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The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe
Études de l’Ifri Proliferation Papers 60 THE EROSION OF STRATEGIC STABILITY AND THE FUTURE OF ARMS COntrOL IN EUROPE Corentin BRUSTLEIN November 2018 Security Studies Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non- governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-36567-932-9 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2018 How to quote this document: Corentin Brustlein, “The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe”, Proliferation Papers, No. 60, November 2018. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 – Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Author Dr. Corentin Brustlein is the Director of the Security Studies Center at the French Institute of International Relations. His work focuses on nuclear and conventional deterrence, arms control, military balances, and U.S. and French defense policies. Before assuming his current position, he had been a research fellow at Ifri since 2008 and the head of Ifri’s Deterrence and Proliferation Program since 2010. -
How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle of Britain British Courage and Capability Might Not Have Been Enough to Win; German Mistakes Were Also Key
How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle of Britain British courage and capability might not have been enough to win; German mistakes were also key. By John T. Correll n July 1940, the situation looked “We shall fight on the beaches, we shall can do more than delay the result.” Gen. dire for Great Britain. It had taken fight on the landing grounds, we shall Maxime Weygand, commander in chief Germany less than two months to fight in the fields and in the streets, we of French military forces until France’s invade and conquer most of Western shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, predicted, “In three weeks, IEurope. The fast-moving German Army, surrender.” England will have her neck wrung like supported by panzers and Stuka dive Not everyone agreed with Churchill. a chicken.” bombers, overwhelmed the Netherlands Appeasement and defeatism were rife in Thus it was that the events of July 10 and Belgium in a matter of days. France, the British Foreign Office. The Foreign through Oct. 31—known to history as the which had 114 divisions and outnumbered Secretary, Lord Halifax, believed that Battle of Britain—came as a surprise to the Germany in tanks and artillery, held out a Britain had lost already. To Churchill’s prophets of doom. Britain won. The RAF little longer but surrendered on June 22. fury, the undersecretary of state for for- proved to be a better combat force than Britain was fortunate to have extracted its eign affairs, Richard A. “Rab” Butler, told the Luftwaffe in almost every respect. -
People's Liberation Army Air Force Aviation Training at the Operational
C O R P O R A T I O N From Theory to Practice People’s Liberation Army Air Force Aviation Training at the Operational Unit Lyle J. Morris, Eric Heginbotham For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1415 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9497-1 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface About the China Aerospace Studies Institute The China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) was created in 2014 at the initiative of the Headquarters, U.S. -
United States Air Force and Its Antecedents Published and Printed Unit Histories
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AND ITS ANTECEDENTS PUBLISHED AND PRINTED UNIT HISTORIES A BIBLIOGRAPHY EXPANDED & REVISED EDITION compiled by James T. Controvich January 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTERS User's Guide................................................................................................................................1 I. Named Commands .......................................................................................................................4 II. Numbered Air Forces ................................................................................................................ 20 III. Numbered Commands .............................................................................................................. 41 IV. Air Divisions ............................................................................................................................. 45 V. Wings ........................................................................................................................................ 49 VI. Groups ..................................................................................................................................... 69 VII. Squadrons..............................................................................................................................122 VIII. Aviation Engineers................................................................................................................ 179 IX. Womens Army Corps............................................................................................................ -
Rethinking Strategic Advantages of Air Supremacy in Modern Warfare Revista De Derecho, Núm
Revista de Derecho ISSN: 0121-8697 [email protected] Universidad del Norte Colombia Melamed Visbal, Janiel David New Wars, New Challenges: Rethinking Strategic Advantages of Air Supremacy in Modern Warfare Revista de Derecho, núm. 44, julio-diciembre, 2015, pp. 226-246 Universidad del Norte Barranquilla, Colombia Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=85141031010 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative artículo de investigación New Wars, New Challenges: Rethinking Strategic Advantages of Air Supremacy in Modern Warfare* Nuevas guerras, nuevos desafíos: Repesando las ventajas estratégicas de la supremacía aérea en las guerras modernas DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14482/dere.44.7174 Janiel David Melamed Visbal** Universidad del Norte (Colombia) * The following article is the result of research, regarding international security, new wars and asymmetrical armed conflicts, developed within the framework of the “Agenda Internacio- nal” research group. ** Lawyer and holds a M.A. in Government, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism from the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy (IDC-Israel). He is a full time profes- sor within the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Universidad del Norte (Colombia), and is currently enrolled in a doctoral degree program in International Secu- rity at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), through the Instituto Uni- versitario General Gutiérrez Mellado (IUGM). [email protected] / [email protected] REVISTA DE DERECHO N.º 44, Barranquilla, 2015 ISSN: 0121-8697 (impreso) ISSN: 2145-9355 (on line) 226 Abstract The objective of the following article is to conduct an analysis of air power and its role in modern warfare. -
Effects-Based Operations and the Law of Aerial Warfare
Washington University Global Studies Law Review Volume 5 Issue 2 January 2006 Effects-based Operations and the Law of Aerial Warfare Michael N. Schmitt George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Michael N. Schmitt, Effects-based Operations and the Law of Aerial Warfare, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 265 (2006), https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Washington University Global Studies Law Review VOLUME 5 NUMBER 2 2006 EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND THE LAW OF AERIAL WARFARE MICHAEL N. SCHMITT* Law responds almost instinctively to tectonic shifts in warfare.1 For instance, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 constituted a dramatic reaction to the suffering of civilian populations during World War II.2 Similarly, the 1977 Protocols Additional3 updated and expanded the law of armed conflict (LOAC) in response both to the growing prevalence of non-international armed conflicts and wars of national liberation and to the recognized need to codify the norms governing the conduct of hostilities.4 In light of this symbiotic relationship, it is essential that LOAC experts carefully monitor developments in military affairs, because such developments may well either strain or strengthen aspects of that body of law.5 As an example, the widespread use in Iraq of civilian contractors and * Professor of International Law and Director, Program in Advanced Security Studies, George C. -
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Armed Forces Equivalent Ranks Order Men Women Royal New Zealand New Zealand Army Royal New Zealand New Zealand Naval New Zealand Royal New Zealand Navy: Women’s Air Force: Forces Army Air Force Royal New Zealand New Zealand Royal Women’s Auxilliary Naval Service Women’s Royal New Zealand Air Force Army Corps Nursing Corps Officers Officers Officers Officers Officers Officers Officers Vice-Admiral Lieutenant-General Air Marshal No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent Rear-Admiral Major-General Air Vice-Marshal No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent Commodore, 1st and Brigadier Air Commodore No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent 2nd Class Captain Colonel Group Captain Superintendent Colonel Matron-in-Chief Group Officer Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Wing Commander Chief Officer Lieutenant-Colonel Principal Matron Wing Officer Lieutentant- Major Squadron Leader First Officer Major Matron Squadron Officer Commander Lieutenant Captain Flight Lieutenant Second Officer Captain Charge Sister Flight Officer Sub-Lieutenant Lieutenant Flying Officer Third Officer Lieutenant Sister Section Officer Senior Commis- sioned Officer Lieutenant Flying Officer Third Officer Lieutenant Sister Section Officer (Branch List) { { Pilot Officer Acting Pilot Officer Probationary Assistant Section Acting Sub-Lieuten- 2nd Lieutenant but junior to Third Officer 2nd Lieutenant No equivalent Officer ant Navy and Army { ranks) Commissioned Officer No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No equivalent No -
For 30 Minutes, James H. Howard Single-Handedly Fought Off Marauding German Fighters to Defend the B-17S of 401St Bomb Group. for That, He Received the Medal of Honor
For 30 minutes, James H. Howard single-handedly fought off marauding German fighters to defend the B-17s of 401st Bomb Group. For that, he received the Medal of Honor. One-Man Air Force By Rebecca Grant Mustang pilot who took on the German Air Force single-handedly, and saved on Nazi aircraft and fuel production. our 401st Bomb Group from disaster?” uesday, Jan. 11, 1944, was Devastating missions to targets such wondered Col. Harold Bowman, the a rough day for the B-17Gs as Ploesti in Romania had already unit’s commander. of the 401st Bomb Group. produced Medal of Honor recipients. Soon the bomber pilots knew—and TIt was their 14th mission, but the Many were awarded posthumously, and so did those back home. first one on which they took heavy nearly all went to bomber crewmen. “Maj. James H. Howard was identi- losses—four aircraft missing in ac- Waist gunners, pilots, and naviga- fied today as the lone United States tion after bombing Me 110 fighter tors—all were carrying out heroic acts fighter pilot who for more than 30 production plants at Oschersleben and in the face of the enemy. minutes fought off about 30 Ger- Halberstadt, Germany. The lone P-51 pilot on this bomb- man fighters trying to attack Eighth Turning for home, they witnessed ing run would, in fact, become the Air Force B-17 formations returning an amazing sight: A single P-51 stayed only fighter pilot awarded the Medal from Oschersleben and Halberstadt with them for an incredible 30 minutes of Honor in World War II’s European in Germany,” reported the New York on egress, chasing off German fighters Theater. -
Kings RAF Booklet
Combined Cadet Force Royal Air Force A Commissioning Aide Memoire for the Officer Cadre Version 1 “Where else could you learn to fly aerobatics, visit Royal Air Force Stations, tour foreign countries, play sports from local to international level, learn the skills to lead expeditions, become a target shooting marksman, gain your Duke of Edinburgh Awards, canoe through white water, assist your community, join a band, learn aviation subjects, go caving, parachute, climb, sail, ski...? These and much more are readily available to you as a member of the Air Cadet Organization.” Air Commodore Jon Chitty OBE. Introduction The school cadet organisation originates from 1859, when schools at Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Rossall, Felsted, Hurstpierpoint, Winchester and Tonbridge formed armed uniformed units as part of a national reserve to counter a perceived threat from abroad. By 1900, cadet units were established in over 100 schools across the country and in 1908, these units were re-titled the Officer Training Corps (OTC). In 1948, the OTC was renamed the Combined Cadet Force. The aim of the Combined Cadet Force is to provide a framework through which young people develop the qualities of team work, self-reliance, resourcefulness, leadership and responsibility. A weekly programme of military training is designed to give young people at King’s a chance to exercise responsibility and leadership, to provide them with knowledge of our defence forces, and to encourage those who might be interested in becoming officers of the Armed Services. Uniform members of the Combined Cadet Force will regularly stay on Royal Air Forces bases, therefore it is important that cadets are able to demonstrate an awareness of the structure and organisation of the Royal Air Force, its role in the defence of the United Kingdom and her interests and the operations in which the Royal Air Force are currently engaged. -
Air Base Defense Rethinking Army and Air Force Roles and Functions for More Information on This Publication, Visit
C O R P O R A T I O N ALAN J. VICK, SEAN M. ZEIGLER, JULIA BRACKUP, JOHN SPEED MEYERS Air Base Defense Rethinking Army and Air Force Roles and Functions For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR4368 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0500-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The growing cruise and ballistic missile threat to U.S. Air Force bases in Europe has led Headquarters U.S. -
BNC Final Brief
Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions John Stillion and Bryan Clark Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 1 • Battle Network (BN) definition: – A combination of distributed target acquisition sensors (finders and damage assessors), command and control (deciders), weapons (shooters), and the electronic communications linking them together. • Essential BN attributes: – Enable shooters to engage targets they cannot “see” far more effectively than would otherwise be possible – Enable finders to achieve much higher levels of effectiveness as a group than they possess organically – Enable deciders to coordinate and prioritize tactical engagements at a much higher level of efficiency to achieve the desired operational effects – Enable those assessing the results of these operations (damage assessors) to determine their relative success with far greater accuracy than would otherwise be possible • BNs first emerged about 100 years ago but were relatively rare until recently due in part to the high cost of transmitting and processing information – This limited the number of BNs and the instances of BN competition • Declining cost and increasing power of information transmission and processing systems will likely spur BN proliferation, and with it BN competition 2 • Network attributes depend heavily on operational metrics • Tempo of operations influences decision to exploit or disrupt opposing network • “Virtual Attrition” is often more cost-effective than platform destruction • Competitions accelerate and culminate, then jump to new mode • In some cases one side or the other is “saved by the bell” when a conflict ends just before a competition jumps to a new mode 3 • Submarines vs. ASW – Examine competition with focus on BMC2, multi- domain elements, success of networked vs. -
20 Years After Kargil 26
Event Report-07/2019 20 years after Kargil: Military operations, perceptions, and decision-making July 2019 Brookings India hosted its second “Back to the Future” panel discussion, marking the 20th anniversary of the Kargil War, to explore the political, military, and diplomatic challenges of the war and the lessons it holds for India’s future strategy. e series involves inviting former decision-makers to revisit a historic episode in India’s foreign and security relations to draw lessons and improve future policies. e expert panel included Gen. V.P. Malik, Chief of Army Sta, Indian Army (1997-2000); Lt. Gen. Mohinder Puri, Major General, GOC, 8 Mountain Division (1999); Air Marshal Narayan Menon, Air Ocer Commanding (AOC), Jammu and Kashmir; Shakti Sinha, Private Secretary to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1996-1999) and Indrani Bagchi, Diplomatic Correspondent, e Economic Times (1999). e session was moderated by Dr. Anit Mukherjee, Non-Resident Fellow, Brookings India. e event was open to the public and on-the-record. In attendance were ocials from various ministries, from the Indian Armed Forces, foreign diplomats, academics from leading universities and think tanks, as well as members of the media and civil society. Kargil Revisited What was the nature of intrusions which triggered the Kargil Mukherjee contended that such calls have gone largely War in 1999? What were some of the major contentions, costs, unanswered, posing the larger question of whether democracies and consequences of the war? Twenty years later, where do we necessarily need crises to usher in change. stand today? Moderator Anit Mukherjee not only addressed Mukherjee also brought up the need to teach the present these questions by providing a general outline of the war, but generation of ocers the main lessons that emerged from the also evoked certain issues of contemporary relevance to set the war.