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UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Waging War among Civilians: The Production and Restraint of Counterinsurgent Violence in the Second Intifada Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5rg476mq Author Manekin, Devorah Sarah Publication Date 2012 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Waging War among Civilians: The Production and Restraint of Counterinsurgent Violence in the Second Intifada A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Devorah Sarah Manekin 2012 © Copyright by Devorah Sarah Manekin 2012 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Waging War among Civilians: The Production and Restraint of Counterinsurgent Violence in the Second Intifada by Devorah Sarah Manekin Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2012 Professor Edmond Keller, Chair Theories of violence against civilians in conflict have tended to view combatants in homogenous terms, as the obedient pawns of military elites, or as uniformly prone to violence due to passionate emotions, economic opportunism, or military socialization. In contrast, this study shows that combatant participation in violence is variable: While in some circumstances soldiers embrace violence eagerly, in others they attempt to shirk it or refuse to commit it outright. What accounts for this variation in violence and restraint? Why are some individuals, and some combat units, more likely to act violently than others? And what accounts for combatant participation in varying forms and targeting of violence? This dissertation examines ii these questions through an analysis of Israeli soldiers in the Second Intifada, employing interview, survey, and observational data. The core argument is that variation in combatant violence and restraint is a consequence of organizational control within the military. Drawing on theories in organizational and management studies, I define organizational control broadly to include not only formal mechanisms such as rules, discipline, and enforcement, but also informal mechanisms, such as the inculcation of values, norms, and beliefs among organizational members through training and leadership. Through organizational control, the military seeks to align the preferences and beliefs of combatants regarding the use of violence with those of military leaders, ensuring that combatants both produce the violence demanded of them (strategic violence) and at the same time do not surpass or subvert such violence so that it no longer serves military interests but their own (opportunistic violence). I show that effective organizational control leads to participation patterns consistent with the preferences of armed group leaders – maximal participation in strategic violence and minimal participation in opportunistic violence. In contrast, weak control leads to participation patterns inconsistent with the preferences of armed group leaders – reduced participation in strategic violence and increased participation in opportunistic violence. When leader preferences are uncertain and control is ambiguous, new, entrepreneurial forms of violence emerge from the military's lower levels. iii The dissertation of Devorah Sarah Manekin is approved. Deborah W. Larson Elisabeth Jean Wood James Ron Edmond Keller, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2012 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables..................................................................................................................................ix List of Figures...........................................................................................................................…...x Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................................xi Vita................................................................................................................................................xiv 1. Introduction.............................................................................................................................1 2. Violence and Control in the Second Intifada.....................................................................13 2.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................13 2.2 Theories of Violence against Civilians in Conflict.........................................................15 2.2.1 Instrumentalist theories.........................................................................................15 2.2.2 Theories of identify and emotion..........................................................................19 2.2.3 Theories of social influence……..........................................................................20 2.2.4 Organizational theories………….........................................................................24 2.3 Concepts and Definitions................................................................................................31 2.3.1 Participation..........................................................................................................31 2.3.2 Violence................................................................................................................32 2.3.3 Civilians................................................................................................................37 2.4 Organizational Control and the Production and Restraint of Violence..........................39 2.4.1 Organizational control..........................................................................................39 2.4.2 A logic of violence and control............................................................................43 2.5 The Trajectory of Control in the IDF.............................................................................51 2.5.1 Prior to enlistment: Instilling motivation to fight................................................52 2.5.2 Military training: Creating violence workers.......................................................57 2.5.3 Operational deployment: Erosion of control.......................................................60 2.6 Conclusion......................................................................................................................61 3. Research Design and Methods: Collecting Sensitive Data................................................63 v 3.1 Introduction: Collecting Data from Combatants............................................................63 3.2 Case Selection.................................................................................................................65 3.3 Data and Research Design..............................................................................................69 3.4 The Conflicting Meanings of Violence: Violence Work and Dirty Work.....................73 3.5 Talking about Violence: Transformations of Meaning...................................................77 3.6 The Politics of Violence: Solicitation of Loyalty...........................................................82 3.7 Violence and Emotion....................................................................................................87 3.8 Conclusion......................................................................................................................93 4. IDF Counterinsurgency in the Second Intifada Background...........................................95 4.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................95 4.2 Defensive Operations......................................................................................................98 4.2.1 Static protection of roads and settlements............................................................98 4.2.2 "Infrastructure activities"....................................................................................104 4.3 Population Control Measures........................................................................................106 4.3.1 Closure................................................................................................................109 4.3.2 The separation barrier.........................................................................................115 4.3.3 Internal closure...................................................................................................116 4.4 Offensive operations.....................................................................................................120 4.4.1 Large-scale operations........................................................................................121 4.4.2 Small-scale operations........................................................................................128 4.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................................131 5. The Production of Strategic Violence...............................................................................134 5.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................134 5.2 Organizational Control and the Production of Strategic Violence...............................138 5.2.1 Pre-enlistment attitudes towards military service...............................................138