JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Editorial Leadership Is the Art of Getting Someone Else to Do Something You Want Done Because He Wants to Do It

M Edition 7 M JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Editorial Leadership is the art of getting someone else to do something you want done because he wants to do it. General Dwight D Eisenhower

I introduce this Edition of the JAPCC Journal with the above quote for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the fact that its author oversaw one of history’s largest Battlespace Management (BSM) challenges – the amphibious assault on Normandy in 1944. An endeavour, which required the highest degree of cross-environmental co-ordination and, incidentally, was predicated on the delivery of unchallenged dominance of the skies!

It also rather succinctly draws a connection between BSM and Command, a theme we introduce in the opening article and the challenge we set out to explore from an air perspective throughout this Journal. Network enabling is the driver for this review of BSM. I hope you will agree, from the analysis of early networking in the Battle of Britain, to reflections on the very real challenges of contemporary operations, through to how BSM might evolve as new capabilities and concepts emerge, that the Air and Space environment is potentially in an era of seismic change. Our objective, therefore, is to open the debate on how that change might take place, rather than wait for it to unfurl around us.

The Journal of the JAPCC welcomes I am also delighted to include 2 articles from one of the newer NATO unsolicited manuscripts of 1500 members, Romania. In particular, our thanks go to Lt Gen Croitoru for words in length. Please e-mail your his valuable insight into his Air Force’s on-going experience since joining manuscript as an electronic file in the Alliance. We have also included a follow-up article on Space and a either MS Word or WordPerfect to: new subject, the Psychology of Remote Control Warfare, both aimed [email protected] at broadening our perspective of all aspects of our operating domain. Indeed, these articles also act as a lead-in to our next Journal, Edition 8, We encourage comments on where we do not intend to follow a single theme, but declare open season the articles in order to promote and ask for submissions on any subject associated with the evolution of discussion concerning Air and Space Power inside NATO’s Joint Air Air and Space Power. So if you have an Air and Space Power itch you community. All comments should be want to scratch, please pick up a pen! Similarly, if you disagree with sent to [email protected] anything we have published, write and tell us – I assure you, we will air your view. Current and past JAPCC Journal issues can be downloaded from Better still, come and join the debate at the JAPCC Conference 2008, www.japcc.org the first to be hosted by our new Director, Gen Brady, on ‘Joint Air and Space Power - Decision Superiority in the 21st Century’ between 14-16 Oct. See you there!

The Journal of the JAPCC, Roemerstrasse 140, D-47546 Kalkar Germany

Garfield Porter Air Commodore, GBR AF Assistant Director Transformation

JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transforming Joint Air Power: The Journal of the JAPCC Transformation & Capabilities Director Joint Air Power Competence Centre 6 Command and Battlespace Management within the Gen Roger A. Brady Context of an Effects Based Approach to Operations – An Air Perspective Executive Director Joint Air Power Competence Centre Lt Gen Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger

Editor Air Cdre Garfield Porter

Deputy Editor Lt Col Jim Bates

Editorial Board Col Valentino Savoldi Lt Col Terje Fagerli Copyright: SSgt Christina M. Styer, USAF Wg Cdr Peter York Lt Col Patrick Piana 10 Romanian Air Force Transformation: Maj Gert-Jan Wolkers A Must for a Secure Environment Maj Ron Peterson Maj Tom Single Maj Frank Weißkirchen 14 ISAF Approach to Effective Battlespace Management Production Manager/ Sponsor Manager 18 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams: Mr Simon Ingram Tomorrow’s Battlespace Management – Today Design and Art Production SSgt Duane White

Distribution SMSgt Edgar Hersemeyer

The Journal of the JAPCC is the professional publication of NATO’s Joint Air Power Competence Centre aiming to serve as a forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on NATO Air Power related issues such as doctrine, strategy, force structure and Copyright: Gerben van Es / AVDD readiness. The views and opinions expressed or implied in The Journal of the JAPCC are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of NATO. 22 Network Enabled – The Air Defence of Great Britain 1917 - 1940 All articles within this issue not bearing a copyright notice may be reproduced in whole or in part without further permission. Articles bearing a copyright notice 26 Firebird Operations in the Nevada Desert: may be reproduced for any NATO purpose without Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into permission. If any article is being reproduced, The Journal of the JAPCC requests a courtesy line. To obtain Joint Terminal Controller Training permission for the reproduction of material bearing a copyright notice for other than NATO purposes, contact the author of the material rather than The 30 Sensor Data Fusion in a Network- Journal of the JAPCC. Centric Environment

JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 CONTENTS

View Points Out of the Box

34 Interview with Lieutenant General 51 The Psychology of Remote Croitoru, Romania’s Chief of Control Warfare Air Force Staff

Inside the JAPCC Copyright: Romanian Air Force 54 News 38 What is NATO’s Position on Space? Regulars

56 Biographies 42 The Role of Knowledge Management for Effective Battlespace Management 59 Book Reviews

45 Pushing the Envelope – Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment

48 Battlespace Management and Active Layered M Denotes images digitally manipulated. Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence

JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

CommandCommand andand BattlespaceBattlespace ManagementManagement withinwithin thethe ContextContext ofof anan EffectsEffects BasedBased ApproachApproach toto OperationsOperations –– AnAn AirAir PerspectivePerspective

By Air Commodore Garfield Porter, GBR AF

There are 2 developments that will Effects Based entities. Finally, the Actions increasingly affect the way we do Approach To necessary to achieve Effects will business in the first quarter of the Operations predominately be the playing 21st Century: an Effects Based out and aggregation of Tactical Approach to Operations (EBAO) An EBAO might be usefully activities. and Network Enabled Capability summarised as: (NEC). Each is closely linked to Command the other, although it is probable Actions carried out to achieve Effects, that the promise of a compelling, which lead to the realisation of decisive A key function of Command comprehensive product from the Objectives in the pursuit of favourable within EBAO is, therefore, to set Information Age, which NEC long term End-states. the parameters, in terms of Actions, offers, provided the rationale to Effects, Objectives and End- pursue an EBAO. Working back from a command states, appropriate to the level of planning perspective, an End-State Command exercised. This implies This article aims to investigate, represents the desired outcome an approach, which reaches at least in conceptual terms, the impact – a Strategic level product. The one-level up and down; for example, of EBAO and NEC on C4ISR; in Objectives necessary to achieve a Component Commander1 should particular, the article focuses on such a position will be identified at aim to influence the setting of Joint the functions of Command and the the Operational level, albeit most Effects (to meet Objectives) and subsequent enabling of Command likely with Strategic input. The then orchestrate Actions within Intent through Battlespace Effects necessary to reach such his domain to help realise those Management (BSM). Having Objectives will also be identified Effects. Given that a Component explored such a generic construct, at the Operational (Joint and Commander will only rarely have it then looks more closely at the Interagency) level, but this time the wherewithal to realise an emerging implications for Air and with significant input from the Effect in isolation, it follows that Space practitioners. higher Tactical (Component) sensitivity to, and an ability to

JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 synchronise with, the Actions of control mechanisms as well as the circumstances, the Control other Components is critical to where and when; these are likely (procedural and direct) emphasis achieving Joint Effects. Essentially, to endure (for example ROE) and has prevailed. this model reflects the basic tenets will often also set the conditions of Mission Command, albeit for operations. Network Enabling updated to embrace an emerging EBAO vocabulary. Moreover, So what is changing that will bring it places particular emphasis on ‘... this brief article the necessary agility to operations accurately articulating Command challenges the very to allow us to transfer to a BSM Intent in effects based terms at regime that is more conducive all levels of command from the idea of C4ISR as to an EBAO? The commonly Strategic to the Tactical. perceived wisdom is that network a useful future enabling will be at the vanguard Battlespace construct.’ of this transformation, but how? Management Today It will certainly enhance C4ISR such that the Commander has Traditionally, BSM (Airspace In addition, through Tactical a timelier, richer understanding Control, Waterspace Management, Data Links (TDL), Air and of context, which should enable Land Boundaries) has been based Maritime forces have increasingly decision superiority at all levels in on the procedural division of been able to bring a degree of the planning process. Moreover, environmental time and space Shared Situational Awareness the result – the Commander’s in which planned activities (SSA) to the BSM equation that Intent – through network enabling are carried out.2 Thus, in the has allowed them, to a limited should also be widely understood execution of operations, the BSM extent, to self-synchronise in the (in terms of Objectives, Effects and emphasis has been very much pursuit of their missions.3 Until Actions) across the Battlespace. on Control. This explains why now, however, the ubiquity of Equally important, this very same Command (the decision and such TDL and the granularity of networking should increasingly planning basis for operations) and detail they have provided, even deliver a degree of SSA to all Control are invariably interlinked in these environments, has been environments (and, critically, as C2. There are, of course, other uneven and so, except in optimal linked across them!), which will

NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control team in action.

JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

allow the operators to routinely reflecting high level Command thinking. Perhaps C4ISR should self-synchronise their Actions to Intent) would risk both eroding be recast to place more emphasis optimise the pursuit of Effects to initiative across the battlespace on BSM and, within an EBAO, the benefit of all, whilst identifying and being unresponsive to the focus specifically on Command? and mitigating any unintended ‘atmospheric’ changes that herald To this end, C4ISR might be Effects along the way. Combined, unintended consequences, which replaced by Command, Battlespace these advantages set the ideal in reality must be avoided at every Management, Intelligence, conditions to pursue Mission turn. Surveillance and Reconnaissance Command, where the aims and (CBISR). This change may constraints are specified, but their C4ISR appear to be semantics-based attainment is left to the creative and cosmetic, but it is necessary wherewithal of the appropriate By focusing on Command and to encourage mindset shift, to subordinate commander. BSM, this brief article challenges focus leaders on the rigours and the very idea of C4ISR as a useful challenges of Command (rather Battlespace future construct. In particular, than the attractions of Control), Management what does C4 really mean? and to identify and strike the right Tomorrow Command is fine and enduring – it balance between Control and SSA is the decision making and directive in the BSM equation. As to the From this, we can also deduce that process that underpins operations. necessity of retaining ISR as equal BSM in the future will comprise However, as we have seen, Control acronym partners, a discussion 2 supporting elements: Control is really a part (and arguably perhaps for another day………… and SSA. Moreover, given that a diminishing part) of BSM. SSA will become more widespread Moreover, Communications and Implications for as network enabling takes hold Computers are systems/equipments Air & Space and that Mission Command that support the C2/ISR processes; appears to offer the best route to actually, they are more than that, Given that the Air and Space delivering a truly agile EBAO, we they are the equipments on which environment is of prime should expect to see the demands network enabling is based and, importance in enabling NEC across on Control diminish with time. importantly, enable the second all environments, it follows that The alternative is to use network element of BSM - SSA. It could be dominance of Air and Space will enabling for the ultimate exercise concluded, therefore, that C4ISR is remain a paramount consideration of the long ‘Control’ screw-driver, an unhelpful term and does little for Joint Commanders and their which (whilst perhaps accurately to add clarity of thought to EBAO Staffs – an Objective, in EBAO

‘Command is fine and enduring – it is the decision making and directive process that underpins operations.’

JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 I am not suggesting that Control Copyright: USAF mechanisms have had their day, more that the balance between Control and SSA will need to be redefined and that NEC should provide the wherewithal for a more responsive, interactive approach. Indeed, this analysis begs whether the Air Environment should explore the possibilities of creating an interactive ATO market place, where subordinate commanders are encouraged to add value to the process, rather than continuing to rely on the current top-down monolithic approach?

A final implication that will need careful interpretation will be the roll-out of SSA across the Joint Force. As mentioned previously, the Air and Maritime domains have invariably been ahead of Land in this area. This could well change, The US Global Hawk on an ISR mission. but it is probably reasonable to terms, necessary to achieving a include those Effects that need to assume that SSA across the entire favourable End-state. be achieved (and the Objectives Battlespace will remain uneven. they support), as well as those Therefore, it follows that BSM Beyond enabling the Joint effort, that will need to be avoided, it is across the component seams will the Air (and Space4) Component likely that the shape of the AOD remain a critical area for future will need to develop new methods will need to evolve along with commanders to resolve. This will, to meet the challenges of such an our experience. Significantly, no doubt, add further nuances emerging regime. At the Joint greater SSA should also allow to the Control/SSA balance; Force (perhaps even Interagency5) us to cascade responsibility for however, given that any Blue on level, the Air Commander will delivering specified Actions in Blue engagement is ultimately need to play his part in influencing support of Effects and Objectives a failure in BSM, it will require the setting and monitoring of both to subordinate commanders; as much, if not more, attention Objectives and Effects. To this for example, the responsibility from commanders than their own end, it may be that the key Joint for planning and delivering environmental arrangements. functions centre around a Joint Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) Objectives and Effects Board suppression in a designated area rather than the kinetically centric might be allocated to Wing or Endnotes: 1. Assuming components survive the EBAO/NEC Joint Targeting Board of today. Group Commander. An Air take, cultural shift. Either way, it will be for the Air perhaps, on devolved Mission 2. Albeit tempered by the initiative encouraged in the Commander to promote the use of Command and an opportunity to concept of Mission Command. air activities to realise the desired capitalise on the operational and 3. TDL in the Air and Maritime environments have been encouraged by the need for interoperability at platform Effects. creative wherewithal of our air level, rather than the formation level requirement unit commanders in the field, who traditionally assumed for Land forces. 4. It is unclear how the Air and Space environment Moreover, having brokered Air’s under current practise do little might be managed in this construct, given that place in the Joint marketplace, more than marshal their units to Space transcends normal Operational (AOR type) boundaries. the Air Commander will need to meet the demands of the ATO. 5. The Comprehensive Approach has not been addressed deliver a rich and comprehensive in this article, although it is accepted that some form of Interagency BSM would need to orchestrated at the Command Intent through his Such a development would Joint level and above.

Air Operations Directive (AOD). clearly require a different ATO/ 6. ATO is Air Tasking Order, ACO is Air Co-ordination Given that this will need to ACO/ACM6 regime from today. Order and ACM is Air Co-ordination Measures.

JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities Romanian Air Force Transformation; A Must for a Secure Environment By Air Flotilla General Doctor Florian Râpan, ROU AF

In autumn 2007, the Chief of and effects, enabled by concepts The challenges facing the Romanian Air Force Staff and ideas of the information era.2 transformation of the ROU AF discussed the restructuring of the This article looks at the include: Romanian Air Force (ROU AF) in restructuring underway in the an article published in The Romanian ROU AF with a view towards • Modernising the air platforms to Military Thinking,1 a Romanian transformation and overcoming the enable the carriage and launch of General Staff magazine. Focus challenges facing transformation. precision guided munitions. areas for the restructuring process • Improving the ability to deploy follow an aggressive strategy and Romanian Air Force forces, by means of transport include: establishing flexible and Transformation and logistic support, to remote agile organisations / structures, areas. which continuously collaborate Transformation of the Romanian • Integrating the multi-mission to facilitate transformation Armed Forces, as a whole, and capabilities to support other and to institutionalise cultural the modernisation of the ROU forces’ activities. change; establishing deployable AF in particular, represent a • Expanding the air data merging force packages; developing permanent development process; system by integrating data from innovative thinking, which new concepts, strategies, doctrines sensors such as AWACS and, guides transformational activities; and integration of capabilities possibly, sensors of other nations. changing from planning and are required to improve • Developing a protected programming centred on threats effectiveness and interoperability and secure voice and data and platforms to planning and in a continuously evolving security communications system that is programming based on capabilities environment. resistant to jamming.

10 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Romanian Air Force Transformation; • Establishing an air command moulded and influenced by the and the co-evolution of and control system, which imperious needs of the information operational concepts, as well as A Must for a Secure Environment includes deployable forces and age, integrated fighting capabilities by improvements to training and By Air Flotilla General Doctor Florian Râpan, ROU AF integrates with other Romanian of Joint coalition warfare, and by experimentation. national systems. the network enabled capabilities. • The increase of nuclear Specifically, Air Power’s biological chemical (NBC) The transformation of the ROU effectiveness in the information and intercontinental ballistic AF should be neither a goal age will be determined by: missile threats by way of experts, per se nor an isolated target. materials and technology transfer Aligning with our NATO allies • The capacity to provide and to hostile countries and by the and other partners, identifying assimilate information. development of ballistic missile and overcoming cultural, • Instant access to information. technologies in countries with informational, physical, financial • Speed of reaction. hostile regimes. and organisational barriers, is • The possible increase of a new possible when the whole process is The transformation process is military space and cyber-space based on principles, requirements a technological necessity. The race as many states develop micro and rules accepted and consistently combination of technological and nano-satellite capabilities applied throughout the Alliance progress, globalisation, and and offensive information in accordance with Alliance scientific development has created operations capabilities, which transformational goals. What some significant trends for the can be used to attack both trade follows are some rules or, rather, evolution of strategy and defence and military systems. tenets of the transformational planning, which include: • The increased potential to use process. new information technologies to • The advance of technology gain information and knowledge The Transformation regarding sensors, data for the development of weapons Process processing and targeting systems of mass destruction (WMD). throughout the Defence Industry. The transformation process is This rise was made possible The transformation process is a strategic necessity. It must be both by technological means a threat-determined necessity.

Romanian Forces ramp ceremony at Kabul International Airport.

11 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

MiG-21 LanceR aircraft on air-policing mission.

Trends in this field include: considering the role structure at an • Ensuring multidimensional inter-allied level. The specialising protection for own forces against • Lowering protection, as a result fields must be identified according all threats, including NBC. of new technologies, which to commitments and the way they • Interoperability with Allied allows enemies to reach across are included in Romania’s Reform Forces. geographical boundaries. Planning, with a view to meeting • Ensuring optimum capabilities • Raising danger of regional the requirements of the Prague based on full options analysis in conflicts, as a result of WMD Capabilities Commitment NATO time. and ballistic missile technology initiative. development. The Romanian Air • Raising asymmetric threat. Given that there is no major Force Requirements • Increasing danger from territorial threat to Romania ungoverned areas or unreliable and its allies, wider security risks This assessment of the political regimes that support drive ROU AF transformation. transformation process leads to terrorist networks. Besides terrorism, the current deductions about the ROU AF • Spreading power and military range of risks includes human and capability requirements: capabilities to fundamentalist weaponry trafficking, an acute non-state actors, who support state of regional instability, illegal • A lower number of Air Force world terrorism. migration, civilian emergencies, structures, but with increased • Continuing difficulty to foresee WMD proliferation and the means action capabilities and full possible locations of future to use them. Determinations interoperability with those conflicts. imposed by threats, as well capabilities of the NATO as current and future risks, member countries. Defence policies and strategies demand the following capability • Larger air coverage for the need to be adapted. The force requirements: Alliance mission spectrum, planning process in the ROU AF according to the Prague will be based on both Joint and • Fast deployment of forces Capabilities Commitments, specialised role concepts as well including the means for their self- which includes the fight against as on NATO recommendations support in a limited time-frame. terrorism and the associated

12 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 training, instruction, equipment and obtain or maintain their NATO command in accordance and supplies. competitive advantage. with NATO standards. Currently, • Compliance with the political- more than 60% of NATO- military agreements between Adapting to become designated forces are certified Romania and NATO countries. Flexible and Agile through the NATO TACEVAL3 • Clear deadlines for the time when programme. The acquisition of a forces must be operationally The ROU AF has made huge strides Link-16 capable multi-role aircraft, ready to the time of actual action on its journey of transformation. which will replace the MiG-21 in a theatre of operation. Within this edition of the JAPCC LanceR aircraft, will position the • The achievement of in-theatre Journal, the Chief of the Romanian ROU AF as an expeditionary and exchange and rotation, and Air Force Staff, Lieutenant General network-enabled force, capable of a level of readiness for the Croitoru, offers a comprehensive integrating with other Air Forces operational capabilities, as well view of our transformational in the Alliance. Equally important as their support according to progress. The ROU AF has come will be Romania’s realisation of the funding possibilities and the a long way since 2002, when we its goal to fully integrate into economic status of the country. deployed a C-130 aircraft into the Alliance’s homogeneous Air • Alignment of capabilities Afghanistan in support of the Command and Control System throughout all services within coalition effort there. This was the (ACCS) with the implementation the Romanian Armed Forces. first deployment mission that our of an ARS4 in Romania. • The ability to act within the Air Force carried out abroad since European Union also, according WWII. In 2005, we deployed four Significant change is underway to pre-existing agreements. IAR-330 SOCAT helicopters into in the ROU AF, a force that is • Improving and providing Bosnia and then in 2006, Romania adapting to become flexible and flexibility to develop the Forces’ became lead nation of the KAIA agile in this new age. leadership. (Kabul Afghanistan International • Considering the new operational Airport). In the KAIA mission, concepts and the operational way we realised the vital role of our to apply them (network-based ground personnel operating in this Endnotes: warfare, effects-based approach most demanding environment. 1. Lieutenant General Constantin Croitoru, Current to operations, and decisive rapid Lessons learnt from these missions Directions and Priorities of the Air Force Transformation, The Romanian Military Thinking, No. 5 / 2007, page 11, operations). have served to help the ROU AF Bucharest, Romania

evolve towards a more deployable 2. Ibid, page 12.

The key to achieve the winding and expeditionary force. 3. TACEVAL, an abbreviation for Tactical Evaluation, is a transformation process is to training and evaluation programme which tests, unit by unit, the operational readiness of NATO forces. apply solutions, which allow the Full integration into NATO is our 4. ARS, an Air Command and Control System (ACCS) Romanian leadership to address foremost goal. From the first day entity, is composed of the Air Control Centre (ACC), the RAP Production Centre (RPC), and the Sensor Fusion challenges brought by exercises Romania entered NATO, the ROU Post (SFP). The ARS may be static or deployable. and operations. In a nutshell, AF conducted air policing under military structures do not transform by themselves. What is needed is a change in behaviour, at the staff and organisational level, and the ability to face challenges collectively amongst both military and civilian leaders. Such change of mindset allows a root transformation to occur in a way in which military operations are planned and unfolded. The future will not necessarily belong to the most technologically advanced militaries, but to those who will be able to adequately understand the character of the conflict and Copyright: Romanian Air Force to properly transform themselves, IAR-330 SOCAT helicopter.

13 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities ISAF Approach to Effective Battlespace Management

By Air Commodore Michael John Madoc Jenkins, GBR AF

Afghanistan presents NATO with In addition, the employment Following on, let us look at the diverse expeditionary challenges of an ever-increasing number command and control challenges both as an alliance and as an ad of diverse air platforms has at the tactical level in delivering hoc coalition. These challenges challenged traditional command full-spectrum, effects based1 Air include the mix of traditional and control systems. During 9 Power in a safe and effective way; and non-traditional military months as Director of the ISAF producing and executing both the missions, integration with a large Air Coordination Element in Air Tasking Order (ATO) and the International Community and Kabul, I worked to develop Air Coordination Order (ACO). I non-governmental reconstruction effective Air Combat and hope to outline and illustrate 3 key effort and the need to operate Control, and Command, Control, challenges, which face the ATO: within a country of geographic Communications and Intelligence visibility, time-cycle and mobility, extremes. All this is set against (C3I) structures designed to meet and then turn to the complexities a country with a history of these expeditionary challenges of the ACO: air environment, instability, ethnic war, occupation and to enhance the execution of geography and security. and more recently criminality, effective air support. Maj Gen corruption, narcotics production/ Meulman, DCOM (Air) ISAF X, Strategy to Task trafficking and with open provided an excellent insight in his borders and a fragile Central article for JAPCC Edition 6. An effective air battlespace is Government. Thirty-seven reliant on information collection, coalition nations with different We should overcome national approaches processing and dissemination warfighting cultures, disclosure and interests and work in the best interest processes [the Joint Tactical and security implications, less of the men and women on the ground, who Air Request (JTAR) to the than optimal communications are executing their mission on a daily ATO process] and coherence in and radar coverage, and a military basis. […] It may be that the biggest ‘strategy to task.’ Before we can air campaign set within a growing challenge is to Command and Control the deliver an effective ACO/ATO, civil aviation structure make for a Coalition, thereby keeping it together and the context has to be derived complicated battlespace. focussed at times when it is most needed. from the Commander’s intent.

14 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 That intent, expressed through in order to take advantage of the Since air can’t ‘afford’ to commit the campaign plan, describes a local operational environment or scarce assets to every activity, series of operations, integrated ‘spontaneous opportunity.’ The air support has to be ‘bid for’ in time space, whose purpose is geographically localised or tactical and employed effectively. This to achieve objectives within a focus adds to the complexities requires a tasking process, which strategic goal. The delivery of of the ATO and ACO in part by is driven to achieve procedural the air element of this integrated introducing a plethora of local standardization (on the ground campaign is expressed in the Joint air vehicles from light aircraft for and in the air) and which manages Air Operations Plan (JAOP) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams to geographical splits. The process in the Air Operations Directive tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles must operate in a complex (AOD) that, together, set the (UAV) for FF. Therefore, COIN C3I regime where physical context for air missions and, to presents significant challenges for security, freedom of movement, land commanders, the air priorities a centralised air command and information ‘releasability,’ diverse and effects available to them. control system working alongside a information technology and decentralised land process. voice systems all complicate the In counter-insurgency (COIN) production, dissemination and operations, as opposed to Major To maximise air effect, we need a execution of the ATO. Simply Combat Operations (MCO), the flexible and focussed JAOP, weekly put, everybody wants air support operational environment is one AOD and integrated planning (not to minimise the risk to the FF mixed between warfighting and Joint where a land plan is given to since air provides an undeniable reconstruction/normal life. Friendly air to add air support, but where the advantage in COIN operations. forces (FF) do not necessarily air and land effects are integrated The ‘bid’ must be supported with own the initiative in ‘military’ to deliver the objective), clear justification through the JTAR operations and the campaign must objectives and the mechanism for and performance reporting is be won through an enduring effort reporting against these missions or provided through mission reports of public influence to alienate the objectives. To achieve integrated (MISREPs, Ground/Contact opposition, in terms of politics or planning, expert airmen are reports and Joint Tactical Air ideals, and make the conduct of required in the planning teams Controller (JTAC) reports). violent activities unacceptable. All of the land tactical elements to FF activity must be intelligence advise how air effects can be made Consequently, an Air Priority led, localised and often reactive available.2 Matrix (APM) is required that

Afghan National Army trainees prepare to learn perimeter security during training at the Kabul Military Training Center.

15 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

The MH-60 Black Hawk supports ground operations in ISAF.

reflects the campaign plan but also the question, ‘Building the ACO- The ACO is a simple expression prioritizes activities for support ATO in expeditionary warfare: of a complex airspace. However, in accordance with the ground UAS, Rotary Wing, Fixed Wing – is unlike the ATO, it can be commander’s intent. Initially, a there room for all?’ In other words, enduring. The ACO provides the unit priority system was in place ‘can we overcome the challenges to backbone of both flight safety and for Afghanistan as opposed to a the ACO/ATO process?’ Combat ID; it may be procedural mission based system. However, or actively managed. However, this did not correctly reflect The ATO is a relatively simple it is critical that it is adhered to. a scheme of manoeuvre and challenge but reliant on 2 factors; This highlights the first of its 3 required a complete rethink to visibility of assets and also, the challenges: All military airspace ensure the right people at the right responsiveness and capacity of the users must comply with the time received the right air support. ATO planning cycle. The ATO ACO; however, it is worth noting The resultant air led CJ3/53 APM provides a task order to synchronize that on a number of occasions ensured maximum support whilst air activities, taking into account civil aircraft have taken short- allowing flexibility to enable national caveats/capabilities, cuts through active Restricted the spectrum of air effects and geographical constraints through Operating Zones (ROZ) to tasks. Execution was dramatically basing or coverage and finally achieve direct routing. The second enhanced by the use of multi- life support provision (Air- challenge is that of dissemination, role platforms and exploitation of to-Air Refuelling and Search every military air user must have latent capabilities – non-traditional and Rescue). The challenges, access to the ACO and receive intelligence surveillance and therefore, relate to the knowledge updates of ROZ or other changes reconnaissance using targeting of the platforms within the theatre depending upon activities. Clearly pods for real time full motion and if they are available for more this has transmission, security video support to JTACs and for than just parochial use. Without and time sensitive consequences collection. the visibility of air capabilities and and challenges. Finally, the third land intent, the ATO will fail – this challenge is to address the complex So, using the Afghan model of is a similar principle to weapons to airspace ‘geography’ with adequate expeditionary ops and its effective target matching. The ATO is the flexibility to allow reactive and mechanism of air command and execution order for legal purposes dynamic ground operations to control, let’s move on to address and it works. be supported by air. We cannot

16 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 micro-manage everything and so minded to be trusted/compliant and we must also ensure we retain procedural airspace management operators within the ACO?’ I our MCO ability. As Lord Tedder is perfectly acceptable, by default think there is work to be done in RAF said in 1947: therefore, our process is adequate this area for many nations - if not for the new environment. all. We British are often accused of preparing for the last war, or even the last war but Conclusion Turning to the ATO, we need an one. The rate of technical development is ATO process that is flexible enough, now so rapid, and the effects of changes I have outlined an effective air yet robust enough to manage in techniques so far-reaching, that it command and control in COIN MCO and COIN/humanitarian may well be fatal to lag behind. For our and have drawn a key conclusion: operations. In Afghanistan and own security we must think in terms of The management of the ATO in the Combined Air Operations modern war. The last war is not modern; and ACO processes is critical Centre, it is just about there! To it is out of date! for the future. However, in the capture these new ways of working expeditionary context, the ‘enemies’ and learn them, we need to expose are distance, geography, operating as many of our people to them constraints and the proliferation of and disseminate the right lessons. platforms. Nonetheless, adherence NATO has moved a long way to the ACO and a culture of sound since our Cold War posture, but airmanship provides adequate adapting our Article 5 organisation Endnotes: safety for air operations conducted and doctrine at a pace to keep up 1. Albeit many nations do not fully embrace the effects by ‘kite runners’ to B1s in the with ‘reality’ and support a 10-20 yr based concepts. same battle space. So, if the ACO enduring operation is challenging. 2. In Afghanistan, most capabilities are not in individual national order of battle reports and so national airmen is a valid mechanism for the safe We are learning fast and CC-Air, can be challenged to understand the full range of execution of air activities, the capabilities which can be available to the coalition JAPCC and others are working forces. follow on question is, ‘Are our hard to ‘spread the word.’ We need 3. The CJ3/5 represents the Combined Joint Staff from land commanders, UAV/JTAC and every soldier, sailor and airman to both the operations directorate (CJ3) and the plans & policy directorate (CJ5). artillery operators sufficiently air- be open to new ways of business

The Bamiyan Cliff, once a Buddhist shrine, holds back the daunting Afghan terrain and shadows an emerging peaceful community.

17 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities Copyright: Gerben van Es / AVDD Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams: Tomorrow’s Battlespace Management – Today

By Colonel Dan Lewandowski, USA AF

In Plato’s Republic, book II, What is the new invention? The months or less, there is very little or Socrates is noted to have said ‘Yet invention is that of network enabled no transportation infrastructure, the true creator is necessity, who capability. The new capability is the the Host Nation support is very is the mother of our invention.’ combination of shared situational limited, the weather and geography Operations in Afghanistan are awareness and control capabilities are difficult, and the adversary is once again proving Socrates was to achieve unprecedented well versed in combat operations right. The NATO-led International Battlespace Management. ISAF due to continued combat over the Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat operations have led to this past 25+ years. How is it then has invented a new kind of military invention, and Air Power is the key that NATO forces have been so unit due to the necessity of the enabler. successful? situation. This new unit of 12 to 19 personnel is called an Operational The Importance of Besides a strong comprehensive Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT).1 Air Power approach, NATO has the advantage The concept of a NATO-led of Air Power. Air Power provides OMLT is that it is embedded into Since NATO took command the means to quickly emplace and an Afghan National Army (ANA) of the ISAF mission in August remove units. Air Power provides unit to provide training, mentoring 2003, many difficulties have enhanced situational awareness and liaison capabilities to ensure been encountered.2 The ISAF through its wide reaching that ANA forces receive enabling forces are far from their support intelligence, surveillance and support. At first glance, an OMLT systems, they speak many different reconnaissance capabilities. Air may seem like nothing more than languages (39 different nations Power provides the means to deliver a way for allies to lend assistance. are currently participating), there supplies to remote areas, even in This type of military cooperation is a constant spin-up cycle due to adverse weather conditions. Air is not new. So, what is new then? rotations of personnel every 12 Power provides close air support

18 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 and close combat support so that ISAF unit even though Air Power the problem is supply and demand. Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams: maneuver units don’t need their was available. There still aren’t enough OMLTs own artillery support everywhere for all of the ANA forces. As of Tomorrow’s Battlespace Management – Today they go. Convoys can operate and This ability to draw support early January 2008, 26 OMLTs know that overwhelming force whenever and from wherever it were deployed in the ISAF area By Colonel Dan Lewandowski, USA AF application is available should is needed became a necessity in of operations.5 Fortunately, this they run into an ambush. In some ISAF and was one of the reasons number is expected to grow to cases, a simple low ‘Show of Force’ the NATO command structure about four times that amount.6 flyby will be enough to stop the developed the OMLT concept. Taliban from firing on coalition With an OMLT embedded within Effective use of forces. The Taliban fear Air Power ANA forces, that ANA unit Air Power that much. In short, Air Power immediately becomes network provides ISAF the single most enabled. That ANA unit can get The key for effective OMLT use important asymmetric advantage. intelligence support, it can get of Air Power for CAS or close weather information, and it can get contact support is the FAC. FACs Tomorrow’s Air Power. The unit can request are specifically trained to control Battlespace support and, because of the any coalition aircraft that engages Management Today connectivity that NATO Network in combat with ground troops and Enabled Capability (NNEC) they are expected to be part of Air Power has been so successful offers, that support could come most OMLTs. However, not all that the demand for it continues very quickly. Since April 2007, OMLTs need FACs as the ANA to increase. Helicopters for the French have increased their unit that they are assigned to may transportation are in short contribution from 6 to 160 OMLT not deploy into the field of combat. supply. The small number of personnel and they expect to add In operations, aircraft may be large serviceable airfields and the even more in 2008.4 But again, planned or they may be called in lack of transport aircraft have led to airlift operations that are far less than required. In Close Air Support (CAS), the demand can not be met by the supply. In this case, ironically, aircraft availability is not the problem. The deficiency rests with Forward Air Controllers (FACs).3 It is these critical personnel on the ground who direct the firepower from the air. Nations have not been training enough of these personnel, and no capability rests with the ANA. One recent estimate stated that US forces had only about one-third the ground controllers that were needed. The result is a severe degradation of CAS effectiveness. If ISAF or ANA forces went on missions without a FAC, they could be in great danger if attacked and the probability of engaging the wrong target, including Blue-on-Blue, is vastly increased. In one example in 2007, an ANA unit was away from base with a few ISAF support personnel when it was ambushed. No FAC was part of the unit, and Copyright: Commonwealth of Australia the Taliban massacred the ANA/ ‘It is these critical personnel on the ground who direct the firepower from the air.’

19 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

Nations that have contributed Nations that plan to contribute be positioned at the right place, to the programme in the near future at the right time. They can bring to bear the appropriate actions Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Portugal and Romania to achieve the desired effects. Is France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, it working? In a recent Pentagon Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom, news conference, Major General United States David Rodriquez stated that Taliban and al-Qaida fighters are Figure 1 - ISAF OMLTs and Embedded Training Teams 7 now operating from havens in the largely ungoverned tribal areas of on short notice for unexpected evacuation. They fight alongside western Pakistan and they appear firefights. The FAC will gather the ANA when the going gets to have shifted their focus toward information about the troops-in- tough. They don’t command the targets inside Pakistan rather than contact such as the location of the ANA units that they are attached across the border in Afghanistan.9 friendly ground forces, location of to, they just help.8 The goal of Could the reason be that there is important structures like mosques, every OMLT is to work themselves virtually no Air Power available in and the location of the target(s). If out of a job. They want the ANA the Pakistan battles? the OMLT has only a Joint Fires units to be self sufficient. To meet Observer (JFO), that JFO must this goal, from the Air Power As Seneca stated in the first century work through a FAC. The JFO perspective, the Afghan National AD, ‘You cannot escape necessities, becomes the eyes and ears for the Army Air Corps (ANAAC) is but you can conquer them.’10 FAC, since only FACs are trained working on its airlift capacity NATO, enabled by NNEC, is to directly control aircraft. It is and, by 2013, it hopes to have conquering the necessities of ISAF with these ground controllers CAS capable aircraft. Until the operations. OMLTs, and their that the asymmetric advantage ANAAC has its full operational use of Air Power, are showing the of Air Power can be applied at capability though, the OMLTs will positive effects of innovation in nearly any time, in nearly any need to be there to assist. Figure 1 the battlespace. place. And this is another example shows the nations that contribute of network enabling – the JFO to the OMLT programme. is the sensor providing decision superiority via the FAC hub. At the more strategic level,

battlespace management is enabled Endnotes: OMLTs provide more than just by OMLTs; through their ability to 1. NATO Fact Sheet on Operational Mentor and Liaison FACs to support CAS operations. remain connected to the ANA and Team (OMLT) Programme, September 2007, www. nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/omlt.html They serve as teachers. They to the NATO command structure. 2. The ISAF Mandate is based upon eight UN Security talk the military language with As a result of the OMLTs, the Council Resolutions (1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707 and 1776), the Bonn Conference of December 2001 Afghan leaders in a mentoring ANA/OMLT units can be guided and the Military Technical Agreement of January 2002, capacity. They call in aero-medical through the battlespace. They can www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html 3. NATO Standards use the term Forward Air Controller (FAC), the United States uses the term Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC). Both terms describe the Copyright: Department of National Defence Canada same person doing the same job.

4. President Sarkozy’s visit to Afghanistan, Saturday 22 December 2007, www.ambafrance-au.org/article. php3?id_article=2608

5. ‘Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams,’ 4 Jan 08, http://shapesitrep.com/?p=12

6. ‘DoD News Briefing with Gen Craddock from the Pentagon,’ 10 October 2007, www.defenselink.mil

7. NATO Fact Sheet for Operational Mentor and Liaison Team Programme, valid as of September 2007, www. nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/omlt.html

8. ‘OMLT: Slowly working themselves out of a job,’ Kristina Davis, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, July 2007

9. ‘Taliban Offensive Unlikely,’ Associated Press article, 24 January 2008

10. Seneca, Epistulae ad Lucilium, xxxi, as quoted in ‘Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations,’ by Robert Debs Heinl Jr., United States Naval Institute, 1966 ‘The goal of every OMLT is to work themselves out of a job.’

20 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Inside the JAPCC

JAPCC CONFERENCE 2007 The Role of Joint Air Power in Expeditionary Security and Stability Operations

The 3rd annual JAPCC Conference, cognitive effects in this new Panel 1 – The Comprehensive held in Kleve, Germany, 16-18 warfare environment. Approach. Panel 1 identified that October 2007, considered ‘The Role a Comprehensive Approach is ideal of Joint Air Power in Expeditionary Following General Ramms’ in irregular warfare, but at present Security and Stability Operations’. address, Lieutenant General in Afghanistan, there was no James N. Soligan (United States single organisation responsible for Opening Air Force), Deputy Chief of Staff leading such an approach and thus, Presentations Transformation at Headquarters the cross-organisational leadership Supreme Allied Command and definition of objectives are General William T. Hobbins (United Transformation gave an update lacking. The ‘Lead Nation’ States Air Force), Commander, US on ACT’s work to transform concept was a possible solution Air Forces Europe; Commander, NATO Air and Space Power to the but this carried with it significant Component Command Air, requirements of today’s warfare. political complications. There is a Ramstein and Director JAPCC need for military authorities at all opened the conference. General Air Commodore Garfield Porter levels to work closely in harmony Hobbins emphasised that Air Power (Royal Air Force), Assistant with their civilian counterparts. remains a critical contributor to the Director Transformation JAPCC joint battle and an essential factor in then set the scene for the panel Panel 2 – Command & Control today’s coalition battle space. The discussions with a presentation and Intelligence, Surveillance Conference aimed to explore how on Air Power in Expeditionary, & Reconnaissance. Panel Air and Space Power in traditional Security and Stability Operations. 2 focussed upon the need to warfare is best translated into a integrate the capabilities of all decisive edge in expeditionary Panel Discussions contributing components into security and stability operations, a truly joint operation. In this with special reference to NATO’s The panels and audience endeavour, NATO should leverage ongoing International Security comprised a mix of joint, land, the ‘Information Age’ thinking to Assistance Force operations in maritime and air commanders, upgrade its Command of Air and Afghanistan. specialist staff officers, academics Space policy and doctrine. and representatives of industry. In the Keynote Address, General The panels in turn discussed the Egon Ramms (German Army), following: Continued on page 54 Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, underlined Copyright: JAPCC that conflicts with non-state actors, known variously as irregular warfare, small wars, Military Operations Other Than War, Low Intensity Conflict, and including Counterinsurgency operations, are now the prevalent form of warfare, and could remain so for the foreseeable future. Despite frequent update, Air Power doctrine remained focused on inter-state conventional conflict. There was now an urgent need for airmen to consider how the air and space environments can be exploited to facilitate and deliver Air Marshal Walker responds to questions during the 2007 JAPCC Conference.

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Network Enabled – The Air Defence of Great Britain 1917 - 1940 By Group Captain John Alexander, GBR AF

22 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 The Battle of Britain in 1940 started as a response to German heights, and by 1918 it was using was a battle for control of the air Gotha daylight bomber raids on wireless to direct airborne fighters. between Britain and Germany London in June and July 1917 While the sensor, processing and over southern England and the which killed 219 people, wounded communication technology at that surrounding waters. For the many others and caused panic, time was limited – resulting in a Luftwaffe, control of the air despite an uncoordinated response lack of accuracy – this integrated would make invasion and British by a large number of defending air defence system had some defeat possible. British control aircraft. The officer appointed to success against German bombers, of the air would prevent defeat. command the London Air Defence which flew at less than 70 knots As the only major, self-contained Area (LADA), Brigadier General and relied on visual navigation. and absolutely decisive air battle ‘Splash’ Ashmore, a pilot, Royal By the end of 1917, German in history, the Battle’s machine Flying Corps Brigade Commander, bombers were forced to fly at against machine engagements and former artilleryman, realised night. Throughout 1918 German could be said to characterise the key to an effective air defence bombers had a 21% combat and industrial age warfare. Indeed, system was the rapid and accurate accident loss rate and Ashmore the Battle between a few thousand collection and dissemination of expected 12% of his fighters to aircrew on each side harked back information through a centralised intercept incoming bombers. By Network Enabled – to a chivalrous age of warfare command structure. May 1918, the LADA was the between individuals - Churchill world’s most advanced command described the British aircrew as and battlespace management The Air Defence of Great Britain 1917 - 1940 ‘the Few’. But the Battle of Britain ‘... the world’s first system, and a network enabled was also the first battle of the integrated air defence capability, albeit with centralised information age. The Luftwaffe situational awareness.2 came close to fatally weakening system was based on a Fighter Command by late August network concept, first Although disbanded completely 1940 through its offensive counter after the War, the air defence air operation, but because of poor used in 1917 ...’ system was revived in 1923 and then intelligence the Luftwaffe did not continually developed. A Home know it was being successful, and The battlespace was managed Defence Air Force was created as so switched to bombing cities. On through the use of three defensive the world’s first strategic air force the other hand, British decision rings – an outer ring of anti-aircraft using the 1924 doctrinal principle superiority was such that John (AA) guns and search lights to that ‘the bombing squadrons should Ferris has described the battle as break-up German formations, be as numerous as possible, and the a walkover.1 While this may be a middle ring of fighters – the fighters as few as public opinion an exaggerated view, this article Fighting Zone - and an inner and the necessity for defending sets out to show that the world’s ring of AA guns, searchlights and vital objectives will permit’.3 first integrated air defence system barrage balloons. Intelligence and Contrary to Trenchard’s strategic was based on a network concept, information gathering was based bombing theories, the RAF’s air first used in 1917, and developed on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) defence interest was focused by into a network enabled capability and the direction finding of British Army threats to seize the that by 1940 provided a level of German radio transmissions. A role. Both the Army and RAF’s air shared situational awareness that dedicated telephone system allowed defence organisations were led by permitted effective command and all the elements of the LADA experienced commanders and from battlespace management during – guns, searchlights, aerodromes, 1923 to 1939 Britain spent more on the Battle. observation posts - to connect strategic air defence than any other to one of 25 regional sub-control state. A dedicated strategic air A study of the development of rooms, which plotted reports defence HQ was formed (Fighting British air defence demonstrates for the region, and then ‘told’ Area HQ and from 1936 RAF that the network concept came the reports to the central control Fighter Command), collocated first, to which capabilities such room in London where, in modern with the Army’s AA Command. as radar were developed and terminology, they were fused into Air defence would rely on fighters added, not the other way round, an air picture. The London control backed up by AA guns. The layout as in Germany and the USA. The centre used direct lines to the of the fighter and AA gun zones was development of an integrated air aerodromes to scramble fighters adapted as capabilities developed. defence system for Great Britain to fly on patrol lines at staggered SIGINT continued to be used, a

23 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

• All intelligence data from radar stations was sent by telephone or teleprinter to the Fighter Command filter room. • The Filter room filtered raw data and plotted it on the Filter Room map. Plots were transmitted to the Fighter Command Operations Figure 1 - The RAF Fighter Control System 1940.4 Room and plotted. • An assessment by the Operations Room was passed to appropriate civilian-manned Observer Corps developed and each development Group Operations Rooms. was formed, sound locating was characterised by the close • The Group Operations Rooms acoustic mirrors developed, and working of air force officers and plotted raids and assigned eventually radio direction finding scientists. Together through intercepts to Sectors. (RDF), or as we now call it, radar, experimentation and testing in • The Sector Controller scrambled introduced. A dedicated telephone exercises, they developed methods fighters and vectored fighters network was established and such as filtering track information onto enemy formations. ground-to-air radios developed. and vectoring fighters onto enemy • The Fighters intercepted From 1930, twice yearly exercises bomber formations, rather than as bombers at or near the coast. pitted the metropolitan RAF’s previously deploying fighters in a fighters and bombers against screen across the expected bomber During the Battle of Britain, the each other, and proved that air path. air defence system came under defence capabilities were keeping great pressure and continued to be up with the bombers. The science By 1940 the Dowding System refined, particularly as a result of of Operational Research was (named after Air Chief Marshal Operational Research. The RAF’s

A Royal Air Force radar, 1939-1945, at Poling, Sussex.

24 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Air Historical Branch’s secret network enabled capability. The during the Battle of Britain official studies of the Battle, the key concept was the network, a Bomber Command raided enemy radar and the air defence system network that could be adapted as ports and aggressive anti-shipping concluded that the ‘air struggle technology, including information work was undertaken by Coastal was fought without any large technology, was developed. In Command. In contrast, the deviation from the technique of 1917 situational awareness was German self-contained Luftflottes raid reporting, and [the] fighter only available in the LADA control proved much more effective in control organization evolved for room, which therefore exercised joint, expeditionary operations, defence in air exercises before the both command and control. with excellent liaison between the war’. The first Fighter Command By 1940, the improvements in German services at the operational engagement of World War Two early warning provided by radar and tactical levels, and based on was a fratricide on 6 September allowed the decentralisation of joint training at the tactical level. 1939 and most RAF aircraft shared situational awareness, and However, Germany moved to a were not fitted with the new permitted mission command to functional air defence system when Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) be decentralised to Sectors, and on the defensive later in the war. until October 1940. It was realised by late 1940 sensor fusion could very late that the abilities of the be delegated once all fighters Network enabled capability based filterers were essential, and that were fitted with IFF. In modern decision superiority, using a concept science or mathematics graduates terminology, the Dowding System continually evolved from 1917, was were needed. However, the most consisted of human and synthetic critical to the RAF preventing significant flaw was that during enablers that, together, through the Luftwaffe gaining the degree times of large attacks the system shared situational awareness and of control of the air required to verged on collapse caused by distributed collaborative working, mount an invasion. The Germans information overload on the single delivered decisive advantage and never realised the importance of filter room. This concern had been favourable outcomes. The concept, the system, and never conducted raised in January 1940 when the and people (like the filterers) were deliberate command and control Chief of Air Staff asked Dowding as important as the information warfare against it. Dowding to consider creating filter rooms technology (radar, telephones and survived the Air Council’s 1 for sensor fusion at Group level. radio). October 1940 criticism of the lack This was not implemented before of Group filter rooms, but a few the Battle, causing Radio Stations While today’s networks are weeks later Fighter Command’s to pass general information on required to function across joint failure to counter night bombing raids when overloaded during and combined boundaries, the raids on British cities by an enemy the Battle. Dowding eventually Dowding System worked within denied, as in 1917, control of the established Group filter rooms a self-contained air environment air over England by day probably after Air Council intervention of fighters and ground based air contributed to Dowding’s in October 1940 once all fighters defence, limited geographically replacement. Night interceptions had been fitted with IFF, in order to England and the surrounding were made possible by the fielding to ensure the reliability of the airspace. The division of the of the Airborne Intercept Radar recognised air picture. metropolitan RAF into functional equipped night fighters already in strategic commands – Fighter, development – but that is another The British air defence system Bomber, Coastal and Training part of the network enabled story. was therefore a robust network that – allowed Fighter Command to enabled command and battlespace focus on air defence. However, management, through shared this functional organisation situational awareness. It allowed detracted from what we would activity and effects to be prioritised now call Combined Joint Force Air Endnotes: and synchronised throughout Component planning, operations, 1. John Ferris, ‘Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence the operational environment. training and development. in Great Britain, 1917-1934’, The Journal of If network enabled capability Contemporary RAF fighter and Military History, 63. 4 (1999), pp. 845-84 (p. 884). implies near real-time gathering, other British operations outside of 2. Ferris and also David Zimmerman, ‘Information and the Air Defence Revolution, 1917-40’, Journal processing and diffusion of the Fighter Command network, and of Strategic Studies, 27. 2 (June 2004), pp. 370-94. information to enable the high in joint and combined operations, 3. Air Staff Memorandum No 11.A, February 1924, AIR tempo conduct of activities, as in France and Norway proved 5/328. then Fighter Command was a much less effective, although 4. http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/controlsys.html/

25 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

Firebird Operations in the Nevada Desert

Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into Joint Terminal Controller Training

By Major Dean Driskill – US Marine Corps, and Major Pat Filbert – US Army

In September 2007, Operation 300 into their planned JTAC being pressed into more areas of Firebird1 was executed in the training exercises. The training responsibility to support missions Nevada desert, successfully fusing exercises and the NSAWC facility such as JCAS. two major objectives of the United at Fallon, Nevada, provided an States Joint Forces Command ideal venue for accomplishing all Joint Close Air (USJFCOM), the United States objectives. Support Navy Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC), and the Joint The event included participation JCAS is arguably the most delicate Unmanned Aircraft Systems by all four US Services, Allied mission that military air can execute. Center of Excellence (JUAS Nations, Joint Staff, Joint Agencies, The ability to quickly and accurately COE). The Firebird operation not and civilian contractors. employ fires from the air in close only provided real-world data to proximity to ground forces (while support joint tactics, techniques, Expanded Role of simultaneously accounting for the and procedures (JTTP) for UAS fire and movement of those forces) employment of unmanned aircraft is often a key aspect of successful systems (UAS) in joint close air Operation Firebird originated in military operations. The ability to support (JCAS), but it also tested response to the enhanced role direct and control kinetic and non- the value of a UAS to the joint of UAS in military operations. kinetic fires from aircraft remains terminal attack controller (JTAC). Though traditional UAS missions closely linked to effective military included long-range fires spotting combat operations. Firebird operations also tested and intelligence, surveillance, the feasibility of using commercial reconnaissance, the number and The modern operational UAS for training purposes – the capabilities of UAS have grown, environment allows for two JUAS COE worked with the and so have their functions. One primary methods to control NSAWC to incorporate a Viking result is that UAS operators are airborne fires. One is to have a

26 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 terminal controller direct fire from deployment training syllabi. UAS flying during training or the cockpit of an aircraft, and the Also, it is important to note that during practical field exercises. other is to use a terminal controller a large percentage of JTACs have on the ground. As technology not received dedicated, in-depth Several factors account for advances, JCAS fires continue to training to incorporate UAS into the absence of UAS material in become more lethal, accurate, and their ‘tool kits.’ Too often, these JCAS training and qualification timely. It is increasingly important JTACs have deployed to combat exercises. For example, the to leverage advances in technology theatres with the bare minimum operational tempo for military with the time-honoured and of UAS integration experience. UAS units leaves little, if any, time combat-proven tactics for effective The JTACs must then go through to support JTAC training prior to JCAS. a significant amount of ‘on the job deployment. The vast majority of training.’ military UAS sorties are used for Current UAS technology can ongoing operations, often leaving provide the joint warfighter Training for incoming personnel no extra sorties available to support with additional capability when has often been limited to pass- JCAS training courses. conducting JCAS missions. down of procedures learned from previous units, or partial training Also, resources necessary for Training Gaps obtained from trial and error. an effective JTAC training Additionally, this training in the programme are sometimes lost Increasingly sophisticated system field is not standardized and is in the planning stages due to capabilities demand commensurate often an imperfect reality of combat inexact requests. Planners equate training, and operators in JCAS operations. Furthermore, UAS a capability (eg, full motion video environments must learn to integration training received at the from an unmanned platform) with operate in increasingly congested JTAC and other close air support a materiel solution (eg, Predator airspace occupied by both manned schoolhouses often includes only a UAS). When planners request and unmanned systems. However, few classroom lectures, classroom a specific UAS solution instead training for such missions is sand table exercises, and a notional of a capability, the requests are frequently not reflected in pre- UAS ‘simulated’ with no actual frequently returned unfilled.

A commercially controlled UAS supports JTAC training and qualification.

27 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

One method to potentially sensor installed. Such an aircraft JTAC training course at Naval Air alleviate this shortfall is to request can provide some limited training Station Fallon. NSAWC provided capabilities rather than specific for recognition of aerial imagery on a statement of required capability UAS platforms. For instance, a remote video terminal. However, for a UAS, and the JUAS COE instead of asking for a ‘Predator’ a manned ‘surrogate’ does not conducted the search for available for sixty-five hours, a request for provide the same level of training assets to fulfil this need. After ‘sixty-five hours of day and night as an actual UAS. Too often, both a Service and commercial full motion video, supplied by an airspace integration and sensor solution search, the UAS selected unmanned system, compatible ‘pointing’ are not accomplished the BAI Aerospace Viking 300 with a remote video terminal’ may by the intended JTAC, but by the UAS, as part of an overall UAS come back with additional options personnel operating the surrogate services contract. to support the JTAC training.2 or by simulating the UAS through artificial means (ie, through Execution However, what if there are no computer simulation). Service UAS available to support The JUAS COE involvement in training? With a majority of So, we’re back to the question of Operation Firebird was on a not- military UAS units unable to how to provide a viable solution to-interfere basis—it was designed support the training, a JTAC for this dilemma. Is there another so that it did not deviate from the training planner may conclude that option? The answer is a firm ‘yes’ established NSAWC JTAC training the door is shut for UAS support, - a commercially contracted UAS, syllabus or cause a JTAC student to turning instead to a notional UAS as part of an overarching UAS fail his course. or a ‘surrogate’ UAS. services contract, to support JTAC training and qualification. During the September JTAC Live versus Course, the Viking 300 UAS, ‘Surrogate’ UAS The JUAS COE worked with designated ‘Firebird,’ conducted NSAWC from December 2006 active support to day and night A ‘surrogate’ UAS is simply a to August 2007 to plan the JCAS missions, and provided manned aircraft with an imagery incorporation of a UAS into the support for artillery indirect fire

Training UAS crews and JTACs to work cooperatively under a common standard.

28 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 adjustment. Since this JTAC COE is supporting integration To facilitate data collection course coincided with a Carrier of these JTTPs into U.S. Joint in support of USJFCOM Air Wing pre-deployment training Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, JTTP validation, JUAS COE exercise, the Viking 300 was also Techniques, and Procedures for consolidated data collected from integrated into dynamic strike Close Air Support. The JUAS the September event into a final and killbox training for the Air COE also supports parallel work to report, finalized in January 2008. Wing; UAS integration was not facilitate specific UAS integration The report supports integration required for Carrier Air Wing pre- requirements into the JTAC and of military, or commercial, UAS deployment training. Throughout Joint Forward Air Controller into training exercises to provide the exercises, the Viking 300 (Airborne) memorandums of necessary ‘hands-on’ and decision- operated from a dry lake bed agreement.3 based training that surrogate UAS while flying in a restricted area may not provide. with manned aircraft seamlessly The JTTPs are summarized below. and safely operating above, The September integration event This exercise at Naval Air Station below, and through the airspace. focused on the first six. The armed Fallon demonstrated that UAS can The UAS was integrated into all (weaponized) UAS JTTP was not be effectively integrated to improve phases of the missions including evaluated at that time. JCAS training. Recurring training planning, briefing, execution, and for JTACs integrated with UAS debriefing. • Support to JCAS Missions via crews and related equipment can target identification/full motion have noticeable, positive impacts There were several constraints video/bomb damage assessment/ on improving JCAS combat placed on UAS operations, primarily bomb hit assessment. operations support. The exercise for training safety purposes. The • Planner/operator awareness of identified shortfalls requiring UAS flew with lateral and altitude UAS characteristics. further training integration to separation while complying • Evaluation of payload ensure a stronger, more integrated with the requirement to remain effectiveness (electro-optical/ JCAS team. It also demonstrated within a geographically small infrared, laser target designator/ that UAS can serve as another (approximately 11 nautical miles in laser target pointer). tool for the JTAC, specifically, diameter) restricted operating area. • Use of Data links. by adding another set of ‘eyes’ to Also, the scenarios were scripted • Planning considerations with generate target coordinates for to follow existing JTAC and regard to UAS. manned aircraft munitions delivery Carrier Air Wing training, which • Evaluation of UAS flight profiles and ground artillery mission meant the target sets were clearly and deconfliction methods. adjustments. visible during day JCAS missions. • Armed UAS. Further, the JTACs could control The JUAS COE will maintain the fires visually, as they could see the Conclusions momentum built by the work that target set during the day missions culminated in Operation Firebird — the need to use UAS video Data gathered to support overall to further assist integration of UAS increases dramatically at night or validation of UAS in JCAS JTTPs in JCAS operations. This work will when the terminal controllers are indicate the JTTPs are framed continue to support USJFCOM in a less structured environment. correctly for joint doctrine JCAS efforts to better support U.S. incorporation. This exercise also and Coalition operations. Results highlighted a need to develop training for UAS crews (eg, aircraft UAS integration during Operation operator, sensor operator, UAS Firebird was focused toward real- Mission Commander) to effectively world data collection to support work with JTACs. Training of both Endnotes: Service validation of UAS in UAS crews and JTACs to work 1. ‘Firebird’ is the radio call sign designated for UAS at Naval Air Station Fallon. JCAS JTTP. The JTTPs had been cooperatively under a common 2. A remote video terminal could be in the form of a developed during an eight-month standard and certification process remote optical video enhanced receiver or one system study conducted by the JUAS COE across the Services will ensure remote video terminal. 3. The JUAS COE and the JAPCC co-hosted a Concept in 2006 to support quantification effective UAS integration and of Employment / Concept of Operations workshop of existing joint doctrine. Working employment during JCAS missions for UAS on 20-21 Sep 07. Cooperative work continues in this area of UAS operations. together with USJFCOM, the JUAS in a dynamic target environment.

29 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities Copyright: NATO Sensor Data Fusion in a Network-Centric Environment By Colonel Sandro Sampaoli, ITA AF

Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) domains. The technical challenges highly successful demonstrations capabilities can provide the of developing an ‘infostructure’ to develop a collaborative warfighter with an unprecedented capable of offering high quality environment between Signals level of Shared Situational information services with low Intelligence (SIGINT) and Awareness (SSA), which in turn latency, large bandwidth, secure and Suppression of Enemy Air allows friendly forces decision robust data links need to coincide Defences (SEAD)/ Electronic superiority over an adversary. with the development of doctrine, Warfare (EW). In April 2005, NCW principles applied to the full concepts of operations, tactics, the SEWWG organised Trial spectrum of military activities can techniques, procedures and a new HAMMER 05 on the Franco- provide the following advantages: way of thinking about information German electronic warfare range management and Command and at Polygone. This trial established • Higher speed of command. Control (C2). a common data reporting format • Forces capable of self- (NATO Common ELINT and ESM synchronisation. NATO Experiences Reporting Format) for the NATO • Increased lethality, survivability in SIGINT and EW SIGINT and EW Operations and responsiveness. Fusion Centre (SEWOC), which was responsible for processing and These improvements to NATO organisations have been distributing a common Electronic operational effectiveness are, working on these issues for a long Order of Battle. The SEWOC of course, attractive but their time, promoting valuable initiatives also aimed to improve tactical implementation is dependent upon to enable the transformational coordination between the air the successful transition from process on both technical and assets provided by ten NATO legacy to open-architecture systems, conceptual issues. In particular, Nations into two main mission which are capable of managing the the NATO Signals Intelligence areas: the Intelligence Preparation information domain as well as we and Electronic Warfare Working of the Battlespace and SEAD. The are able to manage other warfare Group (SEWWG) organised two trial revealed significant shortfalls

30 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 in interoperability and in the capabilities. We developed the Joint • Multiple sensor processed data availability of secure tactical data Forces Fusion Centre to collect fusion/correlation to derive links to exchange information - data from Air Force and Army usable information. only three platforms were equipped collectors through multiple data • Transformation of information with Link 16. link sources (Link 16 and IDM), into knowledge by means of to perform electronic warfare experienced operators, who In November 2006, the same data fusion and to distribute the are then able to make proper working group organised Trial results via the same data links tactical/operational decisions. SPARTAN HAMMER 06 in to higher echelon Commands Greece. As well as implementing and to the forces in the air. This The challenge was to define the the concepts and procedures collaborative environment offered architecture where these four tasks produced from Trial HAMMER an opportunity to test and evaluate occurred, what the processing 05, the new trial focused upon the benefits/constraints of a larger method would be and how the using the data link system, scale net-centric environment both exchange of data/information Improved Data Modem (IDM), in technically and operationally. should be organised. Legacy and a wider range of joint mission areas. new generation assets normally In particular, 14 NATO Nations Technical perform the first task at platform provided air, land, maritime Considerations level but after that, a collaborative and special operations forces to virtual environment using digital establish the geographic location The sensor data fusion process networks is needed to enable the of threat emitters by means of used during the trial involved the exchange of data/information. the cooperative exchange and following steps: New generation assets equipped processing of emitters’ parametric with multiple sensors possess data. • Transformation of analogue the processing power to perform sensor signals into raw digital all tasks at platform level, but The Italian Air Force took part in data. sensor/data exchange, correlation both HAMMER trials and defined • Analysis/synthesis of sensor raw and fusion are still required to a roadmap to achieve a progressive digital data into sensor processed exploit the capabilities offered by improvement in operational data. other platforms’ sensors.1 The

An efficient “infostructure” is a pre-requisite for the application of NCW principles.

31 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Transformation & Capabilities

overall concept is not new; the hierarchical information flow) among available air assets and improvements to the recognised to allow self-synchronisation across service and/or operational air picture provided by increased and the desired reduction of the domains (air, land, maritime and capabilities of the Airborne sensor-to-shooter chain. special operations) can provide a Warning and Control System • A need to adopt new ways of good balance between accuracy, and Link 16 are an example thinking in the C2 domain and to timeliness and completeness of of improved data fusion. The develop concepts and procedures the picture provided. Sensor data innovation lies in the fact that the to allow the re-tasking of air fusion can take place at the lowest fighter could receive information in assets in real time. hierarchical level appropriate to the cockpit, during the mission in the accomplishment of a specific real time, as well as information/ Multi-dimensional mission. It is easy to see the knowledge about all domains of Horizontal Fusion potential benefits of this horizontal the battlespace: friendly/enemy, multi-dimensional fusion in close air/ground/maritime forces and Traditionally, information flows air support, but the same synergistic the operational environment. from the platforms/sensors in effect can assist many other types the combat arena up the chain of of air missions. Transferring Operational command, where it is processed, information and concentrating the Considerations and then re-distributed back to the effects, instead of concentrating forces. This procedure prevents forces, can overcome geographic Experiences gained from the partial or bad intelligence being constraints. A small number of sensor data fusion process during distributed to forces. However, aircraft geographically dispersed, the Trial SPARTAN HAMMER the process time is not acceptable but capable of concentrating their revealed: for high tempo operations. Speed effects, could achieve results of processing can adversely affect equivalent to those of a composite • A need for multi-dimensional accuracy, but the NCW of today air operations package. The horizontal distribution of offers acceptable levels of accuracy horizontal multi-dimensional information to the forces in near-real-time. The exchange fusion must be complemented (besides the traditional vertical/ of data/information in real-time by the traditional hierarchical

The exchange of information in real-time among available air assets and across services provides completeness of picture.

32 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Copyright: NATO

Information needs to be exchanged and fused at the lowest hierarchical level and across the services and operational domains. information flow in order to allow will be necessary to explore new and Electronic Warfare domains. processing and updates of the concepts and procedures to allow Operationally, we determined Common Operational Picture the necessary flexibility. This self- that information needs to be (COP) provided to Commanders synchronisation concept is not exchanged and fused at the lowest and back to the forces. limited to lethal target engagement. hierarchical level; among air It can be applied across the spectrum assets and across the services and C2 Issues of air operations; eg, to intelligence, operational domains. TST and surveillance, and reconnaissance dynamic re-tasking procedures Currently, Time-Sensitive-Targeting asset support and to non-lethal are well established within the Air (TST) involves all command levels target engagement. Force, but the current lack of a because of the nature and sensitivity comprehensive COP makes joint of the targets. In fact, it is often Conclusions integration difficult. Nevertheless, possible for aircrew to identify a new concepts and procedures can number of mobile/volatile targets NCW principles applied to the full be evolved which will allow the that do not have the same Joint spectrum of military operations necessary flexibility to permit self- Force Commander priority, but can provide a higher speed of synchronisation and re-tasking in which may contribute equally to the command, forces with the ability real time across the spectrum of achievement of the ‘Commander’s to self-synchronise within the air operations. Experimentation Intent.’ Presently, the engagement Commander’s Intent and a dramatic with the NCW Concept will of such targets involves the operator increase in the effectiveness of Air continue with Trial IMPERIAL referring the potential target back up and Space Power. The availability HAMMER 2008, when Italy will his chain of command to, ultimately, of an efficient ‘infostructure’ is a act as Host Nation. re-task attack assets. This laborious pre-requisite for the application of process has been a constant source these principles, but the technology of frustration - especially to our must be matched by a new way of land and maritime colleagues. SSA thinking about military operations. can improve self-synchronisation if Within NATO HAMMER Trials, Endnote: the aircraft (mission) commander the Italian Air Force had the 1. Own platform sensor acquisition range is limited and well defined but acquisition capabilities can be is delegated decision authority chance to evaluate the benefits of dramatically enhanced by the information shared on for real-time re-tasking, but it sensor data fusion in the SIGINT the network.

33 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points Copyright: Romanian Air Force

Interview with Lieutenant General Croitoru, Romania’s Chief of Air Force Staff

Conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Bates and Lieutenant Colonel Mihai Stir

This interview was conducted in because the Romanian Air Force is Air Force wherever Romanian late 2007. getting involved where Romanian politics is involved. Although it is politics is involved. We can only not particularly a defence against The strategic environment be specific about the national level terrorism issue, we are currently today is complex and subject when referring to renegade aspects. performing air policing in the to unforeseeable developments. I can say this because at the Baltic States. As an Air Force, Terrorism, instability due to national level, we act in conformity we are already operating in Iraq, failed or failing states, regional with all NATO standards and Afghanistan and the Balkans with crisis and conflicts are but some procedures. We have our Main our transport aircraft. In this examples. Can you tell us how Air Operational Centre (MAOC), regard, we remain involved in the Romanian Air Force is which is NATO connected and we the missions, which the Alliance remaining relevant in today’s perform the air policing mission and the EU are establishing for challenging environment? directly under NATO command. themselves. We are subordinate to Combined Talking about these strategic Air Operation Centre (CAOC) 7 How has Romania’s integration aspects of the worldwide threats Larissa and then to Component into NATO impacted your Air today, I think that, firstly, we Command Air Headquarters (CC Force? must talk about the aspects which Air HQ) Izmir. This could be involve NATO and EU. I cannot taken as a particular aspect of Yes, joining NATO impacted the talk about the implications for the this idea of responding to direct Romanian Air Force. Let’s talk Romanian Air Force in isolation, threats. We will respond as an through this in stages. Immediately

34 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 after joining NATO in 2004, impacting the Romanian Air Continuing with the theme of from the first day, the Romanian Force? remaining relevant, could you Air Force began performing air tell us your views on developing policing missions under NATO Projecting our Air Force into the people of the Romanian command. It is true that we the future, based on NATO’s Air Force to take on their started with our own aircraft under guidance, we quickly changed challenging roles? command of the Romanian MAOC, our approach to training, we in full compliance with NATO changed our force structure and, Our personnel understood quickly from the technical, procedural and regarding our Air Force’s future that we needed to conform to new personnel training perspective. acquisition programmes, our goal rules. It was not easy at all. We had This was the opinion of the NATO is to be aligned with the Alliance’s to send all our people to different evaluation team from CC Air HQ requirements. We are looking training courses because I did not Izmir and other teams that assessed forward to the acquisition of a want to create a new philosophy our readiness, including the team multirole combat aircraft, able to but rather comply with NATO’s led by General Hobbins from CC perform from the outset inside philosophy. In all branches of the Air HQ Ramstein, your Director. NATO operations, having avoided Air Force, we used all the personnel However, there was no need for from the beginning a Russian training opportunities offered by a transition period to implement solution. We are finalising the different partners. I am not against NATO standards in the Romanian upgrade to our Air C2 system in those who are old and want to leave Air Force due to our intense 2008, fully compliant with NATO the system because it is well known preparation prior to joining NATO. standards. We have acquired new that the younger generation adapts The day we entered NATO, we air defence radars, all NATO much faster to the new rules. This began using NATO’s air policing compliant. We have a short-range is the moment. It is not easy at all procedures immediately. air defence system acquisition, - talking about social aspects and sourced from NATO, and looking financial aspects - but we have to How have the people adjusted to 2010 and beyond, we can talk do this, the modification needs to to NATO? about a long-range surface-to-air be done! missile system acquisition. We are Quickly. For a long time, they trying hard to implement NATO’s How has the recruiting system were facing west. Then came transformational goals into our had to adjust as a result of the the Partnership for Peace period, transformational projects. We aim newer generation? beginning in 1994 with Romania to keep everything deployable, being the first nation to sign particularly aircraft and short As you probably know, we no up, a period highlighted by our range missiles, because this is a longer have mandatory military participation in many NATO and NATO requirement. service. We have only professionals, bilateral exercises. The Romanian Air Force has been out in front of the Romanian Army & Navy Copyright: Romanian Air Force personnel – while they were talking about NATO, our pilots and aircrew were taking part in common exercises with NATO Airmen.

So your Air Force took a leading role within Romania’s military to become a full NATO partner?

It’s not easy for the others to accept, but it’s true.

Looking to the future, how are NATO’s transformational goals IAR-330 Socat helicopters.

35 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points

soldiers employed by contract. We facilities and host nation support. There are 3 aspects to deal with have to accept that the young people In 4 or 5 years, once we receive the modernisation process. Let’s we are employing today are already the new multirole aircraft and new start with the personnel training, highly educated. We are trying to logistics, I could say that we will be which we already discussed and train them through a direct and able to do this. And, I could also which is done 100% according indirect system, using the indirect say with pleasure that, wherever to NATO standards. Secondly, system especially for the technical we as a nation deployed, we have talking about the new acquisitions, branches and for training the received very good support from all are complying with the NATO NCOs. Previously the Romanian our coalition partners. requirements and, additionally, I Air Force had many officers, try to create the structures and the more-or-less equal in number to How is the Romanian Air Force logistics to have them deployable. the NCOs. We are now trying to able to sustain simultaneous Any acquisition on this topic is respect a NATO rule to have one missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, sustaining this idea. At the same officer to 3 NCOs. These are major and in the Balkans? time, regarding the Romanian and difficult modifications because Air C2 system, I am trying to at the same time we are changing It is very hard for me to say that comply with all the NATO rules. structures, training people, and I can get involved in all areas. At I cannot talk about a deployable performing the required missions. this moment, of course keeping in Air C2 system because, as you mind the proportion amongst the know, NATO has only projected Could you share with us some of nations, we can get involved in 2 2 such systems – the 2 Deployable the Air Force’s lessons learned theatres or, let’s say, 2 areas, but not CAOCs. based on the experiences of with the same aviation categories your Airmen serving abroad in in each. For example, we can go What are your views on Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the with helicopters in one area and Romania’s integration Balkans? fighters in another, or with both into NATO’s Battlespace in the same place. We cannot do Management, now and in the I’m thinking of at least 3 particular more at the moment. future? examples. We had a good experience as Lead Nation during Where do you see the Romanian If we keep the proportions, the the Kabul International Airport Air Force applying its focus in first aspect we are debating directly mission. That demonstrated to me expeditionary operations? with NATO, at the moment, is that, in future, I also have to have the implementation of an ARS1 in permanently prepared personnel I think that, without doubt, the Romania. As you know, NATO for ground activities because if we transportation aspects can be set has decided to establish 16 fixed are going to have expeditionary - airlift and combat search and and 2 deployable ARS in different missions, I will not go only with rescue. Once our multirole aircraft countries. The new countries pilots. I will need those who act on arrive in Romania, probably in joining NATO were not taken into the ground, especially logistic and 2011 or 2012, I could perform account; however, a requirement force protection personnel. This more missions in theatre. Until and a recommendation of the was one example. Secondly, our this date, for me with the MiG-21 NATO Military Committee participation in Operation Althea LanceR, it will be very, very hard, (NMC) from 2003 states that in Bosnia was a good experience, although not impossible, but will NATO countries should have which compelled some changes to be very difficult to deploy these such a facility. We have already our training manuals, in particular airplanes anywhere, especially forwarded a request on this to the in-theatre night training with without support. NATO and we are now awaiting a helicopters and the use of night decision. Even though SHAPE, to vision goggles. In addition, a We have deployed 4 MiG-21 a certain extent, is vacillating, we third example is in regard to the LanceRs to the Baltic countries are waiting for the NMC decision. capability to operate the C-130 for air policing, however, the costs All NATO decision makers are in theatre: what does the pilot are not the same when we discuss aware of this aspect. As well, I training for specific zones and the a deployment to Iraq, for example. believe it is fitting and we must maintenance of the aircraft mean have this ARS in Romania, when you deploy? I have to say Where is the Romanian Air Force because in this very short period that at the moment, we cannot applying its modernisation effort we have quickly complied with operate from a bare base without to become a force of the future? the imposed rules in terms of

36 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Copyright: Romanian Air Force

IAR-99 Hawk trainer.

Command and Control. Another the legal point of view, a technical a good level for all these needs. issue, which is more quickly agreement must exist between Sure, everything can be better and achievable, and responds to this the US government and our more beautiful if the budget were to topic, is the implementation this government. We have already sent increase. As you know, in Romania autumn [2007] and the following a letter of request on this specific there are many needs in many spring of both the CRONOS2 and matter, regarding the Link-16 domains but, our Gross Domestic ICC3 systems. This will directly connection between our MAOC Product is growing; it has a positive connect our MAOC and our air and the AWACS. For the next trend. So, I am hoping that if we bases, which are performing air step, we must decide, first of all, properly plan for a couple of years policing, to NATO’s Air C2. It will what our multirole aircraft will be we will resolve these problems. I be much easier to transmit specific and then, after that, to establish also have to highlight that I am orders in this way. What’s more, inside the government whether it receiving plenty of support and we performed already the first test will have Link-16. I think we are help from different partners in with AWACS4 and our MAOC moving in the right direction and different ways: we are talking using Link-11. In the very near I must work these specific aspects about training, logistics help, and future, we will resolve the Link-16 during the next 3 to 4 years. support in theatre. I believe this problem [the Link-16 connectivity will help us fully integrate into between the MAOC and NATO Sir, would you like to leave us NATO more quickly. aircraft]. From this point of view, with any final thoughts? our MAOC connection with the Sir, thank you for this E-3A AWACS will be resolved very I think we have been very much interview. quickly. In fact, we will use all involved in all current matters Endnotes: these technical possibilities during specific to the Alliance. Here we the NATO Summit in April next are talking about, let’s call them, 1. ARS, an Air Command and Control System (ACCS) entity, is composed of the Air Control Centre (ACC), year in Bucharest. day-to-day activities but also about the RAP Production Centre (RPC), and the Sensor Fusion Post (SFP). The ARS may be static or visions for the future. I am trying deployable.

Is it the intent that your multirole to train my personnel and the air 2. CRONOS is NATO’s classified network, formerly aircraft will evolve to Link-16 bases in accordance with these called the Crisis Response Operations in NATO Operating System (CRONOS). capability? requirements and, I recognise, 3. ICC is the Integrated Command and Control system, it is not easy when I also have to NATO’s Air C2 tool used at the CAOC.

Sure, it is a NATO requirement. consider the budget. I’m thinking 4. AWACS is the Airborne Warning and Control System. But you know there are some optimistically from this point of specific steps in this way. From view that we will be able to ensure

37 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points

What is NATO’s Position on Space? By Major Tom ‘Solo’ Single, USA AF

NATO’s transformation to an multiplier for the warfighter. For and battle damage assessment. expeditionary, network enabled example, intelligence personnel One example of remote sensing joint military force is predicated on conduct analysis and then send the is the detection of ballistic missile space-based capabilities. information to forward deployed launches, provided by the US forces. Satellite communications Defense Support Programme Current operations in Afghanistan enable beyond line-of-sight satellites. The detected launches highlight NATO’s dependence command and control of forces, are disseminated world-wide using on the use of space capabilities; the distribution of information satellite communications. however, NATO lacks a space for global situational awareness policy, a military space strategy, and and intelligence, friendly force There are many applications a space concept of employment. tracking, missile warning and many for the civil military cooperation Persistence, precision, flexibility other operational and planning use of space capability in security and network enabled operations tasks. Furthermore, intelligence and stability operations. Remote are needs for NATO forces, and a products, such as imagery, and the sensing, in particular commercial critical enabler are the capabilities Air Tasking Order are normally satellite imagery (CSI), can be provided by space operations. sent via satellite communications. used for crop yield prediction Today’s warfighter, and even Additionally, until forces can and precision farming, map more so in the future, has come connect to a host nation network, creation, disaster monitoring, to depend on the capabilities expeditionary forces utilise satellite terrain analysis, monitoring provided by space systems to gain communications for internet recovery operations, infrastructure decision superiority. Without delivery, providing email, voice assessment, population proper guidance, how can the over internet, data transfer and demographic assessment, support Alliance forces properly integrate many other applications. to local police and non-government and utilise space capabilities? organisations, damage assessment Space-based remote sensing and urban growth using change NATO’s Reliance on greatly contributes to military detection, engineering and Space operations and provides key construction analysis and planning, information to planners and and civil aviation. Satellite imagery It is important to understand decision makers. Satellite capability can be used to pick out suitable some of the ways space is already includes electro-optical, infrared areas for food drops and to speed contributing to the joint fight. and radar imaging, as well as other relief to refugee camps. CSI can be NATO’s forces have become intelligence gathering such as used for border and port security, reliant on satellite communication, electronic and signals intelligence monitoring special events (elections, intelligence, weather and collection. This helps provide Olympics, etc.), and counter-drug navigation systems. Space allows information on the location of operations. The benefit of CSI is reachback with beyond line-of- enemy and non-combatant forces, that it is unclassified and can be sight communications, thereby identification of human activity, widely shared among coalition reducing the footprint of forward monitoring reconstitution of forces, partners, civil agencies and host deployed forces. This ability to treaty verification and violations, nation/indigenous decision makers reachback for support is a force weapon selection and targeting, and their forces.

38 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Many satellite systems are other user requests. Therefore, in picture that contains status on dual use, meaning that they are order to be able to use space assets, all Alliance space assets (military used for both civil and military it is essential that space capabilities and commercial)? How can requirements. Except for some be planned well in advance of NATO leverage existing bi-lateral dedicated military satellites, contingency operations, and when and multi-lateral relationships to communications and remote assigned those capabilities, the better integrate space capabilities sensing satellites are dual use. JFC should fully integrate the for the warfighter? Does NATO Examples include weather satellites use of space capabilities into the have any requirements for a space and the global positioning satellites strategy and planning phases of surveillance network to better that provide navigation and timing operations. enable security and deterrence? To information. Space systems are date, NATO has issued very little used by decision makers, planners guidance on how to address these and forces conducting operations. questions. Decision makers utilise space to monitor resources, climate change, ‘... NATO has not Governance disasters and pollution. Tracking clearly provided is possible for VIPs in urban areas The biggest gap that NATO has to masses of refugees in rural areas. guidance to member for space operations is the lack Information is also provided on of proper governance. What is solar and deep space activities nations on NATO’s NATO’s vision for space? The EU that could impact terrestrial military space has issued a space policy; where operations. Lest we forget, these is NATO’s? Is space support systems are available to just about requirements.’ to the warfighter limited by not anyone, including our adversaries, having a NATO space policy? I and satellite communications would postulate that it is. What are being used for live television directs military leadership or the reporting, internet, email and warfighter to use and integrate data services in remote locations, space capabilities? Allied Joint videoconferencing, banking Publication 3.3 (Air and Space transactions, distance learning, Security and Operations) only briefly touches etc. Deterrence on the subject. If NATO had a Space Policy, what are the key It is important to note that The examples above demonstrate concerns that the policy should unlike air assets, space systems how reliant our forces have become address? What principles should are generally strategic in nature. on space capabilities. However, be contained in a Military Space They are owned by nations there are many questions that are Strategy? There isn’t a Concept or commercial companies/ difficult for NATO to answer. of Employment or Concept of consortiums and while they may be Can NATO create better shared Operations. How does NATO tasked to support deployed forces, situational awareness to enhance determine its space priorities and control of a satellite is not given security and deterrence? How can requirements? NATO’s Defence to the Joint Force Commander. NATO improve global situational Requirements Review clearly Tasking of satellite payloads (i.e. awareness using space capabilities? should have inputs from personnel sensors and transponders) is not How can space systems contribute to with space expertise. Other than done by deployed forces. Deployed decision superiority? Does NATO some niche areas, such as satellite forces request support, which is need a joint common operations communications, NATO has prioritised and de-conflicted with picture or single integrated space not clearly provided guidance

39 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points

Air Power Copyright: MSgt Scott Wagers, CENTAF in Urban Operations - Fallujah

‘As the US continues to modernise, how can their space capability be integrated into Alliance .... operations?’

to member nations on NATO’s that capability? What is the the US continues to modernise, military space requirements. military utility of small satellites how can their space capability Proper governance would address and how can they contribute to be integrated into Alliance and these and many other questions. To military capability? Should NATO coalition operations? These other highlight the need for governance, have the capability to conduct forces could be marginalised over for example, what would be offensive or defensive space time as the US rapidly advances its NATO’s response to an attack on a control missions? What research space capability. Therefore, how member nation’s space system? areas should NATO investigate? should NATO organise, train and Member nations are aggressively equip its forces to best integrate Requirements for pursuing national space programs space capabilities from all Allied Space Capabilities without direction from the nations? NATO does not have Alliance. Without proper guidance many personnel with space Once governance has been and without understanding expertise, so what are the personnel established, military planners how space capabilities can help and training requirements? Due could expect guidance, properly the warfighter, it is difficult to to challenges with exchanging directed and coordinated, to be determine system requirements. intelligence data from space used to determine the military systems, should there be a NATO utility of space capability and the Conducting common funded ISR space system? priorities for development and Combined Space What should NATO’s position be integration. For example, ISR Operations on Galileo, and should the Alliance (Intelligence, Surveillance, and standardise and require dual use Reconnaissance) can be done The US is far ahead of the other receivers? There are many issues from space, but what part of the Alliance member nations in to be resolved before the Alliance ISR mission requirements should conducting joint space operations. can begin to conduct combined be done from space? What They have the most capability space operations; key among requirements does NATO have so and have been conducting space these issues is standardisation and that member nations may provide operations for many years. As interoperability.

40 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Standards and capability is often not utilised The Road Ahead Interoperability to its full potential. However, this is not the only issue; the Without governance, NATO cannot One of NATO’s strengths is critical challenge is over-coming properly develop, integrate and its ability to write and enforce classification and ‘releasability’ utilise space capabilities. Without standards to ensure interoperability. issues associated with national proper requirements, NATO cannot In mission areas such as satellite space intelligence capabilities. tell the nations what space capability communications, ISR, and friendly to provide. Without standards and force tracking, NATO must interoperability, NATO will not be establish or expand standards for ‘Space assets can able to conduct combined space space capabilities. Interoperability close the gap and help operations. NATO must address is a major concern for the use these issues immediately and the of space communications and provide persistent ISR JAPCC is working hard to identify intelligence systems. A key coverage, if they are the gaps in its ‘NATO Space example related to the need for Operations Assessment’ that will standards and interoperability is properly employed.’ be released to ACT in June 2008. ISR information. Space assets Additionally, the next JAPCC can close the gap and help provide Conference will, for the first time, persistent ISR coverage, if they Nations must work together to have a panel dedicated to space are properly employed. There is a increase the amount and types of operations. These are solvable lack of familiarity with space ISR intelligence data exchange because issues and critical for support to our system capabilities and limitations; it’s needed by our warfighters warfighters. So, what is NATO’s consequently, space based ISR currently deployed. position on space?

‘As the US continues to modernise, how can their space capability be integrated into Alliance .... operations?’

‘Space assets allow ISAF to seize the initiative in the realm of decision superiority.’ Major David Franklin, USAF / HQ ISAF

41 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points

The Role of Knowledge Management for Effective Battlespace Management By Doctor Dieter Jaepel and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Wolfgang Schneider, IBM

Until recently, Battlespace Globally Integrated Companies, pragmatic approach: knowledge Management (BSM) inside a like IBM, depend heavily on is created by bringing a piece of Control and Reporting Centre thoroughly designed and managed information, tacit or explicit, into a involved drawing areas and zones information exchange and meaningful context thus enabling a with grease pencils on radar scopes knowledge transfer. This article is person to execute an activity.1 and boards. Today, headquarters, meant to be a pragmatic, practical battle staffs and operations halls and operational approach to the Figure 1 shows how data evolves are full of electronic displays and issue. Based on own experiences, over a number of phases into information walls. But, despite coupled with knowledge drawn competitiveness and survivability. all the advances in information from a global enterprise, it argues Information is a prerequisite technology, effective BSM is still that the usage of tools alone is for gaining knowledge, and characterized by the successfully not the right answer. Finally, the knowledge is just another phase in executed synchronization of article postulates the necessity for that hierarchy! Often, Knowledge activities towards the achievement a more comprehensive approach. Management (KM) is discussed of a desired end state, and all with Information Technology of these activities continue to Information & (IT) tools in mind, eg, for visual be based on information and Knowledge representation. Figure 1 suggests knowledge. Effective information that Information Management and knowledge management In colloquial language the terms (IM) is supported by information remains the most critical aspect of ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ are and communications technology BSM. frequently used interchangeably. tooling which helps align business Scientifically motivated definitions value and IT infrastructure Today, we live in the information are typically abstract and lack within an information lifecycle age. We live in a world where operational differences, getting management process.2 the availability of, and access to, even worse with the distinction information is absolutely critical. between terms like conscious IM ensures that the resource Everyday, we see new technologies and unconscious, demonstrative ‘information’ is available to the being introduced to assist the and intuitive, individual and right user in the right amount knowledge based enterprise in organizational, internal and and quality at the right place and managing the growing volume of external, or explicit and implicit. time. Knowledge and capabilities available information. Moreover, This article follows rather a do not play a role in IM.

42 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Obviously, it is possible to support IM processes with IT tools. In contrast, generating knowledge relies on people, organization and collaboration. KM has to be managed in a top-down process.

KM does not describe the storage and transmission of available information, but rather the process of achieving usability and capabilities. Support tools may be applied, but if people refuse to collaborate and to share knowledge, Figure 1 – The positioning of Knowledge in the chain of developing Competitiveness satisfactory KM is impossible. On the journey towards the goal of ‘singularity,’ the stage ‘knowledge’ is only an intermediate step. KM won’t be either. Governance KM is a combination of strategy, Military people, especially, are and leadership link with people processes, people, organization well aware that practice, will, and and organizations; ie, to define and the enabling technologies and right action at the right time are roles in KM processes, to assign infrastructures. These concepts the essentials to be better than the responsibilities to people and to can directly be applied to BSM. opponent. build a supporting governance Inside military operations, the organization. People and integration of KM into an overall KM Framework organizations must have assigned strategy is crucial. What used to responsibilities in the process. be the principle of centralized We suggest discussing KM in a Both KM activities and personnel planning and decentralized framework with three directions shape the KM strategy. The KM execution during Cold War times (Figure 2). At its base we find KM strategy has to be linked to the is now transformed into the tools, security control as well as overall corporate or business information age parlance as ‘power KM awareness and support. The strategy and, most importantly, to the edge.’ The purpose is quite two further directions cover (1) top management and subordinated similar: an individual within the KM activities, KM measurements, department heads must drive KM chain of command or within the rewards and incentives, and (2) with strong leadership. network may well have enough governance, KM working groups, knowledge of the overall situation common shared values and Relevance of and the commander’s strategy leadership. KM for BSM to come up with appropriate decisions. A difference might Four Action areas result from Following the reasoning above, it exist in the volume of available the three directions. KM tools now becomes obvious that KM is as information. need enabling technology and a important in the military domain as KM infrastructure; ie, technology it is elsewhere. Especially in a net- Whether the actual security and infrastructure as well as the centric environment, it is essential environment requires operations environment to enable people to that individuals share knowledge. other than war or full scale use knowledge the right way at Network Centric Operations conflict, an effects based approach the right time. Often this part (NCO) do rely primarily on human to operations can be applied, with is misinterpreted as KM. The networks and on the technical all its requirements for interagency direction of KM activities leads networks supporting them. NCO coordination and interaction. As to processes, in other words, to can only be efficient, if relations a consequence, BSM must reflect operate supporting KM processes, and networks of humans work the overall political end state as activities and measurements to in accordance with the ‘need-to- well as, for example, diplomatic or capture, share and use knowledge share’ paradigm instead of ‘need- economic objectives. An embedded of high quality. If KM activities, to-know.’ We suggest an even KM strategy must ensure that measurements and incentives are stronger notion: the ‘obligation- adjacent domains are adequately not geared towards processes, to-share.’ represented and understood.

43 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points

inside the battlespace, have similar or even the same objectives, in particular in an NCO environment. It is not possible to orchestrate actions efficiently if incoming information cannot be analyzed in context, and if individuals’ experiences cannot be included.

The main objective is to be better than an opponent, or competitor. In business terms, IBM learnt that lesson during the 90’s, when the corporation started its transformation from a multi-national manufacturer of mainframes towards a globally integrated enterprise with services Figure 2 – Overview of Knowledge Management Framework and consulting as its main business areas. This transformation was Such a KM strategy must be IT tools were chosen to support absolutely necessary to remain reflected in the processes, which legacy processes. This might be relevant and competitive. Lou inBy turn Mr Richard must assure Newton availability of a possible solution in the case of Gerstner, the former chairman information to the right person, in information representation. and CEO said: ‘We needed to the right quality and quantity, at the integrate as a team inside the right place and time. In addition, KM needs new processes and company so that we could integrate a top-down process must guarantee tools to support them, like Web for customers on their premises.’3 that available knowledge and 2.0 technologies. Users will no This was a tremendous cultural experience can be used properly. longer be simply consumers, change for IBM. In parallel, rather they become contributors. information and knowledge The application of both strategy Appropriate toolsets need to management processes and tools and processes depends on the include support for collaboration, were introduced. The experience willingness to accept them. People web conferencing, document can well be applied to BSM. KM and the organization as a whole management as well as instant is an essential part of BSM, and it must recognize the value of KM in messaging and net meeting. Such should be represented in any BSM’s the BSM process, through improved tools will significantly contribute to strategy, processes, technologies, situational awareness and common BSM as well: decision makers can and infrastructures. The most situational understanding. Maybe have chats and web conferencing critical challenge though remains this requires a change in the with the staff; documents can be to change the way people think and incentive systems such that team produced in a collaborative and behave, and how the organization results are rewarded, as opposed to transparent manner; different works: a transformation towards individual results. levels of command may contribute a knowledge based defence simultaneously to orders and enterprise. IT tools for end users are typically directives, and they may have the presentation layer of associated the opportunity to prepare their processes. Tools supporting the own orders in parallel. Such an KM process at the back end tend approach will definitely speed up Endnotes: to be the more important ones. the overall process, and it will lead 1. In order to execute this activity, an individual or a Tools can only help, if they are to faster and better decisions. community then needs additionally skills, experiences, chosen appropriately. Choosing resources or artefacts, heuristics and natural talent. 2. The Distributed Information Services Hub (DISH), tools without properly reflecting Conclusion which was demonstrated during the last JAPCC overall strategy, involved processes, Conference in October 2007 could be seen as one example of such a tool. people’s needs, and organizational KM must not be seen in isolation. 3. Gerstner, Louis V. Jr. ”Who says Elephants Can’t aspects may result in an KM, giving context to information, Dance?“, HarperBusiness 2002. Available from inappropriate toolset. Sometimes, and BSM, synchronizing action Harvard

44 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Copyright: Sue Sapp, USAF Pushing the Envelope – Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment

By Colonel Stephen Moulton, USA AF

Modern warfare is changing. Background JEFX 08 Focus The Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX) is one of many The JEFX program began in 1998 This year’s theme is collaboration ways in which the United States and has continually changed its and connectivity for the warfighter Air Force (USAF) strives to meet methods, time-lines and structure across the strategic, operational and anticipate the needs of the to keep in step with the fast-paced and tactical levels of command modern warfighter. As the name world of cyber technology. The to better enable planning and implies, JEFX is an experiment to Air Force Global Cyberspace execution of military operations. assess the operational utility and Integration Center (AF GCIC), technical readiness of emerging the lead agency for JEFX, has To support this theme, the Air technologies. The aim is to scaled down its experiments to Force Chief of Staff directed five transition technologies that solve smaller, quarterly-paced events, focus areas for JEFX 08 to include: practical warfighter problems, which enable greater flexibility and Global Effects Integration; Globally such as reducing ‘Time Sensitive increased focus. Linked Air and Space Operations Targeting’ timelines to single-digit Centers; Unit-level Command minutes, much faster than in-use JEFX 08-1 took place in Nov and Control; Cyberspace; and acquisition channels allow. The 07 and was the first of the leaner, Distributed Theater Operations. experiment uses robust modeling more agile events. JEFX 08-2 will The goal is to provide a scenario- and simulation in a collaborative, run for one week in early March driven environment that stresses synthetic environment, as well 2008 and involves a rollout of the new technologies and/or processes as live-flying. The most recent airborne network that will support (called initiatives) designed to event, JEFX 08-1, involved over the JEFX 08-3 live-fly event. improve vertical and horizontal 640 participants at 17 different JEFX 08-3 begins in April and integration of geographically- locations and included players will include live links to Air Force separated command elements from the US Army and Navy as assets around the country to assess as well as to enable machine-to- well as representatives from our real-world kinetic and non-kinetic machine (M2M) transfer of critical coalition partners. capabilities. warfighting information in a

45 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points

The JEFX environment offers an effective means for assessing emerging technology.

highly-collaborative environment environment. FCS objectives across a range of operations and to include an airborne network. include disseminating positions intensity. The Maritime initiative of Blue Force and Red Ground is focused on the operational level JEFX 08 Initiatives Threats detected by unattended of command and control using ground sensors, conducting Joint the MOC to collaborate with the While JEFX events are hosted Networked Fires in support of Air and Space Operation Center by the Air Force, they are also the combatant commander, and (AOC). proving grounds for the services, integrating Army systems with the combatant commands and our Air Force, Joint, Coalition, and The MOC is integrally involved coalition partners. The FY08 NATO systems. in providing viable maritime experiment will integrate a total strike options to the Joint Forces of 11 initiatives into its two main The experimentation results Maritime Component Commander. events. will be used to assess the current JEFX 08-1 allowed the Navy to state of FCS network integration experiment with collaboration One of the initiatives featured this and interoperability, reduce capabilities between the respective year is the Army’s Future Combat related risks to the FCS program Maritime and Air Force command Systems (FCS). FCS is made up of record, provide information centers. of a modular family of networked leading to improved and more systems, unattended sensors/ rapid program development and Two JEFX 08 Air Force initiatives munitions and unmanned aerial help refine evolving doctrine and are Joint Coordinated Real-Time systems (UAS). FCS will establish training support products. Engagement (JCRE) and Strategic a capability for evolving enterprise Worldwide Integration Capability services to provide soldiers access The US Navy will experiment (SWIC). to critical battlefield data and in JFEX with their Maritime services. Operation Center (MOC) JCRE is a United States Strategic The FCS initiative will demonstrate initiative. MOC will provide Command (USSTRATCOM) joint and multinational a rapidly deployable, globally- sponsored Advanced Concept interoperability in this live, networked headquarters capable of Technology Demonstration that virtual and constructive JEFX directing maritime and joint forces demonstrates the synchronization

46 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 of global effects and actions for COA synchronization. This integrated views of theater data, executed either locally or initiative shows great promise for integrated with other global from geographically dispersed USSTRATCOM planners. information to form accurate, locations. JCRE provides global shared data, and enabling quicker capabilities, effects, actions, and SWIC is a prototype software decisions by providing an 80% event synchronization services application enabling shared solution. designed to span from tactical to awareness of critical mission national levels. JCRE provides a planning and execution data and JEFX 08-3, which takes place way to visualize integrated global available assets across multiple in April, will focus on globally operations and track execution command and control (C2) linking AOCs, distributed theater of missions developed during agencies worldwide. SWIC operations, airborne networking, Deliberate or Time Sensitive provides different command and integration of cyberspace Planning (TSP). The result of centers a continuous collaborative (non-kinetic) effects into AOC these combined services and environment to provide detailed planning and execution efforts. It the associated visualization planning to quickly develop COAs will culminate with a robust live- capabilities provide a higher-level in support of USSTRATCOM’s fly event; making that final linkage of global situational awareness Joint Global Strike TSP process. between the operations centers to the associated Communities and live aircraft in order to assess of Interest. SWIC accesses Friendly Order of system interoperability, operational Battle data from multiple theater utility, and technical maturity. The TSP portion of the 08-1 AOCs and integrates with weather, event used the JCRE application space, refueling, intelligence, and Conclusion to visualize the synchronization of other data from a multitude of Courses of Action (COAs). JCRE additional sources. Using the The JEFX environment is a cost- products were used in the COA integrated data, planners can effective way to assess emerging Development and Commander’s collaborate quickly to develop technologies that will provide Estimate Briefings. Utilizing JCRE Global Strike COAs, and pass capabilities across units, forces, in conjunction with Adobe Connect, them to the operational and tactical and theaters of operation. The the primary JEFX collaboration level units for detailed planning USAF is committed to continuing tool, and ISPAN Global Operation and execution. These capabilities the process of recognizing gaps in Center-Collaborative Environment enable SWIC to integrate kinetic warfighter ability, and battlespace (GOC-CE) resulted in the and non-kinetic engagement COAs management, and identifying development of initial Tactics, in a seamless global strike planning the ways and means of filling Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) process. SWIC provides persistent those gaps.

JEFX 08-03 will focus on globally linking AOCs.

47 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points

Battlespace Management and Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence

By Christopher Lombardi, ThalesRaytheon Systems

For more than a dozen years now, missile defence (BMD) capabilities ACCS requirements process, NATO leadership has recognised that will protect deployed forces NATO incorporated an initial the risks associated with the while continuing to study how the set of BMD related requirements proliferation of missile technology Alliance should address territory and anticipated the need to add and its development across the and population centres. The additional functionality later. As globe. Whether such knowledge is concept behind NATO’s approach such, ACCS architecture has been being spread for personal profit, to is to start by fielding a ‘layered’ specifically designed to enable the support a rogue government bent theatre missile defence system incorporation of future capabilities on the destruction of an enemy, or providing protection for deployed and NATO has positioned ACCS for ideological purposes, it is clear NATO forces. After several as the foundation Command and that many more entities possess the years of study, the Active Layered Control (C2) system for BMD. requisite competence to build and Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence launch ballistic missiles capable of (ALTBMD) concept began its first The initial fielding of the ACCS substantial damage than existed a phase in the autumn of 2006, when provides key C2, Battle Management decade ago. an industrial team was selected and Communications (C2BMC) to develop the architecture and functionality to support NATO’s As far back as 1999, NATO interoperability test bed for the future BMD strategy. ACCS officially included missile defence protection of deployed NATO Limited Operational Capability 1 in its strategic concept and began forces from ballistic missile (LOC1) is being developed with to study specific missile defence threats. initial BMD capabilities in the options as an alliance in 2002.1 following areas: ballistic missile Although the threat of hostile ACCS: track reception; transmission; aircraft or other air-breathing The Core of ALTBMD classification; processing; display elements has certainly not been (including 3D) and alerting; ballistic eliminated, the additional threat In terms of Battlespace missile simulation and training; of a missile attack against deployed Management, NATO’s Air theatre ballistic missile sensor NATO forces has increased Command and Control System configuration; management and immensely. The combination (ACCS) will be the automated coverage analysis; and surface-to- of NATO’s increased emphasis system, which provides the tools air missile coverage determination on deployed operations and the that support the ALTBMD based on missile profiles. Initially, proliferation of ballistic weapons in approach to missile defence. Basic these functions in ACCS are the hands of potential adversaries BMD planning and simulation for implemented in a limited way, clearly means NATO’s out-of-area training is part of the ACCS baseline although full functionality will operations face significant danger system; however, the capabilities be achieved after a well defined from ballistic missiles. will need to be upgraded to bring process of full requirements ACCS to the full functionality definition, software upgrades, and NATO has adopted a spiral required for the ALTBMD mission integration. Therefore, NATO’s approach to building ballistic of the future. During the original next step in their ALTBMD

Copyright: US DoD 48 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 programme will be to upgrade To accomplish the mission set out The primary operational entities of or enhance ACCS to provide full by the commander, ACCS uses an the ACCS system function within capabilities within an integrated inter-connected web of personnel, an integrated, secure information air and missile defence picture for communications, equipment, network. The Combined Air NATO. facilities, and a defined set of Operations Centre (CAOC) procedures to manage the flow of operates at the operational level Battlespace information and to exercise control of planning, tasking, and mission Management over assigned sensor and weapon monitoring; while the ACC, RPC resources. The effectiveness of and SFP combine to form an ARS2 Applying ACCS to Battlespace the C2 system is a function of at the tactical level for mission Management for ALTBMD personnel training, pre-planned execution. Together these entities requires an understanding of the procedures, and the speed and provide the capabilities to manage C2 process governing ALTBMD efficiency of the communications the ALTBMD mission from the operations and ACCS capabilities. and IT systems used to distribute strategic guidance provided by the In any military operation, C2 is and utilise the information. Joint Force Commander (JFC) and the vital centralising function for the allocation of resources by a ensuring success and information CAOC, through to the detection is the key to that success. ‘Due to the very short and tactical engagement phase by Management of ALTBMD an ARS. operations requires getting the time lines ... right information to the right place the opportunity for In ACCS, Battlespace Management at the right time. The mission at the CAOC begins as the BMD objectives, Rules Of Engagement real-time intervention planners receive initial guidance (ROE), defended assets, resources, by an ARS controller from higher headquarters (JFC and and threat scenarios must be the Joint Force Air Component conceived, planned, coordinated, is limited and much Commander) concerning the communicated, executed, will depend on ROE prioritised defended areas or assets monitored and assessed – that is and the potential allocation and what ACCS does. procedures ...’ lay-down of defensive resources for

The CAOC, together with the ARS, will provide the capabilities to manage the ALTBMD mission.

49 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 View Points

detection and engagement. From accurate picture of the space tracks, NATO forces as well as reach- that guidance, the generated air providing advance cuing and back into the NATO static C2 tasking order and air coordination potential fire control solutions for system in Europe. However, order governing operations will be weapons that may be in a position to the interoperability standards distributed to all participants by engage the target. ACCS provides employed by ACCS enable the the CAOC. During the execution the opportunity to integrate inputs data exchange with other BMD C2 phase of operations, the CAOC is from multiple external sensors and systems and, in this context, NATO monitoring air and BMD activity use them to enhance the shared will be prepared to interface with and managing changes using the BMD picture and the engagement the US C2BMC system for the joint environment picture and decision process. ACCS will form exchange of planning information, communications systems. As the gateway for satellite launch situational awareness and track ALTBMD evolves to include warnings and sensors such as data. Although NATO ALTBMD more assets in the future, the the airborne infrared system or is initially only for deployed forces, importance of ACCS will increase other systems that may form an ACCS interface with the US for centralised C2BMC planning, part of the NATO ALTBMD BMD systems will demonstrate re-planning, and tasking aspects architecture. The ACCS shared a high degree of cooperation at operational levels or higher joint environment picture provides and provide potential two-way echelons. Force generation, the capability to integrate air situational awareness between communications planning, and air- and BMD activity into the same NATO Europe and US systems space co-ordination are examples strategic overview in a real-time thus improving the operational of CAOC activities that will set the situation. effectiveness of both. operational planning parameters of ALTBMD employment in In the ARS, operators trained in Conclusion conjunction with NATO out-of- the BMD mission and weapons area forces. systems perform engagement Although NATO leadership has monitoring and coordination. In been working for more than a In the ARS, real-time operations the event of any hostile ballistic decade on implementing a missile are conducted using a combination missile activity, ARS controllers defence capability, recent world of dedicated air and ALTBMD have automated support tools developments in the area of ballistic assigned resources to defend to deal with the threat such as missile technology have validated against threats. In the event of a the space track picture, threat the ALTBMD approach adopted missile launch against the area of evaluation and ranking functions by NATO and have underscored responsibility, the first mission of (calculating and prioritising the importance of urgently the ARS is detection and sharing inbound threats against defended completing the effort. Possibly of information to all echelons of assets), engagement modes of the best pressure to apply to those C2 - including weapons systems. control (messages to weapons states bent on developing ballistic The main surveillance capabilities systems), engagement control missile weapons is through the used by operators in the ARS to solutions, sequencing multiple deterrence that NATO ALTBMD manage the BMD related tasks engagement solutions, weapon provides. If NATO can protect are: ballistic object track handling allocation, engagement monitoring, troops deployed to Afghanistan or (which includes track correlation, and kill assessment. Due to the assets situated in the Mediterranean trajectory, and launch point); very short time lines normally with the capabilities offered by impact point prediction and expected in a theatre missile event, ALTBMD, the threat of ballistic early warning; ballistic missile and the capabilities of lower-tier missile weapons programmes sensor management (including weapons, the opportunity for could be rendered ineffective. controlling sensor detection, real-time intervention by an ARS controlling sensor data, processing controller is limited and much will requests, processing measurement depend on ROE procedures and and additional ID data requests); engagement authorities defined in Endnotes: and ballistic missile and space advance. 1. NATO Topic: Missile Defense; available at http://www. nato.int/issues/missile_defence/index.html (specific track picture dissemination. links to the official Prague Summit Declaration (2002) and the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999)) The ALTBMD capabilities in 2. The ARS is composed of the entity types that include In the boost phase, multiple ACCS are initially focussed on the Air Control Centre (ACC), the Recognised Air Picture (RAP) Production Centre (RPC), and the sensors that observe the threat NATO out-of-area missions and Sensor Fusion Post (SFP). An ARS may be static or trajectory can contribute to a more interoperability with deployed deployable.

50 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Out of the Box Copyright: SSgt Reynaldo Ramon, USAF

The Psychology of Remote Control Warfare By Wing Commander Pete York, GBR AF

The development of robotics for of its social connection to the Political Aspects use on and above the battlefield network of warfighters, the RCW has allowed soldiers to distance scenario is strikingly similar to Public Opinion. The risk of themselves from dangerous, dirty online gaming, albeit the latter is, casualties is a very real constraint and mundane tasks. During for the moment, artificial. The on the foreign policy ambitions 2007, the United States conducted concept of the virtual warfighter of political leadership.1 RCW approximately 250,000 hours of is being pursued through the Joint has much potential to reduce Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Expeditionary Force Experiments friendly loss of life simply because operations in theatres around the and, to some extent, NATO’s its warriors may no longer need globe, a fraction of that expected exercise Warfighter Alliance in a to go to war. Moreover, a society in years to come. UAS operations Virtual Environment. that gets accustomed to RCW will have brought a new dimension become less and less capable of to the idea of Remote Control RCW is reality, so what are the accepting friendly loss of life in Warfare (RCW). The UAS operator psychological implications of battle. As long as boots on the today controls multiple Unmanned this new art of war? Does this ground are still required, the more Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), potentially development change the concept risk averse a society becomes and in multiple areas of operation, of modern warfare, is the change the less likely it is to tolerate friendly connected to a community of inevitable and what, if anything, casualties on enemy soil. For those warfighters in and outside the should Commanders be doing to nations with RCW capabilities, this theatre through a virtual network, address the issues? reduced propensity to risk friendly all from his comfortable office loss of life, while improving a just a short distance from home. This article will examine some government’s ability to impose its No longer does the warrior need aspects of RCW under the foreign policy objectives must be a to face the enemy in combat, generic headings of political, good thing. However, with less risk to relate to his enemy or try to legal, operational and human of collateral, governments may also understand his motives, nor does factor implications with a view become more willing to start wars he need to deploy forward, to live to identifying some possible to achieve their political ambitions. in austere conditions or even to consequences for military Thus, the likelihood of proliferating dress for the occasion. In terms commanders to ponder. world conflict could increase.

51 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Out of the Box

Economic Considerations. on, in-theatre ‘man on the ground’ may never physically meet his Defence budgets remain under confidence building activities must contemporaries in combat. perpetual scrutiny and Western start. The transition from RCW multi-national military manpower to this face-to-face contact will be Situational awareness. The levels continue to recede. tricky. Effects Based Approach to Contractorisation of military tasks Operations requires that warriors is now widespread. Recently, an Legal Aspects at all levels have a profound enterprising Defence Industry understanding of the effects they company offered to provide, The legal aspects of RCW are are aiming to achieve. Learning deploy, operate (remotely) and complex. Specifically, RCW by seeing, feeling and ‘suffering’ maintain UAVs in operational Commanders should consider their alongside one’s adversary all theatres in accordance with military responsibilities under the Geneva contribute to this situational requirements. Under this ‘UAV Convention and whether or not understanding. From his 5-legged by the Hour’ concept, the military Rules of Engagement (ROE) for computer seat in a warm isolated would simply order and receive Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles office, the RCW warrior gets required surveillance information (UCAV) have been developed none of these inputs. Again, the from the UAV Company and pay sufficiently.3 Similarly, RCW forces discipline required of these UAS accordingly for the service. This will require sophisticated (and operators and their Commanders company was able to offer this different, possibly more stringent) to raise their staff’s battle concept for sale because the UAS discipline to abide by ROE from a situational awareness to the same offers ‘minimum risk to the air remote detached environment with level as ‘in-contact’ forces will be vehicle operator.’2 Again, this only media images of the effects extraordinary. reduced risk to friendly military being perpetrated. Importantly, lives is welcome and, ultimately, the increased possibilities of ‘Blue- UAS Flight Safety. The crew the intelligence information on-Blue’ in an RCW situation must members of a manned aircraft provided could be cheaper than be very carefully considered. routinely check the weather, employing full time military terrain, performance hazards operators to acquire it. However, Operational Aspects and flight parameters of every the consequently reduced need for ‘... the more proposed flight plan because, inter military risk-takers could prove alia, their very survival depends on irresistible to decision makers technologically it. The life of the UAV Controller seeking to minimise front line advanced nations is not subject to the same military manpower levels and inherent dangers. However, the budgets. This dilution of military remove the human consequences of getting it wrong manpower in theatre could factor from their could be equally lethal; possibly adversely affect a Commander’s fighting capabilities, not to the operator himself but to flexibility to manoeuvre when third parties! It takes a massive ’boots on the ground’ are needed. the more they leap of self discipline to apply the perpetuate asymmetric same dedication to any activity Reconstruction. Every conflict that one would apply if one’s life is inevitably followed by a warfare and terrorism.’ depended upon it – compare how reconstruction phase, when carefully a rock climber looks legitimate government is restored, after his safety equipment and legal systems are empowered, procedures with how carefully a public services are re-established Morale. Deploying forward with computer operator routinely boots and economies are re-built, in order like-minded colleagues, dressing up his computer. This presents a that internal stability can prevail; in uniform and living in austere significant supervisory challenge eg, Iraq and Afghanistan. External conditions give military forces for RCW Commanders. governments, who may have been identity and a sense of belonging. the protagonists of bringing down Both are good for military morale Human Aspects a regime by RCW, could not then and, therefore, the achievement expect to occupy a fallen nation in of military objectives. Military War is about ‘People.’ Military order to begin this reconstruction commanders will need to devise forces exist as a tool of government process. At some point the RCW means of replicating this collective to inflict the will of one regime must stop and the real live, hands- morale for the RCW warrior, who on that of another. This can be

52 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 particular, but also of reach-back command centres, Cruise Missiles, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, Space, Satellite and Net-Centric communications links, High Altitude Airships with endurances up to 18 months, the Internet, reducing military manpower levels and the CNN factor will all contribute towards a move away from traditional, territorial warfare and towards increased RCW in the future. However, we would Copyright: LCPL Kenneth E. Madden, USMC be prudent to exercise caution by The UAS operator is connected to a community of warfighters through a virtual network. considering the ethics and effects of this progress. Once the real effects accomplished peacefully through Controller than an athlete. He or of RCW become apparent, multi- humanitarian support, at one end she may have all the coordination millions will have been spent on of the spectrum of conflict, to skills for the job and possibly the development of remotely controlled aggressive kinetic intervention capability to assimilate and react weapon systems. At that point, at the other; either way, face-to- to multiple inputs in a potentially it will be politically very difficult face human contact is most often high workload and high pressure to scrap those systems for ethical the most effective persuasive environment. Moreover, Play reasons. force. Ultimately, rather than fear Station games simulate conflict, of the sledgehammer,4 it is the violence and loss of life – good This article is intended to provide respect of one nation for another virtual warfighter training. On food for thought, rather than all the that changes political will. That the other hand, would that same answers to how we should address respect is difficult to generate if the computer geek have the equivalent the challenges that advancing attacked perceives that his attacker self discipline and decision making technology will inevitably bring. is sitting at home (metaphorically) ability of today’s military warrior? JAPCC will continue to follow in his carpet slippers! Moreover, it Moreover, as UAS technology up work on this subject. If you is indeed difficult to imagine how improves with time, the need to have a view or information on the a UAV operator will win a medal employ UAV operators with live subject, we would be delighted to for gallantry. flying experience will diminish. hear from you. Could a Commander rely upon Endnotes: Non-Technological Solutions. a Play Station expert without 1. Body bags returning home bring the harsh reality History tells us that no matter actual flying experience to make of warfare into the public eye and have the potential to turn public opinion sharply against the operations how technologically superior one consistently safe aviation-related themselves. Ultimately, this can be a ’vote loser’ for the politicians, who made the decision(s) to get the force may be over another, the less judgement calls for his vehicle in home nation involved. This is especially relevant when technologically able will always the air? those operations pose no perceived direct threat to homeland security. Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan are find a way of attacking stronger or contemporary examples. opposing nations’ people centres The Future 2. It is recognised that UAV maintenance and launch/ recovery crews (military or civilian) would need to (eg, 9/11) as a means of imposing operate forward, but in most cases they could operate their will. It could be argued that There is, of course, a need to at a safe distance from the JOA and ‘out of harm’s way.’ 3. Consider a tactical situation where the crew of a the more technologically advanced apply perspective. Advancing manned aircraft can ‘see’ that the required effects of nations remove the human factor technology is a familiar, welcome an attack have been accomplished using a part weapon load and that further attack would result in unnecessary 5 from their fighting capabilities, the and inescapable fact and UAS loss of life, which could, ultimately, have an overall detrimental effect on achieving the strategic effects. A more they perpetuate asymmetric and other means of achieving UAV operator denied this ‘eyes on target’ information, may continue to prosecute further attacks with obvious warfare and terrorism. effects remotely will, at least for negative effects on the overall mission.

the foreseeable future, only be 4. For example, during WWII neither German bombing attacks on British cities nor the British counter bombing Selection and Training. An one club in the military golf bag, of German cities succeeded in changing the stance of overweight computer geek with which will be used alongside other either Nation. Instead, both increased the resolve of respective populations to overcome their aggressor. green hair who misspent his youth capabilities, including traditional playing ‘war’ games on a Play fighting. The increasing capabilities 5. RCW began with the development of the longbow! Station may make a better UAS of not only UAV and UCAV in

53 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Inside the JAPCC

Continued from page 21 Civilian authorities play the major of irregular warfare. It was the part in this effort but the military intention of the JAPCC to address Panel 3 – Physical and Cognitive contribution remained significant many of the policy and doctrinal Effects. Non-kinetic Air and and more could be done to exploit issues raised by the Conference Space capabilities are a critical military success in rehabilitation during coming months. enabler with great potential in operations; the earthquake relief the delivery of cognitive effect. operation in Pakistan was a good The Conference paper, renamed However, in order to maximise example. ‘Air Power and Irregular Warfare,’ these capabilities in irregular has subsequently been refined. warfare, Panel 3 agreed that there In his closing remarks, Lieutenant This paper is being used to was a need to develop new ideas General Friedrich W. Ploeger inform and shape the JAPCC’s and doctrine for Air and Space (German Air Force), Executive development of the NATO Future Power Information Operations. Director JAPCC, commented that Joint Air and Space Power concept the Conference discussions had and the development of Allied Panel 4 – The Role of Joint reinforced the relevance of Air and Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Air Power in Reconstruction Space Power in today’s complex Operations (AJP-3.3) and Crisis and Development. Panel 4 environment. He reiterated that Response Operations (AJP-3.4). discussed rehabilitation in the there was much work to do to adapt context of building a new state. Air and Space doctrine to the needs

NEWS Copyright: JAPCC New Faces in the Leadership of the JAPCC

In early December 2007, the JAPCC said goodbye to its Director, General William “Tom” Hobbins, as he retired from the US Air Force. General Hobbins brought the JAPCC from its fledgling Centre of Excellence Lt Gen Ploeger and Col Clampitt welcome Gen Brady to the JAPCC Conference Centre. status in December 2005, through Full Operational Capability and into its current leading position Ramstein and US Air Forces in NATO Future Joint Air championing Air and Space Power Europe. and Space Power transformation for NATO. The JAPCC bids a warm JAPCC has almost completed a In January 2008, we welcomed welcome to Commodore Jan project to examine the future of General Roger Brady as our van Hoof, RNLAF, who has NATO Joint Air and Space Power new JAPCC Director. General succeeded Brigadier General over the forthcoming 20 years. Brady came to the JAPCC from Elia Baldazzi, ITAF, as Assistant The paper examines the future the Headquarters US Air Force Director Capabilities. The Strategic Environment and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel JAPCC community wishes part Air and Space Power will play role. He also commands NATO’s General Baldazzi well in his new in likely Joint operations of the Component Command Air appointment in Rome. future. It examines a proposal to

54 55 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 apply the principles of ‘Mission of these nascent capabilities in NATO Nations to standardize Command’ to the command of Air a special topic discussion at the CAS-FAC training and equipment. and Space Power and it shows how conference, and recommended a Congratulations are extended to we should aim to harness emerging systematic research plan to identify Lt Col Dietmar Heine (German Air and Space technologies to the military utility and potential Air Force), the custodian of these optimum effect. Finally, the operational requirements of documents, for his outstanding paper recommends steps which employing Air-to-Air Refuelling to leadership of the project. Work can be taken now to maximise the extend UAV operations. Moreover, on CAS-FAC project continues, benefits of Air and Space Power in military operators and industry as we aim to standardize training the future. designers were encouraged to take of FACs and to draw helicopter a cooperative, interactive two- procedures closer to those of fixed Air C4ISR Roadmap hands-on-the-wheel approach wing aircraft. to steering development paths. In November 2007, the Director, JAPCC AAR experts participate Maritime General Hobbins, approved the in several panels each year at Air Coordination JAPCC Roadmap for Air C4ISR the annual conference where Conference in NATO. The project achieved over 400 industry and military its goal of establishing the Air representatives gather to share The Maritime Air Coordination C4ISR baseline for NATO as a AAR information and solutions. Conference will take place this whole and for NATO Nations, autumn in Kalkar, Germany. and identifying capability gaps and UAS Flight Plan for The JAPCC co-chairs this appropriate corrective measures. NATO 2008 - Update annual meeting with Component Command-Maritime Northwood Space The JAPCC Unmanned Aircraft to discuss important maritime air Systems (UAS) project team has issues. Please refer to the JAPCC As part of JAPCC’s 2008 capstone completed its work on updating website (www.japcc.org) for more theme, Air & Space’s Contribution the JAPCC Flight Plan for UAS information on this forthcoming to Battlespace Management, in NATO. The new Flight Plan event. JAPCC will deliver to SACT includes updates to the 26 issues by 1 June 2008 a NATO Space raised in the 2007 Flight Plan JAPCC Conference Operations Assessment. In as well as new information on Centre support of this project, the JAPCC sensors and UAS in NATO. The will host a NATO Space Workshop additional information will be The new state of the art JAPCC in Kalkar on 22 April 2008. Space particularly useful to personnel Conference Centre has proven is vital to NATO transformation engaged in operational planning. invaluable in hosting symposia and as such it is imperative that The UAS project team is also and working group meetings NATO should address the Space leading the NATO effort for the critical to the transformation Operations mission area. The aim production of an agreed Concept of Air and Space Power. The of the workshop and the follow-on of Employment of UAS in NATO. facility is available for external assessment is to identify gaps and An Air Forum was held in Kalkar charter. Initial enquiries should be to provide recommendations to in February 2008 and the working directed to Mr Simon Ingram on address shortfalls. group will meet again in Rome Commercial: +49 (0)2824 90 2108. in May 2008. We hope to be in a JAPCC Encourages position to elicit comment on the R&D of Automated final draft Concept of Employment and UAV AAR from NATO Nations by the fall of 2008. JAPCC’s Combat Support Branch submitted a paper, Automated and Close Air Support - The JAPCC Journal UAV AAR: Getting the Second Forward Air Controller welcomes your Hand on the Wheel, for the Air Project feedback. Refuelling System Advisory Group’s Conference in April 2008. The newly completed STANAGs We also provided an operator’s 7144 and 3797 reflect real-world Go to www.japcc.org perspective on the development operations in ISAF and assist

54 55 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Regulars Biographies

Lieutenant General Croitoru, Commissioned as a pilot in 1981, Chief of Romanian Air Force Air Commodore Michael John Staff, was born in Ditesti, Prahova Madoc Jenkins immediately County, on 5th May 1952 and became a flying instructor. In 1986, graduated from the Air Force he joined the Harrier Force and Military School in 1974. After gained operational flying experience attending courses at the Academy in Operations WARDEN, DENY of High Military Studies from 1981 FLIGHT and DECISIVE EDGE. to 1983, he was appointed Chief He has commanded No 20(R) Instructor, 70th Air Division, a post he held until 1990 Squadron and RAF Wittering. In January 2003, he when he moved to the Military Air Force Command. deployed as Operation TELIC Deployed Operating In 2000 he became the Chief of Staff of the 1st Air Base Commander. He has served on the staffs of the Division ‘Siret’, before taking command of the 90th Air Warfare Centre, the Ministry of Defence, as Joint Airlift Base, the 1st Air Division and then the Main Force 2000 Implementation Team Leader and as Chief Air Operational Command. In 2005, he was appointed of Staff HQ 1 Group. More recently, he spent 9 months Deputy Director of the General Staff and a year later the in Afghanistan as the Director of the Air Coordination General Director of Defence Intelligence. He assumed Element, ISAF. He is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical his current appointment as Chief of the Air Force Staff Society, an active musician and a keen sailor. He was in March 2007. General Croitoru has accumulated over awarded the OBE in June 2003. 1500 flying hours on MiG-15, MiG-21 LanceR, MiG-29, HONG-5, and IAR-316 aircraft. He is married and has a son.

Air Flotilla General Florian Air Commodore Garfield Râpan joined the Romanian Air Porter joined the RAF in 1978. Force in 1974 and served initially A navigator, he has served as a as a traffic controller with the crew captain, Flight Commander 91st Aviation Regiment. He and Squadron Commander on the attended the Military Academy in RAF’s Nimrod Maritime Patrol 1983 before returning to the 91st Aircraft amassing some 5500 flying Aviation Regiment as Head of the hours. He was awarded the Queen’s Command Point. In 1987 he turned Commendation for Valuable Service to academics as a lecturer and university professor of in the Air for the Search and Rescue operation following Aviation Tactics at the Academy of Advanced Military the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster. Following attendance at Sciences. Air Flotilla General Râpan was awarded a the RAF Staff College in 1993, his ground tours have PhD in Military Sciences in 1998. In 2004 he became predominately been in strategic plans and programmes, the Deputy Commandant of the National Defence and concepts and doctrine. He assumed command of University. He has written numerous publications RAF Kinloss in 2002 and, more recently, completed an on military aviation issues. In addition to his native operational tour as the UK Air Component Commander language, he speaks English, Russian and French. He is Middle East. He joined the JAPCC in May 2007 as married with 3 children. Assistant Director Transformation from his previous assignment as Director Air and Space in the UK’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Colonel Stephen K. Moulton is the Director of the Air Force Modernization and Innovation Colonel Dan Lewandowski is Directorate, Global Cyberspace Chief Combat Air Branch at the Integration Center. Colonel JAPCC. He was one of the first Moulton entered the Air Force in career space operations officers in May 1985. In achieving command the USAF. He was the Branch Chief pilot status, he has accumulated for space and C4ISR programs for over 4000 flying hours mainly the Deputy Under Secretary of the on B-52 and B-2 bombers as a pilot, instructor pilot, Air Force for International Affairs. evaluator, squadron commander and deputy commander In 2002, he took command of the of an operations group. He has a Bachelor of Science 50th Operations Support Squadron, responsible for 130 degree in Aeronautical Engineering and a Master of personnel and the combat readiness training of over Science in Aerospace Science Technology. He has 530 crew personnel, operating over 140 satellites. He extensive staff experience in the management of has four masters degrees in Strategic Studies, Military training and as the Chief of Bomber Operations, ACC Operational Art and Science, Space Systems and Business Inspector General Squadron, Langley AFB, Virginia. Administration.

56 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Biographies

Group Captain John Alexander Colonel Sandro Sampaoli joined is Chief Combat Service Support at the Italian Air Force in 1981 and the JAPCC. Commissioned in the has spent most of his operational RAF Regiment, he served with RAF career flying for the 155th Rapier units in Germany, Belize Squadron as a Tornado Weapon and the Falkland Islands; USAF System Officer. He flew combat Rapier in the UK; on secondment missions in Operations DESERT in Oman; as Adjutant of a Light STORM and ALLIED FORCE. In Armoured Wing in the Gulf 1990- 2001, he was assigned to ReSTOGE, 91; in staff appointments at the Central Tactics and the Italian Air Force Electronic Warfare Centre and Trials Organization, in MOD operational requirements, was appointed Chief of the Centre in 2006. Under Col at the Air Warfare Centre, in the MOD on Iraq WMD Sampaoli’s lead, ReSTOGE has become increasingly counter-proliferation policy and in PJHQ(UK) J3; on involved with the NATO EW Community. The Centre operations to disarm Iraq in 2003 and in HQ MNF-I has organized, coordinated and executed several national to support the January 2005 Iraqi elections; and he has and multinational Operational Test Trials and Campaigns, commanded 37 Squadron RAF Regiment and the Joint including TRIAL HAMMER 05 and TRIAL SPARTAN Rapier Training Unit. He is a graduate of Newcastle HAMMER 06. Col Sampaoli was recently appointed University (BA(Hons) Geography), the Open University Trial Manager for TRIAL IMPERIAL HAMMER 08. (MBA and Postgraduate Diploma in History), the Royal School of Artillery Gunnery Staff Course and the Air Battle Staff Course, and has taught on the Advanced and Higher Command and Staff Courses.

Lieutenant Colonel Mihai Stir Wing Commander Pete York has nearly 24 years of operations is a VIP transport navigator who and staff experience, including arrived at JAPCC in 2005 from assignments in National Air Force CC-Air Izmir, Turkey where he was structures and, most recently, the Director of Staff. Prior to that, in the Romanian General Staff. he was CC-Air Izmir’s CJFACC Since February 2006 he has been Planning Chief and responsible the Romanian Senior National for the implementation of NATO’s Representative in the JAPCC, where, CJFACC and NRF Concepts. He in the Future Capabilities Branch, he has contributed to has experience in planning and execution of the flying the Transformation of Air and Space Power in NATO. schedules for RAF AT, AAR and VIP transport fleets He has focussed particularly on manned and unmanned during peacetime routine and crisis operations. He has aircraft issues and the transformation of NATO Air also been a tutor in the Muharraq Al-Abdullah Command Command and Control structures. Lt Col Stir received and Staff College in Kuwait. his bachelor’s degree in economics in 1992 from the West University, Timisoara, Romania, his home town. He was recently awarded a PhD in Post Conflict Air Operations issues at the National Defence University “CAROL 1st” in Bucharest, Romania. He is married with 2 children.

Major Dean Driskill, US Marine Corps, was the JUAS COE lead Major Tom Single is a member at Naval Air Station Fallon for of the JAPCC C4ISTAR Branch. ‘Operation Firebird.’ Commissioned His operational experience from the US Naval Academy in 1997 includes ICBM, space and AOC with a Bachelor of Science degree in weapon systems. He has combat History, he became a Marine EA- experience in support of OIF and 6B Electronic Countermeasures OEF and has participated in several Officer. He attended the Marine major exercises as a theatre space Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course in 2002 and operations duty officer. He has a is working on his master’s degree from the Air Command BS in Aerospace Engineering, a MBA and a MS in Space and Staff College. He has made numerous deployments Operations from the Air Force Institute of Technology. to the Far East and in support of Operation IRAQI In his previous assignment, he was the Chief of Theatre FREEDOM. Prior to arriving at the JUAS COE, he was Support at HQ Air Force Space Command. He arrived an instructor at the EA-6B training squadron, Naval Air in Kalkar in March of 2007 and serves as the JAPCC Station Whidbey Island, Washington. subject matter expert on space operations.

57 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Regulars Biographies

Dr. Dieter Jaepel is a computer Lieutenant Colonel (retired) scientist with a Doctorate Degree Wolfgang Schneider is Senior from the Erlangen Technical Managing Consultant at IBM University. Initially, his research Deutschland GmbH. He graduated interest focused around the greater from Bundeswehr University field of Pattern Recognition and Hamburg as a business economist Artificial Intelligence, in particular and engineer and spent most of character recognition, speech his service in different air battle analysis, and image analysis. management functions in different In 1986, Dr. Jaepel joined the IBM Research Laboratory German Control and Reporting Centres. He has served in Rueschlikon/Switzerland, where his work focused on at the GAF Regional Command South as a staff officer computer communication, including Local Area Network and he has commanded the Tactical Air Control Company technology, broadband networks and mobile computing. 221 in Messstetten. He attended the 46th General More recently, Dr. Dieter Jaepel has resumed work on Staff Officers Course at the German Armed Forces Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Management. Command and Staff College from 2001 to 2003, followed For many years, Dr. Jaepel’s interests have revolved by an assignment as Branch Chief for Modelling and around the impact of technology on industry with a Simulation in Bundeswehr Centre for Transformation. focus on innovation. Since 2002, he has been a member In 2006 he moved to the German Ministry of Defence, of the IBM Industry Solutions Lab (ISL) at IBM Zurich where he was Assistant Branch Chief Air Staff III 6, Research, developing and running innovation workshops responsible for C4ISR within the GAF. He retired from for IBM customers in the Insurance, HealthCare, the Bundeswehr in 2007 and joined IBM Deutschland, Pharmaceutical, Government, and Defense industries. where his responsibility is to support the Bundeswehr Transformation process.

Major Pat Filbert, US Army, was Lieutenant Colonel Miklós the lead JUAS COE ‘Operation Szabó, HU AF is the attack Firebird’ planner. Major Filbert was helicopter specialist in the Combat commissioned an Armor Officer in Air Branch of JAPCC. He graduated 1986, and later shifted to military in 1989 from the College of Military intelligence, with a Bachelor of Arts Aviation in Hungary becoming an degree in History from the University engineer of helicopter maintenance of Hawaii. He is a graduate of the and also a transport helicopter pilot US Army Command and General flying the MI-8 and the MI-17 HIP. Staff College and will complete his master’s degree He is a graduate of the US Army’s Aviation Officers in Intelligence in fall 2008. He has served in the US, Advanced Course at Fort Rucker, Alabama. After holding Bosnia-Herzegovina, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Korea, different positions at his unit he became the squadron and Germany. He was the Army programmatics lead for commander of the Transport Helicopter Squadron. He several UAS from 2001-2003. Prior to arriving at the holds a bachelor degree of Finance and Accountancy and JUAS COE, he was the US Army Europe G2 Planner in a master’s degree of Military Leadership as a graduate of Heidelberg. the Hungarian Defence University in Budapest in 2000.

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Bates Christopher Lombardi joined joined the Canadian Forces in 1986. ThalesRaytheon Sytems in March He commanded telecommunications 2006 as Manager, International squadrons at 4 Wing Cold Lake, Business Development. Currently, Alberta and at 22 Wing North Bay, he is part of the team responsible Ontario. In 2002 he deployed to for the NATO Air Command Bosnia and Herzegovina as the G6 and Control System (ACCS). Mr. in support of the Canadian Battle Lombardi was born in 1970 in Group in SFOR. Working in the Denville, New Jersey. He received C4ISTAR Branch of JAPCC, he is responsible for deployed a bachelor’s degree in international communications and information systems. Lt Col Bates affairs and political science from the University of is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff Colorado in 1993 and a master’s degree in international College in Toronto; he holds a Bachelor of Electrical relations from The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Engineering and a Master of Business Administration. International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University in 1997. In addition, Mr. Lombardi took European studies courses at Oxford University in England. He is married and has two children.

58 JAPCC Journal Edition 7, 2008 Regulars Book Reviews

The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall By Ian Bremmer Simon & Schuster Ltd 2006

The J-Curve presents a model for looking at stability amongst nations, which will be of interest to any student of international relations, particularly those in the military keen to understand potential causes of instability and ungoverned space. In the early chapters, the author uses a J-shaped curve to locate nations in terms of stability – the short steep left side for authoritarian states (closed) and the longer less inclined right side for those that are more democratic and institutionally stable (open). The catch is that for a state to transition from the authoritarian left side to the sunny uplands of the right, it must first travel through the bottom of the curve; in other words, risk even greater instability in the short term for greater gains over time! The remainder of the book then looks at several case studies of countries at different points on the curve to identify how stability transition might be best managed. If you want to get to the bottom of effects based thinking in its widest sense, this book is a good place to start.

Review by Air Commodore Garfield Porter, GBR AF

To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations from Achilles to Al Qaeda By Derek Leebaert Little, Brown and Company Publishing, 2006

Special operations have become an integral part of every commander’s tool kit, maturing through thousands of years of history. It is no coincidence that a silver Trojan Horse has been featured on the badge of the 10th Special Forces Group ever since the Green Berets were created some three millennia after that city fell. In this groundbreaking exploration of war and politics, the author chronicles the adventures of a very special breed of soldier and uncovers the stories of special operations from Troy to Al Qaeda.

While examining the history-changing rewards of special warfare, the book also explains how this method of conflict came into being and how it has evolved; how its practitioners have reasoned; what prowess, arms and doctrine they have resorted to from the days of spears and bows to nuclear weapons; and what may now be lurking in the anteroom.

The book is not only a chronicle of military history; it gives the reader a political, diplomatic, technical and cultural flavour of the events which shaped it. The continuity of adventure-filled stories and the voice of a story-teller keep the pages turning while reading this monumental book.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Miklós Szabó, HUN AF

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