Research Forum
ארכיון צה"ל ומערכת הביטחון
The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story Dov Tamari 2019 marked the the fiftieth anniversary of the War of Attrition, which was fought mainly against Egypt, and on a smaller scale, was waged along the ceasefirelines with Jordan and Syria. This article refers to the mindset in the IDF and within the General Staff during the six years between the Six Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973), and to the nature of the discourse between the military and the government. The War of Attrition against Egypt enables three wars to be merged into one story, due to the decisive prominence of Egypt in these wars against Israel. The focus is on the military echelon and the interactions between the military echelon and the political echelon during the years of the War of Attrition, and the impact of military thinking on political thinking between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, while focusing on the years of the War of Attrition in the Egyptian theater. 50 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
Introduction not refer to the arguments within the Israeli In 2019, the Israeli media covered the fiftieth governments over the six years of intensive anniversary of the War of Attrition, which was conflict. Rather, the focus is on the military fought mainly against Egypt, and on a smaller echelon and the interactions between the scale, was waged along the ceasefire lines with military echelon and the political echelon Jordan and Syria. The War of Attrition resulted during the years of the War of Attrition, and the in 968 fatalities and 3,730 wounded, 260 of impact of military thinking on political thinking whom were combatants in the Suez Canal arena. between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur On June 16, 2019, four former IDF Chiefs of War, while focusing on the years of the War of Staff were interviewed on the Israeli television Attrition in the Egyptian theater. channel Kan, and recalled their memories of that war. All four men, who are deserving of Interpretive and Formative Concepts much esteem for their military service and their My interest in the three wars, and primarily in dedication to the State of Israel, fought during the War of Attrition, focuses more on what the the War of Attrition as junior officers, and their political and military leadership were thinking stories were replete with the nostalgia typical during those six years and less on what they did. of those recalling painful past experiences. My research on “how they thought” includes However, during the program, none of the four analyses of the deliberations in the various addressed the question of the relevance of that echelons and analyses of plans of action and war to the present day. the evolution of the thought processes during This article refers to the mindset in the those six years. All of these present a series of IDF and within the General Staff during the concepts, most of which evolved from past six years between the Six Day War (1967) and experience, previous political baggage, and the Yom Kippur War (1973), and to the nature cognitive baggage of identifiable origin. of the discourse between the military and the No person is capable of comprehending his government. Within this context, the article environment and reality without interpretive focuses on the nature of the fighting in the concepts; the same is true of any social Egyptian arena during the War of Attrition, which organization. In this context, “concepts” differed from the fighting against Jordan and are not mere terms, but rather conceptions Syria. More specifically, the War of Attrition or approaches used to interpret reality and against Egypt enables three wars to be merged prompt toward action. Although the Agranat into one story, due to the decisive prominence Commission decided that “conception” is a of Egypt in these wars against Israel. The dirty word and should be avoided, without questions addressed include: Did the way in this or that conception, there is nothing, and which the General Staff interpreted the War of we are left at the starting line. Therefore, the Attrition and its modus operandi derive from its important questions are: Is the conception interpretation of the Six Day War and from the that we have—i.e., the set of concepts used to idea of expansionism that evolved within the interpret reality—indeed relevant to reality? IDF following the War of Independence? Were And, are individuals capable of discerning—and both of these wars the direct precursor of the if so, when—that their conceptions are no longer Yom Kippur War? What remains relevant from relevant to interpretation of emergent reality? the War of Attrition today? Among the familiar concepts routinely This article does not survey the international used in studies about national security are: environment, the positions of the world powers, existential threat; warning; deterrence; decision; or their involvement and influence in the War of strategic depth (and the lack of strategic depth); Attrition and during those six years, and does endurance; “crushing” capability; offensive Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 51
defense strategy; shift of the war to enemy and of military thinking, sometimes up to the territory; security borders; air supremacy; and highest level. many more, up to personal security, which When tactical conceptual language replaced the concepts of general security and is applied to the strategic and operative safe peace. These concepts are still awaiting thinking environments, a crisis will almost proof of viability. certainly occur, because the logic underlying A review of the history of the relations these spheres of knowledge is very different; between statesmen and the military in Israel tactical thinking is a natural response, a matter shows that the political leadership’s conceptual of incidents and responses, while the logic horizon relating to security and war was almost underlying strategic and operative thinking always supplied or designed by the senior engages in creating conceptions for the near military echelon. This means that discussions or distant future, providing guidance in force between the echelons almost exclusively tapped buildup processes, and deciding modes of concepts used by the IDF to interpret reality and future force deployment in scenarios that are understand threats and crises (Tamari, 2012). difficult to foresee. Because switching between It follows, therefore, that the governmental- organizational structure called the “political echelon”—and the “military echelon” that When tactical conceptual language is applied to the strategic and operative thinking environments, is subordinate to it and receives directives a crisis will almost certainly occur, because the from it —is operating properly in terms of the logic underlying these spheres of knowledge is hierarchy needed to underpin the running very different. of a democratic state. But the thinking, the understanding, the concepts, and the language created in the IDF and the extent of the the strategic to the tactical and vice versa is transformation and internalization of these problematic, as Yehoshafat Harkabi described in concepts in governments, and vice versa, is his book War and Strategy (1992), the imposition uncertain and vague, as long as the members of tactical thinking and its adoption at higher of the government and the prime minister are echelons is liable to transform the strategy and not systematically engaged in the development the campaigns being planned into a mere set of knowledge relating to security and the crises of incidents and responses. that require the operation of military force. Another assumption, based on decades- The Onset of Indecision regarding long observation of the IDF, is that the IDF’s the Outcomes of War interpretive concepts are deeply affected by The Six Day War of June 1967 ended after Israel tactical language and concepts, given the defeated three neighboring Arab armies. The impact of the tactical level on the levels above Israeli government, the public, and possibly also it. The fireworks of every war are the tactical the IDF were surprised by the achievements of achievements, because they are more critical to such a short war and its relatively few casualties, the fighting capability of every individual soldier, compared to the prevalent public gloom before unit, and formation. They are a significant the war. generator of the socialization of the individual In the wake of the unexpected new reality, and of society in relation to that particular war. disagreements arose on June 18-19, one week Over the years, the tactical excellence of IDF was after the ceasefire on all fronts, at a meeting outstanding and surpassed that of its enemies. of Israel’s first national unity government, Consequently, “tactics” became the interpretive regarding some of the decisions that were conceptual anchor of the military experience made. The purpose of the deliberations was 52 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
to formulate and clarify Israel’s position warning, and decision—an inherently erroneous with regard to the outcomes of the war in approach that was never viable since it is preparation for the debate at the UN and paradoxical, because any deterrence dissipates toward clarifications that were sent secretly at some point, warning is never guaranteed, to the American administration. Subsequently, and decision is transient by nature. This triad the discussions engaged in a series of material reflected a deterministic approach. These issues in this newly emerging reality, such “essentials” were not sufficiently analyzed, as the status of previous agreements with and they were not revised if and when reality neighboring countries; changes in the armistice changed, sometimes to an extreme. lines; the future of the West Bank and a possible Subsequent to the Ben Gurion government, annexation of territories; the unification of almost none of the Israeli governments forged Jerusalem; the possibility of a binational state, or formulated any coherent security concept. and more. The Israeli research literature addressing The government’s discussions and this important issue often presents security resolutions give us an idea of the conceptions concepts that were formulated by researchers held by members of the government even before after the fact; i.e., researchers performed a the war—conceptions originating from the years retrospective analysis and formulated what since the War of Independence and the Sinai in their opinion was a security concept, and Campaign—that now had to be reexamined sometimes, what should have been a security in light of a new reality. Striking during these concept. It is unlikely that the relevant political discussions was the position of Minister of the and military leaderships formulated any idea Police Eliyahu Sasson, a longstanding Arabist of a security concept in the same way that since before 1948, who argued that if the researchers did after the fact and years later. ministers were discussing a new order in the It appears that in Israel, security concepts were vicinity, their understanding of Arab countries formulated retrospectively in light of successful and their governments was inadequate. wars, and not before them. What was done between 1950 and until the First Lebanon War in The Security Concept 1982? The IDF, the General Staff, and the senior Israel’s security concept between the War of military leadership formulated approaches Independence and the Six Day War comprised for deploying military forces that could be several essentials: full recruitment of the called security concepts. One can see in them resources of the state and the society toward “expansionist approaches” or “positioning Israel the possibility of war; the need for the war to in the region.” In other words, some of Israel’s be short, be it initiated by Israel or launched wars were designed to be expansionist, while as a preventive war or preemptive strike; and others were caused as a consequence of the victory on the territory of neighboring countries. expansionist policy (Tamari, 2012). The security concept was also summed up succinctly as a trifold strategy of deterrence, Expansionism From the War of Independence and until after It is unlikely that the relevant political and military the Yom Kippur War, the IDF was considered to leaderships formulated any idea of a security be the most successful organization in Israeli concept in the same way that researchers did after society (Tamari, 2012). Successive governments the fact and years later. It appears that in Israel, related to the IDF as the entity that guarantees security concepts were formulated retrospectively the state’s existence and is capable of providing in light of successful wars, and not before them. the right response to any situation and conflict with enemy countries on the one hand, and on Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 53
the other hand, as a social entity that builds the for critical dates and opportunities that might nation and the society. The IDF, for its part, saw emerge between 1954 and 1957. In addition, itself as hegemonic in relation to all national expansionism appears in all of the multi-year security issues and as the organization that plans subsequent to the Sinai Campaign and must influence and also sometimes define until the Six Day War. The five-year Bnei Yaakov the infrastructure development in the State plan of 1958 stated that a war with one or more of Israel during its nascent years in light of its neighboring countries requires the conquering security needs. The IDF also assumed the role of territories of up to 250 kilometers from of government tool, even beyond immediate Israel’s borders. The five-year Bnei Or plan of security needs. December 1964, which was in effect until 1969 A methodical perusal of General Staff and and retroactively also covered the Six Day War, regional command documents, multi-year stated that Israel must be proactive and occupy plans, and various staff research studies of the West Bank until the borders are changed. the General Staff between 1950 and 1973, and The expansionist ideas were what prompted even until 1981, finds that the IDF cultivated the IDF to occupy territories in the Sinai unequivocal conceptions about expansionism, Peninsula, in the West Bank, and in the Golan about demarcating completely new borders Heights in 1967. Subsequently, the IDF was for the State of Israel, and about Israel’s tasked with defending them, but a defensive positioning in the Middle East. At the same time, approach was not formulated, but rather only and notwithstanding the subversive nature an approach for a continuation of expansionism. of this conception, it was no secret and was The objectives of the war defined by the General not concealed from the prime ministers and Staff headed by Lt. Gen. David Elazar in the defense ministers, though for their part, the summer of 1973 were to defeat Egypt and Syria governments did not delve into the conceptions in order to maintain the status quo achieved of war adopted by the IDF. after the Six Day War and “to improve the The expansionist policy, as designed in the ceasefire lines” at the end of the war (“The IDF, influenced the conduct and outcomes of Yom Kippur War,” Doctrine and Training Division, the Sinai Campaign in 1956, the Six Day War, 1980). The improvements were approved by the War of Attrition and surrounding events Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and included in 1967-1970, the Yom Kippur War, the First the occupation of territories not much smaller Lebanon War, and, it appears, the occupation than those occupied in 1967. of the West Bank. All of the staff plans and The IDF’s expansionist policy was designed research studies pertaining to expansionism not only to eliminate imminent danger and deter were designed to create “forward strategic an enemy by a show of Israel’s power, but also to depth” in the hostile regions between Arab effect a permanent change in the State of Israel’s armies and Israel’s living space (Nevo Research, geostrategic conditions. The Six Day War is 1954). The Lavi strategic planning dossier of clear evidence of this—the government had not the Operations Branch/Planning Department, issued any instructions to the IDF about which November 1953, clearly contains the idea of territories to occupy and for what purpose. expansionism, with an advanced planning The government’s only instruction to the IDF addendum that proposed the inclusion of the was “to remove the seal choking the State of expansionist plans in the IDF’s multi-year plan; Israel,” and indeed, this was removed in one i.e., a prescribed directive for planning every day as a result of the Air Force’s achievements. war so that it would be capable of acquiring All the rest—the occupation of the entire Sinai new territories for Israel. Planning for such a Peninsula up to the Suez Canal, contrary to war, so it was written, must be coordinated the directives of the Minister of Defense, the 54 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
occupation of the West Bank and the Golan disregarded reality and the IDF’s duty to use Heights—were an outcome of the expansionist its military, strategic, and systemic knowledge. approach, which was the prevalent mindset in the IDF that dominated easily, due to the Defending the Sinai Peninsula after absence of directives from the government, the Six Day War and superseded any government directive to Very briefly, in mid-June1967 , it appeared that moderate the scope of the occupation. After the Israel’s wars against its neighbors were over, Yom Kippur War and after the disengagement after the Arab armies suffered such a crushing agreements, and also after the peace accord was defeat. Yet very quickly it became evident that signed with Egypt, the General Staff retained the this was not the case. There are different ideas desire to return to the Sinai, as is apparent from on when the War of Attrition began. While Israel the Gates of Salvation operational plans and and the IDF say it began in March 1969, it can similar plans from 1981 that were formulated also be understood as a war that started two in case the agreements with Egypt were weeks after the end of the Six Day War, launched not fulfilled.1 unequivocally by Egyptian President Nasser (Kabha, 1995). Some researchers believe that it did not start before September-October Examination of the IDF’s expansionist approach 1968, while others assert that every war has a prompts the question: How would the IDF occupy “maturation period” prior to its outbreak, and extensive territories in the region? Decisive the War of Attrition against Egypt is an example answers to this were provided in the form of the of this. The Egyptian decision to launch the war structure and organization of the IDF, the military was accompanied by a series of brutal attacks force deployment concepts, and utilization of the overall Israeli potential for the possibility of war. A against the IDF along the Suez Canal and at sea. historical review shows that the question of how It began with seemingly sporadic incidents, Israel would hold occupied regions was almost such as the sinking of the Eilat battleship, which never addressed—a salient issue given that the resulted in 34 fatalities, and two preplanned neighboring countries would not be eager to accept massive shelling attacks in September and the loss of territories and would do everything in October 1968, which resulted in the deaths their power to get them back. of 25 soldiers. But until then the IDF did not understand what a war of attrition is, or how it should prepare for it. Prime Minister Eshkol, Examination of the IDF’s expansionist who was skeptical despite the victory in June approach prompts the question: How would the 1967 and was concerned that the victory and the IDF occupy extensive territories in the region? quiet were only temporary, did not know how Decisive answers to this were provided in the to translate his concerns into clear directives form of the structure and organization of the to the government and to the IDF. IDF, the military force deployment concepts, and Until the Six Day War, the IDF did not lack utilization of the overall Israeli potential for the basic military knowledge about defensive possibility of war. A historical review shows that fighting as a strategic foundation, but for the question of how Israel would hold occupied justified reasons it was deemed an unacceptable regions was almost never addressed—a salient option. As long as it was necessary to defend issue given that the neighboring countries would the State of Israel at the ceasefire lines, the not be eager to accept the loss of territories solution for defensive fighting was initiated and would do everything in their power to get war and preemptive strikes. This might be them back; no thought or investigation was the reason for the inadequate engagement in devoted to it, and if answers were given, they defensive fighting until the Six Day War. After Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 55
the war, the thinking about defense of the newly Damascus or Jabal al-Druze, the Litani River or occupied territories was adversely affected by Port Fouad, and the western side of the Suez the lack of prior knowledge about the concept Canal. To this end, Israel’s military force must of defensive fighting. After the Six Day War and also be prepared for the scenario that the force the seizure of expansive territories three times will accomplish a maximum achievement, which larger than Israel at the ceasefire borders, one is a long term arrangement that might require would expect that thought processes about Israel to remain in Cairo or in its vicinity for a strategic defense might be initiated, but this month or two years—so he said. His statements did not happen. contained a new twist, or perhaps were a Upon his appointment as Chief of Staff, return to the model recalled from the War of Haim Bar-Lev held a series of meetings on the Independence—i.e., a war that opens with a subject of defending the Sinai. The basis of the defensive stance and, as soon as it succeeds, discussions about defense should have relied on switches to an offensive stance to win the war a conceptual system that clarified the concept and gain achievements at least as advantageous of strategic depth, the volume of military forces as those of the Six Day War. and their availability relative to the region, the A few weeks later, in November, during a military capabilities of the adversary’s army, and meeting at the General Staff attended by Minister the government’s policy and its interpretation of Defense Dayan, OC Southern Command Maj. by the General Staff. During a General Staff Gen. Yeshayahu Gavish clarified the defensive meeting in September 1968, Chief of Staff Bar- approach for the length of the Suez Canal line Lev said (“The Yom Kippur War,” Doctrine and (ibid.): Training Division, 1980): The principles on which the plan is built As for the question: Which war? I think are as follows: first—we must defend that here too, if we hang onto some the canal line. The defense needs to defensive conception, it’s an optical enable us to prevent any crossing illusion because, in the final analysis, of the canal in places not under our we have always said: we will stop the control...Naturally, the significance enemy’s attack and we will shift the of our deployment along the canal is war to its land. I think that this was an outcome of two considerations— valid during the period of the Green military and political…There is no Line and it is also valid today. And doubt that the vulnerable point of our forces need to be trained to stop the forces crossing the canal is the a surprise attack and switch to an preparation time before the crossing offensive response. I think that the and their being in the water. We will war—if there will be an all-out war— achieve this advantage if we deploy will be a war that they initiate. I see along the shoreline. very little chance or likelihood that we will be the initiators. The Chief of Staff summarized:
The Chief of Staff developed his approach But like I said, we have all of the when he said that if a war erupts, it might chances of stopping them on the become necessary to occupy targets, like Cairo canal line based on three elements: or Alexandria or the hills surrounding Cairo; the defined areas, counterattacks, and i.e., an optimal course of action, according to air power. We hope that all three will him. This would also be true for Amman and work, because then it will be good. 56 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
Even if two of them work, this will also talk to me about the conception of the be good. (ibid.) strongholds and the Bar-Lev Line....If war indeed breaks out, it must have Therefore, the line of strongholds along the one mission: to defeat the enemy’s banks of the Suez Canal, whose construction army. began in the winter of 1968, was not designed solely for a war of attrition. This was a line that The Chief of Staff went further and essentially was designed to protect the Sinai region at buried defensive fighting as a basic scenario its most western edge, in the event of a wide- in a war: “The Sela defensive plan [the code scale war. The viewpoint of the Chief of Staff, name for the Sinai defensive plan] must give us the General Staff, and the Southern Command an alert for a rapid switch to the offense... and contradicted any basic military logic. The to gain major and substantial achievements defensive holding line, which is the line that immediately.” as long as is held fulfills its mission, was the OC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Ariel most forward line possible, hundreds of meters Sharon promptly came to the support of the from the Egyptian military forces. Therefore, Chief of Staff: “We are not presenting Sela at there was no tactical depth and no systemic all, because we have Sela overlapping the depth—which thwarts any defense in advance. maximum offensive plan.” The Operations Branch officer added: “Sela is general, while we have two additional divisions at the front The viewpoint of the Chief of Staff, the General line—162 in the northern sector and 143 in the Staff, and the Southern Command contradicted Refidim sector on the arteries and um-Machtsa any basic military logic. The defensive holding in the direction of the central sector...when line, which is the line that as long as is held fulfills its mission, was the most forward line possible, the operation is being built in order to launch hundreds of meters from the Egyptian military Operation Desert Cat” (ibid.). forces. Therefore, there was no tactical depth and It appears that after the Six Day War, both no systemic depth—which thwarts any defense Chiefs of Staff and three OCs Southern Command in advance. nearly completely ruled out the defensive fighting designed to maintain Sinai under Israel’s absolute control. The set of conceptions The next Chief of Staff, David Elazar, did not that the IDF designed and followed prior to 1967 revise his predecessor’s viewpoint, but added remained as it had been—a strategic attack to that he absolutely negated defensive fighting win the war immediately after it erupts, despite as a reasonable option in war. He considered the possibility that an intelligence warning of an attack on the Suez Canal and on the Golan imminent war was not guaranteed,2 while the Heights as the opening position of the war, even possibility of an Israeli preemptive strike similar though he admitted that the prospects of an to the Six Day War was not plausible. A similar Israeli preemptive strike were low. Regarding situation also existed on the northern front the possibility of war being initiated by Egypt, opposite Syria. he said in the summer of 1973 (ibid.): The military outcomes of the Six Day War cemented the strategic thinking in the IDF. I don’t want to talk about the After the reality drastically changed in the conception, about deployment at entire region, the approach toward deploying the canal in a defensive posture and military force (or perhaps the security concept) about managing a defensive war. I remained as it was between 1956 and 1967: think this will be a disaster....Don’t with the same sets of concepts, and the Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 57
same approaches toward force deployment. presence in Lebanon, and its occupation of the The security paradigm was not reviewed or West Bank since 1967 to this day. challenged by a new paradigm. The preparation for the next war was a replay of the Six Day War. The complete set of military conceptions that One of the essential rules of thought in large organizations, and certainly in military was relevant prior to 1967 was imposed on an organizations, is that every change of guard entirely different reality, which did not undergo requires the leader (the Chief of Staff, in this case, any paradigmatic scrutiny. The War of Attrition, or the Minister of Defense) to analyze the extent of mainly along the Suez Canal—which ended in the relevance of the existing paradigm and of the August 1970 without Israel relinquishing any dominant cognitive conception, and to challenge territorial gain—strengthened this fixation. them with a new external paradigm. If we examine the foundation for the discussion about defensive fighting designed to hold the territory occupied by the IDF, which One of the essential rules of thought in is supposed to be based for the most part on large organizations, and certainly in military a set of conceptions that clarify the “strategic organizations, is that every change of guard depth,” the volume of the military forces requires the leader (the Chief of Staff, in this and their availability relative to the region, case, or the Minister of Defense) to analyze the national potential from which military the extent of the relevance of the existing capabilities can be tapped for the new reality, paradigm and of the dominant cognitive the military capabilities of the enemy army, and conception, and to challenge them with a new the government’s policy and its interpretation external paradigm. This does not mean that the by the General Staff, it appears that the error outcome will necessarily be a replacement of or perhaps the cognitive fixation was quite the dominant paradigm, but it is dangerous to profound. analyze a security paradigm from the inside, and certainly not after the successes of the The War of Attrition in the Egyptian war that just ended. This is because internal Arena, June 1967-August 1970 investigation and analysis, as critical as they In retrospect, it can be argued that the War of may be, do not facilitate abandoning accepted Attrition, particularly in the Egyptian arena, conventions. was the cognitive link between the Six Day War The most prominent situation to emerge and the Yom Kippur War. It was an outcome of from the Six Day War is paradoxically a rare the former and its repercussions forged the military achievement and a cognitive inability beginning of the latter. to contend with the outcomes of the war. The The IDF and the political echelon failed to fixation that prevailed after the war originated delve into the question of how Israel will hold in the assumption that Israel had designed a on indefinitely to the expansive territories it permanent reality, and that all that was left for occupied in 1967. The test of both the lack of it to do is to preserve it. As for the IDF, which understanding and the ability to retain occupied at that time was an organization lacking any territories was the Yom Kippur War. However, multidimensional strategic discourse, there was the failure in the IDF and in the government to no government above it that could balance or consider the question did not begin the day challenge the policy and the one-dimensional after the Six Day War. Its roots can be seen in conception that characterized the Israeli the plans for holding onto Sinai (one of the military. objectives of 1956), and continued in the six The War of Attrition against Egypt enabled years between 1967 and 1973, Israel’s 18-year and even mandated a re-examination of the 58 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
security concept, of the outcome of the war, process in order to understand if the war of and of the IDF’s approaches to deployment. attribution has forged a different reality or one Up until October 6, 1973, this did not happen. that is about to change, and what is now needed in political, military, and social spheres. Within Theoretical Perspective on the War this context, a question arises comparing a of Attrition battle between countries to a battle between Every war in every location in the world differs a country and a non-state organization, which from other wars, but nevertheless there are currently characterizes the battle between some common characteristics. With regard Israel and terrorist organizations. It appears to wars of attrition, the objectives of the war that similarities may be found between both are limited, and the initiator’s intention is to cases, but this question must be analyzed fully motivate a change in the existing reality, while in a separate research study. the responding side exerts efforts to preserve it; the term “decision,” which is always ambiguous, IDF Conduct during the War of does not suit a war of attrition in which the Attrition parties are not looking to be victorious, but The Bar-Lev report that the outgoing Chief of rather, are looking to “move toward” an Staff submitted to the Prime Minister, to the innovative change or “revert to the previous Minister of Defense, and to incoming Chief of situation.” One assumption of the initiating Staff Elazar (Bar-Lev, 1972) allows a window into side is that the rival country will not respond the thinking in the General Staff throughout with all-out war, either because it does not the War of Attribution against Egypt. Most want to launch it or it is incapable of doing so; of the report, about 300 pages, was written the initiating side must assess the rival side’s by the relevant departments in the General capabilities to withstand prolonged attrition Staff, while the first 27 pages were written and and, to the same extent, it must assess its own signed personally by the Chief of Staff and are stamina, since a war of attrition affects both the essence of the report. The Chief of Staff sides. The initiating side must assess the speed divided his term of office into three periods: of the initiated operations intended to wear until the War of Attrition at the Suez Canal; the the enemy down, because if they are not swift period of the War of Attrition; and following the enough, the enemy might have an opening War of Attrition, until the end of his term on to launch an all-out war; each side looks for January 1, 1972. The events in the Jordanian, military, economic, and social targets that are Syrian, Lebanese, and international arenas painful to the enemy, but not devastating and were similarly described. Bar-Lev also wrote decisive. For the most part, both sides are forced about force buildup in the IDF, manpower, a to prefer being capable of maintaining stable summary, and conclusions.3 defense over an offensive, in order to avoid According to the report, as soon as it deterioration into all-out war; a war of attrition became evident to the General Staff that the is never short and sometimes persists over Egyptians began a war of attrition, and this, only many years. This requires both sides to begin a in September or October 1968, the following learning process. There is no point to defining objectives were defined:4 a clear plan, including its long range future a. To prevent Egypt from gaining any ground stages, and then operating according to it: both achievements sides undergo a learning process that enables b. To create pressure that will force the changes of direction and actions. The end of a Egyptians to agree to a ceasefire war of attrition, if a permanent arrangement c. To avoid mutual escalation in the use of has not been achieved, requires a new learning heavy war materials, such as aircraft Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 59
d. To carry out singular strikes in order to Because the strongholds were spread over a moderate Egypt’s activity distance of 160 kilometers, and sometimes the e. To deploy minimum forces along the Suez distance between them was about 10 kilometers, Canal armored forces and mobile forces were deployed f. To demonstrate to the Egyptian government in the intervening spaces. Armored forces would that it is incapable of changing the territorial be deployed at a particular distance from the reality created after June 1967 shoreline that would be capable of reaching g. To compel Egypt to comply with the ceasefire every stronghold and every point along the agreed upon the day after the Six Day War canal within a short time. Artillery corps units (Bar-Lev, 1972). would be deployed at a particular depth and The initial deployment along the Suez Canal would be able to assist the forces along the was in outposts that had poor endurance canal line and hit targets on the other side of the potential. The rear camps were also in canal. The planning team headed by Brig. Gen. vulnerable positions and were still within Avraham Eden, the commander of the armored Egyptian artillery range, which was far superior corps in Sinai, presented fortified company to that of the IDF. After two devastating Egyptian camps at the depth of several kilometers shellings in September and October 1968 that from the banks of the canal forming divisional were meticulously planned in advance, the camps that were to fulfill these objectives—a General Staff initiated a retaliatory response firm defensive line reinforced by tank, artillery, that quickly proved to be a great success: infantry, and engineering units. The rear line destruction of two bridges on the Nile River of fortified camps that were supposed to help in Upper Egypt and the bombing of a critical hold the frontline was never built. transformer substation in the Aswan-Cairo Chief of Staff Bar-Lev’s report (Bar-Lev, 1972) power grid and on the Nile Delta. The damage reveals the thought processes of the General was not very substantial, but the Egyptian Staff during the War of Attrition. This report has government was taken by surprise. It turned almost never been analyzed in research studies out that the Suez Canal arena was defended, about the War of Attrition. What follows are its but the rear and critical infrastructure in Egypt central points. were not. The Israeli course of action compelled As soon as the War of Attrition reached the Egyptian government to halt its military substantive dimensions, the IDF’s goals were operations for five months in order to prepare to prevent Egypt from gaining any ground and to defend its territories deep inside Egypt—time to pressure it until it agreed to a ceasefire; i.e., that was sufficient for the IDF to build about to revert to the situation as it was the day after thirty fortified positions along the banks of the Six Day War. However, in June and July 1969, the Suez Canal along 160 kilometers, which it became evident that the line of strongholds provided reasonable cover against artillery would not survive without the involvement of fire. In the IDF, they were called “strongholds” the Air Force, in order to compensate for the (“Micha Study,” Operations Branch, 1956). The lack of artillery capable of contending against capability of these strongholds of harassing the the Egyptian artillery power. The first goal was Egyptians on the other side of the canal or of accomplished in late 1969, but the second goal defending themselves against a small or massive was not, and therefore, the decision was made crossing by Egyptian forces was negligible. They to launch an aerial attack deep inside Egypt, at were nothing more than demonstration of an the risk of the Soviet Union becoming directly Israeli presence, which required substantial involved. The Chief of Staff added: investment. A stronghold-outpost could barely defend itself. 60 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
Today, it appears that during that would be deployed adjacent to the west bank period, we failed to analyze thoroughly of the canal, which would impede us when the the significance of the impact of fighting resumes”; in other words, if the War of the deep attacks on the Soviet Attrition resumes. involvement. But in retrospect, it The Chief of Staff summarized the end appears to me that we were correct— of the War of Attrition against Egypt using even if intuitively—in our decision to short sentences: the Sinai Peninsula is launch a deep attack, because as a fortified and adequately organized in terms result, the fighting intensified until it of fortifications, roads, barriers, posts, water reached a particular boiling point that supply, communications, landing strips, and put a stop to this process, and finally to everything needed for fighting. The Chief of a ceasefire....The deep attacks began Staff did not specify which type of fighting— on January 7 and ended on April 13, resumption of a war of attrition or all-out war 1970, when it became evident that between Egypt and Israel. It appears that the Russians took it upon themselves his intention was the possibility of attrition: to defend the interior of Egypt with “preventing Egypt from gaining any ground rockets and aircraft operated by them. achievement and achieving a ceasefire as soon as possible.” The Chief of Staff explained that pressure on What were the achievements of the War of Egypt presented one serious problem: the Attrition for Israel, according to the Chief of Russians. But “if we thought that refraining Staff’s assessment? “Egypt’s leaders, who saw from action (deep inside Egypt) would cause themselves as responsible for a solution in all greater damage, then we confronted the of the territories, including the problem of the Russians in Egypt.” Palestinian people, are not adhering to this daily like they did in the past.” And, “Egypt of today is not enthusiastic about fighting.” Even The Chief of Staff summarized the end of the War two years after the ceasefire at the Suez Canal, of Attrition against Egypt using short sentences: clearly the thought processes at the General the Sinai Peninsula is fortified and adequately Staff focused on the possibility of resumption organized in terms of fortifications, roads, barriers, of the War of Attrition, and almost never on the posts, water supply, communications, landing strips, and everything needed for fighting. The possibility that Egypt would launch an all-out Chief of Staff did not specify which type of fighting. war against Israel. The War of Attrition persisted until July 1969. The Egyptian army began with night incursions And indeed, the Red Army took a very by small forces, which raided Israeli strongholds active part in defending the battleground and planted mines on the access roads to them. at the frontline and deep inside Egypt. The Both sides persisted with raids from air and ceasefire in August 1970, which called for a sea and with incursions by small forces that standstill (a freeze on the deployment of forces) crossed the Suez Canal. Egypt had superior by both sides, was immediately violated by artillery power, and the Egyptian army launched Egypt, which advanced its ground-to-air incursions deep inside Israeli territory.5 Not missile batteries. The IDF’s response did not even a few months elapsed before it became produce any results but, as the Chief of Staff clear that Israel’s fortified strongholds were said, “Our main consideration regarding an beginning to collapse. Nevertheless, not one attack on the batteries was the concern that if of them was abandoned. we don’t respond, an entire array of missiles Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 61
On July 21, 1969, the Israeli Air Force Israel to build the 30 strongholds on the banks launched a massive aerial attack west of the of the Suez Canal. All the rest, as successful canal on the artillery batteries, antiaircraft as they might have been, did not change the missile batteries, and the Egyptian forces close conduct of the two rivals. This was a multi-round to the canal. The attacks were accompanied boxing match with the achievements recorded by frequent aerial skirmishes, during which in points and not by a knock-out. Israel demonstrated clear superiority. The deployment of the Israeli Air Force in the war Domestic Criticism of Israel’s was more a matter of no other choice, and, Conduct during the War of Attrition despite this, it was not enough to compel the In cognitive and practical terms, the Israeli Egyptian government to stop the fighting. On government and the IDF entered the War of the contrary, the heavy aerial bombardments Attrition against Egypt after a delay of more than deep inside Egyptian territory prompted Egypt one year. Israeli intelligence did not discern the to call up the Soviet Union, which began to Egyptians’ preparations for a war of a type that take an active part in the fighting, mainly by neither Egypt nor Israel had ever experienced. adding massive reinforcements of ground-to- The starting position of the government and air missile batteries and combat planes. Some the IDF was that the defeat of Egypt in 1967 of the battle campaigns were manned by Red would oblige the Egyptians to accede to Army troops (Adamsky, 2006). exaggerated concessions that would enable The General Staff assessed that after about an arrangement with Israel. The “three nos” 10 months of continuous fighting, the first part of the Khartoum Resolution in late August—no of the goal was achieved; i.e., that the Egyptians recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, had no chance of holding onto the eastern bank and no peace with Israel—justified, from the of the Suez Canal. However, the ceasefire did perspective of Israeli governments, its decision not appear to be achievable using the modus not to offer the Egyptians an arrangement that operandi applied until then. In order to increase could be satisfactory to Israel and Egypt alike, the pressure, the Israeli Air Force began attacking even though it was not certain that any Israeli deep inside Egyptian territory and, although proposed arrangement would be acceptable to it did increase the pressure on the Egyptian Egypt at that time (although President Sadat government, the Egyptian anti-aircraft defense proposed a possible arrangement to Israel in system improved and developed concurrently 1971 through the United States). until it achieved superiority over the Israeli Air On the Israeli side, the War of Attrition was Force during the Yom Kippur War. not accompanied by a learning process in the Much has been written about the special systemic and strategic environment, but only operations deep inside Egyptian territory in the narrow military sense. However, the during the War of Attrition (for example, military learning was successful in relation to Nadal, 2015), and this was a flourishing period several aspects: the investment of relatively few of special IDF operations that has not been manpower resources enabled the IDF to focus repeated since. Suffice it here to emphasize on other arenas and engage in military force one conclusion about the achievements of the buildup; the number of casualties was tolerable, special operations: the first three operations considering the intensity of the Egyptian on October 31-November 1, 1968, forced the firepower; the IDF succeeded in limiting the Egyptian government into a temporary halt in forces deployed on the Suez Canal line to the the War of Attrition, for those who believe that minimum necessary: along the canal line it the War of Attrition had already started, or even deployed a few hundred soldiers, about 100 before then. This lull in the fighting enabled tanks, and five artillery battalions, as well as 62 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
engineering corps of one to two battalions. harsh outcomes of that process on the IDF were This was not the case with regard to budgets. evident during the Yom Kippur War. Perusal of The canal line, inclusive of its military posts, the Bar-Lev Report and the letter of Maj. Gen. access roads, and critical infrastructures across Israel Tal, Elazar’s Deputy Chief of Staff, about the length and breadth of the arena were very the defense of Sinai (Tal, 1970), shows that no expensive for those days; the use of the Air Force, analytical process was initiated in the General which was not easy or inexpensive, enabled the Staff after the War of Attrition for the purpose strongholds along the canal line to survive. In of understanding the development of Egypt’s relation to all matters pertaining to a political intentions regarding a new war after its defeat. and military learning process, it is hard to point One cannot say that the IDF did not plan for to an Israeli achievement or to substantive war since the end of the War of Attrition, but strategic thinking. The line of defense of the the fixed conceptions originating in the Suez canal, from the moment it was established, Canal line caused extreme operational problems constrained any other possible Israeli direction, during the Yom Kippur War. whether at that time or in the future. The phenomenon evident in the War of Attrition influences the current attrition in the Gaza Strip to this day, notwithstanding It appears that the War of Attribution was perceived the tremendous difference between the by the IDF and by Israel as the last day of the Six two phenomena. Israel has operated under Day War, while in Egypt, it was perceived as the first a problematic paradigm for more than fifty day of the next war. years: in times of relative quiet, like after the Six Day War, or when the threat to Israeli society is After a ceasefire was achieved in August not imminent, the government does not take 1970, and during the three-month trial any political and military initiative designed to period, considerable resources were invested moderate the conflict. The policy is to maintain in preparing the line of strongholds for a the status quo: “fight and then do nothing.” resumption of the War of Attrition, and From Israel’s perspective, the ball is in the strengthening the existing line became the Arab/Palestinian court and they are expected ultimate objective. No brainstorming was held to compromise and agree to an arrangement to consider the possibility of an all-out war in that is desirable and comfortable for Israel. the future, which differs from a war of attrition, When instead of compromising with Israel, the and the future value of the existing canal line adversary’s policy is to use force, then Israel is was not evaluated, which was suitable for the not prepared to negotiate or to accede to policy War of Attrition that had ended. It appears that initiatives. The past and current logic underlying the War of Attribution was perceived by the IDF this mindset and conduct paradigm is that Israel and by Israel as the last day of the Six Day War, does not concede one iota, if the concession is while in Egypt, it was perceived as the first day deemed to be the outcome of the use of force of the next war. by the rival, so that Israel’s dominant position Although the aerial bombardments deep is not eroded. How that will end is anybody’s inside Egyptian territory produced immediate guess. On the other hand, when the hostilities achievements and applied intense pressure are discontinued, Israel reverts to refraining on Egypt, they were the catalyst for Egypt’s from initiating any moderating policy or from reinforcement of its anti-aircraft capabilities working out any arrangements. This was Israel’s against the Air Force already during the War mode of conduct between 1967 and 1973, in of Attrition itself and provided a significant Lebanon between 1985 and 2000, and today, learning process for the Egyptians, and the between Israel and the Palestinian Authority Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 63
and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This mode of The War of Attrition against Egypt, and those conduct can be deemed the Israeli governments’ against Jordan and Syria that ended at the security concept. end of 1970, provided the Israeli leadership After the three-month ceasefire that began with an opportunity to change its mindset, but in August 1970 and the renewal of the ceasefire it failed to do so, despite the fact that every for another three months, Defense Minister conclusion of a round of warfare justifies and Dayan began to change his mindset. He tried to even dictates a critical examination for the break this cycle,6 but within the government he future, even if and particularly when it might alone was of this opinion, and the IDF opposed appear that the achievements and outcomes this idea vehemently. The outcome was the were favorable. During the early 1950s, a security Yom Kippur War, which resulted in Israel being concept and a concept of force buildup and forced to relinquish its hold on the Suez Canal. deployment were forged that endured until the This is how the correlation between the War of Six Day War. Subsequent to the Six Day War, a Attrition and the Yom Kippur War should be change in reality occurred—the most dramatic understood. An analysis of the Israeli modus change since the War of Independence and the operandi suggests that only a deep and severe establishment of the State of Israel—but no crisis is capable of triggering a change in the significant change was made in the thought Israeli mindset. Since the Sinai Campaign and processes of the political and military leadership. perhaps to this day, the IDF and the Israeli public have a sense of military, political, and national A senior officer who is appointed the Chief of Staff, superiority over the hostile countries in the and a commander of a territorial or functional region. This belief was initially punctured during command, prior to assuming his post, must outline the War of Attribution and was uprooted during for himself the current paradigm in light of the the Yom Kippur War. Nevertheless, this belief mission, in light of the IDF’s structure, and the was retained by the Israeli leadership during deployment approach whereby he is required the period of the First Lebanon War. to think and act, and to examine it using a new paradigm unlike the previous one. Conclusion Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the state and its military have contended with wars One of the most common terms in Israeli at a frequency that could be defined as one long society and in the IDF is the term “lessons.” In the ongoing war. The interesting story is that the end tactical-combat environment, the word signifies of one war shapes the next war, and sometimes the rectification of lapses that were discovered, is the catalyst for the next war. Consequently, or the reinforcement and strengthening of this article examines three consecutive wars: achievements already achieved. In the systemic the Six Day War, the War of Attrition, and the and strategic environment, “lessons” signifies Yom Kippur War. The question what remains a thorough investigation of the war and its relevant to us today from wars waged 52 or outcomes in order to ascertain what must be 46 years ago is perhaps troubling. Every war discarded so that it will not happen again. The and campaign is ostensibly a new story—the thought processes during the War of Attrition, reality is different, the context is different, and upon its end and prior to the Yom Kippur War, the people leading the state and the IDF are remained the same as those that led to the different—and yet it is still possible to identify achievements of the Six Day War. This was a similar phenomena in the Israeli context, and failure in thinking that could have been avoided. these should be scrutinized. During the three said wars, military leaders and commanders who headed the General Staff, 64 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
the territorial commands, and the functional they offer any benefit, but instead, perhaps are commands travelled the entire route from rather quite damaging. The first conception is the War of Independence to the Yom Kippur “deterrence”: from the media and from listening War. They had taken part in the design of the to political leaders and even to senior military security concept, the military force deployment officers, we find that “deterrence” is a mantra: it approach, and the design of the expansionist must be achieved at all cost, because personal policy. It appears that this leadership failed and general security ostensibly depends on to grasp two fundamental principles: the it. The State of Israel and its military indeed importance of constantly striving to prepare deter neighboring countries and neighboring for the next round; and no less important, forces, but up to a certain point, and largely analysis of the implications of the outcomes in the immediate environment. If a military of the previous war and those expected from a operation, from all-out war to local campaigns war in the future, and what changes in mindset and operations, leads to rivals losing territory or and in actions they dictate for the future. A up to the point of jeopardizing their existence senior officer who is appointed the Chief of Staff, or even their standing, then subsequently, the and a commander of a territorial or functional deterrence dissipates. This is a familiar paradox. command, prior to assuming his post, must The injured adversary who has been beaten and outline for himself the current paradigm in light defeated cannot reconcile itself with its situation of the mission, in light of the IDF’s structure, of having been deterred. Therefore, it will seek and the deployment approach whereby he a new and sometimes surprising tactic in order is required to think and act, and to examine to extricate itself from the status of having been it using a new paradigm unlike the previous deterred, even if this will require time, a change one. He must be able to disconnect from the in approach, and enormous effort. After the dominant paradigm and to create something Six Day War, Egypt could not reconcile itself new. This does not purport to assert that a with its loss of the Sinai. The outcome was commander who does so will actually adopt the an overhaul of its policies, its military, and its new paradigm. He might return to a previous approach toward military deployment. In its one or turn to a third alternative, or at least, shift competition against the Israeli government his mindset. But this will be a critical, objective and the IDF, the Egyptian government gained examination that is free of the existing mindset. an upper hand. This is not a rule or universal principle, but The IDF’s aerial bombardments deep inside rather an insight that military and political Egyptian territory, which were designed to deter leaders should consider and implement.7 and had devastating repercussions on Egypt, resulted in Egypt building and operating an anti- aircraft system that three years later, during the The paradox of deterrence persists in our region to Yom Kippur War, destroyed the Israeli Air Force’s this day, in the battles against Hamas in the Gaza superiority. The paradox of deterrence persists Strip and, in a different way, in Lebanon as well, in our region to this day, in the battles against where Hezbollah, which was deterred during the Hamas in the Gaza Strip and, in a different way, Second Lebanon War, later achieved a balanced deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Israel. in Lebanon as well, where Hezbollah, which was deterred during the Second Lebanon War, later achieved a balanced deterrence strategy An investigation of the leaderships’ vis-à-vis Israel. conceptualizations during the said period The question about the relevance of a war 52 finds conceptions that were prevalent then years ago is still troubling. A war of attrition has and also today, when it is very doubtful that persisted for over 14 years between Israel and Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 65
the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Seemingly However, the IDF’s standing in Israeli there is no basis for comparison. It is not the statesmanship and in participating in the design same enemy, not the same territory, not the of the security concept (if one exists) and in same opposing army, and the context is entirely influencing the governments was significantly different. It also appears that it is also not the weakened as a result of the Yom Kippur War, the same Israeli society and leadership as back then. First Lebanon War, and the subsequent 18 years However, there are some ideas and conceptions in Lebanon. On the other hand, the more that that give rise to thought, back then and today at issue are broader governments, composed too. of a coalition of more political parties, the First, the expansionist culture still exists. more contradictory approaches and modus This culture has supporters who are extremely operandi there are. There is no clear political influential in the Israeli political environment. conception, apart from maintaining the status The old term “border” as a region for expansion quo. The governments’ capacity for self-learning was gradually replaced with “Greater Israel.” is practically nonexistent. Consequently, the In terms of security, the West Bank area is a major and minor rounds of violence are not relatively “soft environment” today, but the changing the picture of attrition as a whole. Gaza Strip is not. Between 1967 and 1973, Israeli Third, contrary to the War of Attrition expansionism hit a strong wall in the form of following the Six Day War, and after the War the Egyptian state and nation. Although the of Attrition, the three years until the Yom Kippur Egyptian army did not excel during the Sinai War, in the Gaza Strip and on the Lebanese Campaign, and definitely not during the Six border, a strategy of defensive fighting has been Day War, the Egyptian potential as a whole deemed preferable to an offensive strategy, was very high and was incorrectly evaluated and even as essential. It appears that the IDF by the IDF and by Israeli governments. Viable and the governments have comprehended expansionism can endure in soft regions; that an attack, after which you go home armed i.e., regions that do not belong to a country with a dubious arrangement, is less valuable that has the potential of changing the reality than strategic defensive fighting that prevents forced upon it as a result of the operation of recurring rounds of violence. However, this force. The chances of permanently occupying insight has not gained general acceptance, a region seized during a war will be low if it neither by the governments nor by the public. requires coping with a wall of resistance that Fourth is the physical barrier. In the past, the could potentially exceed Israel’s capability of Suez Canal was considered a physical barrier breaking it down. In the Gaza Strip, the wall that affords a substantive advantage and the is not the armed Hamas organization per defensive fighting was based on it. During the se, but rather two million Palestinians, who Yom Kippur War, it became evident that the will remain there even after the future major barrier did not provide any advantage, due to campaign to purify the Gaza Strip of the armed the lack of adequate Israeli defense. In the Gaza organizations that harass Israel using a strategy Strip, the IDF erected physical barriers: a barrier of wearing Israel down. Israel cannot drive out that prevents infiltration tunnels and a fence two million people; Israel cannot “educate” that prevents terrorists from infiltrating and them to reconcile with Israel, and cannot rule prevents mass border-crossings by Gazans. In over them similar to the practice in the West addition to these, Israel’s excellent technological Bank. capabilities of intercepting missiles and rockets Second, it appears that the General Staff are some of the best and most impressive in today is more responsible and wiser than the world. As an alternative, the Palestinian the General Staff during the War of Attrition. organizations shifted to torching fields and 66 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
communities, and apparently to attack drones relating to security and the military imposes and to additional tactics in the future that the heavy responsibility on the entire government existing barriers cannot block. This translates and on its prime minister. Israel’s governments into a war of attrition that continues indefinitely are not always happy about bearing this with recurring rounds of violence. It could be responsibility. that status quo now means a war of attrition The outcome is that the IDF is the only entity that is a dead end. in Israel that regularly engages in the methodical Other longstanding conceptions formulated development of knowledge about possible wars during the 1950s and 1960s, like “a defensive and violent confrontations. The governments do strategy that is applied offensively,” “shifting not develop relevant knowledge about conflicts the war to enemy territory,” and “security and wars. The customary statement that “the borders” were not reviewed during paradigmatic government decides and the IDF executes” is discussions after the Six Day War, which allegedly correct. In fact, it is absolutely devoid dramatically changed the reality. Moreover, the of content, if the government does not think War of Attrition and its repercussions provided about the knowledge that is used to underpin another opportunity for critical thinking that resolutions, about the IDF’s deep involvement should have shaken up the existing conceptual in the decision making process, or about the system. This did not happen. influence that it has in interpreting abstract Every war that ends, actually or seemingly, decisions regarding operating principles. requires an interpretation of the outcomes and That is why the governments will always be their implications for the future. The War of surprised, not because of any lack of intelligence Attrition was perceived by the IDF as the seventh warning, but rather because the government day of the Six Day War, while Egypt perceived lacks any rational knowledge-based foundation, it as the first day of the next war. which is essential for learning and clarifies and Examination of the six year period during conceptualizes an emerging reality. Under which three wars were waged raises the concern these continuing circumstances, when a crisis that Israel’s governments are not learning. arises, there will always be a gap between the They do not bother to investigate and develop reality as interpreted by the IDF and the way knowledge that emerges in relation to security by which statesmen interpret that reality. A and military issues and then to set policies gap is not a disadvantage per se, and perhaps accordingly.8 Such a statement might appear it is an advantage, because it should prompt odd, because prime ministers and ministers investigation and clarification. The question is: with military backgrounds and experience have On which knowledge is the gap based? served in Israel’s governments, but this does The historical outcome, and the outcome not negate this conclusion. The very existence that is apparently expected in the future, is the of broad coalition governments—composed of acceptance of the opinions and proposals that political parties with diametrically opposed the IDF formulates without any appropriate security and social conceptions—creates political interpretation. For the most part, at a situation whereby the broader and more least until today, the IDF lacks any guiding politically stable a coalition government is, the political thinking, because governments do more it spawns more vehement disagreements. not customarily inform the IDF in a timely The questions of what Israel’s borders should manner and concretely about expected crises. be, the fate of the Palestinians, and of the As a result, Israel’s governments often found Palestinian state are at the heart of a profound themselves engaging in wars and military disagreement that has not yet been resolved. operations, whether preemptive or retaliatory, Knowledge developed in Israel’s governments without having clarified for themselves for what Dov Tamari | The War of Attrition: Three Wars, One Story 67
purpose and toward what end. The situation Kabha, M. (1995). Kharb al-Istinzaf: The War of Attrition as reflected in Egyptian sources. Efal: Galilee Institute, reached the point that, in most of the wars, Yad Tabenkin [in Hebrew]. it was the IDF that defined the immediate Nadal, H. (2015). Special and combined IDF air and naval and long-range objectives and took care of operations between two wars. Ben Shemen: Modan convincing the governments to approve the Publishing and Maarachot Publishing [in Hebrew]. Sadat, A. (1982). On war and peace 1970–1980. Ed. by R. objectives that it defined. Israeli. Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Y.L. Magnes Finally, this article also hopes to inspire Publishing [in Hebrew]. additional research studies. Much has been Tal, I. (1996). National Security: The few against the many. written about Israel’s security concept, and Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing [in Hebrew]. Tamari, D. (2012). The armed nation: The rise and fall of much is worthy of commendation, adding vital Israel’s reserve forces phenomenon. Ben Shemen: knowledge about national security issues. Israel Modan Publishing and Maarachot Publishing [in has not had a security concept since 1967. There Hebrew}. were wars and there were crises that required the use of military force and, for the most part, Notes the governments and the IDF managed to cope. 1 See Operation Baal Zro’a: background and planning directives, February 1980, General Staff, Operations But it is highly doubtful that a security concept PIXABAY Branch, IDF Archives. Operational plan for an IDF exists. Of course, such a statement depends on attack on the western front to occupy critical targets the definition of the term “security concept.” in the Sinai Desert, economic and ground targets, and Therefore, further research is in order. to destroy the Egyptian army. “Basic assumptions about the enemy: the Egyptians breached the peace accords by deploying forces in Sinai beyond the agreed Brig. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Dov Tamari served as numbers. Egypt decided to join a comprehensive commander of the General Staff Reconnaissance Arab attack, before, concurrent with, or gradually on Unit, commander of a standing armored brigade the eastern front ... all fighting on the western front and of an armored division, chief intelligence requires an important achievement to be reached officer, and commander of the Command and Staff during every stage, with the priorities in the following College. He was awarded a Medal of Courage and order: seizure of the sources of oil; occupation of el- Arish; destruction of the Egyptian army; occupation of two Chief of Staff Citations. He was formerly one of a section of the Suez Canal; occupation of the entire the executive directors of the Operational Theory Sinai Peninsula.” Research Institute and the founder of the National 2 Two documents that head of the Intelligence Branch Security and Home Front Defense Program at Beit Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv sent to the Chiefs of Staff cast Berl College, and is the author of And How Will We doubt on the prospects of the warning of a war, the know? Intelligence, Operations, Statesmanship first on October 3, 1968 and the second in 1972. See IDF Archives. Regarding the second document, see (2011) and The Armed Nation (2012). Tal, National security: The few against the many, pp. 206-208. 3 Surprisingly, the Bar-Lev Report refers to the term Sources “war” only once and not in the context of the past or the future. 4 Until the end of 1968, neither the Chief of Staff nor Archives the General Staff realized that Israel was in a war of Israel State Archives attrition in three arenas. The Intelligence Directorate, General Staff Archives / Doctrine and Training Division / despite its achievements during that period, did not History Department evaluate the phenomenon and failed to conceptualize The IDF and Defense Establishment Archives it. 5 On July 29, 1969, Egyptians raided the Mezach armored Books corps stronghold, killed eight soldiers, wounded nine, Adamsky, D. (2006). Operation Caucasus: The Soviet and kidnapped one soldier, who died in captivity. Two involvement and the Israeli surprise in the War of tanks were destroyed. Egyptian marine commandos Attrition. IDF Publishing/Maarachot and the Ministry attacked three times through swimming and diving of Defense Publishing [in Hebrew]. to the Eilat Port from a base that they received from Harkabi, Y. (1992). War and strategy. Tel Aviv: Maarachot the Jordanians at the adjacent Aqaba Port. In both Publishing, Ministry of Defense [in Hebrew]. 68 Strategic Assessment | Volume 23 | No. 1 | January 2020
incursions—in November 1969 and in February 1970— kilometers east of Refidim.” In other words, two thirds the Egyptians succeeded in causing damage to ships. of the Sinai Peninsula. I was present during this lecture. 6 In 1972, after it became clear that the War of Attrition 7 An examination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s would not resume, Minister of Defense Dayan visited writings finds that this appears to be the process that the armored corps command post in the Sinai and he underwent after Nasser’s death. See Sadat, On war lectured to the senior officers there. At that time, there and peace. were already reports that the American government 8 See the report of the Foreign Affairs and Defense was considering an arrangement between Egypt and Committee’s subcommittee on the examination Israel that might obligate Israel to withdraw from the of Israel’s security concept, 1986. The committee Suez Canal by only a few dozen kilometers. When one chairman was MK Dan Meridor. His efforts to hold of the officers asked the Minister up to what distance discussions on the security concept in the government was Israel willing to withdraw, the answer was: “In during the first decade of this century, as a member exchange for an unlimited ceasefire, up to one hundred of the ruling political party, were unsuccessful.