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Home , Air force, Eduardo Oban, Jessie Dellosa, Philippine Air Force, Philippine Navy, Voltaire Gazmin

BACKGROUNDER No. 2733 | September 24, 2012

Getting the Flying Again: The Role of the U.S.–Philippines Alliance Renato Cruz De Castro, PhD, and Walter Lohman

Abstract or two years, the U.S.– The recent standoff at Scarborough FPhilippines alliance has been Key Points Shoal between the Philippines and challenged in ways unseen since the China demonstrates how Beijing is closure of two American bases on ■■ The U.S. needs a fully capable ally targeting in its strategy of Filipino territory in the early 1990s.1 in the to protect U.S.–Philippines interests. maritime brinkmanship. Manila’s China’s aggressive, well-resourced weakness stems from the Philippine pursuit of its territorial claims in ■■ The Philippines Air Force is in a Air Force’s (PAF) lack of air- the South China Sea has brought a deplorable state—it does not have defense system and air-surveillance thousand nautical miles from its the capability to effectively moni- tor, let alone defend, Philippine capabilities to patrol and protect own shores, and very close to the airspace. Philippine airspace and maritime Philippines. ■■ territory. The PAF’s deplorable state For the Philippines, sovereignty, The Philippines has no fighter jets. As a result, it also lacks trained is attributed to the Armed Forces access to energy, and fishing grounds fighter pilots, logistics training, of the Philippines’ single-minded are at stake. For the U.S., its role as and associated basing facilities. focus on internal security since 2001. regional guarantor of , secu- ■■ The government of the Philippines Currently, the Aquino administration rity, and freedom of the seas is being is engaged in a serious effort to is undertaking a reform challenged—as well as its reliability more fully resource its to shift the PAF from its focus on as an ally. needs and shift focus from inter- to its original role The U.S. has no stake in the nal security to territorial defense. of air defense, an effort hindered by the details of a settlement to the territo- Its air force is an important part of perennial lack of funds. It is imperative rial dispute. That is not to say it is this effort. for the U.S.—Philippines’ alliance—to neutral: The U.S. is deeply implicated ■■ America’s long-standing historical assist the PAF in developing the air by virtue of its treaty obligations to relationship with the Philippines, power and skills to spread its wings the Philippines. The U.S. must help and the U.S.–Philippines Mutual and protect the country’s territory. the Philippines stand up for itself Defense Treaty, provides the basis and develop the capability to be a for the U.S. to help the Philippines rebuild its air force into a credible valuable ally—at sea and in the air. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at fighting force. http://report.heritage.org/bg2733 Produced by the Asian Studies Center Military Challenges The Heritage Foundation for the Philippines 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 On March 2, 2011, two Chinese (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org patrol boats harassed an unarmed Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily Filipino-commissioned oil-explora- reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill tion ship at off the west- before Congress. ern Philippines island of . In BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2733 September 24, 2012

response, the Aquino immediately ordered the up a credible fight if challenged—a dispatched two aging and obsolete allocation of more funds to build defense capable of deterring Chinese planes—an OV-10 Bronco recon- up the military’s territorial defense adventurism or aggression off the naissance plane and an Islander capabilities.7 Philippines’ coast. Such a capability light aircraft—but the two Chinese The recent two-month standoff involves assisting the Aquino admin- patrol boats had left the area by the between Filipino and Chinese civil- istration in weaning the PAF from time the slow piston-engine planes ian vessels at Scarborough Shoal its current task of supporting the arrived.2 In the following months, in the South China Sea has since Philippine ’s counterinsurgen- the PAF recorded a series of aerial accentuated the country’s military cy operations to assuming its origi- intrusions by unidentified aircraft weakness, especially when it comes nal role as the Philippines’ first line into the area. On May 19, 2011, two to air defense and maritime domain of defense against external threats. PAF OV-10s sighted two unidenti- awareness. Filipino military officers Specifically, the PAF needs to devel- fied fighter jets over the Reed Bank. argued that the incidents could have op air-power capabilities, such as On June 4, a Filipino fishing vessel been prevented if the Philippines had intelligence surveillance, maritime reported the overflight of an uniden- a credible military that can stand up patrol, precision-strike capabilities, tified fighter jet at Dalagang Bukid to China’s coercive diplomacy. With and , command, control, and Shoal3 south of Reed Bank. On July the withdrawal of American military communication systems. 11, a of Filipino fishermen facilities in the country in 1992, the sighted a low-flying unidentified Congress of the Philippines passed WHAT THE PHILIPPINES NEEDS FOR aircraft and a near Raja the 1995 AFP Modernization Law ITS OWN DEFENSE, AND TO BE A Soliman Reef, also south of the Reed that allocates 331 billion Filipino Bank. pesos (around $6.62 billion) over 15 STRONGER ALLY OF THE U.S., IS A These developments generated years for modernizing the Filipino 24-HOUR-A-DAY CAPABILITY TO panic within the military establish- military. Unfortunately, the law “ran PATROL ITS TERRITORY AND CLAIMS ment and the Aquino administration. the full length of its implementing FROM THE AIR. Former chief of of the Armed period and expired (in December Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 2011) without any significant prog- Lieutenant ress” in terms of any major arms The PAF Clips Its Wings admitted that “the AFP is helpless acquisition for the AFP.8 Thus, 15 In late 2001, the Arroyo admin- because the PAF does not have the years after the law was passed, the istration released Executive Order capability to monitor and identify PAF has neither the fighter planes No. 21, the national internal security the intruders.”4 Philippines Defense nor a modern radar system. A nation- plan (NISP), which considered the Secretary con- wide air-defense system remains various insurgencies in the coun- curred,5 and presidential spokesman elusive. try as a serious threat to national Abigail Valte noted that the inci- What the Philippines needs for security. The executive order dents highlighted the need for the its own defense, and to be a stron- directed the government to adopt Filipino government to step up the ger ally of the U.S., is a 24-hour-a- a holistic approach—consisting of modernization of the AFP.6 She also day capability to patrol its territory political, socioeconomic, psycho- announced that President Benigno and claims from the air, and to put logical, security, and information

1. Subic Naval Base and Clark have since re-opened for U.S. military presence. Jamie Laude, “US Troops Can Use Clark, Subic Bases,” The Philippine Star, June 6, 2012, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?publicationSubCategoryId=63&articleId=814442 (accessed September 7, 2012). 2. “Philippines Protests Against China’s Planned Oil Rig, Constructions in Spratlys,” BBC, June 2, 2011. 3. Air Defense , “Situation: Chinese Aggressiveness in the West Philippine Sea,” Philippine Air Force, Fighter Town, Air Base Basa, pp. 1–2. 4. “AFP Has No Fighter Planes to Protect Philippine Air Space—Oban,” The Philippines News Agency, June 12, 2011, p. 1. 5. “Defence Secretary Says Philippine Forces Lack Capability to Detect Intruders,” BBC, May 25, 2011. 6. Aurea Calica, “Palace in No Hurry to File China Protest,” The Philippine Star, May 21, 2011, pp. 1, 16. 7. Ibid., p. 1. 8. Vincent Cabreza, “Philippine Defense Secretary Admits AFP Upgrade Plan a Dud,” Tribune Business News, February 19, 2012.

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components—to address the root 2010, or to disarm and demobilize consisted of combat helmets, body causes of the armed violence engen- the MILF. 10 As a result, the AFP’s armor, squad-machine guns, combat- dered by these insurgent movements. focus on internal security intensified, lifesaver kits, ground-attack planes, The NISP identified three major and its territorial defense develop- and night-capable attack helicop- internal security threats: (1) the ment efforts were relegated to the ters. Instead of replacing its aging Communist Party of the Philippines sidelines. Suitable military materiel F-5A fighter plans with F-16 Falcons and its military arm, the New intended for territorial defense were or Tornadoes, the AFP diverted its People’s Army; (2) the secessionist used for internal security purpos- limited budget to the acquisition or groups on the island of ; es. Furthermore, limited financial reconditioning of Killer Medium and (3) terrorist groups, such as the resources for the AFP modernization patrol crafts from , Islamist . were diverted to personnel cost and OV-10s from Thailand, and UH-1H In response to these threats, to the combat operations against the Huey from the U.S. These the AFP formulated the 2002 insurgent groups. Consequently, an acquisitions were used to combat ter- Operational Plan Bantay Laya (free- average of 70 percent of the defense rorism and domestic insurgency. dom watch) primarily to “intensify budget went to personnel services, Sadly, the PAF, the most advanced the conduct of counter-insurgency while only about 29 percent was Southeast Asian air force in the operations” to eradicate Abu Sayyaf allotted for the maintenance of 1960s, had by 2001 become the weak- and the New People’s Army. The AFP existing equipment and operational est air force in the region with its also tasked the military with neu- expenses.11 At the same time, capi- meager fleet of aircraft left over from tralizing the Moro Islamic Liberation tal outlay for the acquisition of new the War—consisting prin- Front (MILF) and renegade elements equipment amounted to a mere cipally of 15 obsolete F-5 Freedom of the Moro National Liberation 1 percent. An internal AFP paper Fighters and 19 OV-10 Bronco recon- Front (MNLF) to create a secure bemoaned that the “proportion for naissance planes.14 During its heyday environment in Mindanao conducive personnel and MOE [Maintenance, in the early 1980s, the PAF could for national economic development. Operation, and Expenses] leaves deploy nearly 50 interceptors—F-5 The plan emphasized the AFP’s nothing for capital outlay which is A/B and F-8 Crusaders—and could overarching strategic objective in the necessary for the organizational challenge any aircraft entering the early years of the 21st century, which development of the armed forces.”12 country’s airspace without permis- was to “decisively defeat the insur- Moreover, the AFP set aside its sion.15 In 2005, the AFP leadership gent armed groups” in the country.9 modernization plan and merely ordered the decommissioning of the Consequently, the AFP was drawn upgraded existing capabilities remaining F-5 A/B fighters, robbing into “fighting on two fronts” (the through the AFP Capability Upgrade the country of external defense capa- Communist insurgents in and Program (CUP). CUP involved refur- bilities. Fittingly, the move came the , and MILF/Abu Sayyaf bishment of transportation, upgrade after the Department of National on Mindanao). In the process, it saw of military firepower, and improve- Defense (DND) decided to devote that its combat capabilities and gov- ment of communication facilities for the military’s resources to internal ernment support were inadequate to internal security operations.13 From security operations thinking that end the Communist insurgency by 2002 to 2011, the AFP’s shopping list there was “no immediate external

9. Raymond G. Quilop, Darwin Moya, and Czarina Ordinario-Ducusin, Putting an End to Insurgency: An Assessment of the AFP’s Internal Security Operations ( City: Office of the Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 28. 10. Herrboy Aquino, “An Analysis of Two Key Security Challenges Facing the Philippine Republic over the Next Ten Years,” Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues, 3rd Quarter 2010, p. 51. 11. Katheline Anne S. Tolosa, “Owing Sovereignty,” Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues, 4th Quarter 2008, p. 7. 12. Noel L. Patajo, “Measuring the Cost of Insurgency,” Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues, 3rd Quarter 2006, p. 8. 13. Ibid., p. 10. 14. “Philippine Military Official Says Forces Lack Defense Capabilities,” BBC, January 9, 2004, p. 1. 15. “Philippines: Military Said Philippines Air Space Remains Unprotected for the Past Eight Years for Lack of Fighters,” Asia News Monitor, April 27, 2012, pp. 1–2.

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security threat to the Philippines.”16 conduct of basic air force missions, air-defense capabilities is attribut- Because there were no fighter planes, let alone the full range of sustained able to the PAF’s role in the AFP’s the PAF deactivated the Air Defense air operations under dispute.”20 internal security operations. The Command (ADC) as part of the AFP’s primary tactic was to con- “restructuring effort of the AFP to THE PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE—THE duct clear-hold-consolidate-develop 17 focus more on internal security.” MOST ADVANCED SOUTHEAST ASIAN (CHCD) missions against the vari- The PAF began using its Italian- ous insurgent groups in the country. made S-211 trainer planes for its AIR FORCE IN THE 1960S—HAD BY This involved the neutralization of air-defense requirements. However, 2001 BECOME THE WEAKEST AIR the insurgents’ armed capabilities; it could only deploy three S-211s FORCE IN THE REGION. the conduct of combat, intelligence, that were not in tip-top condition and civil-military activities; the and had only 54 percent operational Philippine powerlessness was organization of local inhabitants readiness.18 The planes could not well illustrated during the reported into Integrated Territorial Defense even be modified to serve as inter- May 11, 2011, buzzing by unidenti- units; and assistance to other gov- ceptors because they were originally fied jet fighters.21 According to AFP ernment agencies in undertaking designed to train airmen for surveil- sources, the PAF planes patrol- socio-political and economic devel- lance rather than for aerial interdic- ling Reed Bank saw the intruding opment programs.24 This type of tion missions. With many issues on jet fighters at an altitude of 5,000 military operation created a mind- the S-211’s inoperability surfacing, feet. The PAF pilots mistakenly set within the AFP that: an Internal its safety worthiness was questioned identified the intruding jet fights Security Operation (ISO) is pri- and its capability for Philippine air as civilian commercial airliners.22 marily a ground operation, hence defense became extremely doubtful. They realized too late that the two priority for defense spending and At the tail end of the Arroyo approaching planes were jet fight- capacity buildup should be given administration, the PAF acquired 20 ers. The pilots wanted to challenge to the ground forces (Philippine UH-1 Huey helicopters and one C-130 the intruding jet fighters but know- Army and Philippine ); the from the U.S., all geared toward ing that their obsolete piston-engine PAF should be limited to provid- internal security requirements.19 planes were no match against the ing to ground Meanwhile, on the PAF’s ability to unidentified warplanes, they decided operations performing a tactical respond to a major contingency in to maintain their course. At this air-mobility role and supporting the South China Sea dispute, the point, the two planes flew closer, and national development goals by help- 2007 AFP’s Capability Assessment flew above the hapless OV-10s.23 ing maintain a secure environment; noted: “In air defense, surveillance, and the ISO is a low-tech operation , and ground attack capabili- Air Power in Support requiring move-shoot-communica- ties, the meager resources that could of Internal Security tion capabilities that are basically be mustered severely hamper the The dismal state of Philippine ground-force-oriented.25

16. “Philippine Air Defense Compromised by Fighter Decommissioning—Officer,” BBC, October 3, 2005, p. 1. 17. “Philippine Air Force Restructured to Focus on Internal Security,” BBC, April 3, 2005. 18. Kathleen Mae M. Villamin, “Defending Philippine Territorial Integrity in the 21st Century,” Digest: A Forum of Security and Defense Issues, 1st and 2nd Quarter 2009, p. 8. 19. “Ten Helicopters Arrive in Philippines; U.S. Refurbishes Aircraft for Philippines,” U.S. Federal News Service, June 8, 2007, p. 1. 20. Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning (J-5),AFP’s Capability Assessment (: , 2007), p. 23. 21. “Defense Secretary Says Philippine Forces Lack Capability to Detect Intruders,” BBC Monitoring Asia (May 25, 2011), p. 1. 22. Calica, “Palace in No Hurry to File China Protest.” 23. Jaime Laude, “Chinese Jets Buzz PAF Patrol Planes,” Philippine Star, May 20, 2012, pp. 1–5. 24. Rey Ardo, “Military Dimension of ,” in Peace and Development: Towards Ending Insurgency, Raymond Quilop, ed. (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Office of Strategic and Special Studies, 2007), p. 7. 25. Rino Francisco and Jose Antonio Custodio, “The Challenge of Air Force Modernization in an ISO-Driven Strategy,” unpublished manuscript, p. 5–4. (Available from the authors upon request.)

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The AFP’s 2001 National Military focus on internal security, a defense The capability of the AFP, in Strategy directed the PAF to support analyst wryly remarked, “The capa- this area (air defense), to include the Army-Marine territorial maneu- bility of the AFP to undertake exter- intelligence, air surveillance, and ver force by attending to buildup nal defense operations is severely air combat support is insufficient and deployment of C-130 transport limited at the moment. In itself, the to address territorial defense planes, light-attack helicopters, and AFP’s air and maritime assets are concerns. The Philippine Air fixed-wing ground-, unable to pose a credible deterrent to Defense Control Center and and the maintenance of one squad- foreign aggression.”29 other units cannot effectively ron of fighters to confront external Currently, the PAF is the small- perform their required duties threats emanating from the South est service branch of the AFP, with (e.g., air strategic, tactical, and China Sea.26 Consequently, almost 16,000 officers and personnel. It has civil aviation intelligence, aerial 85 percent of the PAF resources an inventory of 49 aircraft and 67 patrol, photogrammetry, and were used for tactical air operations transport and combat helicopters. In activities). in support of the ’s recent years, it was able to acquire The readiness rating of equip- internal security operations. There SF-260 trainer planes from and ment for this capability area is was practically nothing left for the night-attack helicopters from the also insufficient due to lack of air acquisition of any weapons system U.S. To further improve its internal assets.31 for air defense. This intense uti- security capabilities, the PAF plans lization of its air assets increased to acquire within a three-year period The Shift to the PAF’s maintenance costs. Also, (2009–2012) the following: eight pri- Territorial Defense heavy expenditures for ammunition mary ; 10 additional Aware of China’s growing asser- and fuel of its aircraft for support of Huey UH-1H utility helicopters; eight tiveness in the West Philippines, ground operations further depleted brand new combat-utility helicop- President Benigno Aquino III has the PAF’s scare resources.27 Finally, ters; eight new attack helicopters; stressed the need for the AFP to shift as part of the AFP’s directive that two transport aircraft; and 12 trainer from internal security to territorial “form should follow function,” the helicopters. Missing from the shop- defense since he took office in June PAF was pressed to assign some ping list are interceptors and ground- 2010. On several occasions, President of its units for counterinsurgency attack aircraft for territorial defense. Aquino reiterated the urgency of operations to prevent their aboli- In 2010, the Philippine Commission modernizing the AFP. During the tion or merger. The PAF’s Special on Audit reported that the PAF has welcome ceremony for the new AFP Operations Wing (SOW) was given a total inventory of 21 aging aircraft Chief of Staff, General Ricardo David, limited counterinsurgency mis- and 54 helicopters. However, the President Aquino exhorted the mili- sions that duplicated the Philippine report also revealed that of the total tary to defend democracy and to be at Army combat battalions’ ground of 339 air assets of the air force, only the vanguard of government reform. operations.28 91 are operational, 81 are grounded, He committed his administration to All these factors drained the while the rest are for disposal.30 revive and support the AFP modern- PAF’s limited resources, which led to Thus, the DND’s 2013–2016 Defense ization program.32 He also ordered the demise of its air-defense capa- Planning Guidance made this candid Defense Secretary Gazmin to ensure bilities. On the AFP’s single-minded admission: that the AFP modernization be

26. General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, The Armed Forces of the Philippines National Military Strategy 2011 (Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2001), pp. 35–36. 27. Raymond Jose Quilop, Darwin C. Moya, and Czarian Ordinario-Ducusin, Putting an End to Insurgency: An Assessment of the AFP’s Internal Security Operations (Quezon City: Office of the Strategic and Special Studies, 2007). 28. J. R. S. Franco, “Enhancing Synergy within the Defense Establishment,” in Peace and Development: Towards Ending Insurgency, ed. by Raymond Quilop (Quezon City: General Headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo, 2007), p. 35. 29. Ibid., p. 17. 30. “Philippines Air Force Gets 81 Trainer Aircraft from Italy,” BBC, September 23, 2011. 31. Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, Defense Planning Guidance, 2013–2018 (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 2011), p. 15. 32. Delon Porcalla, “Noy to AFP: Defend Democracy,” The Philippine Star, July 3, 2010, pp. 1–8.

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an “instrument” to strengthen the interdiction capabilities, along with capabilities. The present administra- country’s military capabilities. In the capacity to conduct maritime tion has realized that it could be on response, Secretary Gazmin vowed patrol and reconnaissance. a collision course with China in the to fast-track current government The Philippines’ territorial South China Sea. In June 2011, the and AFP efforts, and harnessed other defense goal is to establish a modest executive branch of the government sectors of society to generate the but “comprehensive border pro- and the AFP agreed on a multiyear, necessary funds for the ill-equipped tection program.” This program is multibillion peso defense upgrade Philippine military. anchored on the surveillance, deter- spending and military buildup. The The 2010 AFP Internal Peace and rence, and border patrol capabili- Department of Budget Management Security Plan highlights the AFP’s ties of the PAF, the Philippine , (DBM) released a multiyear obliga- transition from internal security to and the Philippine that tion authority (MOA) to the DND, territorial maritime defense. The extend from the country’s territorial allowing the AFP to enter into plan acknowledges the AFP’s lack of waters to its contiguous and exclu- multiyear contracts with other capabilities to perform its mandated sive economic zone (EEZ).36 This governments or private arms and task of safe guarding the Philippines’ course of action requires enhancing military hardware manufacturers. extensive maritime borders and the AFP capabilities, prioritizing its The DBM also committed 40 billion ensuring its security from even the needs, and gradually restructuring pesos (about $800 million) in the remotest possibility of external its forces from internal security to next five years (2012–2016) to devel- aggression.33 It provides a three- territorial defense. The long-term op the AFP’s capabilities for greater year period in which the Philippine goal, according to the 2011 AFP’s domain awareness of the Philippines’ military will shift its myopic focus Strategic Intent, is to develop the territorial waters and EEZ. In the on internal security, and develop force structure and capabilities proposed “rolling” program, the the capabilities necessary to under- enabling the Philippine military executive branch will ask the take unilateral defensive operations to maintain a “credible deterrent Philippine Congress to allocate 8 bil- against external armed aggression.34 posture against foreign intrusion or lion pesos ($160 million) annually for The DND–AFP’s 2010 Long- external aggression, and other illegal five years for the acquisition of air- Term Capability Development Plan activities while allowing free naviga- defense surveillance radar, surface- raises the need to re-evaluate the tion to prosper.”37 attack aircraft, close-air-support air- Philippine military’s priorities and craft, combat-utility helicopters, and 38 the urgency of upgrading its weap- THE CURRENT PHILIPPINE long-range patrol aircraft. Also cov- 35 ons system. It provides a change in ADMINISTRATION HAS REALIZED ered are current upgrade programs, strategic planning from counterin- such as the installation of a radar and surgency and counterterrorism mea- THAT IT COULD BE ON A COLLISION communications network along the sures to maritime contingencies due COURSE WITH CHINA IN THE SOUTH coast of Palawan and East Mindanao to the South China Sea dispute. This CHINA SEA. under the Coast Watch System and requires joint capabilities for mari- the acquisition of three refurbished time domain awareness, maritime Diplomatic and strategic devel- U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton class cut- defense operations, and interdiction. opments in the second half of 2011 ters for the . For the PAF, the plan necessitates have prompted the Aquino admin- According to then AFP chief of the development of its air defense, istration to hasten the development staff General Oban, the AFP would close air support, and battlefield air of the AFP’s territorial defense prioritize territorial defense over

33. AFP General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan (Quezon City: Camp General Aguinaldo, 2010), p. 8. 34. Ibid., p. 13. 35. Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff for Plans (J-5),Current Thrust in Upgrading AFP’s Capability: AFP Long-Term Capability Development Plan (Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2010). 36. National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011–2016 (Quezon City: National Security Council, 2011), p. 39. 37. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff,Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2011), p. 27. 38. William B. Depasupil, “Armed Forces to Spend P14b to Upgrade Naval, Aerial Defense,” Tribune Business News, June 29, 2011, p. 1.

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internal security. In September system and platform to sustain measures to strengthen the AFP’s 2011, the DBM released 4.95 billion the deployed maritime assets; territorial defense capabilities; and pesos ($117 million) for territorial development of the Philippine Navy defense requirements. The budget ■■ Development of the AFP’s long- to enhance maritime security in the was roughly divided between the range maritime air patrol and sur- South China Sea.42 Then in January Philippine Navy and the PAF, with veillance through the acquisition 2012, the DND reduced the number 2.6 billion pesos ($60.5 million) allo- of assets for long-range maritime of army and marine battalions to cated for the Philippine Navy’s base air patrol and accompanying base redirect resources and personnel support and logistic system, coast support system; and used for internal security and civil- watch requirements, and purchase of military operations to current priori- two more patrol ships and three heli- ■■ Reactivation of the Philippine Air ties, such as maritime security and copters for . The PAF, Defense System (PADS) through territorial defense.43 in turn, received 2.3 billion pesos the acquisition of air surveillance ($53.5 million) for the acquisition of radar and a of air- Air Power in Support eight attack and utility helicopters defense/surface-attack aircraft to of Territorial Defense and for its bases. provide air-defense coverage over In November 2011, President In October 2011, the Secretary of areas of high concern. Aquino expressed an interest in the National Defense released a three- acquisition by the PAF of two year (2013–2016) Defense Planning During its first 17 months in office, squadrons of second-hand Guidance restructuring the AFP the Aquino administration spent F-16C/Ds through the U.S. Excess to a “lean but fully capable” armed 33.596 billion pesos ($387 million) Defense Articles (EDA) program.44 forces to confront the challenges to to boost the AFP’s internal security The interest is linked directly to the country’s territorial integrity and territorial defense capability.40 China’s growing naval presence and maritime security. It envisions According to Secretary Gazmin, in the South China Sea near the the development of an effective force the DND–AFP signed 138 defense Malampaya natural gas project, projection capability for the AFP to contracts that will be implemented located at the westernmost prov- monitor the Philippines’ territorial in the next five years to improve the ince of Palawan facing the Spratly waters and EEZ. It contains the fol- AFP’s force protection, maritime Islands. However, the acquisition lowing measures:39 surveillance, transportation, and of these fourth-generation fighter combat support system.41 General planes could cause tremendous ■■ Reduction of infantry and marine Oban’s successor, Lieutenant financial strain to the AFP since it battalions and the redirection of General (Philippine is still actively engaged in internal limited financial resources to key Army), pledged his support for the security operations. Relative to the priorities, such as theater mobility, AFP’s shift to territorial defense. AFP’s Internal Peace and Security close-air support, air surveillance, He also announced that he would Plan, the PAF is assigned the follow- and air defense; pursue four main goals: full imple- ing counterinsurgency and counter- mentation of the Internal Peace terrorism functions:45 intelligence- ■■ Acquisition of naval assets for and Security Plan; organizational surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR); , strategic sea-lift, reforms to ensure fiscal transparen- precision attack to minimize collat- and accompanying base support cy within the military establishment; eral damage in its ground-support

39. Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, Defense Planning Guidance, 2013–2018 (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 2011), pp. 11–16. 40. “Philippines Spends US$387 Million on Armed Forces Upgrade,” BBC, January 16, 2012. 41. “AFP Modernization Program in Full Swing–Gazmin,” Philippine News Agency, March 18, 2012. 42. “New AFP Chief Vows to Focus on Territorial Defense, MILF Peace Talks,” Philippine News Agency, December 13, 2011. 43. “Philippines Mulls Reorganization of Military to Boost Territorial Defense,” BBC, January 2, 2012. 44. Jon Grevatt, “Philippines to Hasten Recreation of Dedicated Combat Wing with Ex-USAF F-16 Purchase,” Jane Defense Industry, . 29, No. 1 (January 1, 2012), p. 1. 45. Francisco and Custodio, “The Challenge of Air Force Modernization in an ISO-Driven Strategy,” p. 3.

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operations; and education and Brazilian Super Tucano) to replace budget and defense capabili- information dissemination cam- its aging OV-10 Broncos; one long- ties, the PAF will support the paign as part of the AFP’s internal range patrol craft; one air-defense Philippine Navy’s limited naval security strategy in winning hearts radar; and one special-mission interdiction operations. The and minds. aircraft. The purchase of these air PAF’s Air Defense System and the assets under the Aquino administra- Philippine Navy’s Coast Watch THE PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE IS tion will enable the PAF to develop System will provide coverage and LITERALLY REBUILDING THE a credible air defense and enable it augment for over-the-horizon to optimize its role in the Philippine reconnaissance and targeting COUNTRY’S AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEM territorial defense.47 Still heavily capabilities.48 The PAF’s maritime FROM SCRATCH. involved in internal security, the PAF patrol and has to develop a new doctrine for would serve as the primary plat- Another aggravating problem its projected acquisition of military forms of patrols, surveillance, and is the PAF’s lack of trained fighter hardware for air defense. Based on interdiction, while the Philippine pilots, logistics training, and base the DND’s and AFP’s documents Navy’s surface combatants and facilities for advanced fighter planes and pronouncements, the PAF will sea-borne helicopters would con- since it decommissioned two squad- concentrate on two major territorial duct patrol and provide longer on- rons of F-5 planes deemed obsolete defense functions: station time, visible and enhanced and too expensive to maintain. The naval presence, and deterrence.49 PAF also deactivated its Air Defense ■■ Enhancing maritime domain The PAF’s air-defense and coastal Command and replaced it with an awareness. The AFP’s capabil- system would be linked Air Defense Wing equipped with ity for maritime surveillance is with the navy’s surface and trainer jets. The PAF is literally extremely limited. The estab- underwater interdiction capabili- starting from scratch in rebuilding lishment of the National Coast ties that will constitute the first the country’s air-defense system. In Watch System in September 2011 layer of maritime defense for the May 2012, President Aquino hinted to monitor the country’s vast Philippines. that the PAF might have to settle for maritime environment requires brand-new lead-in jet trainers that air assets, trained personnel, and Presently, aside from a lim- can be converted into fighter planes radars. The PAF acquisition of a ited budget for capability upgrade, by modifying their air-frame.46 In an long-range patrol aircraft, lead- the PAF faces many challenges in interview, President Aquino raised in fighter jets, and surface-attack re-establishing a credible defense the possibility of acquiring new aircraft addresses the need for posture.50 It needs to formulate a fighter jets from the United Kingdom, maritime awareness and lim- new doctrine on tactics, techniques, France, Italy, or even South Korea— ited naval interdiction capability, and procedure (TTP) for air-defense given the expense and limited initial particularly within Philippine ter- requirements. It also requires air service life of the refurbished F-16s. ritorial waters to the 200-nautical defense control centers (ADACs), air In June 2012, the DND mile EEZ. defense direction centers (ADDCs), announced that the PAF expects the ground-based air defense (GBAD) delivery of 12 lead-in fighter planes ■■ Joint operations with the system sites, aircraft hangars, and (most probably South Korean-made navy for limited naval inter- other support facilities. Finally, the TA-50s) and six surface-attack air- diction capabilities. Given the PAF can only operate a credible air- craft (either South Korean KT-1 or Philippines’ inadequate defense defense system if it has trained and

46. Aurea Calica, “Aquino: Government Can Now Afford to Buy New Fighter Jets,”The Philippine Star, May 17, 2012, p. 2. 47. Alexis Romano, “Air Force to Acquire 18 Aircraft Within Two Years,” The Philippine Star, June 21, 2012, p. 5. 48. Joes Renan C. Suarez, “The Imperatives of Defending the Philippines and Air-Defense Partnership,” presentation at the Air Power Symposium, June 21, 2012, City, Philippines. 49. Ibid. 50. Raul L. Del Rosario, “Protecting National Interests Through a Responsive Air Power Strategy,” presentation at the Air Power Symposium, June 21, 2012, Pasay City, Philippines.

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skilled pilots to fly its new jet fighters, necessity of maintaining politi- ■■ Assisting the PAF in formulat- supported by dedicated and profi- cally unsustainable and costly ing a new doctrine on TTPs cient ground crews to maintain these permanent bases. A strong and for maritime-domain aware- expensive air assets and man the consistent presence in the region ness and joint operations. The various facilities. is essential to ensure that the old PAF TTPs were based on the U.S. is in a position to respond in protection of and Rebuilding the PAF’s Credible a timely manner…to guarantee Subic Naval Base during the Cold Air-Defense Capabilities freedom of navigation and access War. The PAF needs new TTPs During the spring 2012 to the high seas…. The U.S. needs to assist the Philippine Navy in Philippines–U.S. Bilateral Strategic a stronger ally in the region who developing joint capabilities for Dialogue in Washington, D.C., will be able to take on a bigger air, surface, and sub-surface sur- Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert share of guaranteeing the stabil- veillance, detection, and interdic- del Rosario made an unprecedented ity of the region. It is therefore to tion of the Philippines’ maritime remark: “It is terribly painful to the strategic interest of the U.S. territory. hear the international media accu- to invest in the development of rately describing the poor state of the the Philippines’ defense and mili- ■■ Forming a Pentagon–DND–AFP Philippine armed forces. But more tary capability.52 committee to formulate a mul- painful is the fact that it is true, and tiyear program guiding the re- we only have ourselves to blame for What the U.S. Should Do establishment of the country’s it. For the Philippines to be mini- The U.S. can help its Southeast air-defense system in tandem mally reliant upon the U.S. regional Asian ally to rebuild a credible air- with maritime surveillance partner…it therefore behooves us defense system by: capabilities. to resort to all possible means to build at the very least a most mini- ■■ Providing the Philippines up to ■■ Encouraging U.S. allies mal credible defense posture.”51 two squadrons of refurbished (, , and South Secretary del Rosario indeed con- F-16s through the Excess Korea) to sell the Philippines veyed the Philippines’ vulnerability Defense Articles program, their state-of-the art lead-in and utter desperation in its impasse along with a training program jet trainers that can be used by with a militarily powerful China on their maintenance. the PAF as a transition fighter at the Scarborough Shoal, north of before it shifts to a fourth-gen- the disputed , 124 ■■ Providing a rush training eration interceptor. nautical miles from Luzon, and well course for the development of within the country’s EEZ. a new corps of skilled pilots ■■ Deploying, on a six-month In his speech at The Heritage to fly the newly acquired jet rotational basis, a U.S. Marine Foundation in May 2012, Secretary fighters.The decommissioning or Navy fighter squadron to del Rosario challenged the U.S.: of the PAF vintage F-5s in 2005 be based in cooperative secu- caused a dramatic attrition in the rity locations (CSLs) in the On the part of the U.S., it aims number of trained jet pilots. Many Philippines. This squadron can to build a more geographically of the remaining pilots (and their train with its Filipino counter- distributed, operationally resil- ground crews) have either retired parts and provide more reliable ient, and politically sustainable or have joined commercial air- and seasoned air-defense capa- defense posture, while reaffirm- lines. Consequently, all PAF units bilities before the PAF develops a ing its role as a Pacific power. performing territorial defense credible air-defense system. This will require the ability to be roles have a personnel readiness present in key areas of the region shortfall. ■■ Linking future assistance in a timely manner, without the to major reforms in the

51. “Philippines Sends SOS to the International Community,” The Philippine Star, May 2, 2012. 52. Secretary , “Challenges, New Developments in the Philippines–U.S. Alliance,” remarks delivered at The Heritage Foundation, May 2, 2012, http://www.dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/5318 (accessed August 24, 2012).

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Philippine defense community, ■■ Deploying, on a rotational littoral states, outclassed by its naval such as increasing the percent- basis, a squadron of P-8 prowess—particularly by bringing age of defense spending vis-à- Poseidons to CSLs in the them to the brink of a naval confron- vis the gross domestic product Philippines. These reconnais- tation to resolve what is essentially a (GDP) (from 0.9 percent to sance and surveillance planes maritime jurisdiction issue.54 1.8 percent); increasing the will be flown by a U.S.–Filipino In 2012, China has targeted the ratio of capital expenditure crew to survey and safeguard the Philippines in this naval brinkman- to expenditures on personnel; Philippines’ vast maritime bor- ship game. The Philippines has the and minimizing graft and cor- ders. weakest navy in the region, and ruption in the AFP. Washington its air force is unable to patrol and should also impress upon its ally The three-month Scarborough monitor its vast maritime terri- that adequate budget, facilities, Shoal impasse reveals China’s geo- tory. It resorts to the futile filing of and technical know-how are nec- political gambit against the other diplomatic protests whenever an essary to maintain an expensive claimant states in the South China aggressive China encroaches on its and technologically advanced air- Sea dispute. This gambit involves EEZ. As a last resort, the Philippines defense system. “drawing a line in the sea—using civil- has turned to its only strategic ally— ian maritime vessels to challenge the U.S.—for support. Aside from ■■ Recruiting Filipino Americans these littoral states, and leaving enhancing its own naval presence in to the U.S. Air Force—and them with the risky option of escalat- the Pacific, the U.S. can assist its old- forming a Fil–Am wing of ing matters by resorting to military est East Asian ally by helping the PAF volunteer trained pilots and means which will have dire conse- spread its wings once again. ground crews for temporary quences since” the naval ships of —Renato Cruz De Castro, PhD, is deployment to the PAF once it the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) professor in the International Studies transitions into an advanced “are lurking in the background.”53 Department at De La Salle University stage of air-defense readiness. These relatively weak Southeast (Manila) and holds the Charles Lui Asian nations—like the Philippines Keung Professorial Chair in China ■■ Establishing radar and weath- and Vietnam—are placed in the Studies. Walter Lohman is Director er-monitoring stations in the dilemma of exacerbating the stand- of the Asian Studies Center at The Philippines. These stations will off by using force or backing down Heritage Foundation. The authors be manned jointly by the U.S. completely. They are aware that PLA are grateful to Reno Francisco of the Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force, surface combatants and Philippine Air Force’s Office of Special and the PAF, just like the Wallace are deployed behind these civilian Studies and Major Augusto Padua of Air Station set up prior to 1992 vessels, ready to pounce on their the Philippines Air Defense Wing for when Clark Air Base and Subic unsuspecting patrol boats. China’s their assistance in the preparation of Naval Bases were still operational. apparent stratagem is to put the onus this paper. for the use of force on the smaller

53. William Chong, “Path to Scarborough Far from Fair: South China Sea Rivals no Match for China’s Economic, Military Clout,” The Strait Times, April 21, 2012. 54. Ibid.

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