For USAF, the defense of air bases was mission-critical. And it still is.

The Lessons of Salty Demo

By Christopher J. Bowie

n the spring of 1985, the coun- The findings helped guide the Air the trapped Egyptian aircraft on the tryside around Spangdahlem ’s investment plans in Europe ground. Base in ’s Eifel Region during the waning days of the Cold Within an hour, had lost more reverberated to the shrieks of low- War. Even today, though, many of the than 100 aircraft. The IAF fighters Iflying jet fighters, the moan of sirens, lessons that emerged from Salty Demo recovered, rearmed, and took off for a and the crump of heavy explosions. can be and, in the view of many, should new round of attacks. This was repeated USAF was conducting Salty Demo, a be applied to overseas air bases. several times. Five hours after the first multiweek exercise. Its goal: The idea of Salty Demo could be shot, 300 Egyptian aircraft—half of Assess whether a modern could traced to the Middle East the Arab nation’s air arm—had been survive in the face of a heavy and sus- War. In that conflict, destroyed. tained attack. fighters and medium executed The IAF also struck at targets in , The Air Force was then in the throes a devastating pre-emptive strike against , and to destroy a total of 400 of a effort to guard its ability to the and delivered aircraft during the first day of combat. generate airpower in Europe. Salty Demo serious blows to the air arms of other For NATO men looking on, put the effort to the test. USAF was Arab nations. the implications of this strike for their surprised by much of what it learned. Egypt was the main target. The Is- own forces were profound. The Atlantic Casualties were high. Confusion was raeli aircraft struck nine Egyptian bases alliance relied on airpower as its trump great. Sorties were curtailed. Lowly simultaneously in the opening minutes card in the balance of military power pieces of equipment—for instance, the of the conflict. They closed Egyptian to support NATO’s flexible response humble bulldozer—proved to be criti- runways using rocket-assisted runway strategy. NATO military commanders cally important. penetrating weapons and then shot up assumed that they would gain control 54 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2009 US forces, yet had demanded the operations made the concept highly departure of all of these units. unattractive. US and NATO plans called for the A second initiative called for raising Air Force to augment its forward based the lethality of NATO’s air defenses. This fighter forces with hundreds of addi- was accomplished in several ways: by tional aircraft from the . In fielding advanced air superiority fighters response to their eviction from French armed with advanced ; by em- soil, US forces were soon concentrated placing advanced surface-to-air on a smaller number of airfields closer to systems such as Patriot batteries in the enemy airpower. Moreover, the Warsaw forward and rear area missile belts; by Pact was fielding growing numbers of adding better radars to maintain cover- longer-ranged, more capable aircraft to age; and by developing procedures to bolster its offensive strike power. coordinate defensive activities. Many in NATO also studied results Attacking enemy fighters would need from the next round of the Arab-Israeli to fly through a gantlet of short-range conflict—the October 1973 Middle East guns and missiles, then radar guided War. SAMs, and finally NATO fighters. NATO worked to increase its offen- NATO’s Initiatives sive striking power by fielding more Stung by the 1967 disaster, Syria capable strike forces to take the war and Egypt had hardened their airfields, to the enemy’s bases. These included and the results were instructive. Be- such aircraft as the European Tornado cause the IAF did not have munitions and USAF’s F-111. capable of penetrating the thick Syrian The alliance also developed and and Egyptian shelters, employed fielded more lethal specialized weapons runway attacks. to attack airfields, such as the French- After F-4 Phantom strikes, the Israelis US Durandal runway penetrator and observed that the Syrian fields were Britain’s JP 233, a pod containing both capable of generating aircraft sorties in runway-cratering munitions and area- less than an hour. With sustained attacks, denial mines. however, the time required for repairs Finally, NATO, recognizing that there increased to the point that some Syrian would always be “leakers,” embarked on pilots were forced to eject from their an extensive base hardening program. By aircraft because of their inability to find the end of the , approximately an undamaged landing surface. 100 of some 400 fighter-capable airfields After flying hundreds of sorties in NATO featured hardening. The most against Syrian and Egyptian bases, visible symbol of this effort was the Two F-16 mock-ups wait on a fake runway during Salty Demo in 1985. however, the IAF was able to destroy erection of protective shelters (known only an estimated 22 enemy aircraft on in USAF as TAB-Vs) for aircraft and the ground—compared to more than 400 maintenance gear. just six years earlier. The hardening had These large shelters, shaped like a

DOD photo made the main operating bases much half-cylinder, were equipped with heavy tougher targets. doors and their own power generation of the air and thus exploit this advan- Recognizing the danger of airfield at- systems. The hardened aircraft shelters tage to execute ground attack missions tacks, NATO planners worked diligently offered protection from blast and frag- against invading Warsaw Pact to mitigate the threat to its air forces. ments (but typically not a direct hit), and and, importantly, to remain poised to One critical initiative was the Col- can still be seen dotting the landscape launch nuclear strikes if necessary. located Operating Base program. The of Europe. Other, smaller shelters were Now, they weren’t so sure. They wor- COB program would expand the number constructed to provide protection to air ried about the possibility that massed of available combat airfields, which base personnel and flight crews. Soviet air forces could launch a big and would reduce force concentration and The critical question was this: How successful strike on alliance airfields, decrease vulnerability. would the various NATO initiatives much as Israel had done to shattering ef- By 1984, the US had agreements to fare in the face of sustained Warsaw fect. A rerun of this in Europe could blunt some 60 COBs in Europe, with plans to Pact attacks? NATO’s airpower edge and undermine develop similar agreements with Greece The RAND Corp. had developed a the West’s overall military position. and . In NATO’s Central Region highly detailed computer simulation of France’s withdrawal from NATO’s alone, USAF planned to operate from an airfield that, in the early , indi- unified military command structure in almost 30 fighter COBs in addition to cated Warsaw Pact strikes against USAF 1966 already had aggravated the air base its roughly 20 main fighter bases. Some bases in Europe during the first week of problem in the crucial Central Region. strategists argued that NATO should hostilities would cut sortie generation French territory, which housed nine move to an even more dispersed posture rates by almost 40 percent and destroy USAF air bases and numerous by operating small flights of aircraft 40 percent of deployed aircraft. Such installations, provided critical strategic from roads or other dispersed airfields, results would obviously severely damage depth and lines of communication for but the logistics required to support such the alliance’s military position. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2009 55 destruction and heavy damage to aircraft, vehicles, buildings, communications, DOD photo and power systems. ... Fires burned all over, and unexploded ordnance lay about everywhere. It was difficult to assess the damage accurately. Repair teams were shorthanded and, in some cases, did not have the equipment and supplies they needed.” Day, reflecting on the results, said properly delegating authority is critical to operating an air base under attack. He delegated flying operations to his director of operations and focused his attention on “fighting the base.” Following an attack, Day noted, the most important issue was to get a Snow-covered F-16 mock-ups crouch on a Salty Demo “runway” at Spangdahlem damage assessment. How many per- AB, Germany. USAF also built a parallel operating surface to realistically assess sonnel were killed or injured? Which repair techniques following the Salty Demo “attacks.” surfaces and facilities were damaged? Were submunitions scattered about? Another of RAND analysts conducted the simulated attacks, hitting What were the locations of unex- stated in the mid-1980s, “In Europe, Spangdahlem two or three times a day ploded ordnance? Was it possible for main operating bases (MOBs) and using raids of 16 aircraft delivering 30 aircraft to launch from the remaining support equipment previously thought to 40 weapons per attack. surfaces? If not, which craters had to survivable may become extremely vul- Evaluators then calculated the dam- be repaired first? nerable.” These were, at best, educated age, hung “damaged” placards on build- Once a picture of the damage was guesses. Nothing could take the place of ings, turned off power to simulate the formed, Spangdahlem’s had to real-world experience, but the Air Force cutting of electrical lines, and told prioritize repair efforts. Decisions on thought an exercise might answer some some personnel that they had become where aircraft should land, which take- questions. USAF therefore thought up “casualties.” off surfaces could be used, and how to Salty Demo, the purpose of which was coordinate sortie generation activities to provide a realistic assessment of the When Everything Goes Wrong were complex but needed quickly. various NATO initiatives. “The results were a sobering dem- Communications were not a major Maj. Gen. Lawrence E. Day was the onstration of the synergistic chaos that problem: Spangdahlem had multiple commander at Spangdahlem during ensues when everything goes wrong at buried landlines, and if these were cut, the Salty Demo exercise. In an interview the same time,” wrote John T. Correll personnel could use backup radios. long after the event, Day recalled that in Air Force Magazine’s 1988 review Besides people, the most critical the wing spent about a year preparing of the exercise. resource turned out to be heavy equip- and practicing for the exercise. Correll’s article went on: “Thirty- ment. Day said this machinery was used In the buildup, Spangdahlem’s man- one percent of the base’s personnel 24 hours a day in the exercise and was power was increased significantly—the were casualties, half of them killed and so critical he elected to put it in shelters Air Force housed around 1,500 addi- nearly a third of the wounded unable to to protect it. With the airfields and tional people in a tent city outside the return to duty. There was considerable structures requiring constant repair, airfield. Among these were an additional 25 explosive ordnance disposal person- nel. The Air Force also deployed heavy construction gear: bulldozers, excava- DOD photo tors, dump trucks, and heavy equip- ment operators to help repair damaged runways and facilities. Finally, USAF built a new parallel operating surface to realistically test runway repair techniques following test explosions. The additional runway would also provide operating surface re- dundancy when the exercise was over. US planners estimated the number of Warsaw Pact strike aircraft that would penetrate NATO’s defenses. The Air Force then simulated an attack of “mod- erate severity” on Spangdahlem. For training realism, the 50th Tactical Mock F-16s were placed on a fake flight line to simulate what would no doubt be a Fighter Wing at nearby Hahn Air Base tempting target for enemy firepower. 56 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2009 “The results,” said Tidal W. McCoy, then assistant secretary of the Air Force DOD photo for readiness support, “showed even a fairly moderate Soviet attack could reduce our ability to generate sorties. The degradation was especially severe in the first critical week of this dem- onstration.” McCoy also observed that the outcome of the simulated attacks proved a “shock” to the Air Force. Over the next several years, Air Force planners developed detailed proposals to coordinate air base improvements. With the knowledge provided by Salty Demo, the Air Force proposed to commit significant resources to: Better defend against attacks by An armored bulldozer clears debris and live ordnance from the runway after one enemy special operations forces and bombing run during the base survivability exercise. commandos. Construct more personnel shel- Day was paradoxically willing to lose to what we thought we knew,” Day said ters. an aircraft, but not a bulldozer. after the exercise. “We were impressed Develop and deploy better chemi- The loss of the wrong piece of heavy that we could fly at all, given all the cal suits. equipment could totally shut down sortie damage.” Increase use of camouflage, con- generation capability. cealment, and deception. Another critical piece of equipment Severe Degradation Improve the damage assessment was the mobile arresting gear supplied It became clear that NATO’s bases process. by the Marine Corps. If a runway was needed an adequate supply of bulldoz- Deploy more heavy construction ve- damaged, Spangdahlem’s staff would ers and a tank-like specialized vehicle hicles, including armored bulldozers. plot out a surface to recover aircraft, fill to sweep mines. Maintaining sufficient Increase the number of operating craters if necessary, and then position manpower was an important issue. The surfaces and taxiways. the arresting gear. tent city housing the 1,500 additional Deploy more sets of mobile ar- In Salty Demo, the Air Force did not personnel was deemed off-limits to at- resting gear. simulate losing fuel. Spangdahlem was tack, but without these airmen, air base Stockpile runway repair equipment supplied by three large above-ground operations would have been difficult. and supplies. tanks, and fuel trucks distributed the The Spangdahlem staff also found Before the project could get firmly fuel to fighters. Yet if the tanks were that access to the operating surfaces under way, however, history inter- lost, the base would have to shut down from the shelter complexes was a major vened. The began to operations until alternative means (such headache. wither, Warsaw Pact satellite states as bladders) were positioned. Single runway, opposite direction began to pull away, and the Cold Power supplies, which Day had been takeoffs and landings had to be used War began to flicker and fade out. In concerned about before the exercise, did frequently to get aircraft back to avail- turn, the US defense budget went into not prove a significant problem. All im- able shelters. decline, and only the most critical mili- portant buildings and shelters had been As a result, additional access points tary construction projects managed to equipped with emergency backup power to the runways and taxiways were added get funding. Moreover, Congressional generators. The wing had prepped these in subsequent years. enthusiasm for spending money on during the buildup to the exercise and Day concluded that to operate effec- airfields in Europe was never strong, rarely had any problems—Day said the tively under attack, the Air Force needed and the lessening of the threat there generators were “in tip-top shape.” to exercise under those constrained only increased the antipathy on Capi- A few times, people forgot to fill fuel conditions more regularly. tol Hill. tanks, causing a short-term blackout, but Even with all the preparation, Day The Air Force did carry out some of these cases were rare. felt that USAF had a lot to learn to the planned improvements, but did not A variety of alternative techniques— effectively manage the “recovery after come close to executing the full range quick-set concrete, slabs, and aluminum attack” phase. It was critical to establish of initiatives envisioned in the air base planks—was employed to heal the dozen the repair priorities for sortie generation. operability program. Those monuments jagged craters left by test explosives on The unit had the aircraft, the aircrews, to the Cold War—the hardened aircraft the newly constructed alternative launch and the munitions but needed to find shelters and runways—will remain in and recovery strip. better ways to get them airborne. Europe for decades to come. ■ All three techniques proved suc- cessful; the wing was able to conduct Christopher J. Bowie has held a variety of positions with RAND Corp., the aero- takeoffs and landings on the alternate space industry, and the Air Force. He served recently as USAF’s deputy director for runway after the repairs. strategic planning and today is director of strategic studies for Northrop Grumman “We were impressed by how much Integrated Systems. His last article for Air Force Magazine, “How the West Would we learned going through it, compared Have Won,” appeared in the July 2007 issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2009 57