7 – and that and – 3 anah forces did differently during during differently to concentrate on ed, it was the only h the key points in 1930s, 1930s, argued that he nal and effective Israeli Israeli effective and nal his was only the starting starting the only was his ring approach, bordering bordering approach, ring of an approach that could could that approach an of the building and operation operation and building the following which the State of 1

Thinking in the IDF Thinking Ben-Gurion, who had been at the helm of the defense 2 | Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 21 | No. Volume | Gabi Siboni, Yuval Bazak, and Gal Perl Finkel Finkel Bazak, and Gal Perl Yuval Gabi Siboni, The Development of Security-Military Development The Ben-Gurion understood that would be fighting fighting be would Israel that understood Ben-Gurion The security doctrine that Ben-Gurion devised was based on the idea

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spent his vacation holding the “seminar,” Israel’s security concept was formulated, along wit the IDF doctrine. establishment for the Israeli population since the and scrutinize to order in affairs routine from himself distance to needed re-analyze defense strategies. Arabs Israeli against not and countries, against – war next the the means, the manpower, and the mindset of the Hag not meet the needs of the future. This prompted him formulation the to led which efforts, intellectual T future. the of challenges the with contend better origi of establishment and development the in point of core the at was thinking This thinking. military enabled it and conditions, inferior under strength security and military of the establishment of state and nation, almost against all odds. of achieving military victory in every confrontation. During a time when million and vying against countries whose the Jewish population was 1.2 da a was this million, 30 about totaled populations on the impossible. As far as Ben-Gurion was concern Strategic and Military the of head and fellow research senior a is Siboni Gabi res.) (Col. Dr. Laboratory. Concept IDF the of head the is Bazak Yuval (res.) Col. INSS. at Program Affairs INSS. at of the Military Program Affairs is the coordinator and Strategic Finkel Gal Perl In the seven weeks between August 26 and October 17, 1953, Ben-Gurion 1953, 17, October and 26 August between weeks seven the In S HE IDF ilitary superiority superiority ilitary ith rapid vehicles tent weakening of e the implications pite the clear gaps hold in the Israeli several questions: 2006 and between d so that the IDF will will IDF the that so d ernal lines, in order r to be waged in our sing on the argument argument the on sing ve from a combination combination a from ve nd perhaps the most waged not by border of the characteristics ening of the structured structured the of ening basis, he said that: “If positioned in its rightful rightful its in positioned inly the IDF, to provide a provide to IDF, the inly n the military leadership, leadership, military the n is facing is not a shortage shortage a not is facing is | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT These conclusions led Ben-Gurion to opt for the 4

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Ben-Gurion understood that Israel’s advantages deri advantages Israel’s that understood Ben-Gurion m absolute nearly from benefited has Israel Although focu approach, alternative an presents article This





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logical option, despite the opposition from camps i camps from opposition the despite option, logical mainly from ex- commanders. of human excellence, along with national spirit and the ability to exploit the topographic conditions that facilitate rapid mobility of concentrated groupings of forces, based on operations within int to create local superiority in every arena. On this they attack us in the future, we do not want the wa but country, in rather, the enemy’s so country, that we will not be on the defensive, but rather on the offensive. This war is settlements, but rather by mobile forces equipped w and strong firepower.” strategy of maneuver to push the war swiftly These into enemy territory. to led and decades three next the for doctrine Israeli the forged principles a series of impressive military victories. against achievements its that paradoxically, appears, it decades, recent in its enemies are diminishing. Thus, for example, des in the power ratios between Israel and in partial only reach to time much too took IDF the 2014, in and Israel achievements in the campaigns. Many theoreticians found refuge in the explanation that this is “predestined,” as a result of the new confrontations, an explanation that took security-military public opinion market. that this phenomenon derives mainly from the persis security and military thinking. It maintains that the principal reason for ma and establishment, security the of inability the Israel of State the that challenges the to response weak a from mainly derives rather but resources, of systems inside the IDF that are tasked with developing and assimilating combat approaches. This article attempts to address why has Israeli military thinking weakened? What ar and repercussions for national security and the State of Israel’s military re- be thinking security-military can How strength? place at the heart of Israel’s national strength? A accomplishe be this should how – question important be adequately prepared for the challenges of future?

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| Volume 21 | No. 1 | April 2018 April | 1 No. | 21 Volume | £ ¦ © ¦ ¦§¨ ¤¥£ ¢£ ! HE IDF ry. ry. On the other esult of research re than any other ves. It constitutes a n contemplation that e most critical resource resource critical most e P, as well as its military its as well as P, earch, the foundations foundations the earch, deployment. However, However, deployment. alanced over time, the vironment has realized realized has vironment lution from the industrial industrial the from lution e relevant environment. environment. relevant e nd military strategies and and strategies military nd nal arena, depends today today depends arena, nal r is to lead to the correct se strategies and doctrines doctrines and strategies se allel to the transformation transformation the to allel

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Over the last forty years, with the accelerated evo accelerated the with years, forty last the Over of component key a constituted quality of foundations whose IDF, The Therefore, military thinking must develop, must be revised, and must and revised, be must develop, must militarythinking Therefore,



 G Military thinking is an all-purpose term for knowledge developed about war, preparing for war, and waging war. It relies o strives to intellectualize the phenomenon of war and to extract universal principles and knowledge that were developed as a r and study of the phenomenon of war throughout histo hand, military thinking is inextricably linked to time, place, and specific conditions, since war is a social phenomenon that changes its modes, its means, and the ideas that it serves as mankind evol par in itself transforms and societies of reflection of human societies. th in and data basic the in changes of abreast keep Israel, For military thinking that is creative and vigorous is essential as a a security unique of development the for foundation The challenges. security the address that doctrines will in turn constitute the theoretical foundation for the development of and buildup force for tactics and approaches combat military thinking is tested in the practical world during Its war. power is not in its ability to explain, but rather, its powe action. “It is theory that leads to action.” th become has knowledge age, information the to age GD country’s A countries. for and organizations for internatio the influence to ability its and strength on its ability to acquire and develop knowledge, mo en surrounding Israel’s that more the Yet resource. that knowledge is at the heart of is quality, the core of the and economy, is the the more source that of Israel’s power, security establishment, and has moved in the opposite direction. the IDF in particular, its strength since its initial days, has become imb of quality the from increasingly moved has gravity of center its that more a as inevitable nearly was This technology. its of quality the to doctrine its the in evolved technology While developed. IDF the that way the of result res scientific and academia, industry, of fields open Militaries in the Information Age: Age: Militaries in the Information Thinking? Military Israeli Happened to What HE IDF The intoxication nd forces from a 6 doctrines – when during the War of ions – commanders commanders – ions d methodical effort rked by fundamental fundamental by rked supplemented basic in foreign militaries; dation for its culture make room for single single for room make egative turning point, point, turning egative e 1950s and 1960s that that 1960s and 1950s e ng the wars, a security security a wars, the ng suffered from thinking thinking from suffered ine relied were steadily steadily were relied ine became, over the years, years, the over became, pproach and when there there when and pproach om Kippur War, describes describes War, Kippur om ing after the Six Day War, War, Day Six the after ing 7 | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT

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Until the 1970s, the IDF enjoyed exceptional condit exceptional enjoyed IDF the 1970s, the Until ma period a – War Day Six the after actually was It Maj. Gen. (res.) Haim Nadel, who researched the development of IDF of development the researched who Nadel, Haim (res.) Gen. Maj.







of victory and the nearly mythical faith in the power of the armored the of power the in faith mythical nearly the and victory of of knowledge on which military and security discipl security and military which on knowledge of eroding. Why did this happen? duri acquired experience operational extensive with th during formulated were that doctrine and concept constituted the basis for military thinking and knowledge, coupled with the “intellectual arm” of officers who were trained these officers wrote the combat doctrines and laid the foundation for the IDF’s Doctrine and Training Division. All of these and necessity a as began which education, military a principle in the IDF’s service model and the foun and its professional development. Y the and War Day Six the between thinking military think military Israeli in occurred that “break” the which triggered a process of erosion and depreciation. they that belief commanders’ the to and thinking military of neglect to led law Oral experience. personal their on based battles future manage could superseded personal written experience law, replaced in-depth analyses of the experiences of others, and the General Staff doctrines of the IDF’s to aside pushed were Division Training and Doctrine corps doctrines that were written by the commands a and incidental perspective. temporary, Thus, for example, “even narrow, during emerged gradually had missiles anti-tank and anti-aircraft though air and ground confrontations with Egyptian forces and development this disregarded IDF the Attrition, paralysis. the Moreover, IDF failed to learn lessons from other countries comprehensive a develop to failed and circumstances,” similar faced that conceptual and tactical response to them. a security the underlying conditions the in changes was a dire need for an extensive, comprehensive, an to develop military thinking and to hammer out new the major crisis began in Israeli military thinking, the basis of the entire n a signaled War Kippur Yom The structure. security more attributed were attack surprise the of lessons the that appears it but

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" " HE IDF This 8 al technological diminished the of erosion of the as Chief of Staff, s tasked with its d standing of the or the next battle, the General Staff F’s force buildup, separate doctrines ing Division began, met with opposition opposition with met dily weakened. The ular, compelled the l discussions. During During discussions. l te; officers influenced influenced officers te; on the Soviet doctrine doctrine Soviet the on g, combat tactics, and tary posts, and for good good for and posts, tary ning Division was headed headed was Division ning | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT

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Beginning in the and 1990s in tandem with substanti It is possible, for example, to examine the role an After the Six Day a War, long and protracted trend One of the examples of the loss of military thinking mechanisms was



  to intelligence than to aspects of military thinkin operational plans. advances, a gradual but ongoing process began that of conduct the driving engine the being doctrine of Instead development. technology took its place. war, engaged been had which Division, Training and Doctrine the in reflected through commanders to it militaryimparting developing and in thinking theoretica routine and games, war doctrines, combat Trai and Doctrine the IDF, the of years initial the Directora Operations core IDF’s the from officers by how the army was designed and who were outstanding in combat. mili key to them for springboard a constituted role reason. The Doctrine and Division Training had constituted the General doctrine the where from and developed is thinking where “brain,” Staff’s to all IDF units emanates. Doctrine and Training Division during Rabin’s term General the and Rabin by led process the of part As 1964. in began which Staff under him for the purpose of upgrading the ID weapons procurement, and training and adapting it f took Zamir, Zvi Gen. Maj. by headed Division, Training and Doctrine the after plans operational to units various the of training the adapt to action intelligence was intercepted that indicated that the Egyptian and Syrian based formations defense to switched had militaries – a development that required the IDF to update and revise its operating sometimes were changes these though Even doctrine. from some of the field commanders, the centrality of in determining the training framework in general, and the Doctrine and Training Division’s control over training in partic assimilation of the needed change. importance and centrality of the Doctrine and Train and correspondingly, Israeli military thinking stea breakdown of the IDF’s overall combat doctrine into in discovered were that deficiencies severe the and forces, various the for importance of military thinking and the institution HE IDF pproach and d organizational organizational d ur War, ur remainsWar, rters for the field security ship was rate. This caused d unrecognizably, d unrecognizably, digm shift in what graded to brigadier n the 1992 decision Minister of Defense Defense of Minister pproach in the IDF. ges in Israeli society. society. Israeli in ges of the General Staff the information age ed and perhaps even nce in designing and e in the regional arena arena regional the in e to do so. Moreover, the the Moreover, so. do to : a deep budgetary crisis crisis budgetary deep a : ing lost its standing in high high in standing its lost ing | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT 9 Even though there was a dire need to develop an 10

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This was the first step in a process that resulted i The gap that developed between the IDF’s security a In the absence of the required transformation, the







the combined warfare during the led led War Kippur Yom the during warfare combined the Moshe Arens to order the IDF to establish a headqua an combat the formulating with tasked was which forces, doctrine of the field forces. (when the General Staff was headed by Lt. Gen. ) to demote the Doctrine and Training Division from a division to a division subordinate to the Operations Directo the division a steady and substantial loss of influe formulating the force buildup and the operational a an officer at Initially, the rank of major general was appointed to head it, but as of 2000, requirements for the post were down general. This constituted official acknowledgment that military thinking in the IDF was of lesser importance, and was a para For technology. militaryto from thinking quality, of core the deemed was the first time since the a establishment of the IDF’s General Staff Forum, representative of military thinking was absent from the forum, and so it happened that on the brink of the global entry into think security Israeli 1980s), the during (sometime foundation the provided that pillars supporting The strategizing. echelon gained technology while steadily, eroded structure security entire the for steadily in standing and power. after rapidly changed had which reality, current the and doctrine combat the Six Day War and even more so after the Kipp Yom to be closed; therefore, the doctrine must be updat dramatically revised. failed establishment security the doctrine, updated signified not only Kippur the War change in the battlefield, but also Yom chan profound the reflecting watershed a constituted chang geopolitical profound of years were 1980s The the which on data basic the of chunks huge arena; international the in and security concept and doctrine were based had change as doing in unsuccessful was establishment security the nonetheless, yet Ben-Gurion had done. reality of waves surging the in battered and tossed of crisis a 1980s; early the in economy Israeli the topple to threatened that

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+ * HE IDF s that, since that of a technological to the intensity of substantial logistics logistics substantial public eye and does during the replaced with counter- with replaced xempted from military from xempted elineated deployment served this development, development, this served e IDF during its first three three first its during IDF e continue over a protracted protracted a over continue volve casualties. Moreover, Moreover, casualties. volve cal and military superiority superiority military and cal 11 It became evident that the temptation 12 | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT

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The weakening of the doctrinal departments in the General Staff and For many, the Gulf War and subsequently the war in Kosovo signaled Kosovo in war the subsequently and War Gulf the many, For

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- , the severance of the General Staff from the ground forces resulted in the confidence in non-existential wars; the crisis of the inequitable burden on burden inequitable the of crisis the wars; non-existential in confidence e being segments population from resulting society, draft; and the sour achievements in the battlefield wars, in the security buffer zone, in the years of the first intifada, and in the operations in the . Despite the widening gaps between the IDF and its enemies, and despite its immeasurably strong economic and th of stuff the were that superiority technological decades, the outcomes were disappointing. Wars: Technological-Mathematical Shift The to Vision of the Shattering The One of the key test cases of the phenomenon relates that threats the to response operational IDF’s the in maneuver versus fire developed. Once the information age began, a vision was element maneuver The emerge. to began military fire based primarily on technological intelligence. the beginning of a new era. An era of clean wars, of screens, and buttons of science the by replaced was war of art the which in era an – created was ob who Tal, Israel Gen. Maj. algorithms. developing because that think to mistake a is “it that ago decades two already warned is war that accurate, and precise more becoming are warfare of means the and precise.” also becoming ‘mathematical’ top commands in the IDF neglecting the ground force part as than rather problem the of part as more perceived been have time, to liable is them deploying since solution, the of in certainty, absolute nearly with will, and period requires deployment whose forces, ground the unlike efforts, the air force is available for immediate d (which may be halted at any time) and far from the air the it, of face the On war. actual an to state the commit necessarily not technologi its utilize to Israel enables also force and to employ precision guided missiles, which reduces the risks to IDF forces and to civilian bystanders. to wage clean and precise wars overshadowed the other considerations. HE IDF In his opinion, opinion, his In 15 irectorate, they ls.” ch continued to be not the engine that perational solutions e victorious in these ntinue strengthening al-command response response al-command e various operations in in operations various e thinking that was forged forged was that thinking ce-based firepower. The The firepower. ce-based ed the trend. The farther farther The trend. the ed s increasingly shifted the the shifted increasingly s nization and structure of of structure and nization pposite – “unfortunately, “unfortunately, – pposite nt, emergency stores, and and stores, emergency nt, d the ground force’s strike strike force’s ground the d | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT 14 There were many explanations for this, all of which led 13

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The quality imbalance that was created between military thinking and thinking military between created was that imbalance quality The The more that the art of war deferred to precision firepower, the more the firepower, precision to deferred war of art the that more The

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the balance shifted in force building processes, an processes, building force in shifted balance the intelligen by replaced was and place its lost power ha IDF the Accountability Operation since that fact strengthen only operations fire to gravity of center that the IDF marched along the path toward a the technological military, equipme exercises, to given was attention that less reserve duty; The technological approach all of these became secondary. was not questioned, even after the IDF suffered failures in the battlefield th and War, Lebanon Second the strip, security (the the Gaza Strip). to the inevitable conclusion – that the IDF must co its technological advantage. On the other hand, another conclusion also became incontrovertible: that it is impossible to b types of confrontations. doctrine combat the from priority in shift a caused thinking technological units to the units developing war materials, from o even reality, emerging the In development. and research technological to when efforts were exerted and combat strategies were developed by the Training and Doctrine Division and the Operations D had almost no impact on the force buildup axis, whi technology-centric. Combat doctrines not only were o the rather, but it, behind along technology puled doctrinal-profession a developing in investment the is negligible, compared to the investment in researching and developing the technological response.” Must be Done? What the of principles “the that states Tal Israel security, national on book his In orga basic the of concept the and doctrine security has thinking military Israeli then, since 1950s; the in defined were IDF the military the to footnote a than more much been not fundamenta same the are fundamentals The then. back notwithstanding the dramatic changes that occurred in the security and were that ideas and insights on relying in persisted Israel militaryreality, devised to contend with completely different challenges and conditions.

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: 8 eat eat HE IDF nd assimilation ge development. ers, are the main king in the IDF is strated impressive impressive strated he commanders of cannot be expected expected be cannot aratroopers officer ent in two distinct t developed during the IDF knew about ompetition between dge is rarely acquired acquired rarely is dge he keys for improving improving for keys he any other profession, backbone; and building building and backbone; uate engineering means means engineering uate re capabilities, and was was and capabilities, re capabilities in identifying identifying in capabilities action while internalizing internalizing while action | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT Israel was also very late in responding to the thr the to responding in late very also was Israel 17 16

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Intellectual superiority over the enemy is one of t of one is enemy the over superiority Intellectual The rationale for the need to develop military thin

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- , operational effectiveness. This superiority is evid areas – in creating the advantage in the learning c confrontations, and in the ability to adapt and draw tactical conclusions the and IDF the of capability the hand, one the On confrontation. a during of modes adopt to quickly, learn to forces security new means, were at the basis of the superiority tha the battles against the terrorist organizations during the . On the other hand, the security establishment failed in its preparedness to overcome the threat of the tunnels. Even though Operation following investigation IDF internal the 2003, since threat this Protective Edge, led by Maj. Gen. Bachar,Yossi a p the operation, the to “prior that said Division, Gaza the commanded who attack tunnels were an unknown factor for most of t the maneuvering forces. They were aware of threat, but they failed to recognize its intensity and As magnitude.” a result, the IDF did not train adeq procure not did combat, subterranean in forces to destroy tunnels and did not prepare a comprehensive tactical plan for threat. this eliminating fi trajectory high advancing steadily enemy’s the of in momentum growing the of implications the comprehending in late too demon IDF The campaigns. legal and awareness public inferior but clashes, during capabilities adaptive challenges in advance and building effective responses to them, before a confrontation erupted. command entire the educating and training twofold: the organizational mechanisms for the development a of military thinking. The military profession, like requires a foundation of specialization and knowled knowle because limited, is experience from Learning military the of “laboratories” qualifying sole the are which battlefields, on and militarystudies, education, of component the Therefore, profession. research, which mainly impart the experience of oth tools used to develop military expertise and There know-how. is no way to create military expertise in the currently existing structure, processes, Without experts and and culture expertise in in the the IDF. security and innovation and knowledge worlds, knowledge military on on HE IDF . The Operations e “General Staff ter it was ejected the ground forces. staff in a full time oo many years, the precision firepower. firepower. precision f implementing this rategy identifies the olleges is responsible responsible is olleges combined strike” that that strike” combined , drafting of doctrines, doctrines, of drafting , ct them and reinstate a future confrontation, confrontation, future a vement in operational operational in vement nd, equally important, important, equally nd, Directorate. These two two These Directorate. hey were divided and es. To this end – which which – end this To es. the requisite conditions conditions requisite the critical in order to renew renew to order in critical he , Directorate, Operations he ishment’s military thinking thinking military ishment’s | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT document published in 2015 placed renewed emphasis renewed placed 2015 in published document

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to develop, and without doctrinal innovation, impro innovation, doctrinal without and develop, to effectiveness can hardly be expected. synchronized and immediate “an operate will IDF the massive and maneuvers aggressive and rapid includes Staff’s General the restore to implemented were processes Concurrently, responsibility as the ultimate commander deploying Besides the aspects of force deployment, the IDF st and thinking military establish and develop to need its alongside IDF, the help will which superiority, intellectual creating for doctrin innovative create innovation, technological establ security the for basis the constitutes still the transform to measures substantial of number a take to needs IDF the – vision into a viable reality. and development knowledge between linkage tight creating while brain” assimilation processes and force deployment systems engine the be to used Division Training and Doctrine the and Directorate that drove this purpose of the General Staff, but t weakened over the years. It is essential to reconne split was Directorate Operations IDF The authorities. and standings their Planning the and Directorate Operations the between a them between coordination close need directorates they must be delegated the authority and standing that will enable them The units. and forces the vis-à-vis processes central the guide and lead to appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff to head thet of head the of example former the in as position, is a recommended course of action that is capable o approach. second the is decades, three last the over agenda Staff’s General the from c the of officer commanding the Today step. necessary developing in all at engage not does but officers, senior of training the for Doctrine the militarybetween link the Tightening doctrine. and thinking is colleges military the and Division Training and thinking military developing between connection the and assimilating them during officer training. For t ground maneuver. According to this new document, in document, new this to According maneuver. ground

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J I HE IDF g in the military sive thinking that that thinking sive who are attuned to to attuned are who of these strategies. f a service track for t of the IDF’s officers officers IDF’s the of t riod and the service rinal experts – citizens citizens – experts rinal processes, including edge of this discipline, discipline, this of edge ent of military thinking. thinking. military of ent e of experts, the IDF is eating military thinking thinking military eating ich constitute the core of of core the constitute ich shelf,” while on the other other the on while shelf,” n the military profession. profession. military the n e development of ongoing ongoing of development e o the state of their training, training, their of state the o e systems are disconnected, disconnected, are systems e | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT

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constitutes the fundamental concept for contending with the challenges that it faces, but it is still too early to assess assess to early too still is it but faces, it that from orderly thinking into action, and how it will pressures, and more. challenges of time, organizational politics, daily scienti of development of mode and pace the between knowledge and the impaired development of military this reality, there is a growing temptation to find ha to and market knowledge civilian the in problems to effort Sisyphean and difficult a in applications, f built was which IDF, the In thinking. military on this matter becomes acute. professional military, natio the – echelons highest the from doctrine, its eche lowest the at procedures and techniques the to constitute the information infrastructure that experiences the was from and experience organization’s and strategies tactical develop they when commanders operations the by plans to resolve battlefield problems, and they constitute the foundation for building military strength and for developing capabilities to contend with the challenges of future reality. prospective a taking while experience past from accumulated knowledge develop be to needs knowledge relevant and outlook, of the future. And like any professional discipline from its professionals, acquired through many years own new knowledge bank. and analysis before they can build their from gap the that is feeling the while – advantage technological a creating the enemy is only narrowing – the IDF must change direction and direct the spotlight on intellectual This quality. is what also is it and conditions, difficult more far under formed, first was IDF the used today as the foundation for the growth of the start-up nation that is lea major in forward economy Israeli the propelling op and build to power the has that element only the strength against the challenges of future.

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Z Y HE IDF (Tel (Tel (Tel (Tel (Ben-Shemen: Dare to Win , p. 218. (: Yediot Books, 2008), Yediot Aviv: (Tel , 3rd ed., ed. Gershon Rivlin (Tel , 3rd ed., ed. Gershon Rivlin (Tel , 2000, pp. 128-29. , eds. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Ministry of Defense Publication, 354 (November 1997): 7. 354 (November 1997): (Ben-Shemen: Modan and Ma’arachot Spider Webs | THE | DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITYMILITARYTHINKING INT National Security: The Few Against the Many National Security: The Few Maarachot Annual Report 51.A War and Strategy War What is National about Security? Singularity and Purpose Cease Fire, IDF, IDF Cease Fire, IDF,

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The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge

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(Tel Aviv: Institute of National Security Studies, 2014), pp. 51-57. Institute of National Security Studies, 2014), Aviv: (Tel Publishing, 2017), p. 185. Publishing, 2017), Gal Perl Finkel, “Cognizance is More Important than Information,” INSS blog INSS Information,” than Important More is “Cognizance Finkel, Perl Gal Shorty Yiftah S. Shapir and Gal Perl, “Subterranean Warfare: Old-New Challenge,” Old-New Challenge,” “Subterranean Warfare: S. Shapir and Gal Perl, Yiftah in Yehoshofat Harkabi, Yehoshofat Boaz Amidror, Boaz Amidror, Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1980), p. 142. MinistryAviv: of Defense, 1980), pp. 76-85. The State Comptroller, The State Comptroller, , “Lessons from the Six Day War as a Crisis in the Development Doron Almog, “Lessons from the Six Day War of the Combat Doctrine,” Ibid., p. 226. In this regard, see , In this regard, see Israel Tal, The commanders who headed the Doctrine and Training Division included The commanders who headed the Doctrine and Training Gavish, , Yeshayahu Zamir, Rabin, Zvi Haim Laskov, . and Yitzhak Peled, Yossi Haim Nadel, “The IDF’s Military Thinking between the Six-Day War and the Haim Nadel, “The IDF’s Military Thinking between the Six-Day War doctoral dissertation under the guidance of (1967-1973),” Kippur War Yom 2002), p. 14. Gelber ( University, Prof. Yoav Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Amos Harel and Avi Aviv: Dvir, 1996), p. 215, “The security doctrine lost equilibrium after the Six p. 215, 1996), Dvir, Aviv: It became incompatible with the changes Kippur War. and the Yom Day War in the basic elements of strategies after each two wars.” 1999), p. 360. 1999), pp. 95-97. Modan and Ministry of Defense 2014), David Ben-Gurion, During the War of Independence, Israel initially fought against Palestinian of Independence, Israel initially fought against Palestinian During the War (elite force of the gangs, such as during the battles fought by Palmah the Haganah) on front, including Jewish underground army, and Operation Danny; it was only during the second stage Operation Yevusi and that Israel fought against Arab militaries, including the armies of Egypt the political threat intensified. Jordan. After the war, This article makes use of the term “doctrine,” which means: the tactical which This article makes use of the term “doctrine,” approach or tactical theory of a military organization in general and, the concrete context, of the IDF. Aviv: Yediot Books, 2015), pp. 15-18. Books, 2015), Yediot Aviv: This was “the second seminar” that Ben-Gurion held to study Israel’s security second seminar” This was “the See Ofer Shelah, problems. He held the first one in 1947. N

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L 15 15 Tal, 16 17 5 14 12 12 Gershon Hacohen, 9 7 11 10 8 6 13 4 3 2 Notes 1