BACKGROUNDER No. 2733 | SEptEMBER 24, 2012 Getting the Philippines Air Force Flying Again: The Role of the U.S.–Philippines Alliance Renato Cruz De Castro, PhD, and Walter Lohman Abstract or two years, the U.S.– The recent standoff at Scarborough FPhilippines alliance has been Key Points Shoal between the Philippines and challenged in ways unseen since the China demonstrates how Beijing is closure of two American bases on ■■ The U.S. needs a fully capable ally targeting Manila in its strategy of Filipino territory in the early 1990s.1 in the South China Sea to protect U.S.–Philippines interests. maritime brinkmanship. Manila’s China’s aggressive, well-resourced weakness stems from the Philippine pursuit of its territorial claims in ■■ The Philippines Air Force is in a Air Force’s (PAF) lack of air- the South China Sea has brought a deplorable state—it does not have defense system and air-surveillance thousand nautical miles from its the capability to effectively moni- tor, let alone defend, Philippine capabilities to patrol and protect own shores, and very close to the airspace. Philippine airspace and maritime Philippines. ■■ territory. The PAF’s deplorable state For the Philippines, sovereignty, The Philippines has no fighter jets. As a result, it also lacks trained is attributed to the Armed Forces access to energy, and fishing grounds fighter pilots, logistics training, of the Philippines’ single-minded are at stake. For the U.S., its role as and associated basing facilities. focus on internal security since 2001. regional guarantor of peace, secu- ■■ The government of the Philippines Currently, the Aquino administration rity, and freedom of the seas is being is engaged in a serious effort to is undertaking a major reform challenged—as well as its reliability more fully resource its military to shift the PAF from its focus on as an ally. needs and shift focus from inter- counterinsurgency to its original role The U.S. has no stake in the nal security to territorial defense. of air defense, an effort hindered by the details of a settlement to the territo- Its air force is an important part of perennial lack of funds. It is imperative rial dispute. That is not to say it is this effort. for the U.S.—Philippines’ alliance—to neutral: The U.S. is deeply implicated ■■ America’s long-standing historical assist the PAF in developing the air by virtue of its treaty obligations to relationship with the Philippines, power and skills to spread its wings the Philippines. The U.S. must help and the U.S.–Philippines Mutual and protect the country’s territory. the Philippines stand up for itself Defense Treaty, provides the basis and develop the capability to be a for the U.S. to help the Philippines rebuild its air force into a credible valuable ally—at sea and in the air. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at fighting force. http://report.heritage.org/bg2733 Produced by the Asian Studies Center Military Challenges The Heritage Foundation for the Philippines 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 On March 2, 2011, two Chinese (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org patrol boats harassed an unarmed Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily Filipino-commissioned oil-explora- reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill tion ship at Reed Bank off the west- before Congress. ern Philippines island of Palawan. In BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2733 SEptEmbER 24, 2012 response, the Philippine Air Force Aquino immediately ordered the up a credible fight if challenged—a dispatched two aging and obsolete allocation of more funds to build defense capable of deterring Chinese planes—an OV-10 Bronco recon- up the military’s territorial defense adventurism or aggression off the naissance plane and an Islander capabilities.7 Philippines’ coast. Such a capability light aircraft—but the two Chinese The recent two-month standoff involves assisting the Aquino admin- patrol boats had left the area by the between Filipino and Chinese civil- istration in weaning the PAF from time the slow piston-engine planes ian vessels at Scarborough Shoal its current task of supporting the arrived.2 In the following months, in the South China Sea has since Philippine Army’s counterinsurgen- the PAF recorded a series of aerial accentuated the country’s military cy operations to assuming its origi- intrusions by unidentified aircraft weakness, especially when it comes nal role as the Philippines’ first line into the area. On May 19, 2011, two to air defense and maritime domain of defense against external threats. PAF OV-10s sighted two unidenti- awareness. Filipino military officers Specifically, the PAF needs to devel- fied fighter jets over the Reed Bank. argued that the incidents could have op air-power capabilities, such as On June 4, a Filipino fishing vessel been prevented if the Philippines had intelligence surveillance, maritime reported the overflight of an uniden- a credible military that can stand up patrol, precision-strike capabilities, tified fighter jet at Dalagang Bukid to China’s coercive diplomacy. With and radar, command, control, and Shoal3 south of Reed Bank. On July the withdrawal of American military communication systems. 11, a group of Filipino fishermen facilities in the country in 1992, the sighted a low-flying unidentified Congress of the Philippines passed WHAT THE PHILIPPINES NEEDS FOR aircraft and a helicopter near Raja the 1995 AFP Modernization Law ITS OWN DEFENSE, AND TO BE A Soliman Reef, also south of the Reed that allocates 331 billion Filipino Bank. pesos (around $6.62 billion) over 15 STRONGER ALLY OF THE U.S., IS A These developments generated years for modernizing the Filipino 24-HOUR-A-DAY CAPABILITY TO panic within the military establish- military. Unfortunately, the law “ran PATROL ITS TERRITORY AND CLAIMS ment and the Aquino administration. the full length of its implementing FROM THE AIR. Former chief of staff of the Armed period and expired (in December Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 2011) without any significant prog- Lieutenant General Eduardo Oban ress” in terms of any major arms The PAF Clips Its Wings admitted that “the AFP is helpless acquisition for the AFP.8 Thus, 15 In late 2001, the Arroyo admin- because the PAF does not have the years after the law was passed, the istration released Executive Order capability to monitor and identify PAF has neither the fighter planes No. 21, the national internal security the intruders.”4 Philippines Defense nor a modern radar system. A nation- plan (NISP), which considered the Secretary Voltaire Gazmin con- wide air-defense system remains various insurgencies in the coun- curred,5 and presidential spokesman elusive. try as a serious threat to national Abigail Valte noted that the inci- What the Philippines needs for security. The executive order dents highlighted the need for the its own defense, and to be a stron- directed the government to adopt Filipino government to step up the ger ally of the U.S., is a 24-hour-a- a holistic approach—consisting of modernization of the AFP.6 She also day capability to patrol its territory political, socioeconomic, psycho- announced that President Benigno and claims from the air, and to put logical, security, and information 1. Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base have since re-opened for U.S. military presence. Jamie Laude, “US Troops Can Use Clark, Subic Bases,” The Philippine Star, June 6, 2012, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?publicationSubCategoryId=63&articleId=814442 (accessed September 7, 2012). 2. “Philippines Protests Against China’s Planned Oil Rig, Constructions in Spratlys,” BBC, June 2, 2011. 3. Air Defense Wing, “Situation: Chinese Aggressiveness in the West Philippine Sea,” Philippine Air Force, Fighter Town, Air Base Basa, pp. 1–2. 4. “AFP Has No Fighter Planes to Protect Philippine Air Space—Oban,” The Philippines News Agency, June 12, 2011, p. 1. 5. “Defence Secretary Says Philippine Forces Lack Capability to Detect Intruders,” BBC, May 25, 2011. 6. Aurea Calica, “Palace in No Hurry to File China Protest,” The Philippine Star, May 21, 2011, pp. 1, 16. 7. Ibid., p. 1. 8. Vincent Cabreza, “Philippine Defense Secretary Admits AFP Upgrade Plan a Dud,” Tribune Business News, February 19, 2012. 2 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2733 SEptEmbER 24, 2012 components—to address the root 2010, or to disarm and demobilize consisted of combat helmets, body causes of the armed violence engen- the MILF. 10 As a result, the AFP’s armor, squad-machine guns, combat- dered by these insurgent movements. focus on internal security intensified, lifesaver kits, ground-attack planes, The NISP identified three major and its territorial defense develop- and night-capable attack helicop- internal security threats: (1) the ment efforts were relegated to the ters. Instead of replacing its aging Communist Party of the Philippines sidelines. Suitable military materiel F-5A fighter plans with F-16 Falcons and its military arm, the New intended for territorial defense were or Tornadoes, the AFP diverted its People’s Army; (2) the secessionist used for internal security purpos- limited budget to the acquisition or groups on the island of Mindanao; es. Furthermore, limited financial reconditioning of Killer Medium and (3) terrorist groups, such as the resources for the AFP modernization patrol crafts from South Korea, Islamist Abu Sayyaf. were diverted to personnel cost and OV-10s from Thailand, and UH-1H In response to these threats, to the combat operations against the Huey helicopters from the U.S. These the AFP formulated the 2002 insurgent groups. Consequently, an acquisitions were used to combat ter- Operational Plan Bantay Laya (free- average of 70 percent of the defense rorism and domestic insurgency.