It Was Flawed Strategy, Not Failed Airpower, That Led to the IDF's Inconclusive Performance in Lebanon

AP photo by Hussein Malla

It was flawed strategy, not failed airpower, that led to the IDF’s inconclusive performance in Lebanon.

or 34 tense days in the sum- mer of 2006, the Israeli De- fense Forces conducted a Fcampaign against the Hezbollah or- ganization in response to a surprise cross-border incursion from southern Lebanon into Israel. Hezbollah terror- ists targeted and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers for use later as hostages. The Israeli counteroffensive, code- named Operation Change of Direc- tion, included the most complex and 112 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2011 AIR FORCE Magazine Magazine FORCE AIR for a mission against Hezbollah. Hezbollah. against mission a for preparation in advances F-16 Israeli an as Below: ramp the on Two are JDAMs 2006. August in strikes air Israeli after stronghold, Hezbollah and Lebanon, rut, Bei of suburb southern a Dahiyeh, Left: Olmert Ehud Minister Prime gressed, 1948. in state Jewish the of founding the since IDF the by performance inconclusive history. It also ended up being the most Israel’s in operation air sophisticated Hezbollah 2006 War With Behind Israel’s s sals oneofnie pro counteroffensive Israel’s As / September 2011 September / - -

AP photo by Baz Ratner early insertion of special operations operations special of insertion early an also but helicopters, attack and ers only by strikes IAF fight not around-the-clock included IDF’s of the counteroffensive “failure though a per to airpower”—even attested disappointing formance IDF’s strategy of the choice and initial that Halutz’s was impression early persistent goals. campaign’s the about bring could alone airpower that belief parochial a to succumbed had airman, an as chief, IDF the that conclude to many led results in decisive and progress The halting troops. campaign’s ground of a commitment of early an preci instead included that offensive on joint attacks entirely standoff sion almost first at position. military top country’s the crisis ever the the first airman to erupted occupy time the at was and (IAF) previ had the ously Israeli commanded Air Force He the conduct. determined campaign’s largely Halutz Dan lethal the to harassment. end an brought finally A Israel. in cease-fire northern centers population civilian into Hez fired rockets bollah Katyusha of barrage short-range daily relentless to the unable stem were forces their intensified because unfolded conflict the as of fighting. weeks five nearly the elusive throughout remained Those goals Lebanon. extravagant southern in fighting a force as Hezbollah of removal permanent a and soldiers kidnapped two the of return unconditional an as goals main his government’s declared Furthermore, a predominant and and predominant a Furthermore, rely to was response chosen His Gen. Lt. Staff of Chief IDF’s The Israelis among felt frustration The ------By BenjaminS.Lambeth during during the Six Day War of 1967. No as one as many nearly fatalities, 600 troop than more sustained IDF the 2000, to 1982 from Lebanon in occupation of In 18 years everyone government. in the Olmert major affecting a factor was inhibiting casualties friendly of 400 action. in as killed many soldiers as IDF invasion the land cost could major a that warned Kaplinsky, chief Moshe Gen. Maj. staff, deputy of IDF’s the move, an as early option ground serious a about deliberations initial cabinet’s Dur the ing it. implement to eager not was leadership its but Lebanon, southern sce from forces to nario a expel Hezbollah’s such just for intended fensive counterof air-land an for ready plan bidding. its do to Nasrallah, Hassan co leader, fiery to Hezbollah’s erce attacks standoff precision on solely rely to was being, time the for strategy, Israel’s that clear became it expectations. of public mismanagement goals; government and campaign’s the pursuing for alternatives of choice poor a accept; likely would the community and international people Israeli the that military force of mix any by unattainable goals initial adversary; the of nature on judgments the leadership high-level was a of the ill-advised blend problem Rather, se. per warfare of instrument other conduct any or airpower and Israeli not was planning campaign’s in Lebanon. targets southern against fired rockets field battle and of artillery rounds thousands of daily and ground the on forces The near-certainty of a high number The near-certainty contingency a refined had IDF The ended, combat of day first the As the in “failed” ultimately What 113 - - - - - tion to major ground fighting would produce an unacceptable number of Israeli casualties. Eventually, calls for a massive IDF ground incursion to drive Hezbollah’s forces out of southern Lebanon became more vocal. The IDF mobilized three reserve divisions on July 20, in its largest troop call-up in four years. The government’s issuance of the invasion order came only on Aug. 11, however. This left the IDF with three days to make the most of its long-delayed ground push before a cease-fire went into effect. During the final 72 hours of combat, the IDF tripled its troop numbers in southern Lebanon to a peak of around 30,000. It suffered its heaviest casu- alties during those last three days of fighting. Hezbollah continuously attacked Israel even after the Israeli withdrawal from Leba- Coordination among force elements non in 2000. Pictured is an Israeli civilian dwelling, destroyed by Hezbollah rockets. was uniformly poor throughout this final phase of the conflict. In some wanted a replay of the experience. For during the much higher-intensity Yom cases, embattled tank crews requested Israelis, the Lebanon occupation was Kippur War of 1973. immediate close air support but were and remains their country’s Vietnam- During the campaign’s first week, denied by the IDF’s Northern Com- like experience. Halutz rejected any the IAF flew some 2,000 fighter and mand out of concern that CAS would idea of the IDF going back into south- attack helicopter sorties day and night result in a friendly fire incident. ern Lebanon to recapture and occupy against a wide variety of Hezbollah The performance of IDF ground Lebanese territory immediately north targets. Despite tactical and opera- forces throughout this escalated end- of the Israeli border. tional-level successes that week, it game further revealed shortcomings The IDF’s ground commanders became increasingly clear that standoff in combat tradecraft. Infantry units also opposed a major land counter- attacks alone would never bring about were often unable to coordinate with offensive because their troops were the Olmert government’s overarching armor, and tank crews proved repeat- totally unprepared for combat against campaign goals. edly nonproficient in night operations. a robust opponent such as Hezbollah. Not long after, the government’s From start to finish, IDF ground Since the start of its preoccupation principals found themselves in an acri- activity lacked a clearly identifiable with the Palestinian intifada in 2000, monious debate on the IDF’s inability pattern. Troops returning from battle the IDF had conducted virtually no to stop the relentless Katyusha rockets reported that Hezbollah’s dug-in de- periodic large-scale training for major and the offsetting concern that escala- fenses and the hardened fighters who land combat. As a result, operational integration between Israel’s ground forces and the IAF had all but ceased to exist, and ground force readiness for any contingency other than con- taining the Palestinian uprising had been allowed to lapse. Yet, Halutz wanted to teach Hez- bollah a lesson its leaders would not AP photo by Mohammed Zaatari soon forget. Ever since the IDF had withdrawn from Lebanon, Hezbol- lah had continuously tested Israel’s patience through recurrent border provocations and random rocket fir- ings into northern Israel. With the final outrage of the troop abduction, Halutz decided to seek a sea change in the situation.

The Campaign Unfolds From the first day onward in this second Lebanon war, some 173,000 Female members of Hezbollah shoulder Katyusha rocket models at a rally in artillery and rocket rounds were ex- southern Lebanon in 2007. The rocket attacks against Israeli towns did not stop pended. This was more than were used until a cease-fire halted the 2006 war. 114 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2011 manned them proved far more resil- ient than anticipated. In the end, the IAF provided abundant on-call CAS as required, and many wounded IDF troops were promptly evacuated by UH-60 helicopters under heavy fire. AP photo by Kevin Frayer

Strategic Errors The second Lebanon war’s less than resounding outcome for Israel in no way reflects a failure of the IAF to perform to the fullest extent of its abilities. Rather, it stemmed from a broader deficiency in the strategy of Olmert’s most senior leaders. There was nothing wrong in prin- ciple with the government’s decision to respond to Hezbollah’s cross-border provocation with escalated force. Yet the ramifications of the response were not adequately explored before An Israeli soldier protects his ears as a heavy artillery piece fires into southern proceeding. Lebanon in July 2006. That same day, Hezbollah fired a barrage of rockets into the There was more than one option Israeli city of Haifa, killing eight and wounding seven. available to the IDF in the immediate aftermath of the provocation. However, continuing rocket fire represented a be a mistake not to make the most of the options were not systematically core strategic threat to northern Israel’s them,” he said. assessed and rank-ordered by Israel’s civilian population and economy only Olmert himself voiced the senti- civilian leaders and by Halutz. As a became clear once the counteroffen- ment to IAF personnel at Hatzor Air result, the IDF initiated its counter- sive was well under way. Base during the campaign’s second offensive without giving sufficient The decision to start the campaign week. “In every combat situation, the thought to the campaign’s best and with a standoff-only counteroffensive preference is to act from the air and most attainable outcome. was not Halutz’s alone. It had a consen- not on the ground,” he said. One key deficiency in the govern- sus among Israel’s ground commanders Another source of trouble for the ment’s chosen response was that it and civilian leaders alike, because it campaign plan as it unfolded was the offered no way of negating Hezbol- offered the least unacceptable option IDF’s ground forces’ lack of prepara- lah’s rocket attacks in case Halutz’s for an initial response. The IDF’s top tion for serious combat against Hez- attempt at coercion by standoff fire planners, Halutz included, knew full bollah’s well-trained and disciplined failed. Critics blamed Israeli airpower well standoff attacks alone would not fighters; all they had done for the for not dealing satisfactorily with end Hezbollah’s rocket fire into north- preceding six years had been lower- the rocket conundrum, but the IAF’s ern Israel—let alone achieve Olmert’s intensity operations against the Pal- leaders never once claimed that the most extreme goals of getting the two estinian intifada. Years of focusing on task lay within their technical and kidnapped soldiers back and putting immediate preoccupations gutted the operational competence. Hezbollah out of the military business. IDF’s ability to conduct a large-scale On the contrary, during a joint train- The government deferred the transition ground operation against a capable foe. ing exercise conducted by the IDF just to a major ground assault as long as The greatest failure for Israel, how- a month before the crisis broke, the possible because no one among Israel’s ever, was the imbalance both Olmert IAF’s commander, Maj. Gen. Eliezer senior leadership wanted a ground and Halutz allowed to develop between Shkedy, warned that no one should war. As a former IDF Chief of Staff the extravagant goals initially declared expect Israel’s air arm to be able to (1998-2002) and then-serving cabinet by the prime minister and the inca- prevent a continuing barrage of short- minister, Lt. Gen. (Res.) Shaul Mofaz, pacity of his government’s response range Hezbollah rockets from southern later declared: “If you can do it from to achieve them. Not only were those Lebanon. “Expect a success of no more the air, it is better.” initially outsized goals progressively than one to three percent in [our] hitting Another former Chief of Staff (1995- ramped downward as the campaign the Katyushas,” Shkedy said. 1998) and land combatant, retired Lt. progressed, they also created early A related deficiency in the Olmert Gen. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, remarked expectations in Israel’s rank and file government’s chosen strategy was that while the campaign was under way that that had no chance of being fulfilled. until the campaign’s last days, stem- he did not see any particular connec- Still, having bought wrongly into ming the short-range rocket fire—by tion between Halutz’s upbringing as a baseless view of what airpower whatever means—was never high on an airman and his choice of strategy alone could accomplish was not the the IDF’s list of priorities. The govern- for conducting the war. Olmert government’s main failing in ment’s most senior leaders, civilian “Any other chief of staff would have the planning and conduct of Opera- and military, entered the campaign made a similar use of force. Aerial tion Change of Direction. Retired Air having dismissed the rockets as a capabilities have developed greatly Commodore Jasjit Singh of the Indian mere nuisance factor. The fact that over the past decade, and it would Air Force later wrote, “The end result AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2011 115 struck some 7,000 approved targets throughout Lebanon at an average rate of 340 sorties a day. Roughly 12,000 of those were fighter sorties in all mission categories, with attack helicopters racking up another 2,500 sorties. More than half of the strikes were flown at night. In addition, more than 1,500 surveil- lance sorties and roughly 1,300 air mobility sorties were flown during the campaign. IAF rotary wing aircrews conducted roughly 120 combat search and rescue missions, nearly half of them inside Hezbollah-infested terri- tory and almost always under heavy fire. Furthermore, 110 combat medi- cal evacuation sorties were flown, 94 entailing emergency rescue operations under fire. Viewed with the benefit of five Maj. Gen. Eliezer Shkedy (r), IAF’s commander during the 2006 war, briefs Prime years’ hindsight, the IDF’s inconclusive Minister Ehud Olmert and Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, IAD Chief of Staff, in a Tel Aviv air campaign against Hezbollah does not operations center. Nearby monitors show radar imagery from a G550 airborne early appear now to be the unqualified setback warning aircraft and full-motion video from UAVs in the theater. many had initially presumed. Although was that the two sides were fighting throughout the 34-day engagement. the second Lebanon war ended in a a war at different planes, with dif- Indeed, the final report of the Winograd less than decisive outcome for Israel, ferent strategies, seeking to exploit Commission, which had been tasked Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and asymmetric vulnerabilities in target- by Olmert to investigate and assess the combat capability were dealt a severe ing different centers of gravity. Israel IDF’s and government’s performance blow by the IDF’s massive retaliatory targeted Hezbollah’s military assets after the campaign ended, concluded attacks. and infrastructure, while Hezbollah that the IAF had registered “impressive Israel also gained a much-improved targeted Israel’s civilian community.” achievements.” The Israeli Air Force was security situation in southern Lebanon, Singh pointed out that Israel’s use deemed the most effective participant by with the formerly volatile border region of force was inconsistent with the far in all aspects of Operation Change now more quiescent than it has been campaign’s aims and “was not tailored of Direction. in a generation. With the singular to a correct assessment of how the Those achievements included the exception of three short-range rockets enemy would fight, in spite of excel- IAF’s largely successful pre-emptive fired into northern Israel from southern lent intelligence about the specific attack against Hezbollah’s known and Lebanon during the IDF’s subsequent capabilities of the enemy.” He added targetable medium-range rockets during 23-day campaign against Hamas in that this “makes the traditional debate the campaign’s opening night. They also the Gaza Strip more than two years about airpower versus ‘boots on the included its subsequent highly effective later (which Hezbollah quickly de- ground’ irrelevant to the real issues.” time-sensitive targeting attacks against nied responsibility for), not a single Fundamentally, the IDF unleashed short-range rocket launchers, and against rocket has been fired from Lebanon its counteroffensive without giving some medium-range launchers as well, into Israel since Operation Change of adequate thought to the campaign’s often within minutes after Hezbollah Direction ended. likely endgame. Consequently, the squads had fired their weapons. This trend is in spite of Hezbollah government lacked an appropriate The only major disappointment in harboring far more short-range rockets plan for ending the war on a high note. the IAF’s combat performance was in (as many as 50,000) in its since-recon- timely and effective CAS delivery, owing stituted arsenal than ever before. This Assessing the Results to an absence of joint rehearsals during suggests Hezbollah’s postcampaign Worse yet, both IDF leaders and their peacetime training exercises over the motivations and behavior have, at least civilian masters took an overly unre- preceding six years. for the time being, been affected for the flective view of what military power In all, the IAF flew 18,900 com- better by the significant bloodying the of any kind, unaided by an effective bat and combat support sorties and IDF inflicted on it. n strategy, could accomplish in a situa- tion where the government’s initially declared goals were so unrealistic. Benjamin S. Lambeth is a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a position he assumed in July 2011 following a 36-year career at the Neither of these consequential mis- RAND Corp. This article is derived from his 2011 RAND Project Air Force study, “Air steps in strategy choice had anything Operations in Israel’s War Against Hezbollah: Learning From Lebanon and Getting It to do with any strengths or limitations Right in Gaza.” An electronic copy of the full report can be downloaded at http://www. of Israel’s air posture. rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG835.pdf. Lambeth’s In combat mission areas, the IAF most recent article for Air Force Magazine was “A Short History of Military Space,” in performed to its usual high standards December 2004. 116 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2011