AP photo by Hussein Malla It was flawed strategy, not failed airpower, that led to the IDF’s inconclusive performance in Lebanon. or 34 tense days in the sum- mer of 2006, the Israeli De- fense Forces conducted a Fcampaign against the Hezbollah or- ganization in response to a surprise cross-border incursion from southern Lebanon into Israel. Hezbollah terror- ists targeted and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers for use later as hostages. The Israeli counteroffensive, code- named Operation Change of Direc- tion, included the most complex and 112 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2011 Behind Israel’s 2006 War With Hezbollah By Benjamin S. Lambeth sophisticated air operation in Israel’s declared his government’s main goals forces on the ground and thousands history. It also ended up being the most as an unconditional return of the two of daily rounds of artillery and battle- inconclusive performance by the IDF kidnapped soldiers and a permanent field rockets fired against targets in since the founding of the Jewish state removal of Hezbollah as a fighting southern Lebanon. in 1948. force in southern Lebanon. Those What ultimately “failed” in the As Israel’s counteroffensive pro- extravagant goals remained elusive campaign’s planning and conduct gressed, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert throughout the nearly five weeks of was not Israeli airpower or any other fighting. instrument of warfare per se. Rather, Left: Dahiyeh, a southern suburb of Bei- rut, Lebanon, and Hezbollah stronghold, The frustration felt among Israelis the problem was a blend of ill-advised after Israeli air strikes in August 2006. as the conflict unfolded intensified high-level leadership judgments on the Below: Two JDAMs are on the ramp as because their forces were unable to nature of the adversary; initial goals an Israeli F-16 advances in preparation stem the relentless daily barrage of unattainable by any mix of military for a mission against Hezbollah. short-range Katyusha rockets Hez- force that the Israeli people and the bollah fired into civilian population international community would likely centers in northern Israel. A cease-fire accept; a poor choice of alternatives finally brought an end to the lethal for pursuing the campaign’s goals; harassment. and government mismanagement of AP photo by Baz Ratner The IDF’s Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. public expectations. Dan Halutz largely determined the As the first day of combat ended, campaign’s conduct. He had previ- it became clear that Israel’s strategy, ously commanded the Israeli Air Force for the time being, was to rely solely (IAF) and was at the time the crisis on precision standoff attacks to co- erupted the first airman ever to occupy erce Hezbollah’s fiery leader, Hassan the country’s top military position. Nasrallah, to do its bidding. His chosen response was to rely The IDF had a refined contingency at first almost entirely on preci- plan ready for an air-land counterof- sion standoff attacks instead of a fensive intended for just such a sce- joint offensive that included an early nario to expel Hezbollah’s forces from commitment of ground troops. The southern Lebanon, but its leadership campaign’s halting progress and in- was not eager to implement it. Dur- decisive results led many to conclude ing the cabinet’s initial deliberations that the IDF chief, as an airman, had about a serious ground option as an succumbed to a parochial belief that early move, the IDF’s deputy chief airpower alone could bring about the of staff, Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, campaign’s goals. warned that a major land invasion Furthermore, a predominant and could cost the IDF as many as 400 persistent early impression was that soldiers killed in action. Halutz’s initial choice of strategy The near-certainty of a high number and the IDF’s disappointing per- of friendly casualties was a major formance attested to a “failure of inhibiting factor affecting everyone airpower”—even though the IDF’s in the Olmert government. In 18 years counteroffensive included not only of occupation in Lebanon from 1982 around-the-clock strikes by IAF fight- to 2000, the IDF sustained more than ers and attack helicopters, but also an 600 troop fatalities, nearly as many as early insertion of special operations during the Six Day War of 1967. No one AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2011 113 tion to major ground fighting would produce an unacceptable number of Israeli casualties. Eventually, calls for a massive IDF ground incursion to drive Hezbollah’s forces out of southern Lebanon became more vocal. The IDF mobilized three reserve divisions on July 20, in its largest troop call-up in four years. The government’s issuance of the invasion order came only on Aug. 11, however. This left the IDF with three days to make the most of its long-delayed ground push before a cease-fire went into effect. During the final 72 hours of combat, the IDF tripled its troop numbers in southern Lebanon to a peak of around 30,000. It suffered its heaviest casu- alties during those last three days of fighting. Hezbollah continuously attacked Israel even after the Israeli withdrawal from Leba- Coordination among force elements non in 2000. Pictured is an Israeli civilian dwelling, destroyed by Hezbollah rockets. was uniformly poor throughout this final phase of the conflict. In some wanted a replay of the experience. For during the much higher-intensity Yom cases, embattled tank crews requested Israelis, the Lebanon occupation was Kippur War of 1973. immediate close air support but were and remains their country’s Vietnam- During the campaign’s first week, denied by the IDF’s Northern Com- like experience. Halutz rejected any the IAF flew some 2,000 fighter and mand out of concern that CAS would idea of the IDF going back into south- attack helicopter sorties day and night result in a friendly fire incident. ern Lebanon to recapture and occupy against a wide variety of Hezbollah The performance of IDF ground Lebanese territory immediately north targets. Despite tactical and opera- forces throughout this escalated end- of the Israeli border. tional-level successes that week, it game further revealed shortcomings The IDF’s ground commanders became increasingly clear that standoff in combat tradecraft. Infantry units also opposed a major land counter- attacks alone would never bring about were often unable to coordinate with offensive because their troops were the Olmert government’s overarching armor, and tank crews proved repeat- totally unprepared for combat against campaign goals. edly nonproficient in night operations. a robust opponent such as Hezbollah. Not long after, the government’s From start to finish, IDF ground Since the start of its preoccupation principals found themselves in an acri- activity lacked a clearly identifiable with the Palestinian intifada in 2000, monious debate on the IDF’s inability pattern. Troops returning from battle the IDF had conducted virtually no to stop the relentless Katyusha rockets reported that Hezbollah’s dug-in de- periodic large-scale training for major and the offsetting concern that escala- fenses and the hardened fighters who land combat. As a result, operational integration between Israel’s ground forces and the IAF had all but ceased to exist, and ground force readiness for any contingency other than con- taining the Palestinian uprising had been allowed to lapse. Yet, Halutz wanted to teach Hez- bollah a lesson its leaders would not AP photo by Mohammed Zaatari soon forget. Ever since the IDF had withdrawn from Lebanon, Hezbol- lah had continuously tested Israel’s patience through recurrent border provocations and random rocket fir- ings into northern Israel. With the final outrage of the troop abduction, Halutz decided to seek a sea change in the situation. The Campaign Unfolds From the first day onward in this second Lebanon war, some 173,000 Female members of Hezbollah shoulder Katyusha rocket models at a rally in artillery and rocket rounds were ex- southern Lebanon in 2007. The rocket attacks against Israeli towns did not stop pended. This was more than were used until a cease-fire halted the 2006 war. 114 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2011 manned them proved far more resil- ient than anticipated. In the end, the IAF provided abundant on-call CAS as required, and many wounded IDF troops were promptly evacuated by UH-60 helicopters under heavy fire. AP photo by Kevin Frayer Strategic Errors The second Lebanon war’s less than resounding outcome for Israel in no way reflects a failure of the IAF to perform to the fullest extent of its abilities. Rather, it stemmed from a broader deficiency in the strategy of Olmert’s most senior leaders. There was nothing wrong in prin- ciple with the government’s decision to respond to Hezbollah’s cross-border provocation with escalated force. Yet the ramifications of the response were not adequately explored before An Israeli soldier protects his ears as a heavy artillery piece fires into southern proceeding. Lebanon in July 2006. That same day, Hezbollah fired a barrage of rockets into the There was more than one option Israeli city of Haifa, killing eight and wounding seven. available to the IDF in the immediate aftermath of the provocation. However, continuing rocket fire represented a be a mistake not to make the most of the options were not systematically core strategic threat to northern Israel’s them,” he said. assessed and rank-ordered by Israel’s civilian population and economy only Olmert himself voiced the senti- civilian leaders and by Halutz. As a became clear once the counteroffen- ment to IAF personnel at Hatzor Air result, the IDF initiated its counter- sive was well under way.