ANGLO-CANADIAN WARTIME RELATIONS, 1939-1945: RAF BOMBER COMMAND AND NO. 6 (CANADIAN) GROUP By (£) WILLIAMS. CARTER, B.A., M.A. Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy McMaster University April 1989 ANGLO-CANADIAN WARTIME RELATIONS, 1939-1945: RAF BOMBER COMMAND AND NO. 6 (CANADIAN) GROUP DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (1989) McMASTER UNIVERSITY (History) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: Anglo-Canadian Wartime Relations, 1939-1945: RAF Bomber Command and No. 6 (Canadian) Group AUTHOR: Williams. Carter, B.A. (York University) M.A. (McMaster University) SUPERVISOR: Professor John P. Campbell NUMBER OF PAGES: viii, 239 ii ABSTRACT In its broadest perspective the following thesis is a case study in Anglo-Canadian relations during the Second World War. The specific subject is the relationship between RAF Bomber Command and No. 6 (Canadian) Group, with emphasis on its political, operational (military), and social aspects. The Prologue describes the bombing raid on Dortmund of 6/7 October, 1944, and has two purposes. The first is to set the stage for the subsequent analysis of the Anglo­ Canadian relationship and to serve as a reminder of the underlying operational realities. The second is to show to what extent Canadian air power had grown during the war by highlighting the raid that was No. 6 Group's maximum effort of the bombing campaign. Chapter 1 deals with the political negotiations and problems associated with the creation of No. 6 Group on 25 October, 1942. The analysis begins with an account of how the Mackenzie King government placed all RCAF aircrew graduates of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan at iii the disposal of the RAF and then had to negotiate for the right to concentrate RCAF aircrew overseas in their own squadrons and higher formations. This policy of concentration was known as 'Canadianization' and its greatest success was the establishment of the Canadian Bomber Group. The second chapter is an operational history of No. 6 Group. Inevitably, this largely reflected the fortunes of Bomber Command as a whole. The Group's performance during the period from January 1943 to March 1944 was lacklustre; only after the advent of the pre-invasion bombing cam~. 1gn of 1944 did it improve. The period from April 1944 to May 1945 was one of triumph as the Group's performance improved remarkably. Chapter 3 deals with social relations between RCAF personnel overseas and the RAF and English civilians. During the early years, 1941 and 1942, relations between the Canadians and their hosts were poor, primarily h~cause of mutual misunderstanding. In the period 1943 to 1945 the two sides settled down and got to know each other better, thereby leading to an overall improvement in Anglo-Canadian relations. Even so, there were always points of friction between RCAF personnel overseas and the RAF. iv The fourth chapter examines four intergovernmental disputes over the policy and administration of the RCAF Overseas: namely, Canadianization, commissioning, special aircrew leave, and the duration of an operational tour. In spite of the victory achieved by the creation of No. 6 Group, the Canadian government had difficulty at the policy level because the British still had to be consulted regarding the effects of such decisions on the war effort. The history of those disputes underscores the importance for Canada of maintaining administrative autonomy over her own service personnel, even in the absence of strategic control. Two key themes are brought out in the Conclusion. The first is that although the struggle for RCAF administrative autonomy overseas had little strategic significance, this period was a most vital and necessary one in the development of the RCAF as a separate service within the Canadian Armed Forces. The second is the degree to which a small nation like Canada finds it impossible to retain strategic control over he~ own armed forces when she is allied with larger, more powerful countries. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many individuals have contributed to the successful conclusion of this academic marathon. At McMaster University Dr. John P. Campbell, my thesis supervisor, has been an outstanding mentor and critic. It is largely thanks to him that this study turned out as well as it did. Ors. Alan Cassels and Richard Rempel, my two departmental readers, were kind enough to lend their expertise and criticize the finished product. Dr. Torn Willey was also kind enough to comment on my work. Carol Mazur, David Cook, and Valerie Parke at Mills Memorial Library (McMaster) were unflagging in their helpfulness and friendliness. In the History Department's office Vi Croydon, Sheena Gorman, and Wendy Benedetti answered my many requests with utmost patience. Manon Ames, Dr. Sam Cioran, and Joanna Johnson at the Humanities Computer Processing Centre also provided me with much needed advice. In Ottawa the Director of the Directorate of History (Department of National Defence), Dr. W.A.B. Douglas, and his staff were most generous with their assistance and vi courtesy. The tollowing people should be mentioned: Dr. Norman Hillmer (Senior Historian), Drs. Steve Harris, Owen Cooke, Carl Christie, Fred Hatch, and Dave Fransen, Messers. Ben Greenhous and Paul Marshall, Major John Armstrong, and Ms. Loretta Wickens. At the National Archives of Canada Miss Barbara Wilson, and Messers. Ron Falls and Glenn Wright gave unselfishly of their time. In England there were many people to whom a debt of gratitude is owed. They are: the staff at the Public Record Office in Kew; Messers. P.G. Murton and M.C. Tagg (who filled a huge photocopy order for me) at the RAF Museum in Hendon; Mr. John Wing (whom I burdened with another large photocopy order) at Christ Church Library, Oxford; Mr. Dagleish and Miss S. Warner at Nuffield College Library, Oxford; Miss M. Stewart and Miss L. James at Churchill College Library, Cambridge; Messers. R. Suddaby and P. Reid, and Dr. Young at the Imperial War Museum; and Messers. S.K. Ellison and A. Spencer, and Miss K.V. Bligh at the House cf Lords Records Office. A special thanks goes to Dr. C.P. Stacey who helped me define the main theme of this thesis, and whose book, Arms, Men and Governments, proved invaluable. vii Lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my parents, William F. Carter (one of 'Bomber' Harris' 'old lags') and Marion E. Carter, for the love and support of a lifetime. I could not have done it without them. viii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT . iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi PROLOGUE: STRIKE HARD, STRIKE SURE. The Dortmund Raid Endnotes . 2 5 Chapter 1. THE ACID TEST OF SOVEREIGNTY. • . • . 27 Bomber Group Negotiations Establishment of No. 6 Group Endnotes . 61 2. ORDEAL BY BATTLE. ... 64 Operational History of No. 6 Group Endnotes . ... 1 1 1 3. BLAME THE CANADIANS 1 1 6 RCAF/Civilian Relations RCAF/RAF Relations Morale and Discipline Endnotes ........ 1 61 4. THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY 166 Canadianization Commissioning Special Aircrew Leave Duration of Operational Tours Endnotes ...... 215 CONCLUSION: RITES OF PASSAGE. 222 Endnotes . 227 APPENDIX . 228 GLOSSARY 230 NOTE ON SOURCES 232 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 233 PROLOGUE STRIKE HARD, STRIKE SURE On the morning of 6 October, 1944, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, selected Dortmund as the primary target for that night's bombing operation. He chose D~rtmund because its status as an industrial, commercial, and communi~ations centre made it a vital link in Germany's war effort and, therefore, a valuable military target for Bomber Command. Dortmund is located in Westphalia, at the eastern edge of the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland. "The Bomber's Baedeker," a two-volume compendium of targeted G~rman cities, ranked Dortmund, with its pre-war population of 550,000 citizens, as the Ruhr's largest city. No less than twenty-nine heavy industrial works were located in and around Dortmund, including thirteen coking plants, nine collieries, three chemical and explosives works, and four iron- and steel-works. Also listed, but considered to be of lesser importance, were fourteen engineering and armaments works, a municipal gasworks and ten power stations. In 2 addition to its industrial importance, Dortmund was a transportation and communications centre. The "Baedeker" listed six railway marshalling yards and an inland harbour that served as the terminus of the Dortmund-Ems Canal, connecting Westphalia with the North Sea. The canal had handled four million tons of goods inward bound and 1 .4 million tons outward bound in 1938, the last year of peace. This shipping capacity helped make Dortmund the second most important transportation centre in the Ruhr after Duisburg, and one of Germany's most important commercial centres. 1 Consequently, Dortmund was the object of forty-nine bombing operations during World War II. 2 Almost half of these operations were no more than harassment raids carried out by fewer than a dozen aircraft and were intended to disrupt industrial production by driving workers into air raid shelters and depriving them of sleep. The raids were also designed to keep anti-aircraft and night fighter defences spread thinly throughout German and German occupied territory by diverting the enemy from actual Main Force targets. Bomber Command also launched a number of major operations against Dortmund, notably on 6/7 October, 1944. The raid had additional significance for No. 6 (Canadian) Group. Never before or after did the Group order up as many aircraft on a single operation as they did that night. No. 6 Group was at the peak of its striking power. It had become an integral part of Bomber Command and, as such, a symbol of growing Canadian air power. 3 The attack reflected the complex nature of Bomber Command's tactical planning at this stage of the war.