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Iraq in Crisis MAY 2014 Iraq in Crisis ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN AND SAM KHAZAI AND SAM ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW| Washington DC 20036 t. (202) 887-0200 | f. (202) 775-3199 | www.csis.org Iraq in ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706 t. (800) 462-6420 | f. (301) 429-5749 | www.rowman.com Crisis AUTHORS Cover photo: Photo by Kaveh Seyedahmadian. http://www.flickr.com/photos/samanvari/3388535986/. Anthony H. Cordesman ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD ISBN 978-1-4422-2855-9 Sam Khazai Ë|xHSLEOCy228559z v*:+:!:+:! A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy Blank Iraq in Crisis Authors Anthony H. Cordesman Sam Khazai A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy May 2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-4422-2855-9 (pb); 978-1-4422-2856-6 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com Table of Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................ ix Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... x I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................... 3 THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ................................................................................................................................ 3 THE 1991 GULF WAR ................................................................................................................................ 4 THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ .................................................................................................................... 4 THE AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION ......................................................................................................... 7 2007-2011: A SHIFT TO MORE REALISTIC GOALS.................................................................................... 7 THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT (SFA) AND THE US-IRAQ STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) ........................................................................ 8 THE STEADILY MORE DOMINANT IMPACT OF IRAQ’S INTERNAL POLITICAL DIVISIONS ......................... 9 II. VIOLENCE IN IRAQ: THE GROWING RISK OF SERIOUS CIVIL CONFLICT ............................ 11 THE CHALLENGES THAT SHAPE IRAQ’S VIOLENCE ................................................................................ 13 ANALYZING IRAQ’S GROWING LEVELS OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE .......................................................... 19 THE PRESSURES UNDERLING THE STATISTICS ON RISING VIOLENCE .................................................... 19 Divided Sunni Voices ......................................................................................................................... 20 Harith al-Dari and the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) ........................................................ 21 The Role of Jordan ............................................................................................................................. 22 The Mixed Impact of the Syrian Civil War ......................................................................................... 23 The Interaction Between Sectrarian and Ethnic Violence ................................................................. 24 MEASURING CURRENT TRENDS AS “VECTORS,” RATHER THAN ABSOLUTE NUMBERS ........................ 24 The Other Limits to the Data On rising Violence .............................................................................. 25 The Rise in Violence in 2012-2013: How Much is Too Much? .......................................................... 26 STATISTICAL TRENDS VERSUS HUMAN IMPACTS .................................................................................. 28 III. VIOLENCE AND CASUALTY TREND ESTIMATES THROUGH 2012 ........................................ 35 QUANTIFYING THE TRENDS IN IRAQ ....................................................................................................... 35 REGIONAL PATTERNS IN VIOLENCE ....................................................................................................... 43 THE IMPACT OF AL QAEDA AND IRAQ’S MILITIAS ................................................................................. 54 Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State of Iran and Syria (ISIS) .......................................................... 54 Other Violent Movements and Militias .............................................................................................. 55 IV. THE 2013 SURGE IN VIOLENCE AND NASCENT CIVIL WAR .................................................. 57 RISING NUMBERS OF DEAD AND WOUNDED .......................................................................................... 57 UN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DATA ..................................................................................................... 77 REFUGEES: THE OTHER CASUALTIES ..................................................................................................... 79 Broad Estimates of Refugees .............................................................................................................. 80 Rising Trends at the End of 2013/Early 20145 .................................................................................. 80 Guessing at the Full Human Impact................................................................................................... 81 RESPONSIBILITY: STATE ABUSES OF POWER VERSUS THE CONTINUING ROLE OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS .................................................................... 86 V. IRAQ’S CRISIS IN LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS .......................................................................... 88 THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE OR THE VIOLENCE OF POLITICS? ............................................................... 88 THE FIRST ROUND OF IRAQI GOVERNMENTS AND ELECTIONS .............................................................. 92 THE JANUARY 2009 GOVERNORATE ELECTIONS ................................................................................... 92 THE MARCH 2010 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ................................................................................... 93 iv | Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai NON-GOVERNMENT BY PARALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 94 THE ERBIL AGREEMENT (OR LACK THEREOF) ....................................................................................... 94 PRIME MINISTER MALIKI’S STEADILY MORE REPRESSIVE EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE POWER ........... 96 The Mutlaq Case ................................................................................................................................ 97 The Hashimi Case .............................................................................................................................. 99 The Usama Abdu’l Aziz al-Nujayfi Case .......................................................................................... 100 The Rafi al-Issawi Case.................................................................................................................... 101 THE “DEATH” OF THE ERBIL AGREEMENT ........................................................................................... 103 SECT, ETHNICITY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF FEDERALISM................................................................... 104 A CONSTANTLY EVOLVING POLITICAL CRISIS AT THE TOP ................................................................. 106 Shi’ite versus Sunni Divisions in 2012 ............................................................................................
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