The Air Superiority Battle I N the Middle East, 1967-1973 Clarence E. Olschner, 111, MAJ, WAF U.S. Army Command and General Staf

Home , Air force, Egyptian Air Force, Israeli Air Force, Israel Tal, List of blockades, Syrian Air Force

The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973

Clarence E. Olschner, 111, MAJ, WAF U.S. Army Command and General STaff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Final report 9 June 1978

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Couunand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 MASTER OF MILITAQY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate a Title of thesis The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973

, Research Advisor

, Member, Graduate Faculty

Member, Consulting Faculty

1978 by , Dir1 ctor, Master of Military Art and Science.

Thc opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoinq statement.)

ii ABSTRACT

THE AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1967-1973 by Major Clarence E. Olschner, 111, WAF', 103 pages

This paper is an historical study of the strategy, tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, Egypt, and Syria in the battle for air superiority from 1967 through 1973. The study is developed chronologically beginning with the 1967 War, through the War of Attrition, and ending with the cease-fire in the 1973 War. It has been compiled from an extensive review of unclassified, primarily secondary, unofficial sources. The paper concludes that, in a mid-intensity war with modern air forces and air defense forces: 1. The achievement of strategic, tactical, and/or technological surprise can significantly influence the battle for air superiority.

2, Missiles have demonstrated the capability to significantly influence the air superiority battle in surface- to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground operations. 3. Air superiority can be achieved over the modern battlefield only by defeating both surface-to-air and air- to-air capabilities of the enemy. 4, The achievement of air superiority over the battle area requires the combined efforts of air and land forces of which long range artillery may be the most effective weapon for the suppression of surface-based air defenses.

iii ASKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to say thank you to those who gave generously of their time and talent to make this thesis possible. Dr. Kenneth Werrell provided excellent guidance and assistance throughout the year. COL ToN. Dupuy (USA, Ret.) kindly answered numerous questions and made available several unpublished resources. LTC Roger K. Taylor (USAF) offered insight on the employment of airpower which was most helpful. Mrs. Marilyn Slack has provided expert typing assistance. Finally, I thank my loving wife, Donna, without whose prayers and support this paper could not have been writ ten.

iv TAEILE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPROVALPAGE. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ii ABSTRACT ...... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv LIST OF TABLES ...... viii

INTRODUCTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ix

I. THE1967WAR ...... 1

THE ISflA?3LI WAR PLAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SURPRISE ACHIEVED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

THE IAF ATTACK ON EGYPT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 THE IAF' VERSUS JORDA.. AVD SYRIA ...... 10 TOTAL LOSSES ON 5 JUNE 1967 ...... 11 AIR ACTIVITY ON 6 JUNE 1967 ...... 11 TOTAL LOSSES, 5-6 JUNE 1967 ...... 12 AIR ACTIVITY 7-10 JUNE 1967 ...... 12 OBSERVATIONS ON THE 1967 WAR ...... 14

E.NDN0TES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 II. BETWEEN TWO WARS ...... 19 THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR OF ATTRITION . . . 20 AIR POWm IN THE WAR OF ATTRITION . . . . . 21

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SAM UMBRELLA 0 0 0 24 IsRmLr VIEW OF THE UMBRELLA ...... 25 DEVELOPMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE

FORCE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

V Page PREPARATION OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE .... 31 REBUILDING THE smrm AIR FORCE ...... 33

SUMMARY OF THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 0 0 0 0 0 33 ENDNOTES ...... 36 111. THE 1973 BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY ...... 39

THE ISRAELI CONCEPT ...... 40 THE ISRAELI DECISION TO NOT PRE-EMPT .... 41 THE ARAB STRATEGY ...... 43 THE COORDINATED ATTACK ...... 45 OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. 6 OCTOBER 1973 ... 46

TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE 0 0 0 a a a 0 0 48

IAF TACTICS AND LOSSES. 6 OCTOBER 1973 0. . 49 MOUNT HERMON.. ANOTHER SURPRISE ...... 50 GOLAN SUMMARY. 6 OCTOBER 1973 ...... 50 OVER THE SINAI. 6 OCTOBER 1973 ...... 50 SUMMARY OF THE AIR BATTLE. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . 54 rm PRIORITIES ON 7 OCTOBER 1973 ...... 54 COUNTERAIR STRIKES .AGAINST AIRFIELDS BEGINNING 7 OCTOBER ...... 56 IAF ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAN BRIDGES ...... 58 IAF DIRECTLY CONFRONTED SAMS. BEGINNING 8OCTOBER ...... 59 WEAPONS AND TACTICS USED AGAINST SAM SITES . 59 COUNTERMEASURES .AGAINST SAMS ...... 62 STRATEGIC BOMBING IN SYRIA BEGINNING 9 OCTOBER 2973 ...... 63 THE EGYPTIAN OFFENSIVE. 14 OCTOBER ..... 63

Vi Page COUNTERING EGYPT'S SAM UMBRELLA, 16-24 OCTOBER 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 E.AF RESPONSE TO THE ISFIAELI CROSSING . . . . 65 SUMMARY OF' THE 1973 AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE . 66

ENDNOTES0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72 IV. OBSERVATIONS .AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 79

SURPRISE. 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79

CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80

MISSILES. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80

CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81

SURFACE-BASED AIR DEFENSES 0 0 0 0 81

CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 COMBINED ARMS FOR AIR SUPERIORITY . . . . . 83

CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83

BIBLIOGRlLDXY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85

vii LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 . Air Order of Battle. 5 June 1967 0 . 0 3 2. IAF Losses Against Egypt on 5 June 1967 ... 9 3 . Aircraft Lost 5-6 June 1967 ...... 12 40 Air Order of Battle. 6 October 1973 ..... 34 5 . 1973 Aircraft Losses by Type ...... 68 60 1973 Aircraft Losses by Cause ...... 68 7. 1973 Aircraft Losses by Time Period ..... 69 80 1973 Combat Sorties and Loss Rates ...... 69 1973 IAF Air-to-Air Kills by Weapon ..... 69

viii INTRODUCTION

Air superiority in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is of particular interest to the military tactician today because this battle for the air was intensely fought with some of the most modern weapons and tactics in the world. The intensity, complexity and duration of this battle contrasted sharply with the relatively simple and quick manner in which the Israeli Air Force (IAF) gained air superiority in the 1967 War. To understand the conduct of the 1973 War it is essential to examine the development of the air battle in the 1967 War and the War of Attrition. This paper is an historical study of the strategy, tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, Egypt, and Syria in the battle for air superiority from 1967 through 1973. The study is developed chronologically beginning with the 1967 War, through the War of Attrition, and ending with the cease-fire in the 1973 War. It is appropriate here to say a few words about data.

This study has been prepared from unclassified, primarily unofficial, secondary sources. Because of the limited information available on Syrian participation in the war, greater emphasis has been given to examining the battle on tho Egyptian front.

ix The study of an air superiority battle revolves around the destruction of aircraft and how they were destroyed. While different sources seldom agree on the air order of

httttlc at thc start of a war, t.here is greater difficulty in

(3etcrmining how many aircraft were lost during a war and,

further, how they were lost. Few, if any, participants in

a war can afford to accurately reveal their own losses, but

each side makes claims about the opponent's losses. Some claims are conservative, some are optimistic, and some are exaggerated for reasons which are easy to understand.

Since the Arab-Israeli dispute is far from settled, it is not surprising that none of the participants has

opened its records for examination.

A number of books and articles have been written by

Israeli and, more recently, by Egyptian political and military leaders. These provide good information on the

course of the war, but they generally omit details on their own losses. Most of the data on Israeli losses must come

from the many military analysts who have contacted unofficial

sources in Israel. Unfortunately, very few western writers have had access to unofficial sources in the Arab countries, and their reports usually cover Israeli rather than Arab losses. This author has attempted to select the data on

Israeli losses which is most consistent with the course of

the war; the data on Arab losses, as explained, has been limited primarily to that reported by Israel.

X With the passage of time and hopefully the resolution of this conflict, one can hope that all participants will reveal more of the information which will enable a true picture of the war to emerge.

Xi CHAPTER r

On 5 June 1967 Israel launched a combined air and land attack against three of her neighbors: Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Israel initiated the fighting after considerable preparations for war by both sides. On 7 April 1967 there was a serious clash between Syrian and Israeli fighters in which six Syrian MIGs were shot down.' Between 14 and

16 May, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan mobilized their armed

forces, and the Egyptian Army began a buildup in the Sinai. On 28 May the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also began to mobilize. The next day Egyptian President Nasser requested that the U.N. observers withdraw from the Sinai, and he 2 ordered the Gulf of Aqaba be closed to Israeli shipping. On 23 May Israeli Premier Eshkol termed the blockade man act of aggression against Israel"; a week later he appointed Moshe Dayan as defense minister. The threats, maneuvering, and buildup of forces continued through Sunday, 4 June, when Iraq joined the defense alliance recently formed by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. On the same day, the Israeli cabinet con- cluded that Israel could best survive a war against this 3 Arab alliance by striking the first blow.

THE IsRm.m WAR PLAN L

Seizing the initiative and taking the battle into 2 enemy territory at the earliest opportunity had become official Israeli doctrine under the direction of Israel's first defense minister, David Ben-Gurion. Churchill wrote,

"Because of the small size of Israel and the concentration of her population, the Israelis know that they can never afford

11 4 to let their own country be the battlefield . . .. The main objective of the Israeli plan was to reopen the Straits of Tiran, and it assumed that Israel would have only 48 hours before the U.N. and the great powers imposed a cease-fire, To accomplish the objective, the Israelis planned to quickly destroy the Egyptian Air Force and to thrust the Israeli Army into the Sinai supported by the IAF' as soon as it was available,5

The Egyptian Air Force (Em) (Tabla X) posed the greatest threat to the IN; it therefore had to be the first targeto Surprise was critical to the IAF plan; they had to catch the EAF on the ground before they could launch against

IsraeL. From their bases in the Sinai, the EAF could be over Israel's cities and airfields in less than ten minutes, and their TU-26 "Badgerffbombers could reach Israel from the fartherest corner of Egypt. Ex-IAF Commander, Ezer Weizman, stated that the IAF' developed the plan and the capability for a pre-emptive strike over a period of ten yearsO7 Another source reported: 3

6 TABLE 1

AIR ORDER OF B.ATTLE, 5 JUNE 1967 ---- JORDAN ISRAEL

Fighter- --Bombers : su-7 Mirage 92 MIG-21 Super Mystere 24 MIG-19 Mys tere 82 MIG-15/17 0-uragan 55 Hunt er - Total 358 253

Bombers :

Tu-3.6 30 Vautour 24 1~-28 43 -0 Total 73 24

--SAMS : 160 0 50 143 550 950 --

NOTES: All the SAYS possessed by Egypt at this time were SA-~S, Israel also had 60 Magister trainers which had a light ground attack capability, 4

The whole of the IAFfs operational training syllabus over the past five years or more had been based on the assumption that a large-scale pre-emptive strike might one day have to be made on airfields in Egypt and the other Arab countries. Five bombing ranges in the Negev had be!3 n specially designed to simulate enemy targets 0 0 0.

In 1.965 the IAF began a routine of launching large flights of fighters early each morning and sending them

west into the Mediterranean. The EDresponded with a sizeable "dawn patrol'f of MIG fighters, but after several months these flights became a standard practice rather than a response to IAF activity. The presence of large flights of IAJ? aircraft north of Egypt had become routine and were no longer a cause for alarm in Egypt. The Egyptian dawn patrol would land about 0830 hours; the pilots then had

breakfast and prepared for the dayb training,9

The IAF, therefore, selected 0845 hours as the optimum time to attack. At this time, there were a minimum of EAF aircraft on alert; the morning fog over the four bases along the canal had usually lifted; and many of the EAF commanders would be caught enroute to their offices (because the normal workday began at 0900). This time also anticipated the great physical strain the IAF'pilots would

experience in the first two days of the war, By attacking 10 at 0845 the Israeli pilots could sleep until 0400.

As the first wave of IAF fighters departed Israeli airspace at 0825 hours on 5 June 1967, there were two 5 factors which nearly preve.nted the IAF from achieving the all-important element of su.rprise. The first was the flight of a twin-engine IL-14 flying command post of the Egyptian Air Force, which was carrying Egyptian Air Force Commander, General Sidki, Egyptian Chief of Staff General Alner, and a Soviet Air Force brigadier general, the advisor to the E.AF. The IL-14 took off at 0805 so that Generals Sidki and her could personally assess the Sinai situation. When the Ilyushin reached the eastern Sinai and turned south, the Israeli generals watching it on radar breathed a sigh of relief. Had the plane turned north toward Gaza, the occupants would probably have seen 11 the first wave of IAF' fighters enroute to their targets.

The second factor was the Jordanian radar station at

Ajlun which saw the Israeli fighters and at 0838 hours sent a warning message to Egypt. A recent directive by the Egyptian War Minister, Shams-al-Din Badran, however, required such messages be routed through his office enroute to the Air Forcc. This delay prevented the message from reaching 12 the EAF before the Israelis did.

f With these two favorable breaks, the IAF did the rest.

They maintained absolute radio silence and penetrated beneath the Egyptian radars by flying over the water and land at 30 to 50 feet. Good fortune, extensive planning, preparation and training, ,.anddisciplined execution resulted in the achievemsnt of complete surprise. I3 4 6

THE IAF ATTACK ON EGYPT

At 0845 hours Cairo time (0745 in Tel Aviv) on Monday, 5 June 1967, the first wave of Israeli fighters simultaneously struck nine of Egypt's nineteen airfields.

Minutes later, the morning fog lifted over Fayid airfield on the canal, and it was immediately struck. The first wave consisted of one or two flights of four for each of the ten bases. These aircraft had a maximum of ten minutes over their targets before the arrival of the next wave. The second and third waves struck at 0855 and 0905 hours and expanded the attack to include the remaining six bases in northern Egypt. Then there was a thirty minute respite before the first wave returned. In this manner, nine waves in three hours destroyed the greater part of the EM'. That afternoon the three bases in Southern Egypt (Hurghada, Luxor, 14 anti! RasBanas) were hit by the "Vautour" light bombers. The IAF capitalized on the element of surprise by first attacking the runways, thereby trapping most of the Egyptian aircraft on the ground. The majority of the attackers hit the runways with 500 or 1,000-pound bombs while about 40 percent employed the French-designed "concrete dibber.ff This bomb had retrorockets which slowed it immediately after release and pointed it straight down; then another rocket drove it into the concrete where a timer exploded it moments, minutes, or hours later. It produced a hole one to two meters deep, and the delay fuse produced a 7 difficult problem for runway repair crews, This bomb also allowed the attackers to remain at low altitude instead of

"popping uptr several thousand feet for a conventional dive 15 bomb attack.

The initial bombing pass by the Israelis was made at about 500 knots. Subsequent passes, for firing cannon and rockets, were flown at minimurn effective speed. Although this slow speed increased I@ losses to A4 guns, it also increased Israeli accuracy, target identification and damage 16 assessment. The EAJ? had no hardened shelters for their aircraft, but some were parked in revetments. Nonetheless, the accurate strafing of the IAF enabled them to fire inside these revetments. In this manner, all 30 of the TU-~~S, the IAFb highest priority target, were destroyed at Cairo

West airfield by the first and second waves. Accurate strafing also accounted for most of the second-priority

MIG-21s. These proved to be particularly susceptible to flro; they burst into flame after relatively few hits by 17 30-mm cannons. To insure the success of the attack upon Egypt the IA??had confidently concentrated almost all of the fighters in its offensive, holding back only 22 interceptors for air defense. On this day, the IAF also did not fly any escort missions, and mrther ordered the pilots not to engage in air-to-air combat unless they were intercepted during their 18 ground attack. 8

Egypt had interceptors on alert at the end of a number of .ruriwayy:;, but tkic attack came so swiftly that only two fli.[;htr;of four MIG-22s each got airborne. These aircraft shot down two IAF' aircraft engaged in ground attack before all eight of them were shot down. Twelve MIG-21 and eight

MIG-19 interceptors also got airborne froa the southern base of Hurghada. They flew over 200 miles north and engaged 16 Mirages in a dogfight over Abu Sueir. Four of the MIGs were shot down, others were destroyed while landing on torn-up runways, and a few got down safely, The only other aircraft reported to have been airborne during the attack were four unarmed Egyptian trainers and the flying co.mand post. 19

Lieutenant General Mohamrllad Fahmy later related the inadequacy of Egyptian air defense to stop this attack:

Enemy aircraft approached at low altitudes, making use of the gaps in our radar field, which was still being established. In addition to the limited number of our available antiaircraft missile units, they were not designed for engagement of low altitude targets, at which height all enemy air raids were carried out. Thus the enemy air force was confronted only by the limited, old- fashioned anti-aircraft artillery which dated back to World War 11. It was not capable of dealing efficiently with modern aircraft which had speed and maneuverability. Nevertheless, AA units did shoot down a number of enemy aircsBft . But this had no effect on the results of the war.

Table I1 shows the losses by cause, for the IAF' in 490 sorties against Egypt on the first day. The loss of 19 aircraft amounts to 3.9 aircraft lost per 100 sorties, or an attrition rate of approximately 4 percent. Of the l.3 Israeli aircraft shot down by AAA three were hit on their initial bombing pass; the other ten were knocked 9 TABLE rI2l

IAF LOSSE3 .A”rAINST EGYPT ON 5 JUNE 1967

Air-to-air. 13 AAA 0 SAM 2 Flew into the ground. 2 Own ordnance or target explosion. I I Unknown

down while making their second, third, or fourth pass. 22 rt

should also be noted that the IAF’ did :not lose any aircraft to the Egyptian S.A-2 SAMs. The SA-2 was ineffective below

3,000 feet; and, when fired at aircraft above that altitude, it was defeated by a hard descending turn into the missile.

The SAMs were not considered important enough to even be atkackcd. on the first day. 23 During the afternoon of 5 June the IAF’ attacked radar sites in Egypt and claimed the destruction of 23 including all 16 of the radars in the Sinai. 24 Before sundown the IAF

returned to most of the airfields in northern Egypt and hit the runways with delay-fuse bombs to deter repairs during

the night. 25 With the 493 sorties flown against Egypt on

the first day the IAF claimed the destruction of 254 of the 10

EAPs 358 combat aircraft, most of them on the ground. 26 On this day the IAF also dealt crushing blows against Jordan aric I Syria,

THE IAF VERSUS JORDAN AND SYRIA

Late on the morning of 5 June, the Syrian Air Force damaged the oil refinery in Haifa Bay and some dummy aircraft on the airfield of Meguiddo. Of the three Syrian

MIGs which attacked Meguiddo, two were shot down and the other crashed, Shortly after noon, three Jordanian Hunters produced some injuries and damage in the city of Natanya bcforc being intercepted and driven off. 27 The IAF response was quick.

Monday afternoon the IAF' directed the majority of their aircraft against the airfields of Jordan and Syria. In a brief series of raids on Aman and Mafraq airfields, the IAF clcstroyed all of Jordan's corn twenty-one Hawker .c Iluntcrs. (Jordan quickly borrowed three more from Iraq.)

Simultaneous at tacks on five Syrian airfields destroyed 60 of Syria's 127 combat aircraft. At this point, Syria with- drew the remainder from the battle area and relinquished air 28 superiority over the Golan Heights. The 1A.F claimed the total destruction of the Jordanian

Air Force with no Israeli losses. The attack on Syria was also impressive but not without a price. Robert Jackson has recorded the air battle in Syria: Anti-aircraft; fi rc was heavy and several Israeli a.i rcrafl, wor'(s sho I; down including two Mystcrcs, destroyed ov(;.r ~~arrix;cu~~,Anol-hcr MysL-crc was jumpcd by a flight of MIG-XYs, which shot it; down as it was attacking targets on the ground; the MIGs were hemselves shot down by Mirages a few minutes later,25

The only other important counterair action on 5 June was the destruction of the powerf'ul Jordanian radar at Ajlun.

This was accomplished at noon by a flight of four Super Mys teres. 30

TOTAL LOSSES ON 5 JUNE 1967

The final score for 5 June was approximately 388 Arab aircraft destroyed versus about 23 IAF' aircraft lost for a ratio of 27 to 1,

AIR ACTIVITY ON 6 JUNE 1967

Except for some Magister trainers ancc a few Tautours, there was little IAF support for the Israeli Army on 5 June. On 6 June, however, the priority was reversed, and the

I::raol%{;round forces received heavy support in the Sinai and on thc wcst bank of the Jordan, On Tuesday, the IAF also flew some missions against airfields in Egypt and

Iraq.33- A lone Iraqi TU-16 bombed the city of Natanya on Tuesday morning; as the TU-16 exited the target area it was knocked down by accurate AA fire. The IAF' retaliated by attacking the Iraqi airfields of Habbaniya and Hotel Three.

Enroute to one target, eight Mirages were jumped by eight 12 Iraqi Hunters; this resulted in the loss of three Mirages

TOY only om Tluntcr. On thc pound, howt7vm7, tlic IAF dcs-

koycd nine MIG-22s, four Hunters, and two IL-14 transports. 32

Table III shows the aircraft lost by type after two days of conflict. About 23 of the Arab aircraft were lost in thdz air; ths rest were destroyed on the ground.

TABLZ 11133

LOST 5-6 JUNE 1967

Egypt Jordan Syria Iraq Arab Total:

Israel 26-n

Includes 7 Magister trainers used for ground attack.

AIR ACTIVITY 7-10 JUNE 1967

After the airstrikes on the Iraqi airfields on 6 June, the IAF enjoyed almost unchallenged air superiority for the remaining four days of the war. Diring this time the IAF was able to devote most of its sorties to ground support. As a result, approximately two-thirds of the total IAF sorties flown during the war were in support of the ground forces. On the 7th and 8th the IAF' used the recently

captured airfield of El Arish to fly nuxerous missions attacking Egyptian armor in the Mitla Pass and on the road from Bir Gifgafa to Ismailiya. On the 8th the I@ attacked a well defended column of Egyptian tanks near Kantara; here the deadliest AA fire of the war downed five Israeli aircraft in a couple hours. 34 Tns air battle against Egypt had been won on Monday, but it continued through Wednesday. In a last desperate attempt to assist the hard-pressed Egyptian Army, the EAF flew their remaining MIGs (and a few borrowed from Algeria) in close air support. Most of them were engaged by the IAF which claimed 14 killed 2n air-to-air combat and no Israeli 35 losses. On the 9th and 10th the IAF strongly supported the

Israeli Army assault on the Golan Heights. In this campaign thc IN;' silenced a number of AA guns by exploding proximity- fuscci bombs directly over the sites. Thereafter, the IAF was heavily committed to the task of destroying the concrete bunkers and fortifications on the Golan. In spite of concentrated bombing, most of these positions were overcome only when the Israeli infantry assaulted them.

When the cease-fire went into effect Saturday, 10 June, the IAF had made a significant and critical contribution to 36 the Israeli victory. OBSERVATIONS CIN Ti33 1967 WAR

In six days of warfare the Israelis claimed the destruction of 452 Arab aircraft. Of these, 32 were downed in some 50 dogfights. The IAF admitted losing 26 aircraft in the first two days, but have not released a figure for

the entire war. Jackson indicated the IAF’ lost 40 aircraft

and had another 10 so badly damaged that they could be used

only for parts. In a more recent book Zeev Schiff stated the IAF lost 45 aircraft in this war. 37

The IAF dsny losing any aircraft in air-to-air combat,

but their use of the term ffair-to-airflmust be clarified.

Their use of this term does not include IAF aircraft which were ffjumpedtfin the process of an air-to-ground mission. Tne IAF acknowledged two such losses over Egypt, another is reported over Syria, and three more were lost when the Iraqi 33 Hunters jumped an IAF strike flight on the second day. For the most part, this was a missileless war. The IAF pilots credited the Egyptian S.A-2 missiles with only one

ffpossibleffkill. The .-... 1 1 2%

tive. r envelo2e4 or,,.out-maneuvered... < , 5 3 ,, it,, L .1after ” - .-..AI.it ‘GW*was&=d. These

results compare favorably with the U.S. experience over North

Vietnam. During 1967, 59 S.A-2 missiles were fired for each 39 U. S. aircraft downed. The IAF did not employ missiles in either a.-f-to-al’_tr

0% s

were w- n. Cannon was also the most effective weapon hlSW -.n.v.--*. because of these factors (not in order of precedence):

1, IAF' achieved comglete surprise.

2. IAF' concentrated its forces on the primary objective. IAF prepared for years for that explicit mission.

Egyptian aircraft were not sheltered, 5. Egyptian airfields were not well defended. 60 The S.A-2 missiles were ineffective below 3000 feet,

Unlike the Egyptians, the air forces of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq were not surprised, but they were no match for the

IAF', They were to3 small and their airfields were also unprotected and poorly defended.

Thc parformmce of the IAI? in the 1967 Mar has been

I;(>r~nc;d a classic employment of airpower. The developacnt and training of this force for a specific mission, the long range efforts to achieve surprise, and the advantages of striking the first blow are but a few of the lessons to be drawn from this war. Many nations have studied this war, but no one studied it harder than the Arab participants, especially the Egyptians. They learned the lessons well, and they began to prepare for the next war, END.NOTES

'Military Balance 1967-1968 (London: The Inter- national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), pp. 51-52,

2Randolph Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 76-77; Ezer W~izman,On Eagles' Wings (New York: MacMilIan Publish- ing Coo, Inc., p. 210.

3Roderick MacLeish, The Sun Stood Still (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 83. 4 Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Coo, 19741, p. 92; Quote is from Churchill, p. 62.

'Claude Witze, "Kiss in the Desert" Air Force Magazine, July 1967, p. 8; Wsizman, pp. 215-216,

%ohn Andrews, COL. (USAF, Ret. ), Historical Evalua- tion and Research Organization, Interviewed on 3 and 4 May 1978.

'William Stevenson, Zanekl A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force (New York: .The Viking Press, 19711, p. 331.

8Hobert Jackson, The Israeli Air Force Story (London: Northumberland Press Ltd., 19701, p. 176.

'T. No Dupuy, COL. (USA, Ret.), Elusive Victory (To be published in the near future), p. 243.

"Navad Safran, From War to War (New York: Pegasus, 19691, p. 321; Churchill, pp. 78-79.

"Jackson, pp. 185-186.

12MG Do KO Palid (India), Return to Sinai (New Delhi : Palit & Palit Publishers, 1974), p. 230 16 14Robert R. Rodwell, "Three Hours - And Six Days," Air Force Magazine, October, 1967, p2a 57-63; Jackson, pp. 177-178.

I6D,a J, F, Reagan, fUir Power Over Sinai," Ordnance November-December, 1967 , pp. 258-259 a

"Peter Borgart, "The Vulnerability of the Manned Airborn3 Weapon System,If (Part 2), International Defense Review, October 2977, pa 863; Jackson, p. 187.

18Warren C. Wstrnore, ffIsraelis* Air Punch Major Factor in Aviation_ W&k & Space Technolom, July 3, 1967, p. 18; Churchill, p. 82; Safran, p. 324.

*'Yohammad Ali Fabmy, LTG, &History Air Defense -___.-Forcem(T0 be published in the near future.

21Avihu Ben-Nun, LTC, (IAF), "Three Hours in June, If A video-tape available at UaSa Amy Comxand and Gmsral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

25.~o~we~l,p. 60. 18

2YJackson, pp. 193-1953 Safran, p, 328.

29Jackson, p. 195.

30Jackson, p. 295.

31Jackson, pp. 200-202.

32Wetrnore, p. 18; Safran, 329.

33Jackson, pp. 204-205; Churchill, p. 86. Churchill differs slightly indicating Egypt lost 264 combat aircraft and that the total Arab losses were 416.

36Wetrnore, pp. 18-27; Jackson, pp. 212-215; Rodwell, P. 62,

37Jackson, p. 263; Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973 (Louis Williams, trans.), (Tel Aviv: Univer- sity Publishing Projects, Ltd., 19741, p, 263.

38Ben-Nun film; Jackson, p, 195. One of the primary lessons Egypt and Syria drew from the 1967 War was that they must develop the capability to deny Israeli air superiority over their countries and protect

their air forces and armies from its crippling blows.' With

Soviet assistance they soon began major programs to achieve .this end.

Jordan was least capable of defending itself against

the IAF, but King Hussein prepared to remain vulnerable

rather than ally his nation with the Soviet Union. Jordan's

rebuilding would again produce a small air force, not expec- 2 ted to seriously challenge Israeli air superiority.

The Israeli leaders recognized the decisive advantage which air superiority had given them in the 1967 War and

continued to base their wartime strategy upon its achievement and o~ploitation.~One of their first concerns was to replace the 45 aircraft lost in the War with modern aircraft which would insure their continued dominance of the air.

The Israelis were counting on the receipt of 50 Mirage V fighters which had been ordered from France in December 1966.

France, however, placed an arms embargo on "frontline participants" in the Mideast War and remsed to deliver the Mirages. In early 1968 Israel turned to the United States 20 with a request for 50 F-4 Phantoms. The United States was already providing Israel with 48 A-4 Slcyliawlcs on an agreement reached just before the 1967 War. In December 1968 the

United States agreed to the sale of the F-4s with delivery 4 to begin in September 1969.

THE BEGINNING OF TH.E WAR OF ATTRITION

On 8 September 1968 Egypt significantly increased the price Israel would have to pay to continue to occupy the

Sinai. On this day 150 Egyptian artillery batteries fired over 20,000 shells against Israeli positions across the Suez

Canal. Israel retaliated by shelling the Suez oil refineries and the cities of Ismailia and Suez. The Israeli bombing of these civilian targets prompted the Egyptians "to evacuate some 400,000 people from the Canal Zone area. It was evident that Egypt was wiZling to pay a substantial price in order to continue artillery harassment of the Israeli-held east bankoff In October 1968 the IDF responded to another Egyptian shelling with commando raids deep into Egypt. From November 1968 to March 1969 light artillery exchanges were fired as 5 occasional harassment. On 8 March 1969 the Egyptians fired a massive artillery bombardment on the recently-constructed Bar Lev Line, and President Nasser announced the beginning of a "Period of Attrition.f1 Heavy artillery exchanges continued through

April and May 1969 accompanied by commando raids by both 6 sides. 21

The artilZe.ry botnbardrnents and raids hit Israel's wcak spob--rnanpower. At this time Israel had approximately half a million men of military age while Egypt had some five million, For each casualty the Israelis sustained, they felt they had -to produce ten casualties or they were losing this "War of

The Egyptians, however, had considerably more artillery on the Suez front than did the Israelis. From their 1967 experience the Israelis believed the IAF could always concentrate firepower more rapidly than artillery and at a lower cost in manpower. They, therefore, purchased planes in lieu of howitzers and considered the aircraft ttflying artilleryoff As the Israeli casualties approached a peak of 30 killed and 76 wounded in July 1969, the Israeli 7 governme,nt decided to use the IAF in retaliation.

AIR P01dT3H IN THE WAR OF A'ATRITIOTJ

On 20 July 1969 the IAF began a ten-day campaign of i.nf;eii,si.vc airstrikes on artillery and SAN sites on the west

Tho quick response of the EAF to the IAF strike on

20 July was described by Edgar OfBallance:

Just before dusk on that day the Egyptian Air Force flew out to challenge the Israeli Air Force seriously for the first time since the June War, ASout 40 aircraft (ten MIS-21s and 30 SU-~S)penetrated over 60 miles into the Sinai. Israeli aircraft were scrambled and a number of dogfights took place. Mien it was over the Egyptians claimed to have shot down 19 Israeli planes, but admitted the loss of two of their own, while the Israelis also admitted Losing two planes but cZairned to have brought down five Egyptian ones. . . . The startling fact was that the Egyptian Air Force hag penetrated in such strength so far into Israeli air space. 22

O-JC~the n(?.xI: tcn days there were three more majQ3-L-,

air brxtl;lcs in wliich the IAF proved that it was still

superior. Air activity continued, but at a much slower pace,

through August and the first week of September. On 9 September

1969 the IAF changed its priority from artillery to SAJI sites

on the west bank. The EAJ? responded on 23 September with a

202-plane raid into central Sinai where numerous dogfights

developed. Afterwards the IAF claimed 11 kills (eight air-

to-air, two by Hawk missiles, and one by A.4 fire) and admitted losing one Israeli fighter, The EAF claimed four

(three by combat and one by A4 fire) while admitting the loss

of two Egyptian aircraft. lo The IAF continued to attack missile sites throughout September and in October expanded

the attacks to SAWS and radars west aLong the mediterranean

coast as far as Alexandria, By the end of 1.969 the IAF

claimed the destruction of 24 SAI4 sites and 61 Egyptian air-

craft since the 1-96? War; in this time the IAF lost 15 air- 21 craft 0.n all fronts.

By January 19'70 the 1A.F had achieved air superiority over Egypt, prevented the Egyptians from developing an air defense over the Canal, and greatly reduced Israeli casual-

ties, but there was no end in sight. The Egyptians continued

to repair and replace the missiles and were gaining considerable combat experience. To further pressure Egypt to end the War, on 7 January 1970 the 1A.F began to hit targets 12 of military significance near Egypt's population centers. 23 Thfs styategic bombing of military and industrial

f,c.ir*/,;t;I,;.: i ri !:?I.(: hcarL (if Egypt put pressu:ir,t?upon Presichxit

Nasser, not to yield to the Israelis, but to retaliate. In

late January 1970 President; Nasser made a secret trip to

Moscow in search of lloffensive weapons.lf Instead he received

from the Soviets a pledge to assist Egypt in the development

of a modern and effective air defense,l3 It was, therefore,

the strategic bombing in Egypt which, more than the 1967 War, p.rompted the Soviets to give Egypt the massive assistance required to develop the strong air defense which faced the

TAP in 1973.

In March and early April 1970 Soviet MIG-21 squadrons

and S.4-3 (SAI4) battalions arrived in Egypt, By mid-April

they assumed responsibility for the air defense of the Nile

Valley md -the Delta,l4 The IAF had struck at will throughout Egypt for a little over three months; but, when on

27 April 3.970 they realized the Soviets were flying air defense for Egypt, they abruptly ended deep strikes into

FQ;ypL-. T.hc.reaf.ter, the IAF confined itself to striking SAM

::ii;os and artillery within a 25-mile wide strip on the west bank of the Canal. 15

The Russians seemed to accept this arrangement by normally keeping their aircraft 25 miles from the Canal. On

30 Jme 1970, however, the inevitable confrontation occui~ed.

Reports of the incident vary, but here are the essential details. The IAi?' employed a favorite Ifanbush tacticft of behind the A-4s and at low altitude (below radar coverage) were

f0u.r or eight Israeli fighters. Wien -the A-4s were inter-

ccpted by a flight of Soviet piloted MIG-2ls, the Israeli

fighters shot down four MIG-2lsY killing three of the pilots.

Neither Israel nor %he Soviet Union publicized the incident, but some months later Mrs. Meir confirmed it had occurred. 16

TIIF, COIJSTRUCTIOF? 0 LLA 0

%tween April and June 1970 the Israeli government had made several public statements that it did not want to

injure any Russ-ians in Egypt, but that Israel could not allow

the erection of a rnissile umbrella over the Canal. Such an uinbrella could protect an Egyptian crossing of the Canal and,

therefore, threatened the security of Israel's recently established border. Israel made it clear that the 1A.F' would bomb any SA-3 site established within 25 miles of the Canal regardless of whose soldiers manned them, The Soviets apparently accepted this risk as they assisted the Egyptians in the preparation of numerous SA-3 sites in the Canal Zone 17 during May and June of 1970.

On the night of 29 June 1970 SA-3 missiles were brought forward -to the Canal sites and on 30 June a SAM umbrella came into being over the Canal, It may have besn

this fait accornpli which prompted the Soviet MIGs that day 18 to make their ill-fated intercept of the IAF Skyhawks. 25 The more significant event of the day in the long run was the establishment of the SAY umbrella, The SA-3 was much more capable than the SA-2 at low altitude and was not affected by the ECM pods which the United States had recently made available to Israel.

During the moiith of July the IA?’heavily attacked the

SAM sites in the Canal zone with partial success but at a substantial price. The IAi? lost 6 aircraft to SAYS between 1 July and 7 August 1970.19

ISlXAELI VIEW OF THE: UMBRELLA

The political situation was moving toward a cease- fire on tho Suez, and the U.S. Department of Defense advised

Israel that a cease-fire would provide the time required to develop countermeasures for the SA-3, 011 the evening of 20 ‘7 August 1970 the cease-fire went into effect.

The cease-fire was a welcome relief for most Israelis, but some were concerned with the situation which prompted it,

In the opinion of one Israeli military writer:

The War of Attrition ended when the clash between aircraft and Eg,y-ptianand Russian operated missile batteries resulted in stalemate, While the IAF only had to fight SA--2s o2erated by Egyptians, the planes still enjoyed supremacy, Russian crews, with SA-3 missiles, modern radar equipment and SUzf3 radar-guided guns, changed the balance of power,

After the cease-fire the United States and Israel worked together to improve -the Shrike anti-radiation missile

SO it could destroy the SA--3 tracking and guidance radar, 26 Ily ~a.rbZy197.1 thc IAF was co.nfident that with these Shrikes

The growing inventory of F-~s,A-4s, ECM pods,

Shrikes, and other armaments between 1971 and 1973 kept wartime expectations of the IAF at a high level.

Since 1967, it was assumed that the Air Force could, in the event of war, achieve aerial supremacy quickly, serve as the IDF's strategic arm and supply full support to ground forces. Defense plans were based on the Air Force as the major factor. So great was their self- confidence that no other possibility was conceivable. Their success in the War of Attrition, in which the Israel Air Force was the major offensive factor, only served to strengthen the feeling. The missile problem at the end of the War of Attrition was considered a mere episode.23

Not everyone was convinced this was SO. Ex-IAF commander Ezer Weizman was quite concerned about the SAM umbrella. This is his post rnortem on the War of Attrition: The Egyptian surface-to-air missile system . . . could have been eliminated in 1970. It would have required scndin in infantry and armor, in addition to the air 54 force.

In another passage he said:

Throughout the War of Attrition, there were apprehen- sions about the Russians, which was why the ground forces were not used for any decisive purpose, and also why the air force attacked here and there, causing the Egyptians- and itself-casualties and damage, but without employing its full strength. As the war dragged on, without our Army finding a way to put a stop to it, I, unlike others, became gradually convinced that this was the first time we were not winning. I said so countless times: we failed in this war. We did not conprehend it correctly. When the Egyptians agreed to a cease-fire, in A-;zgust1970, we interpreted it as an admission on their part that they couldn't stand our 27 hoinbin;r any tnore. Without detracting from the great suffer- ing inflicted on them by our air force, I don't have the shadow of a doubt that the Egyptians wanted a cease-fire in order to move their missile system forward to the Canal, so that it could neutralize our air force when their units crossed the waterway. All this backs up both of my contentions. First, the War of Attrition, in which our best soldiers shed their blood, resulted in the Egyptians gaining a free hand, over a period of three years, to prepare for the great war of October 1973; if so, it is no more than foolishness to claim that we won the War of Attrition, On the contrary, for all their casualties, it was the Egyptians who got the best of it, Sacond, by our errors between March 1969 and August 1970, and, subsequently, by our tragic acquiescence when the Egyptians violated the cease-fire and moved their missiles ahead, we, with our25 own hands, smoothed Egypt's path to the Yom Kippur War.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE FOZCE

The erection of the SAY umbrella was the most threaten- ing, but not the only important development in Egypt's air defense capability. On 23 June 1969 the Egyptian Air Defense

Force (EADF) became a separate service, co-equal to the

Egyptian Army, Navy, and Air Force, The EADF commanded the territorial air defense units and the air defense wits which accompanied the ground forces, It also had operational control of Air Force fighters on air defense missions as well as those on air defense alert. 26 The EADF gained considerable operational experience during the War of Attrition and meticulously noted every Israeli tactic. The EADF was organized, trained and equipped for only one purpose, to maintain air superiority over Egyptian territory and forces in the expected war, The E.ADF knew that Egyptian fighters did not have the range to knock out the airfields inside 28 Israel; therefore, they expected that they would have to

withstand the full force of an IAF assault in the next war. 27

By 1973 the NADF included 280 radar sites, 400 radars,

50 control centers and some 200,000 well trained officers and

men,28 The chain of command ran from E.ADF headquarters to

division, brigade, battalion (equal to a U.S, battery) then

launcher. In operation, the EADF was controlled by a number

of joint command posts at brigade level. The air defense

brigade commander was joined by an air force colonel in a

command post buried deep under reinforced concrete and sand,

A brigade normally controlled eight missile battalions and

110 to 60 interceptors. Providing radar coverage for the brigade were multiple Russian-made P-35 Barlock radars with 29 a range of approximately 200 nautical miles.

The primary duties of the brigade control center were

to detect enemy aircraft and identify them by type, number, and ECM being employed and to control friendly interceptors,

The brigade commander then directed one or more missile battalions to engage each enemy flight depending upon its

type and strength. Missile battalion commanders were additionally authorized to engage any target within their coverage identified as hostile. 30 The S.A-2 battery normally consisted of six single missile launchers clustered about a control radar, The SA-2

Guideline was propelled by a first stage solid booster and a second stage liquid sustainer giving it a slant range of 25-30 miles (40-50 km,), It was designed to attack targets 29

up to 80,000 feet. Reported modifications by Egyp.tian

engineers improved the S.A-2fs low altitude capability from

a minimum of approximately 3,000 feet down to about 1,500

feet and gave it an optical tracking capability, The missile

carried a 286 pound warhead which could be detonated by

contact, proximity or command.31 The relatively large size

of the missile (overall length of 35 feet) produced some low altitude limitations; if the command guidance quickly

reversed from a turn in one direction to a turn in the

opposite direction, the missile often went out of control

or even broke in half. This was due to overcontrol by the

large control surfaces which were designed to operate in

the much thinner air at high altitude. In spite of its

size, Egyptian missile crews demonstrated the capability

of taking an S.A-2 from its truck transporter and placing

it on its launcher in less than a minute. 32

The SA-3 Goa was a smaller missile (22 feet) with a

better low altitude capability than the SA-2. Powered by

a two stage, solid fuel motor, it could cover a range of

15-18 miles (25-30 km.) and altitudes up to 40,000 feet.

Guidance was reported to be automatic radio command with

semi-active radar homing in the terminal stage.33

Tne SA-6 Gainf'ul was a more modern and sophisticated

low altitude weapon than the SA-3. Mhile the ground radar

units of the S.A-2 and S.A-3 transmitted on fixed frequency bands, the supporting radar of the SA-6 switched rapidly 30

L~cro;;sscvoral radar bands (betwecn C-band and X-band). The

SA-6 was cornnand guided initially but switched to active

radar terminal homing once these systems acquired the target,

AQ S.A~battery normally consisted of four highly mobile,

armored vehicle launchers with three missiles on each

vehicle plus a separate radar and control vehicle. 34

Complementing the SA-2, 3 and 6 missiles were two typzs of AA guns, the s-60 and the ZSU-23-4, and the shoulder

fired SA-7, The s-60 was a 57 mrn. single-barrel anti-air-

craft gun capable of firing 105 to 120 rounds per minute.

It could engage targets visually out to 4 km. or out to 6 km.

when coupled with offcarriage radar.

The ZSLJ-23-4 was a four-barrel, 23 mm anti-aircraft

gun system mounted on an armored vehicle. It could engage

targets optically or with its integral radar out to 3 km. and could fire up to 4,000 rounds per minute. 35

The SA-7 Grail (Saviet name-Strela) was a shoulder

launched, heat seeking air defense missile, similar to the

U.S, ficcieye missile. Its maximum effective range was about

3.5 km. The relatively small size of this missile (4 feet,

6 inches long) severely limited the size of its warhead and reduced its effectiveness. The SA-7 was employed primarily by the Army to provide organic air defense at battalion and

company level. 36

Each Egyptian Army combat battalion normally had a

Strela platoon, which consisted of six firing teams; a team was two men with one S.A-7. Because central command and control of these teams was not feasible, Strela teams in combat were directed to fire at any aircraft they visually identified as hostile. The danger that friendly aircraft could be mistaken for hostile was a risk the Egyptians were willing to accept.

Two additional measures taken by the EADF to prepare for an Israeli attack were: first, they had complete air defense units positioned in reserve near the expected critical arcas; second, they trained combat repair teams to quickly repair or replace damaged radar and supporting electronic equipment. These preparations provided Egypt with recovery capabilities it did not have in 1967 or during the War of

Attrition. 37

PR.EPARATION OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE

The preparation of the Egyptian Air Force (EM) for the 1973 War was comparable to that of the E.ADF. The rebuilding of the E.AF' after its destruction in a967 required an increase in the number of pilots, planes, and airfields.

Soon after the 1967 War a large nurnber of student pilots began training at airfields well removed from the Saez front and in the Soviet Union. The Soviets quickly replaced the aircraft lost in 1967, but: the pilot shortage took years to overcome. The shortage was in experience as well as in the number of pilots. Many of Egypt's most experienced pilots had been killed trying to get their MIG-21s airborne 32

in tho first hour of the 1967 War. (Shortage and inexperience wcrc -two reasons for coinmitting the EA-??only on high priority missions in the War of Attrition.) 38

From 1968 until October 1973 every combat pilot flew

20 hours per month; heavy emphasis was placed on countering

Israeli tactics observed in 1967 and during the War of

Attrition. In 1970 the Libyans converted Whellus Air Base, which the US.AF had recently vacated, to a training center

for Arab pilots. Here Egyptian, Libyan and Russian aviators

trained in air-to-ground and air-to-air operations with the

trainer version of the MIG-21, the Nongol, and the Mirages 39 which Libya had purchased from France.

Two problems which the EAF wzs determined to overcome were the lack of airfields and aircraft protection. In 1967 the EAF lost five airfields in the Sinai, and four more on the west bank of the canal were unusable because they were within Israeli artillery range, The E.m, tnerefore, construc-

ted twenty new airfields, with at least two runways each.

At some bases sections of the nearby highway were reinforced

to provide emergency landing strips, Dispersed about these fields they constructed hangarettes of reinforced concrete covered with sand and protected the entrance and exit with massive doors. These shelters were also well vented to minimize blast effects, In additioii, the EAF' trained and equipped explosive ordnance teams and runway repair crews at 40 each airfield. 33 REBUILDING THE SYRICNJ. AIR FORCE

‘/‘/I( t’( L)~iilflitri; or thv SM wL1:: :;irriilL~~~Lo tiiat 01.. tlie

EAJ’ but; on a smallor1 scale and at a slower pace. The

Syrians also constructed concrete hangarcttes, multiple

runways, and emergency landing strips; but from 1967 to 1970

they concentrated on airfields well removed from the Israeli

border. IC2 The pace of development increased after Air Force

General Hafez Assad seized control of the Syrian government

on 18 October 1970. In January 1971 Assad visited Moscow in

scarch of additional weapons; Syria soon received substantial

numbers of MIG-~ZS,SU-~S, SAMs, and other equipment.42 It

was not until May 1973, however, -ci-,atthe Soviets made the

commitment to provide the SAF with an air defense system

which could negate Israeli air superiority in war. The

addition of the SA-6 to the Syrian umbrella was completed in August and September of 1973.43

Egypt, too, received the SA-6 late in the summer of

1973. With these weapons, the air defenses and air forces

of Egypt and Syria were prepared Lo take on the IAF in the

air superiority battle. The air order of battle as of

6 October 1973 is shown in Table IT/.

SUMMARY OF THE .INTEH--dAR PERIOD

Egypt began the War of Attrition to extract a high price from Israel for continued occupation of the Sinai.

When the Israelis, ic turn, escalated the war to bombing 34

TABLE IV 44 .AIR ORDER OF BATTLE, 6 OCTOBER 1973 ----- _.-- -I_-_-----___------ISRAEL - EGYPT I Fighter-bombers: i I

su-7 130 45 1 A-4 150 140 ~1~47 200 120 i F-4 -- 1 Super Mystere 12 MIG-19 60 i 160 50 MIG-21 - 352 550 J

Bombers : 4 -- I Vautour 8 TU-16 18 i 1~~28 22 48

Helicopters: 8 MI-6 12 12 MI-8 -70 82 30 50

SAM Launchers: 75 SA-2/3 800 SA-6 80 SA-7 920 1,800

AA funs: 770 ZTJ-23 k50 212 ZSU-23-4 300 s-60, 57 mm 550 1,300 35 ta.rl;c?Ls outside Cairo, the Soviet Union was prompted to j)rnciv i (I(: whal, 13~yj)/,laclccd in 2.967-CL missiilc! urnbrella stronc c,nouf:h to challenge Israeli air superiority. By October

1373 the Soviets had provided Syria with a similar, but smaller, umbrella. These umbreIZas, reinforced aircraft shelters and strong air base defenses convinced Egypt and

Syria that they were prepared to again meet Israel in the battle for air superiority. CHAPTER I1

ENDNOTES

‘LTG Mohammad Ali Fahmy (Egypt), A Yistory of the Egyptian Air Defense Force (Unpublished manuscript).

2Analysis of Military Balance (1967 through 1973), [London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies).

3Zeev Szhiff, October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973 (Louis Williams trans.) (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects Ltd., 19741, pp. 258-2590

4~obertJackson, The Israeli Air Force Story (London: Northumberland Press Ltd., 19701, pp. 221-226.

No Dupuy (USA, Ret.), Elusive Victory (To be published in the near future), pp. 357-358.

’William Stevenson, ZanekI A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force [New York: The Viking Press, 19711, p. 71; Edgar O’Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East: 1968-70 (Hamden: Archon Books, 19741, pp. 67-69;MG Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown and Coo, 1975), PP. 252-253.

8fiPuY, P. 363.

90tBallance, p. 69.

”0 t Ballance, pp. 83-85.

“OtBaZlance, p. 86; Dupuy, p. 365.

“Strategic Survey 1.973 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 19741, p. 13; OtBallance, 37

13MG Do KO Palit (India), Return to Sinai (New Delhi: Palit & Palit Publishers, 1974), pp. 25-26; OrBallance, p. 106,

16Charles Wakebridge, flElectronsOver Suez, Ordnance, May-June 1972, p. 475; Martin Miller, "The Israeli Air Force," Ordnance, September-October 1972, p. 128; OfBaZlance, p. 122.

z7Stevenson, p. 158; OrBallance, pp. 1l7-1l8.

18Fahmy manuscript; O'Ballance, p. 124.

lg~f~a~~ance,pp. 126-127.

"Wakebridge, p. 475; OfBallance, p. 126.

21Schiff, p. 259.

"Schiff, p. 260.

23Schif f, pp. 258-259.

24Ezer Weizman, On Eagles' Wings (New York: MacMillan Publishing Coo, Inc., 19771, p. 281.

25Weizrnan, pp. 274-275.

26~a~ymanuscript.

27LTG Mohammad Fahmy (E.ADF) in International Symposium on the 1973 October War (Cairo: Egyptian J nistry of War, 1976), p. 87.

28MG 3enjamin Peled (IAF) in Military Aspects of the Israeli Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 242. 38

2gRobert Hotz (ed.), Both Sides of the Suez--Airpower ------in Mideast, Aviation Week- and Space Technology- (McGraw Hill Publications, 19751, p. 20.

3°~ota, 21.

"Ronald Pretty (ed.), Jane's Pocket Book of Missiles (New York: Collier Books, 19761, p. 79.

32~otz, 21.

"pretty, p. 74.

341nsight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Doubleday and Company, 297km86; Pretty, p. 680

35R. Do M. Furlong, ffEvolutionin Air Defense Require- ments, International Defense Review, June 1974, p. 313.

36~retty, p. 76.

37~~t,,p. 25.

38Wakebridge, p. 473; Miller, P. 128.

39Stevenson, p. 140.

"Herbert J. Coleman, ffIsraeliAir Force Decisive in War," Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 3, 1973, p. 21; LTG Mahmond Moneim (E.AF) in International Symposium on the 1973 October War, (Cairo: Egyptian Ministry of War, 1976), Po 1320

42mPuY, P. 372.

43David Nicolle, "The Holy Day Air War,f1Air Enthusiast International, May 1974, p. 241; Louis Williams (trans), Kippur (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1973), p. 124.

44C0L John Andrews (USAF', Ret. ), Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Interviewed on 3 and 4 May. CHAPTER 111

THE 1973 BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY

The IAF gained air superiority in 1967 by an offensive counterair campaign which destroyed most of the

Arab aircraft on the ground. Air superiority became a factor in the War of Attrition when Israel decided to employ the IAF to match the firepower of large numbers of Egyptian artillery. As the 1973 War began, the majority of Egyptian and Syrian firepower still resided in their artillery while more of Israel's firepower was concentrated in its aircraft, which were considered "flying artillery. rrl Thus, the 1973 battle for air superiority was centered upon Israel's efforts to effectively deliver this firepower, and the kab actions to deny the 1A.F this freedom of operation. In the words of

Professor Handel : In 1973 the Israelis projected their preoccupation with air superiority onto the Egyptians and the Syrians, and were astonished to discover that the Arabs were content merely to negate Israel's control of t9 e skies, rather than to dominate the skies themselves.

As we shall see, the battle ranged across the full spectrum of counter air operations, but the crucial battle was between Israeli fighter-bombers and Arab surface-to-air defenses. As it turned out, a critical resource used by

39 the IDF against the SAM in 1973 was the ground weapon which

Israeli aircraft had, to a significant degree, replaced-- 3 long range artillery.

THE .rsR.mLI CONCEPT

Prior to the October War the IAF' did not appreciate

what a difficult, combined arms effort would be required

to suppress the Arab air defenses. As early as 1971 an IAF' spokesman stated:

We are convinced we have the full answer to missiles. In July 1970, we didn't have it. Now there will be no serious problems. There will be losses, but smaller than those we sustained on the eve of cease-fire [in 19701. This should be proven within the first two or three hours of war. We 4 will overcome the whole system within two or three days.

Since the 1A.F considered the missiles vulnerable to a concerted effort, they felt that air superiority would

thereafter be won primarily in air-to-air combat, at which the IAF was clearly superior. In 1973 Israeli Intelligence estimated that the EAF could not possibly challenge the IAF in the air for several years. Without a.n effective counter air capability in the EAF, the IAF believed the Egyptian Army would be badly defeated if they tried to attack across the

S-~ez. This overconfidence and preoccupation with air superiority caused the Israelis to misinterpret the signals 5 of impending war in early October 1973. On 5 October 1973 there were reports of Syrian fighter- bombers moving to bases closer to the Golan Heights. In spite of these and other reports on large scale Syrian and

.Egyptian f'maneuvors,If the Chief of Israeli Intelligence briefcd the Cabinet on the 5th that the probability of war 6 was f'Zow,'' As a result of this estimate Defense Minister Dayan and Prime Minister Meir rejected a proposed mobilization of Israel's reserve forces; nonetheless, they accepted Chief of Staff Elazarfsrequest to place the IAF' on a C Alert, its highest state of readiness.7

The intelligence failure and the decision not to mobilize were to have a significant impact upon employment

of the IAF in the first three days of the war, The mobilization process was expected to expand the IDF within 72 hours from 30,000 to 300,000 mene8 A late decision to mobilize required the IAF to allocate a larger percentage of its sorties to ground support until the reserve armor and artillery units arrived at the front.9

THE ISRAELI DECISION TO NOT PRE-EMPT

At OkOO on 6 October Prime Minister Meir and Defense Minister Dayan learned that there were definite indications

that Egypt and Syria would attack at 1800 hours that day, When the War Cabinet assembled at 0700 hours, General Elazar advised that the Air Force was ready to make a pre-emptive

strike and suggested 1300 hours, Mrs, Meir, supported by Dayan, vetoed this suggestion, There appears to have been at least two considerations against a pre-emptfve strike, 42

The first was strictly political. Mrs. Meir agreed with

Dayan that Israel would receive no support from the world community, not even from the United States, if it appeared

Israel had started another war. lo A second consideration was their belief that Israel would not be seriously hurt by allowing the Arabs to strike first. General Elazar later elaborated on this point. In 1967 he was one of several leaders who advised Premier Eshkol that Israel could be defeated if they allowed the Arabs to strike first in a combined attack. However, on 6 October 1973, he advised

Mrs. Meir that "8 pre-emptive strike is very important from the military point of view . . but, even if we do not 11 strike first we shall not lose the war."

Overconfidence prompted the Israelis to reject the strategy which had contributed so much to the achievement of air superiority in 1967. In the words of Eeer Weiarnan: "In 1967 we launched the first attack because we felt too weak to withstand an Egyptian first strike; in 1973 we didn't land the first blow, because we felt strong,42

Wnat the targets and effects of a pre-ernptive strike would have been we can only speculate, but Zeev Schiff, a prominent military writer in Israel, provided this opinion: The strike would certainly have caused heavy Arab losses, but would not have prevented their offensive. Since the General Staff were watching the north, the preventive air attack would certainly have been against Syria. The Air Force would probably have lashed out at missile batteries, headquarters and communications centers. This might have shortened the first stage of the war, but would not have prevented it. The Air Force would probably not 43

have sent its planes against Egypt at the same time. So, the canal crossing would have been carried out according to plan. 13

General Peled has revealed that after the decision was made to not pre-empt, the IAF planned to launch a counterair campaign on the morning of the 7th. Approaching t darkness at the expected start time of the war, 1800 hours, 14 would preclude effective counterair strikes on the 6th. When this is considered in conjunction with Mr. Schiffb statement, the principal elements of IAF' strategy on the eve of the war appear to have been: 1. Maintain Israelb air sovereignty to protect the population and the mobilization of the reserve forces. 2. As in 1967, begin the counterair campaign against Egyptian airfields, but attack the Egyptian SAM umbrella as well.

3. Sappress the Syrian SAY umbrella to the extent necessary to allow close air support for the Israeli ground forces. Following the War Cabinet meeting, a partial mobilization began about 1000 hours on the 6th, and the IAF remained on alert awaiting the enemy attack. 12;

THE ARAB STRATEGY

The strategy of Egypt and Syria was strongly influenced by their respect for the capabilities of the IAF. First, the coordinated attack was designed to force the Israelis to 44

divide their air and land forces between two fronts. Sacond,

both Egypt and Syria attacked across the rUll length of their

borders to fbrther disperse Israelrs firepower over "broad

fronts. l6 Third, to prevent the IAF from disrupting the

crossing of the Canal, the Egyptian plan required this

operation be conducted primarily under the cover of darkness.17

Finally, both Egypt and Syria planned to protect their armies from the IAF by keeping them under the cover of their SAY umbrellas.z8 For the Syrians, whose SAM umbrella included numerous highly-mobile SA=6s, their objective was the re-

capture of the Golan Heights. With a lower percentage of

S.A-6s in its umbrella and the Canal to cross, the Egyptian military objective was limited to a bridgehead of 15-20 kilometers.19

Egypt% ultimate goal was to recover the entire Sinai.

President Sadat recognized the superiority of the IAF outside

Egyptrs S.AM umbrella and knew that the entire Sinai might be 20 regained only by political, not military, means. Egypt sought to force Israel to negotiate by employing

the same strategy as in the War of Attrition-produce maximum

Israeli casualties. The Egyptian Army would seize a bridgehead, dig in, and attrit the IDF in the expected counter- attacks. The EADF would maintain air superiority over the

Egyptian Army and attrit as many Israeli aircraft as possible.

The EAF was to assist the EADF in the counterair role and, on selected missions, provide close air support for the Egyptian Army. The EAF' was to be used somewhat sparingly 45 until the IAF was weakened by the constant hammering of the 21 air defense umbrella.

Tne S.AF was to be used more aggressively both in air- to-air and air-to-ground operations. While the EAF normally provided the second echelon defense behind the SAM umbrella, the SAF was employed in the midst of their missile screen and seldom left its protection. They also provided their Army 22 with close air support on a modest but continuing basis.

THE COORDINATED ATTACK

The Egyptian and Syrian air forces were both heavily committed to the initial attack on 6 October 1973. The IAI? received tactical warning of the initial attack when the radar on top of Mount Hermon detected approximately 100 Syrian aircraft heading southwest from airfields in the vicinity of

Damascus. Some 250 miles southwest of the Golan Heights, over 200 Egyptian fighter-bombers were flying eastward at such low altitudes that they were not seen until they crossed the Canal. 23 24 At 1405 hours on Saturday, 6.0ctober 1973, these Syrian and Egyptian aircraft began a coordinated attack upon

Israeli positions onthe Golan Heights and in the Sinai desert.

At the same time, those Israeli aircraft which had scrambled at the first warning were turning toward the borders to meet the attackers. 46 OVgR 'THE' GOLAV HEIGHTS, 6 OCTOBZR 1973

With MIG-21 interceptors flying top cover, the Syrian

SU-7 and MIG-17 fighter-bombers attacked Israeli armor, infantry, command posts, and communication facilities throughout the Golan Heights. A number of these attacks were reportedly quite effective. Same Syrian aircraft tried to penetrate beyond the Golan Heights (which took them beyond their SAV umbrella) to bomb targets in the Huleh Valley.

The Israelis state that these were shot down or driven off arid that no bombs fell on Israel proper, over which the IAF maintained air superiority.25 Somewhat surprisingly, the

IAF claimed only five Syrian aircraft were downed on the 26 first day-all in air-to-air combat.

The Syrian S.AV umbrella was quite active against the

IAF on the first day, as will be discussed later, and the

MIG-21 top cover operated in the same area as the SAMs. Tne

Syrians relied upon the identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) system to differentiate between Syrian and IAF aircraft.

Although they did shoot down some friendly aircraft later in the war, this system apparently worked well the first day. 27

From the IAF point of view, the SAYS picked out the Israeli planes devastatingly well.

Following a massive artillery barrage by 1500 guns at 1405 hours, three reinforced Syrian divisions with over 900 tanks attacked Israeli positions on the Golan Heights held by 1000 infantrymen and less than 200 tanks.28 At this point the IAF paid the price for Israel's late decision to

mobilize, The IAF tried to provide the firepower needed by

tbc badly outnumbered ground forces without first suppressing

the SAM umbrella, An excellent description of the extreme difficulty faced by the IAF on 6 October is provided by the Insight Team of the London Sunday Times: The A-4 Skyhawks played the heaviest ground-attack role, with Phantoms and Mirages giving air cover, The Israelis' targeting was so precise that tank commanders could call down air strikes,only a few yards from their positions. But losses were heavy for among the defense screen that the Syrians had moved up to their Golan lines was the latest Soviet mobile anti-aircraft missile, the SAM-6, And Israel had no counter to this: It had never been seen in combat anywhere in the world before, ln the first afternoon, Israel lost thirty Skyhawks and about ten Phantoms over Golan. All to SAM-~Sor the devastating flak of the mobile ZSU-23 antiaircraft batteries (also Soviet) which chewed up the Skyhawks if their pilots dropped to deck level in an effort to beat the SAMs, There were rarely any parachutes . . .. The scale of losses was so clearly insupportable that in mid- afternoon, Chief of Staff Elaear actually abandoned air strikes over Golan . . ., But without air strikes, there was no hope of salvaging the olan front: After a couple of hours they had to resume. 2s

On their initial response to the Arab attack the IAE'

f'%f;hter-bornbers came in at medium altitudes, confident that

thcir JCCM pods (supplemented by more powerfbl ECM on nearby helicopters), chaff, and flares would suppress the Arab air defenses.30 But, the Soviet designers of this S&V/AAA UM- brella were one step ahead of these Israeli countermeasures.

As a result of technological surprise the IAF' was unable to achieve air superiority over the Golan Heights. 48 TECHNOLOGICAL S"i3RPRISE

On 6 October 1973, the S.A-6 was being employed for

the first time anywhere in the world, and it was not affected by the ECM, chaff, or flares then employed by the IAF', 31 The Israeli ECM equipment was designed for the S.A-2 and S.A-3 and not for the wider frequency band over which the SA-6 mdar operated,32 Even if the ECM were effective, the SA-6 could .have been launched under optical control. 33 Chaff, which the IAF used extensively, also had to be fftunedffto the proper frequencies, Leo,cut to the proper lengths.34 The Israeli flares were intended to divert the SA-7; they could not affect the ffcommandplus semi-active radar homing guidance!' 35 of the SA-6.

When compared with earlier SAM'S, the SA-6 was faster, more maneuverable, had a better lowcaltitude capability, and was more difficult to spot, Because the second-stage ramjet engine burns inside the first stage rocket chamber, the SA-6 36 did not have the telltale fire plume of the SA-2 and S.A-3.

The SA-6 scored a number of kills on Israeli aircraft; but its greatest contribution to the Arab effort was %ending the Israeli attack planes into their standard high-G split-S evasive dive to the deck where the ZSLJ-23s chewed them up. ff37 The ZSU-23-4 radar, like that of the SA-6, operated over a wide frequency band which was not affected by

Israeli ECM at the start of the war. The S.A-7 was not of itself a surprise because it had been used in Vietnam; however, its appearance in the 1973 49 War included two new capabilities: filters were added to

counter flare decoys, and it was launched in salvos of four

or eight frommulti-barreled racks on top of armored

carriers. The only weakness of the SA-7 was its small war-

head which damaged without knocking down many aircraft. 38

IAF TACTICS AND LOSSES, 6 OCTOBER 1973

Because of heavy initial losses, the IAF stood down

for about two hours and reviewed their tactics in an attempt

to find a means of working around the enemy capabilities. In the last light of the afternoon the IAF resumed close

support over the Golan with minimum altitude tactics. They

approached the Golan at tree-top height in a sweeping hook

over Jordanian territory to attack the Syrian columns in the

flank, then continued in a left turn and egressed to the

southwest. The use of napalm and cluster bomb units (CBU) minimized the requirement to rrpop-upftfor ordnance delivery.

Minimum altitude, high speed, and a single pass reduced air-

craft vulnerability but increased the difficulties of target

acquisition and accurate weapons delivery. These tactics,

therefore, did not provide as effective close support, but

they reduced the attrition rate and so had to be used until 39 the air defenses could be suppressed.

In an estimated 281 ground support sorties over the Golan on 6 October, the IAF lost 30 to 40 aircraft for a loss rate of 10-14 percent. ‘O The loss rate was highest in the

first hour and a half and decreased with the revised tactics. An estimate of the loss rate with modified tactics was

"about one Skyhawk down in twelve sorties" or about 8 percent,41

MOUNT HERMON--ANOTHEX SURPRISE

The Syrians achieved more than technological surprise,

They also took by surprise the important Israeli observation post on Mount Hermon. Syrian commandos in four MI-8 helicopters assaulted the mountain top and overran the 55-man carrison in a little over two hours on the first afternoon o:r tho war. In this action the Israelis lost the radar which looked northeast into Syria and the vantage point from which air and artillery strikes could have been directed across 42 much of the Golan Heights.

GOLAN S'UMMARY, 6 OCTOBER 2973

To summarize the first day on the northern front, the

S.AF, primarily with surface-to-air weapons, concentrated their forces and initially achieved air superiority over the critical area of the land battle, With revised tactics the

IAF reduced their ?ass rate to a level which was acceptable only because of the desperate situation on the ground,

OVER THE SINAI, 6 OCTOBER 1973

When compared to the Golmj there were some distinct differences in the air battle on 6 October over the Suez; but the end result was quite similar, The Egyptian aircraft 5s initially penetrated beyond their air defense umbrella to

strike military targets throughout the occupied Sinai but

suffered moderate losses in doing SO. The IAF'maintained air

superiority over the occupied Sinai, but was unable to achieve it within Egypt's air defense umbrella.

Over 200 EAF' aircraft crossed the Canal at 1405 hours and proceeded at minimum altitude to targets in the Sinai.

These strikes had been well rehearsed against representative targets erected in the Libyan desert. (This was quite similar to IAF training for the 1967 War.) Priority targets

were the larger airfields in the Sinai (El Meliez, El Arish, Ras Nasrani, Bir Tamada, Ophira, and Akaba), air defense batteries, radars, command posts, tank depots, lines of communication, and artillery. (FROG missiles were fired at Bir Gifgafa and Tasa bases.) Following the Israeli example of 1967, the Egyptian Air Force employed a rocket-propelled 43 bomb to crater the runways.

Those Israeli aircraft which did not launch at the first warning were apparently well protected in hardened bunkers, but reports on the results of the EAF attack are limited. The EAF commander, Lieutenant General Moneirn, later claimed Egypt had lost only five aircraft while damaging targets which included six runways, twelve Hawk missile positions, and two radar stations. 44 Israeli and other sources claim the EM' lost 16 fighters and 20 helicopters on the first day. 45 For the fighters this was a loss rate 52 46 of 5-7 percent, While this loss rate was not prohibitive, :it was hrifyh considcring tho dement of surprise the E.AF

enjoyed in striking the first blow, It also reflected con-

tinued Israeli air superiority east of the Egyptian SAY

umbrella.

The initial EAF attack disrupted somewhat the IAF*s

support of the ground forces on the Canal,47 One of the

mctions of the Bar-Lav Line was to act as a trip-wire to provide an eight-minute response time for fighters to hit targets which attempted to cross the Suez Canal, but the first IAF airstrike on the canal occurred 26 minutes after 48 tho war began.

There was no shortage of targets for the IAF.

Eight thousand Egyptian soldiers had crossed the Canal in rubber dinghies, and 20 bridges were being constructed (10

for infantry and 10 for vehicles). The first IAI? targets were the bridges, and second were the troop concentrations on the east bank, The IAF reportedly began with extremely low-flying tactics as they attacked the bridges, The SA-7

Learns already on the east bank damaged the tailpipes of several aircraft, but Ifit was the more formidable track- mounted SAM-~Sand the ZSU-23 batteries that, as on Golan, 49 took the toll,If The devastating effectiveness of the Egyptian SA!! uiibrella was equal to that on the Golan, but the IAF' losses on the Suez were not as high. While the Egyptians claimed 13 jets downed in the first three hours, an Israeli source 53 at1.rri.i LLcc? -Lo only six planes lost by sundown.50 The reasons

1Ni’ ror L-hc Sinai umbrella (which prompted the IAF to come in low rather than at medium altitude) and the shift of primary IAF emphasis to the Golan after the first wave of attacks on the Suez bridges. ” Nonetheless, the Sinai losses contributed to the total losses which shocked the IAF in the first two hours of the war. During the time the Golan front reported a two-hour pause in ground support sorties, the Egyptians intercepted a clear-text (uncoded) message from General

Pcld which directed IAF pilots to avoid flying within 15 kilometers of the Canal. 52

Until the IAF resumed missions over the Canal, it can only be said that the IAF conceded air superiority over the

Suez. After the two-hour review of the situation the IAF’ once again accepted the challenge of the Egyptian umbrella.

IDF General Tal evaluated the effectiveness of the IAF in these words:

The air force succeeded in covering the mobilization and the deployment of the reserves but did not live up to our expectations with regard to its participation, with the standing ground forces, in containing the e offensive until the reserve formations arrived.3gmy

IDF MG Chaim Herzog offered this explanation of the roots and results of these expectations: The basic errors of the Israelis in the Yom Kippur War grew, paradoxically enough, out of their victory in the Six Day War. It was never properly appreciated that in that war the Israel Defense Forces had attacked a com- paratively hastily deployed Egyptian Army--with the result that the Israeli commanders had emerged from it feeling 5 that it was possible to accomplish everything with a tadc and a plane and so built their armed forces in an un- balanced manner . . .. Because it was assumed that the Air Force could answer most of the problems of close support, the Israeli forces lacked adequate artillery, and above all lacked the necessary transporters, so that the artillery available reached the battlefield in the south nly on the third and fourth days of the battle . ..58

There is little question that the IDF needed the firepower of the IAF as a substitute for artillery. On 6 October 1973 the IDF had no more than four battalions

(48 tubes) of 175 and 155-mrn artillery in the Sinai. Forty percent of this was reportedly damaged by the initial EAF airstrikes. 55

SUMMARY OF THE AIR BATTLE, 6 OCTOBER 1973

From the foregoing discussion it should be apparent that Egypt and Syria had properly assessed the overreliance of the IDF upon the firepower of the IAF. The achievement of technological surprise enabled the air defense umbrellas of Syria and Egypt to maintain air superiority over their armies and prevented the IA3? from effectively delivering its fircpower.

IAF PRIORITIES ON 7 OCTOBER 1973

After less than 12 hours of battle, the Israeli commanders were quite aware that the situation on the Golan

Heights was the more critical problem for Israel. While the size of the Sinai allowed them to trade space for time, the of northern Israel. For the next few days two-thirds of the

IAE;' sorties were allocated to the Golan front and one-third to th2 Sinai front.56 Oil 7 October the priority targets for the IAF were:

1. Syrian ground forces on the Golan.

2. SAi batteries on the Golan. 3. Seven Egyptian air bases. 4. Bridges and ground forces on the Sinai front. 57

IAF operations in the 1967 War and their priorities

03 t.he eve of the 1973 War (as previously discussed) reflected

IAF adherence to the doctrine of achieving air superiority prior to 2roviding extensive ground support. But on the first afternoon the I&'? suffered heavy losses because they had to provide close support without first achieving air superiority over the intense Syrian air defenses. The situation was no less critical on the second day, but the IAF then knew it had to support the Ai-rny and simultaneously suppress the SAYS. A two-pronged attack was the best solution for this situation, but many of the early ground support flights still suffered heavy losses. General Herzog gave this account of support for the 3d Armor Battalion:

As the sun rose, four Israeli Skyhawks swooped in to bomb the Syrians, but as they approached their target the tell-tale signs of surface-to-air missiles were seen. All four planes exploded in the air in rUll view of the hard- pressed troops of the battalion. Undeterred,g second flight of four planes flew in. Two exploded. 56

In spite of the Zosscs the IAF pressed their two-

r)ro,n,-;ccXattack, Thc Israeli Army units also fought valiantly,

being thrust into battle as soon as they reached the front,

011 Sunday afternoon the IAFprovided critical assistance to

a handful of talnks which stopped the Syrian armor advance within sight of the Ssa of Galilee,59 Part of the reason

for this success was the fact that these Syrian tanks had moved forward faster than their missile umbrella. The lead

tanks were, therefore, not as well protected by their air defense.6o It was a costly battle for the Israelis, but

they were showing signs of turning the tide,

During the night of 7-8 October sufficient Israeli

tanlcs arrived on the Golan so that the real danger of a

Syrian penetration beyond the Heights passed, This factor was to allow the IAF to begin a concentrated counterair 61 campaign over the Golan on the 8th.

COUNTERAIR S'I'RIKES AGAINST AIRFIELDS SEGINNING 7 OCTOBER

On the Suez front the IAF 'began the second day with attacks on a nunher of Egyptian air bases, Because the ground situation in the Sinai was bad, but not desperate, the

IAF was able to adhere more to their air superiority doctrine and early plan, They undoubtedly also wanted to preclude another 200-plus airplane raid by the ED.

The counterair strikes over Egypt began at dawn on the

7th. Egyptian and Israeli sources agree that the targets of these strikes were the seven EAF bases of Beni Suef, Bir Arida, 57 &at tamia, Mansourah, Gianaclis, Shabraweet, and Tanta. Tne

ILL came in over the Mediterranean at minimum altitude

(reminescent of 1967) and penetrated the FAii and MIG defenses in scven consecutive waves of eight to twelve Phantoms and

Skyhawks for a total of 68 planes.62

The extensive Egyptian Visual Observer Corps provided the first warning of the approaching attackers (and alerted the ZSU-23-4 gunners so they could align their Gun Dish radars in the direction of the approaching aircraft). The EAF responded by scrambling 60 MIG-21 interceptors which engaged the IAF through the SAM belt and all the way to the tar#;ets. The EADF admitted shooting down some friendly aircraft on other occasions but claimed that on this day the

IFF worked well in picking out enemy aircraft. 63

Excellent aircraft shelters, strong air defenses, and a rapid runway repair capability made these strikes relatively ineffective. In these attacks the IAF lost at least five aircraft (Egypt claimed 18 destroyed). 64 In spite of these poor results the IAF continued to attack airfields on subsequent days but decreased the number of bases struck and increased the nunJ:,er of attackers to 16 to 24 planes against 65 each airfield.

The IAF persisted in attacking airfields in both Egypt and Syria throughout the war, but at its end, could claim 66 ody 22 total aircraft destroyed on the ground. In considering the merits of airfield attack, COL Dinwiddie (USAF',

Rct.) said: 58

Perhaps the clearest lesson to come out of the October War is the value of covered shelters, coupled with effec- tivc hich/Zow anti-aircraft defenses at airfields, to protect aircraft on the ground, The need for such protection was a lesson from the 1967 War which was well learned, These countermeasures (together wi rapid runway repair capability) proved very effective.&

It may be that the IAF continued to attack airfields in order to first, make the miway unuseable and, second, to occasionally catch an aircraft outside of its shelter, At one point the IAF'had reportedly knocked out all the runways in southwest Syria, and the SA?? fighters were forced to use the 68 emergency strips which had been prepared in the highways ,

Thcsc strikes may also have interru2ted Soviet resupply of arin,:nents, including S.AVs to the Syrians.

1A.F ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAV BRIDGES

'rne EADF had made extensive preparations to defend the Egyptian bridges across the Canal. The IAF began concentrated attacks against these bridges on the afternoon of

'7 October and continued these attacks throughout the war.

By evening on the 8,th the IAF claimed that all but one of the bridges .had been knocked owt , ItHowever, the extremely flexible construction of the Soviet bridges enabled them to be repaired rapidly and put into full use under cover of darkness. 69

Attacking these bridges without first achieving air superiority 0-ver the Canal extracted a persistent price from the IAF. 59 IAF DIRECTLY CONFRO.;NTED SAYS, BEGINNING 8 OCTOBEH

The necd to support the ground forces on the first two

days of the war had prevented the IA??from concentrating on

achieving air superiority over the Golan and Sinai fronts.

The arrival of large numbers of IDF reserve units on Sunday evening (the 7th) enabled the IAF to begin concentrating on the missile umbrella on the 8th. These missile defenses had to be destroyed before the Israelis could hope to roll. back the armor facing them on either front . . .. Over Golan, the Syrian missile screen made it prohibitively costly for the Israelis to adopt, as a consistent tactic, the close coordination of tanks and air strikes that was the core of' thcir armored thinking. Somehow, the SAY missiles h.ad to be oukwitted by Israeli Countermeasures or tactics bcfore th y--and the armor they protected-could be smashed.78

The IAF began on the 8th to hit the center of the

Syrian umbrella and the northern end of the Suez umbrella around Port Said. 71

W!APONS AID TACTICS USED AGAINST SAM SITES

Ti32 Shrike anti-radiation missile was used with some

success against the S.A-2 and SA-3 sites, but it was less effective against the SA-6 whose transmitter shifted rapidly 72 over a wide range of frequencies.

If the SAM site detected the launch of the Shrike it had at least three countermeasures.

1. Shut down their transmitter.

2. Divert the transmitted power to a remote trans- nit ter. 3. Diver-1; thz transmitted power to a transmitter-only faciili-ty to absorb the Shrike. 73

The Shrike was not the only anti-radiation weapon used,

Oiie source reported the IA!? employed modified Ryan Firebee I drones as a s-taadoff weapon against SAM sites.74 The EAF, likewise, fired 25 Kelt air-to-surface missiles (from Badger bombers) some of them in an anti-radiation configuration.

While Israelis claim that 20 of the 25 subsonic missiles were s.hot down, they admit the destruction of two radars and a supply depot in the Sinai.75 Egyptian source reported the IAF also employed televi- sion-guided standoff weapons (Walleye and Maverick) against

SAM sites. To counter this, "the Egyptian air defense men set up a dense smoke screen around the missile positions, which led the rockets astray and created bad visibility for 76 the pilots. If

Against the SA-6 sites the IAE' found hard bombs gave the greatest probability of success. The IAF had observed that the SA-6 was launched at a shallow angle and the missile climbed more steeply only after it accelerated. To attack an SA-6 site the F-4 approached at medium to high altitude, rolled over and dropped its bombs going almost straight down over the guidance radar unit. In this maneuver the F-4 was vulnerable primarily to other SA-6 batteries whose coverage overlapped the position being attacked. 77 This overlapping coverage was seriously degraded when 61 "on the third day of fighting (Monday), Israeli jets managed

to knock out the computer installation controlling most of 78 the Syrian missile screen."

The IAF paid a high price to achieve a limited success

against the SAY umbrellas on both fronts. On the 8th and 9th

they destroyed a number of SAM batteries on the Golan front. This allowed them to better support the Israeli Army which

gradually forced the enemy back. The success against the

SAMs, however, was short lived due to the assistance of the Soviets in repair and resupply. 79 A continuous campaign against the SAMs was required on both the Golan and Suez

fronts.

The Port Said area was defended by four SA-2 and SA-3 .

batteries and a number of ZSU-23-4 and 57mm. AA guns.

Egyptian sources indicate the IAF'kmocked out all four SAM batteries on 8 October by concentrating 94 sorties on the area between 1100 and 1700 hours. The IAF' continued to attack the SAM sites on the 9th and loth to prevent their 'becoming operational again. Nonetheless, on the 12th the

Port Said defenders surprised a squadron of 1.6 Israeli planes by suddenly firing all four SAM batteries. The EADF claimed the destruction of 12 of the 1.6 planes which had confidently

entered the area at medium altitude. On the 13th the IAF'

again knocked out three of the four. 8o This was the nature of the bloody see-saw battle between the SAM sites and the IAF. The continuous supply of air defense armaments enabled 62 ..\ the Arabs to rebuild and replace what the IAF' at considerable cxpense destroyed. The IAF', therefore, damaged without dcfoating tho air defense umbrellas and was unable to achieve superiority over them.

COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST SAMS

In addition to attacking the SAM sites the IAF em- j?loyed a number of countermeasures before and after a SAM .Launch to negate its effectiveness.

2, Electronic jammers on board the fighter aircraft isere supplemented by jammers on standoff helicopters and transport aircraft. Another powerful jammer faced the :Suez umbrella from the hilltop at Urn-Khashib in the Sinai. 81

2. Chaff was used in large quantities and once again 82 proved its worth in combat. 3. Helicopter spotters were situated just outside the SAM umbrella to warn IAF pilots of SAM launches. 83

4, Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVfs)were used as 84 decoys and chaff dispensers.

5. Violent evasive action, normally down and across ishe path of the SAM was often the pilotfs last ditch effort. 85

Because the SA-7 was the only heat-seeking SAM the

ZAF faced, they used three countermeasures specifically against it. 1. Flares were dispensed from the aft section of the 86 Israeli fighters to distract the missile. 63 2. The IAF pilots were able to dump f’uel and ignite it with their afterburner. This normally matched the heat signature of the engine better than the flares did and was a counter to the filters installed on the SA-7.

3. When the Israelis saw that the SA-7 would damage without destroying many A-bs, they added an extra section of tailpipe to absorb the blow and minimize the damage to the aircraft .87

STRATEGIC BOMBING IN SYRIA SEGINNING 9 OCTOBER 1973

The IAii suppression campaign began destroying Syrian

SAM sites on the 8th, but the Syrians had other batteries which could be shifted to the front and additional missiles were being supplied by the Soviet Union. To force Syria to divert some of these missiles away from the front, the IAF began strategic bombing of military and industrial targets around Damascus and other Syrian cities north of the capitol.

The bombing of the ports of Latakia and Tartus also impeded the Soviet resupply of armaments to Syria. The IAF lost a few aircraft in this campaign, but the Syrians were forced 88 to disperse some of their SAMs to protect these targets.

THE EGYPTIAN OFFENSIVE, 14 OCTOBER

Israel had forced Syria to divert some air defense assets away from the Golan front. Syria, likewise, wanted to force Israel to divert air and land assets from the Golan 64 to tho Sinai front. When the tide of battle turned against

Syria in the first wcek, President Assad urged Egypt to launch a major offensive in the Sinai. 8y By 9 October tho

Egyptian Army was dug in 10-12 kilometers east of the Canal and was adhering to its plan of remaining under its SAM umbrella. For Egypt to undertake a major offensive, the umbrella had to be displaced eastward or the EAF had to seriously disrupt Israeli air superiority east of the SAY umbrella.

The Egyptians recognized that the EAF should not attempt to directly confront the IAF', but shifting the SAM bclt was a problem too. Soovl after the Israeli reservz artillcry units arrived at the front, the IDF began employing their longest-range gun, the 175-mm, to suppress Egyptian

SAYS. The 28-kilometer range of the 175-mm significantly influenced Egypt's advancement of its SAY umbrella.

Egyptian General Fak-Lmy reports that the Egyptians studied the Israeli artillery dispositions nightly to determine where to place their SAMs for the next day. 90

At the end of the first week, the EADF took the risk of placins a few SA-3 and SA-6 batteries on the east bank to support a limited offensive on 14 October. The results demonstrated Egypt's need for the SAY umbrella to deny Israeli air superiority. Once the Egyptian Army emerged from under the umbrella, they were badly defeated by the IDFls air-armor team91 65

COrJ,IVTEU.ING EGYPT'S SAM UMBRELLA, 16-24 OCTOi3ER 1973

Thc Israeli artillery played its most important role

in SAM suppression when the IDF crossed to the Wst bank of

the Canal on 16 October, The 175;-mm battalion, which crossed

over on the morning of the 26th, assisted Israeli armor in

forcing the withdrawal of nearby SAM sites, This produced a hole in the umbrella which the IAF exploited to provide

effective close air support, As the armor and artillery expanded the pocket southward around the Great Bitter Lakes,

thc southern half of the missile umbrella was forced to withdraw up to 15 miles from the Canal, By this action, the IA?? caincd air superiority over the Lakes region and, more 92 importantly, over the Egyptian Third Army on 21 October.

EAT RESPONSE TO THE IsRmLr CROSSING

When the Israeli Army forced a pocket in the Egyptian umbrella, the IAF quickly gained air superiority within it,

The seriousness of an Israeli bridgehead on the West bank prompted the Egyptian high command to fully commit the EAF

to the battle, The EAE' then directly confronted the I@,

Egyptian sources reported the EAF' flew 2,500 sorties and engaged in 18 major air battles near the crossing site between 16 and 22 October. In this effort the EAi? faced the same type of situation which confronted the IAF earlier in

the war, It was the EAF which in this period had to attack the bridges and provide ground support where it lacked air 66 superiority. The E.AF's recognition of this problem was

reflected in their allocation of sorties: 300 to ground

attack and 1,800 to the air battle. 93

In this period the primary battle for air superiority, in the Israeli view, changed from an air-to-ground battle

to an air-to-air battle. The dogfights often began on the

deck. The EA?? fighter-bombers approached the bridgehead at

tree top level and were there engaged by Israeli fighters. As more aircraft joined from each side the number of aircraft involved often grew to over fifty. In this environment the superior skill and weapons of the IAF prevailed.94

The Egyptian pilots had few illusions about the extreme difficulty of their task and performed with courage

and determination. When the war ended on 24 October the EAF and EADF were battered and bent but not broken. The losses, however, for the period 16-24 October tell the story; while 95 the IAF lost 15 aircraft to all causes, the EAF lost 250.

SUMMA3Y OF THE 1973 AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE

The 1973 battle for air superiority can be summarized by analyzing some appropriate statistics. Truly accurate statistics on this war will probably not be available for many years, however those currently available can with reason- able assurance be analyzed to determine the nature of the air battle. The consensus of reports on Israeli aircraft lostinthe 1973 War is about lo3 fighters plus 6 helicopters for a total thc discrepancy by considering the report that 236 Israeli aircraft suffered battle damage and 215 of these were repaired in less than one week. Of the 21 remaining aircraft, many may have been damaged beyond repair and could be added to the ft109 lostfffigure. 96 (See Table V.) The aircraft losses by cause (Table VI) reflect the basic difference in the Israeli and Arab approaches to gaining air superiority. The IAF relied primarily upon manned aircraft to destroy enemy aircraft while the Arabs achieved most of their kills with SAMs and AAA. Table VI also emphasizes the effectiveness of well defended and hardened aircraft shelters. The IAF', which had destroyed over 400 aircraft on the ground in 1967, was able to destroy only 22 aircraft on the ground in 1973. In spite of this inability to achieve air superiority by destroying aircraft on the ground, the IAF achieved limited air superiority through air-to-air combat. While the IAF achieved only 32 kills in air-to-air combat in 1967, they downed at least 287 planes in air-to-air in 1973. (This reflects an increased requirement for air-to-air vs? air-to-ground skills.)

The increased capability of the SAM is reflected in the 40 plus Israeli planes downed. As was previously men- tioned, it was the SAM which also forced the Israeli aircraft to the deck where the AAA was so deadly. 68 TABLE V97

1973 AIRCRm LOSSES BY TYPE

-~ Fighters Bombers Helicopters Israel 6 Egypt 182 40 222 Syria 265 5 170 Iraq 22 2 22

==;1==,====--=.=.= Causc IAF Losses Arab Losses

Air-to-Air 22 SAM 40 AAA 31 Air-to-Ground 0 Unknown 15 Friendly Forces 2 I Total 109

NOTE: An Israel Defense Ministry publication claimed the

Arabs lost 451 aircraft during the War. 99 While this is about 40 more than suggested by some other sources, the 451 total in Table VI is the only figure for which a breakdown by cause is available. 1973 AIRCRAFT LOSSES BY TIME PERIOD

ARAB-SUEZ ARAB-GOLAV TOTAL ARAB IAF 6-8 October 84 60 144 80 9-15 October 49 65 114 25 16-24 October 150 43 L22 15 Total 283 168 451 120

TABLE vnr101

1973 COMBAT SORTIES AND LOSS RATES

102 Combat Sorties 11,233 I 6,815 I 3,000 Combat Air- craft Lost 103 182 16.5 Loss Rates 9% 2.7% 5.5%

TABLE IX103

1973 rm NR-TO-AIR KILLS BY WEAPON

----- AIR-TO-AIR KILLS WEAPON

About 200 Shafrir Missile About 75 Other Missiles 60 Cannon Total 335 70

The losses to friendly forces indicate the difficulty of integrating aircraft into a SAM/AAA umbrella. The absence of any 1A.F losses on the ground reemphasizes the value of hardened shelters and attests to the degree of air superiority which the IAF'maintained over Israel proper and the occupied territories (beyond the Arab SAM umbrellas). The breakout of losses by time period (Table VTI) reflects the extreme difficulty of providing close support and interdiction where air superiority has not been achieved.

The demand for ground support under these conditions cost the IAF 80 aircraft in the first three days and cost the EAF

150 aircraft in the last eight days of the war,

The high Israeli losses early in the war and lower losses as the war progressed also demonstrate the impact of the strategic and technological surprise which the Arabs achieved. The total sorties flown (Table VIII) reflect the IAF'rs considerably greater aircraft utilization rate and two areas in which the employment of the IAF differed from that of the

EAF and SAF, The aircraft was the primary air defense weapon for the Israelis with the SAM the secondary weapon; in the areas covered by their SAMs the reverse was true for Egypt and Syria. The aircraft also provided the Israelis much of the firepower which artillery provided to Egypt and Syria. The overall Israeli loss rate of less than one percent is an often cited statistic, but it is not a very meaningml one, The more meaningful statistics (for which data is not available from any of the participants) are daily loss rates for each type of mission. The breakout of IAF air-to-air kills by weapon (Table IX) reflects the development of the air-to-air missile as an effective combat weapon for the IN?, While none of the 32 air-to-air kills by the IAF in the 1967 War were by a missile, over two-thirds were by missile in 2973.

It is appropriate to end this discussion of the 1973 battle for air superiority with a review of who achieved it,

The IAF maintained air superiority over Israel proper and over the occupied territories outside the effective coverage of the Arab SAM umbrellas, The Arab umbrellas were battered by the IA??, but their repair and resupply capabilities allowed them to prevent the IAF from gaining dominance of the air within their coverage, When Israeli artillery and armor drove the Egyptian SAM umbrella back on the west bank, the EAF was unable to contain the IAF' which achieved air superiority over the Lakes region and the Egyptian Third Army, 'MG Israel Tal (IDF, Reserve), ffIsrael'sDefense Doctrine: Background and Military Review, March 1978, p. 28.

'Michael I. Handel, ffTheYom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise," International Studies Quarterly, September 2977, pp. 474-475.

%OL To No Dupuy (USA, Ret.), Interviewed on 3 and 4 May 1978. 4 Zcev Schiff, October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 2973, (Te1 Aviv: University Publishing Projects, Ltd., 19741, p. 260.

5MG Benjamin Peled (IAF) in Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Project% Ltd., l975), p. 240; Schiff, p. 31.

7Louis Williams (trans. ), Kippur (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects Ltd., l973), p. 23.

'Military Balance 1973-1974 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 19731, p. 33.

'Peled, p. 240; Schiff, p. 260.

"General David Elazar in Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (TeJ Aviv: University Publishing Projects, Ltd., 1975), p. 258.

12Ezer Weizman, On Eagles' Wings (New York: MacMilZan Publishing CO. , Inc. , 1977) , p. 262.

72 '''The IAF did attack Egyptian airfields early on the morning of the 7th, and General Peled has stated that the IAF planned to begin an air defense suppression campaign at the same time. See Peled, p. 240.

15COL To N. D-dpuy (USA, Ret.), Elusive Victory (To be published in the near future), p. 408; Williams, p. 25.

"MG D. K. Palit (India), Return to Sinai (New Delhi: Palit di: Palit Publishers, 19741, p. 41.

I.'General Hassan el Badri, Gen Taha el Magdoub, and MG Mohamcd Dia el Din Zohdy, The Ramadan war,, 1973 (Dm Lapin{;: T. No Dupuy Associates, Inc., 19781, p. 50.

leStrategic Survey 1973 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 29741, p. 53.

''palit, p. 43.

20Palit, pp. 31-32,

dl. Palit, pp. 153-154.

22Palit, p. 156.

23Martin J. Miller, "The Israeli Air Force, It Ordnance, Scpternber-October 1972, p. 127; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 410.

241n 1967 the attack began at 0745 Tel Aviv time and 0845 Cairo time. In 1973 Tel Aviv and Cairo were on the same time.

25Palit, pp. 97 & 154.

26The Israeli Air Force in the Yom Kippur War (Israel Ministry of Defense, 1975), p. 15.

27David Nicolle, "The Holy Day Air War," Air Enthusiast International, May 1974, p. 241, 74

Riad El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas (eds.), The October --War (Beirut: An-Nahar Press Services, 1973), p. 9.

231n:-igl~tTom of thc London Sunday Times, Thc Yom Kippur War (New York: Iloubleday & Coo, 1974), p. 162.

30Herbert J. Coleman, "Israeli Air Force Decisive in War," Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 3, 1973, p. 18.

"Insight Team, p. 161.

32Peter Borgart, "The Vulnerability of the Manned Air- borne Weapon System,ff International Defense Review (Part 3) , December 1977, p. 1040.

33Strategic Survey 1973, pp. 54-55.

341nsight Team, p. 187.

"Ronald Pretty (ed.), Jane's Pocket Book of Missiles (New York: Collier Books, 19761, p. 680

36ffS.A-6--ArabAce in the 20-Day War,If International -Defense Revie!, December 1973, p. 779.

38Robert Hotz (ed), in Both Sides of the Suez--Air- power in Mideast, Aviation Week & Space Technology [McGraw Hi11 Publications , 1975), p. 43.

391nsight Team, p. 161.

40Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, "The Arab-Israeli October War, 1973," Combat Data Subscription --s Ssrvice Spring, 2977, p. 49.

411nsight Team, p. 182.

42Palit, pp. 90 and 95.

43Badri, pp. 62-62; Palit, p. 154; Hotz, p. 38; Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 411, 75

44LTG Mahmoud Moneim (Em) in International Symposium on -the 1973 October War (Cairo: Egyptian Ministry of War,

45Williams, p, 30; the Israeli Air Force in the Yom Kippur War, pm 8; Palit, pm 82,

46HERO has estimated the EAF ground support sorties at 208 for 6 October. The 36 fighter aircraft lost would include interceptors and fighter-bombers which together probably flew 250 to 300 sorties,

471nsight Team, p. 167.

48Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 418,

"Badri, pp. 62-63; For quote see: Insight Team, p m 3-67.

50Badri, p. 64; Schiff, p, 60,

"Insight Team, p. 184,

52Badri, p, 64,

53~a~,p, 28.

54MG Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown, and Coo 1975) , pp. 270-2720

55Dupuy, Elusive Victory, pp, 399-400; Insight Team, p m 168m

56Herzog, p, 97; COL John Andrew (USAF, Ret.), Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Interviewed on 3 and 4 May 1978.

57The Israeli Air Force in the Yorn Kippur War, p. 16.

5gHerzog, p. 96; Schiff, p, 85; Insight Team, p, 183, 0 6 Cliarlcs Wakebridge, !!The Syrian Side of the Hill, MiliLary r~~vi~w,Is'cbruary, 1976, p. 29. 61 Insight Team, p. 185,

62The Israeli Air Force in the Yom Kippur War, p. 16; Badri, pp. 144-145; Hotz, p. 38.

63R.D.M. firlong, Wvolution in Air Defense Require- ments,'! International Defense Review, June 1974, p. 313; Hotz, p. 38; Badri, p. 146.

64Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 421; Badri, p. 145.

66Handel, p. 490; Confirmed in COL Andrews interview.

67C0L James F. Dinwiddie (USAF, Ret.), in The Inter- national Symposiwn on the 1973 October War, p. 199.

69Herzog, p. 258.

"Insight Team, pp. 185-186.

"Coleman, p. 19; Badri, p. 149.

72ffSovietAid Sparks Arab Gains, Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 15, 1973; p. 14.

73~atunymanuscript.

74Miller, p. 128.

75Nicolle, pp. 242-242.

"Insight Team, p. 204,

I' 77

78ffW3~~ing:'No Easy Victories, Newsweek, October 22, 1973, PP. 64 and 79.

79ffSA-6--ArabAce in the 20-Day War, International Defense Review, December 1973, p. 779.

80Badri, pp. 148-151.

81~ahrny manuscript.

82R.D.M. Furlong, Wvolution in Air Defense Require- ments," International Defense Review, June 1974, p. 312; Insight Team, p. 187.

8311S&6--hab Ace in the 20-Day War," p. 781; Insight Tern, p. 188.

841rwin Stambler, W.S. Remotely Piloted Vehicle Programs, International Defense Review, April 1974, p. 179; Fahmy manuscript; Insight Team, p. 188.

861nsight Team, p. 187.

87COL To No Dupuy (USA, Ret.), Interviewed 3 and 4 May 1978.

880ther reasons have been given for this "strategic bombing: (1) Retaliation for FROG missiles fired into northern Israel; (2) To make the Syrians pay dearly for attacking Israel; (3) To discourage Jordan's King Hussein from opening a third front. See Insight Team, pp. 202 to 204; Palit, pp. 100-101; and El-Rayyes, pp. 16, 17, and 244.

89Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Coo, 1975), p. 218.

90Fahmy manuscript. 78

g2~upuyinterview; Herzog, pp. 259-2600

93Badri, p. 112.

94NiCOlle, p. 249.

95Arab losses from The Israeli Air Force in the Yom Kippur War; IAF losses from Borgart, p. 1066,

96The loss of 103 IAF fighters is reported by HERO and by Corddry. Strategic Survey 1973 reported 220 fighter aircraft lost, and Peter Borgart reported 220 total aircraft lost. The aircraft damaged and repaired figures are provided by HERO.

97This table was compiled from a number of sources: Strategic Survey 1973, p. 26; Handel, p. 490; Coleman, p. 18.

98HER0. The Israelis claim a total of 451 Arab aircraft were destroyed. Strategic Survey 1973 reported Arab fighter losses of 368 but did not provide a breakdown by cause.

99The Israeli Air Force in the Yorn Kippur War.

looArab losses were totaled from The Israeli Air Force in the Yorn Kippur War; IAF breakdown is from Borgart, p. 1066.

lo2IAF sorties are from Corddry, p. ; Arab sorties are from Dupuy, Elusive Victory, p. 550. Losses are from Table VI.

lo2Corddry breaks out the 11,233 total IAF sorties into 1,830 and 5,442 attack/strike sorties on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts respectively, plus 3,961 sorties for top cover, escort, and air defense.

zo3Borgart, p. 1066, This total of 335 air-to-air kills appears to include the 287 air-to-air kills in Table VII plus the 48 kills attributed in that Table to ffunknown" causes. CHAPTER IV

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Many lessons have been drawn from the air wars in

the Middle East with applications for everyone from pilots

to political leaders. Lessons from any war, however, must

be evaluated in the context from which they were drawn. The relatively small theater of operations, the predominately good weather for flying, and the scarcity of foilage to con-

ceal objects from aerial observation are but three distinc-

tive factors of air operations in the Middle East. Nonethe-

less, this paper attempts to provide the military planner with some observations and conclusions which could apply to another mid-intensity war with modern air forces and air defense forces. Four conclusions seem most appropriate.

SURPRISE

In the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1967 and 1973 the side which perceived itself as weaker made the political decision and developed the capability to employ the element of surprise at the start of the war.

The achievement of strategic and tactical surprise in 1967 enabled the 1A.F’ to destroy most of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and thereby gained air superiority over

79 80 mYPt Egypt and Syria achieved strategic surprise in 1973 partially because Israel could not believe Egypt would dare to enter a war with primary reliance upon a surface-based air defense to achieve local air superiority.

It was the technological surprise of the SA-6 and

ZSU-23-4 which enabled the surface-based air defenses of

Egypt and Syria to achieve local air superiority.

The strategic and tactical surprise which the Arabs achieved in 1973 over the Israeli Army forced the IAF to initially concentrate on providing close air support instead of fighting for air superiority,

comLusrON

The achievement of strategic, tactical, and/or technological surprise can significantly influence the battle for air superiority,

The missile had little influence on the 1967 War, but the 2967 to 2973 period witnessed the increasing impact of the missile on air operations, The S.A-3 demonstrated its effectiveness in the last few weeks of the War of Attrition, and the SA-6 had a significant impact upon the 1973 War. The small warhead of the SA-7 knocked down very few of the aircraft it hit, however, it indicated the potential 81 of' 1 ho shoi~ldrtr-f'i~rodmissile against the aircraft.

1-n 1973 SAM,? degtroyod 40 of 71 Israeli aircraft known to have been hit by surface-to-air weapons. While missiles accounted for none of the air-to-air kills in 1967, they demonstrated their effectiveness by producing over two-thirds of the Israeli air-to-air kills in 1973. Although the Kelt, Shrike, Maverick, and Walleye missiles achieved only limited success in the 2973 War, they demonstrated the rapidly increasing capability of air-to- ground missiles.

CONCLUSION

Missiles have demonstrated the capability to significantly influence the air superiority battle in surface-to- air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground operations.

SURFACE-BASED AIR DEFENSES

In 1967 air superiority was won by destroying Arab aircraft, and their vulnerability on the ground made that the best place to attack them.

In contrast, the destruction of only 22 Arab aircraft on the ground in 2973 showed the effectiveness of well defended, hardened and dispersed aircraft shelters.

The losses incurred by the IAF' in attacking these well defended bases showed that airfield attack with non- nuclear weapons is of questionable value. 82

Tho 1973 W.ir showed that airplanes can and must be

dcctroycd in the air by strong air-to-air and surface-to-air

capabilities. The performance of the Arab S.AM/AAA umbrellas in-

dicate that a strong surface-based air defense may achieve

and maintain local air superiority even in the absence of an accompanying air-to-air capability.

CONCLUSION

Air superiority can be achieved over the modern

battlefield only by defeating both the surface-to-air and air-to-air capabilities of the enemy.

COMBINED ARMS FOR AIR SUPERIORITY

The 1973 War showed that high aircraft loss rates

must be expected if close air support is performed prior to

achieving air superiority.

The IAF' suffered heavy losses in the first few days of the 1973 War as it attempted to provide ground support where enemy surface-based air defenses maintained local air

superiority. After the Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal in the 1973 War, the EAF' suffered heavy losses attempting to provide ground support where Israeli aircraft maintained local air superiority. In the 1973 War Israeli long range artillery proved

to be a very effective weapon for the suppression of enemy surface-based air defenses in the battle area.

C0NCLUSION

The achievement of air superiority over the battle area requires the combined efforts of air and 2and forces of which long range artillery may be the most effective weapon for the suppression of surface-based air defenses. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGHAPHY

BOOKS

Sad:ri, Gen. Hassan el., Gen. Taha el Magdoub and MG Mohamed Dia el Din Zohdy. The Ramadan War, 1973. Dunn Loring: To N. Dupuy Associates, Inc., 1978. This book is valuable because it presents a semi-official Egyptian view of the buildup and execution of the 1973 War.

Churchill, RandoIph and So Winston. The Six Day War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. Pages 78-94 cover the 1967 air war.

\'Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Special Subcommittee on the Middle East. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973 (HASC No, 93-32). This is a trip report, not an objective analysis of the War. Many classified statistics have been deleted, and some of those given are open to serious question.

' El-Rayyes, Riad and Dunia Nahas (ed.). The October War. Beirut: An-Nahar Press Services, 1973. Pages 3-54 give a daily summary of the 1973 War activities on both fronts.

Ileikal, Mohamed. The Road to Ramadan. New York: Quadrangle/ The New York Times Book Co,, 1975. This book provides insight on Egyptian political decisions 1967 to 1973.

/ Herzog, MG Chiarn. The War of Atonement. Boston: Little, Brown and Coo, 1975. Pages 251-276 provide insight and some statistics on the performance of the IAF' in the 1973 War, Hotz, Robert (ed.). Both Sides of the Suez--Airpower in Mid- east, Aviation Week & Space Technology. McGraw Hill Publications, 1975. This collection of previously published articles contain muc.h interesting, and some conflicting, information on the air war in 1973. 86

Insight Team of the LDndon Sunday Times. The Yorn Kippur War. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1974. Various sections of this book give some of the best information available on the air war. International Symposium on The 1973 October War. Cairo, 28-21 October 1974;. Military Sector, First Volume, Cairo: Egyptian Ministry of War, 1976. This bo0.k presents evaluations of the war by Egyptian and western military analysts.

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Jackson, Robert. The Israeli Air Force Story. London: Northumberland Press Limited, 1970. This is a detailed account of IAF' activities from 1948 to 197s. It is probably the best work on the 1967 air war.

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Stevenson, Williams, Zanekt A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force, New York: The Viking Press, 1971. This is an inside look at the I&? in 1970. Although it reads like a historical novel, most of the facts can be picked out and substantiated by other sources. ,! r /Strategic Survey 1973: London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974. Pages 16-27 summarize the war, including highlights of the air war,

*; Weizman, Ezer. On Eagles' Wings, New York: MacMillan Publishing Co,, Inc., 1977. This autobiography provides insight on IAF strategy in the 1967 to 2.973 period, Wiener, Friedrich, The Armies of the Warsaw Pact. Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1976. This book provides data on Soviet weapons capabilities.

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Dupuy, COL To N. (US.A, Ret.). Executive Director, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Interviewed on 3 and 4 May 1978.

Z>u~)uy,COL, To No, (US.A, Ret.). Elusive Victory. To be published in the near future.

Fahmy, LT GEN Mohammad Ali (Egypt). A History of the Egyptian Air Defense Force. To be published in the near future .

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