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Sanctuary Lost: the Air War for ―Portuguese‖ Guinea, 1963-1974

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Sanctuary Lost: the Air War for ―Portuguese‖ Guinea, 1963-1974 Sanctuary Lost: The Air War for ―Portuguese‖ Guinea, 1963-1974 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Matthew Martin Hurley, MA Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2009 Dissertation Committee: Professor John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Advisor Professor Alan Beyerchen Professor Ousman Kobo Copyright by Matthew Martin Hurley 2009 i Abstract From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, or PAIGC) waged an increasingly intense war for the independence of ―Portuguese‖ Guinea, then a colony but today the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of this conflict Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy and increasingly based its strategy on this advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a central role in the war for Guinea, at times threatening the PAIGC with military defeat. Portugal‘s reliance on air power compelled the insurgents to search for an effective counter-measure, and by 1973 they succeeded with their acquisition and employment of the Strela-2 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile, altering the course of the war and the future of Portugal itself in the process. To date, however, no detailed study of this seminal episode in air power history has been conducted. In an international climate plagued by insurgency, terrorism, and the proliferation of sophisticated weapons, the hard lessons learned by Portugal offer enduring insight to historians and current air power practitioners alike. This study consequently aims to correct that shortfall in the existing literature. Much of the information in this document has been derived from the reflections and first-hand recollections of combatants on both sides of the conflict. Additional data ii has been drawn from the archival record, particularly the Archivo Histórico da Força Aérea outside Lisbon and satellite collections of PAIGC documentation in the United States. The collected evidence is presented as a narrative detailing the context and course of the conflict itself, the struggle for air mastery, and the aftermath. Additional contextual information is presented in separate chapters to frame the central narrative regarding the air and air defense war for Guinea. The evidence demonstrates that the FAP—despite the many challenges it faced— was indeed effective against its insurgent adversaries in Guinea, so much so that those insurgents devoted considerable military effort and diplomatic capital to the problem of air defense. Their subsequent use of the Strela-2 missile, a weapon ideally suited to guerrilla needs, downed five Portuguese aircraft within a two-week period in the Spring of 1973. Those losses initiated a cascade of effects that impacted, in turn, the FAP‘s ability to prosecute the air war, the Portuguese Army‘s ability to maintain its military position on the ground, and Portuguese forces‘ willingness to continue the three colonial wars then raging in Angola and Mozambique as well as Guinea. Ultimately, this cascade of effects contributed to—and in some respects precipitated—the 25 April 1974 coup that overthrew the authoritarian regime in Lisbon and led to the independence of Portugal‘s African territories. The air war for Guinea thus represents a near-textbook case of war‘s inherent complexity (given the disproportionality between action and result), as well as the value—and the vulnerabilities—of air power in a counter-insurgency context. iii Dedication Dedicated to the memory of the 505 Portuguese airmen who gave their lives for their country in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique from 1961 to 1974. Ex Mero Motu. Also dedicated to Cadet Third Class Christopher Sullivan, First Lieutenant Jim Poppo, and Captain Keith Sands—fallen airmen of a different flag. iv Acknowledgements No work of this scale springs from the efforts of a single being; rather, the author‘s output inevitably reflects the influence and assistance of too many others to count, let alone to acknowledge in a paltry few pages. The following, however, warrant special consideration and gratitude for the incomparable assistance they have rendered me as I trooped this particular trail. First, I extend my heartfelt appreciation to Professor John F. Guilmartin, my mentor during these past few years and, particularly, during the production of this document. I understand it is considered somewhat rare for an academic advisor and a graduate student to work together so easily, to share so many common interests, and to contribute to each others‘ continued learning. I would not have had any idea, given my relationship with ―Dr. G.‖ He has provided invaluable guidance and feedback throughout many graduate seminars and review sessions, at the cost of untold hours of his time, which is always in demand by others. Additionally, it has been a privilege to work so closely with a living American hero. Similar thanks must be extended to Professor Alan Beyerchen, who is not only a true ―intellectual heavyweight‖ but an exceptionally congenial human being. His insight and scholarly depth have given me, in turn, befuddlement, headaches, and finally some insight of my own that never would have come to light but for his patient efforts. His v multi-disciplinary approach to history has proven especially valuable to me in this enterprise, particularly in relation to my dawning understanding of non-linearity and complexity in military operations. I arrived here as a one-dimensional ―A to B‖ thinker of the linear school, regrettably like so many of my compatriots in uniform; thanks to Professor Beyerchen, I plan to torment planners and commanders the world over with reminders that this type of thinking all too often finds us, confounded and paralyzed, at ―Q‖ or beyond. Thanks also should go to Professor Ousman Kobo, the third member of my dissertation committee and my African history graduate advisor. I came to The Ohio State University with some real-world appreciation of recent African events, given my military service and previous duties as an instructor at Air Command and Staff College. Professor Kobo, however, opened my eyes to the nuances—and the regrettable but inevitable gaps—inherent within African history, and the importance of both respecting the field‘s specificity while recognizing its limits. As such, he has taught me to better value what evidence is available, and to strive to fill the gaps through a lifetime‘s worth of further research. The faculty and staff of the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, also deserve kudos, particularly Dr. Charles Costanzo. Without his mentorship and support I would never have been given the opportunity to attempt this program. I further extend my gratitude to him for providing me the necessary advice to successfully complete it. I very much look forward to working with him and the rest of the ACSC team in the future; they have consistently provided convincing proof that pure vi patriotism and profundity of thought are not mutually exclusive, whatever some of our collective critics may say. Dealing with primary sources in a variety of foreign languages can always pose a challenge, particularly when the acquisition of those sources involves overseas travel. As such, several Portuguese Air Force personnel, active and retired, deserve laudatory mention. I extend my thanks to Colonel Ismael Gomes Alves, Director of the Arquivo Histórico da Força Aérea in Alfragide, Portugal. His assistance proved critical in finding the resources I needed to build a coherent picture of Portuguese air operations in Guinea, and he extended me every courtesy in copying documents, declassifying them if necessary, and preparing them for use. I am told that the degree of cooperation Colonel Alves exhibited is rare for an archivist, but again, from his example alone I would have had no idea that archival research could pose any sort of challenge or frustration. Colonel Miguel Pessoa, a retired Portuguese fighter pilot, also provided me with considerable assistance, most significantly in telling me his own story. Colonel Pessoa represents a living ―pivot‖ of the air war in Guinea, having been the first Portuguese pilot shot down by an air defense missile there. He has been extremely open and forthcoming with details of the incident, in matters of translation, and in my efforts to seek out other veterans of the war in Guinea for additional details or clarifications. To him and his wife Giselda, I owe a heartfelt ―obrigado.‖ Dr. Luís Graça has also been exceptionally helpful in this last regard. An army veteran of the war in Guinea, Dr. Graça currently runs a website by and for Portuguese personnel who served in that conflict. Not only did Dr. Graça translate and post my vii prospectus for comment by other veterans, he also relayed my request for photographs which could be used in the finished work. While the images are extremely useful, the veterans‘ perspectives he acquired for me have proven priceless. I am indeed fortunate to have had his cooperation, as well as the insight of those veterans who took the time to provide their comments. I am also indebted to Major Alberto Cruz, another former Portuguese Air Force pilot who served in Guinea. In addition to more general perspectives and opinions regarding the war there, Major Cruz provided critical new information, that has never before been published, regarding the loss of his aircraft over that territory. Those are the sorts of ―nuggets‖ that make the sometimes tedious task of research a joy, and his willingness to freely share his recollections is much appreciated. Together, Miguel Pessoa, Luis Graça and Alberto Cruz have shown themselves to be the utmost paragons of duty, dedication, and helpfulness; I am privileged that we crossed paths.
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