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ARROYO CENTER and PROJECT AIR FORCE CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Arroyo Center RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Hard Fighting Israel in Lebanon and Gaza David E. Johnson Prepared for the United States Army and the United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution unlimited ARROYO CENTER and PROJECT AIR FORCE The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001 and by the United States Air Force under Contract No. FA7014-06-C-0001. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Johnson, David E. (David Eugene), 1950- Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / David E. Johnson. pages cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-5850-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Israel. Tseva haganah le-Yisra'el. 2. Asymmetric warfare—Case studies. 3. Lebanon War, 2006. 4. Gaza War, 2008-2009. 5. United States—Military policy. I. Title. UA853.I8J645 2011 956.9204'524095694—dc23 2011049689 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. © Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand. org/publications/permissions.html). Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This monograph examines the Israeli experiences in the Second Leba- non War (2006) and Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009) to assess the challenges posed by hybrid adversaries and the military capabilities needed to prevail over them. It describes what happened during the war in Lebanon, why the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had difficulty fighting Hezbollah, what corrective measures the IDF took after Leba- non, and what happened during the operation in Gaza. The research presented here shows that the Israeli experience provides compelling insights that will be important to the U.S. joint force—and particularly to the Air Force and the Army—as it consid- ers the capabilities needed in the future to prevail against hybrid chal- lenges. To this end, the monograph makes several recommendations about ways to improve the integration of air power, ground power, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) across the Air Force and the Army in hybrid warfare. The research reported here was sponsored by then–Major General William J. Rew, Director of Operational Planning, Policy and Strat- egy, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (AF/A5X), and by Major General Francis G. Mahon, Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, Headquarters U.S. Army (G-8). It was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE and the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program of RAND Arroyo Center. The monograph should be of interest to a wide group of U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and defense personnel involved in many aspects iii iv Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza of the doctrine; combat organizations; tactics, techniques, and proce- dures; and related employment concepts that link interservice air and ground combat operations. It should also be of use to military and civilian planners within the Department of Defense who are working to provide the U.S. military with the capabilities needed to operate successfully across the full range of military operations, particularly against hybrid adversaries. Questions and comments regarding this report can be addressed to the author: David E. Johnson RAND Corporation 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050 Phone: 703-413-1100, ext. 5205 Email: [email protected] RAND Project AIR FORCE RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Cor- poration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and devel- opment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the devel- opment, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Train- ing; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. Additional information about PAF is available on our website: http://www.rand.org/paf/. RAND Arroyo Center RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a feder- ally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. Research is conducted in four programs: Strategy, Doc- Preface v trine, and Resources; Force Development and Technology; Military Logistics; and Manpower and Training. The Project Unique Identi- fication Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is ASPMO09224. For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Operations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; FAX 310-451-6952; email ([email protected]), or visit Arroyo’s website at http://www.rand.org/ard/. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. xi Tables .............................................................................xiii Summary ..........................................................................xv Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxxi Abbreviations ................................................................. xxxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Purpose .............................................................................. 4 Methodology ....................................................................... 5 Monograph Organization ......................................................... 7 CHAPTER TWO The Second Lebanon arW ....................................................... 9 Conflict Backdrop ................................................................10 The State of the Israeli Military in 2006 .......................................13 What’s in It for Us? The Problems with “Lessons Learned” from Lebanon .....................................................................13 The IDF in Transition ..........................................................16 Confronting Protracted Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism .......... 20 Complex Concepts for Complex Problems: Systemic Operational Design ...................................................................... 26 The IDF and Standoff Fires ....................................................31 Systemic Operational Design and Standoff Fires in Action: Defeating the Intifada .....................................................37 vii viii Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza The Israeli Elite’s Misperceptions About the Security Environment ......39 IDF Deficiencies on the Eve of the Second Lebanon War ................ 43 The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hezbollah .................... 44 Terrain ............................................................................45 Hezbollah’s Preparation of the Battlefield ...................................45 Hezbollah: A Hybrid Adversary .............................................
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