FROM COLD PEACE TO COLD WAR? THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EGYPT’S MILITARY BUILDUP Jeffrey Azarva*

Since the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Egyptian government has undertaken extraordinary efforts to modernize its military with Western arms and weapon systems. By bolstering its , air force, and naval fleet with an array of U.S. military platforms, the Egyptian armed forces have emerged as one the region’s most formidable forces. But as the post-Husni Mubarak era looms, questions abound. Who, precisely, is Egypt arming against, and why? Has Egypt attained operational parity with ? How will the military be affected by a succession crisis? Could Cairo’s weapons arsenal fall into the hands of Islamists? This essay will address these and other questions by analyzing the regime’s procurement of arms, its military doctrine, President Mubarak’s potential heirs, and the Islamist threat.

INTRODUCTION force to a modernized, well-equipped, Western-style military. In March 1999, then U.S. Secretary of Outfitted with some of the most Defense William Cohen embarked on a sophisticated U.S. weapons technology, nine-nation tour of the Middle East to Egypt’s arsenal has been significantly finalize arms agreements worth over $5 improved—qualitatively as well as billion with regional governments. No state quantitatively—in nearly every military received more military hardware than branch. While assimilating state-of-the-art Egypt. Totaling $3.2 billion, Egypt’s arms weaponry into its order of battle, the package consisted of 24 F-16D fighter Egyptian military has also decommissioned planes, 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks, and 32 Soviet equipment or upgraded outdated Patriot-3 missiles.1 Five months later, Cairo ordnance. This unprecedented military inked a $764 million deal for more buildup, however, extends beyond the mere sophisticated U.S. weaponry. Few in Egypt procurement and renovation of Western and the United States batted an eye. armaments; Egypt has been the beneficiary For the government of Husni Mubarak, of joint military exercises and training exorbitant military expenditures have programs with the United States dating always been the rule, not the exception. In back to 1983. the 29 years since the Camp David However, while the Egyptian leadership Accords, successive U.S. administrations has professed its desire for peace and have provided Egypt with roughly $60 emphasized the deterrent nature of the billion in military and economic aid buildup, its stockpiling of arms should subsidies to reinforce its adherence to arouse some concern. Already the most peace.2 Under U.S. auspices, the Mubarak advanced army on the African continent, regime has utilized $1.3 billion in annual the Egyptian military faces no appreciable military aid to transform its armed forces threat on its Libyan or Sudanese borders. from an unwieldy Soviet-based fighting Thus, some analysts believe it has been reconstituted with one purpose in mind: to

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) 59 Jeffrey Azarva achieve military parity with its neighbor capable of deterring any danger threatening across the demilitarized — our national security.”3 Senior officials and Israel. generals in the Egyptian armed forces, such Many Israeli policymakers, though, see as Minister of Defense and War Production Egypt’s conventional military buildup in a Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein different light. In their analysis, Egypt’s Tantawi, have echoed similar sentiments self-perception as a regional power broker that, while stressing the doctrine of necessitates the creation of a potent deterrence, have explicitly stressed the military. While Egypt remains a hotbed of importance of offensive capabilities. While anti-Semitism nearly three decades after not discounting the probability of armed peace, for them, such rhetoric is intended conflict with Israel, Egyptian officials view only for domestic consumption. The such offensive-orientated capabilities as a mainstream Israeli defense establishment, means of enhancing Egyptian diplomacy, by and large, shares this assessment, citing allowing it to operate from a position of the Egyptian military’s doctrinal flaws and strength. The Mubarak government sees questionable combat readiness as an this posture as a prerequisite for regional impediment to renewed conflict. stability, inextricably linked to a Yet while battle plans are not being comprehensive settlement of the Arab- drawn up in Cairo, Egypt’s muscle-flexing Israeli conflict. does raise an eyebrow when other factors However, diplomatic leverage alone are considered. As the Husni Mubarak era cannot explain Egypt’s buildup. As the enters its twilight years, no real decision main bastion of regime support, the has been made concerning his successor, military’s strength serves Mubarak’s though his son certainly appears the interest in stability. Given the paranoia that frontrunner. While Egypt’s Islamists are pervades much of the ruling elite in Egypt unlikely to usurp power anytime soon, a and other Arab mukhabarat states, it is drastic change in leadership could spawn understandable that the Egyptian leadership greater instability in the Egyptian-Israeli views a strong military as its greatest asset. arena. Likewise, Egypt’s failure to curtail In this sense, Egypt’s bloated defense endemic weapons smuggling on the Egypt- budget represents a quid pro quo of sorts. Gaza border—arms which are funneled to Mubarak furnishes his military brass with Palestinian terrorists—has fueled weapons and pensions; in return, they speculation among Israeli hardliners that refrain from dabbling in politics and pledge Cairo may be girding for war. to safeguard his regime from external The truth, of course, likely lies threats. Perhaps one can also frame the somewhere between these divergent buildup in terms of domestic prestige. viewpoints. Owen L. Sirs writes that during the height of the 1960s, the government’s military ARMING TO THE TEETH parades “…served as a sort of symbolic dialogue between the Egyptian regime and In a November 1995 speech, President its people.”4 While today’s demonstrations Husni Mubarak encapsulated the mission may lack the pomp and grandeur statement of the Egyptian military, reminiscent of the Nasser era, they still declaring, “…The level of our armed forces serve to showcase the country’s is a source of pride for us all, and [they] are modernization and progress.

60 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) From Cold Peace to Cold War?

Other motives drive Egypt’s strategic transfer agreements, $5.7 billion of which objectives as well. Ostracized by its was used to purchase U.S. weaponry.6 neighbors in the 1980s for blazing a trail to During this period, Egypt supplanted Saudi peace, Egyptian leadership found Arabia as the primary recipient of U.S.- vindication in the peace process of the manufactured arms in the Middle East.7 1990s. Yet with this historic opportunity Among Egypt’s most noteworthy came two distinct choices. As Robert acquisitions has been its procurement of Satloff notes, Egypt could either “…expand American-made M1A1 Abrams battle the circle of peace via widening Arab tanks, whose components are partly normalization with Israel or [choose] to assembled on Egyptian production lines. follow a different path, one that views When the U.S. Department of Defense first Israel as a fundamental challenge to licensed production of the M1A1 tank Egypt’s self-perception as a regional (commensurate with the Israeli Merkava power… and makes anti-normalization a tank) in Egypt in 1988, the decision raised fixture of Egyptian policy.”5 Perhaps alarm in some U.S. and Israeli policy threatened by the Jewish state’s regional circles, given the sensitive transfer of assimilation and military prowess, Egypt technology involved, the method of co- has opted for the latter. Thus, it has production, and the fiscal constraints it embarked on a sustained campaign to would place on an already burdened contain Israel and alter the Middle East’s Egyptian economy. Yezid Sayigh notes that balance of power. this industrial strategy of in-country Flush with billions in U.S. military aid assemblage, prevalent in the Middle East, since the 1980s, the Egyptian government enables the arms importer to “…acquire the has significantly revamped its conventional necessary production skills and military forces, paying particular heed to its armored technology gradually, with the eventual aim corps, air, and naval forces. Today, Egypt, of producing indigenous systems.”8 Israeli no longer a beneficiary of its erstwhile analysts believe that by the time the current Soviet patron, can boast of a Western-style contract is completed in 2008, Egypt’s fighting force—comprised of 450,000 armored corps will have amassed 880 regular servicemen—that approaches the M1A1s.9 quantitative and qualitative levels of the In 1999, Israeli defense officials became Israeli military in certain sectors. Israel is, concerned when Egypt acquired 10,800 of course, more concerned with preserving rounds of 120mm KEW-A1 ammunition for its edge in the latter. That is, given the sheer its Abrams battle tanks.10 Composed of size of Israel’s Arab neighbors, it is depleted uranium, this armor-piercing imperative that the Jewish state compensate ammunition—long possessed by the Israeli for its inevitable quantitative weakness by Defense Forces (IDF)—was used by U.S. maintaining its advantage in weapons Abrams crews to decimate 4,000 Iraqi tanks systems, training, and technological know- and armored vehicles during Operation how. Desert Storm and is said to be able to Still, the qualitative gap has shrunk as neutralize any armor system in existence.11 Egypt catapulted itself into the upper None of this is to mention Egypt’s 835 echelon of Middle Eastern arms importers upgraded and U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks during the past decade. From 2001 to 2004 that also saw action in the 1991 Gulf alone, Egypt paid $6.5 billion in arms crisis.12

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) 61 Jeffrey Azarva

The influx of sophisticated, Western aspect of the military’s modernization weapons into Egypt is not limited to the program. The Jaffee Center for Strategic renovation of its armored corps. This Studies’ 2003-2004 Middle East Strategic buildup also extends to the Egyptian Air Balance report notes that Egypt acquired Force (EAF), which now sports roughly two Knox class frigates and four Oliver 220 F-16 fighter planes, in comparison with Hazard Perry frigates from the United the approximately 240 F-16s in the Israeli States in the 1990s.17 Obtained as excess arsenal.13 Israeli strategic analysts, such as defense articles from the Pentagon, the Ret. Brigadier General Shlomo Brom, are Perry-class frigates are “capable of over- quick to point that while this margin has the-horizon combat and anti-submarine narrowed substantially since the 1980s, the warfare.”18 status of the Israeli Air Force’s qualitative However, it was the November 2001 edge should not be confused with Bush Administration decision to sell Egypt quantitative parity in military platforms. 53 satellite-guided Harpoon Block II “We say they aren’t the same planes. The missiles, which can exploit Israel’s lack of level of the pilots and the quality of the strategic depth by evading its current air weapons systems are not identical,” Brom defense systems, that has truly caused stated.14 There are also reports that Israel consternation in .19 This purchase will be the first Middle Eastern state could signal a strategic shift in Egypt’s equipped with the F-22 and F-35, the F- naval doctrine—one that would allow it to 16’s successors. project its open-sea capabilities even further Still, other IDF officials disagree with in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and place Brom’s assessment and believe that the a stranglehold on Israel’s most important EAF’s growth has forced Israel to alter its maritime lifelines. Though the U.S. State air combat techniques. Those critics point Department downplayed the missiles’ to the EAF’s recent integration of 36 AH- offensive nature, one must remember that 64A Apache attack helicopters, each Egypt’s geographic position gives its capable of carrying 16 laser-guided, anti- fleet—which maintains principal naval tank, Hellfire missiles.15 It is worth noting, bases at Ras al-Tin on the Mediterranean though, that while permitted to upgrade the and at Safajeh and Hurghada on the Red Apaches to their more advanced prototype Sea—the capability to blockade both of (the AH-64D), Egypt has been prevented Israel’s sea links with the outside world. from acquiring the helicopter’s most The United States will likely continue to coveted feature—the Longbow radar— refrain from selling the Egyptian which has first-rate target identification government advanced weapon systems that capabilities.16 Nonetheless, the Israeli Air would allow the EAF, or any other branch Force maintains only a handful more of of the Egyptian armed forces, to enjoy Apaches than its Egyptian counterpart. operational parity with their Israeli While apprehensive about the buildup of counterparts. Former U.S. Secretary of the Egyptian ground and air forces, some Defense William Cohen said as much Israeli officials, especially Member during his visit to the region in 1999, when Yuval Steinitz and former commander-in- he reassured then Israeli Prime Minister chief of the Israeli Navy, Major General Benjamin Netanyahu that the United States Yedidia Ya’ari, consider the overhaul of the remained committed to “…Israel’s Egyptian navy to be the most significant

62 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) From Cold Peace to Cold War? qualitative edge and military capability to characterized by a rigid command structure; protect its own people.”20 one that strategic analysts say precludes the In the past, though, the United States has implementation of the Revolution in demonstrated a willingness to export some Military Affairs (RMA)—a military of its most sensitive military technologies concept espousing the use of precision- to regional governments, as evidenced by guided weaponry, information technology, the Clinton Administration’s sale of the and integrated command and control AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range-Air- systems with real-time capabilities. to-Air-Missile (AMRAAM) to the United That the Egyptian armed forces have Arab Emirates in 1998.21 Prior to this failed to fully adopt the RMA paradigm transfer, only Israel had been cleared to thus far is true. Even with continued purchase the AMRAAM among Middle American aid at current levels, the Egyptian Eastern states.22 However, contracts were armed forces would encounter a serious soon inked in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and economic crunch in financing such an Egypt, with the United States selling Cairo initiative. Yet that is not to say they do not a lesser ground-launched version of the possess some of the requisite skills. The missile in 2000 only because of vociferous military has been the beneficiary of Israeli objections.23 Prime Minister numerous joint initiatives and training Benjamin Netanyahu’s blasé reaction to exercises with Western forces dating back these and other related developments belied to the large-scale “Operation Bright Star” Israel’s true concern. In 2004, Israeli maneuvers kicked off in 1983.25 Held Defense Minister and Foreign biennially in the Egyptian desert, “Bright Minister Silvan Shalom vehemently Star” stresses interoperability and has opposed—and ultimately won restrictions exposed thousands of Egyptian military on—a U.S.-AMRAAM sale to Jordan based personnel to U.S. advanced training on fears that the technology would techniques and expertise in tactical ground, eventually be sold to Egypt.24 Though air, naval, and special operations.26 purchasing the AMRAAM system had once Mubarak’s deployment of 30,000 troops, been the sole prerogative of NATO member including commando and paratrooper units states (and Israel), the flurry of U.S. sales to paired alongside U.S. forces, into the non-NATO Arab governments, including Kuwaiti theater during Operation Desert Egypt, signaled that U.S. arms transfer sales Storm in 1991 illustrated Egypt’s ability to could indeed trump strategic promises. apply RMA techniques in actual combat.27 U.S. programs such as Peace Vector and WESTERN WEAPONS, SOVIET the International Military Education and DOCTRINE? Training initiative (IMET) have provided additional know-how to the Egyptian While detractors of the gloom-and-doom military in tactical training and weapons scenario in the Israeli defense establishment maintenance. Under the third installment of will not dispute the Egyptian military’s the Peace Vector program (PV III), which modernization, their sanguine assessments began in August 1991, Egyptian Air Force assume that it will be mired in its pilots have logged thousands of flight hours antiquated Soviet-style military doctrine for with their American counterparts in tactical the foreseeable future. Undoubtedly, operations.28 Other projects in the PV III Egypt’s military ranks are still program have included the U.S. Army

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) 63 Jeffrey Azarva

Corps of Engineers’ construction of a self- war does not necessarily mean the sufficient F-16 air base located in achievement of peace, and vice-versa.”33 Ismailiyya, Egypt (adjacent to the Suez Similarly, the Jabal Pharon exercise on Canal and demilitarized Sinai), which can April 22, 1998 sought to create a scenario accommodate a population of up to 20,000 whereby the Egyptian Third Army, in personnel.29 Under IMET, 6,600 Egyptian conjunction with naval and air force soldiers have participated in U.S. military personnel, conducted operations in the education courses since 1995 in an effort to rugged terrain of the Sinai.34 Once more, instill U.S. values, doctrines, and the target was the Israeli Defense Forces. procedures.30 On August 12, 2001, in the midst of the al- Despite such assistance, logistical Aqsa Intifada and three days after a support, and extensive coordination, the suicide bombing rocked Jerusalem, mainstream Israeli defense establishment London’s Sunday Times reported that a continues to perpetuate the belief that the senior Egyptian official allegedly Egyptian military’s mere knowledge of the threatened to deploy the Egyptian Third RMA doctrine does not necessarily imply Army into Sinai—at the late Yasir Arafat’s its implementation. The Badr-96 and Jabal behest—if Israel moved into the occupied Pharon-98 exercises debunk this myth. In territories to thwart Palestinian terrorism.35 September 1996, the Egyptian armed forces That another Badr-like exercise ensued the staged a ten day maneuver near the Suez following month36 at Ismailiyya should be Canal, the largest operation of its kind since sufficient evidence to suggest that the the late 1970s. The target of the exercise Egyptian military—which enjoys a was explicit: Israel. Badr-96—the same symbiotic relationship with Mubarak and code-name used for Egypt’s crossing of the the state—feels constrained by the security Suez Canal in the 1973 measures imposed on it by the 1979 treaty. (Badr-73)—simulated a large-scale As a result, some Israeli officials see these amphibious landing on the Sinai Peninsula exercises as an inherent Egyptian desire to coast by a mechanized infantry battalion.31 remilitarize the Sinai. Whether that Designed first to repel an Israeli attack, the ambition translates into capability is battalion—coupled with border guards, contested, given the assertion of military paratroopers, and special forces—would experts that any successful military then engage in a counteroffensive to seize operation in the Sinai Peninsula requires control of the entire Sinai and penetrate RMA-style warfare. Israeli territory.32 It is here, precisely, where Egypt’s Hailed by the Egyptian media as a stern acquisition of the M1A1 Abrams tank and warning to Prime Minister Netanyahu, the AH-64A helicopter could have dire Badr-96 evoked stirring nationalistic consequences. As the tank battles of the sentiments from the 1973 war. The state- 1967 and 1973 wars have illustrated, the controlled newspaper al-Ahram was one of peninsula is an ideal battleground for several media outlets to engage in saber- armored, mobile warfare. Theoretically, an rattling. An editorial published by the Egyptian foray into Sinai, in which M1A1s paper’s managing editor read “...The are given aerial cover by AH-64A Apaches lessons of Badr-73 and Badr-96 take us and F-16s, would enable mechanized forces back to the starting point… that the end of to seize the strategic Mitla and Giddi passes in central Sinai before an Israeli

64 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) From Cold Peace to Cold War? counterattack. By controlling these access might have a different attitude toward routes, vital for east-west movement, the Israel.”38 Egyptian armored corps could then traverse While President Mubarak at age 78 is in the entire peninsula in a relatively short reputedly “good health,” his fainting during period of time. a televised parliament session in 2003 and This scenario, though, is not universally his sudden two-week absence for medical accepted. While the M1A1’s superior long- treatment abroad in 2004 paint a different range capabilities were put on display in the picture of stability.39 Mubarak has also Iraqi desert in 1991 and 2003, Stephen A. eschewed pressure over the years to appoint Cook believes that the “…Egyptians are a vice president, most recently during an able to employ them [M1A1s] only as set April 9, 2006 interview with al-Arabiyya battlefield pieces. This is a function of the TV. Mubarak stated: “The constitution fact that Egypt’s land forces… cannot gives me the right of appointing a vice- refuel and re-supply its forces beyond a president. The vice-president has no work limited range.”37 Other Israeli analysts except as he performs only directives of the counter that the Suez Canal zone’s weak president. This is the point and I’m not logistical infrastructure, which includes ready to appoint a vice-president…”40 bridges (some of which are pontoons), Despite a constitutional provision ferries, and the Ahmad Hamdi tunnel, specifying the temporary transfer of power renders the movement of Egypt’s M1A1s to the speaker of parliament following the highly susceptible to an Israeli air attack president’s permanent incapacitation,41 vice with precision weapons. presidents have, in practice, assumed the mantle of leadership before. Thus, THE DAY AFTER MUBARAK Mubarak’s gambit in maintaining this vacancy has not only clouded the issue of Most Israeli policymakers, though succession, but has generated much unease anxious about the buildup on the Nile, in Egypt and elsewhere as well. In recent portray Egypt as something of a paper tiger; years, this decision appears to have cleared one that derives too many rewards from the path for heir apparent Gamal Mubarak, peace to foolishly self-inflict death and Husni’s son and one of three deputy destruction on its own people. Their secretary-generals in his father’s ruling conventional wisdom holds that President National Democratic Party (NDP).42 The Mubarak’s quarter-century of authoritarian liberal-minded Gamal continues to burnish rule has actually acted as a bulwark against his image at home and abroad. During the not only those extremist elements in fourth annual NDP conference in Egyptian society who wish death upon September 2006, he proposed an Egyptian Israel, but against the military’s nuclear program and openly defied adventurism as well. Even if that Washington’s vision of a “new Middle assumption were true, Egypt faces a East,” stating: “We will not accept looming presidential succession that could initiatives made abroad.”43 Still, his completely invalidate this strategic “inheritance” of the presidency is not a assessment. In 2003, Shaul Mofaz voiced foregone conclusion. his uncertainty over the matter, stating, In a January 1, 2004 press conference, “Within a few years Egypt’s leadership the elder Mubarak reassured Egyptians that might be replaced and the new regime he would not emulate the “Syria model,”

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) 65 Jeffrey Azarva which witnessed Bashar al-Asad’s rise to and the arms race” will guarantee Egyptian power after his father’s death in 2000. “We national security.47 Egyptian security are not a monarchy. We are the Republic of sources revealed that had the 1995 plot to Egypt… we are not Syria and Gamal assassinate Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Mubarak will not be the next president of Ethiopia succeeded, Tantawi, a Mubarak Egypt,” Mubarak declared.44 Gamal echoed confidant for many years, would have similar sentiments during 2005’s “Cairo become president “without a doubt.”48 Spring,” when his father introduced Tantawi’s advanced age and failing health, political reforms authorizing Egypt’s first though, likely decrease his prospects of multi-candidate presidential election. Eager succeeding Mubarak. to shed the label of heir apparent, Gamal General Omar Sulayman, the head of stated: “I am absolutely clear in my mind Egyptian intelligence, remains another and the president’s mind that this story of candidate in the offing. Arguably the father and son has nothing to do with second most powerful man in Egypt, reality.”45 Sulayman, aged 70, raised his public profile Of course, actions speak louder than considerably after he was handed the words in the Middle East. The recent Palestinian dossier following the intifada’s consolidation of key policy positions by outbreak in 2000.49 A career military Gamal and his associates within the NDP officer and Mubarak’s right-hand man, belies such statements. However, in a Sulayman was also responsible for quelling country where the Free Officers the Islamist insurgency in Egypt during the Movement’s 1952 coup d'état still 1990s. Some Israeli policymakers suggest resonates—every president since has been Sulayman’s role as an interlocutor between drawn from the military’s ranks—Gamal’s the Palestinians and Israelis and between non-military background could present a Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, problem. Edward S. Walker Jr., a former particularly during the 2003 hudna (cease- U.S. ambassador to both Israel and Egypt, fire) negotiations, juxtaposes his tough anti- warns that if Gamal is truly bent on Islamist terror stance. economic reform, “…the entire military and Sulayman has often met with Hamas security structure could easily lose its and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror chiefs privileges, its special treatment, its informal in Cairo, Gaza, Ramallah, and Damascus— retirement benefits…”46 Such a gestures which have not only conferred development, in which the Egyptian legitimacy upon such groups, but have also military loses its patronage, could loosen served to undercut a weakened and once- the government’s reins on the armed forces secular Palestinian Authority.50 While he and unnerve Israeli leadership. At the very publicly sought to broker an unconditional least, the armed forces would be hard- cease-fire between Palestinian terror pressed to accept such a monarchical-style factions and Israel in 2003, as required by transition. the Quartet’s road map for peace, Sulayman Other potential successors do not elicit privately demanded that the former only much Israeli confidence either where the halt its attacks within the West Bank, Gaza military is concerned. One is current Strip, and 1949 armistice lines for a period Defense Minister Muhammad Hussein of six months.51 Tantawi, who believes that only the Though Sulayman did in fact engineer “endless development of military systems an official, albeit brief, cessation of

66 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) From Cold Peace to Cold War? violence on June 29, 2003,52 his had called for the evacuation of all Jewish intervention came under close Israeli settlements and military installations in scrutiny. Oded Granot, an Israeli journalist, Gaza, with one exception. The plan stated suggested that Sulayman’s efforts were that the IDF would not redeploy in the perhaps motivated more by an urge to Philadelphia Corridor, an eight-mile border “quiet” the Egyptian street during the Iraq zone between Gaza and Egypt notorious for War’s infancy, lest anti-government its arms-smuggling tunnels. protests break out, than by a genuine desire As disengagement approached, the for peace. Israeli officials reserved harsher decision to retain control of the corridor criticism for Sulayman. Foreign Minister became untenable, despite the concerns of Silvan Shalom believed that the general’s Israeli policymakers that withdrawing efforts would implicitly endanger the troops from the area, including the Rafah Jewish state by creating a “ticking time border crossing with Egypt, would result in bomb;” a respite that would allow Gaza’s the militarization of Gaza as a terror base. terrorist infrastructure to regroup and Israeli leaders determined that maintaining replenish via the Philadelphia Corridor and an Israeli presence in the border strip would Sinai. be a lasting source of Palestinian and Arab antagonism and would undercut their TUNNEL WARS government’s claims of complete withdrawal. The Israeli government looked Seven weeks later, the hudna began toward Cairo as the most viable alternative unraveling. On August 19, 2003, a Hamas to patrol the border and stem the flow of operative blew himself up while riding a contraband into Gaza. Though some Israeli Jerusalem bus.53 At the same time, IDF officials remained skeptical of Egypt’s Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon reported that commitment, the two governments signed after the Israeli army discovered and the “Agreed Arrangements Regarding the destroyed several smuggling tunnels in Deployment of a Designated Force of Gaza, smoke billowed from their opposite Border Guards along the Border in the end—in some cases from inside Egyptian Rafah Area” on September 1, 2005.55 military posts.54 Pursuant to the agreement,56 Egypt No picture of Egypt’s de facto strategy dispatched a border guard force to the toward Israel can be considered complete corridor (comprised of 750 armed without examining the Gaza tunnel personnel) to replace the Egyptian police phenomenon. While in past years the IDF force mandated by the 1979 peace treaty. and Israeli intelligence have monitored Permitted weaponry included assault rifles, Egypt’s conventional arms buildup with rocket-propelled grenades, and machine unease, their attention has often been guns.57 Though subject to the treaty, which diverted to another front where Cairo’s true stipulates the Sinai Peninsula’s intentions have increasingly been called demilitarization, the Agreed Arrangements into question—the Egypt- raised fears in Israel over the Egyptian border. force’s objectives in the Sinai and the On August 22, 2005, the Israeli overall stability of the peace agreement. government completed its disengagement While observers often perceive the from the Gaza Strip after 38 years of corridor’s smuggling as an exclusive occupation. Israel’s Disengagement Plan Palestinian enterprise, Israeli concerns have

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) 67 Jeffrey Azarva been augmented by what Major General Unfortunately, these instances are few and Doron Almog, former head of the IDF’s far between. Southern Command, calls “a parallel Yuval Diskin, head of the Shin Bet Egyptian mechanism for smuggling and domestic security service, and Avi Dichter, infiltration”58 extending into Sinai and the minister of internal security, are two of the mainland. Black market forces may often outspoken leaders in Israel sounding the serve as the impetus for this mechanism— alarm. On August 29, 2006, Diskin referred smuggling is a very profitable business— to the Sinai Peninsula and Rafah border but in the end, it can only function with area as a veritable “Garden of Eden” for what Almog refers to as the “official weapons smuggling. On September 27, acquiescence” of the Mubarak regime. 2006, he again spoke of the exponential Several factors suggest that Egypt’s increase in smuggling since Israel’s 2005 failure to curb the influx of weapons at Gaza withdrawal, estimating that nineteen Rafah—a town physically straddling the tons of weapons and explosives were Egyptian-Gazan border—is a product of burrowed into the strip during the past year. inaction, not inability. First, an army Holding Egyptian officials directly general on active service presides over the accountable, he said, “The Egyptians know Sinai governorate that stretches 100 miles who the smugglers are and don’t deal with behind Rafah.59 In an authoritarian country them. They received intelligence on this like Egypt, where the armed forces are the from us and didn’t use it. We’re talking guarantor of internal stability, the military about an escalation that is endangering is cognizant of all that goes on under its us.”61 Three days after his remarks, four nose. Second, there are only two access Egyptian policemen were caught attempting roads in the Sinai; countering the to smuggle ammunitions and hand grenades movement of weaponry bound for Rafah to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.62 Alluding should be a relatively easy undertaking. to this incident and other tunnel discoveries, Finally, while the IDF’s counter-smuggling Dichter urged White House officials in operations in the corridor have almost October 2006 to ratchet up pressure on always met fierce opposition from local Cairo, criticizing its government’s failure to inhabitants, Egyptian patrols encounter no employ the “considerable capabilities” at its such armed resistance in Egyptian Rafah. disposal.63 The Egyptian military has proven Whether or not smuggling activities are capable of reducing the security threat in officially sanctioned by the Mubarak the past. When the Israeli military outpost government is irrelevant. What does matter of Termit, located in Rafah, came under is that the current regime’s see-no-evil attack in 2001, Egyptian Rafah was policy at Philadelphia—what Almog refers conspicuously quiet.60 That is, despite the to as a “release valve for [Egyptian] public presence of illegal arms and Palestinians in sympathy for the Palestinian armed that area of the city, Israeli soldiers were struggle” 64—significantly raises the stakes only ambushed from within Gaza. The for Israel’s national security by allowing Egyptian army had restrained all violent arms and material to be pumped into Gaza activity on its side of the border. In past at a dizzying rate. years, it is also true that Egypt has arrested smugglers and detonated tunnels, but only when it has been politically expedient.

68 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) From Cold Peace to Cold War?

THE ISLAMIST THREAT Islamists and the military have not always remained mutually exclusive entities. Some suggest that Egypt’s radical Islamists from the Muslim Islamist movement, closely allied with like- Brotherhood’s most violent offshoots— minded Palestinian groups, has been the such as al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Jama’at prime beneficiary of the government’s al-Jihad—have had past success in Philadelphia strategy. Not only has infiltrating the military’s ranks. Among the unimpeded smuggling at Rafah stoked the members of Jama’at al-Jihad, the group that flames of Egypt’s Islamist movement, it has carried out Anwar Sadat’s 1981 permitted homegrown jihadists and those in assassination, were an army colonel on the Palestinian territories the opportunity to active duty and a reserve lieutenant attack the Mubarak government and Israelis colonel.67 Other members were drawn from simultaneously. The October 2004 suicide a broad swath of Egyptian society, bombings at Tab’a, a popular resort including state security forces and military location for Israelis in Egypt, were intelligence. In December 1986, a ring of perpetrated by Sinai Bedouins and Hamas four military officers and 29 Islamists operatives.65 A Palestinian group in Gaza, affiliated with the same group was arrested Monotheism and Jihad, physically trained and charged with waging jihad against the an Egyptian terror cell in the use of Mubarak regime.68 By the end of the explosives and firearms before carrying out decade, the government’s purge had the April 2006 bombings at Sinai’s Dahab resulted in the detention of some 10,000 resort.66 Islamists suspected of infiltration. That the corridor and its environs could That the regime has grown wary should become a personal fiefdom for Egyptian not come as a surprise. In prosecuting its extremists is one reason that Israeli own “war on terror” against radical prognosticators fear an Islamist takeover in Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s, the state Cairo. Although considered improbable began implementing policies to counteract today, the specter of an Islamic revolution the threat. Yet rarely has the military following Husni Mubarak’s rule should not entered into this calculus. Fearing its be dismissed. Coupled with the Egyptian exposure to fundamentalist ideologies, the military buildup, it would have grave government has rarely summoned the consequences for regional security. armed forces into action.69 Instead, To be sure, the toppling of the secular counterterrorism operations have often been Mubarak regime by Islamist extremists delegated to state security services, but would have far-reaching effects. The even they have not been immune from this extensive American aid and assistance phenomenon. Thus, the regime has left no programs would cease automatically. The stone unturned in stemming the tide of Egyptian military’s already shoddy infiltration. In addition to restricting the weapons maintenance would be military’s rules of engagement, it has begun exacerbated. Jihadists would annul the 1979 constructing a host of military cities in treaty. Yet it would be wrong to assume remote locations, such as Mubarak Military that Egypt would thus become nothing City in the Nile Delta region, to ward off more than a massive arms depot to which Islamist influence. somebody had thrown away the key. The regime’s precautionary steps have Despite government efforts to the contrary, often been supplemented by stern

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) 69 Jeffrey Azarva counterterrorism measures—measures Egyptian military’s unrelenting buildup which not only broke the Islamist appears to have already met its stated insurgency’s back in the 1990s but have objectives of deterrence. The continued also allowed relative quiet to prevail since. integration of Western weaponry into While the threat posed by al-Jihad and al- Egypt’s armored corps, air force, and naval Jama’a al-Islamiyya has not evaporated— fleet has thus raised the question: To what even with the latter’s renunciation of end? Egyptian defense officials will riposte violence—the radical Islamist leadership in that a strong military is essential for Egypt remains fractured and marginalized. enhancing regional security, protecting Mubarak’s cooption of the movement’s strategic maritime routes, and strengthening mainstream and less militant elements, U.S.-Egyptian coordination. coupled with the recent release of 950 al- Though the Egyptian armed forces do Jama’a al-Islamiyya members in April serve these and other interests, one cannot 2006,70 has further moderated their ranks. neglect the fact that rearmament is also Despite episodic violence, Mubarak’s geared toward changing the military status balancing act has thus far allowed him to quo vis-à-vis Israel. Of course, this is not to secure the allegiance of the military—the suggest that Egypt is on the warpath, regime’s most significant pillar of moving toward a confrontation with Israel strength—while thwarting the Islamists’ tomorrow or the day after. Full-blown attempt at regime change. Still, the latter’s hostilities, reminiscent of past Arab-Israeli quest for power in Egypt lies within the wars, that would reap wholesale death and realm of possibility, given Mubarak’s destruction are not, one would think, in border policies at Rafah and his failure to Cairo’s best interests. Yet in an explosive appoint a vice president and surefire region such as this, policymaking is not successor. often equated with best interests. Viewed in the context of Egypt’s CONCLUSION regional ambitions, limited rapprochement with Israel, and potential succession As the Egyptian armed forces continue crisis—with all its implications for the to upgrade the quantity and quality of their peace treaty and an Islamist resurgence— military platforms to unparalleled heights— the military’s buildup resembles a powder levels rivaling those of Israel—they have keg forming on Israel’s doorstep. Three positioned themselves to be a major player decades of peace notwithstanding, the on the Middle Eastern block. The path Egyptian-Israeli front remains a tinderbox, charted by Egypt during the coming years, one in which a cold peace may just become though, will go a long way toward a cold war. determining the significance of its meteoric rise from an archaic, Soviet-styled military *Jeffrey Azarva is a research assistant at to a Western-armed, twenty-first century the American Enterprise Institute in juggernaut. Washington, DC. While justifiably concerned about the neighborhood in which they operate, the

70 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) From Cold Peace to Cold War?

NOTES 12 Yiftah S. Shapir (ed.), “The Middle East Military Balance,” The Jaffee Center for 1 David Honig, “A Mighty Arsenal: Egypt’s Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, Military Buildup: 1979-1999,” Policy February 20, 2006. Watch, No. 447, (The Washington Institute 13 Amnon Barzilai, “Should We Be Up in for Near East Policy, March 21, 2000). Arms Over Egypt’s Buildup?” Ha’aretz, 2 United States Government Accountability January 18, 2005. Office, Report to the U.S. House 14 Ibid. Committee on International Relations, 15 Honig, “A Mighty Arsenal: Egypt’s “State and DoD Need to Assess How the Military Buildup: 1979-1999.” Foreign Military Financing Program for 16 Shlomo Brom and Yiftah S. Shapir, The Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Middle East Strategic Balance: The Security Goals,” April 2006, GAO-06-437. Egyptian Armed Forces (Sussex Academic 3 Hillel Frisch, “Arab Armies: Religious, Press, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Economic, and Structural Dimensions,” Studies at Tel Aviv University, 2004), p. Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 54 97. (June 2003), p. 95. 17 Ibid, p. 98. 4 Owen L. Sirs, Nasser and the Missile Age 18 Honig, “A Mighty Arsenal.” in the Middle East (London and New York: 19 Federation of American Scientists, Routledge, 2006), p. 98. “Harpoon Missile Sale to Egypt Launches 5 Robert Satloff, Testimony before the U.S. Debate,” Arms Sales Monitor, No. 47 House Committee on International (January 2002), p. 3. Relations, April 10, 1997. 20 Wade Boese, “U.S. Announces New 6 Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Sales to Middle East Worth Billions,” Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, Arms Control Today, March 1999. 1997-2004,” Congressional Research 21 Frisch, “Arab Armies,” p.100. Service (RL33051), August 29, 2005, p. 28. 22 Boese, “U.S. Announces New Arms 7 Ibid, p. 28. Sales to Middle East Worth Billions.” 8 Yezid Sayigh, Arab Military Industry: 23 Frisch, “Arab Armies,” p. 100. Capability, Performance, and Impact 24 “Report: Israel trying to block US sale of (London: Brassey’s, 1992), p. 63. missile system to Jordan,” Agence France 9 Though granted a license by the Pentagon Presse, August 1, 2004. to produce the M1A1 model in 1988, the 25 Frisch, “Arab Armies,” p. 101. Egyptian government first began 26 Clyde R. Mark, “Egypt-United States assembling the Abrams tank after the 1991 Relations,” Congressional Research Persian Gulf War. The first assembly Service (IB93087), August 20, 2003, p. 9. contract lasted from 1991 until 1998 and 27David A. Silverstein, “Keeping an Eye on resulted in the production of 555 combat the Allies,” Backgrounder Update, No. 154 tanks. (The Heritage Foundation, February 4, 10 Arieh O’Sullivan, “Egypt—The New 1991). Enemy?” , August 25, 28 Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Egypt 1999. Francis J. Ricciardone at Abu Suwaye Air 11 Ibid. Base, June 21, 2006.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) 71 Jeffrey Azarva

29 See Program,” New York Times, September 20, http://www.perini.com/pmsi/federal_defens 2006. e_body.htm. 44 El Pais (Madrid), March 28, 2000. 30 Michael Coulter, “Review of U.S. Policy 45 Anton LaGuardia, “Mubarak’s Heir and Assistance Programs to Egypt,” Apparent Hails ‘Cairo Spring’” The Daily Testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Telegraph, June 14, 2005. International Relations, May 17, 2006. 46 “The Future of Egypt,” The Middle East 31 Yossef Bodanksy and Vaughn S. Forrest, Review of International Affairs (MERIA), “Approaching the New Cycle of Arab- Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2006). Israeli Fighting,” Task Force on Terrorism 47 Frisch, “Arab Armies,” p. 96. & Unconventional Warfare, U.S. House of 48 Daniel Sobelman, “Gamal Mubarak, Representatives, December 10, 1996. President of Egypt?” Middle East 32 Frisch, “Arab Armies,” p. 102-03. Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 2001). 33 Satloff, Testimony before the U.S. House 49 Hossam Hamalawy, “Powerful Egyptian Committee on International Relations. Spy Chief No Longer Behind the Scenes,” 34 Frisch, “Arab Armies,” p. 103. Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2005. 35 Uzi Mahnaimi, “Egypt Threatens Show 50 Yuval Steinitz, “The Growing Threat to of Armed Force to Aid Arafat,” Sunday Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge,” Times (London), August 12, 2001. Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 10 36 See (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/worl December 11, 2003). d/egypt/army.htm. 51 Oded Granot, “An Israeli View: The 37 Stephen A. Cook, “Egypt—Still Egyptian Initiative for a Unilateral America’s Partner?” Middle East Ceasefire,” www.bitterlemons.org, No. 6, Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2, (June 2000). February 10, 2003. 38 Reuven Pedatzurr, “A New Threat Pops 52 Eli Kazhdan and David Keyes, “The Up—Egypt,” Ha’aretz, October 22, 2003. Inevitable Disintegration of the Hudna,” 39 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Mubarak the Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 5 Pharaoh,” The Wall Street Journal, July 15, (August 26, 2003). 2004. 53 Molly Moore, “In Jerusalem, A Scene 40 Mubarak Interview with al-Arabiya ‘Like a Horror Movie,’” The Washington Satellite Channel, Egypt State Information Post, August 20, 2003. Service, April 9, 2006; see 54 Mark Lavie, “Israel: Peace Plan in Deep http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Presidenc Freeze Until Palestinians Crack Down on y/President/Interview/ Militants,” Associated Press, August 11, 41 See Egypt's constitution in English: 2003. http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Constituti 55 Michael Herzog, “A New Reality on the on/Text/040703000000000001.htm. Egypt-Gaza Border (Part II): Analysis of 42 Gamal Essam El-Din, “Reintroducing the New Israel-Egypt Agreement,” Peace Gamal Mubarak,” al-Ahram Weekly, March Watch, No. 520 (The Washington Institute 30-April 5, 2006. for Near East Policy, September 21, 2005). 43 Michael Slackman and Mona el-Naggar, 56 During the 18-month-long negotiations, “Mubarak’s Son Proposes Nuclear Sulayman and Tantawi sought to package the agreement as the first phase in the

72 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) From Cold Peace to Cold War?

deployment of thousands of Egyptian 69 Jonathan Spyer, “Failure and Longevity: troops to the Israel-Egypt border. Israel The Dominant Political Order in the Middle rejected this proposal, citing Annex I, East,” MERIA, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2006). Article II in the1979 treaty. This annex, 70 Challiss McDonough, “Egypt Frees 950 which delineated four security zones in the Gamaa Islamiya Prisoners,” Voice of Sinai, prohibits Egypt from stationing any America News, April 12, 2006. armed personnel, except civil police, in the zone closest to the Israeli border. 57 Brooke Neuman, “A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part I): Analysis of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement,” Peace Watch, No. 518 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 19, 2005). 58 Doron Almog, “Tunnel-Vision in Gaza,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 2004). 59 Hillel Frisch, “Eye of the Sphinx: Egypt’s Military Doctrine,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 2 (Winter 2002), p. 13. 60 Ibid, p. 13. 61 “Shin Bet Chief Accuses Egypt of Allowing Weapons Smuggling into Gaza Strip,” Ha’aretz, September 27, 2006. 62 “Sinai: Egyptian Policeman Try to Smuggle Arms to Gaza,” http://www.ynetnews.com, September 30, 2006. 63 Yitzhak Benhorin, “Dichter Urges U.S. Pressure on Cairo over Gaza Arms Smuggling,” http://www.ynetnews.com, October 19, 2006. 64 Almog, “Tunnel-Vision in Gaza.” 65 Aaron Klein, “Palestinians Plotting Egypt Attack?” http://www.ynetnews.com, September 13, 2006. 66 Daniel Williams, “Cairo Links Sinai Attacks to Palestinians: Gaza Extremists Said to Train Egyptians,” Washington Post, May 24, 2006. 67 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 146. 68 Ibid, p. 98.

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1 (March 2007) 73