The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973 Clarence E. Olschner, 111, MAJ, WAF U.S. Army Command and General STaff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 Final report 9 June 1978 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Couunand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 MASTER OF MILITAQY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of candidate a Title of thesis The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973 , Research Advisor , Member, Graduate Faculty Member, Consulting Faculty 1978 by , Dir1 ctor, Master of Military Art and Science. Thc opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoinq statement.) ii ABSTRACT THE AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1967-1973 by Major Clarence E. Olschner, 111, WAF', 103 pages This paper is an historical study of the strategy, tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, Egypt, and Syria in the battle for air superiority from 1967 through 1973. The study is developed chronologically beginning with the 1967 War, through the War of Attrition, and ending with the cease-fire in the 1973 War. It has been compiled from an extensive re- view of unclassified, primarily secondary, unofficial sources. The paper concludes that, in a mid-intensity war with modern air forces and air defense forces: 1. The achievement of strategic, tactical, and/or technological surprise can significantly influence the battle for air superiority. 2, Missiles have demonstrated the capability to significantly influence the air superiority battle in surface- to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground operations. 3. Air superiority can be achieved over the modern battlefield only by defeating both surface-to-air and air- to-air capabilities of the enemy. 4, The achievement of air superiority over the battle area requires the combined efforts of air and land forces of which long range artillery may be the most effective weapon for the suppression of surface-based air defenses. iii ASKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to say thank you to those who gave generously of their time and talent to make this thesis possible. Dr. Kenneth Werrell provided excellent guidance and assistance throughout the year. COL ToN. Dupuy (USA, Ret.) kindly answered numerous questions and made available several unpublished resources. LTC Roger K. Taylor (USAF) offered insight on the employment of airpower which was most helpful. Mrs. Marilyn Slack has provided expert typing assistance. Finally, I thank my loving wife, Donna, without whose prayers and support this paper could not have been writ ten. iv TAEILE OF CONTENTS Page APPROVALPAGE. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ii ABSTRACT . iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . iv LIST OF TABLES . viii INTRODUCTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ix I. THE1967WAR . 1 THE ISflA?3LI WAR PLAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 SURPRISE ACHIEVED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 THE IAF ATTACK ON EGYPT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 THE IAF' VERSUS JORDA.. AVD SYRIA . 10 TOTAL LOSSES ON 5 JUNE 1967 . 11 AIR ACTIVITY ON 6 JUNE 1967 . 11 TOTAL LOSSES, 5-6 JUNE 1967 . 12 AIR ACTIVITY 7-10 JUNE 1967 . 12 OBSERVATIONS ON THE 1967 WAR . 14 E.NDN0TES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 II. BETWEEN TWO WARS . 19 THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR OF ATTRITION . 20 AIR POWm IN THE WAR OF ATTRITION . 21 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SAM UMBRELLA 0 0 0 24 IsRmLr VIEW OF THE UMBRELLA . 25 DEVELOPMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE FORCE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V Page PREPARATION OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE .... 31 REBUILDING THE smrm AIR FORCE ....... 33 SUMMARY OF THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 0 0 0 0 0 33 ENDNOTES .................. 36 111. THE 1973 BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY ...... 39 THE ISRAELI CONCEPT ............. 40 THE ISRAELI DECISION TO NOT PRE-EMPT .... 41 THE ARAB STRATEGY ............. 43 THE COORDINATED ATTACK ........... 45 OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. 6 OCTOBER 1973 ... 46 TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE 0 0 0 a a a 0 0 48 IAF TACTICS AND LOSSES. 6 OCTOBER 1973 0. 49 MOUNT HERMON.. ANOTHER SURPRISE ....... 50 GOLAN SUMMARY. 6 OCTOBER 1973 ........ 50 OVER THE SINAI. 6 OCTOBER 1973 ....... 50 SUMMARY OF THE AIR BATTLE. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . 54 rm PRIORITIES ON 7 OCTOBER 1973 ...... 54 COUNTERAIR STRIKES .AGAINST AIRFIELDS BEGINNING 7 OCTOBER ........... 56 IAF ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAN BRIDGES ....... 58 IAF DIRECTLY CONFRONTED SAMS. BEGINNING 8OCTOBER ................. 59 WEAPONS AND TACTICS USED AGAINST SAM SITES . 59 COUNTERMEASURES .AGAINST SAMS ........ 62 STRATEGIC BOMBING IN SYRIA BEGINNING 9 OCTOBER 2973 .............. 63 THE EGYPTIAN OFFENSIVE. 14 OCTOBER ..... 63 Vi Page COUNTERING EGYPT'S SAM UMBRELLA, 16-24 OCTOBER 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 E.AF RESPONSE TO THE ISFIAELI CROSSING . 65 SUMMARY OF' THE 1973 AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE . 66 ENDNOTES0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72 IV. OBSERVATIONS .AND CONCLUSIONS . 79 SURPRISE. 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 79 CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 MISSILES. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81 SURFACE-BASED AIR DEFENSES 0 0 0 0 81 CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 COMBINED ARMS FOR AIR SUPERIORITY . 83 CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83 BIBLIOGRlLDXY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 vii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1 . Air Order of Battle. 5 June 1967 0 . 0 3 2. IAF Losses Against Egypt on 5 June 1967 ... 9 3 . Aircraft Lost 5-6 June 1967 ......... 12 40 Air Order of Battle. 6 October 1973 ..... 34 5 . 1973 Aircraft Losses by Type ......... 68 60 1973 Aircraft Losses by Cause ........ 68 7. 1973 Aircraft Losses by Time Period ..... 69 80 1973 Combat Sorties and Loss Rates ...... 69 1973 IAF Air-to-Air Kills by Weapon ..... 69 viii INTRODUCTION Air superiority in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is of particular interest to the military tactician today because this battle for the air was intensely fought with some of the most modern weapons and tactics in the world. The intensity, complexity and duration of this battle contrasted sharply with the relatively simple and quick manner in which the Israeli Air Force (IAF) gained air superiority in the 1967 War. To understand the conduct of the 1973 War it is essential to examine the development of the air battle in the 1967 War and the War of Attrition. This paper is an historical study of the strategy, tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, Egypt, and Syria in the battle for air superiority from 1967 through 1973. The study is developed chronologically beginning with the 1967 War, through the War of Attrition, and ending with the cease-fire in the 1973 War. It is appropriate here to say a few words about data. This study has been prepared from unclassified, primarily unofficial, secondary sources. Because of the limited information available on Syrian participation in the war, greater emphasis has been given to examining the battle on tho Egyptian front. ix The study of an air superiority battle revolves around the destruction of aircraft and how they were destroyed. While different sources seldom agree on the air order of httttlc at thc start of a war, t.here is greater difficulty in (3etcrmining how many aircraft were lost during a war and, further, how they were lost. Few, if any, participants in a war can afford to accurately reveal their own losses, but each side makes claims about the opponent's losses. Some claims are conservative, some are optimistic, and some are exaggerated for reasons which are easy to understand. Since the Arab-Israeli dispute is far from settled, it is not surprising that none of the participants has opened its records for examination. A number of books and articles have been written by Israeli and, more recently, by Egyptian political and military leaders. These provide good information on the course of the war, but they generally omit details on their own losses. Most of the data on Israeli losses must come from the many military analysts who have contacted unofficial sources in Israel. Unfortunately, very few western writers have had access to unofficial sources in the Arab countries, and their reports usually cover Israeli rather than Arab losses. This author has attempted to select the data on Israeli losses which is most consistent with the course of the war; the data on Arab losses, as explained, has been limited primarily to that reported by Israel. X With the passage of time and hopefully the resolution of this conflict, one can hope that all participants will reveal more of the information which will enable a true picture of the war to emerge.