in the broadest sense of the concept. In this language maybe it is possible to describe the life of peasants, but when it is necessary to give voice to something that needs a maximum intellectual effort, it is impotent. This is exactly why there is not one famous Ukrainian philosopher.) (lovehate.ru)
Not only did he believe that Ukrainian is a language for peasants, but he also used that belief to justify his conclusion that Ukrainian speakers are also not intellectually advanced.
Another forum member, S., continued the argument on July 18, 2005. Not only does S. believe that the language is “wild” and “uncivilized,” but he has never met (and therefore there probably do not exist) any intelligent people that speak it.
Он почти как русский, но такой коверканый и нелепо-смешной, дикий какой- то, первобытный. Нецивильный язык, неэлитный. Никогда в жизни не встречал интеллигента, говорящего на этом языке. Это мѐртвый язык для высшего света, он - для хуторов, деревнь и провинции.
(It is almost like Russian, but so deformed and absurdly funny, wild somehow, primitive. It is an uncivilized language, not elite. Never in my life have I met an intellectual who speaks this language. This is a dead language for higher society, it is for farms, villages, and provinces.) (lovehate.ru).
Thus, Ukrainian is, according to S., a language for uneducated farmers.
On June 25, 2003, H. used historical figures to attempt to prove that Russian is the intellectual counterpart of Ukrainian: Потому что звучит как опримитивленный,
деревенский эквивалент русского. Не удивительно, что Гоголь и тот писал на
русском. (Because it sounds like a primitivized, village equivalent of Russian. It is not surprising that Gogol wrote in Russian.) (lovehate.ru). Gogol was Ukrainian by birth but chose to write in Russian; his choice of Russian over Ukrainian, according to H., was based in the “fact” that Ukrainian is an inadequate language.
In the second forum, the argument that Ukrainian is a lower-level language was taken further with the oft-repeated idea that Ukrainian simply is lacking the lexicon for higher-level thought. [Н]е говоря уже о тупости и не досконал[ьн]ости
украинского языка, сколько слов и терминов вообще не существуют в нем , да и
вообще смешной он какой[-]то... (To say nothing of the vacancy and lack of perfection of the Ukrainian language, there are so many words and terms that don‟t exist in it at all, and it‟s generally funny somehow…) (ixbt.com). This argument was used very often when the subject of Ukrainian versus Russian came up; it is an interesting one, given that
Ukrainian was at this time already used as the official language in schools and many universities, and higher-level science and math were presumably not suffering.
Another poster put it simply: to speak Ukrainian gives you away as an idiot.
They wrote, Человек говорит по украински. Безумец! Ну вот! Дурку включили! (A person speaks Ukrainian. Idiot! There you have it! They turned on the stupidity!).
(ixbt.com) This theme was by far the most common when it comes to negative attitudes towards Ukrainian by Russian speakers.
Nikhrist‟s article also brought up the argument that Ukrainian is lower intellectually than Russian – alluding to the allegation that Ukrainian speakers are also intellectually inferior to Russian speakers. Почему происходит мерзкое насаждение
неприродной насквозь лживой и выдуманной "мовы", на которой никто ни
говорить, ни писать, ни думать не хочет. На которой не пишут книг, и не
слагают виршей? (Why is the vile planting of the unnatural, thoroughly false, and invented “language” in which nobody wants to speak, write, or think, in which books aren‟t written, and verses aren‟t composed?) This followed the same line of thought of many of the forum posters – if Ukrainian were intellectually equivalent to Russian, there would be more poets, philosophers, and writers that used it. This, of course, does not give consideration to the political history of the language.
2.2.2 Argument #2: Ukrainian is simply a dialect of Russian
The second most common theme was that Ukrainian is simply a dialect of
Russian, and should not be granted status as a language at all, much less the official language. O., on April 8, 2002, wrote, Я не ненавижу так называемый "украинский
язык",который на самом деле исторически является лишь русско-польским
диалектом. (I don‟t hate the so-called “Ukrainian Language,” which actually historically is simply a Russian-Polish dialect.) (lovehate.ru) His problem with
Ukrainian was not so much with the language, but that it is considered a language at all.
Similarly, A. on September 16, 2004 wrote that Ukrainian is really just a derivation of Russian, with Polish words thrown in:
В нѐм слишком много польских слов, вот у меня нет украинско-русского словаря, только польско-русский, и он меня ещѐ не подводил, это-то и плохо. Ещѐ плохо, что язык называется украинским, а не киевско-, мало-, южно-, юго-западно-русским или просто русским. Даже если жители России есть помесь славян с т[y]рками и фино-уграми, это не основание для, следовательно, этнически чистых жителей нынешней Киевской земли называть себя не русскими, а какими-то украинцами, с восторженным придыханием, и говорить весилля вместо свадьбы, мова вместо язык, пан вместо господин и т. д.
(In Ukrainian there are too many Polish words; I don‟t have a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary, just a Polish-Russian one, and it hasn‟t let me down yet, that‟s what‟s bad. It is also bad that the language is called Ukrainian, and not Kievan-little- southern-southwestern-Russian or just Russian. Even if the inhabitants of Russia are a hybrid with Turkic or Finno-Ugrian peoples, this is not the basis for, consequently, the ethnically pure residents of today‟s Kievan land to call themselves not Russians, but some kind of Ukrainians, with exalted aspirations, and to say “vesillja” in place of “svad‟ba,” “mova” instead of “jazyk,” “pan” instead of “gospodin,” etc.) (lovehate.ru).
A. contended that not only is Ukrainian a derivative of Russian, but the Ukrainian people are Russians as well, and should not try to fool themselves otherwise.
K. summed it up nicely on September 18, 2004: Как будто неправильный
русский. Вот. (It‟s like an incorrect Russian. There.) (lovehate.ru). The first argument that people turned to is that it is a village language for the uneducated; K. brings the second argument in line with the first by saying that it is like an improper version of
Nikhrist also saw Ukrainian as nothing more than a mishmash of dialects. He wrote: Не стану получать и выдавать на ней документы и не стану выполнять
распоряжения должностных лиц, издаваемых на гнусавой смеси румынско-
татарско-немецко-польских слов.” (I will not receive and issue documents in it, and I
22 will not fulfill the decrees of bureaucrats, published in that nasal mixture of Romanian-
Tatar-German-Polish words.) Nikhrist took the use of Ukrainian as a personal affront.
2.2.3 Argument #3: Ukrainian sounds offensive
The third theme for Ukrainian being a sub-standard language was that it sounds terrible. The sound system of the language is similar to that of Russian (hence the arguments that Ukrainian is simply a dialect of Russian), but nonetheless, the differences are enough to convince many that Ukrainian is less pleasant than Russian, and therefore should not be given status as the official language of Ukraine.
Q., on August 6, 2003, thought that the Ukrainian language sounds terrible, writing: Какая-то эта мова полуфабрикатная, ну невозможно к ней серьѐзно
относиться. Звучит она порой просто ругательно. (Somehow this is “language is half-made, it‟s not possible to treat it seriously. Sometimes it sounds simply abusive.)
(lovehate.ru). Interestingly enough, Q. used the Ukrainian word for language in her posting, and several other Ukrainianisms peppered her other postings on the site. Still, she maintained that it is an insufficient and awful-sounding language.
L., on September 2, 2006, agreed that the sounds of Ukrainian are what make it, in her opinion, inferior to Russian.
[П]росто его противно слушать! я когда была в Турции я пару раз включала хохляцкие каналы,то ни слова не поняла,но слушать было невозможно! я нормально отношусь к самим хохлам,но только если они при мне не разговаривают на своем наречии... глупо ненавидеть какой-то язык, согласна..но этот язык мне противен! если бы меня заставляли его выучить,я бы умерла!...
(It‟s simply offensive to hear! When I was in Turkey a couple of times I turned on [derogatory word for Ukrainian] channels, I didn‟t understand a word, but it was impossible to listen to it! I usually have fine relationships with [derogatory word for Ukrainians], but only if they don‟t speak in their own dialect in front of me…it is stupid to hate some language, I agree, but this language is offensive to me! If they made me learn it I would die!) (lovehate.ru)
L. proclaimed that she hates the Ukrainian language based simply on the way it sounds.
Her posting was also very interesting in that she attempted to present an unbiased viewpoint, but her language is clearly anti-Ukrainian (the language as well as the people).
R., on July 4, 2005, expressed a similar sentiment – Ukrainian is simply strange to hear. Украинский язык - это исковерканный русский, имхо, слушать его
действительно очень смешно (Ukrainian language – it is a distorted Russian, IMHO, to listen to it is really very funny.) (ixbt.com). Although there were several different lines of thought brought up in these forums, many of the anti-Ukrainian users mentioned the actual sounds of the language.
Nikhrist‟s opinion piece, not surprisingly, also presented this argument – he contended that people are standing up for a language that is, in his opinion, ugly. This echoes the sentiment from the forums, where many posters felt that Ukrainian simply sounded “ridiculous.”
Нет такой неблагозвучной мерзости, которую неудачники-мовисты не втянули бы в свою "мову". И чем неудобоваримей ты изрыгнѐшся, чем смешней и нелепей будет твоя речь, чем больше ты унавозишь еѐ "ыканьем" и "эканьем", тем более ты будешь у них в почѐте!
(There isn‟t any discordant abomination, which incompetent partisans of the “mova” wouldn‟t drag into their “language.” And the more indigestibly you vomit, the more ridiculous and awkward your language, the more you cover its “yking” and “eking” with dung, the more you will be honored by them!)
Nikhrist has made two arguments here – that the Ukrainian language sounds stupid, and that those who speak it are intellectually inferior.
2.2.4 Argument #4: Giving official status to Ukrainian causes a rift amongst Ukrainians
Another theme that was common through these forums is the idea that the
Ukrainian language, and especially the naming of Ukrainian as the state language, artificially divides the Slavic people.
Forum user D. strongly expressed this particular sentiment on November 10,
Абсолютно ненужный язык, созданный чтобы отделить когда-то братские народы друг от друга. Ну зачем он вообще нужен - украинец, работающий в России будет все-равно учить русский, а русский, отдыхающий в Крыму, не будет учить украинский. Да и язык этот звучит ужас[н]о - говорят как-будто на базаре сало покупают.
(It is an absolutely unnecessary language, created in order to divide the formerly brotherly peoples from one another. Why would it be needed in general? A Ukrainian that works in Russia will learn Russian anyway, and a Russian that is relaxing in the Crimea will not learn Ukrainian. Furthermore, this language sounds terrible, they speak it like they are in the market buying fatback.) (lovehate.ru)
D.‟s main point was that Ukrainian is simply a wedge in Slavic brotherhood, but, like many posters, also brought in the idea that Ukrainian is for uneducated people and that it sounds terrible.
On September 20, 2007, A. posted the idea that Ukrainians are simply Ukrainians, whereas Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians are divided from the whole. A. stood up for his belief that Ukrainians should speak Russian, which is more useful:
Украинцами нас назвать, просто украинцами. А вас - украиноговорящими украинцами, чтобы обозначит[ь] отличие от просто украинцев, которые знают оба языка, предпочитая активно пользоваться русским, как языком, на котором не только песни красиво звучат, но который действительно пригоден для всех сфер общественной жизни.
(We should be called Ukrainians, simply Ukrainians. And you – they should call you Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, in order to indicate the difference from simply Ukrainians, who know both languages, but choose to use Russian actively, as a language which is not used just to sing pretty songs, but which is truly fitting for all spheres of public life.) (oboz.ua)
A. talked about the division between Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians from those who choose to speak Russian, and reiterated his idea that Russian is a serious language while
Ukrainian is silly, though pretty.
Nikhrist took the argument a step further, drawing from history and the fact that
Kyiv was the original center of Rus‟, from which Russian descended. He believes that the Russian language and culture actually belong to Ukraine, and have been stolen by those to the east. Когда наша Русская земля стыдливо именуется [У]краиной, а
азиаты присвоили себе всѐ, от чего вы с такой лѐгкостью и презрением
отказываетесь? (When our Russian land shamefully changes its name to Ukraine, and the Asians have appropriated everything for themselves, what do you so easily and scornfully refuse?) Nikhrist believes that to speak Ukrainian means to give up the Slavic heritage that rightfully belongs in Ukraine.
2.2.5 Argument #5: Ukrainian is not my native tongue, why should I have to use it?
The final most common reason for anti-Ukrainian sentiment was the easiest to understand (and, in all likelihood, at the root of most of the other arguments). The motive for the negative attitudes for the Ukrainian language for these posters was that they already speak Russian; Russian is easier (since they already speak it); and it is not fair to force people to use a language that is not their native one. All of the other arguments could be disproved or dismissed, but this one got to what is really at stake: can national politics force a person to change their identity? While this is what most of the other viewpoints boiled down to, it was the least commonly expressed of all of the arguments.
I., on April 14, 2007, expressed anger at people using Ukrainian on Russian forums. [П]отому что он неудобочитаем.а [ос]обенно меня бесит,когда на
русских форумах кто-то пишет по-украински, а мы должны это понимать.
(Because it is not easy to read, and especially it drives me crazy when somebody writes in
Ukrainian on Russian forums, and we are supposed to understand it.) (lovehate.ru) I.‟s argument against Ukrainian has nothing to do with the language itself, but with the changing importance of the language, and being left behind.
Continuing this argument was the idea that heritage will be lost with the transfer of the official language from Russian to Ukrainian. On ixbx.com on July 4, 2005, X. posted, Ээ... Я русский, жена - русская, ребенок - украинец? Смешно. (Ehh, I am
Russian, my wife is Russian, our child is Ukrainian? Ridiculous.) This argument was taken a step further by another poster, T., that same day: Мое поколение родилось в
Советском союзе а не на украине! И зн[a]чит мой родной язык - РУССКИЙ почему
я должен перестраиватся? Я не хочу! (My generation was born in the Soviet Union and not in Ukraine! This means that my native tongue is RUSSIAN; why should I reform? I don‟t want to!) Both posters felt their language connected them to the past, and changing the official language would cause them to lose some cultural history.
Interestingly, as noted above, this was the argument that was least common on the forums, but Nikhrist articulated this from the beginning and based his entire opinion piece on it: Ukrainian was not his native language, and he did not want to have to use it.
Лично, для меня неприемл[e]мо само понятие "украина". С каких это пор мы стали "украинцами"? По выдумкам неучей и бездарей вроде Грушевского и Шевченк[o]? Почему наше природное название "русские" мы отдали каким-то азиатам? Сколько можно издеваться над украинским языком?
(Personally, for me even the concept of “Ukraine” is unacceptable. Since when did we become “Ukrainians”? Was it thought up by ignoramuses and untalented people like Grushevskii and Shevchenko? Why did we surrender our natural name “Russian” to some kind of Asians? How much is it possible to make fun of the Ukrainian language?)
This was just the beginning. Nikhrist felt that even the term “Ukrainian” was some sort of betrayal of the past; the change of the official language was an affront to him personally.
Nikhrist felt very strongly that Ukrainian was a terrible language, and that much was being lost in the Russian language because of the Ukrainian language. He writes:
Неужели вам не жалко нашего русского языка, что вы губите еѐ мерзкой "мовой" -
языком убожеств? (Really you don‟t feel bad for our Russian language, that you destroy with the vile “language” – the language of mediocrity?) Nikhrist felt so strongly
28 that Ukrainian was a substandard language that he believed that it was ruining his own language, the language that he thought rightfully belonged to Ukraine.
Nikhrist‟s article also recalled the idea that it was not fair to expect a Russian speaker to understand Ukrainian. Почему я должен получать документ, в котором
написано "отрымання"? Зачем мне все эти мерзкие немецкие словеса в польской
раскладке? (Why should I receive a document on which is written “otrymannja”? What do I need with all of these vile German words in Polish packaging?) Nikhrist felt very strongly that he should not be forced to work in a language that he chose not to use.
There is little doubt that the “language issue” in Ukraine is critical for many
Ukrainians. As the status of the language changes in society, various stereotypes and attitudes towards languages become apparent. In 2008, many negative attitudes towards the Ukrainian language existed, namely that it is a non-intellectual language, that it is merely a dialect of Russian, that it sounds offensive, that it divides the Slavic people of the country, and that it is unfair to force an official language onto those who don‟t speak it as their native tongue. These stereotypes repeatedly arose in opinion forums online, and even among more official publications.
However, the situation in Ukraine is changing. As Ukrainian is used in more and more schools, young people from all over the country are considering Ukrainian and
Russian both as their native languages. This, combined with the pro-Ukrainian attitude of the government, is changing the status of the language in many people‟s eyes. 29
Already, fewer people are publicly standing behind the negative attitudes towards
Ukrainian. As the new generation replaces the older generation, these attitudes towards
Ukrainian as a “peasant language” will almost certainly diminish.
The research from this chapter provided us with a base from which to develop the current study. Specifically, there were some unanswered questions that remained after this pilot study, and an evident need for a broadening of the scope. The pilot study did not control for (or even determine) location, which is critical, not only with an importance of respondents actually living in Ukraine, but also in order to compare various regions within the country itself. In the current study, geographic location is a primary factor. On a similar note, most of the internet-based data are presumably coming from younger people, and it was important to understand different trends based on age; the current study includes adults of all ages. Additionally, the pilot study did not consider questions of self-identification, although it sparked an interest into this line of thought. Identity, as it turns out, is a key piece to the current study, and many critical questions were developed in order to further explore this topic. Finally, the pilot study only used qualitative analysis, and I hoped to get quantifiable measures with the current research.
This chapter‟s research sets the stage for our current research; in-depth questionnaires allow us to look at the attitudes throughout Russian-speaking Ukraine, and to determine how and for whom the situation is changing. They also provide support for current theories regarding identity, linguistic ideology, and language maintenance. While
30 the analysis in this chapter gave us a good picture of stereotypes that exist about
Ukrainian and its speakers, it also provided a strong foundation for our current research.
Chapter 3: Methodology
The study was designed as a socio-linguistic project and used socio-linguistic methods of data collection and analysis.
3.1 Site of the study
Kharkiv11. While each of the cities is primarily Russian speaking, each has specific demographic characteristics that make its population unique; the responses from the four cities give a full picture of the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine. The following criteria were used in selecting these sites: language dominance, location in respect to the center of Ukraine and Russia, and historical relationship between the region and Russia.
Kyiv, as the capital of Ukraine, is a young, vibrant, and liberal city. As it is the political center of the country, it is also the concentration of positive ideology geared towards the Ukrainian language and there is a strong focus on increasing the use of
Ukrainian. Kyiv‟s population is upwards of 3 million people. According to a sociological survey carried out by the Hromadska Dumka Sociological Studies Centre in
11 The spelling of place names can be a contested issue; some cities have different names in Russian and Ukrainian. In this dissertation, all place names are given according to the CIA World Fact Book. 32
2003, 52% of Kyivans use mostly Russian on a daily basis, 32% use both Russian and
Ukrainian, and 14% use mostly Ukrainian daily12.
Simferopol‟ is the capital of the Crimean region; as Crimea was gifted to Ukraine under Khrushchev, and as it houses a large Russian naval center, many Crimeans consider themselves to actually be a part of Russia. Further, Crimea is the only region in
Ukraine that is considered an autonomous region rather than an oblast‟ (province), which means that it is not subject to the same laws as the rest of the country, including some laws on language requirements. Thus, many in Simferopol‟ consider themselves to be genetically Russian and are less subject to the positive ideology about Ukrainian13. There are approximately 350,000 residents of Simferopol‟.
Kharkiv, in the far east of Ukraine, is geographically very close to Russia, and the entire region has a very high level of Russian speakers. With 70.7% reporting Russian as their nationality, the nearly 1.5 million residents of Kharkiv are surrounded by Russian.
Kherson, on the other hand, is in the south, and is a Russian-speaking city surrounded by Ukrainian-speaking villages. There are about 350,000 residents of the city of Kherson, and while the city is Russian-speaking, 73.2% of the population in the
Kherson region report Ukrainian as their native tongue. Because of this, the residents of
Kherson are pulled in both directions.
12 http://www.wumag.kiev.ua/index2.php?param=pgs20032/72, accessed on 2/11/11. 13 According to the 2001 census, 58.5% of Crimeans gave their nationality as Russian, with 24.4% reporting Ukrainian as their nationality. http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/Crimea/, accessed on 2/11/11. 33
Map 3.114 shows census data from 2001 that lists the native tongue of the various regions:
Map 3.1 2001 Census Data
Map 3.215 shows the results of a KIIS survey from 2003:
14 http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ukraine-Rus-Lang-2001.png 15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_language_in_Ukraine
Map 3.2 2003 KIIS Survey
3.2 Materials: survey
The questions on the surveys concerned identity, language use, attitudes, linguistic ideology, language maintenance, and language stereotypes. There was a mixture of multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions, and the respondents were encouraged to write additional comments to questions. There were 65 questions altogether, with room for qualitative responses on 35 of them. There were approximately
20 questions each concerning identity, language maintenance, and linguistic ideology.
Most questions did not require a qualitative response. Towards the beginning of the survey, approximately two thirds of the respondents gave qualitative explanations for
35 their choices; towards the end of the survey, approximately one fourth of the respondents wrote out explanations.
3.3 Procedure: Data collection
Over the course of eight weeks, I collected responses to 101 questionnaires from people in the four cities. I solicited responses from acquaintances and their acquaintances, as well as approaching random people in parks. Approximately half of the responses came from acquaintances, and half came from strangers; in Kherson and
Simferopol, I relied more heavily on acquaintances, while in Kharkiv and Kyiv, there were more responses from strangers. I chose to use both strategies because gathering questionnaires through acquaintances presented certain biases (such as belonging to the same general social circles or regions of the cities), but approaching random strangers made it impossible to control for variables such as education, and the majority of people who were willing to take questionnaires from a stranger were older women. By gathering questionnaires in two different ways, I was able to mitigate the disadvantages of each method.
I was hoping to get 25-30 responses in each of the cities; unfortunately, during my stay in Simferopol‟, there was an outbreak of H1N1 flu in Ukraine. During this time, the country closed down, with all schools and universities closed, public events cancelled, and widespread panic prevalent. Because of this, it was difficult for me to solicit enough responses in Simferopol‟. I was able to collect responses from acquaintances, but approaching strangers was out of the question, as there were very few people on the 36 street, and those that were out were wearing masks and avoiding contact with others. I managed to get 12 surveys in Simferopol‟, which was not as many as in the other cities
(30 from Kherson, 33 from Kharkiv, 26 from Kyiv). There were enough responses to make the information worth analyzing, but there were times when the relatively small number of responses made it difficult to concretely identify trends. As a result, some unexpected findings in the Simferopol data may be explained by the insufficient data.
This shortcoming will be acknowledged throughout the discussion of findings.
All of the respondents identified themselves as native speakers of Russian, which was a pre-requisite for participating in this study.
3.4 Data analysis
Once the data were collected, the answers were coded and sorted using Excel software, and then analyzed for possible trends. The data were analyzed quantitatively.
Tables were used to present the results, and the results further were broken down by age, location, gender, and basis of self-identification. These were the main variables used in the analysis. The qualitative part of the analysis was added to illustrate the identified trend or take a different angle at interpreting the finding. However, the qualitative data were not targeted by the surveys and do not present the major source of findings in the present study.
Chapter 4: Identity
“У нас на районе не звоняʹт, а звоʹнят!”
In our part of town, they don‟t „call‟ they „ring.‟ -from the song “На Районе” by Потап и Настя Каменских
The way an individual identifies himself is complicated and is constantly being negotiated. Race, ethnicity, class, occupation, and a myriad of other factors play a role in the construction of identity; near the top of the list, as well, is language. For many people, language is not simply the way they communicate, but a part of their very being.
Scholars have long found language and identity to be inextricably intertwined, and this connection becomes clearest when a group of speakers feels that their language is being threatened. As one example, the debate over Spanish in American schools can become extremely heated, even in areas far from any borders and with a limited Spanish-speaking population. An attack on a language is felt, by many, to be an attack on identity itself.
While it is clear that there is a compelling connection between language and identity, the precise effect that language has on identity can be varying. In some situations, language can strengthen the bonds between group members, and in others, language may not be as important as other cultural factors such as race or religion in expressing identity. In order to completely understand the linguistic situation 38 in Ukraine, we must first fully examine how language and identity interact, and what aspects of the Ukrainian culture are relevant to this issue.
In this chapter, I will be examining the theoretical framework of identity: how identity is defined, the scholarly framework of identity which is best suited for the purposes of this study, and the different ways that this framework has been applied by scholars, and how these ideas of identity and negotiation have played out in multilingual contexts. I will also look at the role that stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes have to strengthen and complicate the issue of language and identity, and explore how language and language attitudes affect identity formation and negotiation, both positively and negatively. Once these theoretical issues are understood, the motivations behind the current linguistic situation in Ukraine become much clearer.
4.1.1 Social identity theory
Identity theory has been studied for decades by sociologists, and through the
1970s, the primary focus of identity study was the individual. For many, this made intuitive sense; identity is defined by Merriam Webster as “the distinguishing character or personality of an individual: individuality.”16 In the past few decades, though, it has become clear that an individual‟s identity is dependent on more than simply the individual himself, and actually relies on both the individual and the social groups that
16 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity, accessed on 15 August 2009. 39 the individual considers himself to be a part of. Since then, identity has been studied more as it pertains to the idea of the group (Cerulo, 1997). This idea of “social identity” is widely accepted in current studies of identity; simply put, social identity theory follows the idea that the behavior of an individual reflects the society of which the individual is a part (Padilla & Perez, 2003: 42). In other words, the individual‟s identity is inextricably tied to the social group of which they are a part.
According to Padilla and Perez, social identity theory incorporates three important ideas: individuals are motivated to keep a positive self-concept; this self-concept comes from the identity of the individual within the group; and people build their favorable social identity by comparing their group in a positive way against an out-group. The process of social identity thus allows for group members to construct their identity in a way that feels right, while alienating those from outside groups. It is perhaps as a result of this process of alienation that intergroup conflict often occurs, as viewing an outside group in an unfavorable way is an important part of the construction of identity.
The idea of intergroup conflict becomes more understandable when one takes into account the different needs of the individual. “[S]ocial identifications are guided by two core human motives: the need to be unique and the need to belong. Having a social identity (e.g., ethnic, religions, or national) satisfies individuals‟ simultaneous needs for inclusion and differentiation. In other words, we need to simultaneously fill the need to belong to a social group (e.g., Latino) while maintaining our distinctiveness from another group (e.g., Jewish)” (Padilla & Perez, 43). Social identity theory does not simply explain why individuals may define themselves in terms of the group that they belong to,
40 but it also helps to explain why members of outside groups are portrayed in a more negative light.
Brewer (2001) separates identity into four separate types of social identity: person-based social identities (how an individual fits into a group), relational social identities (how a small relationship group, such as a family, fits into a group), group- based social identities (the collective qualities of the group), and collective identities (the achievement of collective efforts, such as shaping of a group identity, beyond what the group already has in common). In this way, even the idea of social identity is not as simple as it originally sounds; rather, each member of the group is negotiating their own identity in a variety of ways as they construct their individuality and group membership.
This particular way of looking at social identity can help to explain how social identity cannot be a simple concept; an individual is constantly negotiating their own identity in relation to the group as well as the group‟s identity in relation to society as a whole.
4.1.2 The application of social identity theory
As identity is being more completely understood, the application of social identity can be found in a variety of ways. It is important to understand exactly how current theories of social identity are being applied, especially as it pertains to linguistic groups, in order to see the big picture in Ukraine.
When social identity theory was first being developed, it was seen primarily as a collective identity. The members of a group were believed to internalize physiological, psychological, and regional traits of the group, which led to the idea of a unified group
41 from which individuals derived their sense of self (Cerulo, 1997). The idea was that all members of a group retain essentially the same identity, and this identity was determined not by the members of the group, but by outside or higher forces. Cerulo mentions Nazi
Germany as an example of this; the characteristics of the group were set, and the group members adhered to these characteristics.
This theory has been adapted in more recent times to reflect a more social view, known as Social Constructionism: “From this perspective, every collective becomes a social artifact – an entity molded, refabricated, and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centers of power” (Cerulo, 1997: 387). In this way, group dynamics interact with the identity of the individual; each individual changes the identity of the whole group, just as belonging to the group changes the identity of each individual.
Using this theory, the members of the group perpetuate the group identity by reinforcing the characteristics of the group. Cerulo cites gender studies to illustrate this theory, stating that belonging to a male or female group does not, in and of itself, result in male or female stereotypical behaviors, but the members of society and reinforce those stereotypes, perpetuating the identity of the group.
When it comes to national identity, “[a] rich collection of sociohistorical works on commemoration, narrative, and symbolization chart the ways in which actors, particularly elites, create, manipulate, or dismantle the identities of nations, citizenships, allies, and enemies” (Cerulo, 1997: 390). The identity of an ethnic group is therefore enabled by the entire group as well as shaped by it. In this way, the identity of each individual in a
42 national group is tied to the national characteristic, even as the national characteristics are dependent on the individual.
The issue of national identity becomes more complicated, though, because it is on one hand the organic dynamics of a group, and on the other hand, it is often conscientiously manipulated by those in power. Because of this, Anthony D. Smith
(1991) suggests that national identity, which can share many characteristics with linguistic identity, should be analyzed somewhere between social constructionism and the more essentialist earlier views, citing a “need for community” as an important aspect of this type of identity. It is neither simply the characteristics of a group as dictated from above, nor the characteristics of a group as determined and continued by the members of that group, but a mixture.
The most recent type of identity theory to come out of the scholarship is
Postmodernism. The basic tenet of postmodern identity theory is that earlier theories are too constricted in their views of identity. The theory holds that each individual is too multifaceted to be boxed into one group or another, and that working on the idea that social identity can define an individual‟s identity is simplifying the issue (Cerulo, 1997).
Postmodernism has been especially useful in discussing gender and sexuality identity, attempting to break down ideas about strict categories that people fall into.
For purposes of this study, it is important to keep all three approaches in mind
(collective identity, social constructionism, and postmodernism); the group of Russian- speakers in Ukraine will certainly be multifaceted, and will both define itself and be defined from above. The main approach will be social constructionism, as the analysis of
43 the study is based on data recorded during a specific period of time in Ukraine. Social constructionism relies on variables and correlates, which were chosen as the most adequate way to study the situation in Ukraine today. While I do not believe that postmodernism alone can be easily applied to the issue of national or linguistic identity, as both national identity and linguistic identity have relatively clear-cut boundaries and individuals often choose or are given definitive labels, there are certain aspects of postmodernism that apply to this situation. Mainly, identity in a context such as Ukraine can go through re-negotiation on a daily basis, and thus it is important to try to understand deeper, individual qualities; qualitative data from the surveys and interviews will help to shed light on some of these qualities. For these reasons, I will be looking at the situation in Ukraine through an adapted lens of social constructionism, remembering that many of the qualities that are ascribed to Russian and Ukrainian speakers may be given to them from above, and remembering to keep in mind individuals and the way that they may define themselves as well as their group.
4.2 Language and language attitudes in identity formation
Language has been found to be connected to identity, but it becomes even more complicated when language attitudes are considered; the stance members from within as well as outside of the linguistic group have toward the language plays a large part in the formation of the collective and individual identity. In this section, social identity theory will be considered as it applies to language, and language ideology and its connection to identity will be studied. 44
4.2.1 Language and social identity theory
Social identity theory has been used to help explain many different aspects of identity, as stated earlier. Language is certainly an important part of one‟s identity, and especially in a bilingual society, where being a member of a certain linguistic group often plays a defining role in an individual‟s sense of self.
It is difficult to definitively state how language and identity interact, because in different situations language use will carry a different amount of significance. In monolingual societies, individuals may attach little significance to their linguistic group; alternatively, in multi-ethnic societies, many different ethnic groups may speak the same language, rendering its status as a group-marker as ineffective. Because of this, language may be a deciding factor in a group, but it does not have to be (Renan, 1990). In certain situations, especially multilingual societies, language choice may be critical to identity, while in others, it may be far less important.
Looking at language in this light, it is tempting to assume that language is not important to the formation of identity. This is a mistake, however. While language may not be a primary marker in all situations, it maintains strong associations with national and ethnic identity (May, 2008). Regardless of the situation of a given language group, language is often deeply tied together with the idea of national identity. When the political situation of a given language group is such that it is a marker of minority or majority status, the significance of the language in terms of identity is strengthened. “If a particular language comes to serve important cultural and/or political functions in the formation and maintenance of a particular ethnic or national identity, it is important”
(May, 130). Thus, while language may play a minor role in identity formation in certain situations (e. g., monolingual societies), it can be a critical factor in other situations (e.g. bilingual societies).
An example of the significance of language to national identity in a bilingual setting can be seen in the Catalonia region in Spain, where Catalan and Spanish compete for the same space. In this area, the language is perceived by both sides to hold significant value not only for its speakers, but for the group and the nation as a whole.
On one side, Catalan nationalists view Catalan as a symbol of their culture with a long and celebrated history, while on the other, some Spanish speakers view Catalan as a threat to the nation (Rees, 1996). This situation is a clear illustration of how language choice, especially in a highly-charged bilingual situation, becomes connected not simply to the way that people speak, but who people are. “Multi-cultural nations throughout the world are undergoing varying degrees of language-related stress with separatist overtones. In Barcelona, the succinct slogan often seen on „tee‟ shirts and in graffiti, Som catalans, no som espanyoles, (We are Catalans, not Spaniards) hints at independence for cultural survival” (Rees, 1996: 319). While language can play a secondary role in identity formation in many situations, there is no doubt that, given the right political environment, geographic space, and linguistic situation, language is a central factor to identity.
David Kaplan (1994) discusses the linguistic situation in Canada, where French and English groups contend for the same space. He writes that the language policy in
Quebec separates French-speaking Quebec from English-speaking Canada, allowing each
46 territory to use language to determine its social, economic, and cultural makeup. Kaplan shows that the language situation has, through the use of politics and group identity, grown to encompass more than just communication, but has effectively divided Canada.
As we think about the study of identity in terms of social constructionism, it is thus not difficult to see language as a critical part of a person‟s identity. In a mostly bilingual society, language can be a choice, and that choice can help to construct one‟s identity; when the use of that language has social, economical, and political implications, the choice of language can be the deciding factor for an individual in terms of which group they belong to; this can expand to include the role that the entire language group plays in society. Looking at identity through a postmodernist lens, language choice can be seen as a way that an individual negotiates their individual identity, while the language group as a whole interacts with society.
4.2.2 Language Attitudes and Identity
The idea of how language interacts with identity becomes even more complicated with the addition of language attitudes and ideology. In theory, linguistic choices simply reflect the group to which an individual belongs, constructing and maintaining an identity for that individual, and possibly constructing a group identity. In practice, though, there is more at stake than simply the categorization of an individual. Economics and power are certainly important to the choices that individuals make, but the attitudes of individuals and a society as a whole toward a language and its speakers become a critical part of the identity construction; negative attitudes between different groups of speakers
47 can increase the strength of the ties between identity and language, and increased strength of ties between identity and language can increase negative attitudes toward speakers who belong to a different language group.
What is important to remember about language in a multilingual society is that it is often, at least on some level, consciously chosen. Edwards (1983) did a study in
Guyana regarding the use of Standard English, Creole English, and an intermediate code.
What is interesting about this study is that it looks specifically at the way that these languages are used by males in Guyana, all of whom have significant exposure to each of the three varieties. In Guyana, Edwards found that rural speakers used Creole English, urban speakers used Standard English, and new immigrants from the rural areas to the city used a mix, using the least stigmatized forms of Creole English combined with
Standard English forms. Urban speakers view rural speakers, and Creole English, as backwards and uneducated, which helps to explain why they overwhelmingly used
Standard English in the interviews. Conversely, rural speakers in Guyana view urban speakers as untrustworthy, which helps to explain why they choose an identity that links them to other rural speakers. New immigrants to the city face pressures in both directions.
There is nothing that is surprising about this type of data. Linguists have long found speakers to adapt their speech to their situation, and Guyana happens to show a very clear-cut example. However, what is important here is the motivation behind these linguistic choices; attitudes toward one language or another allows for very specific pressure to center around how a person speaks. Rather than speakers finding a common
48 language and accommodating each other, which often happens in register shifts, speakers are choosing to use a language to avoid possible negative attitudes, or to garner positive attitudes, that are held about the language choice.
4.3 Identity Negotiation in a Multilingual Context
It is clear that language and identity are intertwined, and many people feel that language connects them to their personal identity group. In a multilingual context, especially one with changing definitions of power and negotiation of public space, this relationship is strengthened. “In the continuum between those poles are territories still in the process of consolidating a cultural hold on their space. For them the path toward asserting identity is self-conscious and often facilitated by legal codification. Language is now often considered the most important factor in defining who this group is” (Gade,
2003: 429). Although there are many factors that can determine identity, when language and power are in flux, language is often vital to an individual‟s identity.
Gade discusses the “scriptoral landscape” of a given area, which is the way that written language presents itself in physical space, and notes that written language is visible proof of the cultural hold on the area. This scriptoral landscape includes official and professionally produced signs, but it also is made up of unofficial linguistic elements such as graffiti, banners, and inscriptions. In this way, while the official language is legally codified, there is a negotiation of space that keeps language in the public consciousness.
Gade studied two cities, a French-speaking city in Canada and a Catalan-speaking city in Spain, and their similarities with the cities that are to be studied in this paper are striking. In each of these cities the majority language of the city is different than that of the country, and that is the first distinction that comes up when discussing other parts of the country. The inhabitants of both of the cities use language to discuss character differences, as “[m]any Catalans describe their group as being better educated and more in tune with the whole of Europe than are other people in Spain. Reference is made to seny - a word with no equivalent in Castilian - as a special human quality that incorporates common wisdom and a sense of equilibrium that is claimed as a distinguishing feature of Catalans. Quebecois have frequently seen themselves as more fun loving - the joie de vivre metaphor - and less materialistic than English-Canadian”
(434). Gade‟s study illustrates how, in a multilingual context, characteristics are attributed to language groups and entire cities and regions.
These different characteristics push bilingual speakers to negotiate their identity and use their speech as a way to define who they are. Aneta Pavlenko discusses the way that language and identity are intertwined, particularly in situations where there is an unequal distribution of power. Negotiated identities, she explains, are those which can be contested by individuals and groups (2003). In a multilingual setting, choice of language can, and often does, project certain attributes about an individual. For those who identify themselves primarily based on language, their use of language reinforces their status as members of the group. For others, language choice helps to project certain characteristics
50 that they wish to attribute to themselves, and is a tool that is used to support their identity, rather than the primary means of identification.
4.4 Stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes
Stigma can play a strong role in determining how identity is formed, especially when we assume that identity is a social construct. According to Goffman (1963), stigma is a characteristic that is present in an individual that is seen as departing, in a negative way, from the norms of society. One type of stigma, most relevant to our purposes, is tribal; race, nation, and religion, all of which are transmitted genetically and apply equally to all members of a family. Although Goffman does not list language as a specific example of this type of stigma, it fits within his definition, being transmitted through lineages and inflicting families.
Stigma has a negative effect on individuals, and the individual that carries a stigma is often shunned in various ways by other members of society, and that somebody with a stigma is viewed by other members of society as being not quite human. As we negotiate our identity, Goffman argues that people will often try to hide certain aspects of themselves, to minimize the stigma involved.
As Padilla and Perez (2003) point out, stigma varies from one situation to another, as a certain attribute may be normal in one society but a marker of stigma in another.
What seems to be universal about stigmatized attributes, however, is the association of a 51 lack of power with the characteristic; high social standing and power are associated with a much lower risk of stigma. Stigmatized attributes may be anything from mental handicap to gender, style of dress to religion, as long as the characteristic is associated with powerless in society and a minority standing.
Goffman highlights the importance of the visibility of a particular stigma. If a stigmatized characteristic is apparent to everybody who encounters the individual, this characteristic will hold great importance for the individual. Some examples of these types of stigma are physical handicap or race. A stigma that is immediately available to the rest of society becomes, of course, highly significant to that individual‟s identity.
There are other stigma, however, that are not readily visible to other members of society. An example of this type of stigma is sexual orientation. In the case of a stigma that is not visible, the individual has two choices, to attempt to “pass,” that is, to monitor the way they dress, act, and look in order to hide the stigmatized characteristic from those in society, or, as Padilla points out, “other individuals may actually make a conscious decision to display their stigma by wearing signs or symbols that convey their stigmatized identity or engage in collective manifestations that demonstrate their identity with a stigmatized group (e.g., gay pride parade)” (45-46). While it is immediately clear that visible stigma plays a critical role in the formation of identity, non-visible stigma is critical in a different way; for some, it is the fear of being, as Goffman calls it,
“discredited,” while for others, it becomes a conscious marker of identity. Language choice can be seen as a type of stigma that is readily available, especially in a
52 monolingual individual, but it can also be something that is hidden, and some speakers of a stigmatized language may simply choose to keep quiet rather than be discredited.
Stigmatized members of society, for the most part, are aware of the negative ideas that are placed upon their group by other members of society, and, for example, immigrant groups may actually rebel against acculturation if they believe that their group is being discriminated against by the majority group (Padilla & Perez, 2003). The existence of stigma, therefore, often increases the amount of resistance between groups, and may make coexistence more difficult.
An additional factor in stigma, discrimination, and identity is the idea of self- esteem. Self-esteem has been found to be tied up with a strong connection to a group. If a group views itself positively in comparison to an outgroup, individual members within the group have higher self-esteems (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). This fits in with the theories above that group membership fosters identity construction, but it also solidifies discrimination and stigmatization: “Collective self-esteem is not just a reaction to positive feelings toward the ingroup but involves a comparison with an outgroup, and the outgroup often loses in the comparison. People give higher ratings to ingroup members than to outgroup members on the same tasks (ingroup favoritism); and focusing on the negative aspects of the outgroup and the positive aspects of the ingroup (which is inherently part of group differentiation) makes ingroup members feel better about their group” (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 521). In other words, the association of an individual with a group can lead to an increase in negative attitudes and stigma of the other group.
4.4.2 Language Discrimination
Stigmatized language groups often face language discrimination; language groups that are the focus of linguistic discrimination may find themselves increasingly stigmatized. Especially in situations where one language is given obvious preferential treatment and preferred status, the stigma becomes more ingrained.
In the past few decades, linguistic rights and linguistic discrimination have been more thoroughly studied by scholars. According to Paulston (1997), the vast majority of works on the subject of linguistic rights have been done since 1979, much of which is either absolutely descriptive and with little attention paid to the consequences of linguistic rights or strongly ideologically biased. Paulston‟s article attempts to find middle ground, defining linguistic human rights as “derive[ing] from the attempt to link language with human rights, i.e. to re- frame the issues of language rights in terms of human rights, now a generally accepted notion” (76) and discussing the consequences of linguistic human rights.
An interesting point that Paulston makes from the beginning, which is relevant to our purposes, is the tendency of many scholars to discuss linguistic and ethnic groups in terms of minority and majority, although it is better to discuss them in terms of privileged and nonprivileged. The number of speakers of a language may not be indicative of the power that the language group holds.
Paulston describes two different ways that nations‟ policies tend to take linguistic differences into account: territoriality and personality. With a territoriality principle, the
54 language of the territory is imposed on the entire area. With the personality principle, the individual chooses their own language, and the linguistic policy of each area within a territory more or less reflects the linguistic makeup of that area. There are two basic factors that come into play when determining language policy: environment and goals.
If the goals of the nation are perceived as more important than the actual linguistic makeup, the nation is likely to adopt territoriality policies, and vice versa.
In 1996, UNESCO and other non-profits met in Barcelona and designed a
“universal declaration of human rights. Article 3 section 2 states:
“This Declaration considers that the collective rights of language groups, may include the following, in addition to the rights attributed to the members of language groups in the foregoing paragraph, and in accordance with the conditions laid down in article 2.2: the right for their own language and culture to be taught; the right of access to cultural services; the right to an equitable presence of their language and culture in the communications media; the right to receive attention in their own language from government bodies and in socioeconomic relations” (http://www.unesco.org/most/lnngo11.htm, accessed on August 28, 2009).
Although the declaration uses the term “may” with regards to these rights, the basic desire of a linguistic group to have specific access to their language comes across very clearly. This is often reflected in the desire for language choice in schools, official documents, and media.
According to Dunbar (2001), the reasoning behind these types of rights is based on the idea that, as language is fundamental to identity, lack of services in a given language can be seen as an attack on an individual‟s sense of self. Further, many who
55 support these types of rights see language diversity as something that is positive in and of itself, and that linguistic diversity should be supported.
4.4.3 Linguistic Stereotypes
Closely tied to the problem of linguistic discrimination and stigma is the use of stereotypes that are created to reflect beliefs about a certain linguistic group. According to Meriam Webster Dictionary, a stereotype is “something conforming to a fixed or general pattern; especially : a standardized mental picture that is held in common by members of a group and that represents an oversimplified opinion, prejudiced attitude, or uncritical judgment” (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stereotype, accessed on 8/29/09).
According to Kunda and Sinclair (1999), social psychologists generally look at two motivations for the creation and propagation of stereotypes: dissonance theory and attribution theory. In dissonance theory, the stereotypes are created to reduce the amount of perceived distance between two groups, and with attribution theory, the stereotypes help to reinforce self-worth of the in-group members. Although Kunda and Sinclair point out that the idea of motivation for stereotypes was not always without controversy, most social psychologists17 now believe that stereotypes can be motivated by desires.
Furthermore, “for the most part, research on the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning has focused on demonstrating motivated activation and use of cognitive elements, and research has shown that people are especially likely to activate and use
17 See Kunda and Sinclair, pp. 12-14 56 those beliefs, concepts, and rules most likely to support their desired conclusion” (Kunda and Sinclair, 13).
Edwards‟ 1983 Guyana study (cited above) exemplifies this point, as rural and urban speakers made specific language choices based on the least stigmatized form of
Creole or Standard English, depending on their situation; one type of language protected the speakers from being perceived as backwards and uneducated, while another choice presumably increased their trustworthiness. In both cases, the stereotypes about speakers of the other variety of the language allowed for increased distance between the two groups as well as an increased level of self-worth based on the chosen language.
Another example of linguistic stereotypes is found in the Garinagu-speaking area of Belize, where Garinagu speakers carry a stereotype of being lower class and even
“savage,” Spanish speakers are stereotyped as privileged outsiders that are “hotheaded,” and Creole speakers are seen as wealthy and adaptable, and authentically “Belizeans”
(Bonner, 2001). Bonner discusses the various stereotypes that exist for the residents of the multilingual town of Dangriga, pointing out that the influx of Spanish-speaking immigrants has increased the motivation and strength of the stereotypes amongst all of the groups. The situation is complicated, as language choice in this area signifies affiliation with a specific group, but also is seen by many as an indicator of more than communication choice.
“Garinagu possess a more secure position within the imaginings of the Belizean nation than do „Spanish.‟ The precarious nature of Creole status and hegemony, coupled with xenophobic fears of „Spanish‟ takeover, lead some Creoles to reach out to Garinagu as individuals with whom they share an African heritage. The heightened popularity in Belize and elsewhere of philosophies of the African
diaspora, such as Rastafarianism and Afrocentrism, also encourages connections between members of these two groups. However, Garinagu have paid dearly for the possibility of affiliation with Creole Belizean national culture. Optimistically speaking, they have made Creoles their allies, thus forging connections to this other, more powerful local community of the African diaspora. Nonetheless, the price they have paid is the shame that Garifuna youth feel about the use of their native language in multiethnic contexts” (Bonner, 92).
Not surprisingly, Kunda and Sinclair cite several studies that show that people are more likely to apply negative stereotypes to members of other groups when they have, for example, just felt an attack on their self-worth. The example in Belize illustrates this, as negative stereotypes are more strongly applied when outside groups enter the situation, and there is less power and prestige available for everybody.
4.5 Language, identity, and the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine
4.5.1 Relevant Research Questions
When it comes to the current linguistic situation in Ukraine and the role that identity plays in the situation, there are several research questions that must be addressed.
First and foremost, how are Ukrainians currently identifying themselves? If the linguistic situation in Ukraine can be explained by a modified theory of social constructionism, it is critical to understand the way that Russian-speaking Ukrainians see themselves: primarily based on their language, their ethnicity, or their geographical location. The way that Ukrainians self-identify will be critical in understanding current language attitudes.
This question becomes more complicated when considering how Soviet citizens were identified in their passports. Under the Soviet Union, each individual had a nationality listed in their passport, based on their ethnicity. In this way, a native Russian speaker born in Ukraine might either be Russian or Ukrainian in their passport, depending on their bloodline (Bilaniuk, 2005). After Ukraine became independent, the nationality distinction was removed from the passport, and all carriers of Ukrainian passports were considered to be Ukrainian. Thus, in Ukraine, there is a generation of people that may identify themselves based on an old official status; this will certainly be important to understand when deciding just what impact language currently has on identity in Ukraine.
Along these same lines, it will be important to understand whether feelings of identity vary depending on demographics. The way that age, region, and gender affect how people identify may reflect not only the way that linguistic policy is affecting different groups of people differently, but also how the situation is changing.
Is there a correlation between identity and language attitudes? If so, what kinds of correlations, why do they exist, and how do they manifest themselves?
Understanding the way that these issues are currently being played out in Ukraine will help to explain the current linguistic situation. There is no doubt that identity is connected to language; exactly how that correlation works in Ukraine is critical to understanding the overall situation.
Social identity, or the way that identity is constructed for an individual with respect to their status as a member of a group, is useful in understanding the language attitudes that are currently being found in Ukraine. Based on our knowledge of the linguistic situation in Ukraine, we can make several hypotheses about how linguistic attitudes are changing over time.
If the language and identity link is strong in Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine, we should see that language use is connected to other perceived characteristics. In this way, I can expect that the group of Russian speakers in Ukraine expect for Ukrainian speakers to share a perceived set of group characteristics, and people who share those characteristics may choose to speak Ukrainian. Similarly, native speakers of Ukrainian who feel that they have certain characteristics may choose to speak Russian instead of
Ukrainian, and those that speak Russian may be perceived to share certain characteristics.
Although many of the negative attitudes and stereotypes toward Ukrainian no longer have a basis in reality, social identity theory allows us to understand some of the motivation behind these feelings. Russian speakers in Ukraine have found themselves to be a marginalized group, as Ukrainian has gained and maintained status for all official uses. As a result, the identity of Russian speakers as it pertains to the group should be felt more strongly, and perhaps the desire to alienate those from outside groups (i.e.,
Ukrainian speakers) will become more important in order to maintain a positive group identity. The stereotypes about Ukrainian and Ukrainian speakers have been widely felt for centuries; I expect that the elevation of the status of Ukrainian to the official
60 language, rather than eradicating these stereotypes, has just provided Russian speakers with a stronger need to propagate them.
The ties between the members of the language group, if they reflect those in other similar multilingual situations, will extend beyond the language or even stereotypical characteristics, but I expect a strong association between Russian language speakers and
Russia, and an equally strong tie between the use of Ukrainian and Ukrainian nationalism.
It has been nearly 20 years since Ukrainian was made the only official language of Ukraine, and most of today‟s young adults, even in Russian-speaking regions, have been educated in Ukrainian and have spent much of their lives surrounded by official documents in Ukrainian, politicians speaking only Ukrainian, and much of the media being in Ukrainian. Other adults, on the other hand, experienced a sharp transition, and may not have been fully prepared; they have most likely faced more consequences and I therefore expect them to have stronger reactions toward Ukrainian. Similarly, as
Ukrainian gains in strength from west to east, I expect stronger negative attitudes toward
Ukrainian in the eastern areas, and more liberal opinions in central regions.
Thus, there are four hypotheses about how linguistic attitudes are changing in
Ukraine: 1) an expectation that individuals suggest that Ukrainian-speaking highlights certain characteristics of its speakers and that speakers of Ukrainian possess certain characteristics because they speak Ukrainian; 2) an expectation that some Russian speakers will perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers; 3) the connection of language to national identity should be strongly
61 felt; and 4) an expectation for different opinions based on age and geographic location.
While the majority of Ukrainians are proficient in both Russian and Ukrainian, the results of this study will help to highlight how linguistic policy change can affect the way groups of speakers see each other and themselves.
4.6 Research Findings
The surveys, questionnaires, and interviews that were conducted in Ukraine covered a wide range of topics; in this section, analysis is done based on survey questions related to language and identity. Specifically, I will be analyzing questions relating to basis of self-identification and linguistic attitudes, and the correlations between those factors.
4.6.1 Basis of self-identification
Sweeping changes have happened in Ukraine since its independence in 1991.
While Soviet citizens were encouraged to think of themselves as part of a unified system, and thus Soviets above all, the question of nationality was relatively straight-forward: everybody over the age of 16 had a passport, and in that passport was the person‟s nationality, based on ethnicity. After 1991, however, the Ukrainian national passport had no such distinction, and the question of nationality was less official. Thus, there are three main ways in which Ukrainians may currently identify their nationality: based on their citizenship, their ethnicity, and their language. As I examine the way that Ukrainians identify themselves, one of the most basic and important questions is where the sense of 62 national identity comes from. We have seen that in a bilingual society, language often plays a large role in self-identification; the following data illustrate how recipients responded to questions about where their feelings of national identity come from.
Table 4.1 shows the respondents‟ answers nationwide to the questions related to language as the basis of self-identification
Table 4.1 Overall basis of self-identity
How strongly is your internal feeling and self- How strongly is your internal feeling and self- identity connected to which language you identity connected to which nationality is speak better? listed in your passport? Strongly Relatively Not Other Strongly Relatively Not Other connected connected connected connected connected connected 20.2 32.3 47.5 0.0 12.1 27.3 59.6 1.0
Table 4.2 illustrates the respondents‟ answers to the question related to the place of residency as the basis of self-identification
Table 4.2 Overall basis of self-identity (percent)
How strongly is your internal feeling and self-identity connected to the fact that you live in Ukraine? Strongly connected Relatively connected Not connected Other 23.2 38.4 36.4 3.0
From these tables, we can see that more people connect their internal feeling with their geographical location than which language they speak more fluently, and fewer people connect their self-identity with the passport. When I break up the data by region, age, and gender, trends can be established.
Table 4.3 looks at the basis of self-identity broken down by region. The question regarding passport information did not illustrate any clear differences when compared between the respondents from different regions.
Table 4.3: Basis of self-identity by region (percent)
How strongly is your internal feeling How strongly is your internal feeling and self- and self-identity connected to which identity connected to the fact that you live in language you speak better? Ukraine? Region Strongly Relatively Not Strongly Relatively Not Other connected connected connected connected connected connected Kherson 26.7 30.0 43.3 23.3 40.0 36.7 0.0 Kyiv 12.0 32.0 56.0 38.5 50.0 7.7 3.8 Kharkiv 25.0 28.1 46.9 12.9 25.8 58.1 3.2 Simferopol 8.3 50.0 41.7 8.3 41.7 41.7 8.3
Looking at the information by region, we see that those in the highly concentrated
Russian-speaking areas are much more likely to connect their self-identity to the Russian language, whereas in Kyiv, internal feelings of self-identity are much more likely to be connected to the fact that they live in Ukraine. Kherson citizens, while likely to connect their self-identity to their native Russian, also report connections to their geography in greater numbers than those from Kharkiv or Simferopol.
The breakdown of these questions by age is critical to understanding the changes that are happening within Ukraine. As we saw in the research hypotheses, it is my contention that a shift is happening, wherein people within the Soviet Union primarily identified themselves based on language, but now, there is an upsurge in patriotism and a connection is being made between the Ukrainian language and national pride; thus, looking at the following questions by age perhaps allows us to understand the mechanism 64 for changing attitudes of Russian speakers toward Ukrainian and its speakers. Table 4.4 looks at the answers to the questions related to self-identification broken down by age group.
Table 4.4 Basis of self-identity by age (percent)
How strongly is your internal feeling and self- How strongly is your internal feeling and self- identity connected to which language you identity connected to the fact that you live in speak better? Ukraine? Age Strongly Relatively Not Strongly Relatively Not Other group connected connected connected connected connected connected 18-35 16.1 31.1 52.8 13.4 51.9 32.8 1.9 45-80 26.4 32.4 41.2 34.2 22.9 42.9 0.0
When comparing these charts, we see that the younger generation is more likely to connect self-identity with living in Ukraine, while the older generation is more likely to connect self-identity to language.
Although gender can be an important factor in self-identification, the breakdown of the data according to gender in these questions, as well as for the majority of the data, did not reveal any noticeable differences. For the rest of the study, gender will only be discussed when the responses illustrate a clear difference between the genders.
To sum up, there are a variety of ways that Ukrainians currently identify themselves, with the two most important characteristics being language and geography.
The respondents of these questionnaires were all native Russian speakers, and all lived in
Ukraine. However, some of the respondents felt a stronger connection to their native
Russian than the fact that they live in Ukraine, while others strongly connected their identity to their geographic location. Generally speaking, those in areas with a high 65 concentration of Russian speakers and older respondents were more likely to identify based on their native Russian, while those in Kyiv and younger respondents were more likely to identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine.
Because self-identification may be based on a number of factors in Ukraine, it was critical for the survey to be designed in a way that would make it possible to understand not simply the way that people identify based on their own internal feelings, but also the way they identify themselves to others, showing a complex picture of identity formation from above and within, at the collective and individual level. As we have seen in this chapter, identity is incredibly complicated, and understanding the way that people identify themselves both internally and externally, officially and unofficially, will help us to understand how these factors interact and create a sense of identity.
The first question to ask, then, is how people identify themselves – as Russian,
Ukrainian, or other18. Table 4.5 illustrates how all the respondents identify themselves.
Table 4.5 Overall national identity (percent)
When people ask, “who are you?” How do you feel internally? whom do you identify yourself as?19 Russian Ukrainian Other Russian Ukrainian Russian and Other Ukrainian 18.0 72.0 10.0 18.7 43.6 32.7 5.0
18 Most identified themself as Russian or Ukrainian, there were a few Moldovan, Belorussian, and Tatar. 19 It is important to keep in mind that the answer to this question may change depending on the situation. 66
Table 4.6 shows the way that the respondents‟ feelings have changed since the fall of the
Table 4.6 Overall change in internal feelings (percent)
In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change? I felt more strongly I felt more strongly I began to wonder more about No Russian Ukrainian who I am in this country 4.4 27.5 26.4 41.7
Based on these findings, the majority of people identify as Ukrainian when asked, but nearly a third feel internally that they are both Russian and Ukrainian. Nearly half of the participants stated that their identification did not change after the fall of the Soviet
Union, but approximately 25% felt more strongly Ukrainian, and another 25% began to wonder more about their place in the newly independent country.
The overall information can give us an idea of the big picture in terms of self- identity on a national level, but one of the most important breakdowns in terms of the data is the way that perceptions of identity differ geographically. Table 4.7 examines the responses to the above questions, separated by region.
Table 4.7 National identity by region (percent)
When people ask, “who are you?” How do you feel internally? whom do you identify yourself as? Region Russian Ukrainian Other Russian Ukrainian Russian and Other Ukrainian Kherson 10.0 86.7 3.3 13.4 53.3 30.0 3.3 Kyiv 7.7 73.1 19.2 7.7 57.7 26.9 7.7 Kharkiv 30.3 63.7 6.0 30.3 27.3 39.4 3.0 Simferopol 33.3 41.7 25.0 25.0 33.4 33.3 8.3
Table 4.8 shows the regional data on how respondents‟ feelings changed after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Table 4.8 Regional change in internal feeling (percent)
In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?
Region I felt more I felt more strongly I began to wonder more about No strongly Russian Ukrainian who I am in this country Kherson 3.5 17.2 34.5 44.8 Kyiv 8.3 41.7 20.8 29.2 Kharkiv 3.6 25.0 21.4 50.0 Simferopol 0.0 30.0 30.0 40.0
In this data, we can see some interesting trends shaping up. First, those who are in the highly-concentrated Russian speaking areas are more likely to identify as Russian than those in Kyiv and Kherson. These trends are true both for how people identify themselves when asked by outsiders, and in terms of internal identification.
Approximately the same percentage of people identify themselves as both Russian and
Ukrainian in all four regions.
Of all of the regions, those from Kyiv are most likely to feel more strongly
Ukrainian after the fall of the Soviet Union, with few people from any region expressing a stronger feeling of Russian identity. Those in Kherson were most likely to wonder about their place in the country, with approximately 1/3 of the Kherson respondents choosing this answer. For all of the regions except Kyiv, the majority of the respondents answered that their self-identification had not changed since independence.
It is also important to look at the way that the data breaks down by age. Many of the respondents never held a Soviet passport; some of them have never known anything other than Ukrainian as the official language. Looking at the data by age will help us to understand if and how the situation is changing. This is shown in Table 4.9:
Table 4.9 National identity by age (percent) When people ask, “who are you?” How do you feel internally? whom do you identify yourself as? Age Russian Ukrainian Other Russian Ukrainian Russian and Other group Ukrainian 18-35 11.1 77.8 11.1 20.4 44.4 29.6 5.6 45-80 28.6 65.7 5.7 14.3 45.7 40.0 0.0
Table 4.10 illustrates the way that the respondents‟ feelings have changed since the fall of the Soviet Union, broken down by age group:
Table 4.10 Change in internal feelings by age (percent)
In the years after Ukrainian independence, did your internal feelings change?
Age group I felt more I felt more strongly I began to wonder more about No strongly Russian Ukrainian who I am in this country 18-35 2.3 25.0 25.0 47.7 45-80 5.7 28.6 22.9 42.8
In this data, younger people are much more likely to identify themselves as
Ukrainian than older people, and older people are more likely to identify themselves as
Russian than younger people. However, when it comes to how the respondents feel internally, many young people still feel that they are Russian, and the older generation is
69 more likely to feel both Russian and Ukrainian. Similarly, it was the older generation that felt more strongly Ukrainian after Ukrainian independence.
4.6.3 Qualitative findings
Some interesting responses came up in the non-numerical data about identity, many of which made it clear that for many, identity (even national identity) is not as simple as checking a box. As an answer for the question of how a person identifies themselves, one respondent (M., male, 20, Kharkiv) wrote, славянин (Slav). Another (T., female, 24, Simferopol) responded Русская, но живу на Украине. (Russian, but I live in
Ukraine). Both answers indicate that for some, national identity is not clear-cut.
Similarly, when asked how they identify internally, one respondent (S., male, 41, Kyiv) wrote simply, дискомфортно (uncomfortable). In a country where, 20 years ago, people were assigned a nationality, and survey respondents are Russian speakers that carry
Ukrainian passports, these answers remind us that identity is negotiable.
The idea of a connection between identity and geography struck a chord with some respondents. One participant (V., female, 77, Kharkiv) wrote, мы в душе как
русские (in our souls, we are like Russians). The final question above, while seemingly innocuous, brought to light how close to the heart the issue of identity can be. One recipient (T., female, 24, Simferopol), when asked how strongly they connect their self- identity to the fact that they live in Ukraine, wrote simply, я люблю свою страну (I love my country). Throughout the survey, there were many responses that suggested a
70 defensiveness about patriotism, something that will be discussed in greater detail in further chapters.
To summarize, the majority of respondents have begun to identify more strongly as Ukrainian since the fall of the Soviet Union, especially younger Ukrainians and those from Kyiv. At the same time, the questions from this section reveal the complexity of identity in Ukraine, as many respondents identify themselves to others in one way while self-identifying in another. This negotiation of identity helps us to understand how linguistic attitudes function, and why both positive and negative stereotypes about
Ukrainian and its speakers are perpetrated in Ukraine today.
4.6.4 Linguistic attitudes
Everything that we have seen in this chapter about the correlations between identity and social attitudes and stereotypes would suggest that, for those Russian speakers who connect their identity to language, negative attitudes toward Ukrainian would permeate the population, and for those who connect their identity to geography, more positive attitudes toward Ukrainian would appear.
Table 4.11 illustrates the respondents‟ opinion about the Ukrainian language.
This was solicited by two different questions: “What is your opinion on Ukrainian?” and
“When you hear Ukrainian, it seems:” with the options of “sounds pretty,” “melodic,”
“sounds ugly,” and “rude.” Since multiple answers were possible, the numbers may add up to over 100%.
Table 4.11 Overall linguistic attitudes (percent)
What is your opinion on Ukrainian? When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: It‟s a It is its It‟s a language that Other Sounds Melodic Sounds Rude dialect own lost a lot during the pretty ugly of language years under Soviet Russian rule and came back as a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian 5.8 68.3 21.2 4.8 65.6 25.0 8.3 9.4
Table 4.12 collapses the above responses into positive and negative categories (“sounds pretty” and “melodic” are considered positive, “sounds ugly” and “rude” are considered negative).
Table 4.12 Overall impression of Ukrainian (percent)
When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: Positive Negative 90.6 17.7
As we can see, throughout Ukraine, people generally believe that Ukrainian is its own language, and are much more likely to have positive associations with the sounds of the Ukrainian language than negative associations. This is not necessarily true for all subsets of society, however; breaking down the data by geography, age, and basis of self- identity will show a more complex picture.
Table 4.13 looks at the respondents‟ opinions on Ukrainian, broken down by region.
Table 4.13: Language attitudes by region (percent)
What is your opinion on Ukrainian? When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: Region It‟s a It is its It‟s a language Other Sounds Melodic Sounds Rude dialect own that lost a lot pretty ugly of language during the years Russian under Soviet rule and came back as a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian Kherson 3.3 63.3 33.3 0.0 41.4 31.0 13.8 20.7 Kyiv 3.8 84.6 7.7 3.8 88.5 15.4 3.8 0.0 Kharkiv 12.5 62.5 31.3 12.5 70.0 20.0 6.7 6.7 Simf. 0.0 83.3 8.3 8.3 63.6 27.3 9.1 9.1
Table 4.14 combines the positive and negative responses given in Table 4.13..
Table 4.14 Regional impressions of Ukrainian (percent) When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: Positive Negative Kherson 72.4 34.5 Kyiv 103.9 3.8 Kharkiv 90.0 13.3 Simferopol 90.9 18.2
Not surprisingly, those in Kyiv were more likely to answer that Ukrainian is its own language, and that it is phonetically beautiful; Kyivans were more likely to have positive feelings about Ukrainian in general. Those from Kherson were also likely to see
Ukrainian as its own language, but had a more negative impression of Ukrainian than the respondents from any of the other cities. Simferopol respondents had generally positive attitudes toward Ukrainian; those from Kharkiv were the least likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, but had generally positive feelings about the way Ukrainian sounds.
Looking at language attitudes by age will help us to fully understand the way that linguistic attitudes are changing over time, and with different levels of experience. Table
4.15 illustrates language attitudes broken down by age group.
Table 4.15 Language attitudes by age (percent)
What is your opinion on Ukrainian? When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: Age It‟s a It is its It‟s a language that Other Sounds Melodic Sounds Rude group dialect own lost a lot during the pretty ugly of language years under Soviet Russian rule and came back as a mixture between Russian and Ukrainian 18-35 1.9 73.6 18.9 5.7 76.5 21.6 9.8 0.0 45-80 11.4 62.9 31.4 5.7 44.1 26.5 8.8 23.5
Table 4.15 shows that the younger age bracket is more likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, whereas those respondents aged 45-80 are more likely to see Ukrainian as something else, whether it is a dialect of Russian, a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, or
Table 4.16 collapses the answer to the above question into positive and negative responses.
Table 4.16 Impressions of Ukrainian by age (percent)
When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: Age group Positive Negative 18-35 98.0 9.8 45-80 70.6 32.4
In this table, it is clear that the younger age group has more positive impressions about
Ukrainian, whereas the older age group is more likely to report negative impressions of
In Table 4.17, the above data are examined based on self-identification; the first group is those that strongly identify based on the language that they speak best, and the second group is made up of those that strongly self-identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine.
Table 4.17: Language attitudes by self-identification (percent) What is your opinion on Ukrainian? When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: Basis of It‟s a It is its It‟s a language Other Sounds Melodic Sounds Rude self- dialect own that lost a lot pretty ugly identity of language during the Russian years under Soviet rule and came back as a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian Language 20.0 55.0 15.0 10.0 55.0 35.0 5.0 10.0
Geography 0.0 82.6 17.4 0.0 73.9 30.4 0.0 8.7
In Table 4.17, we see that those who define themselves by geography are much more likely to consider Ukrainian to be its own language, whereas those who identify
75 themselves based on their native language are more likely to consider Ukrainian something other than its own language.
Table 4.18 combines the answers to the question on the perception of Ukrainian by the above two groups of respondents.
Table 4.18 Impressions of Ukrainian by self-identification (percent)
When you hear Ukrainian, it seems: Basis of self- Positive Negative identity Language 90 15 Geography 104.3 8.7
In Table 4.18, it is clear that those that identify primarily by geography are slightly more likely to have positive feelings about Ukrainian than those who identify primarily by language, who are more likely to have negative impressions of Ukrainian.
In sum, the data from this section illustrate that there is a correlation between linguistic attitudes, geographic region, age group, and basis of self-identity. Those that are from Kyiv and in the younger age group are much more likely to view Ukrainian positively; similarly, those that identify themselves based on the fact that they live in
Ukraine are much more likely to have positive perceptions about Ukrainian and those that speak it. Conversely, those that are in highly Russian speaking regions, older respondents, and those that identify themselves based on their native Russian language are much more likely to hold negative attitudes toward Ukrainian and its speakers.
4.6.5 Stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian speakers
The final category that will be examined in this chapter is that of language attitudes and stereotypes. In Table 4.19, we see the respondents‟ knowledge and belief in stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers.
Table 4.19 Overall stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers (percent) Do you know any stereotypes about people who Do you believe these stereotypes? speak only Ukrainian? Yes No Yes No 30.8 69.2 48.0 52.0
As we can see in the above table, a large percentage of people throughout Ukraine have responded that they do not know any stereotypes about people who speak only Ukrainian; however, of those who know of stereotypes, roughly half of the respondents believe in them.
Table 4.20 shows the respondents‟ knowledge and beliefs about stereotypes about
Table 4.20 Overall stereotypes about Russian speakers (percent)
Do you know any stereotypes about people Do you believe these stereotypes? who speak only Russian? Yes No Yes No 18.7 81.3 46.7 53.3
The table above shows that the majority of the respondents are not aware of stereotypes about Russian speakers and fewer than half of those who know these stereotypes believe in them.
As with the previous sections, the overall data is important to understand, but breaking it down amongst various demographics will help us to fully understand the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine. Table 4.21 shows regional information about stereotypes regarding Ukrainian speakers.
Table 4.21: Stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers by region (percent) Do you know any stereotypes about Do you believe these stereotypes? people who speak only Ukrainian? Region Yes No Yes No Kherson 42.9 57.1 58.3 41.7 Kyiv 23.1 76.9 20.0 80.0 Kharkiv 25.9 74.1 50.0 50.0 Simferopol 30.0 70.0 50.0 50.0
As seen in the table above, respondents from Kyiv are less likely to know stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, and the least likely to believe in the stereotypes. Those from
Kherson are most likely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, and fairly likely to believe in them. Kharkiv and Simferopol respondents were approximately equally unlikely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, and were neither likely nor unlikely to believe in the stereotypes.
Table 4.22 illustrates the data about stereotypes regarding Russian speakers, broken down by region.
Table 4.22 Stereotypes about Russian speakers by region (percent)
Do you know any stereotypes about Do you believe these stereotypes? people who speak only Russian? Region Yes No Yes No Kherson 17.9 82.1 80.0 20.0 Kyiv 19.2 80.8 0.0 100.0 Kharkiv 19.2 80.8 25.0 75.0 Simferopol 20.0 80.0 100.0 0.0
As is seen in the table above, respondents from all four regions were approximately equally unlikely to admit to knowing stereotypes about Russian speakers, but those from
Kherson and Simferopol were much more likely to believe these stereotypes than those from Kyiv and Kharkiv.
Table 4.23 shows the responses for stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, divided by age group.
Table 4.23 Stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers by age (percent)
Do you know any stereotypes about people Do you believe these stereotypes? who speak only Ukrainian? Age group Yes No Yes No 18-35 27.7 72.3 46.2 53.8 45-80 36.3 63.7 50.0 50.0
As seen in the table above, older respondents were more likely to admit to knowing stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, and were equally split as to whether they believe in the stereotypes or not; younger respondents were less likely to know stereotypes, and were less likely to believe in them.
Table 4.24 looks at the generational differences with regards to stereotypes about
Table 4.24 Stereotypes about Russian speakers by age (percent)
Do you know any stereotypes about Do you believe these stereotypes? people who speak only Russian? Age group Yes No Yes No 18-35 22.4 77.6 50.0 50.0 45-80 12.9 87.1 33.3 66.7
In these charts, we can see that young people are both more likely to know stereotypes about Russian speakers than older people are, and they are more likely to believe them.
While the majority of the respondents overall did not have knowledge of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers or Russian speakers, when respondents were asked to indicate attributes that they felt Ukrainian-only speakers had, the answers were quite different. For this question, respondents were given the option of marking multiple options; specific stereotypes were provided. A few individual respondents marked every answer, and a few left the answer blank, but the majority marked either positive or negative stereotypes. Table 4.25 shows the attributes that all of the respondents gave for
Ukrainian speakers. Multiple answers were possible, so the data adds up to more than
Table 4.25 Overall attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual 5.0 5.0 22.8 53.5 33.7 22.8 12.9
Table 4.26 combines the negative answers to the above question (illiterate, uncultured, simple) and positive answers (literate, cultured, intellectual) combined. Nationalistic could be seen as either positive or negative, so it remains separate.
Table 4.26 Overall attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Negative Nationalistic Positive 32.8 53.5 69.4
Overall, more respondents feel positively about people who only speak Ukrainian than negatively, and more than half of respondents believe that those who speak Ukrainian and not Russian are nationalistic.
Table 4.27 illustrates the above data, as broken down by geographic region.
Table 4.27 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Region Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual Kherson 3.3 0.0 30.0 50.0 36.7 16.7 10.0 Kyiv 11.5 11.5 11.5 50.0 50.0 30.8 34.6 Kharkiv 3.0 6.1 30.0 54.5 21.2 21.2 6.1 Simferopol 0.0 0.0 8.3 75.0 25.0 25.0 0.0
Table 4.28 collapses the attitude in Table 4.27 into positive, negative, and nationalistic.
Table 4.28 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Region Negative Nationalistic Positive Kherson 33.3 50.0 63.4 Kyiv 34.5 50.0 115.4 Kharkiv 39.1 54.5 48.5 Simferopol 8.3 75.0 50
Table 4.28 shows that respondents from Kyiv have much stronger positive feelings about those who speak Ukrainian than respondents from the other regions, which have are nearly equal in their responses, although those from Kherson are slightly more likely to feel positively about those who speak only Ukrainian. Simferopol respondents are the least likely to report negative characteristics that they attribute to Ukrainian speakers, with the other three regions being relatively similar. Those in Simferopol are also more likely than respondents from other regions to report that they believe Ukrainian speakers are nationalistic respondents from the other three regions.
Table 4.29 shows the attributes that are given to Ukrainian speakers, as broken down by age group.
Table 4.29 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Age Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual group 18-35 1.9 3.7 29.6 55.6 37.0 40.7 18.5 45-80 11.4 8.6 17.1 48.6 28.6 8.6 5.7
Table 4.30 combines the answers given in Table 4.28, into negative, positive, and nationalistic.
Table 4.30 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Age group Negative Nationalistic Positive 18-35 35.2 55.6 96.2 45-80 37.1 48.6 42.9
As we can see in Table 4.30, approximately the same amount of younger as older respondents attribute negative characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, and there is very little difference in the percentage of respondents who consider Ukrainian speakers to be nationalistic; however, those who are between 18-35 are much more likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian speakers than those who are 45-80 years of age.
As with previous sections, language attitudes when broken down by gender show no noticeable difference in most of the questions. However, there was a difference in the attributes given to Ukrainian speakers; Table 4.31 shows these attributes, split between male and female respondents.
Table 4.31 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Gender Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual Male 5.7 0.0 25.7 48.6 31.4 25.7 11.4 Female 4.5 7.6 21.2 56.1 34.8 21.2 38.5
Table 4.32 collapses the data in Table 4.31 between positive responses, negative responses, and nationalistic.
Table 4.32 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent) What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Gender Negative Nationalistic Positive Male 31.4 48.6 68.5 Female 33.3 56.1 94.5
Table 4.32 shows that, while men and women are equally likely to attribute negative characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, women are much more likely to attribute positive characteristics than men are, and slightly more likely to believe that Ukrainian-only speakers are nationalistic.
Table 4.33 shows the beliefs that people have about speakers of Ukrainian, broken down by basis of self-identification.
Table 4.33 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Basis of Illiterate Uncultured Simple Nationalistic Literate Cultured Intellectual self-identity Language 10.0 20.0 30.0 75.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 Geography 0.0 0.0 26.1 39.1 52.2 30.4 26.1
As is seen in Table 4.33, each of the first three categories (negative responses) is more widely believed by those who identify themselves based on their native Russian language, and each of the last three categories (positive responses) is more widely believed by those who identify themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine.
Table 4.34 illustrates these categories.
Table 4.34 Attributes given to Ukrainian speakers (percent)
What do you think about people who speak only Ukrainian and don‟t speak Russian? Multiple answers possible Basis of self-identity Negative Nationalistic Positive Language 60.0 75.0 60.0 Geography 26.1 39.1 108.7
Table 4.34 shows that those who identify primarily based on geography are much more likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian speakers, while those who identify themselves primarily based on their native Russian language are much more likely to attribute negative characteristics to Ukrainian speakers. There is also a large difference in the number of respondents who view Ukrainian-only speakers as nationalistic; those who identify themselves primarily based on language are much more likely to see
Ukrainian speakers as nationalistic. 85
4.6.6 Qualitative responses to questions of linguistic attitudes and stereotypes
The questions about linguistic attitudes and stereotypes brought up some strong emotions in the respondents, both positive and negative. When asked about the status of the Ukrainian language, one respondent (R., female, 33, Kyiv) wrote that Ukrainian is a
ПРЕКРАСНЫЙ20, МЕЛОДИЧНЫЙ и БОГАТЫЙ язык (SPLENDID, MELODIC, and
RICH language) as if to defensively preempt anybody who might say otherwise. Many of the respondents brought up the idea of a “clean” or “pure” language; insisting that literary Ukrainian deserves separate attitudes than colloquial Ukrainian, with such responses as: литературный язык самостоятельный язык. То что они говорят в
западной украине, это смесь (the literary language is its own language. What they speak in western Ukraine is a mixture) (P., male, 63, Kharkiv); чистый украинский
очень красивый язык (pure Ukrainian is a very beautiful language) (K., female, 23,
Kyiv); and Ситуация меняется, Украинский был красивым языком, но стал хуже
(The situation is changing, Ukrainian was a beautiful language, but it became worse)
(A., female, 63, Kharkiv). These ideas of a pure language will be further explored in the next chapter, but it is important to look at the way individuals respond to these types of questions, as they help to illustrate the identified trends.
In Kharkiv in particular, many felt that Ukrainian sounds pleasant, but they often qualified their choice. Some of these responses were from L. (female, 70, Kharkiv), who wrote: смотря кто говорит, литературный украинский красиый, другой
20 All caps font in the original 86
украинский не красивый (It depends on who is speaking, literary Ukrainian is beautiful, other Ukrainian is not); D. (female, 66, Kharkiv), who marked “melodic” если человек
владеет (if a person has mastered it); and P., who wrote (male, 63, Kharkiv)
литературный язык самостоятельный язык. То что они говорят в западной
украине, это смесь (the literary language is its own language. What they speak in western Ukraine is a mixture). In this way, the respondents from Kharkiv were able to be positive about Ukrainian, while maintaining superiority over the language that is actually spoken in Western Ukraine; this may be indicative of the pressures from above to accept
Ukrainian as a legitimate language, while allowing respondents to keep their negative attitudes about those who are not in their social group.
Another attitude came up in the qualitative responses that was not illustrated fully in the quantitative responses. On one hand, Ukrainian is officially, and ideologically, stronger than Russian. On the other hand, Russian is, in many regions, socially more powerful than Ukrainian. As a gentleman in Kharkiv was opting not to fill out the survey
(he did not want to have documented proof of him speaking out about Ukrainian), he told me that Ukrainian would never gain a foothold in Kharkiv, even if it was required in schools. Teenagers like his daughter, he said, would simply refuse to talk or associate with somebody if they tried to use Ukrainian in conversation. In this sense, Ukrainian can be the stigmatized factor.
To summarize, while most respondents did not claim to know stereotypes about those who spoke only Russian or Ukrainian, when given possible stereotypes to choose from, I was able to see specific trends with regards to attitudes about Ukrainian and its
87 speakers. Specifically, those from Kyiv, younger respondents, women, and those who connected their self-identity to the fact that they live in Ukraine were far more likely to hold positive views of Ukrainian and its speakers than their counterparts; negative responses were much more equally distributed. Across the board, the idea of a pure language was held up as a higher standard than any mixtures between Russian and
4.7 General Discussion
Identity is composed of many factors, and is constantly being negotiated.
According to the social identity theory, one of the most critical ways that individuals define themselves is by the group that they are a part of, as well as by the group of which they are not a part. In Ukraine, many of the people generally share the same religion, the same general ethnic background, and the same cultural customs. However, there is one marker that separates the country into two very distinct groups: language. Although most Ukrainians are bilingual, the mother tongue of a region has come to symbolize not simply the preferred method of communication, but it also brings to mind the politics of the region, as well as many of the perceived characteristics of the speakers. This chapter, and the survey questions analyzed, helps to show us how identity and language interact in
Ukraine, how various linguistic attitudes are playing out throughout the country, and how it is reflected on different groups of people. In this section, I will discuss the implications of the research, as it pertains to the changing basis of identity in Ukraine, and the
88 implications such identification has for the different groups within the country, including linguistic attitudes and stereotypes.
4.7.1 Basis of self-identity:
One of the most important factors in understanding the current linguistic situation in Ukraine is the basis of self-identification. Because of several reasons, the basis of self- identity in Ukraine is complicated. National identity under Soviet rule was dictated from above in the form of a passport feature; on the other hand, language has been shown to be closely tied to national identity, and since independence, there has been an upswing in nationalism tied to the idea of living in Ukraine. Thus, understanding how and why people are identifying helps to explain all other connections between language attitudes and identity.
The findings reported in this chapter show that overall, in Ukraine, there is a tendency for people to connect their own self-identification with the fact that they live in
Ukraine, rather than their native tongue or their passport status. This gives us a good impression of the current situation, as Ukrainian national pride has been strongly supported, especially since the Orange Revolution of 2004, and where nationality has not been marked in passports since the fall of the Soviet Union. As the majority of respondents did not feel a connection between self-identification and the nationality listed in their passport, language and connection to Ukraine are the most critical factors in identity formation and negotiation in Ukraine today.
Taking this into account, different demographic groups base their self-identity on these two factors (language and geography) in different ways. As we have seen earlier in the chapter, identity is complex, negotiable, and fluid; hence, these factors vary amongst individuals and throughout different groups. In Ukraine, the two clearest demographic indicators that affect how individuals form and negotiate their identity are age and region within Ukraine.
Generational differences are seen throughout the world, and it is no surprise that they come into play in Ukraine, where the social, economic, and political world has changed enormously over the past thirty years: the younger generation is in an entirely different country than the one in which the older generation came of age. As Padilla and
Perez pointed out, social identity theory tells us that an individual‟s behavior reflects their society. The society of the youth today is vastly different than that in which the older generation formed their identities.
One of the key components of social identity theory is that individuals play up the characteristics of their social group while viewing out-group members in a more negative light in order to build their own self-esteem and gain a strong sense of identity. For the youth in Ukraine, the defining groups have shifted significantly. In the Soviet Union, the communist ideal was that all members of the Soviet Union were part of one large group, and the use of the Russian language helped to cement the ties of this group, as did the out-group comparisons to the West during the Cold War. Soviet citizens were able to form their identity against those who were different; at least one aspect that could be used to determine outsiders from insiders was language. In this way, the older generation in
Ukraine had a vested interest in building their identity based on their language, and perpetrating negative stereotypes about those who spoke differently (in this case, those who spoke Ukrainian).
On the other hand, the younger generation is part of an entirely different social group. Ukraine as a country has long been associated with Russia, all the way back to
Kyivan Rus‟, and the independence of the country requires a symbolic separation from
Russia. The younger generation, thus, has a new social group which defines itself in opposition to Russia. The younger generation has a strong incentive to build their identity based on their geographic location rather than language: their geographic location allows them to be a part of a strong, nationalistic, independent Ukraine, whereas basing their identity on their native Russian language ties them more closely to the outgroup, Russia.
In both of these situations, the Ukrainians were able to maintain their uniqueness in the world in opposition to the outgroup, while supporting a sense of belonging to their ingroup. Thus, the changing basis of identity for these groups is not simply an individual phenomenon, but instead, a reflection of the vast changes that have occurred in the country.
In a similar way, geographic location within the country has a large impact on the way that individuals form and negotiate their identity. In some parts of Ukraine, such as
Simferopol and Kharkiv, the ties to Russia are still very strong, with many citizens having relatives in Russia and with frequent travel back and forth to Russia. Because of this, the ingroup for many in those regions is actually not Ukraine, but Russia. For the
91 same reasons as seen above, these individuals have a strong incentive to identify therefore on the basis of their language, which they share with their neighbors to the east, as opposed to the fact that they live in Ukraine, which alienates them from the other members of their ingroup. In Kyiv, however, the political center is built on Ukrainian independence, and all official business is centered on Ukraine. Thus, the citizens in Kyiv have a stronger interest in forming identity based on the fact that they live in Ukraine, which ties them to Ukrainians, as opposed to their native Russian, which ties them to their particular outgroup (Russia).
Looking at the negotiation of identity for different demographic groups in
Ukraine helps to paint a bigger picture about how the social, economic, and political situation is affecting individuals. Identity negotiation and formation for different age groups suggests that there is a large shift occurring in the country over the course of time, with the ingroup of the younger generation being tied to the newly independent country and opposed to Russia, whereas the older generation‟s social group was tied to the rest of the Soviet Union. Likewise, geographically, we can see a change sweeping across the nation from west to east, with the more western and central regions connecting themselves to the newly independent country, and the eastern regions being part of an ingroup that is connected to Russia.
Once it is clear what social group a certain demographic is likely to align themselves with, the identity formation and negotiation falls into place as expected by social identity theory, and the positive and negative attitudes that arise about the
Ukrainian language and its speakers are exactly what we might expect: those who see
92 themselves first and foremost as part of the independent, strong, nationalistic Ukraine perpetrate positive stereotypes and attitudes, and those who connect themselves to Russia are much more likely to view those who speak Ukrainian as members of an outgroup, and to hold negative viewpoints accordingly.
Now that we understand why people are identifying themselves in the way that they do, it is useful to take a closer look at how people identify, in terms of nationality.
Throughout the nation, respondents were overwhelmingly more likely to identify themselves to others as Ukrainian, whereas internally, there is a lot more room to negotiate, with respondents splitting their answers between Ukrainian, Russian, and
Ukrainian and Russian.
As we have seen earlier in the chapter, a multilingual setting allows for and even encourages a somewhat fluid sense of identity. Gade‟s 2003 study showed that the
“scriptoral landscape” in a multilingual setting keeps language in the public consciousness, and this is absolutely true in Ukraine today, especially in regions with a
Russian-speaking majority. While day-to-day business, family life, conversations between friends, and nearly all other personal interactions take place in Russian, the written environment, by law, is nearly completely Ukrainian, and the media is some of each, with many television channels showing Russian programs with Ukrainian subtitles.
Because of this, there is an aspect of identity that is split for many Ukrainians, as they are
93 on one hand Ukrainian and therefore connected to the country, and on the other hand alienated somewhat from the official discourse.
This kind of fluid self-identity is seen especially amongst demographic groups that are caught between two worlds. Identity is being imposed on all Ukrainians from above, connecting language and nationalism, and providing many with a strong incentive to identify as Ukrainian first and foremost. It is also felt by native Russian speakers from below, providing an incentive to identify as Russian. Regionally speaking, Kharkiv is quite close to Russia, and Simferopol has a very strong Russian past; while speakers from these regions certainly feel the pressure from above to identify as Ukrainian, their
Russian identity has a solid base. Kyiv, on the other hand, is the political center, and even if private discourse is in Russian, public conversations, business transactions, and workplaces are often Ukrainian-speaking. In Kyiv, we saw the fewest respondents identifying either internally or externally as solely Russian.
Pavlenko (2003) discusses this when she talks about negotiating identity in multilingual settings; in a situation where identity is truly fluid, and there are options, choice of language signifies an individual‟s desire to belong to a group, based on certain characteristics, or to play up characteristics in themselves that are associated with that group. Because of this, there is often a difference in the way that individuals identify themselves internally and externally. Externally, respondents from all regions use their
Ukrainian national identification as a way to highlight their feelings of national pride, whereas internally, they may feel more strongly Russian.
Kherson is a Russian-speaking city surrounded by Ukrainian-speaking villages. It has neither a strong connection to Russia nor important political connections. The national identity of those in Kherson is the most vulnerable of all of the regions.
Interestingly, Kherson‟s respondents defined themselves to others as solely Ukrainian more than any other region, including Kyiv. Internally, they also self-identified at a high level as either Ukrainian or Ukrainian and Russian. This is interesting, given the history of the region as a Russian-speaking stronghold. However, if we look back to the way that
Smith (1991) views national identity through the lens of social constructionism, it is not surprising to see respondents from Kherson identifying strongly as Ukrainian. As we have seen above, their identity is in a vulnerable position, politically and geographically, and Smith‟s “need for community” places a greater need on Kherson residents to find that community. As the bases of self-identification become shaken, the members of the community risk more by being ambivalent about the community to which they belong; thus there is more pressure to adhere to specific communities.
This vulnerability is shown in the way that respondents report changes after the fall of the Soviet Union. Although a few respondents in Kyiv felt more strongly Russian,
Kyivans were much more likely to report that they felt more strongly Ukrainian, perhaps as a result of the very rapid change of official business to Ukrainian. Khersonians are the most likely of any respondents to feel confused about their place in the country; this is not a region with an inherent connection to either Russian or Ukrainian identity, so confusion is more likely here. As noted above, though, this confusion indicates a
95 vulnerable situation, and leads to more people clinging to the identity that is imposed from above.
When it comes to the difference between self-identification and age groups, we see that younger people are more likely to identify themselves to others as Ukrainian, but when it comes to internal feelings, the 18-35 year olds were much more split than the older group. Much like the data from Kherson, this is most likely an indication of changing times and the vulnerability of the youth. They are pressured from above to feel a national pride and identify as Ukrainian, but geographically and linguistically, many of them feel strong connections to Russian, as well. Thus, social constructionist theory lets us see this in terms of what each group of respondents is receiving from and giving to the community; on the surface, and to outsiders, it is increasingly important for young people to identify as Ukrainian in order to conform to the pressure of society. However, the fluidity of identity and the importance of language and immediate social circles can push them in the opposite direction.
When we look at the data about changes since the fall of the Soviet Union, there was not a large discrepancy between the younger and the older respondents. Those aged
45-80 were more likely to feel more strongly Russian, more strongly Ukrainian, and more confused; this makes a lot of sense once you take into account the fact that many of the younger respondents had not fully formed their identity when the Soviet Union fell (the oldest members of that group being only 17), and therefore, they were less likely to feel any sort of change, or report on it in the survey.
4.7.3 Summary of discussion on identity
As we saw earlier in the chapter, identity is incredibly complicated, and involves a myriad of factors. Social constructionist theory allows us to look at the way that society shapes identity both from above and from within, and when we look at the data from the surveys, that is precisely what we see happening in Ukraine. On the surface, there are pockets of relatively stable identification, whether geographically, politically, or in terms of age. Scratching below the surface, however, we see that certain subsets of
Ukraine are becoming more vulnerable to questions of identity, based on pressures both from above and from within. We have seen that identity in a multilingual context is constantly being negotiated, and Ukraine illustrates this point quite well.
The data show us that, in general, those who are living in Kyiv are more pro-
Ukrainian (both as a language and as a nation), as are those who are between the ages of
18 and 35. We have also seen that those who are living in Kharkiv and Simferopol, long seen as Russian strongholds, are more likely to identify as Russian, to connect their identity to their native Russian tongue, and be less affected by the pressure from the state to feel strongly nationalistic. We see the same with the older group, ages 45-80. We also see, however, that in the vulnerable geographic area of Kherson, identity is much more confusing and fluid; younger people, too, are likely to feel pulled in multiple directions.
This is likely a direct result of their changing position (politically, geographically, linguistically), and the need to feel connection to a group while maintaining strong internal feelings of identity.
Ukraine is rapidly changing, and the identification of the people from Ukraine reflects these changes and the personal disturbance that comes with such strong political and linguistic upheavals. While each person in Ukraine determines their own identity and basis for that identity, there is pressure from the central powers to connect identification to living in Ukraine, and internal pressure that connects identity to language. The results from these surveys reflect such pressures. How people identify themselves is critical to the way that people interact with each other, and is central to the way that language attitudes play out in society.
4.7.4 Stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes
In order to understand the way that language attitudes work in Ukraine, it is critical to look at the data keeping in mind stigma, discrimination, and stereotypes.
Goffman‟s (1963) work on stigma helps us to understand the potential for negative attitudes between language groups in a multilingual situation. As Padilla and Perez point out, the factor that is stigmatized is one that is, in some way, disadvantaged or having a lack of power. In Ukraine, there are two ways in which power is connected to language choice currently: economically and politically, and socially.
In Ukraine, Ukrainian is currently the language of political and economic power.
In other words, an individual that is not fluent in Ukrainian faces a large disadvantage in the country, even in regions where Russian is primarily used; court documents, post office signs, train schedules, and all official writing is in Ukrainian. Further, many workplaces require Ukrainian fluency, such as schools, universities, and government
98 offices. In this sense, Russian language would be the language to carry stigma; the reverse of this is that Ukrainian language speakers are given positive attributes based solely on their language use.
In Ukraine, the choice of Ukrainian for the entire nation is clearly an example of
Paulston‟s (1997) territoriality principle. As we discussed earlier, this indicates that the goals of the nation currently come first in Ukraine. Because of this, the situation for native Russian speakers in Ukraine is in opposition to the linguistic rights laid out by
UNESCO: in many places, Russian is not taught (or is not taught at an equal level as
Ukrainian), there is restricted access to cultural services, there is not equitable presence of their language and culture in communications media, and they cannot receive attention in their own language from government bodies. This directly affects the stigma that can be felt by those who speak Russian natively. We have also seen how, in some places,
Ukrainian holds a social stigma, as Russian speakers form a cohesive ingroup bond, and language can shut people out.
As Kunda and Sinclair (1999) pointed out, situations such as the one above can lead directly to linguistic stereotypes. Because of dissonance theory, stereotypes about
Russian and Ukrainian may be perpetrated in order to increase the distance between the two groups, and because of attribution theory, positive attributes may be given to speakers of each language in order to boost their self-esteem.
Because the stigma and the power vary between the two languages, there is not an obvious language choice for all situations. At times, in certain regions, and in various situations, Ukrainian may be stigmatized; other circumstances can result in a
99 stigmatization of Russian. This complicates the situation, but it helps us to understand how and why both positive and negative stereotypes and attributes about Ukrainian are currently found in Ukrainian society, and how the attitudes break down across demographics can show us more clearly the power differentials between the languages in different situations.
As in previous sections, how an individual determines their social group is critical to understanding the way that these stereotypes work throughout the country. For those who are identifying first and foremost as Ukrainian, because they live in Ukraine,
Russian is stigmatized, and Ukrainian is characterized by positive attributes and stereotypes. For those who identify primarily as Russian, because that is their native tongue, Ukrainian is stigmatized, and negative stereotypes and attributes are assigned to it. In the next two sections, we will discuss the specific findings with regards to language attitudes and stereotypes.
4.7.5 Language attitudes
The overall survey results found that most people in Ukraine see Ukrainian as a separate language, and the vast majority of overall respondents had a positive response to the way that Ukrainian sounds. Given the generally negative feelings about Ukrainian under the Soviet Union, and the findings of the pilot study discussed in Chapter 3, this is strong evidence to the success of policies to increase the use of and positive attitudes toward Ukrainian.
It is important to note some conventional wisdom about Ukrainian, which seems to be known by all but hard to verify. Something that often comes up in conversations about Ukrainian is the idea that Ukrainian is one of the most melodic languages in the world. Although it is very often cited, it is difficult to find the source. The following quote comes from an article about Ukrainian: На конкурсі краси мов у 1934 р. у
Парижі українська мова зайняла третє місце після французької і перської (In a contest of beautiful languages in 1934 in Paris, Ukrainian took third place, after French and Persian).21 However, there seems to be no trace of the actual contest. Regardless, it is in the public consciousness that not only is Ukrainian a beautiful language, but it is internationally regarded as such. Hence, it is not surprising that many respondents answered that Ukrainian sounds beautiful or melodic.
Regionally, the responses exactly reflect what the scholarship expects. Those from Kyiv, which has the strongest political and economical advantages for Ukrainian, and the weakest social advantages for Russian, were most likely to see Ukrainian as its own language, and are much more likely to have positive than negative responses to what
Ukrainian sounds like. Those in Kherson were also very likely to think of Ukrainian as its own language, but were the most likely of all the respondents to respond negatively to the sounds of Ukrainian. Once again, the data from Kherson indicate something of a dichotomy, as on one hand, those from Kherson seem to support Ukrainian, and on the other, they have negative attitudes about it. This is a result of the competing forces that are playing themselves out in Kherson.
21 (http://www.ukrlit.vn.ua/article/1046.html, accessed on January 11, 2010). 101
Those from Kharkiv, which has the least economic and political power for
Ukrainian and the most social power for Russian, are least likely to see Ukrainian as its own language and most likely to see it as a dialect of Russian, although they have a generally positive attitude about the way that Ukrainian sounds - with a caveat. In
Kharkiv, many respondents made sure to point out that standard, literary Ukrainian (such as the Ukrainian from the “international competition”) is beautiful, but that the language which is spoken in the western part of Ukraine today is not. In this way, respondents were able to maintain negative beliefs about what is actually being spoken, while accepting the ideology of Ukrainian (in many people‟s minds, this can only mean the literary standard language) being beautiful.
The data from Simferopol are difficult to fully understand. I would expect the responses from Simferopol to mirror those of Kharkiv, which they do, in terms of the sounds of Ukrainian, but respondents from Simferopol were nearly as likely as Kyivans, and much more likely than any other regional group, to feel that Ukrainian is its own language. This may be because of the small sample size from Simferopol, as discussed in
When looking at language attitudes by age, the youth are much more likely to feel that Ukrainian is its own language, whereas the 45-80 age group respondents were more likely to think of Ukrainian as something else, whether it is a dialect of Russian, a mixture between an older version of Ukrainian and Russian, or other. This reflects the changing attitudes; many of the youngest respondents had not yet made it through the school system when most schools switched to Ukrainian, and therefore, are more likely to
102 accept Ukrainian as a fully functioning, legitimate language; they likely connect
Ukrainian to economic and political power, and, having been educated in Ukrainian, are less likely to feel the social pressure to always speak Russian. Similarly, the age group breakdown showed a difference in the way that respondents perceived how Ukrainian sounds, many more of those 18-35 year olds felt positively towards the sounds of
Ukrainian than those between the ages of 45 and 80; conversely, very few of the younger group felt negatively, as opposed to nearly 1/3 of the older group.
One of the most telling ways of looking at the data on language attitudes is by breaking it down by basis of self-identification. As we saw earlier, respondents were asked to distinguish what they most strongly connected their identity with: passport status, language, or the fact that they lived in Ukraine. Those who identify themselves based on their native Russian tongue are likely to attach a stigma to the Ukrainian language, in order to distance themselves from the outgroup. On the other hand, those who identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian, in order to boost the collective self-esteem of the ingroup.
The analysis of the survey reflects just this phenomenon.
From the data, we can see that those who strongly connect their self-identification with the fact that they are native Russian speakers are more likely to think of Ukrainian as a dialect of Russian, and have a negative view of the way it sounds, and those that connect their identity with the fact that they live in Ukraine are more likely to see
Ukrainian as its own language, and are more likely to think of Ukrainian as beautiful or melodic.
4.7.6 Stereotypes about Russian and Ukrainian speakers
Overall, there were more respondents that did not know any stereotypes about
Ukrainian-only speakers than those who did, and of those who did, approximately an equal number were likely to believe in the stereotypes as not. Fewer people knew stereotypes about Russian-only speakers, and the respondents were less likely to believe the stereotypes. Given what we know about the formation of stereotypes, and the fact that the respondents were all native Russian speakers, it is somewhat surprising to find such similar numbers when it comes to belief in stereotypes, although not surprising to see that many more people knew stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers. Looking at the data from the point of view of specific subgroups, however, makes the picture much clearer.
Regionally, those from Kherson were the most likely to know stereotypes about
Ukrainian speakers, while those in Kharkiv were the least likely. However, while those in Kyiv were unlikely to know stereotypes, they were the most likely to believe in them.
Those from Kharkiv and Simferopol were approximately equally unlikely to know or believe in the stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers. All groups were equally unlikely to know stereotypes about Russian-only speakers, but those in Simferopol and Kherson were very likely to believe in such stereotypes.
Looking at this question from the point of view of age groups, the younger group was slightly less likely to know of stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers than the older age group, but both groups were split fairly evenly on whether they believed the
104 stereotypes or not. However, the youth were more likely to know of stereotypes about
Russian-only speakers and were far more likely to believe in the stereotypes.
The findings on stereotypes are surprising; except for the fact that young people are more likely to believe in stereotypes about Russian-only speakers than the older population, there is no clear explainable trend. This may be because of the wording of the question in Russian, which used the borrowing стереотипы (stereotypes), which does not have the strong connotations in Russian as it does in English. However, this is something that will need to be examined more thoroughly in the future.
When asked about stereotypes in a different way, however, very clear trends became apparent. Rather than asking recipients to describe stereotypes that they knew, this question asked for respondents to check off characteristics that they attributed to
Ukrainian speakers. The choices were illiterate, uncultured, simple, nationalistic, literate, cultured, and intellectual, with multiple answers possible. Some respondents chose not to answer at all, some marked every response, and many chose a few responses.
Overall, the percent of positive responses about Ukrainian outnumbered the negative stereotypes. Throughout the data, there is a strong correlation of speakers of the
Ukrainian language and nationalism. Many of the respondents wrote in answers about their feelings of patriotism toward Ukraine, even though there is no reason that a Russian native speaker might not love the country. However, in the years after the fall of the
Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalism has been strongly connected to the use of the
Ukrainian language, as will be further explored in the next chapter. Thus, overall, it
105 seems that the connection of Ukrainian to national pride and positive ideology are effectively managing the stereotypes that are being associated with Ukrainian speakers.
Regionally, those in Kyiv were overwhelmingly more likely to attribute positive characteristics to Ukrainian-only speakers, followed by Kherson, with Kharkiv and
Simferopol evenly matched. Given that Kyiv attaches the most economic and political power to Ukrainian, this is to be expected; the stigma is likely to be on Russian speakers, and positive attributes assigned to Ukrainian speakers. Kherson is, once again, pulled in many directions and likely to have positive feelings about Ukrainian, as dictated from above. All of the regions except Simferopol reported approximately 1/3 negative stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, with Simferopol reporting far fewer. Kherson,
Kharkiv, and Kyiv were also very similarly matched in terms of believing that Ukrainian- only speakers are nationalistic, at approximately ½ of respondents; 3/4 of respondents from Simferopol reported the same. The data from Simferopol may be skewed because of the small sample size.
The responses, when broken down by age group, are quite similar to what I would expect. The majority of the respondents aged 18-35, who likely attach economic and political power to Ukrainian, felt positively about Ukrainian speakers, as opposed to less than half of those between the ages of 45 and 80. The negative responses were fairly evenly matched, and approximately ½ of each group felt that Ukrainian speakers were nationalistic.
What is striking about these data is not the negative stereotypes, or lack thereof – both regionally and by age group, approximately 1/3 of respondents reported negative
106 stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, with little discrepancy amongst groups. This suggests that little is changing in the way of negative stereotypes over time or geography.
In other words, the stigma that is attached to Ukrainian does not seem to vary depending on demographics, whereas the positive attributes and stereotypes differ greatly. Looking at this from the point of view of stigma, stereotypes, and discrimination, it seems that while the social power that is connected to Russian is steady (and thus, the stigma and negative stereotypes are steady) regardless of demographics. However, the economic and political power that is attached to Ukrainian, and thus, the positive attributes given to
Ukrainian speakers, is being felt much more strongly amongst those who are in Kyiv and the youth. In this case, it is clear that the policies and ideology that are being promoted from the central government are having a direct impact on the way that people feel about
Ukrainian speakers. Nationalism and language use are consistently linked to approximately 50% throughout regions and age groups. This suggests that the idea of nationalism being connected to language is not changing with time or geography, but is already a relatively stable concept.
Although the breakdown between genders did not show a noticeable trend up until this point, it is interesting to note that they follow the same general pattern as the subgroups above, with women being more susceptible to positive ideology about
Ukrainian. Both groups report approximately 1/3 negative stereotypes, and approximately ½ equate Ukrainian with nationalistic tendencies. However, women report positive attributes the vast majority of the time, and men attribute positive
107 attributes only about 2/3 of the time. This seems to indicate that Ukrainian women are more sensitive to the political and economic power that is being given to Ukrainian.
The final breakdown in this category is by self-identification, and it is very telling in terms of how linguistic stereotypes currently exist in society. Whereas all of the other subgroups had similar numbers for negative stereotypes and nationalism, the group of people who identify by language were much more likely to believe negatively about
Ukrainian speakers than those who identify based on geography. Those who identify based on language were also much more likely to attribute nationalism to Ukrainian than those who identify based on geography, and much less likely to attach positive attributes to Ukrainian. This suggests that there is a greater-than-average social power attached to
Russian for those who identify based on their native language, and a lower-than-average social power attached to Russian for those that identify based on the fact that they live in
The other variation in this set of data is that of nationalism and the Ukrainian language. Those who identify based on language report a connection of Ukrainian to nationalism 3/4 of the time, whereas those who identify based on geography report the same connection only about 1/3 of the time, both of which are different from the data I received from any other breakdown of the data. Those who identify based on their native
Russian tongue may be feeling defensive and more in-tune to the nationalistic ideology that has been connected to Ukrainian; those who identify based on their geography, by nature of their self-identification, feel a certain amount of national pride, and, as they are
108 native Russian speakers, may not believe in a strong connection between native language and national pride.
4.7.7 Summary of discussion on linguistic attitudes and stereotypes
Looking at the data, it becomes clear that there are forces at work both in favor of and against the Ukrainian language. Linguistic attitudes, overall, are relatively positive about the Ukrainian language and its speakers, which is remarkable in and of itself, given the recent history of the language under the Soviet Union.
When I compare what is happening across different age groups, geographical regions, and identity groups, current trends of linguistic attitudes and stereotypes come into focus. In terms of linguistic attitudes, the younger respondents and those in Kyiv
(and, to some extent, Kherson) are more likely to feel positively about Ukrainian as a language, and to see it as its own language; this helps us to understand the way that positive attitudes about Ukrainian are moving geographically across the country from west to east, as well as through time, with the younger generation feeling more positively about Ukrainian. Based on what we know about stigma, stereotypes, and discrimination, it seems that the youth and those in Kyiv are connecting more political and economic power to Ukrainian than those of other demographic groups. This suggests that positive linguistic ideology is affecting the groups of people who are less strongly connected to the Russian language in their communities.
In terms of stereotypes, we see similar results, with more positive stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers being held by the young and those who live in Kyiv, followed
109 by those who live in Kherson. What is interesting about the negative stereotypes is that they are consistent across age groups, geography, and gender, showing that there does not seem to be a change taking place in Ukraine with regards to negative stereotypes.
Similarly, nationalism is connected to Ukrainian speakers at the same rate regardless of demographics. However, there are large differences based on demographics in the number of respondents who believe in positive stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers; thus, these positive attitudes are likely in the middle of change, as certain categories of people in Ukraine have accepted the ideologies while others have not yet. This suggests that the positive ideology about Ukrainian, and the connection of Ukrainian to political and economic power, is increasing over geography and time.
Always important in the discussion of attitudes and stereotypes is the issue of self-identification. Although some trends are visible based solely on geographical region, age, and gender, positive and negative attitudes and stereotypes about Ukrainian and its speakers come sharply into focus when broken down by basis of self-identification: those who identify based on their native Russian tongue are much more likely to feel negatively about Ukrainian and its speakers, and those who identify based on their geographic location are much more likely to feel positively about Ukrainian and its speakers. Once again, this likely reflects the way that the respondents understand the linguistic power in Ukraine today.
The political and ideological changes that are happening in Ukraine affect not simply the way that people view the language of the country, but also the way that people view each other. We have seen in this section that the positive ideology towards
Ukrainian is changing the way that people view Ukrainian and each other, while for many, negative attitudes and stereotypes still hold true.
4.7.8 Relevant research questions and hypotheses
Earlier in this chapter, I laid out several relevant research questions. After looking at the results of the analyses, I can now shed light on the answers to these questions.
First, I wondered how Ukrainians are currently identifying themselves. It is obvious that Ukrainians are identifying themselves in multiple ways, and that there is no clear-cut answer. Even in individuals, there is some fluidity between the way that they identify themselves to outsiders and the way that they feel inside. However, the former role of the identification in the passport is diminishing with time, and more Ukrainians are identifying themselves based on their language or the fact that they live in Ukraine.
Of those, more young people and people in Kyiv are likely to identify themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine, with respondents from Kherson not far behind.
Those in Simferopol and Kharkiv, as well as older respondents, are more likely to identify themselves based on their native tongue. This split in how people identify themselves is more important in the explanation of different linguistic attitudes in
Ukraine than the simple split of Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers.
In the course of determining how people identify themselves, it has become clear that, for many purposes, gender is not a significant factor in self-identification, although age and geography are.
I also posed a question about the connection of language attitudes and identity in
Ukraine, and, in the course of the research, it has become very clear that language attitudes and self-identification are strongly correlated. Those who identify themselves based on their native Russian tongue are much more likely to hold negative views and stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers than those who identify on the basis of geography, who are much more likely to connect positive attributes to Ukrainian and its speakers.
I also listed several hypotheses earlier in the chapter that should be revisited. The first was an expectation that individuals suggest that both Ukrainian-speaking highlights certain characteristics of its speakers and that speakers of Ukrainian possess certain characteristics because they speak Ukrainian. I found this to be true, with varying results.
Once again, the issue of self-identity is at the forefront with this question, as those who identify based on language are more likely to believe in negative stereotypes about
Ukrainian speakers; they are also more likely to believe in a connection between nationalism and Ukrainian speakers, meaning that those who feel strongly nationalistic are likely to choose Ukrainian. Other respondents, who do not have as strong of a connection between identity and language, are also likely to believe certain stereotypes about Ukrainian speakers, but they are much more likely to believe in positive stereotypes and characteristics.
Second, I expected that some Russian speakers will perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers; this is absolutely true, and the correlation, as discussed above, is on what basis the speaker self-identifies. If the
112 speaker self-identifies based on language, they are much more likely to perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers.
My third hypothesis was that the connection of language to national identity should be strongly felt; this was felt, across the board, by approximately half of the respondents. This does not seem to be dependent on geography, age, or gender.
Finally I expected different opinions based on age and geographic location, which was absolutely true. Age and geographic location helped us to understand how the situation is changing over time and as Ukrainian spreads from west to east. Additionally, basis of self-identification played a large role in the way that people view Ukrainian, and gender, while generally not a distinguishing feature for language and identity, made a difference when it came to stereotypes about Ukrainian.
Russian speakers in Ukraine are in an interesting position. Twenty years ago,
Russian was the language of power, and, especially in cities and in the east, was the language of majority. During this time, the use of Ukrainian was often stigmatized, as many people believed that it was only fit for a peasant lifestyle and could not be used for serious work. Now, however, the tables have turned, and in many places, especially
Western Ukraine, Russian is perceived as the language of the oppressors, or, at the very least, a symbol of life before independence. Ukrainian, on the other hand, has been connected by policy and ideology to national pride and independence.
Because of the multilingual status of Ukraine, identity is constantly being negotiated; this is especially seen amongst Russian speakers living in regions with high levels of positive Ukrainian-based ideology, and amongst the younger subset of Russian speakers. On the surface, it seems that there is a split in Ukraine based on native language, and there is; more importantly, however, is the way that people connect their identity to their language and their nation. Those who connect their identity to Ukraine are increasingly showing positive attitudes and stereotypes toward the Ukrainian language and its speakers, while those who connect their identity to their native Russian tongue are more likely to perpetuate the old, negative stereotypes about Ukrainian.
The linguistic situation in Ukraine is complicated and nuanced, but in understanding the way that identity affects people‟s attitudes toward each other, we can more fully understand how stereotypes and attitudes, both positive and negative, arise in society, and how linguistic policy and ideology affects such phenomena. Further, looking at changing identity and how this connects to attitudes and stereotypes allows us to better predict the direction in which Ukraine is heading, both in terms of time and geography; such understanding can also help to illuminate various multilingual situations the world over.
Chapter 5: Ideology
An understanding of linguistic ideology is critical to understanding the way that the linguistic situation is unfolding in Ukraine. In this chapter, I will be looking at what linguistic ideology entails, current theories in linguistic ideology, language and power, the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine, and research findings from my study that pertain to linguistic ideology.
Linguistic ideology has been defined by Michael Silverstein (1979) as “any sets of beliefs about language articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification for perceived language structure and use” (193). These sets of beliefs are often used as a way to view language as a commodity of sorts – owned by its speakers and containing intrinsic value that can be judged against other languages or other versions of the same language.
Linguistic ideology as such can be a way for people to forge a connection between language and power. In the case of the contemporary linguistic situation in
Ukraine, there are two main ways that linguistic ideology comes into play: the first is the relatively recent connection of the Ukrainian language to “real” Ukrainian national pride and culture (and, subsequently, the disconnect between the Russian language and
Ukrainian national pride and culture), and the second is the long-standing idea of a
“clean, pure” Ukrainian (or Russian) being superior to the “dirty” mixture of the two. In both cases, those who владеют (possess) literary Ukrainian language are currently in a position of political and social power in Ukraine, while those who speak Russian or the
“impure” mixture known as Surzhyk are increasingly disenfranchised.
5.1 Linguistic Ideology
Woolard (1998) discusses four “strands” of linguistic ideology that are discussed by most scholars today in terms of linguistic research: 1) ideology as a mental phenomenon, connected to ideas and beliefs, 2) ideology as derived from the experience of a specific social position, 3) ideology as a direct link to power, as the tool of the dominant group in society, and 4) ideology as rationalization, a way of distorting the truth. When looking at ideology in certain ways, especially the third and fourth strands, it can be seen as a distinctly negative phenomenon, one which provides rationalization for power that is perhaps undeserved. On the other hand, as in the case of the first and second strands, linguistic ideology may be seen in a more neutral light, reflective simply of the way that people view the world.
While all four strands of ideology are legitimate ways of studying the phenomenon, for purposes of this research, the most important aspects of linguistic ideology are the third and fourth strand that Woolard mentions. In Ukraine, there is a direct connection of language (certain language) to power, and beliefs about Ukrainian and Russian, whether based in fact or not, rationalize attitudes and stereotypes about speakers. 116
5.1.1 Theories of Linguistic Ideology
Throughout history, linguistic ideology has had a somewhat marginal role in the study of linguistics. While acknowledged, it was generally seen as secondary to formal linguistic data; Leonard Bloomfield considered it a detour from primary data, and modern linguists who follow in his traditions have seen linguistic ideology as potentially impacting written language, but much less significant for speech (Woolard, 1998).
Michael Silverstein was instrumental in changing the way that linguists viewed ideology, asserting that language is “an unstable mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms contextualized to situations of interested human use mediated by the fact of cultural ideology” (1985: 220); the ideas that people have about language can and do shape the use of the language, affecting the structure. Silverstein used as an example the
Quakers‟ use of the informal variant “thou,” and the way that this was perceived, as a direct reason for the nearly complete adoption by the English community of the formal variant “you.” Different definitions of linguistic ideology do allow for different interpretations of how ideas about language are reflected in the structure of the language itself, which leaves room for debate amongst linguists as to the value of the study of linguistic ideology. For this paper, though, Silverstein‟s interpretation of linguistic ideology and its importance to linguistic analysis in general is the approach that I will be using: the beliefs that people hold about language shape the usage of the language, as well as the language itself.
5.2 Language and Power
It is said that the 15th century Spanish scholar Antonio de Nebrija suggested that
Christopher Columbus conquer the Native Americans through the use of language, rather than by means of physical force (http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Antonio-de-
Nebrija). While the early European settlers did not exactly take this route, the idea serves to illustrate the compelling connection between language and power. In both institutional and social situations, the use of a specific language or type of language can be seen as a way to gain access to power and status.
Overtly, language has long been used to express symbolic domination of one linguistic group over another, both by granting power to people who manipulate the language well, and by restricting power to those who cannot. As Heller (1995) writes:
“Language is central to institutional processes of symbolic domination, since conventional language practices serve to establish the normality, the everydayness of institutional processes. Language norms are a key aspect of institutional norms, and reveal ideologies which legitimate (or contest) institutional relations of power. The forms of knowledge which are privileged as expert knowledge in institutions, and taken to be inherently better for the accomplishment of institutional goals, are linked to the knowledge which is the cultural product of dominant groups. These forms of knowledge are constituted through social interaction, as is the value accorded them. By according legitimacy to certain forms of knowledge over others, and by restricting access to valued knowledge, groups can wield power” (372-373).
In this way, language is a key which explicitly allows for certain people to maintain their position of power, often to the exclusion of others.
Heller (1995) writes specifically about the linguistic situation in Canada, asserting that in multilingual societies, the connection between power and language is often quite visible. Especially in Quebec, the use of French and English are key to social mobility,
118 but since not everybody has equal access to the learning of both languages (and many of the schools in Quebec are monolingual Francophone schools, so as to maintain the
French language), language has been one way in which minorities and lower-class citizens of Canada have been excluded from power.
Manning (2002) writes about a “linguistic division of labor” in Welsh slate quarries in the 19th century. During this period, there was a distinct division along ethnic and cultural lines, which was most clearly seen in language use. Those who spoke
English were in a position to own the companies and be in management positions, which provided a visible link between language and power. Those who spoke Welsh maintained their own type of power, controlling what actually happened within the quarries, and the idea of Welsh-speakers being more able to work with the rocks was apparent in the way that the jobs were spoken about (hence, the title of Manning‟s article:
“The Rock Does Not Understand English”). In this sense, language reinforced divisions of power and control, and both Welsh speakers and English speakers used their linguistic knowledge to justify their positions, and specific types of power, in the quarries.
Queen (2003) describes the situation in Germany, which has long considered itself to be a monolingual nation, but with an increase in immigration from Turkey is becoming multilingual. Queen points out the political capital involved with linguistic knowledge, and that being natively fluent in German is often the key to social, political, and economic gain. In this example, the negative attitudes toward Turkish immigrants is reinforced by linguistic policy, in an attempt to “encourage Turks to return to Turkey”
(201). Once again, we see that language is used as a tool for some to maintain power, while others are excluded from positions of control and power because of language.
Another example of a clear connection between language facility and power is given by MachEachern (2002), who writes about the people living in the Mandara
Mountains in Cameroon and Nigeria. Although the different groups of people in these mountains spoke different (but related) languages and had contentious histories amongst themselves, they were able to come together and, using common linguistic knowledge and multilingualism, effectively resist European colonialism. The lack of linguistic knowledge by the Europeans resulted in fruitless conquests, and the Mandara populations
“used language in a very competitive attempt to order their complex world to their best advantage” (39). In this example, language proficiency clearly allowed one group of people to maintain power and resist another group‟s attempt at domination.
The above are all examples of fairly overt connections of language to power; in some situations, language policy dictates which linguistic group controls the political, social, and economic power, while in others, social norms influence which opportunities certain languages allow or forbid for their speakers. There are more subtle ways that language and power interact, though, from situations of discrimination to stereotypes about speakers, which also impact speakers profoundly.
Echeveria (2003) looks at the way the Basque language is used in Spain, and concludes that language, nationality, and gender are tied together, often subtly removing power from women in the community. Basque is encouraged in terms of national pride, but the system of honorifics in Basque indexes masculinity, and Echeveria contends that
120 this creates a link between the Basque language, authentic Basque nationalism, and men.
While this is in no way as distinct as language policy providing for certain possibilities for speakers of one language over another, the way that language is used can also be shown to give certain members of a society power and prestige over others.
The history of African American Vernacular English (AAVE) in America is another illustration of language and power dynamics. Morgan (1994) discusses some of the theories of AAVE, as well as some of the challenges facing scholars, much of which is tied up with the implicit assumptions that were made at the time about speakers of
AAVE. She discusses the way that differences of the African American community from the white community were seen by some scholars as “deviant” or “pathological,” and points to the fact that language was used as a marker for many of these supposed traits.
Morgan asserts that in the 1990s, when AAVE was just beginning to be taken seriously as a dialect, many considered AAVE to be substandard, and thus, a barrier to successful social navigation.
When language is seen as a commodity, it can easily be connected to power, as with any commodity. Those that “own” what is perceived as the correct language, or the correct version of the language, often have access to economic, social, and political capitol that might otherwise be obstructed from them. This can be seen in overt ways, if linguistic policy requires a certain type of language to be used in certain arena such as school and government, or in more subtle ways, as people make assumptions about speakers based on the values that are attributed to the way that they talk.
5.2.1 Linguistic ideology and nationalism
Language, it has been said, is a dialect with an army and a navy. In similar ways, many people believe that until a group of people has its own language, it cannot be seen as a nation. This has shown itself to be true in recent years with new independent nations rising along with their local tongue. In this section, I will look at why language and nationalism are often linked together, and discuss examples of this phenomenon.
Stephen Barbour (2000) describes the relatively new phenomenon of language and nationalism being linked together, explaining it as a particularly European occurrence, and one that is only a few centuries old (although globally accepted at this point). Barbour brings up the examples of the Netherlands, Britain, and France, each of which had significant linguistic minorities, but developed a single, national majority language in an effort to unify the citizenry. Other political states tended to look toward these examples, seeing the monolingual nature of the state as facilitating cooperation between citizens. When Germany followed this path in the early 1800s, the history of
German scholarship allowed for strong influence on other countries, and the link between language and nationality was cemented. Since that time, there has been an increase in the phenomenon of national languages chosen specifically in order to facilitate nationalism, and subsequently, nationalism in these countries has been increased on the basis of shared languages throughout Europe.
Spolsky and Shohamy (2000) discuss language policy as a means to create a national identity, wherein knowledge of a specific language takes on a much stronger symbolic value than one of simple communication, “learning X-ish because you are or
122 want to be an X” (25). Spolsky and Shohamy explain this type of linguistic policy as a tool for nation building, promotion of identification with the nation, and assertion of the power of the central elite. They point out that newly independent nations often choose a national language together with a national flag, in order to unite their nationalistic movements. One such situation is the only existing example of a complete language revival in Israel, where Hebrew, which had been used only for literary and sacred practices, became the language of everyday speech through conscious manipulation of language policy. Also of note is the relatively common practice of newly independent nations to use their national language in theoretical opposition of the colonial language, despite this not being the most efficient path for communication.
Cohen (2003) brings up French as something that scholars often point to as one of the birthplaces of linguistic nationalism. France, he states, has been seen as the archetype for the one-nation-one-language model, and points out the French fixation with maintaining proper French. According to Cohen, the French state imposed French over the country, especially over the local language of Occitan, in order to maintain central authority; this policy was continued as France acquired other territories and helped to create a common national identity. Interestingly, while many scholars point to France as an early example of language ideology connecting nationalism to language, Cohen maintains that the process was almost accidental, a result of depoliticizing language in a territory that they wanted to acquire. Although Cohen states that France has “the notables of an isolated, Occitan-speaking mountain region in the western Pyrenees to thank for their national language” (182), the outcome has been the same – French was perceived as
123 a unifying force in France, and other countries and policies have followed suit, in an effort to use language to maintain control and build a national identity.
Friedman (2003) points to the increased connection between linguistic identity and national identity in Macedonia, shifting from the earlier connection between religion and identity; this allows for complicated inter-ethnic conflict, as language and religion both play a role. In nearby Bulgaria, Macedonian is often seen as simply a dialect of
Bulgarian, which symbolically suggests that Macedonian identity is not as complex or status-worthy as Bulgarian national identity. Thus, the same language in two neighboring areas is on one hand an emblem of a nation and on the other, not even considered a language
Errington‟s (1998) description of the Indonesian state language further illuminates the way that language and nationhood are often interconnected. In Indonesia, after World
War II, the Indonesian language was an artificially created dialect, spoken only by a few million native speakers; now it is a fully functioning language, and a concrete symbol of the Indonesian state. “Because Indonesian is conspicuously unattached to any politically salient ethnic native-speaking community,” Errington writes, “it is quite transparently related to the institutional infrastructure of the Indonesian state” (272). This is an instance where, rather than one language being chosen for its connection to the nation, and the ideologies about that language enhanced, the language was created in order to fit the needed ideologies. This is an excellent example of how feelings of national pride can support and cause the spread of one language throughout a state.
Tornquist-Plewa (2000) examined the linguistic situation in Eastern Central
Czech Republic. Each of these nations has a rich history of super-ethnic state-nations, and in the 19th century, nationalism, language, and identity became increasingly important in the citizens‟ lives. This gave pressure to ethnic minorities in each nation to learn the dominant language, and each of the nations moved towards monolingualism.
When oppressive regimes swept through the region, language was used to unify the people. Tornquist-Plewa explains that, in Eastern Central Europe, language has had three functions as nations develop: a means of communication, a marker of common identity, and a symbol for group unity.
Since the 18th century in Europe, language and nationalism have become linked.
Although language‟s primary use of communication has never changed, the ideology behind language has allowed for speech to symbolize more than the way a given person speaks, but among other things, is used as an indication of national pride. From the point of view of the nation, using language to unify the people makes sense, and helps to facilitate communication and cooperation among all people. From the point of view of linguistic minorities within these nations, however, the increasing connection between language and national pride only serves to disenfranchise them and limit their economic, social, and political opportunities.
5.2.2 Linguistic ideology and purism
Along with the connection of language to nationalism, linguistic ideology is important for the study of language in Ukraine when it comes to the idea of linguistic purity. In many linguistic communities in the world, it is believed that language exists as an object that can and should be pure. Often, this “pure” language is the language that is reflected in the standard, literary version of a language, determined by authorities and adhered to by written artifacts. According to Woolard and Schieffelin (1994), beliefs of good and bad language have existed in every linguistic community, but the specific belief in superimposed, codified languages is connected to writing systems, centers of power, and European linguistic communities. In communities where language correctness is connected to the standard language, ideologies often allow for a connection not simply to
“right” and “wrong” speech, but for condoned speech patterns to encompass moral qualities that are connected to the overall culture. Two examples that Woolard and
Schieffelin give are clarity and truthfulness (64). Thus, failure to conform to the given language norms may result in moral indignation.
The way that language purity plays out across cultures is, according to Woolard and Schieffelin, unpredictable. Generally, the means of keeping a language pure are directly tied to the politics of the culture; for some cultures, maintaining linguistic customs that are in line with religious traditions may be how pure language is defined, while in others, resistance to outside contact, specifically contact with languages that are tied to cultures that are seen as opposed to that of the given linguistic culture, may be the most important factor (1994).
Bloomfield (1927) specifically examined the idea of “correct” language and a standard, literary form of the language. To begin, he points out that, when a literary language exists, it originally is created in order to reflect speech; it is ironic, then, that speech is then expected to reflect the literary language. In situations where linguistic purity is held as an expectation by speakers, the literary language is often pointed to as not simply the yardstick against which to judge spoken language, but also as the reason for such judgment. However, Bloomfield studied the Menomini Indians of Wisconsin, a language group with no written standard, and found them to have similar views on correct and incorrect language. Rather than the literary language being the cause of such linguistic ideology, Bloomfield suggests that it is simply a tool by which people implement their inherent beliefs:
“The nearest approach to an explanation of "good” and "bad" language seems to be this, then, that, by a cumulation of obvious superiorities, both of character and standing, as well as of language, some persons are felt to be better models of conduct and speech than others. Therefore, even in matters where the preference is not obvious, the forms which these same persons use are felt to have the better flavor. This may be a generally human state of affairs, true in every group and applicable to all languages, and the factor of Standard and Literary Language versus dialect may be a superadded secondary one” (439).
This is important to keep in mind when discussing linguistic purity. While speakers of a language may connect their beliefs about linguistic purity to a literary standard, and connect positive moral qualities of their culture to that literary standard, the existence or lack of a written language does not seem to affect the way that people idealize “correct” language. Instead, beliefs about correct, pure language seem to be inherent in speakers,
127 and tied to the language of a certain set of people (usually the elites or ruling class), and the literary standard is simply a means of justifying those beliefs.
Belief in correct and incorrect language has lasting effects on speakers within the speech community. Those who have mastered the “correct” version, often those who already have access to economic, social, and political power, are able to maintain their status in society. In an article entitled “On the Language of Lower-Class Children,”
Cohn (1959) discusses the then-current attitudes toward “lower class” language, with the overarching goal of convincing teachers to respect the non-standard versions. Even with his point of view tending toward acceptance, the article was filled with justifications for discrimination against the non-standard English, such as the following: “Students of the problem seem to agree that standard English, which has a more elaborate syntax, is far superior to lower-class English for purely intellectual purposes” (436), implying that
“lower-class” English just was not suitable for high-level thought.
Interestingly, Cohn‟s article manages to get to the real issue when it comes to ideas about standard and nonstandard language. He suggests that teachers in the school system become more tolerant toward the non-standard version of English, and writes:
“The writer does not expect his suggestions to find wide acceptance at this time. We fear lower-class speech and are inclined to give it no quarter. The more precarious our social status in the higher classes - that is, the closer we are to the line that divides the middle from the lower classes or the more recent our ascent from the lower strata - the more insistent we are on the purity of our linguistic credentials” (439). As with many cases of
128 linguistic ideology, the beliefs are used to maintain the status quo, and ensure that those with certain types of economic, social, and political power manage to preserve them.
MacAulay (1973) studied three non-standard versions of language -
African American English in the United States to test beliefs about standard language. At the time of his article, MacAulay believed that many scholars were using the term “non- standard” as a euphemism for “sub-standard,” and held beliefs that the standard versions of languages were the correct versions. It follows from this that many believed that speakers of non-standard language were incapable of using the standard, which is why the non-standard versions managed to exist. To justify their beliefs, the general functions of standard languages were seen as being unifying, separatist, prestigious, and giving a frame of reference. If the standard languages managed to function in these ways, it would only make sense that they were superior to non-standard languages, which held no such functions.
However, these functions are not necessarily true when it comes to actual languages; in Switzerland, the non-standard version tends to be unifying and separatist, and both German and Schwyzertutsch are prestigious and give a frame of reference in their own way. In other words, MacAulay asserts, what had been seen as the functions of a standard language are actually functions of any language. The linguistic situation in
Glasgow is similarly troublesome for those who hold that standard language is of a better quality than non-standard versions; MacAulay points out that the speakers in Glasgow align their language with national pride, and in some senses choose to maintain the
129 phonological distinctions from the standard. This is at odds with the earlier held beliefs that all speakers would choose to use the standard language, if only they had access to it.
This is further illustrated by African American Vernacular English; MacAulay writes that many speakers of this dialect at the time were able to switch freely between the dialects, depending on the situation. Thus, the belief that non-standard versions of English were surviving simply because speakers were unable to attain fluency in standard English was proven to be not true.
MacAulay‟s (1973) article helps to illuminate the way that many, including linguists, have approached the idea of standard and non-standard language. As with
Cohn‟s (1959) article, much of the work seemed to be focused on justifying the superiority of the standard language, in which all scholars had been educated (and, as much of language education is focused on correct and incorrect usage, it is not surprising that those who excelled in the educational system were defending this ideology). The effect of this kind of thinking is more than simple philosophizing; because of usages of language that vary from the given standard, speakers have often been characterized as uneducated, unable to process higher-level thoughts, and ineligible for elite positions in society.
Lippi-Greene (1994) gives a more contemporary view of the affects of the ideology surrounding standard and non-standard language. She begins her article with the story of an Indian woman being fired from her job as a librarian based on her non- native English (although she had been studying English for 20 years and was competent in her position), then explores the way that standard English is supported in America, and
130 non-standard English is undermined. Standard English is taught in the schools and it is used in the media; this provides for a culture wherein non-standard English is discriminated against. On an official level, though, Lippi-Greene discusses the law that forbids employers from discriminating against people because of national origin, including based upon their linguistic characteristics. However, she asserts, 10% of companies from a nationwide survey admit to discriminating based on language, refusing to hire people who don‟t “speak right.” This does not include those who discriminate in subtle ways. There are a relatively small number of cases that have arisen because of this law, Lippi-Greene says, because the burden of proof falls on the “disenfranchised and unassimilated,” and it is often difficult to prove.
The idea that language is an object that can (and should) be pure, and that there are “good” and “bad” ways of speaking a language, permeates most speech communities.
These ideas are generally born from a belief that certain groups of people (generally those who are in a position of power) are keepers of the true language, and are associated with certain moral qualities. While in many cases, the “good” language is connected to the literary standard in the minds of the speakers, a literary language is not required for this type of thinking; in this way, ideas about linguistic purity are another way in which speakers of a certain language, or a certain type of language, have access to social, economic, and political power that is blocked from other speakers.
From these ideas of correct and incorrect language come very real consequences for those who are not speakers of the standard version of the language. In some cases, it
131 may simply be increased pressure to use a specific variant of language, but these ideas can manifest themselves in discrimination, both official and unofficial.
Michael Silverstein‟s definition of linguistic ideology makes a clear connection between beliefs about language and the rationalization of the way that the language is perceived and used. Although linguistic ideology may simply be boiled down to beliefs, when it is combined with a power differential, linguistic ideology can substantially affect the way that people communicate. In multilingual situations, the linguistic ideology of a region plays a large role in the way that people view each other and the language that they speak. The two most important ways that this plays out is in the connection of one language to nationalism and the belief in a pure variety of language. In both instances, the use of one language, or one type of language, allows for a speaker to have access to certain privileges in society, and disenfranchises speakers of other types of language.
From what we have seen in the literature, it is clear that the connection of language to national pride has been widespread in Europe over the past few centuries, and is currently promoted in many countries, especially those that are newly independent or are striving to unite their people under their flag. Purism in language is generally ascribed to those languages with literary standards, but there are instances of linguistic purism even in speech communities that do not have a written language; unlike language and nationalism, linguistic purism seems to be nearly universal.
5.3 Linguistic ideology and the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine
One area in which linguistic ideology has long been treated seriously by linguists is when it comes to multilingual communities, with emphases on language maintenance and shift, linguistic change, language and nationalism, language attitudes, and language development (Woolard, 1998). When languages are in heavy contact, as in a bilingual or multilingual society, the ideologies that surround language have particular power over the languages and their speakers.
As I analyze the situation in Ukraine, it is important to compare the situation to other cases of linguistic ideology in multilingual contexts, as these will reflect most accurately on what is happening, linguistically, in Ukraine. I will also pay particular attention to language and nationalism and language attitudes (especially when it comes to linguistic purity), as these issues are most relevant in Ukrainian society today. Linguistic maintenance will be addressed in an upcoming chapter.
In terms of how linguistic ideology works in a given situation, there are two main ways in which linguistic policy tends to affect language and its speakers. The first is the overt connection of language to power, in terms of status as an official or preferred language; this is a direct way in which language mastery is connected to economic, social, and political power. The second is the use of a literary or standard language, allowing for ideas of “correct” or “pure” language to permeate society, and for non- standard language users to be considered inferior. Both of these aspects of linguistic ideology are critical in Ukraine, helping to fuel attitudes and stereotypes about both
Russian and Ukrainian, and providing fodder for negative ideas about speakers of non- standard language.
Currently in Ukraine, linguistic ideology plays itself out in exactly those two ways: the connection of language (specifically Ukrainian) to nationalism and “real”
Ukrainian culture, and the conviction that the mixture between Russian and Ukrainian, also known as Surzhyk, is impure, dirty, and inferior to both Russian and Ukrainian.
According to Bilaniuk (2005), the legacy of correct speech in Ukraine was widely propagated in communist times; the upheaval of classes led to an entirely new elite class, and language was very critically looked at in order to facilitate the incredible social movements. Although these ideas were focused on Russian, they transferred easily to
Ukrainian after independence. Bilaniuk writes:
“The gradual ascent in status of the Ukrainian language after independence in 1991 was hindered by a deep sense of insecurity regarding its legitimacy, since for so long it had been seen as a second-rate peasant language. The potential change in status led to more stringent views of just what „good Ukrainian‟ is. An ideology of the rareness and exclusivity of true, pure Ukrainian emerged, which helped to elevate its symbolic value and dissociate it from the low connotations of its supposedly impure, unrefined incarnations” (143).
Thus, Ukrainian is both elevated as the national language, and viewed critically as something only a very few people are able to speak well. In this section, I will look at the relevant research questions and hypotheses for linguistic ideology and the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine.
5.3.1 Relevant Research Questions
There are several research questions related to linguistic ideology that are critical to the situation in Ukraine. The first is how, exactly, nationalism and language choice are connected. Although it has only been two decades since Ukrainian was officially made the state language, the connection of Ukrainian to national pride certainly has implications in terms of the way that attitudes toward language and its speakers are played out.
Along with the question of just how ideas about nationalism factor into language attitudes is how these feelings are distributed across demographics. For whom is the connection the strongest, and why? Is there a difference between the ideas that people have about Ukrainian in different parts of the country?
Similarly, it will be important to understand how ideas about linguistic purity affect the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine. According to Bilaniuk, these ideas are prevalent in today‟s Ukrainian society, but it will be important to see how people actually speak about pure and impure language, and whether this affects the way that they view themselves and each other. Unlike the situation with feelings of nationalism, ideas of linguistic purity and correct language have been a part of Ukrainian life for decades if not more; the split (if there is one) between people of various regions, ages, and genders will be important to understand.
When it comes to linguistic ideology and the contemporary linguistic situation in
Ukraine, there are a number of hypotheses that can be tested. Based on our knowledge of the history of linguistic ideology in Ukraine, I can make some basic hypotheses about the way that linguistic ideology is affecting linguistic attitudes over time.
Throughout the world, and especially during the past few centuries in Europe, a strong connection has been built between language and national pride. This has been especially true in emerging states, where a national language in opposition to an
“oppressor” language is often ascribed values such as patriotism, culture of the region, and independence from earlier times. In Ukraine, I expect to see similar ideology:
Ukrainian has officially been named the language of the state, but unofficially, I can expect that people will have created stronger associations between nationalism and
Ukrainian than simply the means of communication for government. I also expect for this to be especially true for younger people, who have spent much of their lives with
Ukrainian as the national language; it may also be true for the older generation, who was able to see the change from Russian to Ukrainian.
I can also expect for other values to be associated with Ukrainian use, such as more negative feelings toward Russia and the former Soviet Union, and a belief that
Ukrainian is a carrier of the national culture. At the heart of linguistic ideology is the connection of beliefs and ideas to language, and in countries that have gone through similar transitions as Ukraine, national pride, independence, and culture have all been associated with the official language.
The political and economic connections to language provide for solidified boundaries between the groups. However, in most parts of the country, Ukrainians are exposed to Russian and Ukrainian through daily interactions and media, and there is a mixture of the languages, known as Surzhyk, that is spoken as well. This mixture is a blurring of the boundaries, and I expect that it is viewed very negatively.
Because of Ukraine‟s history with linguistic purity, I can also expect to find strong sentiments about “pure” or “clean” language, and that these ideas will be connected to the Ukrainian literary language. While the contact between Russian and
Ukrainian means that there is a widespread mixture of the two, public beliefs, I expect, will value a very specific type of Ukrainian.
Demographically, the beliefs about pure Ukrainian language will probably be held more strongly by the older generation, which has been exposed to this type of ideology about language for their entire lives. The mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, while widespread in Ukraine, will almost certainly be seen as an uneducated or crass way of speaking. Young people may also feel a connection between superior language and
“pure” Ukrainian, as this type of ideology is easily passed from generation to generation.
Geographically, it seems that the more Russian-speaking areas will have stronger views about linguistic purity than those in which Ukrainian is more prevalent; it is likely easier to hold beliefs about pure language in areas where that language is rarely spoken, and a mystical ideal can be upheld.
I also expect that there will be some resistance to other changes to Ukrainian, specifically borrowings from other languages such as Polish or English, as these are also
137 movements away from the literary language. In this case, I expect the older generation and those in more Russian-speaking areas to feel more strongly about “negative” outside influences, as they are less likely to speak English or Polish and are more likely to see the influences as an attack on the literary language, rather than new, trendy ways of speaking.
While there are a multitude of ways that linguistic ideology manifests itself across various speech communities, in Ukraine, the most important ones are the connection of the Ukrainian language to national pride and Ukrainian culture, and the belief that standard, literary Ukrainian is superior to other variants, especially mixtures of Ukrainian and Russian or, more recently, Ukrainian with Polish and English influences. These ideas about language certainly affect the attitudes that Russian-speaking Ukrainians have toward the Ukrainian language, the changes that have happened in Ukraine in the last two decades, and speakers of Ukrainian.
5.4 Research findings
Linguistic ideology plays a major role in the way that Ukrainians view both
Ukrainian and Russian, and understanding the way that linguistic ideology functions in
Ukrainian society can help us to understand the linguistic situation as a whole.
5.4.1 Ukrainian and the current linguistic situation
The way that people view the current linguistic situation is almost certainly colored by the way that Ukrainian is perceived in the public consciousness. For many native Russian speakers, the change in official language might seem to be a negative 138 change; if, however, Ukrainian has successfully been connected with positive values, such a change will be seen as positive.
Table 5.1 shows the overall responses to questions about the current linguistic situation.
Table 5.1 Overall linguistic situation attitudes (percent)
What do you think about the current Do you think that the linguistic situation in linguistic situation in Ukraine? Ukraine has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union? The The The situation is The situation The The situation is situation situation is neither good nor is worse situation neither better nor is bad fine bad, it just is is better worse, it just is 50.5 16.5 33.0 37.8 25.6 36.6
We see in the above table that nearly half of the population thinks that the linguistic situation is bad, with only about a quarter thinking that the situation has improved since the fall of the Soviet Union.
In Table 5.2, we see the same questions, but broken down by region.
Table 5.2 Linguistic situation attitudes by region (percent)
What do you think about the Do you think that the linguistic situation in current linguistic situation in Ukraine has changed since the fall of the Ukraine? Soviet Union? Region The The The situation The situation is The The situation is situation situation is neither good worse situation neither better nor is bad is fine nor bad, it just is better worse, it just is is Kherson 60.7 17.9 21.4 48.2 11.1 40.7 Kyiv 46.2 19.2 34.6 20.8 50.0 29.2 Kharkiv 54.8 9.7 35.5 46.4 25 28.6 Simferopol 25.0 25.0 50.0 27.3 9.1 63.6
Across the regions, a majority of respondents felt that the situation is bad, although in
Simferopol, more people were ambivalent about the situation. However, there was a considerable difference when it came to responses about how the situation has changed, with many more respondents from Kyiv feeling that there had been an improvement in the linguistic situation since the fall of the Soviet Union.
In Table 5.3, we see the same information as above, broken down by age.
Table 5.3 Linguistic situation attitudes by age (percent)
What do you think about the current Do you think that the linguistic situation linguistic situation in Ukraine? in Ukraine has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union? Age group The The The situation is The The The situation is situation situation neither good nor situation is situation neither better is bad is fine bad, it just is worse is better nor worse, it just is 18-35 36.5 23.1 40.4 22.7 36.4 40.9 45-80 64.7 8.8 26.5 57.1 8.6 34.3
The younger age group is much less likely to think that the current situation is bad, and much more likely to think that the situation has improved than the older generation.
Many more of the respondents who identify based on their native Russian tongue felt that the linguistic situation in Ukraine is bad, and many more of them also felt that the situation had worsened since the fall of the Soviet Union (Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 Linguistic situation attitudes by self-identification (percent)
What do you think about the current Do you think that the linguistic linguistic situation in Ukraine? situation in Ukraine has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union? Basis of The The The situation is The The The situation is self-identity situation situation neither good situation situation neither better nor is bad is fine nor bad, it just is worse is better worse, it just is is Language 70.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 22.2 27.8 Geography 52.2 13.0 34.8 31.8 27.3 40.9
In sum, while many of the respondents felt that the linguistic situation in Ukraine is bad, the youth and those in Kyiv are more likely to think that things have improved since Ukrainian became the official language, while those who identify as Russian based on their native Russian language are more likely to think that the situation has worsened.
5.4.2 Language and Power
As we saw earlier in the chapter, language can and has been linked strongly to power. In Ukraine, this can be subtle or overt. One of the hallmarks of the Soviet Union was the way that power played itself out in the public arena; citizens understood which sorts of behaviors led to acceptance and rewards from the government, and which behaviors were punishable.
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the respondents‟ answers to issues of discrimination before and after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Table 5.5 Overall discrimination under the Soviet Union (percent)
Did you feel any discrimination under the Soviet Union based on your nationality? Yes, because I am Yes, because I am No, because No, because I Other Russian and didn‟t Ukrainian and wanted to I am Russian am Ukrainian know Ukrainian speak Ukrainian 2.8 8.5 25.4 40.8 22.5
Table 5.6 Overall discrimination after the Soviet Union (percent)
Did you suffer any discrimination after the fall of the Soviet Union based on your nationality? Yes, because I am Yes, because I am No, because I No, because I Other Russian and don‟t Ukrainian and want to am Russian am Ukrainian know Ukrainian speak only Ukrainian 5.1 1.3 20.5 48.7 24.4
As we can see in these tables, the majority of respondents did not feel discrimination either way; however, after the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a higher percentage of people who felt discrimination based on the fact that they are Russian and don‟t know
Ukrainian, whereas many fewer respondents felt discrimination based on the fact that they want to speak Ukrainian. Similarly, the number of Ukrainians who did not feel discrimination because they are Ukrainian increased.
In order to get a better look at the way that the discrimination has been felt throughout the country, it is important to break down the answers of the survey by region.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the responses to those questions above, separated by region.
Table 5.7 Regional discrimination under the Soviet Union (percent)
Did you feel any discrimination under the Soviet Union based on your nationality? Region Yes, because I Yes, because I am No, because No, because I Other am Russian and Ukrainian and wanted to I am Russian am Ukrainian didn‟t know speak Ukrainian Ukrainian Kherson 0.0 3.7 25.9 55.6 14.8 Kyiv 10.5 10.6 0.0 42.1 36.8 Kharkiv 0.0 4.7 42.9 28.6 23.8 Simferopol 0.0 33.4 33.3 0.0 33.3
Table 5.8 Regional discrimination after the Soviet Union (percent)
Did you suffer any discrimination after the fall of the Soviet Union based on your nationality? Region Yes, because I am Yes, because I am No, because No, because I Other Russian and don‟t Ukrainian and want I am Russian am Ukrainian know Ukrainian to speak only Ukrainian Kherson 0.0 0.0 21.4 57.2 21.4 Kyiv 4.7 0.0 0.0 52.4 42.9 Kharkiv 12.5 4.2 33.3 37.5 12.5 Simferopol 0.0 0.0 33.4 33.3 33.3
As we can see in Table 5.7, those in Kyiv were the only ones to feel discrimination under the Soviet Union because they didn‟t know Ukrainian, and those in Simferopol were the most likely to feel discrimination based on the fact that they wanted to speak Ukrainian.
Those in Kherson were most likely to not feel discrimination based on the fact that they are Ukrainian, while those in Kharkiv were most likely to not feel discrimination because they are Russian.
In Table 5.8, we see a sharp increase in the number of respondents from Kharkiv that felt discrimination because they are Russian, but Kharkiv was also the only place where any respondent reported feeling increased discrimination after the fall of the Soviet
Union because they are Ukrainian. Every region had an increase in the percentage of people who did not feel discrimination because they are Ukrainian.
In Chapter 4, we discussed the role that self-identification plays in linguistic attitudes. In Table 5.9 and 5.10, the questions of discrimination are broken down by self- identification.
Table 5.9 Discrimination under the Soviet Union by self-identification (percent)
Did you feel any discrimination under the Soviet Union based on your nationality? Basis of Self- Yes, because I am Yes, because I am No, because No, because I Other identification Russian and didn‟t Ukrainian and I am Russian am Ukrainian know Ukrainian wanted to speak Ukrainian Language 11.8 0 29.5 35.2 23.5 Geography 0.0 10.5 10.5 63.2 15.8
Table 5.10 Discrimination after the Soviet Union by self-identification (percent)
Did you suffer any discrimination after the fall of the Soviet Union based on your nationality? Basis of Self- Yes, because I Yes, because I am No, because No, because I Other Identification am Russian and Ukrainian and want I am Russian am Ukrainian don‟t know to speak only Ukrainian Ukrainian Language 16.7 5.5 22.2 38.9 16.7 Geography 0.0 5.3 5.3 73.6 15.8
These tables show that both groups felt a similar amount of discrimination before the fall of the Soviet Union, but for opposite reasons. After the fall of the Soviet Union, those who identify as Russian based on their native Russian language were considerably more
144 likely to feel discrimination than those who identify as Ukrainian based on the fact that they live in Ukraine.
Overall, the Russian-speaking respondents were unlikely to feel discrimination both before and after the fall of the Soviet Union, but especially in highly speaking
Russian areas and for those who identified as Russian because they were Russian speakers, a stronger sense of discrimination was felt after Ukraine gained independence.
Another indicator of power as it relates to language is how people feel that their professional and social situation would change if they spoke the majority language more fluently. In Table 5.11, we see the results of all of the respondents regarding their perception of their situation and language.
Table 5.11 Overall language and personal situation (percent)
Do you think your situation – social and professional – would change if you spoke Ukrainian better? Would be Would be worse Wouldn‟t change, because Wouldn‟t change, better linguistic knowledge doesn‟t because I know influence that Ukrainian well 9.1 4.0 54.5 32.4
In Table 5.11, we see that the majority of the population does not believe that their situation would change, and of those, most think it is because linguistic knowledge does not influence their situation. This indicates that for a majority of the population, there is not an overt feeling of a connection of language to power.
Table 5.12 shows the responses regarding their professional and social situation, broken down by region.
Table 5.12 Language and personal situation by region (percent)
Do you think your situation – social and professional – would change if you spoke Ukrainian better? Region Would be Would be Wouldn‟t change, because Wouldn‟t change, better worse linguistic knowledge doesn‟t because I know influence that Ukrainian well Kherson 3.4 3.4 75.9 17.3 Kyiv 12.0 0.0 32.0 56.0 Kharkiv 12.1 9.1 48.5 30.3 Simferopol 8.3 0.0 66.7 25.0
Regionally, we see quite a variety in the way that people feel about language and the way that affects their personal situation. Only in Kharkiv and Kherson did anybody think that their situation might worsen, while in Kyiv, the fewest number of respondents felt that language did not play a role in their situation (and the highest percentage felt that their
Ukrainian was good enough that it wouldn‟t matter).
In Table 5.13, the same information is shown by age.
Table 5.13 Language and personal situation by region (percent)
Do you think your situation – social and professional – would change if you spoke Ukrainian better? Age Would be Would be Wouldn‟t change, because Wouldn‟t change, group better worse linguistic knowledge doesn‟t because I know influence that Ukrainian well 18-35 5.6 0.0 57.4 37.0 45-80 14.7 8.8 52.9 23.6
The older generation was more likely to think that their situation would improve with better Ukrainian, and also more likely to think that their situation would worsen. The
146 younger generation was more likely to believe that their Ukrainian was good enough that it would not affect their personal situation.
In Table 5.14, the basis of self-identification is used to examine the question above.
Table 5.14 Language and personal situation by region (percent)
Do you think your situation – social and professional – would change if you spoke Ukrainian better? Basis of Would Would be Wouldn‟t change, because Wouldn‟t change, self- be better worse linguistic knowledge doesn‟t because I know identity influence that Ukrainian well Language 20.0 0.0 60.0 20.0 Geography 4.5 0.0 50.0 45.5
In Table 5.14, we see that, while most of the participants do not think their situation would change if they knew Ukrainian better, those that identify as Russian because they are native Russian speakers are more likely to think their situation would improve, and are less likely to think that their Ukrainian is good enough that it would not change things.
Another reflection of the way that language and power are connected is how those in power approach the situation. The attitudes toward politicians and language, by all of the respondents, are shown in Table 5.15.
Table 5.15 Overall language and politician attitudes (percent)
How do politicians treat the current linguistic situation? Do you support the politicians in these views? Politicians Politicians are Politicians are Other Yes No I don‟t don‟t discuss supportive of supportive of know this situation Russian Ukrainian 25.0 21.4 32.2 21.4 29.2 47.2 23.6
In Table 5.15, we see that many of the respondents believe that the politicians are supportive of Ukrainian, but 1 in 5 says that they are supportive of Russian. Nearly half of the respondents do not support the politicians in these views.
Table 5.16 shows the responses to the above questions, broken down by region.
Table 5.16 Regional language and politician attitudes (percent)
How do politicians treat the current linguistic Do you support the situation? politicians in these views? Region Politicians Politicians Politicians are Other Yes No I don‟t don‟t are supportive of know discuss this supportive Ukrainian situation of Russian Kherson 24.2 31.0 37.9 6.9 33.3 63.0 3.7 Kyiv 25.0 43.7 25.0 6.3 14.3 47.6 38.1 Kharkiv 20.8 3.4 31.0 44.8 30.0 40.0 30.0 Simferopol 40.0 10.0 30.0 20.0 45.4 27.3 27.3
As we see above, those in Kharkiv and Simferopol are much less likely to believe that politicians support Russian, while those in Kyiv are least likely to think that politicians support Ukrainian. Simferopol respondents were most likely to support the politicians in their linguistic views, while those in Kherson were least likely to support the politicians because of their linguistic views.
In Table 5.17, the responses to the above questions are shown, broken down by age group.
Table 5.17 Language and politician attitudes by age (percent)
How do politicians treat the current linguistic Do you support the situation? politicians in these views? Age Politicians Politicians are Politicians are Other Yes No I don‟t Group don‟t supportive of supportive of know discuss Russian Ukrainian this situation 18-35 25.5 14.0 41.9 18.6 27.7 40.4 31.9 45-80 21.2 33.3 15.2 30.3 35.5 51.6 12.9
In the younger age group, respondents are considerably more likely to think that politicians are supportive of Ukrainian, while in the older age group, respondents believe that politicians are more supportive of Russian. Both groups are unlikely to support the politicians in their linguistic views.
Table 5.18 looks at the way Ukrainians view politicians, broken down by basis of self-identification.
Table 5.18 Language and politician attitudes by self-identification (percent)
How do politicians treat the current linguistic Do you support the situation? politicians in these views? Basis of Politicians Politicians Politicians Other Yes No I don‟t self-identity don‟t discuss are are know this situation supportive supportive of of Russian Ukrainian Language 40.0 15.0 35.0 10.0 33.3 61.1 5.6 Geography 28.6 28.6 23.8 19.0 9.1 59.1 31.8
In this table, we see that those who identify themselves based on the fact that they live in
Ukraine are more likely to think that politicians support Russian, while those that identify as Russian because of their Russian language believe that politicians support Ukrainian.
While many more respondents of the linguistically identified group are likely to support their politicians in these views, a high number of participants in both groups do not.
Finally, I want to see how the respondents relate language to the institutional power. In the following tables, we will see what percentage of the respondents connect their views on language to politics. Table 5.19 shows the overall responses.
Table 5.19 Overall language and politics (percent)
Do you connect your views on language with your political views? Yes, very much Yes, but not very much Not very much Not at all I don‟t know 21.9 15.6 13.5 46.9 2.1
Thus, while 1 in 5 respondents very strongly connect their linguistic views with their political views, nearly half do not connect the two at all.
In Table 5.20, the level of connection between language and politics is broken down by basis of self-identification.
Table 5.20 Language and politics by basis of self-identification (percent)
Do you connect your views on language with your political views? Basis of self- Yes, very Yes, but not Not very Not at all I don‟t know identification much very much much Language 45.0 20.0 10.0 25.0 0.0 Geography 45.5 13.6 9.1 31.8 0.0
Those that identify strongly based on their native Russian and those that identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are nearly equal in their connections of language views with political views.
To sum up, there were a number of respondents who connected language to discrimination. For the most part, the respondents did not feel discriminated against based on language either before or after the fall of the Soviet Union, but especially in the heavily Russian-speaking areas and for the younger generation, respondents felt more discrimination after Ukrainian independence because of their Russian. Those that identify themselves based on their Russian language felt an increase in discrimination, while those that identify themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine felt a decrease in discrimination after the fall of the Soviet Union. Many respondents, especially those in Kyiv and Kharkiv, the older generation, and those who identify primarily based on the fact that they speak Russian, thought their situation would improve if they spoke Ukrainian better.
In terms of connections between politics and language, those in Kyiv, the older generation, and those that identify as Ukrainian were more likely to think that politicians supported Russian, while those in the Russian-speaking strongholds, the younger generation, and those that identify as Russian were more likely to believe that politicians supported Ukrainian.
As with all aspects of the survey, qualitative data helps to paint a fuller picture of the situation. When it comes to how the respondents felt their situation would change if they spoke Ukrainian better, one respondent (I., female, 77, Kharkiv) wrote simply,
дискриминация есть (there is discrimination). Two respondents (K., female, 43, Kyiv;
L., female, 70, Kharkiv), both educators, told me stories of their workplace; one had lost her job because she had been unable to learn the scientific words required to teach physics in Ukrainian, and the other was in danger of losing her job because she refused to speak Ukrainian at school. On the other hand, P. (male, 63, Kharkiv) felt that his situation would worsen if he spoke Ukrainian better, because всѐ дело на русском (all business is in Russian).
When it comes to discrimination based on language, unfortunately, the respondents did not elaborate on the changes in levels of discrimination with concrete examples. This is something that I hope to explore further in the future.
In terms of the connection between politicians and language, many of the respondents were skeptical about the motivations of the politicians. In Kharkiv, D.
(female, 66) wrote that politicians играют на чуствах людей (play on the feelings of the people), and in Kyiv, J. (female, 54), wrote они спекулируют (they speculate). While there is a strong connection between language and power in Ukraine, many of the respondents feel that the politicians capitalize on this power, and adjust their views according to their needs.
5.4.3 Linguistic Ideology and Nationalism
In many countries, language use has been linked to a feeling of national pride. In
Ukraine, the official status of Ukrainian created an overt connection between language and nationalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. Some citizens support the idea of
Ukrainian as the national language, while others disagree. The way people have reacted to the status of Ukrainian help us to understand how strongly the ideology is felt. Table
5.21 addresses the feelings of the respondents toward the national language.
Table 5.21 National language preferences (percent)
Do you believe that If you could change the If there could be two Ukrainian should be the official language from official languages of official language of Ukraine? Ukrainian to Russian, Ukraine, both Russian and would you? Ukrainian, the situation would be: No Yes I don‟t No Yes I don‟t Better Worse I don‟t know know know 26.7 64.4 8.9 58.8 25.7 15.5 55.4 19.8 24.8
As we can see in Table 5.21, the majority of the respondents believe that Ukrainian should be the official language of Ukraine, and would not choose to change the official language to Russian. However, many believe that two official languages would make the situation better.
Table 5.22 shows the responses to the questions from Table 5.21, divided by region.
Table 5.22 National language preferences by region (percent)
Region Do you believe that If you could change If there could be two Ukrainian should be the the official language official languages of official language of from Ukrainian to Ukraine, both Russian Ukraine? Russian, would you? and Ukrainian, the situation would be: No Yes I don‟t No Yes I don‟t Better Worse I don‟t know know know Kherson 46.7 40.0 13.3 36.7 36.7 26.6 73.3 6.7 20.0 Kyiv 7.7 92.3 0.0 77.0 11.5 11.5 34.6 34.6 30.8 Kharkiv 24.2 69.7 6.1 63.4 33.3 3.3 48.5 24.2 27.3 Simferopol 25.0 50.0 25.0 63.6 9.1 27.3 75.0 8.3 16.7
The results show that those in Kyiv feel the most strongly that Ukrainian should be the official language, while those in Kherson are most likely to want to change the official language to Russian. Kyiv respondents were least likely to think that two official languages would be an improvement.
In Table 5.23, the same information is broken down by age.
Table 5.23 National language preferences by age (percent)
Do you believe that If you could change If there could be two Ukrainian should be the the official language official languages of official language of from Ukrainian to Ukraine, both Russian Ukraine? Russian, would you? and Ukrainian, the situation would be: Age Group No Yes I don‟t No Yes I don‟t Better Worse I don‟t know know know 18-35 20.4 70.3 9.3 67.9 17.0 15.1 42.6 25.9 31.5 45-80 37.1 54.3 8.6 46.9 37.5 15.6 68.6 14.3 17.1
Table 5.23 shows that the older generation is considerably less enthusiastic about
Ukrainian being the official language, and is more likely to see an improvement in the situation if Russian were added as an official language. 154
The question of official status of Ukrainian and Russian is broken down by basis of self-identification in Table 5.24.
Table 5.24 National language preferences by self-identification (percent)
Do you believe that If you could change If there could be two Ukrainian should be the the official language official languages of official language of from Ukrainian to Ukraine, both Russian Ukraine? Russian, would you? and Ukrainian, the situation would be: Basis of Self- No Yes I don‟t No Yes I don‟t Better Worse I don‟t Identification know know know Language 35.0 65.0 0.0 57.9 26.3 15.8 70.0 10.0 20.0 Geography 17.4 82.6 0.0 74.0 13.0 13.0 39.2 30.4 30.4
From Table 5.24, we can see that, although a majority of respondents believe Ukrainian should be the official language, those who identify as Ukrainian because they live in
Ukraine feel more strongly that it should be so, are less likely to want to change the official language to Russian, and are considerably less likely to think that two official languages would be an improvement.
If the ideology that connects language to patriotism has been effective, respondents are likely to see a future of continued Ukrainian use in the country, and to see value in such a future. Table 5.25 shows the respondents‟ answers to questions about the future and importance of Ukrainian.
Table 5.25 National language preferences (percent)
What do you think will be in the future in Do you think it is important for Ukraine? Ukraine that people speak Ukrainian? Russian? Only Only Russian Ukrainian and It is important It is only It is only Ukrainian will will be the Russian will to speak both important important be the official official both be official Russian and to speak to speak language language languages Ukrainian Ukrainian Russian 42.9 3.3 53.8 89.2 9.7 1.1
As we can see in Table 5.25, very few people believe that Russian will be the only official language, although nearly half of the respondents believe that both languages will be official. Similarly, a very large majority feels that it is important to know both
Russian and Ukrainian, and of those who think one language is more important than the other, more respondents believe that Ukrainian is suitable than those who think only
Russian is important.
In Table 5.26, national language preferences are shown as broken down by self- identification.
Table 5.26 National language preferences by age (percent)
What do you think will be in the future in Do you think it is important for Ukraine? Ukraine that people speak Ukrainian? Russian? Basis of self- Only Only Russian Ukrainian and It is It is only It is only identity Ukrainian will be the Russian will important to important important will be the official both be official speak both to speak to speak official language languages Russian and Ukrainian Russian language Ukrainian Language 47.4 0.0 52.6 94.4 5.6 0.0 Geography 60.0 0.0 40.0 73.9 26.1 0.0
Table 5.26 shows that those who identify as Russian based on their Russian language are more likely to expect two official languages than only Ukrainian, and are more likely to see value in both Russian and Ukrainian, while those who identify as Ukrainian based on their geographic location are more likely to expect only Ukrainian as the official language, and are more likely to see value in only Ukrainian.
When it comes to ideology, it is important to understand the motivations behind the feelings. If people believe that Ukrainian should be the national language because of a connection between nationalism and language, for example, we can expect for qualitative responses to reflect this connection.
In response to the question, “Do you believe that Ukrainian should be the official language of Ukraine?”, one respondent (D., female, 66, Kharkiv) wrote, В принципе,
каждое государство должно иметь свой язык (In principle, every government should have its own language). For this respondent, it goes without saying that “its own language” is Ukrainian. Another (G., male, 20, Simferopol) responded, Это язык
Украины и украинцев (It is the language of Ukraine and Ukrainians), and many (N., female, 44, Simferopol; O., female, 71, Kherson; R., female, 73, Kherson; T., female, 21,
Simferopol; U., male, 30, Kharkiv; M., male, 20, Kharkiv; X., female, 23, Kharkiv; Z., female, 36, Simferopol; R., female, 33, Kyiv; B., female, 20, Kharkiv; C., female, 18,
Kharkiv) replied, Живѐм на Украине (We live in Ukraine). From these responses, it is clear that for many Ukrainians, the connection of national pride and the Ukrainian
157 language is considered to be a fact, something that is obvious enough that it does not need to be explained. The language of Ukraine, it seems, should be Ukrainian, without any thought to the fact that Ukrainian is not actually the native tongue of many
A few respondents took this idea a step further, such as V., female, 27, Kyiv: это
УКРАИНА, а не Россия, This is UKRAINE, not Russia, and A., male, 33, Kyiv: это
патриотично, It is patriotic.
On the other hand, those who thought that Russian should be one of the official languages did not seem to connect language with ideas of national pride. Instead, their responses tended to be based on numbers of speakers. E., female, 22, Kherson, wrote:
минимум 1/3 Украины говорит по-русски, лучше было бы представить людям
выбор. A minimum of 1/3 of Ukraine speaks Russian, it would be better to give people a choice. F., female, 20, Kherson, replied: большая часть населения русскоязычная. A large part of the population is Russian speaking. Interestingly, when the question of a second official language was raised, while some people thought the situation would be worse, the majority of the comments came from those who thought it would make the situation better. Again, instead of focusing on the ideology tied to language, the arguments were more logical in nature, as with G., female, 20, Simferopol: люди
перестали бы спорить и ругаться о том, каким офиц. яз. должен быть. People would stop arguing and yelling about which should be the official language.
The qualitative answers regarding the status of Russian and Ukrainian as official languages reveal that, for many, Ukrainian is more than a language, it is a symbol of the
158 nation. Even those that are native speakers of Russian connect Ukrainian linguistic abilities with Ukrainian pride.
5.4.4 Linguistic Ideology and Attitudes
One of the ways that the power connected with languages is most apparent is the attitude that people have about the suitability of each language for different uses. While linguistic policy overtly gives power to one language at the expense of the other, linguistic attitudes reflect the way that this power has been interpreted by the people.
Table 5.27 and Table 5.28 show the respondents‟ beliefs about which language best suits different uses in society.
Table 5.27 Overall attitudes about language use (percent)
In your opinion, which In your opinion, which In your opinion, which language is better for language is better for science language is better for home? business? and study? Only Russian Only Only Russian Only Only Russian Only Russian and Ukr., Ukr. Russian and Ukr., Ukr. Russian and Ukr., Ukr. no no no preference preference preference 37.8 59.1 3.1 33.3 59.6 7.1 30.0 65.0 5.0
Table 5.28 Overall attitudes about language use (percent)
In your opinion, which language In your opinion, which language is is better for art and poetry? better for the government? Only Russian and Only Only Russian and Only Ukr. Russian Ukr., no Ukr. Russian Ukr., no preference preference 21.0 72.0 7.0 14.0 53.0 33.0
As we can see in Table 5.27 and 5.28, most people believe both languages are equally suitable for every use; there are many more people who believe that Ukrainian is most suitable for government than any other use, and there are more people that think that
Russian is suitable for business than for other uses.
Tables 5.29 and 5.30 show the same information as above, broken down by region.
Table 5.29 Regional attitudes about language use (percent)
In your opinion, which In your opinion, which In your opinion, which language is better for language is better for language is better for business? science and study? home? Region Only Russian Only Only Russian Only Only Russian Only Russian and Ukr., Ukr. Russian and Ukr., Ukr. Russian and Ukr., Ukr. no no no preference preference preference Kherson 55.2 44.8 0.0 51.7 48.3 0.0 36.7 60.0 3.3 Kyiv 16.0 76.0 8.0 12.0 72.0 16.0 16.0 80.0 4.0 Kharkiv 46.9 50.0 3.1 39.4 51.5 9.1 39.4 51.5 9.1 Simferopol 16.7 83.3 0.0 16.7 83.3 0.0 16.7 83.3 0.0
Table 5.30 Regional attitudes about language use (percent)
In your opinion, which language In your opinion, which language is is better for art and poetry? better for the government? Region Only Russian and Only Only Russian and Only Ukr. Russian Ukr., no Ukr. Russian Ukr., no preference preference Kherson 36.7 60.0 3.3 33.3 56.7 10.0 Kyiv 8.0 84.0 8.0 4.0 44.0 52.0 Kharkiv 24.2 63.7 12.1 9.1 42.4 48.5 Simferopol 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 91.7 8.3
In these tables, we see that those in Kyiv are generally more likely than in the other regions to believe both languages are suitable, with Ukrainian preferred for government
160 and a slightly higher percentage believing Russian is better for business than other uses.
Kherson is the most likely to believe that only Russian is good for most uses. In all of the regions, the respondents were more likely to think that only Ukrainian was suitable for government than other uses, and were more likely to think that both languages are most suitable for art and poetry than other uses.
Table 5.31 and 5.32 look at the same information as above, broken down by age group.
Table 5.31 Attitudes about language use by age group (percent)
In your opinion, which In your opinion, which In your opinion, which language is better for language is better for language is better for business? science and study? home? Age Only Russian Only Only Russian Only Only Russian and Only group Russian and Ukr., Ukr. Russian and Ukr., Ukr. Russian Ukr., no Ukr. no no preference preference preference 18-35 25.0 73.1 1.9 22.6 68.0 9.4 24.5 69.8 5.7 45-80 55.9 41.2 2.9 47.1 50.0 2.9 37.1 57.2 5.7
Table 5.32 Attitudes about language use by age group (percent)
In your opinion, which In your opinion, which language is language is better for art and better for the government? poetry? Age group Only Russian and Only Only Russian and Only Ukr. Russian Ukr., no Ukr. Russian Ukr., no preference preference 18-35 13.2 75.5 11.3 5.7 50.9 43.4 45-80 34.3 62.8 2.9 22.9 51.4 25.7
In these tables, it is clear that the older generation is more likely to believe that only
Russian is more suitable for all aspects of life, especially business and science, while the
161 younger group is more likely to think that either language is suitable for most uses, with a stronger preference for only Ukrainian in terms of the national language than any other use. Both languages were good for poetry and art according to both groups, while neither group thought that only Ukrainian would be good for business.
In Table 5.33 and Table 5.34, I look at the same information above, broken down by basis of self-identification.
Table 5.33 Attitudes about language use by self-identification (percent)
In your opinion, which In your opinion, which In your opinion, which language is better for language is better for language is better for business? science and study? home? Only Russian Only Only Russian Only Only Russian Only Self- Russian and Ukr., Ukr. Russian and Ukr., Ukr. Russian and Ukr., Ukr. no no no identificato preference preference preference n Language 55.0 40.0 5.0 57.9 31.6 10.5 40.0 55.0 5.0 Geography 25.0 65.0 10.0 14.3 76.2 9.5 13.6 68.2 18.2
Table 5.34 Attitudes about language use by self-identification (percent)
In your opinion, which language In your opinion, which language is better for art and poetry? is better for the government? Region Only Russian and Only Only Russian and Only Russian Ukr., no Ukr. Russian Ukr., no Ukr. preference preference Language 25.0 65.0 10.0 25.0 55.0 20.0 Geography 9.1 77.3 13.6 9.1 40.9 50.0
Tables 5.33 and 5.34 show us that those who identify themselves as Russian because of their native Russian are less likely to believe that Ukrainian, which is connected to the official power of the government currently, is the most appropriate language for a variety
162 of uses. Especially when it comes to business and science, they think only Russian is best; those who identify themselves as Ukrainian because they live in Ukraine are much more likely, in almost all categories, to believe that both languages are good. They are much more likely to say that Ukrainian is the only appropriate language for government.
To sum up, while Ukrainian is currently overtly connected to power as the governmental language of Ukraine, different subsets of the population have accepted this ideology in different ways. While the youth, those in Kyiv, and those who strongly identify as Ukrainian based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are more likely to think either language is appropriate for most activities, the older generation, those in Kharkiv, and those that identify as Russian are more likely to think that Russian is more appropriate for certain things. We can also see that more people hold on to the beliefs that only Russian is more appropriate for business and science than other uses, and more people believe that only Ukrainian is best for government than other spheres.
While the numbers in this section are critical to the understanding of how the current linguistic ideology is interpreted by the population, the qualitative responses illustrate a more complete picture of the motivations behind the answers.
The first linguistic categories asked about (business and science) are more susceptible to ideology connected to Russian; for years, the best education was in
Russian, and international business continues to be conducted in Russian and English.
The final two categories (art and government) are more susceptible to ideology connected
163 to Ukrainian in the public consciousness, as Ukrainian has been tied to authentic
Ukrainian culture, and there has been a strong push for Ukrainian as the governmental language. The findings in this section reflect this, with more people believing that
Russian is better for business and science, and fewer believing that Russian is better for art and government.
The support for Russian was more likely to be expressed in terms of numbers of speakers, rather than inherent qualities of the language itself. When asked about business, M. (male, 73, Kharkiv) chose only Russian writing, язык международный (the language is international), and G. (male, 20, Simferopol) responded, 180 миллионов
говорят по-русски (180 million speak Russian). Those that thought both languages were good for business also relied on logic for their choices. R. (male, 46, Kyiv) wrote,
только русский в русско-язычной среде, только украинский в украинско-язычной
среде (Only Russian in Russian-speaking areas, only Ukrainian in Ukrainian-speaking areas), and S. (female, 39, Kyiv) wrote, потому что язык – всего лишь средство
(Because language is just a medium). Only one person that chose only Ukrainian for their choice in this question elaborated; A. (female, 36, Kyiv) wrote, это гос. язык
страны (it is the gov. language of the country). All of the qualitative answers to this question were based on practical consideration.
For the next question, which language is better for science and study, there is slightly more ideology in the public consciousness. Since Russian had been connected to good schools and strong academics, some answers reflected the idea that Ukrainian is not strong enough to support study. V. (female, 75, Kharkiv) на украинском ничего не
поймѐшь, преподаватели даже не знают терминологию (You won‟t understand anything in Ukrainian, the teachers don‟t even know the terminology), and W. (male, 42,
Kyiv) chose only Russian, and wrote, уже есть научная база и история исследований
(a scientific base and history of research already exists). For some, such as U. (male, 25,
Kherson), Russian seems like a better choice simply because they are more familiar with the scientific language: для меня украинская терминология сложна (for me the
Ukrainian terminology is difficult). On the other hand, the idea that Ukrainian should be connected to science is also rising; A. (male, 33, Kyiv) chose only Ukrainian for this question, writing, воспитание национальной научной элиты (the raising of a national scientific elite). At the same time, many felt that both languages are equally suitable, such as T. (male, 25, Kharkiv), who wrote simply: без разницы (there is no difference).
For this question, while the answers still seemed practical in nature, there were some instances of beliefs about the inherent suitability of one language over the other.
There is an increase in feelings about the inherent suitability of certain languages when the subjects were asked about which language should be used for home. On one hand, F. (female, 20, Kherson) expressed a belief that is often found in the public consciousness, that Russian is богаче (richer). On the other hand, X. (male, 20, Kharkiv) connected the Ukrainian language to living in Ukraine, choosing only Ukrainian and writing потому что мой дом Украина (because my home is Ukraine). In the middle, there were many such as D. (female, 66, Kharkiv) who felt that the choice зависит от
семьи (depends on the family). For this question, while many people felt that neither
165 language was the obvious choice, those that did were beginning to express strong feelings about the nature of each language.
When it comes to which language is better for the arts, the beliefs about inherent qualities of each language were more strongly expressed. While there were still answers that depended on logic, such as Y. (male, 36, Kyiv), who wrote that the better language
зависит от автора (depends on the author), there were also strong ideas about the languages that were rooted in folk belief. F. (female, 20, Kherson) once again said that
Russian was богаче (richer), and V. (female, 75, Kharkiv) wrote that даже Шевченко
писал на русском (even Shevchenko [Ukrainian poet] wrote in Russian). On the other hand, C. (female, 18, Kharkiv) responded that only Ukrainian is better for art and poetry, explaining он более мелодичный (it is more melodic). While both languages are equally capable of producing art, beliefs about the qualities of each language have colored the respondents‟ views.
The final question of this section, which language is more appropriate for government, elicited the most responses that connected power to perceived inherent qualities of the language. Some respondents chose their answers based on demographics, such as Z. (male, 37, Kherson), who chose Russian and said, большинство
разговариываeт на русском (the majority speaks Russian). E. (female, 22, Kherson) said both languages are best for government, writing, я - за свободу выбора (I am for the freedom of choice). Many of the responses, however, connected the Ukrainian language with patriotism, including C. (female, 18, Kharkiv), who wrote патриотизм должен
хоть чуть-чуть присуствовать (patriotism should at least a little bit exist) and M.
(male, 20, Kharkiv), who said simply, мы живѐм в Украине (we live in Ukraine).
Another respondent, Y. (male, 30, Kyiv), brought up the idea of a pure language, writing,
иначе официальним языком будет суржик (otherwise the official language will be
The qualitative responses in this section show the way that the linguistic ideology in Ukraine is manifested in people‟s attitudes. Although many respondents are able to look at language fairly objectively, the values and morals that have been assigned to
Russian and Ukrainian are showing up in the way languages and the speakers are perceived in everyday life.
5.4.5 Linguistic Ideology and Purism
Language and power are often connected, and in Ukraine, this appears very strongly when it comes to “purity” of language. While there are many in Ukraine who believe that Russian‟s history and earlier connection to elite culture mean that it is a richer or more valued language, and others think that Ukrainian‟s connection to patriotism and perceived melodiousness prove it is better, it is nearly undisputed that
“pure” Russian and “pure” Ukrainian are superior to the mix of the two.
Because of the complexity of this subject, Surzhyk22 was not included in the questions of the survey; I was hoping to research the attitudes of Russian speakers toward
Ukrainian. As such, I did not collect quantitative data on language purity. However, it is impossible to discuss language in Ukraine without the subject of Surzhyk coming up.
22 Surzhyk is perceived as the mixture of Russian and Ukrainian. For a detailed analysis of the complicated issue of Surzhyk, see Bilaniuk (2005). 167
Again and again in the qualitative responses, respondents commented on this mixture between Russian and Ukrainian, overwhelmingly in a negative way. This is something that can and should be researched more in the future; for this paper, the qualitative responses are worth exploring.
When asked about which language was best for different tasks, E. (female, 22,
Kherson), wrote that the schools should be in Russian, explaining, если семья говорит
по-русски, школа - по-украински, то ребенок говорит на суржике (if a family speaks
Russian, and a school – Ukrainian, then the child will speak in Surzhyk). In this case, E. takes it for granted that a child speaking Surzhyk is negative, and the choice of a language at school should not be dependent on the history, the associations with patriotism, the number of speakers, or any of the other common reasons given. Instead, her choice of language reflected a defense against the mixture of Russian and Ukrainian.
The subject of linguistic purity was raised often with the question, “what do you think about the current linguistic situation in Ukraine?” R. (female, 33, Kyiv) wrote, все
еще мало людей знает и говорит на правильном украинском языке (anyway few people know and speak correct Ukrainian); similarly, U. (male, 30, Kharkiv) wrote, мало
кто вообще знает какой либо язык хорошо (there are few who know either language well at all); A. (female, 36, Kyiv) wrote дети в школах пишут и читают на
украинском, дома говорят на русском. Это приводит к тому, что толком нет
знаний ни одного, ни другого языка (children in school write and read in Ukrainian, at home they speak Russian. This leads to the fact that there is not a solid knowledge of one
168 or the other language). This idea that having two languages in society leads to a degradation of both was raised quite often.
In answer to the same question, A. (female, 49, Kherson) replied that язык очень
загрязнен (the language is very dirtied); R., (female, 73, Kherson) said that язык очень
расcорѐн много иностранных слов используется (the language has been littered, there are many foreign words used), and F. (female, 20, Kherson) wrote, много суржика, т.е.
нет чистого ни украинского, ни русского языков в чистом виде (there is a lot of
Surzhyk, that is to say that there is neither clean Ukrainian nor Russian in a clean form).
When people discuss a mixture of the languages, there is an idea that the language is becoming dirty or impure as it changes.
Additionally, to this question, many of the subjects felt that the linguistic situation in Ukraine is bad and explained why by mentioning Surzhyk. It is important to note that simply mentioning Surzhyk is enough to show why the linguistic situation is bad in the minds of many; the existence of a mixture is, in and of itself, negative. B. (female, 18,
Kherson) wrote, люди разговаривают на суржике (people speak Surzhyk); E. (female,
26, Kyiv) wrote, многие люди смешивают украинский с русским языком и говорят
на так называемом "суржике" (many people mix Ukrainian with Russian and speak in so-called Surzhyk); D. (female, 44, Kyiv) wrote, смешиваются два языка и получается
"суржик" (two languages mix together and Surzhyk happens). With these responses, it is clear that the existence of a mixture between the two languages explains, for some people, why the current linguistic situation is bad.
The next question in the survey asked how the situation had changed since the fall of the Soviet Union. F. (female, 49, Kherson), replied that the situation is worse, because
люди не умеют литературно говорить ни на украинском ни на русском языках
(people don‟t know how to speak either literary Ukrainian or literary Russian). Again, the mixture of the two languages is seen as a degradation of both.
The idea of a pure or clean language also came up when the respondents were asked what they thought about the Ukrainian language. P. (male, 63, Kharkiv) wrote,
литературный язык самостоятельный язык. То что они говорят в западной
Украине, это смесь (the literary language is its own language. What they speak in western Ukraine is a mixture). K. (female, 23, Kyiv) wrote чистый украинский очень
красивый язык (clean Ukrainian is a very beautiful language). Both responses suggest that there is a Ukrainian that is valued, but that the mixed or “dirty” versions are of a lower status.
The issue of impure Ukrainian rose when the survey asked respondents what they thought Ukrainian sounds like. L. (female, 70, Kharkiv) replied смотря кто говорит,
литературный украинский красивый, другой украинский не красивый (it depends on who is speaking; literary Ukrainian is beautiful, other Ukrainian is not beautiful). D.
(female, 66, Kharkiv) also said that Ukrainian is beautiful, если человек владеет (if a person has mastered it).
Although the survey did not cover linguistic purity or Surzhyk, the topic is at the forefront of the public consciousness in Ukraine. Respondents were eager to talk about their perceptions of “clean” literary Ukrainian or Russian versus a “dirty” mixture. The
170 qualitative responses show that many of the respondents feel that their beliefs are self- evident, with no need for explanation. In the minds of many, any non-standard version of
Ukrainian or Russian, especially the mixture between the two known as Surzhyk, is indicative of a degradation of the linguistic situation.
5.5 General Discussion
Linguistic ideology has been defined as the way that beliefs about language properties are used to justify the use of that language. In other words, people believe in certain inherent properties of a language, and because of these perceived properties, the language is considered better for certain uses. These beliefs allow for power to be connected to language, with one language or one version of a language seen as holding value above another. In Ukraine, beliefs about Russian and Ukrainian are affecting the current linguistic situation in two main ways: a connection of Ukrainian to patriotism and national culture gives worth to the speakers of Ukrainian, and a widely held perception that the literary versions of Russian and Ukrainian disenfranchise those who speak a mixture of the two. In this chapter, I have looked at questions that investigate what beliefs people hold about Russian and Ukrainian, as well as the differences in these beliefs across various subsets of society. These perceptions about language affect the way that Ukrainians see each other, and what kind of power is held by different speakers in society.
5.5.1 Ukrainian and the current linguistic situation
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the linguistic situation in Ukraine changed dramatically, and in the years since, Ukrainian has been gaining status. The way that people perceive the current linguistic situation helps us to understand how the beliefs about language have affected Ukrainians. Officially, Ukrainian has been strengthened, with its status as the government language. For some people, this change is positive, and for others, the change is negative. The first set of questions that I wanted to look at was, in general, how people feel about the current linguistic situation.
The findings in this section show that, overall, over half of the respondents think that the situation is bad, with approximately a third of the respondents thinking that it has worsened since the fall of the Soviet Union. As we will see when discussing linguistic purity, many of those who think that the linguistic situation in Ukraine is bad explained that it was the mixture of the two languages that was negative. Thus, a correlation between belief in the value of Ukrainian and the responses to the question, “what do you think about the current linguistic situation in Ukraine” cannot simply be drawn; many of the responses discussed linguistic purity instead of just the level of Ukrainian use. For this reason, the second question, “how do you think the linguistic situation has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union,” is more illustrative of beliefs about Ukrainian.
Although Surzhyk has existed for generations, what changed after the fall of the Soviet
Union was the increased use of Ukrainian.
Only about a quarter of the population thinks that the situation has gotten better.
When this data was broken down by different demographics, the picture is much more
172 detailed. Those in Kyiv are much more likely than other geographic areas to think that the situation has improved, as is the younger generation and those that connect their self- identification with the fact that they live in Ukraine. As we have seen in other chapters, these three groups (those in Kyiv, the younger generation, and those who identify themselves as Ukrainian because they live in Ukraine) are more positive about Ukrainian overall; we see here that they are more likely to perceive an increase in Ukrainian usage as a positive linguistic change.
As we saw earlier in the chapter, Woolard‟s strands of linguistic ideology are important to understanding how attitudes about the linguistic situation have changed.
Since all of the respondents are native Russian speakers, it is counterintuitive that so many people would believe that the situation has improved since the fall of the Soviet
Union. However, Woolard explained that ideology can be seen as a direct link to power, and it can also be seen as a way of rationalizing the truth. The truth in Ukraine right now is that Ukrainian has a status that Russian is lacking: official power is granted to
Ukrainian and its speakers. Perhaps in order to rationalize this status, there has been a strong link between the Ukrainian language and national pride. This rationalization explains why some respondents see an improvement in the linguistic situation, even if their status as native Russian speakers has fallen.
Thus, the three groups that are most likely to think that the situation has gotten better are the ones for whom the rationalization about Ukrainian are the strongest. Those in Kyiv are in the political center of Ukraine, which means that there is a very high level of Ukrainian required for many transactions, and consequently, the rationalizations are
173 the strongest. The younger generation has not had the full experience of the linguistic ideology swings, and are more likely than the older generation to believe that Ukrainian has inherent values connected with patriotism. Those that identify as Ukrainian because they live in Ukraine are very likely to have a strong awareness of national pride and what the symbols of such pride are; because of this, they are more susceptible to ideology surrounding Ukrainian.
Any large change is likely to have supporters and detractors, and the change of governmental language from Russian to Ukrainian is no exception. What the study of linguistic ideology tells us is the motivation behind these attitudes, and why some people are likely to see the change as positive, while others are neutral or believe it is negative.
In Ukraine, the groups that support the change the most, while they themselves may be facing disenfranchisement, are most likely to be affected by the linguistic ideology.
5.5.2 Language and Power
In my study, we see that, overall, people were less likely to feel discrimination because they wanted to speak Ukrainian, but slightly more likely to feel discrimination because they do not speak Ukrainian well enough. As with all of the questions, much more can be understood when looking at the data as it is broken down by demographic.
Geographically, the most interesting city for this question is Kharkiv. Only in
Kharkiv were people likely to feel an increase in discrimination because they did not speak Ukrainian after the fall of the Soviet Union, and only in Kharkiv were there any respondents who felt discrimination after the fall of the Soviet Union because they
174 wanted to speak Ukrainian. This suggests that Kharkiv has held onto positive ideas about
Russian and is more resistant to the ideology connecting positive values to Ukrainian.
We can thus see that, while there is overt power connected to Ukrainian in the entire country, in Kharkiv, there is social power connected to Russian, similar to the situation in
Wales as described by Manning (2002). With its proximity to Russia, a resistance to the
Ukrainian ideology in Kharkiv is not surprising.
Generationally, the responses to this question were not varied. Although we have seen a difference overall in the way that the older generation and the younger generation view Ukrainian, we do not see it here. One reason that this may be true is that the younger respondents were not adults at the time of the Soviet Union, and their answers are less based on memories of the time, and more based on their beliefs about what that time must have been like.
When it comes to basis of self-identity, those that identify as Russian because of their native Russian tongue were far more likely to feel discriminated under the Soviet
Union because of a lack of knowledge of Ukrainian, and even more likely to feel discrimination now for the same reason. This suggests that those who identify strongly based on their language felt an increase in positive ideology toward Ukrainian, and consequently, felt negative effects. Those that identify based on their geography, on the other hand, were less likely to feel discrimination before or after the fall of the Soviet
Union, and reported a decrease in discrimination. These respondents, too, feel the connection between Ukrainian and power, but as they themselves identify strongly based on their geography rather than language, this has positive results for them.
Another way to understand the connection between language and power is how people perceive their personal situation and how language plays into it. Overall, the respondents reported that their situation would not change, mostly because language does not influence their situation. As with all of the questions, though, the situation is better understood when broken down by demographics.
Earlier, we saw that those in Kharkiv were more likely to feel a connection between Russian and power; what I would expect for this question, then, is for the respondents from Kharkiv to think that their situation would worsen if they spoke
Ukrainian better. Of all four regions, those in Kharkiv were the most likely to think that their situation would be worse. They are also the most likely to think that their situation would be better; they likely feel the official power connected to Ukrainian as well as the social power connected to Russian in the region. We also see that those in Kyiv are the most likely to report that they already know Ukrainian well enough that their situation wouldn‟t change, which fits in with what we know about the area.
When asked about discrimination, there was not a big difference in the responses between the generations. I explained this as possibly having to do with the fact that many of the younger generation would not have strong memories of the time before the fall of the Soviet Union: thus, for this question, I would expect more differentiation between the groups, which is what we get. While some of the older generation felt that their situation would worsen, none of the younger generation did. This is similar to what is happening in Kharkiv: the older generation is likely facing more social pressure to speak Russian, and so they are more likely to feel some negative effects if they spoke better Ukrainian.
They are also more likely to report that their situation would improve, and this again mirrors the situation in Kharkiv: presumably, this also means that there are many who feel that their Ukrainian is not strong enough to manage the official situations.
What I might expect, then, with the breakdown of this question by self- identification, is that those who identify themselves based on their native Russian language would think that their situation would be worse if they spoke Ukrainian better.
As we saw in the chapter on language and identity, a marker of ingroup status (such as
Russian, if that is being used as a marker of self-identity) can be emphasized, and in this case, some groups of Russian speakers may react negatively to the use of Ukrainian.
This could lead to a worsening social situation with an increased knowledge of
Ukrainian. However, I do not find this, and instead, those that identify themselves based on their native Russian tongue are quite likely to think that their situation would be better if they spoke Ukrainian better. This is somewhat surprising, as those who identify as
Russian based on their language should be facing a high level of social pressure to speak
Russian by other members of their highly Russophone social groups. However, none of those who identify based on their native Russian feel that their situation would worsen with improved knowledge of Ukrainian.
Discrimination and personal situation are two ways to understand how linguistic ideology is affecting the people; another is how people view the politicians. Overall, while more respondents felt that politicians were supportive of Ukrainian than Russian, the numbers weren‟t striking. This does show that, in the public consciousness, there is a belief that power is connected to Ukrainian at a higher level than that which is connected
177 to Russian. Nearly half of the respondents do not support the politicians in these views, which suggests that there is some resistance to the promotion of language as a political tool.
Geographically, the respondents in Kharkiv were far less likely to believe that the politicians are supportive of Russian than any other region. This backs up my claims that those in Kharkiv feel a strong social pressure to speak Russian – and a strong official pressure to speak Ukrainian. On the other hand, those in Kyiv are the least likely to think that politicians are supportive of Ukrainian. This suggests that those in Kyiv feel a stronger social pressure to speak Ukrainian, rather than an official pressure.
Generationally, the younger group was much more likely to see the politicians as supportive of Ukrainian, and the older generation was much more likely to see the politicians as supportive of Russian. We have seen throughout this study that the younger generation has more positive feelings about Ukrainian; they are also feeling a strong connection between official power and Ukrainian. The older generation, who is more likely to feel positively about Russian, interestingly feels that the politicians support
When it comes to personal views, approximately 1 out of 5 respondents feel a strong connection between politics and language, while nearly half feel no connection at all. What this suggests is that, while there are official sanctions of language, and subconscious connections between power and language, most people do not draw those connections overtly. For many people, the ideology is very subtle.
This data become more interesting when looking at the breakdowns between demographics. Those that live in Kyiv and the younger generation are the least likely to connect their ideas about language to their political views. We have seen throughout the study that it is precisely these two groups that are most likely to feel positively about
Ukrainian, and to connect certain morals and values to Ukrainian. It is interesting, then, that they are the least likely to report a connection between political views and language.
One explanation for this is that the ideology has become so ingrained in their lives that they do not think about it on a conscious level; the older generation and those in Russian- speaking strongholds, since they are more likely to encounter people who disagree with the ideology from above, are more likely to personally connect their linguistic views to their political views. Similarly, those that identify strongly based on their geography are less likely to connect their linguistic views to their political views than those that identify strongly based on their native Russian language.
When it comes to language and power, the responses to my survey show that those in Kyiv, the younger generation, and those that identify themselves as Ukrainian based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are more likely to find a positive connection between Ukrainian and power, both personally and on a national level. Those in Russian- speaking strongholds, the older generation, and those that identify based on language are more likely to resist the power that is connected to Ukrainian.
5.5.3 Linguistic Ideology and Nationalism
One of the main ways that ideology is felt in Ukraine is found in the way that people connect national pride to the Ukrainian language. Although people who speak
Russian are not inherently less patriotic than those who speak Ukrainian, this value has been intertwined with the Ukrainian language. On some levels, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy: those who feel strongly patriotic are more likely to speak Ukrainian to show their national pride, and Ukrainian becomes even more associated with patriotism. This is an example of what Spolsky and Shohamy (2000) described, with national pride, power, and a certain language being tied together after the birth of a nation.
For this section, I am trying to understand how strongly this ideology is felt, and what connections the average person makes between language and ideology. As we saw in Table 7.25, approximately 2 out of 3 Ukrainians think that Ukrainian should be the official language, and only about 1 out of 4 would change the official language to
Russian. Slightly more than half of the respondents think that the situation would improve if there were two national languages.
What is interesting about this data is that all of the respondents are native speakers of Russian. If language use were simply a means of communication, I would expect that a high number of people would choose their native tongue to be used as the official language, as it is more convenient for them. The fact that 2/3 of the respondents think that a language other than their native tongue should be the official language gives us an idea of how strongly language and nationalism are connected.
As has been the case throughout the study, the picture is even clearer when broken down by region, age, and basis of self-identification. Those in Kyiv are very likely to think Ukrainian should be the official language, and the most likely to think the situation would worsen if Russian were added, while respondents in the other regions were more likely to think that a combination of Russian and Ukrainian would improve the situation.
The younger generation, as well, is more likely to think that Ukrainian should be the official language, and the older generation is more likely to think that having two languages would be better. Those that identify as Ukrainian based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are very likely to think Ukrainian should be the national language; even those that identify strongly based on their native Russian tongue are likely to think that
Ukrainian should be the national language (although they are quite likely to believe that two official languages is better).
What we can find out from this set of questions is that, as we saw earlier in the chapter, there is a tendency in an emerging nation to promote symbols of national pride, with language used as one of the prominent symbols. This is exactly what we see, even in groups of respondents who are typically more supportive of Russian. The ideology that connects national pride to the Ukrainian language in Ukraine is quite strong.
Nearly half of all of the respondents believe that Russian and Ukrainian will both be the official languages in the future, which roughly matches the number of respondents that believed that the situation would be better with both languages; 4 out of 5 think that it is important for people to speak both Russian and Ukrainian. The most interesting part
181 of these two questions, however, is the very small percentage of responses that believe that Russian alone will be the national language, or that it is important to speak only
Russian, especially when compared to the higher number of responses that expect only
Ukrainian as a national language or think that it is only important to speak Ukrainian. As the informants are native speakers of Russian, it is interesting that there are any responses at all that think that it is only important to speak Ukrainian; this speaks to how strongly the values of Ukrainian have been ingrained into the public consciousness.
Only in Kharkiv and in Kherson did respondents think that only Russian would be the national language, and Kharkiv was the sole region in which any respondents thought that it is only important to speak Russian. In all regions, respondents were more likely to think Ukrainian alone has more value than Russian alone. This is also true for both age groups, with the older generation being more supportive of the idea of two official languages, and slightly more inclined to believe that both languages are important. In the groups of respondents that strongly identify based on language and those that strongly identify based on geography, not a single respondent believed that only Russian will be the national language, and not a single respondent believed that it is important to speak only Russian, although nearly a quarter of those who identify based on geography think it is important only to speak Ukrainian.
No matter how the responses were broken down, more respondents believed that only Ukrainian would be the national language than that only Russian would be, and more respondents believed that speaking only Ukrainian is important than those that thought that speaking only Russian is important. Again, we see how strongly the beliefs
182 about Ukrainian have filtered through the public, as even those who identify strongly as
Russian because they speak Russian natively make the connection between Ukrainian and national pride.
5.5.4 Linguistic Ideology and Attitudes
Although the strongest value that is attached to Ukrainian is that of national pride, there are other values that are connected to both Ukrainian and Russian, and these values affect the way that people relate to each other and to themselves when it comes to communication. In this section, I asked the respondents about which language was suitable for a variety of activities. Overall, the majority of respondents had no preference between the languages for all of the uses of language; of those that had a preference, people were most likely to think that Russian was better for business, science, and home, while Ukrainian was preferred for the government.
Given the history of Russian and Ukrainian in Ukraine, it is safe to say that the positive features associated with Russian are left over from Soviet times, while the positive values associated with Ukrainian are on the rise. Russian was considered more pragmatic as well as a more complex language under the Soviet Union, and the qualitative responses reflect those ideas.
The division of responses between demographic groups strengthens this hypothesis. We have seen throughout the chapter that those in Kyiv, the younger group, and those that identify themselves as Ukrainian based on geography are more susceptible to the current ideology. It is just these groups that feel the strongest that only Ukrainian
183 is suitable for government, and less strong about Russian being suitable for business, study, and home use. Because these values were more strongly felt under Soviet times, and because they are felt with varying levels across the different groups, it is safe to say that the ideology is spreading across the country geographically as well as over time.
These values are increasingly positive with regards to Ukrainian, and decreasingly positive with regards to Russian.
5.5.5 Relevant Research Questions and Hypotheses
Earlier in the chapter, I laid out several research questions and hypotheses that I hoped to explain with the survey responses. In this section, I will revisit these questions and hypotheses, and analyze the results with respect to these issues.
First, I wondered how nationalism and language choice are connected. It is clear that there is a strong connection between nationalism and the Ukrainian language, as a majority of the respondents believed that Ukrainian should be the national language. The qualitative responses shed further light on this subject, as the idea that Ukrainian is a symbol of the independent Ukraine was stated as a simple fact.
I further wondered about the effect of demographics on these beliefs. As we have seen throughout the study, those in Kyiv, the younger generation, and those that identify themselves primarily as Ukrainian because of their geographic location are more likely to have positive beliefs about Ukrainian; this is also true of the connection of language use to nationalism. Respondents in more Russian-speaking strongholds, the older generation, and those that identify primarily as Russian based on their native Russian language were
184 less likely to make the connection between Ukrainian and national pride, although many still did make this connection.
Although the survey did not target linguistic purity, it is worth mentioning here.
This is the second major value that is tied up with language in Ukraine today, with strong ideas about “clean” Ukrainian and Russian. The survey was not designed to explore this issue, but the qualitative answers made it very clear that this is something that exists in the public consciousness. Just as Bilaniuk found, the respondents to this study valued literary Ukrainian and literary Russian, and considered anything outside of the standard to be inferior.
My hypotheses, then, are for the most part correct. There is a strong connection between language and nationalism, across demographics but more strongly for the youth, those in Kyiv, and those that identify as Ukrainian based on geography. Independence and culture are also associated with Ukrainian, although the strongest value to be tied to
Ukrainian is nationalism. Surzhyk is seen as prevalent and negative, and only literary
Ukrainian is held up as the language that is connected to positive values.
Linguistic ideology is the beliefs connected to language, and the way these beliefs are used to justify usage. In a bilingual situation such as Ukraine, the values associated with each language can affect the way that people view each language, themselves, and each other. Although no language is inherently superior to another, linguistic ideology has a strong pull for many speakers, and the values that are connected to language allow 185 for speakers of one language or type of language to have access to power that other speakers do not.
In Ukraine, there are two major ways that linguistic ideology affects speakers.
First, the connection of nationalism, independence, and Ukrainian culture to Ukrainian means that speakers of Ukrainian are seen as authentic Ukrainians, while Russian speakers are relegated to the sidelines. These beliefs also justify the usage of Ukrainian as the national language in Ukraine, with little regard for the millions of native Russian speakers in the country.
The second way in which linguistic ideology affects Ukrainians is in the attitudes toward Surzhyk and literary Russian and Ukrainian. Speakers of Ukrainian are perceived as authentic Ukrainians, but only speakers of literary Ukrainian have full access to these positive values. In the meantime, those that speak any non-standard version of Ukrainian or Russian are further disenfranchised.
A strong comprehension of linguistic ideology is critical in order to fully understand the linguistic situation in Ukraine. The values associated with Ukrainian and
Russian, and the mixture of the two, have been used to justify the linguistic policy, and these values have convinced even native Russian speakers and speakers of nonstandard language to support their own loss of power.
Chapter 6: Language Maintenance
The way that languages are maintained or lost over time is of great importance to the study of linguistics, and critical to understanding the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine. In this chapter, I will look at theories of language maintenance and loss, both on an individual and a societal level, what factors play a role in this phenomenon, how this applies to the current language situation in Ukraine, and my findings with regards to language maintenance and loss.
In multilingual situations, the issue of language maintenance takes on a critical importance. Even under ideal circumstances, there is a strong possibility for one language to become more widely used, more officially sanctioned, or more connected to positive ideology, leaving other languages with fewer speakers, a lower status, and in danger of disappearance. The speakers of these minority languages are faced with the possibility of their children and grandchildren being unable to communicate with them in their native tongue.
In the field of language maintenance and loss, much attention has been given to the complete loss of minority languages over time. For purposes of this project, I will be focusing instead on the loss of minority languages in a specific geographic area, and how this affects the people from that area. Although Russian has become the minority
187 language in Ukraine, it remains a widely spoken language the world over, and is not in danger of being lost completely. Instead, the speakers of Russian in Ukraine are in danger of losing their language within their own country and families.
In this chapter, I will be looking at the current theories of language maintenance and loss, examining case studies of language maintenance and loss throughout the world, exploring the current linguistic situation in Ukraine as it concerns language maintenance and loss, and sharing my recent research findings with regards to language maintenance and loss in Ukraine today.
6.1 Language Maintenance and Loss
Although language maintenance and loss are phenomena separate from linguistic ideology and identity, it is impossible to completely separate all three ideas. The fact that language is closely tied in with identity makes the stakes involved very high, and the ideas and values that surround different languages can encourage or protect against language loss, making it difficult to study any of the three concepts without some reflection of the other two. However, scholars have managed to develop theories that allow us to focus mainly on the mechanisms that provide for language maintenance and loss. This section is devoted to understanding how best to approach language maintenance and loss with a maximum amount of concentration on these phenomena.
The studies can be broken up into psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic longitudinal case studies or group cross-sectional studies.
6.1.1 Individual language maintenance and loss
In the study of language maintenance and loss, there are two ways of looking at the phenomenon: on an individual level, and on a societal level. Each individual that is a speaker of a minority language goes through a process of maintaining or losing their language, and, on an aggregate scale, all of the individuals put together lead to an eventual societal shift. For this first section, I will be looking at theories behind individual language maintenance, and in the next section, I will look at the implications for society.
6.1.2 Factors in individual language maintenance and loss
According to de Bot (2001), there are important distinctions in the terminology used in the study of language maintenance and loss. “Language loss” is a generic term referring to the decline of linguistic skills in either groups or individuals; “language attrition” is language loss over time as it refers to individuals; and “language shift” is language loss between and within generations. De Bot further explains the term “non- acquisition,” which is referring to generational differences in language skills based on the children in the second generation not completely acquiring the minority language.
It is not difficult to find examples of language attrition, as it is a common phenomenon and has been widely studied; it is a clear danger for minority language speakers in a majority language situation. Huls and Van de Mond (1992) studied Turkish families in the Netherlands; not surprisingly they found that the Turkish language used between the adults of the families was influenced by the structure of Dutch. This same
189 study can be used to illustrate language shift, as the children in the families tended to prefer Dutch, even though their parents stressed Turkish maintenance.
In contrast, De Kadt‟s 2001 study of teenage speakers in a German-speaking
South African community is more of a study of non-acquisition; in this study, it was found that the children acquire certain features of the German language, but the structure of their German is influenced by English, and, because they use German almost exclusively in informal settings, their formal German has never been fully acquired.
In the study of individual language maintenance and loss, there are two major approaches to understanding the phenomenon: psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic.
Some factors are purely psycholinguistic, some are purely sociolinguistic in nature, and others are both. My study focuses on sociolinguistic factors, although because some factors are shared, I will look at some psycholinguistic factors, as well.
From a psycholinguistic point of view, de Bot (2001) explains that there are two important processes in language use, production and perception, and they are quite different when it comes to language maintenance and loss. De Bot also explains that frequency of use of certain items will be reflected in the availability of that item, which ultimately leads to the level of its attrition. He writes, “language attrition is basically the weakening of the links between knowledge nodes in memory that have the inherent feature that they decline over time with nonuse” (67). This process of loss happens more quickly when it comes to production than perception.
According to Clyne (1992), there are five major factors that affect the ways that language is lost in individuals: markedness, unified contrast, drift, syntactic convergence
190 and switching, and triggering and switching. In the case of markedness, more marked grammatical features will eventually give way to less marked features, and are more likely to disappear from the minority language grammar. Unified contrast refers to very clear differences between the majority and minority language, with the minority language more likely to lose those features that appear strongly in the majority language. Drift is a phenomenon that is generally happening in the language; if there are competing features already existing in a language, the drift tends to happen in the direction of the similar features in the majority language. Syntactic convergence and switching refers to syntactic changes in the minority language, often related to drift. Triggering and switching is when code-switching with the majority language leads to changes in the minority language.
According to de Bot (2001), most studies on language maintenance and loss have been done in a sociolinguistic approach, with a focus on the effect that sociological and sociolinguistic factors have on language loss. De Bot points out that nearly all minority language situations involve a great deal of contact with a majority language, with the relatively rare exception of self-segregation, such as with the Pennsylvania Dutch. Most of the time, there is a significant socioeconomic advantage to using the majority language; as the minority language speakers learn the majority language, how the minority language survives into the next generation is dependent on a number of sociological factors.
Li Wei‟s 2002 study on competing linguistic forces in Singapore points directly to socioeconomic factors affecting language attrition. Li Wei asserts that each language that
191 is commonly used in Singapore has a specific market value; this market value encourages speakers to switch to the majority language in order to maximize their economic potential. As in most cases with a majority and a minority language, economic value certainly plays a role in linguistic maintenance or loss.
On an individual level, the sociolinguistic factors that influence language maintenance or loss correlate with the benefits and drawbacks that an individual perceives when it comes to language. The two biggest factors, in this case, are socioeconomic pressure and the pressure from the language community.
Socioeconomically, if individuals believe that one language gives them a distinct advantage over another, that language is more likely to be chosen, and the minority language more likely to be lost. Pressure from the minority language community is more difficult to define, but certain factors such as the use of the language in the home and the size of the minority-speaking language community can be taken into account. Thus, when looking at an individual‟s views of the socioeconomic advantages or drawbacks of a language, and combine that with the type of language community that they belong to, it is easier to understand why a language is maintained or lost for individuals.
On some levels, it is extremely interesting to see the way that language is lost or maintained on an individual level, as everything that happens in society begins with individual speakers. However, the overall trends in language maintenance and loss become very clear when looking at society as a whole, and many of the motivations behind the factors that cause the individual loss come more sharply into focus when looking at the big picture.
6.1.3 Theories of societal language maintenance and loss
Definitions of terms
In order to examine theories of language maintenance and loss on a societal level, it is important for certain terms to be defined upfront. “National minority” is the term used to describe a group of people that were present prior to the founding of a state, or were co-founders of a state but have been moved to the side by a dominant language group. “Multination states,” on the other hand, occur when self-governing groups come together to form a larger state, while “polyethnic states” occur when immigration of a linguistic group or group changes the makeup of a formerly homogenous state (Bourhis,
Janse (2000) discusses the terminology relating to five levels of language endangerment. “Potentially endangered” languages occur when children start preferring the majority language and have an imperfect command of the minority language.
“Endangered” languages happen when there are very few child speakers. A “seriously endangered” language refers to when the youngest speakers of a language are already middle-aged or older, a “terminally endangered” language only has elderly speakers left, and a “dead” language is when there are no speakers left at all.
According to Bourhis, there are several different types of ideologies that affect the way that minority languages are either maintained or lost. All of the following ideologies expect minority language speakers to adhere to the majority language in the public
193 sphere, but are in some ways encouraged or allowed to maintain their language practices in the private sphere. “Pluralism ideology” actually supports, financially and socially, the private rights of the minority language group. Supporters of this kind of ideology maintain that it recognizes the value of diversity, while detractors suggest that it undermines national unity. “Civic ideology” also maintains a public/private distinction, but under civic ideology, no state funds or support can be granted to the private language groups. Thus, it adopts a non-intervention strategy. Supporters of civic ideology believe that it helps to maintain national unity, while critics say that non-intervention for the linguistic minority actually aids in the process of that language‟s eventual loss.
“Assimilation ideology” also separates public from private, but does intervene in some private spheres; an example would be a general expectation that linguistic groups assimilate over time. In such situations, the majority language group tends to connect national ideology and cultural values to the majority language. “Ethnist ideology” also does not interfere with the private lives of the minority group, but rather than this being for purposes of diversity, it is due to the idea that minority ethnic groups will never be accepted socially or legally and often sees the minorities as a threat to the nation (2001).
Types of shift
Fase, Jaspaert, and Kroon (1992) discuss the different ways in which language shift can occur: a complete (or nearly complete) lack of communication between the two groups, an insistence by the minority language group to continue using their own language, adoption of a third language by both groups, or, most likely, communication in
194 the dominant group language. How the minority group language is maintained or lost depends in part on the way that the minority group communicates amongst itself: a stable group that communicates amongst itself in the minority language can lead to a relatively stable bilingual situation, and, according to Fase, Jaspaert, and Kroon, the loss of the language only occurs when intraethnic communication within the group disappears. This usually happens when the group dissolves, or when the group chooses to communicate in the dominant language. To demonstrate their point, Fase, Jaspaert, and Kroon write:
“Changes in language choice in intragroup communication are the result of changes of norms. As norms are the results of negotiations between persons and groups that interact socially, it is in the social structure that we should look for the mechanisms underyling these norms” (7). In other words, once the norms of intragroup communication, which are dictated by sociological factors, breakdown amongst speakers of the minority language, it becomes increasingly difficult for that language to be maintained.
In the examples given above by Fase, Jaspaert, and Kroon, communication in the majority language is by far the most common path in multilingual situations. Klatter-
Folmer and Kroon‟s 1997 volume on Dutch around the world gives a good overview of how one language fares in different situations; it also makes it clear just how often groups of speakers tend to communicate in the dominant language of the society in which they live, and thus lose their language within a few generations. In this book, Dutch is studied in Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Indonesia, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States; in each of these situations, Dutch is generally non-preferred by the second generation, and the communities of Dutch speakers are dwindling. The Dutch
195 case is interesting as it shows a wide variety of situations; such fast shift is not necessarily reflective of all language maintenance cases.
Bourhis (2001) goes into more detail with the different possibilities for multilingual societies, discussing five different models of acculturation that can be applied to speakers in multilingual situations. The first is the integrationist orientation, which is when minority language speakers adopt the majority language while maintaining their own linguistic and cultural identity. The assimilationist strategy sees minority language speakers relinquishing their own linguistic and cultural features in order to completely assimilate into the majority linguistic culture. The separatist orientation is when the minority group maintains their own linguistic and cultural features while rejecting those of the majority group, and the marginalization orientation is characterized by a minority group that rejects both the dominant language and culture and their own.
Individualists are similar to separatists, in that they tend to reject both groups, but this is because they see themselves as individuals and not part of any group, not because they are opposed to the specific minority or majority group (2001).
An example of the integrationist strategy is seen in Catalonia, where Catalan is technically a minority language, but there are specific economic and prestigious benefits that go along with speaking it, allowing for Catalan and Spanish to co-exist in relative peace. The assimilationist strategy can be seen in Peru, where Spanish is embraced by nearly all minority language speakers. Christina Paulston writes, “In other words, embracing Quechua is to announce to the world that you are Indian, a word so stigmatized in Peruvian Spanish that its official euphemism now is campesino „peasant‟”
(1992: 64). The separatist orientation is evident in the case of the Pennsylvania Dutch, who maintain their own language and have limited interaction with the majority language group. According to Bourhis (2001), the marginalization orientation is the least common of all of these strategies.
Because the way that minority language groups interacts with society necessarily requires an understanding of the way the majority group views the minority group, these same orientations can be applied to the dominant group, from the other side of the situation. In this sense, integrationists value the minority group‟s cultural and linguistic features while expecting them to adopt the linguistic and cultural values of the majority group; assimilationists expect complete assimilation into the majority group; separatists
(or segregationists) place distance between themselves and the minority group while accepting that they maintain their own linguistic integrity; and marginalists (or exclusionists) believe that minority groups can never be assimilated and in some cases support deportation of minority language speakers. Individualists, as above, do not accept group labels for individuals (Bourhis, 2001).
An example of the integrationist orientation is found in the recent history of
Hawaii, where governmental and other societal support has been given in order to revive the Hawaiian language (Niedzielski, 1992), relatively successfully. The assimilationist orientation is the prominent type of orientation the world over, with an example being the
Sibe language in China, where “Sibe experts agree in saying that there are two factors which threat the survival of the Sibe language and script: the necessity of a thorough learning of Chinese, and the interruption of the teaching of Sibe in secondary schools”
(Stary, 2003: 86). As with the orientations of speakers to the society, segregationalist and marginalist orientations of society to speaker groups are much less common.
The way that any multilingual society will function depends on both the general way in which minority language groups relate to the majority and the orientation of the majority group to the minority language groups. According to Bourhis, the results of these relationships can be consensual, problematic, or conflictual, ranging from individualist/individualist situations being consensual to marginalization/exclusionist situations being conflictual (Bourhis, 2001). Thus, while it may seem that language maintenance and loss should be predictable based on a few societal characteristics, it becomes very clear very quickly that each situation is unique and dependent on a number of complex factors.
According to John Edwards (1992), an additional important factor in the study of language maintenance is whether the minority language is unique, and if not, where it stands geographically to other communities that use the same language. A unique minority language, Edwards explains, is only used in that geographical area; a non- unique minority language is used in a variety of locations but always in minority status; and a local-only minority language is minority in that particular area but is a majority elsewhere. How close the minority language is to other communities that speak the same language can thus be discussed in terms of their cohesiveness. This is important to the discussion of language maintenance and loss, because a unique minority language with no outside contacts is facing an entirely different set of circumstances than a local-only minority language that is geographically close to the same language in a majority status.
Aone Van Engelenhoven (2003) writes about the Maluku region in Indonesia, which has many clear examples of unique minority languages (there are an estimated 92 languages found on the 1000 islands of the Maluku region): When discussing language loss of unique minority languages, the term “endangerment” often arises, as the minority language is in very real danger of dying out. Catalan can be considered a non-unique minority language, as it is found in Spain and Sardinia, both in a minority status
(Edwards 1992). Often, immigrant language groups are speakers of local-only minority languages, such as Dutch in various locations around the world (Klatter-Folmer and
Kroon, 1997). An example of an adjoining minority language, according to Edwards, is
German in Switzerland.
Edwards (1992) also discusses other critical variables for understanding the linguistic situation when it comes to linguistic maintenance and loss, including demographics, politics, and economics, among other factors. Important to Edwards‟ analysis is that each area of study must be looked at not simply in terms of the way that the speaker interacts with, say, the politics, but also the way that the language and the overall setting is connected with each variable. Most importantly, it is critical to understand that in situations of language maintenance and loss, there are a variety of factors, including sociopolitical and personal variables, that help to determine the fate of the language.
An important factor in the maintenance or loss of language on a societal level is the way that the language is approached in the education system. According to Fishman
(1980), “In the absence of bilingual education the unmarked language reigns supreme in the public school and, accordingly, no positive contribution to minority language maintenance can be expected from it” (167). Even when bilingual education is included in the curriculum, there is a considerable range in the effect on the maintenance of the minority language, depending not simply on whether the minority language is taught, but for how many hours and with what goal. Some schools include minority language education with the goal of an eventual transition to majority-only education, which is detrimental to the minority language maintenance. Fishman maintains, however, that good schools which are oriented toward maintaining the minority language can have an independent, lasting effect.
Thus, an important consideration in any minority language situation is the way that schools are oriented in the society. Fishman makes it clear that minority-language schools, on their own, cannot preserve a minority language, but their existence and support in a minority-language environment can provide additional means for overall maintenance of the language. Societies that foster minority-language schools, or bilingual schools with the goal of maintaining the minority language, are less likely to face a loss of the minority language. Niedzielski‟s 1992 study on Hawaii is a good example of an educational system that supports the revival of a minority language:
200 learning is mainly sentimental and therefore, not successful in maintaining the minority languages.
One further factor to consider when it comes to language maintenance and loss in society is the generational makeup of homes. Ishizawa (2004) studied the effect that multigenerational homes have on language maintenance, looking at immigrant households in America with two or three generations. His findings challenge the general idea that the first generation holds onto the minority language, the second generation is bilingual but prefers the majority language, and the third generation speaks only the majority language. While this may hold true in many situations, the presence of many generations in a household will increase the likelihood of minority language maintenance.
Thus, it is also important to consider the typical household makeup when studying language maintenance and loss.
As we consider language maintenance and loss and the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine, it will be important to keep all of these factors in mind: the psycho- and socio-linguistic factors that are taking place in individual language loss and maintenance, the ideologies of the state and the speakers of the minority language, the geographic and demographic information regarding Russian speakers in Ukraine, the way that the language is being observed throughout generations, and the role of the schools and household makeup in the maintenance and loss of language.
6.2 Language maintenance and loss and the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine
In order to fully understand language maintenance and loss in Ukraine, it is important to understand the various factors that affect the way that Russian and Ukrainian are currently functioning in Ukrainian society. Once we have an idea of the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine, we can make hypotheses about the way that
Russian speakers are experiencing language maintenance and loss, in their relatively new status as a minority language community in Ukraine.
On an individual level, we can expect to see some language shift happening between the generations. Although Russian is unequivocally a minority language in terms of official status and function in society, the actual number of Russian and
Ukrainian native speakers is hard to pin down. According to the official census of 2001,
67.5% of the population claims Ukrainian as its native tongue, and 29.6% claims
Russian23. Considering these numbers, Russian is a minority language nationwide, although it is a large minority. The question of native tongue, however, is not always a black and white issue, especially in a country that is so highly bilingual; other questionnaires have come up with quite different results:
Фонд "Общественное мнение" в феврале 2002 года опросил 2000 жителей всех 25 регионов Украины на тему их языковой принадлежности. Респондентам был задан вопрос: "На каком языке Вам легче разговаривать?". 44% ответили, что на русском, 40% -- на украинском, а 13% одинаково легко говорить и на том, и на другом языке.24
(The fund “Public Opinion” in February of 2002 surveyed 2000 residents of all 25 regions of Ukraine on the theme of their linguistic adherence. The respondents were given the question: “Which language is it easier for you to
23 http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/, accessed on 2/11/2010 24 http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2002/059/panorama01.php#13, accessed on 2/11/10 202
speak?”. 44% answered Russian, 40% - Ukrainian, and 13% equally easily speak in both languages.)
Thus, the question of mother tongue may not show the entire picture, and the high number of bilinguals creates a situation which is different than many of the minority language situations in the world.
Further, the present study took place in parts of Ukraine that are still very highly
Russophone, thus creating a minority language situation in terms of status, but not necessarily in terms of number of speakers:
В областных центрах 75% населения предпочитает общаться на русском языке (и только 9% - на украинском) ... 44% жителей Киева заявили, что им все равно, на русском или украинском языке общаться, 34% предпочитают русский язык и только 10% киевлян – украинский...Наибольшая дифференциация по языковой принадлежности наблюдается в зависимости от географического положения: на западе и северо-западе говорят почти исключительно по-украински (92-93% против 4-5% по-русски), на востоке - исключительно по-русски (89% против 1% по-украински).25
(In the center regions 75% of residents prefer to communicate in Russian (and only 9% - in Ukrainian) … 44% of Kievan residents declared that it makes no difference whether one communicates in Russian or in Ukrainian, 34% prefer Russian, and only 10% of Kievans – Ukrainian….The biggest differentiation according to linguistic characteristics is dependent on geographic position: in the west and north-west they speak almost exclusively Ukrainian (92-93% vs. 4- 5% Russian), in the east – exclusively Russian (89% vs. 1% Ukrainian).)
The makeup of the regions in which the data collection for this research was conducted, then, are highly Russian speaking, even though all official business is conducted in
Because of this, we can expect to see some language shift happening on an individual level, as young members of society have a heightened socioeconomic
25 http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2002/059/panorama01.php#13, accessed on 2/11/10 203 incentive to speak Ukrainian, and many of them are educated in the Ukrainian school system. However, language attrition amongst older generations is less likely to happen, as the majority of social circumstances still involve other native Russian speakers. At the same time, given the amount of Russian used in Eastern, Southern, and Central Ukraine, non-acquisition should not be a big problem.
On a societal level, Russian speakers make up a national minority, as they were present in Ukraine prior to the formation of the newly independent Ukraine, and at this point, it does not seem that Russian in Ukraine is a potentially endangered language.
Since there are still a large number of Russian speakers in these areas, I do not expect to see a large amount of loss; if the younger generation is beginning to prefer to use
Ukrainian, though, Russian can be considered a potentially endangered language within
It is important to note that not all of the regions in this study will experience linguistic maintenance and loss in the same way. People who live in Kharkiv, in the easternmost part of Ukraine, with little exposure to areas with a majority of Ukrainian native speakers, will certainly have a different perspective than those who live in Kyiv, where a majority of people claim bilingualism, or those from Kherson, in the central part of Ukraine, which is closer to the Ukrainian speaking regions. There will more likely be a problem of language loss for Russian speakers who live in Kherson and Kyiv, which are less isolated from the Ukrainian language, than Simferopol and Kyiv. In this sense,
Russian is likely to be more endangered in these two cities, and more maintained in
Kherson and Simferopol.
Ukraine currently has an “assimilationist ideology” when it comes to the use of the Russian language. Ukrainian is used for all official public purposes, but it is also being mandated in some private spheres, such as advertisements and broadcast media. At the same time, there are ideologies that have been connected to the use of the Ukrainian language, including the idea of national pride, that place an expectation on Russian speakers to learn and use Ukrainian. These policies are more or less successful depending on the region; Kharkiv, for example, has voted several times to make Russian the official language of the region, and the ideologies connected to Ukrainian are not as strongly felt.
The communication strategies of the speakers of Russian at this point seem to be in a relatively stable bilingual stage. As it stands, the Russian-speaking community is large enough in the Russian-speaking regions for them to communicate amongst themselves in Russian. However, this may change as the youth speak Ukrainian at school, connect Ukrainian with socioeconomic benefits, and accept the ideology of national pride and the use of the Ukrainian language.
When it comes to the orientation of the minority language speakers to the majority culture and language, Russian speakers in Ukraine, at this point, generally have an “integrationist” orientation. Generally speaking, Russian native speakers consider themselves to be fluent in Ukrainian, and use Ukrainian when necessary, but maintain their own linguistic practices. Ukrainian society, on the other hand, is somewhere between integrationist and assimilationist, as can be seen by the way that the language question is discussed in politics and the way that policy actually affects Russian.
Linguistic policy, as discussed in the introduction, has overtly chosen Ukrainian over
Russian in both public and private spheres, yet politicians consistently discuss the possibility of Russian as a second official language, and there is at least the pretense of respect for the separate linguistic and cultural customs of Russian-language speakers.
The Russian language in Ukraine is a local-only minority, adjacent to an area where it is in the majority. This means that overall language endangerment at this particular time is not practically a possibility, and that the Russian speakers in Ukraine are more likely to maintain the language than they would otherwise be.
As discussed in the introduction, the education system in Ukraine is somewhat varied. At this point, there are schools that function solely in Russian, but they are diminishing in number. More common is for Russian to be taught as a foreign language in Ukrainian schools, with a certain number of hours per week devoted to Russian, but all subjects taught in Ukrainian. Entrance examinations for universities and institutes are taken in Ukrainian, and most higher education institutions expect final projects to be completed in Ukrainian. Even with some primary schools being taught in Russian, the overall society (as discussed above) is tending toward transitioning to Ukrainian only. As
Fishman (1980) noted, minority language schools that are generally treated as a step towards transitioning to the majority language are much less likely to be effective in maintaining the minority language.
Another major factor in language maintenance and loss is the makeup of the family; as Ishizawa (2004) determined, language is maintained or lost at different levels
206 depending on who lives in the household. In Ukraine, it is common for three generations to live in one household; this should tend to support language maintenance overall.
Our overall picture of the Russian language in Ukraine, then, is fairly clear.
There are certain aspects of the society that make language maintenance more likely: many regions actually have a majority of Russian native speakers, Russian is a local-only minority language adjacent to a very large community of Russian as a majority language,
Russian speakers tend to have an integrationist orientation which could lead to a stable bilingual situation, Ukrainian society in some senses seems to be supportive of the
Russian language, and the makeup of the family should support the maintenance of the
Russian language. On the other hand, there are specific aspects of the situation that could make language loss more likely: there are clear socioeconomic and ideological advantages to speaking Ukrainian well, many of the policies toward language actually support an assimilationalist ideology, and the education system, rather than supporting the minority language, is geared toward a transition toward Ukrainian-only schools.
Language maintenance and loss is never simple, and Russian in Ukraine is certainly complex; with this in mind, I can pose several research questions for my study.
6.3 Relevant Research Questions
When it comes to attitudes about language maintenance and loss in Ukraine, the most important question will be how people perceive Russian being maintained or lost.
Do they themselves think that they have become better or worse speakers of Russian since the fall of the Soviet Union? Do their children and grandchildren speak Russian 207 with them, and do they feel the need to pressure their children and grandchildren to speak either Russian or Ukrainian?
Further, it will be important to understand whether people believe that Russian needs to be preserved – whether it is in danger of being lost. This will help us to better see the situation from the point of view of Russian speakers in Ukraine; if a need is felt to maintain Russian, the speakers may be feeling that there is pressure working against its maintenance. Similarly, it will be useful to see how important they think it is that their children and grandchildren speak Russian, as this will help us to understand the ideology that the speakers have themselves toward the Russian language.
It will also be important to understand what kind of pressures the speakers feel with regards to language. We have seen that socioeconomic pressure can be a strong incentive for speakers to switch to the majority language; are the Russian speakers in
Ukraine feeling these types of socioeconomic pressures in favor of using Ukrainian?
Ideologically, is there a connection between Ukrainian and positive national qualities that may further pressure Russian language speakers to make the switch? Understanding the pressures that speakers feel will help to understand the motivations behind language maintenance and loss in Ukraine today.
Finally, it will be important to ask these questions based on specific demographics, to understand how the perception of language maintenance and loss is changing over time, and is varied based on geographical location, political affiliation, age, sex, and basis of self-identification. Each speaker has their own story to tell about
208 language maintenance and loss, and determining how the trends break down, and for whom, will help us to understand the big picture in Ukraine.
Based on the linguistic makeup and the current linguistic policies in Ukraine, we can expect several hypotheses to bear out of my research. The first is that there is some level of perceived language loss in Ukraine, although it may play out in different ways for different people. Since there is still a large population of Russian speakers, and generally easy access to media and other outside sources of Russian, most older recipients are unlikely to have noticed language attrition in their own speech. However, with the increase in Ukrainian schools, I expect that the children and grandchildren of adult recipients are speaking an increased amount of Ukrainian, and the younger speakers may feel that they have lost some of their Russian language skills in the past twenty years.
I expect that most Russian speakers will feel that it is important to preserve
Russian, and that their children and grandchildren learn to speak Russian well. As this is all based on self-reporting, it will not necessarily reflect the facts of the situation, but rather, the reactions that Russian speakers have toward those facts. However it should be acknowledged that Marian (2007) found that at least one variable, a self-reported proficiency in the language, correlates with linguistic behavior. In terms of pressuring children to speak Russian or Ukrainian, I expect mixed results. While some parents may feel the urge to pressure their children to maintain their own native tongue, others may
209 feel the socioeconomic and ideological pressure to speak Ukrainian, and therefore pressure them to speak Ukrainian as much as possible.
I expect that Russian speakers are feeling outside pressures to speak Ukrainian, both on a professional level and in terms of ideology. Some may feel that their professional lives would be more successful if they spoke better Ukrainian, others may feel that their sense of national pride is diminished because they are Russian speakers.
I further expect for Russian speakers to believe that all Ukrainians should have the right to choose which language is spoken at the school that their children attend, and to reflect feelings of discouragement at the current system and the focus on Ukrainian.
Regionally, I expect that those in Kyiv will feel more strongly that Russian maintenance is of secondary importance to support of Ukrainian, and that those in
Kharkiv and Simferopol will express more interest in the maintenance of Russian. On the other hand, those in Kharkiv are close enough to Russia that they may not see language loss as a real possibility. The respondents from Kherson, I hypothesize, will have mixed results.
Similarly, with age, I expect that the youth of the country will be less concerned with the maintenance of Russian overall; they are more likely to have been educated in
Ukrainian schools and are more likely to be fluent in both languages, and thus have less at stake than some of the older generation. The older generation, in turn, I predict will be more concerned with the loss of Russian in Ukraine overall.
As it has been nearly 20 years since the fall of the Soviet Union, I expect that the feelings toward language maintenance and loss will be quite strong, although the fact that
Ukraine borders Russia, that a large population of Ukraine speaks Russian, and that multiple generations live in households may mitigate the issue for some Russian language speakers in Ukraine.
6.4 Research Findings
My research in Ukraine yielded results on a variety of topics; the questions and responses in this section will help us to better understand what the linguistic situation in
Ukraine is when it comes to language maintenance and loss, current trends in language use, and how different members of society feel about the maintenance of Russian in
Ukraine. In this section, we will first see the results of the survey, and break down the responses into different demographic groups. Then, I will analyze and discuss these results, using the theories presented earlier in the chapter.
6.4.1 Overall linguistic information
As with any bilingual situation, there is a certain level of instability when it comes to linguistic fluency. Bilingualism levels, and proficiency in each of the languages, are likely to be different today than they were twenty years ago. In order to understand how the breakdown between the languages is changing, and the connection of linguistic attitudes to ideas about language maintenance and loss, it is critical to start with a fairly straightforward question. Table 6.1 illustrates the comfort level in speaking both languages and the individuals‟ perception of bilingualism.
Table 6.1 Overall Language Fluency and Bilingualism (percent)
Do you feel more comfortable speaking Do you consider yourself to be bilingual? Russian or Ukrainian? Equal Russian Ukrainian No Yes I don‟t know 44.6 48.5 6.9 32.7 60.4 6.9
From this table, we can see that nearly 2/3 of the country considers itself to be bilingual, although less than half feel equally comfortable in both languages. Very few of the respondents indicated that they feel more comfortable speaking Ukrainian.
Table 6.2 looks at the above results broken down by region.
Table 6.2 Regional Language Fluency and Bilingualism (percent)
Do you feel more comfortable Do you consider yourself to be speaking Russian or Ukrainian? bilingual? Region Equal Russian Ukrainian No Yes I don‟t know Kherson 60.0 33.3 6.7 30 66.7 3.3 Kyiv 30.8 53.8 15.4 30.8 57.7 11.5 Kharkiv 39.4 57.6 3.0 39.4 57.6 3.0 Simferopol 50.0 50.0 0.0 25.0 58.3 16.7
We can see that those in Kherson are much more likely to indicate that they feel equally comfortable in both languages, with those in Kyiv and Kharkiv most likely to feel more comfortable using Russian. The level of bilingualism is generally split in much the same way as it was nationwide, with approximately twice as many people feeling bilingual as those who do not. In Kharkiv, however, people are much less likely to feel bilingual. An individual‟s perception of bilingualism is as varying as the definition of bilingualism in
212 general; what these results tell us is not how many people are objectively bilingual, but rather the way that people see themselves in a society that is generally seen as bilingual.
As important as looking at the different levels of fluency and bilingualism in different regions is to pay attention to the way that different generations are approaching these ideas. Table 6.3 illustrates the above results broken down by age.
Table 6.3 Fluency and Bilingualism by age group (percent)
Do you feel more comfortable speaking Do you consider yourself to be Russian or Ukrainian? bilingual? Age Equal Russian Ukrainian No Yes I don‟t know 18-35 42.5 51.9 5.6 37.0 53.7 9.3 45-80 48.6 40.0 11.4 22.9 71.4 5.7
As we can see the members of the older generation are more likely to consider themselves to be bilingual, while members of the younger generation are more likely to feel more comfortable speaking Russian.
Another way of looking at the question of bilingualism is by comparing the way that people prefer to receive information, as well as how they are able to pick up clues about a person based on the language that they speak. Table 6.4 summarizes the results on the individuals‟ exposure to the Ukrainian media as well as their socio-linguistic awareness.
Table 6.4 Overall Language reception preferences (percent)
Do you prefer to watch TV/listen to the Is it easier for you to guess the social status radio in Russian or Ukrainian? of somebody who is speaking Russian or Ukrainian? Russian Ukrainian No Russian Ukrainian No difference preference 36.0 10.0 54.0 16.8 2.0 81.2
Overall, approximately half of the respondents have no preference when it comes to reception of information, but of those who do have a preference, approximately four times as many respondents prefer Russian programs. When it comes to clues about a person‟s social status, the majority of respondents do not feel a difference, but of those that do, 8 times as many (admittedly, though, a small actual number) have an easier time deciphering social status when the interlocutor is speaking Russian.
Then the above results were broken down by region (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 Regional Language reception preferences (percent)
Do you prefer to watch TV/listen to Is it easier for you to guess the social the radio in Russian or Ukrainian? status of somebody who is speaking Russian or Ukrainian? Region Russian Ukrainian No Russian Ukrainian No preference difference Kherson 50.0 0.0 50.0 23.4 3.3 73.3 Kyiv 15.4 11.5 73.1 7.7 0.0 92.3 Kharkiv 48.5 21.2 30.3 18.2 3.0 78.8 Simferopol 9.1 0.0 90.9 16.7 0.0 83.3
We can see that those in Kherson and Kharkiv are most likely to prefer to receive their media in Russian, and they also find it easier to guess the social status of somebody who is speaking Russian than those in Kyiv and Simferopol. 214
As with the other data, it is important to break down the responses not just by region, but by age, as well. The younger generation has spent much of their lives with a majority of Ukrainian programming, which may influence their preferences. Table 6.6 shows the breakdown of the above results by age.
Table 6.6 Language reception preferences by age group (percent)
Do you prefer to watch TV/listen to the Is it easier for you to guess the social radio in Russian or Ukrainian? status of somebody who is speaking Russian or Ukrainian? Age Russian Ukrainian No Russian Ukrainian No preference difference 18-35 24.5 13.2 62.3 11.1 0.0 88.9 45-80 54.3 5.7 40.0 25.7 5.7 68.6
As we can see, 18-35 year-olds are more likely to have no preference in their programming, and are also much less likely to sense a difference in social status depending on language.
Although the responses to many of the questions in this study did not show any trends based on gender, Table 6.7 shows that there is a difference in media preference based on gender.
Table 6.7 Language reception preferences by gender (percent)
Do you prefer to watch TV/listen to the radio in Russian or Ukrainian? Gender Russian Ukrainian No preference Male 34.3 17.1 48.6 Female 36.9 6.2 56.9
Thus, we see that women are much less likely to prefer Ukrainian programming, although they are approximately equal to men in their preference for Russian programming.
It is important to know how much the respondents are speaking Russian and
Ukrainian in their daily lives, in order to fully understand the possibilities of language loss, and how different sections of the population are maintaining their Russian. Table
6.8 shows the respondents‟ frequency of Russian use.
Table 6.8 Overall Russian use (percent)
How often do you speak Russian? If you answered ‘every day,’ please indicate how much time during the day you speak Russian. Every Every Every A few times Less Less than 20- 50- More day week month per year 10% 30% 80% than 80% 91.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 5.2 7.2 17.5 70.1
Nearly all of the respondents use Russian daily, and most speak Russian at least half of the day.
It is also important to see how much Ukrainian is being spoken. Table 6.9 looks at the same information as it pertains to Ukrainian.
Table 6.9 Overall Ukrainian use (percent)
How often do you speak Ukrainian? If you answered ‘every day,’ please indicate how much time during the day you speak Ukrainian. Every Every Every A few times Less Less than 20- 50- More day week month per year 10% 30% 80% than 80% 44.0 15.0 12.0 17.0 12.0 32.1 30.4 26.8 10.7
Ukrainian is spoken considerably less frequently than Russian, with fewer than half of the respondents indicating that they speak Ukrainian every day, and of those, most responding that they speak Ukrainian during 30% or less of their day.
These same questions, broken down by region, are strong indicators of where the erosion of Russian is most likely taking place. Table 6.10 breaks down the daily use of
Russian by region.
Table 6.10 Regional Russian use (percent)
How often do you speak Russian? If you answered ‘every day,’ please indicate how much time during the day you speak Russian. Region Every Every Every A few Less Less than 20- 50- More day week month times per 10% 30% 80% than year 80% Kherson 86.7 3.3 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 16.6 26.7 46.7 Kyiv 84.7 3.8 11.5 0.0 0.0 4.3 4.3 17.5 73.9 Kharkiv 97.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 9.4 84.4 Simferopol 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 83.3
Here we see that most regions have a high percentage of people that speak Russian every day, with fewer people in Kherson and Kyiv who speak Russian daily. Similarly, there are fewer people who speak Russian for the majority of their day in Kherson and Kyiv.
The regional breakdown of Ukrainian being spoken is shown in Table 6.11.
Table 6.11 Regional Ukrainian use (percent)
How often do you speak Ukrainian? If you answered ‘every day,’ please indicate how much time during the day you speak Ukrainian. Region Every Every Every A few Less Less 20- 50- More day week month times per than 30% 80% than year 10% 80% Kherson 56.6 6.7 10 16.7 10 27.3 18.2 45.4 9.1 Kyiv 61.6 15.4 7.7 3.8 11.5 23.6 35.3 17.6 23.5 Kharkiv 21.2 18.2 15.2 21.2 24.2 40.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 Simferopol 33.3 25.0 16.7 25.0 0.0 57.1 42.9 0.0 0.0
The results in Table 6.11 correspond with the results in Table 6.10, with those in Kherson and Kyiv more likely to speak Ukrainian every day, and indicating a higher percentage of
Ukrainian during the day, as well.
It is to be expected that there are regional linguistic differences when it comes to the language, as we have seen in the tables above. It is also important to compare language use across generations, to understand whether the language is being maintained or lost over time. Table 6.12 shows the data regarding daily use of Russian, broken down by age.
Table 6.12 Russian use by age group (percent)
How often do you speak Russian? If you answered ‘every day,’ please indicate how much time during the day you speak Russian. Age Every Every Every A few Less Less 20- 50- More day week month times than 30% 80% than per year 10% 80% 18-35 92.4 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 3.8 3.8 9.7 82.7 45-80 85.7 2.9 5.7 5.7 0.0 9.1 12.1 30.3 48.5
It is shown that the younger generation is actually more likely to speak Russian every day, and they are also more likely to speak Russian for more than 80% of their day.
Table 6.13 shows the generational differences regarding daily use of Ukrainian.
Table 6.13 Ukrainian use by age (percent)
How often do you speak Ukrainian? If you answered ‘every day,’ please indicate how much time during the day you speak Ukrainian. Age Every Every Every A few Less Less than 20- 50- More day week month times per 10% 30% 80% than year 80% 18- 37.0 22.2 20.4 16.7 3.7 44.4 29.7 14.8 11.1 35 45- 51.4 8.6 0.0 14.3 25.7 13.0 30.4 43.6 13.0 80
Although the older age group was more likely to speak Ukrainian every day, they were also more likely to speak Ukrainian less than a few times per year. The older generation was more likely to speak Ukrainian for over half of their day.
A similar question to those above is what language is spoken at home. Table 6.14 shows the way that all of the respondents speak with their partners.
Table 6.14 Overall language use with partner (percent)
What language do you speak with your partner? Only Russian and Russian and Russian and Only Russian Ukrainian, but Ukrainian, no Ukrainian, but Ukrainian mostly Russian preference mostly Ukrainian. 56.6 26.5 3.7 4.8 8.4
Here, it can be seen that the majority of the respondents either speak Russian with their partner, or they speak mostly Russian.
Table 6.15 looks at the same question as Table 6.14, broken down by region.
Table 6.15 Regional language use with partner (percent)
What language do you speak with your partner? Region Only Russian and Russian and Russian and Only Russian Ukrainian, but Ukrainian, no Ukrainian, but Ukrainian mostly Russian preference mostly Ukrainian. Kherson 46.5 28.6 7.1 10.7 7.1 Kyiv 40.9 27.4 4.5 4.5 22.7 Kharkiv 81.4 18.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 Simferopol 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Those in Kyiv are far more likely to speak only Ukrainian with their partners than those in any of the other cities, followed by those in Kherson. Kharkiv citizens are the most likely to speak only Russian with their partners.
To sum up, the majority of the respondents consider themselves to be bilingual, although generally, the respondents were more comfortable speaking Russian. Those in the eastern part of the country were more likely to have stronger preferences toward
Russian, and the older generation was more likely to indicate a feeling of bilingualism.
All of the respondents were likely to use Russian every day, and for a large part of their day, with the older generation and those in Kyiv and Kherson more likely to use
6.4.2 Change in linguistic situation
In order to understand language maintenance and loss in Ukraine right now, it is important to see the way that the linguistic situation is changing. First, we will look at people‟s perceptions of their fluency in Russian and Ukrainian, and how these perceptions have changed since 1991. Table 6.16 shows the respondents‟ perception of their own fluency, as well as their fluency in Ukrainian before the fall of the Soviet
Table 6.16 Overall fluency and mastery of Ukrainian before 1991 (percent)
Which languages do you speak How would you rate your mastery of Ukrainian fluently? before Ukrainian became the official language of Ukraine? Russian Russian Other Very Good Okay Fairly Very None and languages good bad bad Ukrainian as well 12.9 73.2 13.9 19.6 29.9 34.0 4.1 3.1 9.3
Here we see that the majority of the respondents feel that they speak at least both Russian and Ukrainian fluently, and approximately one out of every five respondents felt that their Ukrainian was very good before 1991.
Table 6.17 looks at how the respondents rate their own mastery of Ukrainian and
Table 6.17 Overall current mastery of Ukrainian and Russian (percent)
How would you rate your mastery of How would you rate your mastery of Russian Ukrainian now? now? Very Good Okay Fairly Very None Very Good Okay Fairly Very None good bad bad good bad bad 25.7 29.7 37.6 2.0 2.0 3.0 52.5 29.7 17.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
We see that a quarter of the respondents think that their Ukrainian is very good, and there is a general rise in self-perception of mastery. The current level of Russian, for self- described Russian native speakers, is mostly very good or good.
In order to understand the role that regional differences play on self-perception of their own language maintenance, the respondents‟ answers about linguistic fluency and earlier mastery of Ukrainian are shown in Table 6.18:
Table 6.18 Regional fluency and mastery of Ukrainian before 1991 (percent)
Which languages do you speak How would you rate your mastery of Ukrainian fluently? before Ukrainian became the official language of Ukraine? Region Russian Russian Other Very Good Okay Fairly Very Non and languages good bad bad e Ukrainian as well Kherson 23.3 70.0 6.7 20.0 20.0 43.3 3.3 6.7 6.7 Kyiv 7.7 73.1 19.2 23.1 30.7 23.1 7.7 0.0 15.4 Kharkiv 9.1 81.9 9.1 15.6 40.6 34.4 3.1 3.1 3.1 Simferopol 8.3 58.4 33.3 22.2 22.2 33.4 0.0 0.0 22.2
This shows us that Kherson has the highest percentage of speakers who only speak
Russian fluently, while Simferopol and Kyiv had the highest level of speakers who spoke no Ukrainian before Ukrainian became the state language.
Table 6.19 looks at the respondents‟ reports of their current mastery of Ukrainian and Russian, broken down by region.
Table 6.19 Regional current mastery of Ukrainian and Russian (percent)
How would you rate your mastery of How would you rate your mastery of Ukrainian now? Russian now? Region Very Good Okay Fairly Very None Very Good Okay Fairly Very None good bad bad good bad bad Kherson 16.7 30.0 43.3 0.0 3.3 6.7 26.7 33.3 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Kyiv 46.2 26.9 23.1 0.0 3.8 0.0 61.5 38.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Kharkiv 21.2 33.3 39.5 3.0 0.0 3.0 63.6 24.3 12.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Simferopol 16.7 33.3 41.7 8.3 0.0 0.0 66.6 16.7 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Those in Kyiv are most likely to feel confident in their Ukrainian, while those in Kherson are least likely to feel confident in their Russian.
The younger generation, having spent all of their adult lives (if not their entire lives) in an independent Ukraine, certainly have different experiences with language loss and maintenance than the older generation. Table 6.20 shows the generational differences in perceptions about fluency as well as mastery of Ukrainian before 1991.
Table 6.20 Fluency and mastery of Ukrainian before 1991 by age group (percent)
Which languages do you speak How would you rate your mastery of Ukrainian fluently? before Ukrainian became the official language of Ukraine? Age Russian Russian Other Very Good Okay Fairly Very None and languages good bad bad Ukrainian as well 18-35 13.0 72.2 14.8 16.0 42.0 18.0 6.0 6.0 12.0 45-80 14.2 82.9 2.9 22.9 20.0 51.4 0.0 0.0 5.7
The older generation is slightly more likely to speak only Russian fluently, although the younger generation is more likely to speak other languages fluently as well – the most common other language registered in the survey was English. The younger generation was more likely to have limited or no Ukrainian before 1991, although a large percentage of them also had a high level of confidence in their Ukrainian at that time.
Table 6.21 looks at the generational differences between rates of current fluency in Russian and Ukrainian.
Table 6.21 Current mastery of Ukrainian and Russian by age group (percent)
How would you rate your mastery of How would you rate your mastery of Ukrainian now? Russian now? Age Very Good Okay Fairly Very None Very Good Okay Fairly Very None good bad bad good bad bad 18- 25.9 42.5 24.1 3.7 1.9 1.9 50.0 38.9 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 35 45- 25.7 20.0 48.5 0.0 2.9 2.9 54.3 17.1 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 80
Thus, the younger generation is more likely to feel good about their Ukrainian, while the older respondents‟ were more likely to feel okay about their Ukrainian. The same trend is found for Russian levels, as well.
The information from the previous section regarding language spoken with partners is important for understanding the contemporary language situation in Ukraine.
Understanding the language spoken with children, both to and from, can give us a picture of how the situation is changing. Table 6.22 looks at how the respondents from all over the country speak with their children.
Table 6.22 Overall language use with children (percent)
What language do you speak with your What language do your children speak with children? you? Only Russian Russian Russian Only Only Russian Russian Russian Only Russian and Ukr., and Ukr., and Ukr., Ukr. Russian and Ukr., and Ukr., and Ukr. Ukr. but no but but mostly no but mostly mostly preference mostly Russian preference Ukr. Russian Ukr. 55.8 18.0 9.8 11.5 4.9 54.2 22.0 8.5 10.2 5.1
Here we see that, while the majority of the respondents speak and are spoken to in
Russian, there is some mixture, and some respondents only speak Ukrainian to their children.
Table 6.23 examines how respondents speak with their children, by region.
Table 6.23 Regional language use with children (percent)
What language do you speak with your What language do your children speak children? with you? Region Only Rus. and Rus. and Rus. Only Only Rus. and Rus. and Rus. Only Rus. Ukr., but Ukr., no and Ukr. Rus. Ukr., but Ukr., no and Ukr. mostly preference Ukr., mostly preference Ukr. Russian but Russian but mostly mostly Ukr. Ukr. Kherson 40.9 9.1 22.7 18.2 9.1 47.8 8.7 17.4 17.4 8.7 Kyiv 53.8 23.1 0.0 15.4 7.7 50.0 25.0 0.0 16.7 8.3 Kharkiv 68.3 22.7 4.5 4.5 0.0 65.0 30.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 Simferopol 75.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
We can see that the highest percentage of recipients to speak only Russian with their children comes from Kharkiv and Simferopol, and that the only places where solely
Ukrainian is spoken between parents and children as reported by respondents are Kherson and Kyiv. It is interesting to note that in most of the regions, if the parents speak solely 225
Russian to the children, a smaller percentage of children speak only Russian back. The exception to this is Kherson.
This same information is shown in Table 6.24, broken down by age.
Table 6.24 Language use with children by age (percent)
What language do you speak with your What language do your children speak children? with you? Age Only Rus. and Rus. and Rus. Only Only Rus. and Rus. and Rus. Only Rus. Ukr., but Ukr., no and Ukr. Rus. Ukr., but Ukr., no and Ukr. mostly preference Ukr., mostly preference Ukr. Russian but Russian but mostly mostly Ukr. Ukr. 18-35 50.0 25.0 6.3 18.7 0.0 42.9 28.6 7.1 14.3 7.1 45-80 55.9 11.7 14.8 11.7 5.9 55.9 17.6 11.8 11.8 2.9
Here we see that a higher percentage of the older generation speaks only Russian with their children, and an even larger percentage of that generation‟s children speak only
Russian back. The younger generation, while unlikely to speak Ukrainian to their children, is somewhat more likely to have their children speak solely Ukrainian back to them. This may be due to the fact that older people have adult children while younger ones have small children, which accounts for a difference in the attitudes and level of concern.
To sum up, nearly all of the data point to a rise in the usage of Ukrainian, especially amongst those living in Kyiv and the younger generation. The respondents in
Kharkiv and Simferopol were most likely to speak only Russian with their children, and the younger generation was more likely to speak and be spoken to in Ukrainian by their children. 226
6.4.3 Language pressure
Given the current linguistic situation, and the way that the linguistic situation has changed since 1991, Ukraine is a country that is likely to face language loss with
Russian. As we saw earlier in the chapter, one of the driving factors of language loss is the connection of socioeconomic benefits associated with language use. In this section, I will look at perceptions of economic and social pressures to speak Ukrainian and
Table 6.25 shows how all of the respondents feel their situation would change if they spoke Ukrainian better.
Table 6.25 Overall change in social and professional situation (percent)
How do you think your situation – social and professional – would change, if you spoke Ukrainian better? It would It would It wouldn‟t change, because It wouldn‟t change, because become better become worse language knowledge doesn‟t I know Ukrainian well influence that 8.9 4.0 55.4 31.7
As we see, the majority of the respondents did not believe that a better knowledge of
Ukrainian would affect their situation; of those that do, twice as many believed knowing
Ukrainian would make their situation better.
Table 6.26 shows the answer to the same question as Table 6.25, broken down by region.
Table 6.26 Regional change in social and professional situation (percent)
How do you think your situation – social and professional – would change, if you spoke Ukrainian better? Region It would It would It wouldn‟t change It wouldn‟t change, because become better become worse I know Ukrainian well Kherson 3.3 3.3 76.7 16.7 Kyiv 12.0 0.0 32.0 56.0 Kharkiv 9.1 12.1 48.5 30.3 Simferopol 8.3 0.0 66.7 25.0
Here we see that most respondents in all areas do not think that their social and professional situation would change if they spoke Ukrainian better, but the reasons are different across regions; in Kherson, the majority of respondents do not think that the language is important, whereas in Kyiv, most people say that their Ukrainian is already good enough so that it does not matter. For those who do think that their situation would change, those in Kharkiv are most likely to think that their situation would become worse, while those in Kyiv are most likely to believe that their situation would be better.
Table 6.27 shows the answer to the question shown in Table 6.26, broken down by age.
Table 6.27 Change in social and professional situation by age (percent)
How do you think your situation – social and professional – would change, if you spoke Ukrainian better? Age It would It would It wouldn‟t change, because It wouldn‟t change, because become better become worse language knowledge doesn‟t I know Ukrainian well influence that 18-35 5.6 0.0 57.3 37.1 45-80 14.7 8.9 52.9 23.5
In this table, we can see that the majority of both groups do not think language is important to their professional and social situation.
Although gender has not been shown to be a strong divider for much of these data, there is an interesting difference between the genders when it comes to beliefs about how their situation would change. The responses, broken down by gender, are shown in
Table 6.28 Change in social and professional situation by gender (percent)
How do you think your situation – social and professional – would change, if you spoke Ukrainian better? Gender It would It would It wouldn‟t change, because It wouldn‟t change, because become better become worse language knowledge doesn‟t I know Ukrainian well influence that Male 5.7 8.6 54.3 31.4 Female 10.6 1.5 56.1 31.8
As we see, men and women are very similar in their reasonings for why better
Ukrainian would not affect their situation, but women are twice as likely to think that their situation would become better, whereas men are about six times more likely than women to think that their situation would become worse if they spoke Ukrainian better.
The question of self-identity has shown itself to be an important factor, and it is worthwhile to look at the question posed in Table 6.28 broken down between those who strongly self-identify based on their native Russian language and those who strongly identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine. Beliefs about how situations would change, broken down by basis of self-identification, are shown in Table 6.29.
Table 6.29 Change in social and professional situation by self-identification (percent)
How do you think your situation – social and professional – would change, if you spoke Ukrainian better? Basis of self- It would It would It wouldn‟t change, because It wouldn‟t change, because identification become better become worse language knowledge doesn‟t I know Ukrainian well influence that Language 20.0 0.0 60.0 20.0 Geography 4.8 0.0 52.4 42.8
Table 6.29 shows that, while those who self-identify as Ukrainian based on the fact that they live in Ukraine do not believe their situation would change if they knew
Ukrainian better, a fairly high percentage of those who self-identify based on their native
Russian language believe that their situation would become better with better Ukrainian skills.
Another important distinction is shown when the respondents are broken down by their ideological beliefs. In the previous chapter, I examined whether respondents felt that the linguistic situation had improved or gotten worse since Ukrainian was made the official language. In Table 6.30, the way that people feel about their professional situation is shown, broken down by their ideological beliefs.
Table 6.30 Change in social and professional situation by ideology (percent)
How do you think your situation – social and professional – would change, if you spoke Ukrainian better? Beliefs about It would It would It wouldn‟t change, because It wouldn‟t change, because increase of become better become worse language knowledge doesn‟t I know Ukrainian well influence that Ukrainian Positive 0.0 0.0 36.4 63.6 Negative 12.5 9.4 62.5 15.6
Here we see that those who believe that the linguistic situation has improved since
Ukrainian became the official language do not believe that their situation would change at all, with the majority of them believing that they know Ukrainian well enough that it does not matter. On the other hand, those that think the linguistic situation has worsened are more likely to think that their situation would change, and quite unlikely to believe that their Ukrainian is good enough not to affect things.
The respondents were also asked about the pressure that they exert on children to speak either Russian or Ukrainian, which is shown in Table 6.31.
Table 6.31 Overall pressure put on children to use Russian and Ukrainian (percent)
Do you pressure children to speak Russian? Do you pressure children to speak Ukrainian? Sometimes Never Often Sometimes Never Often 9.5 88.9 1.6 13.1 80.3 6.6
As we can see, while the majority of the respondents to not pressure children one way or another. Although people are somewhat more likely to either sometimes or often pressure children to speak Ukrainian rather than Russian, the percentages are close enough that there is nothing more to be shown by breaking down the data by demographics.
In sum, while many of the respondents do not believe that better Ukrainian would change their professional or social situation, of those that do think there would be a difference, women and those in Kyiv are most likely to expect a positive difference, while the older generation, men, and those in Kharkiv are most likely to expect a negative
231 difference. Across the board, respondents were unlikely to pressure their children to speak either Ukrainian or Russian.
6.4.4 Language maintenance
One of the critical factors of language maintenance is the public perception of the status of the language: is the language being perceived as being lost or needing to be preserved? Table 6.35 shows how all of the respondents feel about the importance of maintaining Russian.
Table 6.32 Overall importance of preserving Russian (percent)
How important is it to preserve Russian? Very Important I don‟t Not very Not at all important know important important 37.6 46.6 6.9 7.9 1.0
As we can see, the majority of respondents believe that it is important to preserve the
Russian language. Table 6.33 takes this question a step further, showing the way that respondents feel about their children speaking Russian.
Table 6.33 Overall importance of children speaking Russian (percent)
How important is it that your children speak and understand Russian? Very Important I don‟t Not very Not at all important know important important 44.6 49.4 5.0 1.0 0.0
In Table 6.33, we see similar answers to those listed in Table 6.32, although with a stronger tendency towards the importance of maintaining Russian.
As with the previous questions, in order to understand the situation completely, it is critical to look at the differences across regions in Ukraine. Table 6.34 shows how respondents feel about preserving Russian, broken down by region.
Table 6.34 Importance of preserving Russian by region (percent)
How important is it to preserve Russian? Region Very Important I don‟t Not very Not at all important know important important Kherson 36.7 53.3 10.0 0.0 0.0 Kyiv 26.9 57.8 3.8 7.7 3.8 Kharkiv 54.6 30.3 3.0 12.1 0.0 Simferopol 16.7 49.9 16.7 16.7 0.0
Here we see that, generally, there is similar sentiment about preserving Russian between the regions.
Table 6.35 shows how important respondents think that children speak Russian, broken down by region.
Table 6.35 Importance of children speaking Russian by region (percent)
How important is it that your children speak and understand Russian? Region Very Important I don‟t Not very Not at all important know important important Kherson 36.7 63.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 Kyiv 42.3 53.9 0.0 3.8 0.0 Kharkiv 60.6 33.3 6.1 0.0 0.0 Simferopol 25.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 0.0
In Table 6.35, we see that, unlike Table 6.34, those in Kharkiv feel more strongly than any other region that it is very important that their children speak and understand
The breakdown by age to these two questions can further shed light on the contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine. Table 6.36 shows how the different generations feel about preserving Russian.
Table 6.36 Importance of preserving Russian by age (percent)
How important is it to preserve Russian? Age Very Important I don‟t Not very Not at all important know important important 18-35 29.6 48.1 9.3 11.1 1.9 45-80 45.7 48.5 2.9 2.9 0.0
Here we see a large difference between the generations in their attitudes toward preserving Russian. While much of the younger generation still believes that it is important to maintain Russian, they are far less likely to consider it very important, and much more likely to think that it is not very important compared with the older counterparts.
Table 6.37 shows how the different generations feel about the importance of children speaking Russian.
Table 6.37 Importance of children speaking Russian by age (percent)
How important is it that your children speak and understand Russian? Age Very Important I don‟t Not very Not at all important know important important 18-35 38.8 53.7 5.6 1.9 0.0 45-80 48.6 48.6 2.8 0.0 0.0
Once again, we see that the younger generation is less likely to feel very strongly about the maintenance of Russian, although the differences in attitude are more subtle when it comes to the importance of one‟s children speaking Russian.
The respondents were also broken down by self-identification, and Table 6.38 shows how respondents feel about preserving Russian, broken down between those that strongly identify themselves based on their native Russian and those that identify themselves based on their geographic location.
Table 6.38 Importance of preserving Russian by self-identification (percent)
How important is it to preserve Russian? Basis of self- Very Important I don‟t know Not very Not at all identity important important important Language 70.0 25.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 Geography 21.7 56.6 8.7 13.0 0.0
Here we see that those who identify themselves based on their native Russian language are far more likely to think it is very important to preserve the Russian language, while those who identify themselves based on the fact that they live in Ukraine are more likely to think that is not important to preserve Russian.
The interaction of self-identification and attitudes to maintain Russian for children is illustrated in Table 6.39.
Table 6.39 Importance of children speaking Russian by self-identification (percent)
How important is it that your children speak and understand Russian? Basis of self- Very Important I don‟t know Not very Not at all identity important important important Language 65.0 30.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 Geography 26.1 65.2 8.7 0.0 0.0
As we have seen earlier in this section, all of the respondents feel more strongly about the importance of their children speaking and understanding Russian than they do about preserving Russian in general; the two different groups that are divided by basis of self- identity clearly show differing levels of importance as to whether their children speak and understand Russian; two thirds of those that identify themselves on the basis of their native Russian feel that it is very important that their children speak and understand
Russian, compared to only one fourth of those that identify based on the fact that they live in Ukraine.
In Table 6.40, we see how important people feel preserving Russian is, broken down by their ideological beliefs.
Table 6.40 Importance of preserving Russian by ideology (percent)
How important is it to preserve Russian? Beliefs about Very Important I don‟t know Not very Not at all increase of important important important Ukrainian Positive 13.0 56.6 8.7 17.4 4.3 Negative 58.8 32.4 2.9 5.9 0.0 236
Those that feel that the increase in the usage of Ukrainian is negative are much more likely to believe that preserving Russian is very important, and those that feel that the increase in Ukrainian use is positive are more likely to report that maintaining Russian is not important.
The same breakdown was used to see how people feel about their children speaking and understanding Russian in Table 6.41.
Table 6.41 Importance of children speaking Russian by ideology (percent)
How important is it that your children speak and understand Russian? Beliefs about Very Important I don‟t know Not very Not at all increase of important important important Ukrainian Positive 26.1 69.6 0.0 4.3 0.0 Negative 64.7 32.4 2.9 0.0 0.0
In this table, it is clear that those with positive ideology about Ukrainian think it is important that their children speak and understand their native tongue, but those with negative ideology about Ukrainian feel more strongly that this is very important.
To sum up, most of the respondents felt that it was important to preserve Russian and that their children speak and understand Russian, but the younger generation and those in Kyiv place less value on maintaining Russian than their counterparts, although they still rate it highly. Further, those that identify themselves based on language as well as those that feel negative ideology toward Ukrainian were far more likely to think that it was important to preserve Russian than those who identify based on geography, although neither group thought it was unimportant for their children to speak and understand
Russian. All of the groups feel more strongly that it is important for their children to speak Russian than they do about the general maintenance of the language; this is indicative of how personal the issue of language is. Although the general preservation of
Russian may not be of importance to somebody, thinking about their own children being unable to speak to them in their native tongue is more upsetting.
6.4.5 Qualitative responses to questions of language pressure and language loss
Although most of the responses in this section were straightforward, there were a few respondents that wanted to clarify their answers to questions about language pressure. One participant (L., female, 70, Kharkiv) explained why she pressured children to speak Ukrainian instead of Russian: я уверена, что политики что-то придумают,
и отдадут предпочтение тем, кто говорит по-украински (I am sure that politicians will think of something, and will give preference to those who speak Ukrainian). This speaks very clearly to the idea of socioeconomic pressures on language use; whether it is true or not, there is a perception among some Russian speaking Ukrainians that speaking
Ukrainian allows for certain socioeconomic benefits. Similarly, when asked about whether her situation would become better or worse if she spoke Ukrainian better, another respondent (I., female, 77, Kharkiv) wrote, дискриминация есть (discrimination exists) to explain why her situation would become better. Yet another participant (P., male, 63, Kharkiv) explained that his situation would become worse if he spoke
Ukrainian better by saying, всѐ дело на русском (all business is in Russian). Although the respondents were more likely to express a lack of pressure to speak Ukrainian or
Russian, these responses illustrate that some of the population of Ukraine is feeling external pressure on their linguistic choices.
Similarly to the questions about language pressure, the majority of the respondents simply answered the multiple choice questions without comment. However, two respondents (L., female, 70, Kharkiv; and O., female, 22, Kyiv) wrote the same comment about the danger of Russian being lost: он сам сохраняется (it will be preserved on its own). In other words, the idea of the loss of the Russian language is not worrisome because it seems like such a remote possibility, especially with Russia looming just over the eastern border.
6.5 General Discussion
Language maintenance is a critical component of any bilingual situation.
Although it is not impossible for two or more languages to harmoniously co-exist, there is nearly always some degree of loss of the non-primary language. In Ukraine‟s recent history, Russian was the primary language, and Ukrainian, for much of the country, was relegated to a secondary status. However, that has changed since independence, and now it is Russian speakers who face a possible loss of their native tongue as Ukrainian gains both official and popular support.
6.5.1 Overall linguistic information
In order to understand the risks that Russian faces as a non-primary language, as well as the steps that speakers are taking to maintain it, it is important to have a clear 239 understanding of where the language stands today, and how that has been changing over the past twenty years. As discussed in earlier chapters, the linguistic situation in
Ukraine is complicated by its history; while Russian used to be the prestigious language, that seems to be changing, and Ukrainian is gaining status and power. The findings in this chapter shed light on how the linguistic situation is changing for individuals in society, and the trends that are presented help us to understand the potential loss and maintenance issues for Russian.
Overall, it is clear that the majority of the country considers itself to be bilingual, and from this survey, we can see that nearly half of all native Russian speakers feel that they are equally fluent in Ukrainian as Russian, and 2/3 believe they are bilingual. This is consistent with current statistics from Ukraine, which tell us that the majority of the country is bilingual. The additional information that these numbers give is that nearly half of Russian native speakers feel equally comfortable in both languages.
The regions that were chosen for this research were chosen because of their linguistic makeup; what the linguistic information questions help us to understand is how strongly the Russian native speakers in those regions feel about Russian. While much of the country is bilingual, comfort level in the two languages gives good insight into the strength of each language in the region; we can expect those with a stronger comfort level in Ukrainian as well as Russian to be in regions with stronger connections to the
Thus, while over half of the respondents in every single region consider themselves to be bilingual, in Kyiv a much higher number feels more comfortable
240 speaking Ukrainian than Russian than in any other region; in Simferopol and Kharkiv, very few respondents are equally comfortable in Ukrainian.
This information supports what history, geography, and other statistics would lead us to believe: those in Kharkiv and Simferopol are much less likely to encounter
Ukrainian on a day-to-day basis and therefore are much less likely to feel equally comfortable in Ukrainian. This helps us to move to an understanding of how likely
Russian is to be lost in different regions; with a stronger hold in Simferopol and Kharkiv, the respondents are likely to be less concerned with maintaining Russian.
Dividing the respondents by age group allows for a similar illumination of the current situation. Interestingly, the 45-80 year olds are both more likely to consider themselves to be bilingual and more likely to feel more comfortable speaking Ukrainian than the younger generation. This is not in line with what I would imagine, given that the younger group has been more exposed to Ukrainian in the school system. A possible explanation of this is that, as the younger generation has had a lot of Ukrainian in school, they have been shown a clear picture of “pure” Ukrainian, which is often different from what is being spoken in the community. Thus, while their Ukrainian may actually be at a higher level than that of the older generation, they could be less comfortable speaking
Ukrainian because of a more acute awareness of the literary language.
We see similar trends when discussing the media preferences and ability to guess social status of interlocutors: overall, most people have no preference in the media, although for those that do, many more prefer Russian. Additionally, while most people see no difference when it comes to guessing social status, many more find it possible to
241 guess the social status if the person they are speaking with is Russian speaking than if that person is a Ukrainian speaker. This is consistent with what I would expect, given that all of the respondents are native Russian speakers. What this tells us is that overall, people are able to understand more than just the words that are being spoken by somebody who speaks their native language; it is more difficult to understand more than what is being said when the interlocutor is speaking a different language.
Interestingly, the regional data show that, when it comes to media preference, those in Kyiv and Kharkiv are most likely to prefer to watch TV in Ukrainian, and
Kharkiv, along with Kherson, also has a high percentage of respondents who prefer their media in Russian. While I would expect Kyiv respondents to prefer Ukrainian TV at a higher level than elsewhere, it is surprising that Kharkiv respondents are similarly inclined. This may be because the programs are simply different: Russian channels tend to be broadcast from Russia, and therefore have a different point of view, while
Ukrainian channels are generally perceived to be more Ukraine-centric. Because of this, it is difficult to say whether the media preferences are based on language, or based on the associations that are made between the language use and the programming. This is something that should be further explored in the future.
Generational differences are more in line with what I would expect, given what we know about the linguistic situation. The younger age group is much more likely to prefer Ukrainian media or to have no preference, and they are also much less likely to report language as an important indicator when it comes to social status. The younger generation has been exposed to Ukrainian media for their whole adult lives (if not their
242 entire lives), and so they are less inclined to feel strongly about Russian media.
Additionally, their increased exposure to Ukrainian, it seems, allows them to pick up on social cues equally in Russian and in Ukrainian.
One of the only questions in which we see a real difference between men and women in this study is the question of media preference. Although men and women are almost identically likely to prefer Russian media, men are nearly three times as likely as women to report a preference for Ukrainian programming. Since we have not seen much of a difference between the genders throughout the study, this suggests that there is more going on with this question than simply language preferences. Instead, this supports the idea that for many, the different type of programming dictates their preferences, rather than strictly language choice. Although much of the programming is similar in both languages, there is a difference in the politics that are delivered through Ukrainian media and that which is done in Russian; further, local sports and news are done in Ukrainian.
Thus, what these data suggest are that men might be more interested in the politics, local news, and sports that are broadcast in Ukrainian, rather than the preference for the language itself.
It is clear that the majority of the respondents are relatively comfortable in both languages, with varying degrees of bilingualism depending on the region and age. One of the ways that can round out the picture of the current linguistic situation is by understanding how much the respondents are speaking Russian and Ukrainian. Overall, over 9 out of 10 of the respondents speak Russian every day, with over 2/3 speaking
Russian more than 80% of their day. In contrast, less than half speak Ukrainian every
243 day, and of those that do, only about one in twenty speak Ukrainian for more than 80% of their day.
That information, broken down by region, helps to give more detail of how the regions differ linguistically. While every single Simferopol respondent speaks Russian every day, and with the largest percentage of respondents who speak Russian more than
80% of their day, the smallest percentage of those who speak Russian every day belongs to Kyiv. As with some other sections of this chapter, Kherson‟s statistics are both strongly Russian and strongly Ukrainian; although a very high percentage of respondents speak Russian every day, less than half report speaking Russian for more than 80% of their days.
This information is very helpful in explaining not only the attitudes toward language maintenance and loss, which I will be looking at shortly, but also many of the responses throughout. Simferopol and Kharkiv respondents not only overwhelmingly speak Russian every day, but they speak Russian almost exclusively every day. Kyiv respondents are the least likely to speak Russian every day, and are similarly not as likely as respondents in Kharkiv and Simferopol to speak Russian for over 80% of their day.
Kherson respondents, however, are mixed, with most people speaking Russian every day, but not necessarily for the majority of their day. This backs up the information that we have seen that Kherson is in a linguistically vulnerable position, and, while this leads to inconsistencies in some of the data, it also is likely to provide us with strong feelings about language maintenance and loss.
We see the same types of numbers for Ukrainian in the various regions, with those in Kharkiv and Simferopol least likely to speak Ukrainian daily, and not at all likely to speak it for the majority of their day, Kyiv respondents most likely to speak Ukrainian and for a majority of the day, and those in Kyiv like to speak Ukrainian, but for a smaller percentage of the day. This, again, is evidence that, out of the four regions, Kherson faces the most linguistic instability.
When it comes to linguistic differences by age, we are again faced with data that we might not expect. The younger generation is both more likely to speak Russian daily and with a higher percentage than the older generation, and less likely to speak Ukrainian daily and with a lower daily percentage. This is not what I would expect, given the changes in the state language over the lifetimes of the different age groups, although, again, it may be because the older generation is more likely to be further along in their professional life, and need to speak Ukrainian more often.
Throughout the country, the majority of respondents spoke only Russian with their partners, although approximately 1 out of 5 spoke some Ukrainian along with a majority of Russian. As is to be expected, those in Kharkiv and Simferopol were most likely to speak Russian or mostly Russian, those in Kyiv were most likely to speak only
Ukrainian, and those in Kherson were somewhere in the middle. Older people were much more likely to speak only Russian with their partners than the younger generation; they were also much more likely to speak only Ukrainian. The younger generation, when it comes to language in the home, is more likely to speak a mixture of any kind.
In summary, the information shows that throughout Ukraine, although the respondents are native Russian speakers, there is a high level of bilingualism, and a large percentage of people spend at least part of their day speaking Ukrainian. Regionally,
Kharkiv and Simferopol have the strongest concentration of Russian speakers, while
Kyiv has the strongest concentration of Ukrainian speakers, and Kherson is a mix.
Younger speakers tend to speak more Russian than the older generation. When it comes to language maintenance and loss, then, I can expect that Russian is eroding faster in
Kherson and Kyiv, and the maintenance of Russian is less of a concern in Kharkiv and
Simferopol. Similarly, the youth may not see a strong need to maintain Russian; as they report that they are less likely to encounter Ukrainian daily; they do not see an immediate need for preservation or threat of loss.
6.5.2 Change in linguistic situation
The linguistic situation in Ukraine has been changing since 1991, with Ukrainian gaining in popularity and Russian declining. Each region has gone through the changes in its own way, and different demographic groups are maintaining Russian in different ways.
Overall, respondents felt strongly that they spoke Russian and Ukrainian fluently, with about 15% reporting bad, fairly bad, or no Ukrainian at the time of independence; that number has been split in half at this time. Self-perception of Russian mastery, across the board, is very good. Regionally, the percentage of Kyiv respondents who felt very good about their Ukrainian doubled since 1991, and Kharkiv, Kherson, and Simferopol
246 residents, some of whom had zero mastery of Ukrainian before independence, were unlikely to report anything below “okay” now. Interestingly, the number of Kherson respondents who rated their mastery of Ukrainian as “very good” decreased since 1991.
These data confirm that Ukrainian has been on the rise, throughout the country, and especially in Kyiv. This means that all of the regions are vulnerable to loss of
Russian. The Kherson information also brings up an interesting idea, which is held by many throughout Ukraine: that the mixing of Ukrainian and Russian leads to a poorer command of both languages. As we have seen elsewhere in the chapter, Kherson is primarily Russian speaking in the cities, with Ukrainian villages, and many people in
Kherson speak both Russian and Ukrainian daily. This leads to a perception of erosion not only of Russian, but of Ukrainian, as well.
The above speculation is upheld by the perceptions of Russian language mastery.
In Kharkiv, Simferopol, and Kyiv, approximately two thirds of the respondents replied that their Russian mastery is very good. In Kherson, this number was barely over one quarter, and two out of every five respondents, who are native Russian speakers, rated their mastery of Russian as just “okay.” In Kyiv, Ukrainian is on the rise, but there does not seem to be a self-perception of Russian being lost (nobody in Kyiv felt that their
Russian was anything other than “good” or “very good”). In Kherson, on the other hand, there is a perception of both Russian and Ukrainian losing ground. I believe that this is tied up with ideology. In short, since those in Kyiv are more likely to believe that an increase in use of Ukrainian is a positive trend, they aren‟t as likely to feel a drain on
247 either the Ukrainian or their Russian. In Kherson, where the ideology doesn‟t have the same strength, people report a drop in both.
I believe that something similar is happening with the different age groups: the younger generation reports a big jump in improvement of Ukrainian, while the older generation‟s increase in Ukrainian skills is very slight, and the older generation is much more likely to rate their Russian as just “okay.” The younger generation, who has been growing up with ideology connecting Ukrainian to positive overall goals of the country, is likely not to connect a jump in Ukrainian skills with decrease in Russian, while the older generation is less likely to report a jump in Ukrainian and simultaneously more likely to feel less sure of their Russian.
As we saw earlier in the chapter, one of the most critical factors in linguistic maintenance is the way that children are using language. In areas with a high potential for language loss, children are not acquiring the minority language fully, and are choosing the majority language. In areas with a lower potential for language loss, children speak the minority language to their parents. This is a likely forecast on what will happen in the future, as the children will pass their own linguistic habits on to their own children.
Overall, slightly more than half of the respondents only spoke Russian with their children. Interestingly, an almost identical percentage of respondents‟ children spoke only Russian back to them. Throughout the country, the percentage of children who spoke to their parents in a certain language was nearly identical to the percentage of
248 parents who spoke that same language back to them. This is very highly consistent, and suggests that the situation, in general, is fairly stable.
Regionally, the numbers draw a clearer picture. Kherson is the only region in which the children are more likely to speak only Russian to their parents than the parents are to speak only Russian to their children. In Kharkiv and Simferopol, children are much more likely to speak at least some Ukrainian, and in Kyiv, the numbers are the most stable. This suggests that Kyiv is either not experiencing much loss or is experiencing the same level of loss between the generations, as parents conform to the linguistic standards of the city at the same rate as their children. It also suggests that there is generational erosion of Russian happening in Kharkiv and Simferopol. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Kherson seems to have the highest rate of mixtures between the languages, and, indeed, there are far more respondents in Kherson who expressed a lack of preference for Russian and Ukrainian at home than in any other region.
When it comes to age group, the data regarding language spoken with children also help to round out the picture of how the language situation is changing. In this case, the numbers from the 45-80 year olds are fairly consistent when it comes to language to and from their children. The younger generation, however, is far more likely to report their children speaking only Ukrainian to their parents.
While the regional data suggest that there is minimal loss of Russian, with variation by region, the generational data point to a much stronger rate of loss. The 18-35 year olds, according to the data, tend to have a strikingly different linguistic situation in
249 their households than the 45-80 year olds. Since the children of the younger generation, who are themselves younger, are speaking only Ukrainian to their parents at a rate of more than 1 in 5, it seems that the loss of Russian is most likely with the very youngest generation. In other words, while there is some evidence for the erosion of Russian at various levels in society, it is speeding up over time.
To sum up, the linguistic situation in Ukraine is definitely going through a change, with respondents across the board feeling an increase in Ukrainian skills, and many reporting diminishing Russian skills. There are subtle differences between the regions, with Kyiv, as usual, being the most Ukrainian-centric, and Kherson reporting a high level of mixing. The biggest area of potential loss of Russian is amongst the very youngest generation, who are much more likely than any other group to speak Ukrainian or mostly Ukrainian to their parents, regardless of what their parents speak to them.
Thus, while the situation has remained fairly stable, with some issues of maintenance and loss for Russian, Russian is currently being eroded at a much faster level. As we have seen earlier in the chapter, it is precisely when the new generation begins to speak the majority language instead of the minority language that we see the most potential for loss of the minority language.
6.5.3 Language Pressure
Earlier in the chapter, we saw that socioeconomic pressure was a major factor in language loss. If there is a socioeconomic incentive to speak Ukrainian, I can expect that
Russian will be lost at a faster rate.
Overall, only about 1 in 10 of my respondents felt that their situation would become better if they spoke Ukrainian better, although less than half of that felt that their situation would worsen; over half felt that language is not important, and the rest of the respondents felt that their Ukrainian is already sufficient.
Regionally, those in Kyiv were far more likely than any other region to feel that their professional situation would become better if they spoke better Ukrainian, while those in Kharkiv were far more likely to believe that their situation would become worse.
What this indicates is that, apart from the ideology that is being connected to Ukrainian in the capital, there is a much stronger feeling of socioeconomic pressure to speak Ukrainian well. In Kyiv, as well, the highest number of respondents indicated that their situation wouldn‟t change because they already speak Ukrainian well. In Kharkiv, on the other hand, the pressure is working against Ukrainian, and only about 1/3 of the respondents said that they knew Ukrainian well enough that it wouldn‟t make any difference. In
Kherson and Simferopol, high numbers of respondents indicated that language does not play a role in professional and social position; in these areas, there is less pressure for or against Ukrainian, and thus, less of a likelihood for Russian to be lost.
We see interesting results between the ages, as well. While the younger group is unlikely to express a change of any kind, the older generation is far more likely to expect a negative change, as well as being more likely to expect a positive change. In this regards, it is interesting that the older generation is more susceptible to the linguistic pressures. One reason for this might be that the older generation is more advanced in their professional careers, where Ukrainian is more likely to be encountered.
Pressure for and against Ukrainian was another area where gender seemed to make a difference. Although the numbers of respondents who felt their situation wouldn‟t change were extremely close between the genders, many more men felt that their situation would become worse if they spoke Ukrainian better, while women were twice as likely to say that their situation would become better. It seems that women are feeling socioeconomic pressures to speak Ukrainian, while men are feeling more pressure to maintain Russian.
While I was looking at identity, one of the major distinctions in attitudes came with the basis of self-identity. When it comes to linguistic pressure, basis of self- identification is also an important feature. While those that identify themselves strongly based on their native Russian are very likely to think that their situation would become better if they spoke better Ukrainian, those that identify based on their geography are more likely overall to think that their situation would not change. This is interesting, because, as we saw earlier in the dissertation, those that identify based on language are far more likely to feel negatively about Ukrainian and its speakers. At the same time, they are feeling much more pressure to speak Ukrainian. Thus, those with the strongest negative feelings about Ukrainian are also faced with the strongest push to speak better
Along with socioeconomic pressure to speak Ukrainian, the respondents were also invited to report on the pressures they place on children to speak either Russian or
Ukrainian. Overall, while most people did not put pressure on children either way, the respondents were quite a bit more likely to pressure children to speak Ukrainian, rather
252 than Russian. This is interesting, given the pressures that the respondents themselves feel: throughout Ukraine, although many do not feel pressure to speak Ukrainian, they are more likely to put pressure on the next generation to speak Ukrainian. As the scholarship illustrates, this points to a speeding up of the potential for loss of Russian; the youngest generation is already facing more pressure than the current adults.
Broken down by region, the respondents in Kharkiv were most likely to exert pressure both to speak Russian and to speak Ukrainian (although they were more likely to pressure children to speak Ukrainian). Only in Simferopol were respondents unlikely to ever pressure children to speak Russian; only in Kharkiv were respondents likely to pressure children to speak Russian often. Given the linguistic similarities of Kharkiv and
Simferopol, it is interesting that they are so different when it comes to pressuring children. Russian has been more strongly linked to the political ideology in Kharkiv, which may be why the respondents are more likely to pressure their children to speak
Russian; with 1 in 4 respondents from Kharkiv pressuring children to speak Ukrainian, we can see a distinct change from the earlier questions, wherein those in Kharkiv did not feel that they themselves needed to increase their Ukrainian knowledge in order to better their situation. This is the most pronounced in Kharkiv, but in every region, respondents were much more likely to pressure children to speak Ukrainian than Russian. Again, it seems that there is an increase in pressure on the youngest generation to speak Ukrainian.
Across the generations, the same trends are shaping up. The younger generation is much more likely to pressure their children to speak both languages, suggesting that there is pressure both to hold onto Russian and that there is pressure to increase
Ukrainian usage; the pressure to increase the use of Ukrainian is considerably higher.
The older generation is not as likely to pressure in either direction, but they are more likely to pressure their children to speak Ukrainian than Russian. Once again, it looks like the pressure to speak Ukrainian is increasing over time and the youngest generation is facing the most pressure.
When we looked at the pressures that different respondents felt based on their self-identification, those that identified as Russian based on their native Russian felt more pressure to speak Ukrainian; however, that same group was less likely to exert pressure on their children to speak Ukrainian. Not surprisingly, those that identified strongly as
Ukrainian based on the fact that they live in Ukraine were far more likely than any other group to pressure children to speak Ukrainian. Similarly, those with positive ideology about Ukrainian were more likely to pressure children often to speak Ukrainian; those with negative ideology about Ukrainian were more likely to pressure children to speak
Russian. These reflect the inherent values that the respondents have toward Ukrainian.
To sum up, it has become clear that, at this point, the socioeconomic pressure to speak Ukrainian is not felt intensely throughout Ukraine. However, when comparing the amount of pressure that the respondents felt versus the amount of pressure that they exert on their own children, there is a sharp rise. In other words, with each passing generation, the pressure to speak Ukrainian is increasing. This gives us a good idea that, while there may not be a large threat of Russian being lost in Ukraine at this moment, the threat is increasing over time.
6.5.4 Attitudes to language maintenance
As we consider the danger of Russian being lost in Ukraine, it is important to understand how the respondents themselves feel about the loss of Russian. Overall, we see that nearly 4 out of 5 respondents think that it is important or very important to preserve Russian, and over 9 out of 10 respondents think that it is important that their children speak Russian. This is interesting, in light of the earlier responses, which showed that people were more likely to pressure their children to speak Ukrainian than
Regionally, most of the regions had similar percentages in the combined categories of “very important” and “important” when it comes to saving Russian.
However, those in Kyiv were much more likely to simply say “important,” while those in
Kharkiv were much more likely to say it was very important to preserve Russian. Only in Kyiv did any respondents say that it was not important at all, while conversely not a single respondent from Kherson said that it was not very important or not important at all.
When it comes to children speaking Russian, those in Kharkiv were the most likely to find it very important that their children speak Russian, while those in Kyiv were most likely to say that it wasn‟t very important. In Kherson, every single respondent said that it was either important or very important that their children speak Russian.
Thus, although the feelings of preserving Russian are strongest in Kharkiv, they are most consistent in Kherson. This is most likely due to the fact that Kharkiv is very strongly Russian-speaking, and the feelings of connection to the language can be very strong. However, with many fewer Ukrainian speakers in Kharkiv than in Kherson, the
255 question is more hypothetical than in Kherson. On the other hand, Kherson speakers may not feel as intensely that Russian needs to be preserved, but since they are in daily contact with Ukrainian, their answers are more consistent. As in the other sections of this survey, those in Kyiv are most likely to have positive feelings about the increase in the levels of
Generationally, the same trends shape up as earlier in the survey. Those aged 45-
80 are more likely to feel strongly about saving Russian, while more than 1 in 5 of the younger generation did not think it was important to preserve Russian. Additionally, both groups were more likely to think it was important that their children speak Russian than that Russian be preserved, but again, the youth were less likely to think it was important that their children speak and understand Russian. This is consistent with what we have seen throughout this dissertation, with the younger generation feeling more positive about the overall linguistic changes in the country, and also consistent with the data from this chapter, where we see that the potential for loss is increasing over the generations.
When it comes to the attitudes towards maintenance of the Russian language based on self-identification, the numbers are exactly what I would expect: those who identify based on their native Russian language are far more likely to think it is important to preserve Russian, while those that identify as Ukrainian based on their geographic location are much less likely to think it is important that Russian be preserved, or that their children speak Russian. Additionally, those that associate Ukrainian with positive values are less likely to worry about the loss of Russian, while those that associate
Ukrainian with negative values are more likely to worry about the loss of Russian, as is to be expected.
In summary, the perceptions of loss are exactly what I would expect, given the demographics of Ukraine and the other data that we have seen. Regionally, feelings about loss are strongest in the Russo-centric areas, but most consistent in the areas where the large loss is likely to be happening. Generationally, the youth are much less concerned with the loss of Russian than the older generation, which is an indication that the changing ideology is contributing to the erosion of Russian over time.
6.5.5 Research questions and hypotheses revisited
The first research question that I posed earlier in the chapter was whether Russian speakers felt that their Russian was better or worse since the fall of the Soviet Union, their linguistic situation with their children and grandchildren, and the pressures they exert on the youth. Although I hypothesized that the older generation was less likely to notice a deterioration in their Russian skills than the younger generations, I actually saw the opposite; the older generation was more likely to report a decline in their own
Russian, and the younger generation saw an increase in Ukrainian skills, without a corresponding drop in Russian. This perception, I hypothesize, is based more on the ideology that is connected to Ukrainian: while the older generation feels more negatively about Ukrainian, they are more likely to perceive it as detrimental to their own language, while the younger generation is more likely to connect Ukrainian with positive attributes, so do not see it as a threat to their own language. However, the younger generation is
257 more likely to pressure their children to speak Ukrainian instead of Russian, which is exactly what I expected.
I also hypothesized that, while the majority of respondents would feel that it was important to preserve Russian, it is much more important for their children and grandchildren to speak Russian, which is absolutely true. Across the board, people believed that the preservation of Russian is important, especially when it comes to their descendants speaking Russian.
In terms of pressure that the respondents feel themselves, I hypothesized that individuals would feel varying levels of pressure to speak Ukrainian. While this is true, different groups of people felt the pressure differently than I predicted. While it is to be expected that those in Kyiv feel pressure to speak Ukrainian, it was surprising that the older generation was more likely to expect improvement in their situation if their
Ukrainian improved, whereas the younger generation was less susceptible to these pressures. In this sense, it seems that the 18-35 year olds are in the middle of the change, with the older generation feeling the negative effects of Russian becoming a secondary language, and today‟s children receiving the most pressure to speak Ukrainian.
In general, the feelings toward the maintenance of Russian were quite strong, as I expected. While some of the pressures felt by the respondents played themselves out differently than I hypothesized, the overall trends are quite strong: as Ukrainian grows in popularity and public perception, the fear of Russian‟s loss becomes stronger, and the pressures both felt and perpetuated by my respondents to speak Ukrainian have been growing.
6.5.6 Overall trends and linguistic maintenance
As I analyze the data in this study, there are several variables that consistently make a difference in the way that the respondents answered the questions: region, age, basis of self-identification, and ideological beliefs. Throughout the study, breaking down the responses by these variables has made the linguistic situation come into focus. Each variable on its own helps to paint a clear picture; taken together, they bring that picture to life.
We have seen that, generally speaking, the younger generation, those that live in
Kyiv, those that identify primarily as Ukrainian because they live in Ukraine, and those that feel that the linguistic situation has improved since Ukrainian became the national language correlate with each other. This group of speakers tends to be pro-Ukrainian, and as such, is less likely to be concerned about the maintenance of Russian.
Although this situation is far from unique in terms of majority and minority languages, it is not the typical language loss situation. As we saw earlier in the chapter,
Edwards (1992) pointed out that there are a multitude of variables, including personal, social, and political, and socioeconomic, that affect the language maintenance. For this particular group of people, the shift in identity (the feeling of being Ukrainian because they live in Ukraine) connected with the positive ideology related to Ukrainian has influenced the speakers to the point that they are less concerned with the loss of Russian.
These native speakers of Russian believe strongly enough in the values of Ukrainian, and the idea that national pride is defined by Ukrainian, that it renders the loss of Russian less
259 important. Thus, these respondents are affected more by political and social pressures than by personal or socioeconomic pressures.
On the other hand, also correlated are the older generation, those that live in the other regions (especially Kharkiv and Simferopol‟), those that identify as Russian because of their native Russian language, and those that view the change in linguistic situation as negative. These respondents are more likely to feel the social and personal pressures that go along with maintaining Russian, as opposed to political and socioeconomic pressures. They are very invested in preserving Russian.
Because Ukraine is a country that is very bilingual, and most of the respondents can navigate Ukrainian and Russian situations, some of the factors that typically affect minority language situations are mitigated. While there are certainly socioeconomic advantages to speaking Ukrainian at a professional level, that is not what is typically at stake. Instead, personal identity and political beliefs about the symbol of Ukrainian play a large role in how people feel about preserving Russian.
We saw earlier in the chapter that, in many instances, it is the younger generation that loses the minority language because of social pressure from peers as well as socioeconomic pressure to gain proficiency in the majority language. However, in
Ukraine, this is not exactly the case. While the younger generation is part of the group that is less concerned with the potential (and probable) loss of Russian, it is not because of overt advantages to speaking Ukrainian. Instead, the youth find themselves caught up in an ideological and self-identification movement, wherein Ukrainian is valued in and of itself, and Russian is subsequently less valued. The four factors (age, region, basis of
260 self-identity, and ideological beliefs) are intertwined; their reflections on the potential loss of Russian are part of the larger picture in Ukraine.
With the complicated linguistic situation in Ukraine, the maintenance of Russian is an ever-increasing issue. Because Russian is widely spoken the world over, and Russia itself borders Ukraine, the Russian language itself is not at stake; rather, the language is in danger within Ukraine, between generations and amongst neighbors.
Language loss is most likely to happen in isolated communities that speak the minority language, and when there are strong pressures to speak the majority language.
Especially in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, Russian speakers are not at all isolated, but pressures to speak Ukrainian are increasing. Since 1991, Ukrainian has made progress as the government language of Ukraine, and as the attitudes toward Ukrainian become more positive, the risk to Russian is rising. As we have seen in this chapter, pressures to speak
Ukrainian are increasing, even from native Russian speakers to their own children.
It remains to be seen how Russian will fare in the future in Ukraine, but as it stands now, there is a marked increase in pressure that is being placed on the youngest generation to speak Ukrainian, and, as we have seen in previous chapters, positive ideology toward Ukrainian is increasing; it is likely that Russian will continue to face the possibility of erosion.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
On the surface, it seems that language is simply a means of communication; the truth is that this means is incredibly complicated. Issues of identity are interwoven with linguistics, and how people see themselves and each other is intricately connected to the way they use language.
The history of the Ukrainian language is as long and storied as the history of
Ukraine itself, and for many periods throughout history, it was pushed and pulled by those in power, which affected not just the structure of the language, but also the attitudes that people had towards it. In relatively recent history, Ukrainian was connected to a simple, peasant lifestyle; in the past few decades, however, those attitudes have shifted widely, and many people think of Ukrainian as the language of “authentic” Ukrainians.
In bilingual situations such as Ukraine, language matters have very little to do with communication. Instead, there are two main sociolinguistic components to the language question: linguistic identity and linguistic ideology. The way an individual sees himself colors everything about the way that that individual sees others, and language has been shown to be a strong factor for identification. At the same time, the way that language is overtly as well as subtly connected to power has a compelling affect on linguistic attitudes.
The identity of Russian speakers in Ukraine is constantly being negotiated. Some native Russian speakers consider themselves to be Russian because of their mother tongue. Some feel that they are Ukrainian because of the country in which they live.
Some feel that their ethnic background dictates who they are. Many feel a combination of the three, feeling more or less Russian and Ukrainian depending on any number of factors, often pulled both ways in varying degrees at the same time.
This factor of identity is critical to the way that people view those around them.
As we saw in Chapter 4, there is a strong incentive to build up ties with those in one‟s own identity group, and to strengthen boundaries between those that are in opposing groups. My data show us that an identity shift is happening, as people are identifying more with their geographic country than their language group. This shift is moving from west to east, and is becoming stronger through time.
These feelings on identity, as we saw, have a profound effect on the way that people view speakers of Russian and speakers of Ukrainian. Where once there were negative stereotypes and attitudes toward Ukrainian, now there is a swing in the other direction. Those that speak Ukrainian are more often considered to be cultured, intelligent, and the holders of authentic Ukrainian culture, and those that do not speak
Ukrainian well, it follows, are just the opposite. At the same time, many of the older generation and those in the cities in the far east of Ukraine still hold onto negative stereotypes about Ukrainian and its speakers.
Identity is not the only important factor in how people interact with each other.
Linguistic ideology also plays a major role; with linguistic ideology, a certain language
263 becomes a commodity, and those that have access to that language have access to power in society. In Ukraine, there is pressure in different directions: with Ukrainian the official language of courts, government, and media, there are clear-cut socioeconomic benefits to speaking Ukrainian. In many of the primarily Russian-speaking cities, however, there are social and familial pressures to speak Russian, and Ukrainian speakers are disenfranchised on an informal level. This, too, is changing, and the positive ideology about Ukrainian is spreading across the country and over time; my data show us that the social pressure to speak Russian in some areas will almost certainly slowly diminish.
Those that already identify themselves as Ukrainian based on their country, I found, are clearly supportive of the linguistic ideology that is positive towards the Ukrainian language. There is a complicated interplay of identity and ideology, as identity produces a pressure from within, and ideology produces external pressures.
Additionally, there are negative beliefs held by nearly all Ukrainians toward the mixture of Russian and Ukrainian. This is a different type of ideology, and it justifies an intensification of negative beliefs toward one or the other language, as speakers legitimize their beliefs with the idea that “what „they‟ are speaking is incorrect,” that they personally love Ukrainian (or Russian), but that is not what is being spoken. This is also tied up with the idea of identity; the „Surzhyk‟ mixture blurs the lines between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers, which has been shown to increase negative thoughts from either side.
At stake in this situation is the current interactions between speakers, and the effects of ideology and identity on a population should not be minimized. However,
264 there is more to this than what is happening today, and that is the potential for loss of a language. Russian is by no means an endangered language in the world, but it could become that way in Ukraine. Bilingual situations (with the exception of diglossia) are inherently unstable, and the possibility of the loss of Russian in Ukraine is quite high.
My data show us that, for the most part, people are not concerned about the maintenance of Russian. There are certain factors that will help to preserve Russian in Ukraine, such as the proximity to Russia and multigenerational households. At the same time, an increase in the number of Ukrainian-language schools and socioeconomic pressure are working against Russian maintenance. Perhaps most importantly, the factors that we have looked at above will have a critical role in Russia‟s future in Ukraine. I found that those who identify primarily as Ukrainian based on where they live, as well as those that are connected to the positive ideology towards Ukrainian, are much less likely to be concerned about the possible loss of Russian. In minority language situations, a language can only be preserved if there is a strong concerted effort, and at this point, the tides are flowing in the opposite direction.
The contemporary linguistic situation in Ukraine is complex, and is compounded by matters of identity and linguistic ideology. What I have found in this study is that there has been a shift in self-identification, and a corresponding shift in linguistic attitudes toward Ukrainian. The current ideology supports this shift, and the Ukrainian language is experiencing a rise in popularity and its speakers are being seen in a very different light than they were 20 years ago. The other side of the coin is that the possibility of the loss of Russian in Ukraine looms over the horizon. What will happen in
265 the next few years remains to be seen, but with the way things are moving now, it seems that Ukrainian speakers will continue to benefit from increasingly positive attitudes toward Ukrainian, and Russian speakers will become increasingly disenfranchised within
Arel, Dominique and Ruble, Blair A., (Eds.), Rebounding identities: the politics of identity in Russia and Ukraine. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006.
Barbour, Stephen. “Nationalism, Language, Europe.” In: Barbour, Stephen & Carmichael, Cathie, (Eds.), Language and nationalism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000: 1-18.
Barker, C. & Galasinski, D. Cultural studies and discourse analysis: a dialogue on language and identity. London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2001.
Barreto, Amilcar A. Language, elites, and the state: nationalism in Puerto Rico and Quebec. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.
Bilaniuk, Laada. Contested tongues: Language politics and cultural correction in Ukraine. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Bilaniuk, Laada. “Gender, Language Attitudes, and Language Status in Ukraine.” Language in Society, 32.1 Feb. 2003: 47-78
Bilinsky, Yaroslav. “Expanding the Use of Russian or Russification? Some Critical Thoughts on Russian As a Lingua Franca and the „Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples of the USSR.‟” Russian Review, 40.3 July 1981: 317-332.
Birch, Sarah. “Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics.” Europe-Asia Studies, 52.6 Sep. 2000: 1017-1041.
Blackledge, Adrian. Discourse and power in a multilingual world. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2005.
Bloomfield, Leonard. “Literate and Illiterate Speech.” American Speech, 2.10, 1927: 432-439. 267
Boix-Fuster, Emili & Sanz, Cristina. “Language and Identity in Catalonia.” In: Nino- Murcia, M. and Rothman, J. (Eds.). Bilingualism and Identity: Spanish at the crossroads of other languages. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, Philadelphia, 2008: 87-106.
Bonner, Donna M. “Garifuna Children's Language Shame: Ethnic Stereotypes, National Affiliation, and Transnational Immigration as Factors in Language Choice in Southern Belize.” Language in Society, 30.1, 2001: 81-96.
Bot , K. de. “Language use as an interface between sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic processes in language attrition and language shift.” In J. Klatter-Folmer & P. van Avermaet (Eds.). Theories on Maintenance and Loss ofMinority Languages. Münster: Waxmann, 2001: 65–82.
Bourhis, R. Y. “Acculturation, language maintenance and language shift.” In J. Klatter- Filmer & P. Van Avermaet (Eds.), Theories on maintenance and loss of minority languages. Munster & New York: Waxmann, 2001: 5-37.
Brewer, M. “The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology.” Political Psychology, 22.1 2001: 115-125.
Brewer, M. “The Social Self: On being the same and different at the same time.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24 1991: 163-172.
Bucholtz, Mary. 2003. “Sociolinguistic nostalgia and the authentication of identity.” Journal of Sociolinguistics, 7.3 Aug. 2003: 398-416.
Byron, Janet L. “Displacement of One Standard Dialect by Another,” Current Anthropology, 19.3 Sep., 1978: 613-614.
Cerulo, K. “Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions.” Annual Review of Sociology, 23 1997: 385-409.
Clyne, Michael. “Linguistic and Sociolinguistic Aspects of Language Contact, Maintenance and Loss: Towards a Multifacet Theory”. In Maintenance and Loss of Minority Languages, Fase, Willem, Koen Jaspaert and Sjaak Kroon (Eds.), Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1992: 17-36. Cohen, Paul. “Linguistic Politics on the Periphery: Louis XIII, Béarn, and the Making of French as an Official Language in Early Modern France.” When Languages Collide:
Perspectives on Language Conflict, Language Competition, and Language Coexistence. Eds. J. DeStefano, N.G. Jacobs, I. Lehiste. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 2003: 165-200.
Cohn, Werner. “On the Language of Lower-Class Children.” The School Review, 67.4, 1959: 435-440.
Czubatyj, Nicholas D. “Ukraine: Between Poland and Russia.” The Review of Politics, 8.3 July 1946: 331-353.
Davies, Alan. “Language loss and symbolic gain: The meaning of institutional maintenance.” In Weltens et al. (Eds.). Language attrition in progress, 1986: 117-127.
De Kadt, Elizabeth. “„You still speak German?‟ Teenage language skills in a German- speaking community.” In: Tom Ammerlaan et al (Eds.). Sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic perspectives on maintenance and loss of minority languages. Muenster: Waxmann, 2001: 61-76.
Dunbar, R. “Minority Language Rights in International Law.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50.1 2001: 90-120.
Edwards, John. “Sociopolitical aspects of language maintenance and loss[:] Towards a typology of minority language situations.” In Willem Fase; Koen Jaspaert; and Sjaak Kroon (eds.), Maintenance and loss of minority languages. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1992: 37-54.
Edwards, W. “Code Selection and Shifting in Guyana.” Language in Society, 12.3 1983: 295-311.
Errington, Joseph. “Indonesia(‟s) Development: On the State of a Language of State.” In Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity, (eds.) Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998: 271-84.
Fase, Willem, Koen Jaspaert and Sjaak Kroon. “Maintenace and Loss of Minority Languages: Introductory Remarks”. In Fase, Williem, Koen Jaspaert and Sjaak Kroon (Eds.), Maintenance and Loss of Minority Languages. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1992: 3-13. Fishman, Joshua A. “Minority Language Maintenance and the Ethnic Mother Tongue School.” The Modern Language Journal, 64.2, 1980: 167-172.
Flier, Michael S. “Surzhyk: The Rules of Engagement.” Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk. Eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, Roman Solchanyk. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000: 113-136.
Fournier, Anna. “Mapping Identities: Russian Resistance to Linguistic Ukrainisation in Central and Eastern Ukraine.” Europe-Asia Studies, 54.3 May 2002: 415-433.
Fox, Renata and Fox, John. Organizational discourse : a language-ideology-power perspective, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004.
Friedman, Victor A.. “Language in Macedonia as an Identity Construction Site.” In Joseph, B., Destafano, J., Jacobs, N., and Lehiste, I. (eds.), When languages collide: Perspectives on language conflict, language competition, and language coexistence, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2003: 257-295.
Gade, D., “Language, Identity and the Scriptorial Landscape in Quebec and Catalonia.” Geographical Review, 93.4 2003: 429-448.
Gal, Susan and Judith T. Irvine. 1995. “The Boundaries of Languages and disciplines: How ideologies construct difference.” Social Research, 62.4:967-1000.
Gee, James Paul. The Social mind: language, ideology, and social practice. New York: Bergin & Garvey, 1992.
Giles, H., and Johnson, P. “The role of language in ethnic group formation.” In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds.), Intergroup behavior. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981: 199-243.
Giles, H., and Johnson, P. “Ethnolinguistic identity theory: A social psychological approach to language maintenance.” International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 68, 1987: 69-99.
Goffman, E. Stigma, Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963.
Gubbins, Paul and Holt, Mike, (Eds.). Beyond boundaries : language and identity in contemporary Europe. Clevedon; Buffalo; Toronto; Sydney: Multilingual Matters, 2002.
Gumperz, J. J., and Cook-Gumperz, J. “Introduction: Language and the communication of social identity.” Ed. J. J. Gumperz, Language and social identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982: 1-22.
Guthier, Steven L. “The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917.” Slavic Review, 38.1 Mar. 1979: 30-47.
Hansen, Jette G. and Liu, Jun. “Social Identity and Language: Theoretical and Methodological Issues.” TESOL Quarterly, 31.3 Autumn, 1997: 567-576.
Heller, M. “Language Choice, Social Institutions, and Symbolic Domination.” Language in Society, 24.3 1995: 373-405.
Heller, M. “The role of language in the formation of ethnic identity.” Eds. J. Phinney & M. Rotheram, Children's ethnic socialization. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987: 180-200.
Hill, Jane H. “„Today, there is no respect.‟ Nostalgia, „Respect,‟ and Oppositional Discourse in Mexicano (Nahuatl) Language Ideology.” In: Schieffelin, Bambi B., Woolard, Kathryn A., & Kroskrity, Paul V., (Eds.). Language ideologies: practice and theory. New York : Oxford University Press, 1998.
Huddy, L., “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory.” Political Psychology, 22.1 2001: 127-156.
Huls, Erica and Anneke van de Mond. “Some Aspects of Language Attrition in Turkish Families in the Netherlands”. In Willem Fase; Koen Jaspaert; and Sjaak Kroon (eds.), Maintenance and loss of minority languages. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1992: 99-115.
Hymes, Dell. “Models of the interaction of language and social life.” Eds. J. J. Gumperz, & D. Hymes, Directions in sociolinguistics: the ethnography of communication, New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972: 35-71.
Ishizawa, Hiromi. Minority Language Use among Grandchildren in Multigenerational Households. Sociological Perspectives, 47.4, 2004: 465-483.
Janse, Mark. “Introduction: Language Death and Language Maintenance, Problems and Prospects.” In Janse, Mark; & Tol, Sijmen (Eds.) Language death and language maintenance: Theoretical, practical and descriptive approaches. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003: ix-xvii.
Joseph, Brian, DeStefano, Johanna, Jacobs, Neil G., and Lehiste, Ilse (Eds.). When languages collide: perspectives on language conflict, language competition, and language coexistence. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002.
Kaplan, David H. “Two Nations in Search of a State: Canada's Ambivalent Spatial Identities.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 84.4 1994: 585-606.
Köpke, B. & Nespoulous, J.L.. “First language attrition in production skills and metalinguistic abilities in German-English and German-French bilinguals.” In T.
Ammerlaan, M. Hulsen, H. Strating & K. Yagmur (Eds.) Sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic perspectives on maintenance and loss of minority languages. Münster : Waxmann, 2001: 221-234.
Kubicek, Paul. “Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour.” Europe-Asia Studies, 52.2 Mar., 2000: 273-294.
Kunda, Z. & Sinclair, L. “Motivated Reasoning with Stereotypes: Activation, Application, and Inhibition.” Psychological Inquiry, 10.1 1999: 12-22.
Lapidus, Gail W. “The Nationality Question and the Soviet System.” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 35.3, 1984: 98-112.
Liber, George. “Language, Literacy, and Book Publishing in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923- 1928.” Slavic Review, 41.4 Winter, 1982: 673-685.
Lippi-Green, Rosina. “Accent, Standard Language Ideology, and Discriminatory Pretext in the Courts.” Language in Society, 23.2 Jun., 1994: 163-198.
Louden, Mark L. “African-Americans and Minority Language Maintenance in the United States.” The Journal of Negro History, 85.4, Autumn 2000: 223-240.
Lunt, Horace G. “History, Nationalism, and the Written Language of Early Rus'.” The Slavic and East European Journal, 34.1 Spring, 1990: 1-29.
MacAulay, Ronald. “Double Standards.” American Anthropologist, New Series, 75.5, 1973: 1324-1337.
MachEachern, Scott. “Residuals and Resistance: Languages and History in the Mandara Mountains.” In When Languages Collide: Perspectives on Language Conflict, Language Competition, and Language Coexistence (B. Joseph, J. Destefano, N. Jacobs, and I. Lehiste, eds.). Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2002: 21-44.
Manning, H. Paul, 2002. “„The rock does not understand English‟: Welsh and the division of labor in Nineteenth-century Gwynedd slate quarries.” In When Languages Collide: Perspectives on Language Conflict, Language Competition, and Language Coexistence (B. Joseph, J. Destefano, N. Jacobs, and I. Lehiste, eds.). Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2002: 45-75.
Marcyliena, Morgan. “Theories and Politics in African American English.” Annual Review of Anthropology, 23, 1994: 325-345.
Marian, V., Blumenfeld, H., & Kaushanskaya, M. “The Language Experience and Proficiency Questionnaire (LEAP‐Q): Assessing language profiles in bilinguals and multilinguals.” Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 50 2007: 940‐967.
May, S. Language and minority rights: ethnicity, nationalism and the politics of language. New York/London: Routledge, 2008.
Milivojevic, Dragan. “Language Maintenance and Language Shift among Yugoslavs of New Orleans, Louisiana -- Ten Years after.” The Slavic and East European Journal, 34. 2 Summer 1990: 208-223.
Moelleken, Wolfgang W. “Language Maintenance and Language Shift in Pennsylvania German: A Comparative Investigation.” Monatshefte, 75.2 Summer, 1983: 172-186.
Mougeon, Raymond. “Bilingualism and Language Maintenance in the Gaspe Peninsula, Quebec, Canada.” Anthropological Linguistics, 18.2 Feb. 1976: 53-69.
Niedzielski, Henry Z. “The Hawaiian Model for the Revitalization of Native Minority Cultures and Languages”. In Willem Fase; Koen Jaspaert; and Sjaak Kroon (eds.), Maintenance and loss of minority languages. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1992: 369-384.
Niño-Murcia, M. & Rothman, J., (Eds.) Bilingualism and identity : Spanish at the crossroads with other languages. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008.
Ornstein, Jacob. “Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice.” The Slavic and East European Journal, 3.1 Spring, 1959: 1-24.
Padilla, Amado & Perez, William. “Acculturation, Social Identity, and Social Cognition: A New perspective.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 25.1 2003: 35-55.
Patten, Alan. “Political Theory and Language Policy.” Political Theory, 29.5 Oct., 2001: 691-715.
Paulston, C. “Language Policies and Language Rights.” Annual Review of Anthropology, 26, 1997: 73-85.
Paulston, Christina Bratt. “Linguistic Minorities and Language Policies: Four Case Studies”. In Willem Fase; Koen Jaspaert; and Sjaak Kroon (eds.), Maintenance and loss of minority languages. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1992: 56-79.
Pavlenko, Aneta & Blackledge, Adrian. “Introduction: New Theoretical Approaches to the Study of Negotiation of Identities in Multilingual Contexts.” In: A. Pavlenko & A. Blackledge (Eds.). Negotiation of Identities in Multiligual Contexts. Clevedon, Buffalo, Toronto, Sydney: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 2004: 1-33.
Petherbridge-Hernandez, Patricia, and Raby, Rosalind Latiner. “Twentieth-Century Transformations in Catalonia and the Ukraine: Ethnic Implications in Education.” Comparative Education Review, 37.1 Feb., 1993: 31-49.
Pirie, Paul S. “National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine.” Europe- Asia Studies, 48.7 Nov., 1996: 1079-1104.
Portes, Alejandro and Hao, Lingxin. “E Pluribus Unum: Bilingualism and Loss of Language in the Second Generation.” Sociology of Education, 71.4 Oct., 1998: 269-294.
Queen, Robin. “Language ideology and political economy among Turkish-German bilinguals in Germany.” In B. Joseph, J. DeStefano, N. Jacobs and I. Lehiste, When languages collide: Perspectives on language conflict, language competition, and language coexistence. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2002: 201-221.
Rees, Earl L. “Spain's Linguistic Normalization Laws: The Catalan Controversy.” Hispania, 79.2, 1996: 313-321.
Renan, E., “What is a nation?” In H. Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration. London: Routledge, 1990: 8-22.
Ryazanova-Clarke, Lara. “The Crystallization of Structures: Linguistic Culture in Putin‟s Russia”, in: Ingunn Lunde and Tine Roesen (eds), Landslide of the Norm: Language Culture in Post-Soviet Russia. Slavica Bergensia, 6. Bergen, 2006.
Sanders, J., “Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Societies.” Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 2002: 327-357.
Schieffelin, Bambi B., Woolard, Kathryn A., & Kroskrity, Paul V., (Eds.). Language ideologies : practice and theory. New York : Oxford University Press, 1998.
Shulman, Stephen. “National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine.” Slavic Review, 64.1 Spring, 2005: 59-87.
Shulman, Stephen. “The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine.” Europe-Asia Studies, 56.1 Jan., 2004: 35-56.
Silverstein, Michael. “Language and the Culture of Gender: At the Intersection of Structure, Usage and Ideology.” In Semiotic Mediation, ed. Elizabeth Mertz and Richard J. Parmentier. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1985: 219-259.
Silverstein, Michael. "Language structure and linguistic ideology." In The Elements: A Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels (R. Cline, W. Hanks, and C. Hofbauer, eds.). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 1979: 193-247.
Simpson, Paul, Language, ideology, and point of view. London; New York : Routledge, 1993.
Slezkine, Yuri. “Can We have Our Nation State and Eat it Too?” Slavic Review, 54.3 Autumn, 1995: 717-719.
Smith, A. National Identity. Reno: Univ. Nevada Press, 1991.
Solchanyk, Roman. “Russian Language and Soviet Politics.” Soviet Studies, 34.1 Jan., 1982: 23-42.
Spinner-Halev, J. & Theiss-Morse, E. “National Identity and Self-Esteem.” Perspectives on Politics, 1.3 2003: 515-532.
Spolsky, Bernard and Shohamy, Elana. “Language Practice, Language Ideology, and Language Policy.” In R. Lambert and E. Shohamy (eds.), Language Policy and Pedagogy: Essays in honor of A. Ronald Walton. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000: 1-43.
Sridhar, Kamal K. “Mother Tongue Maintenance: The Debate. Mother Tongue Maintenance and Multiculturalism.” TESOL Quarterly, 28.3 Autumn, 1994: 628-631.
Stary, Giovanni. “Sibe: An endangered language”. In Janse, Mark and Sijmen Tol (Eds.), Language Death and Language Maintenance. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2003: 81–88.
Stephens, Thomas M. “Language Maintenance and Ethnic Survival: The Portuguese in New Jersey.” Hispania, 72.3 Sep., 1989: 716-720.
Szporluk, Roman. “West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation.” Soviet Studies, 31.1 Jan., 1979: 76-98. Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara. “Contrasting Ethnic Nationalisms: Eastern Central Europe.” In: Stephen Barbour and Cathie Carmichael, eds. Language and Nationalism in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000: 183-220.
Turgenev, Ivan S. Rudin. Moscow: Nauka, 1855.
Van Engelenhoven, Aone. “Language endangerment in Indonesia : the incipient obsolescence and acute death of Teun, Nila and Serua (Central and Southwest Maluku),” in: Mark Janse and Sijmen Tol (eds), Language Death and Language Maintenance: Theoretical, Historical and Descriptive Approaches. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2003: 49- 80.
Wei, Li. “Competing forces in language maintenance and language shift: Markets, hierarchies and networks in Singapore.” In David, Maya Khemlani (Ed.) Methodological and Analytical Issues in Language Maintenance and Language Shift Studies. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2000: 100-112.
Weinstein, Harold R. “Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine.” Slavonic Year- Book. American Series, 1 (1941): 124-148.
Wexler, Paul. Purism and language: a study in modern Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalism (1840-1967). Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Publications, 1974.
Wodak, Ruth, (Ed.). Language, power, and ideology: studies in political discourse. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Pub. Co, 1989.
Woolard, Kathryn A. and Schieffelin, Bambi B. “Language Ideology.” Annual Review of Anthropology, 23, 1994: 55-82.
“В Украине „Убивают‟ Русский Язык!” КонференцияIXBT.com. 7 April 2005 – 23 Sept. 2006. 26 March 2008.
Дубинянський, Михайло. “Мова VS Язык.” Українськa правдa. 14 Aug. 2007. 23 Sept. 2007.
“Зачем вообще, и мне в частности, украинский язык.” ФОРум ОБОЗа. 19 Sept. 2007 – 5 Dec. 2007. 26 March 2008.
Нехристь , Александр. “Держава или Трымава.” ЦензорНет Украинская политика в комментариях электора. 30 Jul. 2007. 23 Sept. 2007.
“Про Украинский язык.” Любовь и Ненависть. 1 Nov. 2001 – 22 Aug. 2007. 23 Sept. 2007.
Appendix A: Questionnaire
Русско-говорящие в Украине и Украинский Язык Соцлингвистический Вопросник
Цель этого вопросника - понять отношение русско-говорящих как к украинскому языку так и к его носителям, особенно после того, как украинский язык стал официальным языком Украины. Он состоит из 65 вопросов. Не все вопросы могут относиться лично к вам (например, если вопрос о ваших детях, а у вас детей нет). В этом случае зачеркните номер этого вопроса и перейдите к следующему. Если вы не понимаете какой-то вопрос, пожалуйста, спросите меня. Нет ответов правильных или неправильных!
1. Год вашего рождения 19______
2. Вы: O мужчина O женщина
3. Где вы родились (или жили большую часть жизни):
4. Какая национальность числилась в Советском/Российском паспорте?
O Русский O Украйнец O Другой (а именно?) ______
5. Когда люди спрашивают вас, “кто вы?”, вы себя идентифицируете как
O Русский O Украинец O Другая (а именно?) ______
6. Как вы себя внутренне ощущаете
O Русский O Украинец O Русский и Украинец O Другое (а именно?) ______
7. За годы после получения Украиной независимости ваше внутреннее ощущения себя изменилось?
O Да, я стал острее себя чувствовать русским O Да, я стал острее себя чувствовать украинцем O Я стал больше задумываться о том, кто я в этой стране O Нет, не изменилось
8. В какой степени ваше внутреннее ощущение себя и своей идентичности связано с тем, каким языком вы владеете лучше
O сильно связано O относительно связано O не связано O другое (а именно?) ______
9. В какой степени ваше внутреннее ощущение себя и своей идентичности связано с тем, какая национальность (русский или украинец) числится в вашем паспорте?
O сильно связано O относительно связано O не связано O другое (а именно?) ______
10. В какой степени ваше внутреннее ощущение себя и своей идентичности связано с тем, что вы живете в Украине?
O сильно связано O относительно связано O не связано O другое (а именно?) ______
11. Какой самый высокий уровень вашего образования?
O школа (10 классов) O техникум: O институт/университет (степень): ______
12. На каких языках вы свободно говорите?
O только на русском O на русском и на украинском O также на другом языке (а именно?)
13. Ваша профессия в настоящий момент? Если вы на пенсии, пожалуйста укажите вашу последнюю профессию.
14. Как вы бы оценили свое владение украинским до того как украинский язык стал официальным языком Украины?
O очень хорошо O хорошо O нормально O довольно плохо O очень плохо O вообще не было
15. Как вы бы оценили свое владение украинским сейчас?
O очень хорошо O хорошо O нормально O довольно плохо O очень плохо O вообще нет
16. Как вы бы оценили свое владение русским языком сейчас?
O очень хорошо O хорошо O нормально O довольно плохо O очень плохо
17. Как часто вы говорите по-русски?
O каждый день O каждую неделю O каждый месяц O несколько раз в год O меньше, чем это (а именно?)
18. Если вы ответили “каждый день”, пожалуйста, укажите, сколько времени в день вы говорите по-русски
O меньше 10% O 20-30% O 50%-80% O больше 80%
19. Как часто вы говорите по-украински?
O каждый день O каждую неделю O каждый месяц O несколько раз в год O меньше, чем это (а именно?)
20. Если вы ответили “каждый день”, пожалуйста, укажите, сколько времени в день вы говорите по-украински
O меньше 10% O 20-30% O 50%-80% O больше 80%
21. Вы считаете, важно сохранять русский язык?
O очень важно O важно O не знаю O не очень важно O совсем не важно
22. Вы считаете, важнo чтобы ваши дети говорили и понимали русский язык?
O очень важно O важно O не знаю O не очень важно O совсем не важно
23. Вы себя более комфортно чувствуете, говоря по-русски или по- украински?
O одинаково O по-русски O по-украински
24. Не могли бы вы подробнее рассказать, почему вы себя более комфортно чувствуете, говоря по-русски или по-украински или почему вы одинаково комфортно чувствуете себя, говоря на обоих языках?
25. Какой у вас семейный статус?
O женат O разведен/живу отдельно O вдовец O живем вместе, но не женат O одинокий
26. На каком языке был воспитан ваш партнер/супруг?
O украинский O русский O другой (а именно?):
27. На каком языке вы обычно говорите с партнером?
O только по-русски O по-русски и по-украински, но в основном по-русски O по-русски и по-украински, нет предпочтения O по-русски и по-украински, но в основном по-украински O только по-украински
28. У вас есть дети?
O нет O да, им (сколько лет?)
29. На каком языке вы обычно говорите с детьми?
O только по-русски O по-русски и по-украински, но в основном по-русски O по-русски и по-украински, нет предпочтения O по-русски и по-украински, но в основном по-украински O только по-украински
30. На каком языке обычно дети говорят с вами?
O только по-русски O по-русски и по-украински, но в основном по-русски O по-русски и по-украински, нет предпочтения O по-русски и по-украински, но в основном по-украински O только по-украински
31. У вас есть внуки?
O нет O да, им (сколько лет?)
32. На каком языке вы обычно говорите с внуками?
33. На каком языке обычно внуки говорят с вами?
34. Вы подталкиваете детей, чтобы они говорили по-русски?
O да, иногда O нет, никогда O да, часто
35. Вы подталкиваете детей, чтобы они говорили по-украински?
O да, иногда O нет, никогда O да, часто
36. Вы слушать русское радио/смотреть русские передачи по телевизору, или украинские?
O Русские O Украинские O Русские и Украинские, нет предпочтения
37. Считаете ли вы себя двуязычным? Другими словами, вы считаете, что ваш украинский такой же свободный, как русский?
O нет, потому что
O да, потому что
O не знаю, потому что
38. Вам будет легче догадаться о социальном статусе человека, когда он говорит по-русски или по-украински?
O по-русски, потому что
O по-украински, потому что
O без разницы, потому что
39. Как вы считаете, должен ли украинский язык быть официальным языком Украины?
O нет, потому что
O да, потому что
O не знаю, потому что
40. Если вы бы могли поменять официальный язык с украинского на русский, вы бы это сделали?
O нет, потому что
O да, потому что
O не знаю, потому что
41. Если могло бы быть 2 официальных языка Украины, и русский и украинский, как вы думаете, ситуация была бы:
O лучше, потому что
O хуже, потому что
O не знаю, потому что
42. Вы думаете, что люди должны иметь право отсылать своих детей или в русскую школу или в украинскую школу?
O нет, потому что
O да, потому что
O не знаю, потому что
43. Как вы думаете, какой язык лучше для a. Бизнеса O только русский O по-русски и украинский, нет предпочтения O только украинский Почему? ______b. Науки и исследования O только русский O по-русски и украинский, нет предпочтения O только украинский Почему? ______c. Дома O только русский O по-русски и украинский, нет предпочтения O только украинский Почему? ______d. Искусства и по'зии O только русский O по-русски и украинский, нет предпочтения O только украинский Почему? ______e. Государства O только русский O по-русски и украинский, нет предпочтения O только украинский Почему? ______
44. Как вы думаете ваша ситуация – социальная и профессиональная – изменилась бы, если бы вы лучше говорили на украинском?
O стала бы лучше O стала бы хуже O не изменилась бы, потому что знание языка не влияет на это O не изменилась бы, потому что я хорошо знаю украинский
45. Как вы думаете, что будет в Украине в будущем? O Только украинский будет официальный язык Украины O Только русский будет официальный язык Украины O И украинский и русский будут официальные языки Украины 286
46. Сколько вам было лет, когда распался Сов. Союз?
47. Если вам было 16 или более в момент распада Союза, какие утраченные элементы вы бы хотели вернуть из тех времен (выберите все ответы, которые вам подходят)?
O экономическую стабильность O отсутствие острых национальных конфликтов O русский, как официальный язык Украины O ничего
48. Живя в Сов. Союзе вы испытывали какие-либо притеснения по национальному признаку?
O Да, потому что я русский и не знал украинского O Да, потому что я украинец и хотел говорить на украинском O Нет, потому что я русский O Нет, потому что я украинец O Другое (а именно?)
49. После распада Союза вы испытывали какие-либо притеснения по национальному признаку?
O Да, потому что я русский и не знаю украинского O Да, потому что я украинец и хочу говорить только на украинском O Нет, потому что я русский O Нет, потому что я украинец O Другое (а именно?)
50. Что вы думаете о современной лингвистической ситуации в Украине?
O ситуация плохая потому, что
O ситуация нормальная потому, что
O ситуация не плохая и не хорошая, просто так и есть
51. Как вы думаете, лингвистическая ситуация в Украине поменялась с тех пор, как распался Сов. Союз?
O ситуация хуже потому, что
O ситуация лучше потому, что
O ситуация не хуже и не лучше, просто так и есть
52. Что вы думаете об украинском языке?
O Это диалект русского O Это самостоятельный язык O Это язык, потерявший много за годы советской власти и превратившийся в смесь русского и украинского O Другое (а именно?)
53. Когда вы слышите украинский, он вам кажется
O фонетически красивым O напевным O фонетически некрасивым O грубым
54. Что вы думаете о людях, которые говорят только по-украински и не говорят по-русски? (отметьте всѐ, что относится к вашему мнению)
O неграмотные O некультурные O простые O националистические O грамотные O культурные O интелектуальные
55. Знаете ли вы какие-нибудь стереотипы о людях, которые только говорят по-украински?
O Да, например они
56. Вы верите в эти стереотипы?
O Да потому, что
O Нет потому, что
57. Знаете ли вы какие-нибудь стереотипы о людях, которые только говорят по-русски?
O Да, например они
58. Вы верите в эти стереотипы?
O Да потому, что
O Нет потому, что
59. Как вы думаете, почему такие стереотипы сушествуют?
O Потому, что они правы O Потому, что людям нравятся стереотипы O Потому, что они правы и людям нравятся стереотипы O Не знаю O Другое (а именно?)
60. Как политики относятся к лингвистической ситуации?
O политики не разговаривают об этой ситуации O политики хорошо относятся к русскому языку O политики хорошо относятся к украинскому языку
61. Вы поддерживаете их в этом ?
O да O нет O не знаю
62. Связываете ли вы свое мнение о языке со своими политичискими взглядами?
O да, очень O да, но не очень O нет, но не очень O совсем нет O не знаю
63. Как вы думаете, ваша область поменялась с тех пор, когда украинский язык стал официальным языком Украины?
O да Как? O нет O не знаю
64. Есть ли разница между областями, где люди в основном говорят по- русски, и теми, где они говорят по-украински?
O да Какая? O нет O не знаю
65. Как вы думаете, важно ли для Украины сейчас, чтобы люди говорили по-украински? А по-русски?
O Очень важно говорить по-украински и по-русски O Важно только говорить по-украински O Важно только говорить по-русски Почему?
Вы подошли к концу этого опросника. Вы хотели бы что-нибудь добавить? Это может относиться как к языковым вопросам, так и к комментариям по поводу этого опроса или к данному исследованию в целом.