Keeping Saddam away from mass-destruction weapons requires patience, perseverence, and an occasional bullet between the eyes. Osirak and Beyond REVENTING Iraq from building By Rebecca Grant Weapons of Mass Destruction has been a US objective for Pmore than two decades. Air- power has played a key role in that struggle, which is far from over. Defense analyst Anthony H. Cor- desman noted in a recent analysis, “Iraq is the only major recent user of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Iraq’s Nuclear, Biological, Chemi- cal, and missile programs have emerged as Saddam Hussein’s per- sonal projects and they have sur- Photo via Israeli Air Force Magazine vived many efforts to kill them off. From Israel’s raid on the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 to Desert Storm in 1991 and another seven years of UN monitoring, keeping Iraq’s arsenal in check has gener- ated sanctions, inspections, and air strikes. From the beginning, international concern has focused on a specific problem: the danger Iraq would use its Osirak reactor to produce weap- ons-grade material for a bomb pro- gram. Iraq purchased the reactor from France in 1975. It was de- signed as a civilian power plant that could also produce highly enriched uranium. Iraq’s attempts to develop its own nuclear power sources dated to the 1960s. However, Saddam Hussein himself began the Iraqi nuclear bomb program in the 1970s while he was still vice chairman of the Revolu- An Israeli F-16 pilot’s view as he tionary Command Council, prior to lines up on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear assuming total control of the na- reactor in 1981. tion. The Osirak facility has been at- tacked several times. Iran actually was the first to bomb the reactor area. On Sept. 30, 1980, in the open- ing days of the Iran–Iraq War, an Iranian aircraft lightly damaged the Osirak facility. In response, the offi- cial Iraqi news agency issued the 74 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2002 following statement: “The Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist entity.” In other words, the target was Israel. Israel’s Shocker Israel took note and on June 7, Photo via Israeli Air Force Magazine 1981, shocked the world with a dar- ing and completely successful sur- prise attack on Osirak. Long before they actually pulled the trigger, Israel’s leaders had been debating such a move. Maj. Gen. David Ivry, who was then chief of the Israeli Air Force, recalled that one of the conditions for the attack was “we have to attack before ura- nium was going to get to the facility, because otherwise, after attacking IAF used F-16s (such as this one) and F-15s for the Osirak attack. The raid with uranium inside, it can cause took Iraq off the fast track to nuclear weapons, but Baghdad then spent the radiation damage to the environment next decade pouring money and manpower into WMD development. and so on.” Even when faced with the loom- off the 8,000-foot-long runway just ’til you drop” program. The fact is ing threat of a functioning nuclear before 4 p.m. They flew low and that Iraq, had it been left undisturbed, reactor, Prime Minister Menachem level throughout the flight to Iraq. could have acquired a nuclear bomb Begin struggled with the decision to At 5:35 p.m., they popped up to iden- by 1992. attack. It took “about one year” to tify the target and release their bombs. get a consensus, recalled Ivry, “be- “In one minute and 20 seconds, the Rude Interruption cause there were a lot of people who reactor lay in ruins,” reported an A disturbance definitely was com- hesitated.” Ivry remembered going IDF statement. All aircraft returned ing, however. Iraq’s invasion of Ku- “every two or three weeks in the to base. wait on Aug. 2, 1990, soon raised the Cabinet to talk about it again.” World reaction was intense. Con- prospect of a war involving Weap- Even without a guarantee of fi- demnations of Israel far outpaced ons of Mass Destruction. During the nal approval, Ivry set the wheels in congratulations. In the US, feelings Iran–Iraq conflict, Iraq used mus- motion, holding detailed rehears- were mixed, and yet there was a tard gas and nerve agent weapons on als of the strike. Then–Maj. Gen. strong undercurrent of relief. Sen. 10 occasions between 1983 and 1988. Yehoshua Saguy, head of the Is- Alan Cranston (D–Calif.) spoke for About 25,000 Iranians and Kurds raeli Defense Forces’ intelligence many when he wrote in the New York died, according to an estimate by division, was one who argued for a Times: “The bold Israeli move elimi- Cordesman. nonmilitary solution. On the eve of nates the immediate threat.” Biological and Chemical Weap- the strike, Ivry recalled, “our lead- The destruction of Osirak took ons facilities were the top concerns ing intelligence community recom- Iraq off the fast track to nuclear of coalition planners. Gen. H. Nor- mended not to attack” because of weapons. Iraq responded with a man Schwarzkopf judged Iraq’s key the risk to the unfolding peace pro- double approach. Baghdad put at military strength to be its “ability, cess with Egypt. least 20,000 people to work on the evinced in the second Al-Faw cam- However, Begin eventually con- nuclear program, pressing ahead paign of the Iran–Iraq War, to wage cluded that Israel could not wait and with development of gas centrifuges an offensive with Chemical Weap- had to destroy the reactor. He saw it to produce bomb-grade material. The ons.” In his book, It Doesn’t Take as “my chance to save the Jewish Iraqis also pursued a second, out- a Hero, Schwarzkopf noted that it people.” dated method based on the use of was “the possibility of mass casu- After Begin made the decision to calutrons for electromagnetic sepa- alties from Chemical Weapons” that attack, the head of the Israeli Defense ration to produce highly enriched constituted “the main reason we Forces, Gen. Rafael Eitan, briefed uranium. had 63 hospitals, two hospital ships, the pilots who were preparing to carry Flush with oil money in the 1980s, and 18,000 beds ready in the war out the mission. “The alternative is Iraq spent at least $10 billion to buy zone.” our destruction,” warned Eitan. illicit components. Manufacturing For President George H.W. Bush, On June 7, 1981, all was in readi- and testing facilities were concealed the need to clean out Saddam’s Weap- ness. The starting point for the raid at many sites in Iraq. The strategy ons of Mass Destruction was a com- was Etzion Air Base, located in the worked: Former chief UN nuclear pelling reason for going to war. In Israeli–occupied eastern Sinai, close weapons inspector David A. Kay de- his now-famous Jan. 5 “last chance” to the town of Eilat. Israeli Air Force scribed how Iraq’s nuclear efforts letter to Saddam, Bush warned that F-15 and new F-16 fighters roared were dismissed by experts as a “shop the US “will not tolerate the use of AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2002 75 Chemical or Biological Weapons or the destruction of Kuwait’s oil fields and installations.” USAF photo Coalition air planners had identi- fied “Nuclear, Biological, and Chemi- cal Weapons” as one of 12 strategic target subsets and put NBC targets high on the priority list in case the war ended in just a few days. Most of these suspected sites were chemical and biological research, production, and storage facilities. On Jan. 16, 1991, the target list contained just two nuclear facility targets—though more than 20 facili- ties later would be identified. Plan- ners kept up the search for nuclear and other sites even after the start of the air campaign, but the task was daunting. As Kay later remarked, “There was little hard analysis that Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait raised the specter of a war involving WMD. existed anywhere” on Iraq’s nuclear Coalition aircraft, such as this F-117, targeted nuclear reactors and biological/ capabilities. chemical weapons facilities, setting back research and production capability. The deployment of coalition forces spurred Iraq to accelerate its nuclear intelligence meant that other tar- “been producing enough material for efforts. According to Cordesman’s gets appeared late in the game. One somewhere around 10 to 20 nuclear report, the goal was to produce a was the Al-Athir complex 40 miles weapons a year, maybe more.” working bomb by April 1991. The south of Baghdad, which turned out The Gulf War suddenly ended be- crash program centered on recover- to be the heart of the nuclear pro- fore the coalition could ferret out ing enriched fuel from Iraq’s French gram. The official Pentagon report all of Iraq’s weapons workshops or and Russian–built reactors, in defi- on the Gulf War recorded that Al- fully assess what remained. ance of International Atomic Energy Athir “was not confirmed until late In April 1991, the United Nations Agency safeguards supposedly in in the war.” The very last bomb passed Resolution 687, which was, place. dropped by an F-117 during the war in effect, a conditional cease-fire Iraq also explored building a ra- targeted Al-Athir, inflicting only outlining an extensive plan for the diological “dirty” bomb that would light damage. In fact, subsequent disarmament of Iraq, as the Stock- spew radioactive material. It would inspections found that Al-Athir was holm International Peace Research furnish Iraq with a “nuclear” weapon where Iraq worked with design of Institute described it.