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Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 29
ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 29 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. Copyright 2003: Royal Air Force Historical Society First published in the UK in 2003 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361-4231 Typeset by Creative Associates 115 Magdalen Road Oxford OX4 1RS Printed by Advance Book Printing Unit 9 Northmoor Park Church Road Northmoor OX29 5UH 3 CONTENTS BATTLE OF BRITAIN DAY. Address by Dr Alfred Price at the 5 AGM held on 12th June 2002 WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE LUFTWAFFE’S ‘TIP 24 AND RUN’ BOMBING ATTACKS, MARCH 1942-JUNE 1943? A winning British Two Air Forces Award paper by Sqn Ldr Chris Goss SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE SIXTEENTH 52 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE CLUB ON 12th JUNE 2002 ON THE GROUND BUT ON THE AIR by Charles Mitchell 55 ST-OMER APPEAL UPDATE by Air Cdre Peter Dye 59 LIFE IN THE SHADOWS by Sqn Ldr Stanley Booker 62 THE MUNICIPAL LIAISON SCHEME by Wg Cdr C G Jefford 76 BOOK REVIEWS. 80 4 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham GCB CBE DFC AFC Vice-President Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KCB CBE AFC Committee Chairman Air Vice-Marshal -
How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle of Britain British Courage and Capability Might Not Have Been Enough to Win; German Mistakes Were Also Key
How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle of Britain British courage and capability might not have been enough to win; German mistakes were also key. By John T. Correll n July 1940, the situation looked “We shall fight on the beaches, we shall can do more than delay the result.” Gen. dire for Great Britain. It had taken fight on the landing grounds, we shall Maxime Weygand, commander in chief Germany less than two months to fight in the fields and in the streets, we of French military forces until France’s invade and conquer most of Western shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, predicted, “In three weeks, IEurope. The fast-moving German Army, surrender.” England will have her neck wrung like supported by panzers and Stuka dive Not everyone agreed with Churchill. a chicken.” bombers, overwhelmed the Netherlands Appeasement and defeatism were rife in Thus it was that the events of July 10 and Belgium in a matter of days. France, the British Foreign Office. The Foreign through Oct. 31—known to history as the which had 114 divisions and outnumbered Secretary, Lord Halifax, believed that Battle of Britain—came as a surprise to the Germany in tanks and artillery, held out a Britain had lost already. To Churchill’s prophets of doom. Britain won. The RAF little longer but surrendered on June 22. fury, the undersecretary of state for for- proved to be a better combat force than Britain was fortunate to have extracted its eign affairs, Richard A. “Rab” Butler, told the Luftwaffe in almost every respect. -
Getting the Philippines Air Force Flying Again: the Role of the U.S.–Philippines Alliance Renato Cruz De Castro, Phd, and Walter Lohman
BACKGROUNDER No. 2733 | SEptEMBER 24, 2012 Getting the Philippines Air Force Flying Again: The Role of the U.S.–Philippines Alliance Renato Cruz De Castro, PhD, and Walter Lohman Abstract or two years, the U.S.– The recent standoff at Scarborough FPhilippines alliance has been Key Points Shoal between the Philippines and challenged in ways unseen since the China demonstrates how Beijing is closure of two American bases on ■■ The U.S. needs a fully capable ally targeting Manila in its strategy of Filipino territory in the early 1990s.1 in the South China Sea to protect U.S.–Philippines interests. maritime brinkmanship. Manila’s China’s aggressive, well-resourced weakness stems from the Philippine pursuit of its territorial claims in ■■ The Philippines Air Force is in a Air Force’s (PAF) lack of air- the South China Sea has brought a deplorable state—it does not have defense system and air-surveillance thousand nautical miles from its the capability to effectively moni- tor, let alone defend, Philippine capabilities to patrol and protect own shores, and very close to the airspace. Philippine airspace and maritime Philippines. ■■ territory. The PAF’s deplorable state For the Philippines, sovereignty, The Philippines has no fighter jets. As a result, it also lacks trained is attributed to the Armed Forces access to energy, and fishing grounds fighter pilots, logistics training, of the Philippines’ single-minded are at stake. For the U.S., its role as and associated basing facilities. focus on internal security since 2001. regional guarantor of peace, secu- ■■ The government of the Philippines Currently, the Aquino administration rity, and freedom of the seas is being is engaged in a serious effort to is undertaking a major reform challenged—as well as its reliability more fully resource its military to shift the PAF from its focus on as an ally. -
Blitzkrieg: the Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht's
East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 8-2021 Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era Briggs Evans East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Evans, Briggs, "Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 3927. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/3927 This Thesis - unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era ________________________ A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in History ______________________ by Briggs Evans August 2021 _____________________ Dr. Stephen Fritz, Chair Dr. Henry Antkiewicz Dr. Steve Nash Keywords: Blitzkrieg, doctrine, operational warfare, American military, Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, World War II, Cold War, Soviet Union, Operation Desert Storm, AirLand Battle, Combined Arms Theory, mobile warfare, maneuver warfare. ABSTRACT Blitzkrieg: The Evolution of Modern Warfare and the Wehrmacht’s Impact on American Military Doctrine during the Cold War Era by Briggs Evans The evolution of United States military doctrine was heavily influenced by the Wehrmacht and their early Blitzkrieg campaigns during World War II. -
Messerschmitt Bf 109
Messerschmitt Bf 109 Bf 109 The most famous survivor, Messerschmitt Bf109G-2/Trop "Black 6", Wk Nr 10639; photo taken 1997 Duxford Air Show. Type Fighter Manufacturer Bayerische Flugzeugwerke Messerschmitt Designed by Willy Messerschmitt Maiden flight 28 May 1935 Introduced 1937 Retired 1945, Luftwaffe 1965, Spain Status Retired Primary users Luftwaffe Spanish Air Force Number built more than 33,000. Variants Avia S-199 Hispano Aviacion Ha 1112 1 German Airfield, France, 1941 propaganda photo of the Luftwaffe, Bf 109 fighters on the tarmac The Messerschmitt Bf 109 was a German World War II fighter aircraft designed by Willy Messerschmitt in the early 1930s. It was one of the first true modern fighters of the era, including such features as an all-metal monocoque construction, a closed canopy, and retractable landing gear. The Bf 109 was produced in greater quantities than any other fighter aircraft in history, with 30,573 units built alone during 1939-1945. Fighter production totalled 47% of all German aircraft production, and the Bf 109 accounted for 57% of all fighter types produced[1]. The Bf 109 was the standard fighter of the Luftwaffe for the duration of World War II, although it began to be partially replaced by the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 starting in 1941. The Bf 109 scored more aircraft kills in World War II than any other aircraft. At various times it served as an air superiority fighter, an escort fighter, an interceptor, a ground-attack aircraft and a reconnaissance aircraft. Although the Bf 109 had weaknesses, including a short range, and especially a sometimes difficult to handle narrow, outward-retracting undercarriage, it stayed competitive with Allied fighter aircraft until the end of the war. -
OH-323) 482 Pgs
Processed by: EWH LEE Date: 10-13-94 LEE, WILLIAM L. (OH-323) 482 pgs. OPEN Military associate of General Eisenhower; organizer of Philippine Air Force under Douglas MacArthur, 1935-38 Interview in 3 parts: Part I: 1-211; Part II: 212-368; Part III: 369-482 DESCRIPTION: [Interview is based on diary entries and is very informal. Mrs. Lee is present and makes occasional comments.] PART I: Identification of and comments about various figures and locations in film footage taken in the Philippines during the 1930's; flying training and equipment used at Camp Murphy; Jimmy Ord; building an airstrip; planes used for training; Lee's background (including early duty assignments; volunteering for assignment to the Philippines); organizing and developing the Philippine Air Unit of the constabulary (including Filipino officer assistants; Curtis Lambert; acquiring training aircraft); arrival of General Douglas MacArthur and staff (October 26, 1935); first meeting with Major Eisenhower (December 14, 1935); purpose of the constabulary; Lee's financial situation; building Camp Murphy (including problems; plans for the air unit; aircraft); Lee's interest in a squadron of airplanes for patrol of coastline vs. MacArthur's plan for seapatrol boats; Sid Huff; establishing the air unit (including determining the kind of airplanes needed; establishing physical standards for Filipino cadets; Jesus Villamor; standards of training; Lee's assessment of the success of Filipino student pilots); "Lefty" Parker, Lee, and Eisenhower's solo flight; early stages in formation -
Bombing of Gernika
BIBLIOTECA DE The Bombing CULTURA VASCA of Gernika The episode of Guernica, with all that it The Bombing ... represents both in the military and the G) :c moral order, seems destined to pass 0 of Gernika into History as a symbol. A symbol of >< many things, but chiefly of that Xabier lruio capacity for falsehood possessed by the new Machiavellism which threatens destruction to all the ethical hypotheses of civilization. A clear example of the ..e use which can be made of untruth to ·-...c: degrade the minds of those whom one G) wishes to convince. c., '+- 0 (Foreign Wings over the Basque Country, 1937) C> C: ISBN 978-0-9967810-7-7 :c 90000 E 0 co G) .c 9 780996 781077 t- EDITORIALVASCA EKIN ARGITALETXEA Aberri Bilduma Collection, 11 Ekin Aberri Bilduma Collection, 11 Xabier Irujo The Bombing of Gernika Ekin Buenos Aires 2021 Aberri Bilduma Collection, 11 Editorial Vasca Ekin Argitaletxea Lizarrenea C./ México 1880 Buenos Aires, CP. 1200 Argentina Web: http://editorialvascaekin- ekinargitaletxea.blogspot.com Copyright © 2021 Ekin All rights reserved First edition. First print Printed in America Cover design © 2021 JSM ISBN first edition: 978-0-9967810-7-7 Table of Contents Bombardment. Description and types 9 Prehistory of terror bombing 13 Coup d'etat: Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco 17 Non-Intervention Committee 21 The Basque Country in 1936 27 The Basque front in the spring of 1937 31 Everyday routine: “Clear day means bombs” 33 Slow advance toward Bilbao 37 “Target Gernika” 41 Seven main reasons for choosing Gernika as a target 47 The alarm systems and the antiaircraft shelters 51 Typology and number of airplanes and bombs 55 Strategy of the attack 59 Excerpts from personal testimonies 71 Material destruction and death toll 85 The news 101 The lie 125 Denial and reductionism 131 Reconstruction 133 Bibliography 137 I can’t -it is impossible for me to give any picture of that indescribable tragedy. -
Military Tribunal, Indictments
MILITARY TRIBUNALS Case No. 12 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -against- WILHELM' VON LEEB, HUGO SPERRLE, GEORG KARL FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON KUECHLER, JOHANNES BLASKOWITZ, HERMANN HOTH, HANS REINHARDT. HANS VON SALMUTH, KARL HOL LIDT, .OTTO SCHNmWIND,. KARL VON ROQUES, HERMANN REINECKE., WALTERWARLIMONT, OTTO WOEHLER;. and RUDOLF LEHMANN. Defendants OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (US) NORNBERG 1947 • PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6a171/ TABLE OF CONTENTS - Page INTRODUCTORY 1 COUNT ONE-CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 6 A Austria 'and Czechoslovakia 7 B. Poland, France and The United Kingdom 9 C. Denmark and Norway 10 D. Belgium, The Netherland.; and Luxembourg 11 E. Yugoslavia and Greece 14 F. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 17 G. The United states of America 20 . , COUNT TWO-WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: CRIMES AGAINST ENEMY BELLIGERENTS AND PRISONERS OF WAR 21 A: The "Commissar" Order , 22 B. The "Commando" Order . 23 C, Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of Wal 24 D. Murder and III Treatment of Prisoners of War 25 . COUNT THREE-WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: CRIMES AGAINST CIVILIANS 27 A Deportation and Enslavement of Civilians . 29 B. Plunder of Public and Private Property, Wanton Destruc tion, and Devastation not Justified by Military Necessity. 31 C. Murder, III Treatment and Persecution 'of Civilian Popu- lations . 32 COUNT FOUR-COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY 39 APPENDIX A-STATEMENT OF MILITARY POSITIONS HELD BY THE DEFENDANTS AND CO-PARTICIPANTS 40 2 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6a171/ INDICTMENT -
Realignment and Indian Air Power Doctrine
Realignment and Indian Airpower Doctrine Challenges in an Evolving Strategic Context Dr. Christina Goulter Prof. Harsh Pant Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If it is reproduced, the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs requests a courtesy line. ith a shift in the balance of power in the Far East, as well as multiple chal- Wlenges in the wider international security environment, several nations in the Indo-Pacific region have undergone significant changes in their defense pos- tures. This is particularly the case with India, which has gone from a regional, largely Pakistan-focused, perspective to one involving global influence and power projection. This has presented ramifications for all the Indian armed services, but especially the Indian Air Force (IAF). Over the last decade, the IAF has been trans- forming itself from a principally army-support instrument to a broad spectrum air force, and this prompted a radical revision of Indian aipower doctrine in 2012. It is akin to Western airpower thought, but much of the latest doctrine is indigenous and demonstrates some unique conceptual work, not least in the way maritime air- power is used to protect Indian territories in the Indian Ocean and safeguard sea lines of communication. Because of this, it is starting to have traction in Anglo- American defense circles.1 The current Indian emphases on strategic reach and con- ventional deterrence have been prompted by other events as well, not least the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, which demonstrated that India lacked a balanced defense apparatus. -
Battle of Britain Blood Red Skies
Battle of Britain Blood Red Skies (BRS) Campaign The German “Blitzkrieg”, a new way of waging “lightning war” had raged through first Poland, then in the early summer of 1940 struck at Holland, Belgium and France. The Luftwaffe (German air force) crushed all opponents in the air, and then fast moving armour with ever present air support sliced through ground forces leaving their opponents scrabbling to hold defensive positions that were already untenable. The British Expeditionary Force fell back to Dunkirk and was evacuated against the odds. During this period the RAF (Royal Air Force) had desperately tried to defend the Dunkirk beaches and the constant stream of ships large and small ferrying the remains of the BEF back home. When the last ships left over 338000 men had been evacuated, British and French, but they were exhausted and had abandoned all their weapons and heavy equipment on French roads and beaches. As Churchill said “What General Weygand has called the Battle of France is over ... the Battle of Britain is about to begin” The Battle of Britain was fought in the skies above England in the summer of 1940. The Luftwaffe were seeking to destroy the RAF to clear the way for a cross Chanel assault by the German Army. If they could succeed, Britain would be threatened with defeat and the war would be over. If the RAF could survive, then there may be time to prepare the defences, and possibly take the fight back to the enemy in due course. This campaign is designed to allow players to recreate some of the desperate battles fought in the summer of 1940 using the Blood Red Skies (BRS) rules from Warlord Games. -
Germany at the Pivot
Three powerful factors military dy l Kenne security, trade opportunities, and Pau by Ostpolitik—are shaping West German tos attitudes toward the Soviet bloc. —Pho Germany at the Pivot BY VINCENT P. GRIMES N ONE critical issue after an- tional approach are West German O other—arms control, East- economic and military power within West trade, modernization of NATO and the German perception NATO nuclear weapons, policy to- that a historic opportunity exists to ward eastern Europe—West Ger- ease national problems. many is now exerting a major and The rise of a powerhouse econo- perhaps decisive influence. my in the Federal Republic, far from The nation of 61,000,000 seems concentrating German attention on increasingly ready to place itself at internal affairs, has fed German odds with key allies on the basic readiness to play a more prominent security issue of how to respond to international role. Soviet power. Bonn consistently After World War II, Germany lay outpaces both the US and Britain in destroyed, and the lines of occupa- supporting Soviet leader Mikhail tion became the frontiers of a divid- Gorbachev and in calling for West- ed Europe. From this prostrate con- ern military concessions. dition, the West German state has The West German Air Force's first-rate equipment includes 165 Tornado fighter/ Bonn's actions reflect a desire for risen to become a worldwide indus- ground-attack aircraft. This Tornado and a larger role in eastern Europe, a trial giant and the dominant eco- crew recently visited Andrews AFB, Md., region where the Kremlin faces vast nomic force on the Continent. -
Redalyc.THE IMPACT of NATO on the SPANISH AIR FORCE
UNISCI Discussion Papers ISSN: 1696-2206 [email protected] Universidad Complutense de Madrid España Yaniz Velasco, Federico THE IMPACT OF NATO ON THE SPANISH AIR FORCE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND FUTURE PROSPECTS UNISCI Discussion Papers, núm. 22, enero, 2010, pp. 224-244 Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=76712438014 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 22 (January / Enero 2010) ISSN 1696-2206 THE IMPACT OF NATO ON THE SPANISH AIR FORCE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND FUTURE PROSPECTS Federico Yaniz Velasco 1 Brigadier General, Spanish Air Force (Retired) Abstract: The Spanish Air Force is one of the oldest independent Air Forces in the world and the youngest service of the Spanish Armed Forces. Since the early 50’s of the last century it was very much involved in exercises and training with the United States Air Force following the Agreements that Spain signed with the United States in 1953. That is why when Spain joined NATO in 1982 the Spanish Air Force was already somewhat familiar with NATO doctrine and procedures. In the following years, cooperation with NATO was increased dramatically through exercises and, when necessary, in operations. The Spanish Air Force is now ready and well prepared to contribute to the common defence of NATO nations and to participate in NATO led operations whenever the Spanish government decides to do so.