A Conversationwith the Exiled West Bank Mayors A Palestinian Point of View The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, established in 1943, is a publicly supported, nonpartisan, research and educational organization. Its purpose is to assist policy makers, scholars, businessmen, the press, and the public by providing objective analysis of national and international issues. Views expressed in the institute's publications are those of the authors and do not neces sarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI.
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Held on May 5, 1981 at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington, D.C. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title:
A Conversation with the exiled West Bank mayors.
(AEI studies ; 350) 1. Jewish-Arab relations-1973- -Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Jordan (Territory under Israeli occupation, 1967- )-Politics and government Addresses, essays, lectures. I. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. II. Series. DS119.7.C657 327.56940174'927 81-19087
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AEI Studies 350
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Printed in the United States of America Introduction
JUDITH KIPPER American Enterprise Institute
In this discussion, Mayor Fahd I 1 A Conversation with the Exiled West Bank Mayors MAYOR MOHAMMED MILHEM: I must be very honest in explaining what goes on in the West Bank and in suggesting ways to resolve the conflict. I do not boast that I am a politician; before 1976, I was a school teacher. My colleague, who is an agricultural engineer and a school teacher, became involved after 1976 in the cause of our people and in the politics of the Middle East. When I came to office, I was visited by many journalists-Is raelis, Americans, Europeans, Arabs-who asked me to suggest a solution to the Palestinian problem. At first I responded that the Jews and the Arabs lived together and went to the same schools during the British mandate, so they ought still to be able to live together in one state. Later, I understood that the Israelis wanted their own flag, they wanted their own state. I felt that it was my duty, in order to serve the people who elected me, to have the flexibility to understand the requirements, needs, and aspirations of everyone-Jews and Arabs alike. By 1978, I responded to the same question that Arabs and Israelis could live in two neighboring states, Israel and a Palestinian state. The journalist questioning me asked if I had given up the idea of a secular state in Palestine. I told him that one state, in which the rights of the Jews and the Arabs could be preserved, was a solution. Maybe in fifty or sixty years, after we have maintained two neigh boring states in peace, one state may propose to the other that we unite into one state. It could be the Israelis who move first, or it could be the Palestinians. That is not, however, a precondition for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I never wanted that precondition. My experience during the last four decades in Palestine has been of the British mandate, and then of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and then of the Israeli occupation. During the British mandate there were revolutions. The Palestinians under the 3 British mandate wanted a national identity, they wanted independ ence. Before World War II, the Arabs wanted independence, a Pal estinian state, and a Palestinian flag. After World War II, the West Bank and the East Bank were united under the rule of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As a school teacher, I could see that the Pal estinians were not satisfied, that they wanted equality, that they wanted a national identity. This led naturally to the development of a nationalist movement and to the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization. As long as the Palestinians are treated as refugees, their nationalist movement reemerges. The world continues to neglect one main ele ment, the desires and aspirations of the Palestinians. The Palestinians will not go away. They are there. The rest of the world tries to bypass the Palestinians, to create options, such as the proposed Jordanian option, which bypasses the Palestinians. This is wrong. There is a Palestinian option-dealing directly with the Palestinians. Mayor Kawasmeh and I attended the last meeting of the Pal estinian National Council (PNC) in Damascus. We did not speak; we listened, we learned, and we saw certain things. Yasser Arafat spoke to 400 or 500 Palestinian delegates. He spoke my thoughts, with no differences. He spoke as if he were an elected official of the occupied territories. He spoke of what the Israelis should get and of what the Palestinians should get. Some people say that the Jordanian option should be a precon dition of negotiations; if we want to talk, we must first talk to King Hussein and to the Jordanians, and then the Palestinians will be satisfiedand their aspirations met. I would say this: talk directly to the Palestinians. First talk to those of us who are elected and to the PLO whichrepresents the Palestinians. Then there can be a Jordanian role at the second stage. There can be no Jordanian role as a pre condition to talking directly to the Palestinians. If we secure the minimum political requirements, then we can choose what our re lations with the Jordanians will be. I can choose no other alternative but to have close relations with Jordan, because my brother, my sister, and my other next of kin live there. Which of the Palestinian leaders can choose to close the bor ders between the East Bank and the West Bank? None can. Anybody who tries to do so will lose support and not be reelected. The relations between Jordanians and Palestinians are already there in the element of human interaction. Let me say a few words about Arab-American relations. The Arabs do not traditionally oppose the Americans. When the Amer ican voluntary agencies came to my town to offer help, I opened my 4 officeto them. They went to our vineyards, they went to our people, they were welcomed by our people. Nobody said they did not want the Americans. There is no tradition in the Arab world of hating Americans. What do the Arabs want from the Americans? We wanted fi nancial aid fromthe Americans. We wanted understanding from the Americans. Who prevented it? The Israeli military authority in the West Bank. They did not want me to take American aid money for my market in Halhoul. I told the general consul in Jerusalem that the American money for the Arabs in the occupied territories should not be channeled through the Israeli military authorities. It is Amer ican money, intended not to destroy Israel but to build peace for Israel and for the Palestinians as well. Now let me say a word about Palestinian-Israeli relations. I used to go everywhere, to Israeli neighborhoods, to Israeli towns, to Israeli institutions. I saw that we should change the history of the area. A holocaust should not be the destiny of either the Palestinians or the Jews. We want to change the destiny that someone thinks is inevi table. We can work together for it. We have been telling the Israelis that they cannot rely on the power of their armies. We can learn from history that recognition and understanding are the bridges to peace, but the power of jets, the power of tanks cannot build bridges to peace and security. When we talk of security, everybody talks of security for Israel and for the Israeli people. No one ever talks of security for the mayor of Hebron or for the mayor of Halhoul or for their children. Let's be evenhanded and tell the Israelis that security should be for everybody. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians need secure borders for their own states. This is an age in which we must abandon thoughts of guns and of aircraft. If a newly born Palestinian state has a chance to emerge in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, we must think about the needs of our towns and villages. They need power, water, schools, hos pitals, roads; they need everything. The first duty of any elected official should be to develop his country, not to develop his arsenal. This is very important in this very small part of the Middle East. We were so successful in talking to Israelis that it was one reason the military governor expelled us: we showed we could maintain bridges with Israelis. One other point regarding our expulsion: Why do we insist that we should go back? Thousands were expelled before us, and we can be well provided for outside. We could live better in Amman, or in Riyadh, or in Kuwait. Why do we insist on going back to Halhoul and to Hebron? Because it is our duty to be with our people there and to push forward for the cause of security and 5 for a just peace for everybody, for the Israelis and for the Palestinians as well. This is why we want to go back. We do not want to go back to a luxurious life. We know what responsibilities await us there, but we want you to support us, to see to it that we go back. We are ready to bear all the duties and the responsibilities for future pros perity, peace, and justice for everybody, including the Israelis. There were Israelis who joined us in our towns and during our curfews. They were with us at the PNC when we talked about Palestinian relations with moderate Israelis. Yasser Arafat spoke about those forces of peace, such as Peace Now, Sheli, and Rakah which are sympathetic to the Palestinian people. We should build bridges with these people and coexist. I hope you will help us, my colleague and myself, return to work for that cause. If we did not want to work for the cause of peace we could choose not to campaign for our return to the occupied territories. The one who chooses to go back to the West Bank has one way to go, which is first to develop the bridges of confidence between moderate Israelis and Palestinians. We hope that with your aid and your understanding, we will be able to do this. Questions and Answers HAROLD SAUNDERS, American Enterprise Institute: You made the case very forcefully for a dialogue directly with the Palestinians by those who want to advance the negotiations toward a Palestinian Israeli settlement. Could you say a few words about how the Pal estinian movement collectively is not prepared to organize itself for such a dialogue? You understand the practical problems involved, namely that the PLO is not acceptable to the Israelis as a negotiating partner. You also are aware that the Israelis have expressed willing ness to negotiate with people in the West Bank and in Gaza, such as the elected officials there, presumably. Could you reflect for a moment on how it might be possible to put together a Palestinian party for a negotiation at some point in the near future? MAYOR MILHEM: The invitation for any Palestinian to take part in any negotiations or in any initiative should be based on certain elements. That will be invitation enough for the Palestinians. For example, I will not go to negotiate unless the PLO authorizes me to go. Second, unless I am officially accepted by the other party, I will not go. I have been stating publicly that if I were the prime minister 6 of Israel, with my forces occupying Arab lands, l would publicly offer to recognize the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and to a Palestinian state side by side with the state of Israel. I would await a similar response vis-a-vis Israel from the representatives of the Palestinians, the PLO. While I was awaiting this response, I would not have to remove my forces. In this case, the ball would be on the other half of the playground, where the Palestinians would have to take the initiative. As a Palestinian, I know that our lead ership would have to respond to this positive gesture. We Palestin ians are thirsty for a settlement, because we want security, because we want a way out of the sufferings that are taking place day and night. The initiative must come from the party (in this case Israel) that has everything in its hands: the occupied territory and the mil itary power. Ms. KIPPER: You said that you would not go to negotiation with the Israelis until your people authorized you to do so. What do you mean by that? MAYOR MILHEM: If I am invited, I will have to consult with the PLO. I will point out that the Palestinians have, at last, the chance to achieve the aspirations of our people. With these consultations we will be able to choose our negotiating team. WALTER BERNS, American Enterprise Institute: Mayor Milhem, that was a very moving statement. Even though the Americans have never been refugees, most of us can understand the difficulties of that situation. On the point of who will negotiate with the Israelis, you said that you have no differences with Yasser Arafat. Did I understand you correctly? MAYOR MILHEM: Yes. MR. BERNS: Is it simply obduracy or mean stubbornness on the part of the Israelis not to trust Yasser Arafat and therefore not to be willing to negotiate with him and with those who agree with him? MAYOR MILHEM: First of all, I want to find out whether the Israelis will negotiate with any Palestinian, whether Yasser Arafat or the mayor of Halhoul. If the concept is there, there is no difficulty about personnel. Some of you may have heard that one of the mayors met with Shimon Peres when he was Israel's minister of defense. Peres asked him why the Palestinians insist on the PLO and Yasser Arafat. 7 The mayor asked him, "Do you want me to be the alternative to Arafat?" Peres said yes. The mayor asked, "What would you give me?" Peres said, "Anything." The mayor asked, "Are you willing to give me a state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?" Peres said, "No, that would be impossible." Now I want to ask a question, What are the Israelis ready to give to the Palestinians? If they are ready to recognize that the Palestinians have the right to self-determination and to a state, then we and our leadership can organize a negotiating team. We Pales tinians operate under a democratic concept. We should leave the Palestinians to choose who willgo when the glimpse of hope appears from the side of the Israelis. No one in Washington or in Israel can tell us who our representatives should be or who our negotiating team will be. MR. BERNS: If you were the prime minister of Israel, would you find some reason not to be eager to negotiate with Yasser Arafat? MAYOR MILHEM: The prime minister may have some reason, but there is no reason why he should have any reservations about talking to other Palestinians. MR. BERNS: But with Yasser Arafat? MAYOR MILHEM: When the prime minister says that he has reser vations about talking to Yasser Arafat, he does not understand what Yasser Arafat represents and who he is. When I attended the PNC meetings for ten long days, I, as a Palestinian, learned more about Arafat than I had known before. He is not the person that the prime minister of Israel imagines he is. It is the duty of the prime minister of Israel, who makes the decisions about the fate of his people, to understand more about his neighbors. It is unforgivable for a prime minister of Israel not to understand what the Palestinians have in mind. This could lead to disaster for both. The Israeli prime minister does not understand how faithful Arafat is to the goals of peace for Israel and for the Palestinians. I know that-I have seen it, I have heard it, I have lived it. MR. BERNS: What you are telling us is that Mr. Arafat does not agree with the PLO covenant with respect to the future of the state of Israel? MAYOR MILHEM: It is not true that the PLO covenant calls for the 8 destruction of Israel or for throwing the Israelis into the sea. That is not there. DALE TAHTINEN, American Enterprise Institute: I would like to ask a question about the upcoming elections in Israel. What is the feeling about the possibility that the Labor party may win the election or at least win sufficiently to rule in a coalition? Is there a strong feeling within the Palestinian movement as to how the election comes out? MAYOR MILHEM: Likud will have to have new attitudes and policies regarding future relations with the Palestinians. I would prefer to see the Labor party come to power and commit itself to seeing that Mayor Kawasmeh and I return to our homes. I do not want to deceive you that their attitudes will change overnight. Labor was in power before 1977 and established the settlements policy and deported our colleagues. There are people in the Labor party who sound more sympathetic to our cause than others in the Labor party. It is not only sympathy that we need, but it could make a good beginning. MILTON VIORST, journalist: I read in the press that Peres and the Labor party have, as part of their commitment during the campaign, agreed to accept the Ya'ariv-Shemtov formula devised in 1974 for dealing with the PLO. It provides that the Israeli government will negotiate with any Palestinian force, implying the PLO, of course, that recognizes Israel's existence and that agrees to forswear any violence against it. It seems to get over the hump of who would recognize whom first, by providing that there would be some sort of simultaneous recognition between the Israelis and the PLO, at least for purposes of negotiation. That, of course, does not solve all the problems between them, but it certainly does solve the problem of who speaks to whom. If the Labor government, provided it is elected, proposes the Ya' ariv-Shemtov formula, would Chairman Ar afat, the PNC, and the PLO generally accept this formula as a means of undertaking negotiations with Israel? MAYOR MILHEM: If the Ya' ariv-Shemtov formula were adopted by a newly elected Israeli cabinet, it would be an invitation to the Pal estinians. It would open the door toward peace in the Middle East. The Palestinians, seeing that this new policy is a firm policy for a new Labor party cabinet, would recognize a new set of possibilities. The Palestinians would have the right answer at the right time for it. It would not be ignored, because we are watching for any positive initiatives on the Israeli side. We will never miss a chance to bring 9 the sufferings of our people to an end. We support the Ya'ariv Shemtov formula, and we hope that these people will be in power in the near future and that this idea will be adopted. HERBERT KELMAN, Harvard University: Isam Sartawi wrote an analy sis of the Labor party platform in which he described it as very negative and actually genocidal. Do you take a different view? MAYOR MILHEM: Sartawi was writing his report after the Socialist International summit was held in Europe. Sartawi was disappointed with the attitude of the representatives of the Labor party at this meeting. Personally, I hope that their disappointing statements were campaign tactics. MR. KELMAN: At the end of your remarks, you said something about building bridges between those Palestinians inside the occupied ter ritories and those outside. Were you referring to those inside the West Bank and so on versus those outside? MAYOR MILHEM: First we have to build bridges between the Pales tinians inside the occupied territories and the Israelis. Then the Pal estinians inside the occupied territories will be the bridge between the Palestinians outside and the Israelis. MR. KELMAN: That is what I wanted to ask about. Are there strong differences at the moment? As you found at the PNC, are there strong differences between the Palestinian Diaspora and the Pales tinians on the West Bank and Gaza? MAYOR MILHEM: They are getting closer. In Diaspora, people do not understand the Israeli mentality in the same way as those who are living in the occupied territories. We have to deal with the Israelis day and night, and we come to understand what is the best way to tackle the problem of relations between the Arabs and the Israelis. We have succeeded in the last decade in reflecting this experience to Palestinians outside. This understanding was reflected in the de bates at the PNC meetings. Our chairman's attitude did not come from a vacuum. It came from people like us, who have been very honest in giving Arafat an idea of who the Israelis are and how the aspirations of our people can be achieved. JOHN WALLACH, Hearst newspapers: Is an explicit Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state a precondition for any formal negotiations be- 10 tween Palestinians and Israelis? Must the Israeli government commit itself in some way to the ultimate outcome of a negotiation? In other words, must Israel commit itself to the creation of an independent Palestinian state before the Palestinians will begin negotiations? MAYOR MILHEM: As I said before, if the prime minister of Israel is ready to recognize the rights of the Palestinians to a state, then this will be invitation enough for the beginning of the dialogue and the negotiations. I do not like to view it as a precondition. If we want preconditions, everyone will establish preconditions, and we will end up with nothing. If they are ready to recognize our aspirations for a state without defining all the aspects of this recognition, then that is invitation enough and a good beginning. I do hate to use the word precondition. There should be no preconditions if we genuinely aspire to peace. JOSEPH MONTVILLE, State Department: Could you describe the at mosphere at the PNC after Yasser Arafat described those elements in the Israeli political spectrum with whom the PLO should make contact? What was the reaction of the so-called rejectionists in the PLO, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Saiqa? As a corollary to that, how does Syria respond to these sen timents? What would be Syria's role if a dialogue started to evolve between the Israeli center and Arafat and al-Fatah? MAYOR MILHEM: There would be two reactions: the way the rejec tionists among the Palestinians would react and the way the Syrians, the Libyans, or others would react. When Yasser Arafat talked about the forces of peace in Israel, not a single voice of rejection was raised. Arafat is invaluable; he has all the courage in the world. He has all the explicitness, he is very clear to his people, he is very brave, and he is the man on whom we should place great hopes. Not a single voice was raised, but if somebody other than Arafat had said it, it would have been different. He knows when to take the right deci sion, and he has all the courage to do it. Arafat is the leader of the Palestinians, and he has their support. As long as Arafat is there, then there is a way to peace for everybody. If we make a failure of Arafat, the outcome will not be good for anybody. PHILIP GEYELIN, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University: This discussion has gone on for some time, and nobody has mentioned Camp David. Was that an oversight? Do you see any prospect of that process being revived after the Israeli elec- 11 tions or any profit in doing so? How do you feel also about the so called European initiative? MAYOR MILHEM: We would not be against Camp David if it brought peace and justice to our people. Through the so-called autonomy negotiations between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, nothing was achieved for the Palestinians. If the autonomy negoti ations could very explicitly show that the accords mean a transitional period after which the minimum aspirations of the Palestinians on identity and statehood are met, there would be a response from our side. The Camp David accord meant a great deal for Egypt. We are not against withdrawal from Sinai, but we also want withdrawal from the West Bank and from the Gaza Strip. This is not clear in the Camp David accords. The European initiative is a result of Camp David's not having met the aspirations of the Palestinians or having brought peace to the Middle East. If this initiative gives us our minimum requirements, the Arabs, Arafat, the Palestinians would not oppose it. As I wrote in the Christian Science Monitor, I am very hungry for food; give me some food on my plate and I am ready to eat it. There should be something. I want to see something, but to me Camp David does not mean much, does not mean anything. It does not offer anything except the autonomy that resulted in the continuous expansion of the Israeli settlements. It left us no authority over our land and water. How could anyone expect any Palestinian in the occupied territories to accept it? If the Europeans, who have so far failed actually to formulate an initiative, can bring about an initiative and offer it, why should the Palestinians be against it? What is required from the Europeans is actually to give an initiative, to give something. The prime ministers of Luxembourg and of Holland vis ited the area, fact finding. We do not need fact-finding missions. The facts are known. We need political initiatives. If there were such an initiative, we would accept it. CORNELIUSSOMMER, Embassy of West Germany: West German Chan cellor Helmut Schmidt made some statements on German television with regard to Palestinian self-determination, which were not re ceived too well in Israel. He said a country like Germany, which is actually fighting or workingfor self-determination of its own people, cannot forget about the fight of the Palestinians for their own self determination. He said that if we in the West do not learn to dif ferentiate between the various factions within the PLO, considering the PLO nothing but an umbrella organization for various terrorist 12 organizations, we will drive the PLO further into the arms of Mos cow. Is that statement true with regard to the internal structure of the PLO? Chancellor Schmidt seemed to depict the PLO in such a way as to make it easier for Westerners to accept the PLO. We all have conceptions of terrorism and other things that are connected with the PLO. He was trying to explain that this is only one aspect of the PLO. On the other hand, such a view of the PLO makes it difficult to conceive a negotiating process with an organization that may not speak with one voice. Perhaps Arafat, whom you depicted as being fully in control now, may be subjected to internal forces that make it difficult for him to negotiate on behalf of all Palestinians. Will you comment on this? MAYOR MILHEM: I saw Begin's condemnation of Schmidt's statement in the New York Times. It is not only that Begin does not want to recognize the rights of the Palestinians; he does not want even the Germans to recognize the rights of the Palestinians. This may bring my optimism about the future to an end. It reduces the opportunities, but it justifies my optimism about the Labor party. Peres would not have commented on Schmidt' �statement in the way that Begin com ments. With regard to terrorism, the PLO, and the Soviet Union, people here think that if the West continues to turn its back to the Arabs, the Arabs will be pushed toward the Soviet Union; they will be communist. It may be true to a certain extent, but there is one thing we must remember: Arab tradition and Arab philosophy will not accept communism. We cannot say that Arafat will be a communist one day, or that the PLO will be communist. On the other hand, we cannot say that communism will never gain a foothold in the Arab world, and among the Palestinians in particular. The com munists gain influence where people are frustrated in gaining their rights. I know we have the image here of being terrorists. We have to be able to go to people and tell them what terrorism means, con trasting that to what the Palestinians are doing now. It could be that certain acts of the Palestinians were cruel. When we speak of ter rorism or of murder, we speak of it in the context that such things exist in every nation, but at the rate of maybe one-half of one percent within the community. I am against acts of terrorism, but the way to prevent them is to resolve the problem from the roots and to work for a settlement that gives the Palestinians their political rights. It is very cruel to throw a bomb and kill an Israeli child or an Israeli woman. It is equally cruel to throw another bomb and kill a Pales- 13 tinian child, or a schoolboy in South Lebanon, or in the West Bank, or in Hebron, or anywhere. It is terrorism whenever one thinks of it as killing people, innocent people. The Palestinians and any people under occupation do it because the world has been deaf to their demands. The Israeli government does not want to talk to the Pal estinians, and Begin does not want the chancellor of Germany to speak about the rights of the Palestinians. This means that the Pal estinians will have to use all means, some that they hate. I hate to see violence come about. I like to speak and speak and speak to the Israelis, so that instead of launching arms and bombs, we can appeal to the minds and to the hearts. Do not imagine that the Palestinians in Lebanon who are killed and wounded day and night like this to continue. They do not like it. Who likes to see his sons killed? We need to do a better job in explaining our cause. JOHN COOLEY, Carnegie Endowment: Do you believe that there are trends in the Arab world itself or within the Palestinian movement that could threaten Arafat's moderate position, his position of want ing to negotiate? I believe the Habash group of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was readmitted to the executive com mittee at the PNC meeting you attended. Are there longer-term influences, possibly coming from events in the Arab world, over which the Palestinians have little or no control? I refer to the Iranian Iraqi war, the policies of Saddam Hussein, the policies of Colonel Qaddafi, each of which could upset the moderate leadership in the PLO and put in radicals who are opposed to negotiating or opposed to dealing with the peace factors in Israel. MAYOR MILHEM: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine could have had membership in the executive committee of the PLO for the last seven or eight years. This time the group decided to take it. It is not a new move, or an indication that Arafat is losing the reins, or that things are-going against Arafat. He is well accepted, he is very influential,and he is very courageous. If the prime minister of Israel continues his policies and the United States continues to ignore the PLO, then Arafat's position may get weaker. That is why we should try to strengthen Arafat's position. His position is strong because he is faithful to his people. He is faithful when he talks of peace and he is faithful to a great majority of the Palestinians inside the occupied territories and outside the occupied territories. He still holds the reins, and he still has the support of the majority of the Palestinians. Criticism of Arafat is very natural among a democratic 14 people. I have more admiration for Arafat since the PNC meeting, more than ever before. CHARLES HYMAN, American Enterprise Institute: I would like to ask about the issues on the negotiating table between the Palestinians and the Israelis. You talked about self-determination and about a Palestinian state. Recognizing the concern of the Israelis about such a state, can you conceive of a step-by-step growth of sovereignty in such a state? Could you imagine a state that would be demilitarized and in which the Israelis would continue to maintain some kind of presence to make sure that there was no threat to their own sov ereignty over a period of time? MAYOR Mn.HEM: If negotiations come about, we will not achieve peace overnight. The process has to be gradual, and there should be a transition period, enough of a transition period to build trust among the Israelis and the Palestinians alike. I never thought of a one-jump solution. During this process, the Israelis probably cannot withdraw overnight. Their representatives could be there for a certain period of time, but the Israeli military presence would have to come to an end quickly. If this cannot be clarified,it complicates the process of building trust. We do not want a Palestinian state whose funds will go to building air bases, to buying tanks, and to building ar senals. Our country is in need of building and of developing. We need an economy and institutions to serve our people before any thing else. At the same time, we need to put the minds of the Israelis at rest that the newly born Palestinian state will never be a threat. Once we build our country, why should the Israelis be afraid of us? That is what I have been preaching and what all my colleagues have been preaching as well. It does not happen in one jump. It has to be in phases, until everyone's mind is put at rest that it means peace and nothing but peace. 15 SELECTED AEI PUBLICATIONS AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review (six issues $12; single copy, $2.50) Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future, Daniel J. Elazar, ed. (222 pp., paper $7.25, cloth $10.25) United States Relations with Mexico: Context and Content, Richard D. Erb and Stanley R. Ross, eds. (291 pp. $7.25) A Conversation with Ambassador Tahseen Basheer: Reflections on the Mid dle East Process (24 pp., $2.25) A Conversation with Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts: The Dilemma in the Per sian Gulf(19 pp., $2.25) A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza, Emili! A. Nakhleh, ed. (127 pp., $5.25) What Should Be the Role of Ethnic Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy? John Charles Daly, mod. (28 pp., $3.75) U.S. Policies toward Mexico: Perceptions and Perspectives, Richard 0. Erb and Stanley R. Ross, eds. 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Your contribution, which in most cases is partly tax deductible, will help ensure that decision makers have the benefit of scholarly research on the prac tical options to be considered before programs are formulated. The issues studied by AEI include: • Defense Policy • Health Policy • Economic Policy • Legal Policy • Energy Policy • Political and Social Processes • Foreign Policy • Social Security and Retirement Policy • Government Regulation •Tax Policy For more information, write to: AMERICANENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 A Conversation with the Exiled West Bank Mayors A Palestinian Point of View Mayor Mohammed Milhem discusses the West Bank Pal estinian view of Americans and Israelis and suggests some conditions for getting the peace process under way. He considers the role in the peace process of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its leader, Yasser Arafat, whether Israel should negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Orga nization, and who should be the negotiators in the peace process. Mohammed Milhem, mayor of the West Bank town of Halhoul, and Fahd Kawasmeh, mayor of Hebron, were expelled from their homes in 1980 by the Israeli military governor of the West Bank. They are now living in Amman, Jordan, where they work for their return to the West Bank and to their families. ISBN 0--8447-3480-2 � American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research � 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036