Keeping Saddam away from mass-destruction weapons requires patience, perseverence, and an occasional bullet between the eyes. Osirak and Beyond

REVENTING from building By Rebecca Grant Weapons of Mass Destruction has been a US objective for Pmore than two decades. Air- power has played a key role in that struggle, which is far from over. Defense analyst Anthony H. Cor- desman noted in a recent analysis, “Iraq is the only major recent user of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Iraq’s Nuclear, Biological, Chemi- cal, and missile programs have emerged as Saddam Hussein’s per- sonal projects and they have sur- Photo via Israeli Magazine vived many efforts to kill them off. From ’s raid on the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 to Desert Storm in 1991 and another seven years of UN monitoring, keeping Iraq’s arsenal in check has gener- ated sanctions, inspections, and air strikes. From the beginning, international concern has focused on a specific problem: the danger Iraq would use its Osirak reactor to produce weap- ons-grade material for a bomb pro- gram. Iraq purchased the reactor from in 1975. It was de- signed as a civilian power plant that could also produce highly enriched uranium. Iraq’s attempts to develop its own nuclear power sources dated to the 1960s. However, Saddam Hussein himself began the Iraqi nuclear bomb program in the 1970s while he was still vice chairman of the Revolu- An Israeli F-16 pilot’s view as he tionary Command Council, prior to lines up on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear assuming total control of the na- reactor in 1981. tion. The Osirak facility has been at- tacked several times. actually was the first to bomb the reactor area. On Sept. 30, 1980, in the open- ing days of the IranÐIraq War, an Iranian aircraft lightly damaged the Osirak facility. In response, the offi- cial Iraqi news agency issued the

74 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2002 following statement: “The Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist entity.” In other words, the target was Israel.

Israel’s Shocker Israel took note and on , Photo via Israeli Air Force Magazine 1981, shocked the world with a dar- ing and completely successful sur- prise attack on Osirak. Long before they actually pulled the trigger, Israel’s leaders had been debating such a move. Maj. Gen. , who was then chief of the Israeli Air Force, recalled that one of the conditions for the attack was “we have to attack before ura- nium was going to get to the facility, because otherwise, after attacking IAF used F-16s (such as this one) and F-15s for the Osirak attack. The raid with uranium inside, it can cause took Iraq off the fast track to nuclear weapons, but Baghdad then spent the radiation damage to the environment next decade pouring money and manpower into WMD development. and so on.” Even when faced with the loom- off the 8,000-foot-long runway just ’til you drop” program. The fact is ing threat of a functioning nuclear before 4 p.m. They flew low and that Iraq, had it been left undisturbed, reactor, Prime Minister Menachem level throughout the flight to Iraq. could have acquired a nuclear bomb Begin struggled with the decision to At 5:35 p.m., they popped up to iden- by 1992. attack. It took “about one year” to tify the target and release their bombs. get a consensus, recalled Ivry, “be- “In one minute and 20 seconds, the Rude Interruption cause there were a lot of people who reactor lay in ruins,” reported an A disturbance definitely was com- hesitated.” Ivry remembered going IDF statement. All aircraft returned ing, however. Iraq’s invasion of Ku- “every two or three weeks in the to base. wait on Aug. 2, 1990, soon raised the Cabinet to talk about it again.” World reaction was intense. Con- prospect of a war involving Weap- Even without a guarantee of fi- demnations of Israel far outpaced ons of Mass Destruction. During the nal approval, Ivry set the wheels in congratulations. In the US, feelings IranÐIraq conflict, Iraq used mus- motion, holding detailed rehears- were mixed, and yet there was a tard gas and nerve agent weapons on als of the strike. ThenÐMaj. Gen. strong undercurrent of relief. Sen. 10 occasions between 1983 and 1988. Yehoshua Saguy, head of the Is- Alan Cranston (DÐCalif.) spoke for About 25,000 Iranians and Kurds raeli Defense Forces’ intelligence many when he wrote in the New York died, according to an estimate by division, was one who argued for a Times: “The bold Israeli move elimi- Cordesman. nonmilitary solution. On the eve of nates the immediate threat.” Biological and Chemical Weap- the strike, Ivry recalled, “our lead- The destruction of Osirak took ons facilities were the top concerns ing intelligence community recom- Iraq off the fast track to nuclear of coalition planners. Gen. H. Nor- mended not to attack” because of weapons. Iraq responded with a man Schwarzkopf judged Iraq’s key the risk to the unfolding peace pro- double approach. Baghdad put at military strength to be its “ability, cess with . least 20,000 people to work on the evinced in the second Al-Faw cam- However, Begin eventually con- nuclear program, pressing ahead paign of the IranÐIraq War, to wage cluded that Israel could not wait and with development of gas centrifuges an offensive with Chemical Weap- had to destroy the reactor. He saw it to produce bomb-grade material. The ons.” In his book, It Doesn’t Take as “my chance to save the Jewish Iraqis also pursued a second, out- a Hero, Schwarzkopf noted that it people.” dated method based on the use of was “the possibility of mass casu- After Begin made the decision to calutrons for electromagnetic sepa- alties from Chemical Weapons” that attack, the head of the Israeli Defense ration to produce highly enriched constituted “the main reason we Forces, Gen. , briefed uranium. had 63 hospitals, two hospital ships, the pilots who were preparing to carry Flush with oil money in the , and 18,000 beds ready in the war out the mission. “The alternative is Iraq spent at least $10 billion to buy zone.” our destruction,” warned Eitan. illicit components. Manufacturing For President George H.W. Bush, On June 7, 1981, all was in readi- and testing facilities were concealed the need to clean out Saddam’s Weap- ness. The starting point for the raid at many sites in Iraq. The strategy ons of Mass Destruction was a com- was Etzion Air Base, located in the worked: Former chief UN nuclear pelling reason for going to war. In IsraeliÐoccupied eastern Sinai, close weapons inspector David A. Kay de- his now-famous Jan. 5 “last chance” to the town of . Israeli Air Force scribed how Iraq’s nuclear efforts letter to Saddam, Bush warned that F-15 and new F-16 fighters roared were dismissed by experts as a “shop the US “will not tolerate the use of

AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2002 75 Chemical or Biological Weapons or the destruction of Kuwait’s oil fields

and installations.” USAF photo Coalition air planners had identi- fied “Nuclear, Biological, and Chemi- cal Weapons” as one of 12 strategic target subsets and put NBC targets high on the priority list in case the war ended in just a few days. Most of these suspected sites were chemical and biological research, production, and storage facilities. On Jan. 16, 1991, the target list contained just two nuclear facility targets—though more than 20 facili- ties later would be identified. Plan- ners kept up the search for nuclear and other sites even after the start of the air campaign, but the task was daunting. As Kay later remarked, “There was little hard analysis that Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait raised the specter of a war involving WMD. existed anywhere” on Iraq’s nuclear Coalition aircraft, such as this F-117, targeted nuclear reactors and biological/ capabilities. chemical weapons facilities, setting back research and production capability. The deployment of coalition forces spurred Iraq to accelerate its nuclear intelligence meant that other tar- “been producing enough material for efforts. According to Cordesman’s gets appeared late in the game. One somewhere around 10 to 20 nuclear report, the goal was to produce a was the Al-Athir complex 40 miles weapons a year, maybe more.” working bomb by April 1991. The south of Baghdad, which turned out The suddenly ended be- crash program centered on recover- to be the heart of the nuclear pro- fore the coalition could ferret out ing enriched fuel from Iraq’s French gram. The official Pentagon report all of Iraq’s weapons workshops or and RussianÐbuilt reactors, in defi- on the Gulf War recorded that Al- fully assess what remained. ance of International Atomic Energy Athir “was not confirmed until late In April 1991, the United Nations Agency safeguards supposedly in in the war.” The very last bomb passed Resolution 687, which was, place. dropped by an F-117 during the war in effect, a conditional cease-fire Iraq also explored building a ra- targeted Al-Athir, inflicting only outlining an extensive plan for the diological “dirty” bomb that would light damage. In fact, subsequent disarmament of Iraq, as the Stock- spew radioactive material. It would inspections found that Al-Athir was holm International Peace Research furnish Iraq with a “nuclear” weapon where Iraq worked with design of Institute described it. Iraq would without Baghdad’s having to create charges for nuclear bombs. remain under strict international a traditional nuclear explosion. The Gulf War Air Power Survey, sanctions until the UN certified it to sponsored by the Air Force, con- be clear of Weapons of Mass De- Back to Osirak cluded: “Overall, the struction. Coalition aircraft flew 970 strikes did not fully understand the target The shooting had stopped, but the against NBC targets, using preci- arrays comprising Iraqi Nuclear, coalition military forces remained sion weapons for about 40 percent Biological, Chemical, and ballistic in theater and international diplo- of those strikes. The air attackers missile capabilities before the Gulf mats still had a big job ahead of struck both of the nuclear reactors War. The Iraqis had, in fact, made them. built to replace Osirak. The Isis these target systems as elusive and The United Nations Security Coun- light-water reactor was destroyed, resistant to accurate air attack as cil formed a special committee— and a larger reactor was damaged, possible, with some success.” UNSCOM—to verify Iraqi compli- but the Iraqis hid whatever they Iraq had learned the lessons of ance with the resolution passed by could. Osirak. the world body. It required Iraq to Air strikes hit hard against known The war ended after just 43 days destroy and undertake never to use, biological warfare facilities like of air operations. That was enough develop, construct, or acquire non- those at Salman Pak, but by then, to degrade Saddam’s military capa- conventional weapons or ballistic the Iraqis “had relocated virtually bility, but not enough to fully iden- missiles with a range greater than 93 all of their agent production equip- tify, much less eliminate, the Nuclear, miles. The UN mandate gave the ment to Al-Hakam and other facili- Biological, Chemical, and missile UNSCOM inspectors a free hand to ties and had buried all biological quartet. Coalition air strikes ended inspect and verify destruction of agentÐfilled munitions and agent the immediate threat of an Iraqi existing capabilities and then moni- stockpiles in areas likely to escape nuclear bomb and set back research tor Iraq’s continued compliance. bombing,” according to a Defense and production. Kay commented 10 Department report. years later that, if the war had not Another Iraqi Shock Unfortunately, the lack of focused intervened, the Iraqis would have Thus, the inspectors began what

76 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2002 would prove to be a seven-year ef- The inspectors also found Iraq was when Iraqi personnel started to de- fort to get to the bottom of the NBC still working on Weapons of Mass lay or block the free access of the and missile arsenals. However, in- Destruction even after the Gulf War. UN inspectors. By 1996, Iraq was telligence agencies worldwide were In November 1995, Jordan turned regularly denying the inspectors ac- in for a surprise. The magnitude of back a shipment of missile compo- cess to sites. UNSCOM inspectors the Iraqi program “was a shock to nents headed to Iraq. UNSCOM in- videotaped Iraqis burning and dump- everyone,” said Kay. From 1991 spectors dredged up more missile ing files while waiting to enter one through February 1998, UNSCOM components dumped in the Tigris site in September 1997. supervised destruction of large quan- River. Tips from defectors led the Iraq’s next tactic was to desig- tities of Chemical Weapons compo- inspectors to more documents. As nate new “presidential” sites and nents, including 28,000 munitions late as 1997, Iraq was believed to then say they were off limits. At already loaded with chemical agents. have 79 civilian facilities that could one point, Iraq expelled American Over the years, Iraq tried repeat- be quickly used for Biological Weap- nationals on the inspection team, edly to block inspectors from using ons manufacturing. letting them return only after diplo- aircraft and delayed their access to matic intervention by Russia. At sensitive sites. It took continued pres- “Good Bureaucrats” the same time, China, France, and sure from the coalition to prod Iraq Overall, said Kay, the Iraqis are Russia cooled toward the inspec- into letting the inspectors do their “very good bureaucrats.” They filed tion process and slowed the Secu- jobs. quarterly reports on weapons prog- rity Council’s momentum. In Octo- Not until August 1995 did the in- ress and kept detailed purchasing ber 1997, those three permanent spectors get a big break. Lt. Gen. records. Kay recalled how the Iraqis members abstained from a Security Hussein Kamel, Iraq’s minister of stalled a team waiting to enter an Council finding that Iraq was not industry and minerals with responsi- eight-story building that was “jam cooperating with inspectors. bility for all Iraq’s weapons pro- packed with documents.” The Iraqis Despite a visit to Baghdad by the grams, defected to Jordan and started tried to move the documents out, UN SecretaryÐGeneral Kofi A. Annan talking. Confronted with detailed but the building elevator broke, and to meet with Saddam Hussein in Feb- information about its activities, Iraq they only managed to clear out the ruary, the situation deteriorated fur- retracted previous declarations and ground floor. The most sensitive ther in 1998. That fall, Iraq ceased owned up to an extensive Biological items were on the floors above, and cooperation with UNSCOM entirely. Weapons program and in-depth re- the UNSCOM team got them. The only alternative left was mili- search on long-range missiles. “Essentially, we managed to seize tary attack. In the fall of 1998, the The tally of Biological Weapons much of the file records of their Clinton Administration, with Brit- finally declared by Iraq truly was nuclear program,” said Kay. ish backing, sought allied support astonishing. Between 1985 and 1990, The run of success did not last for a limited air campaign to target Iraq had fabricated 25 Biological long enough for UNSCOM to com- missile production facilities, air de- Weapon missile warheads and 166 plete its mission. Iraqi intransi- fenses, and other key targets. The 400-pound aerial bombs filled with gence—and splits in the UN Secu- campaign was set to launch on Nov. anthrax, botulinum toxin, or afla- rity Council—derailed the inspection 14, 1998. However, Clinton, on the toxin. Raw supplies included at least efforts. advice of National Security Advisor 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin so- Trouble began in September 1991, Sandy Berger, called off the strike lution, 8,500 liters of anthrax solu- tion, and 2,500 liters of aflatoxin. Iraq also admitted researching other

virus strains. In all, Iraq had run 18 DOD photo major Biological Weapons sites be- fore the Gulf War. One report de- scribed them as “nondescript” with “no guards or visible indications they were a military facility.” More shocking, the inspectors con- firmed that Iraq was ready to use Biological Weapons. The research project at Taji produced 25 warheads for use on Iraq’s developmental long- range Al-Hussein missile. Right up until Jan. 13, 1991, four days before the air campaign, Iraq was practic- ing with Biological Weapons belly tanks on its Mirage fighters. Fortunately for the coalition, air- men in 1991 quickly got the under control, and surviving After the Gulf War, a UN committee was to certify that Iraq was clear of WMD. front-line Mirage jets bugged out to Baghdad failed to cooperate. The US and Britain then led Operation Desert Iran after a few weeks. Fox, striking targets such as this missile research and development center.

AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2002 77 with less than an hour to go before murred, saying that it had no “direct ing: “If we don’t use this as the the first Tomahawk land attack mis- evidence” of renewed Iraqi WMD moment to replace Saddam after we siles were to be airborne. programs but said that “given its replace the Taliban, we are setting Disappointed Saudi allies retracted past behavior, this type of activity the stage for disaster.” their support for offensive opera- must be regarded as likely.” The CIA tions. With no further progress on then went on to describe Iraq’s ef- “Just a Dangerous State” inspections, the US and British settled forts to build short-range missiles National Security Advisor Con- on a scaled-down strike plan. Word and convert Czech L-29 jet trainers doleezza Rice clearly drew the link. was passed to the inspectors to leave into unmanned aeriel vehicles. “We worry about Saddam Hussein,” Baghdad, and on Dec. 16, 1998, the “The United Nations assesses that she said in an interview with Al US and British led a three-day air Baghdad has the capability to re- Jazeera TV. “We worry about his campaign under the name Operation initiate both its CW and BW pro- Weapons of Mass Destruction that Desert Fox. grams within a few weeks to months, he’s trying to achieve.” A senior Pen- “Saddam Hussein must not be al- but without an inspection monitor- tagon official claimed in December lowed to threaten his neighbors or ing program, it is difficult to deter- that the situation with Iraq’s WMD the world with nuclear arms, poison mine if Iraq had done so,” the CIA had “gotten worse since UNSCOM gas, or Biological Weapons,” Clinton reported to Congress. Since Iraq re- was driven out.” He added, “Iraq is said. Secretary of Defense William tained a large pool of experts and just a dangerous state, purely and S. Cohen said the first goal of the some nonweapons-grade uranium, simply.” operation was “to degrade Saddam restarting a nuclear bomb program Iraq is probably not in position to Hussein’s ability to make and to use is also a possibility, especially if produce its own fissile material for Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Iraq could import fissile material as much as five years. Still, experts clandestinely. Clinton said at the believe Iraq could buy black-market 70-Hour War time of Desert Fox in 1998, “left weapons material with relative ease. In 70 hours, US forces struck about unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use “I think everyone that I know of in 100 targets with a combination of these terrible weapons again.” the community agrees that if the Navy and land-based fighters, bomb- Since Sept. 11, the focus on home- Iraqis had the nuclear material, high- ers, and cruise missiles. Subsequent land security and the war against enriched uranium or plutonium, they reports claimed good results on tar- has put Iraq back in the would have a weapon in less than a gets, including missile production spotlight. If the confrontation con- year,” said Kay. “The explosive facilities. tinues, airpower may once again be manufacturing and missile program The UNSCOM process managed, summoned to counter Weapons of has gone ahead.” despite Iraqi intransigence, to de- Mass Destruction. The United States and coalition stroy weapons and uncover much Pressure to develop a strategy to partners have succeeded in contain- more of Iraq’s weapons programs. topple Saddam gained strength in ing Iraq. That, however, provides no When the UN inspectors left Baghdad fall 2001. The heat of the moment guarantee that Iraq could not rebuild in December 1998, the chance to lift turned attention to Iraq as a sup- its WMD capability. In May 2002, sanctions against Iraq went with porter of terrorists and possible nest the UN Security Council voted to them. Resolution 687—the condi- of Osama bin Laden sympathizers. relax sanctions, and initiatives to get tional cease-fire—could not be fully Yet the antiÐIraq rhetoric was not inspectors back inside Iraq remain verified. After years of propaganda just about settling old scores or ex- in play. about the impact of the sanctions on panding the war on terrorism right If experience is any guide, even civilian life, the sanctions policy it- away. As it had a decade earlier, the the most capable UN inspectors will self was a liability. issue of Saddam’s ability and pre- need years to hunt down what pro- With inspectors out, there was no sumed lack of inhibition about us- gress Iraq has made on Weapons of way to know whether Iraq had re- ing WMD lay at the heart of the Mass Destruction since 1998. Mean- started its WMD programs. UNSCOM Administration’s cautious and cryp- while, Saddam’s WMD are a poten- inspectors left behind automated tic remarks on Iraq. tial threat to the world whether in video cameras to monitor sensitive In October 2001, Bush commented, his hands or—worse—those of sym- sites, but by 1999, the Iraqis had “After all, he [Saddam] gassed his pathetic terrorists. The menace re- dismantled them. own people” and added “we know mains. All along, Iraq insisted on keep- he’s been developing Weapons of President George W. Bush told a ing together the teams of scientists Mass Destruction.” Former Con- television interviewer in April: “I and experts from the weapons pro- gressman Newt Gingrich put it bluntly made up my mind that Saddam needs grams. Most of these key personnel in a New York Times interview, say- to go.” ■ remained in Iraq. In August 2000, the CIA told Congress that, after Desert Fox, “Baghdad again insti- Rebecca Grant is a contributing editor of Air Force Magazine. She is presi- tuted a reconstruction effort on those dent of IRIS Independent Research, Inc., in Washington, D.C., and has facilities destroyed by the US bomb- worked for RAND, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the ing, to include several critical mis- Air Force. Grant is a fellow of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts, the sile production complexes and former public policy and research arm of the Air Force Association’s Aerospace dual-use [Chemical Weapon] pro- Education Foundation. Her most recent article, “In Defense of Fighters,” duction facilities.” The CIA de- appeared in the July 2002 issue.

78 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2002