For USAF, the defense of air bases was mission-critical. And it still is. The Lessons of Salty Demo By Christopher J. Bowie n the spring of 1985, the coun- The findings helped guide the Air the trapped Egyptian aircraft on the tryside around Spangdahlem Air Force’s investment plans in Europe ground. Base in Germany’s Eifel Region during the waning days of the Cold Within an hour, Egypt had lost more reverberated to the shrieks of low- War. Even today, though, many of the than 100 aircraft. The IAF fighters Iflying jet fighters, the moan of sirens, lessons that emerged from Salty Demo recovered, rearmed, and took off for a and the crump of heavy explosions. can be and, in the view of many, should new round of attacks. This was repeated USAF was conducting Salty Demo, a be applied to overseas air bases. several times. Five hours after the first multiweek airpower exercise. Its goal: The idea of Salty Demo could be shot, 300 Egyptian aircraft—half of Assess whether a modern air base could traced to the June 1967 Middle East the Arab nation’s air arm—had been survive in the face of a heavy and sus- War. In that conflict, Israeli Air Force destroyed. tained attack. fighters and medium bombers executed The IAF also struck at targets in Syria, The Air Force was then in the throes a devastating pre-emptive strike against Jordan, and Iraq to destroy a total of 400 of a major effort to guard its ability to the Egyptian Air Force and delivered aircraft during the first day of combat. generate airpower in Europe. Salty Demo serious blows to the air arms of other For NATO military men looking on, put the effort to the test. USAF was Arab nations. the implications of this strike for their surprised by much of what it learned. Egypt was the main target. The Is- own forces were profound. The Atlantic Casualties were high. Confusion was raeli aircraft struck nine Egyptian bases alliance relied on airpower as its trump great. Sorties were curtailed. Lowly simultaneously in the opening minutes card in the balance of military power pieces of equipment—for instance, the of the conflict. They closed Egyptian to support NATO’s flexible response humble bulldozer—proved to be criti- runways using rocket-assisted runway strategy. NATO military commanders cally important. penetrating weapons and then shot up assumed that they would gain control 54 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2009 US forces, yet France had demanded the operations made the concept highly departure of all of these units. unattractive. US and NATO plans called for the A second initiative called for raising Air Force to augment its forward based the lethality of NATO’s air defenses. This fighter forces with hundreds of addi- was accomplished in several ways: by tional aircraft from the United States. In fielding advanced air superiority fighters response to their eviction from French armed with advanced missiles; by em- soil, US forces were soon concentrated placing advanced surface-to-air missile on a smaller number of airfields closer to systems such as Patriot batteries in the enemy airpower. Moreover, the Warsaw forward and rear area missile belts; by Pact was fielding growing numbers of adding better radars to maintain cover- longer-ranged, more capable aircraft to age; and by developing procedures to bolster its offensive strike power. coordinate defensive activities. Many in NATO also studied results Attacking enemy fighters would need from the next round of the Arab-Israeli to fly through a gantlet of short-range conflict—the October 1973 Middle East guns and missiles, then radar guided War. SAMs, and finally NATO fighters. NATO worked to increase its offen- NATO’s Initiatives sive striking power by fielding more Stung by the 1967 disaster, Syria capable strike forces to take the war and Egypt had hardened their airfields, to the enemy’s bases. These included and the results were instructive. Be- such aircraft as the European Tornado cause the IAF did not have munitions and USAF’s F-111. capable of penetrating the thick Syrian The alliance also developed and and Egyptian shelters, Israel employed fielded more lethal specialized weapons runway attacks. to attack airfields, such as the French- After F-4 Phantom strikes, the Israelis US Durandal runway penetrator and observed that the Syrian fields were Britain’s JP 233, a pod containing both capable of generating aircraft sorties in runway-cratering munitions and area- less than an hour. With sustained attacks, denial mines. however, the time required for repairs Finally, NATO, recognizing that there increased to the point that some Syrian would always be “leakers,” embarked on pilots were forced to eject from their an extensive base hardening program. By aircraft because of their inability to find the end of the Cold War, approximately an undamaged landing surface. 100 of some 400 fighter-capable airfields After flying hundreds of sorties in NATO featured hardening. The most against Syrian and Egyptian bases, visible symbol of this effort was the Two F-16 mock-ups wait on a fake runway during Salty Demo in 1985. however, the IAF was able to destroy erection of protective shelters (known only an estimated 22 enemy aircraft on in USAF as TAB-Vs) for aircraft and the ground—compared to more than 400 maintenance gear. just six years earlier. The hardening had These large shelters, shaped like a DOD photo made the main operating bases much half-cylinder, were equipped with heavy tougher targets. doors and their own power generation of the air and thus exploit this advan- Recognizing the danger of airfield at- systems. The hardened aircraft shelters tage to execute ground attack missions tacks, NATO planners worked diligently offered protection from blast and frag- against invading Warsaw Pact armies to mitigate the threat to its air forces. ments (but typically not a direct hit), and and, importantly, to remain poised to One critical initiative was the Col- can still be seen dotting the landscape launch nuclear strikes if necessary. located Operating Base program. The of Europe. Other, smaller shelters were Now, they weren’t so sure. They wor- COB program would expand the number constructed to provide protection to air ried about the possibility that massed of available combat airfields, which base personnel and flight crews. Soviet air forces could launch a big and would reduce force concentration and The critical question was this: How successful strike on alliance airfields, decrease vulnerability. would the various NATO initiatives much as Israel had done to shattering ef- By 1984, the US had agreements to fare in the face of sustained Warsaw fect. A rerun of this in Europe could blunt some 60 COBs in Europe, with plans to Pact attacks? NATO’s airpower edge and undermine develop similar agreements with Greece The RAND Corp. had developed a the West’s overall military position. and Turkey. In NATO’s Central Region highly detailed computer simulation of France’s withdrawal from NATO’s alone, USAF planned to operate from an airfield that, in the early 1980s, indi- unified military command structure in almost 30 fighter COBs in addition to cated Warsaw Pact strikes against USAF 1966 already had aggravated the air base its roughly 20 main fighter bases. Some bases in Europe during the first week of problem in the crucial Central Region. strategists argued that NATO should hostilities would cut sortie generation French territory, which housed nine move to an even more dispersed posture rates by almost 40 percent and destroy USAF air bases and numerous Army by operating small flights of aircraft 40 percent of deployed aircraft. Such installations, provided critical strategic from roads or other dispersed airfields, results would obviously severely damage depth and lines of communication for but the logistics required to support such the alliance’s military position. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2009 55 destruction and heavy damage to aircraft, vehicles, buildings, communications, DOD photo and power systems. ... Fires burned all over, and unexploded ordnance lay about everywhere. It was difficult to assess the damage accurately. Repair teams were shorthanded and, in some cases, did not have the equipment and supplies they needed.” Day, reflecting on the results, said properly delegating authority is critical to operating an air base under attack. He delegated flying operations to his director of operations and focused his attention on “fighting the base.” Following an attack, Day noted, the most important issue was to get a Snow-covered F-16 mock-ups crouch on a Salty Demo “runway” at Spangdahlem damage assessment. How many per- AB, Germany. USAF also built a parallel operating surface to realistically assess sonnel were killed or injured? Which repair techniques following the Salty Demo “attacks.” surfaces and facilities were damaged? Were submunitions scattered about? Another group of RAND analysts conducted the simulated attacks, hitting What were the locations of unex- stated in the mid-1980s, “In Europe, Spangdahlem two or three times a day ploded ordnance? Was it possible for main operating bases (MOBs) and using raids of 16 aircraft delivering 30 aircraft to launch from the remaining support equipment previously thought to 40 weapons per attack. surfaces? If not, which craters had to survivable may become extremely vul- Evaluators then calculated the dam- be repaired first? nerable.” These were, at best, educated age, hung “damaged” placards on build- Once a picture of the damage was guesses. Nothing could take the place of ings, turned off power to simulate the formed, Spangdahlem’s staff had to real-world experience, but the Air Force cutting of electrical lines, and told prioritize repair efforts.