Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

The New “Lions of Syria” WP Salafist and Jihadist Groups Dominate Insurgency

Guido Steinberg S

Almost three years into the Syrian uprising, Islamist groups of various colour have established themselves as the dominant force among the rebels. The jihadists of the Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria represent two especially powerful groupings. Their growing strength has led international donors to reduce their sup- port, and has sown violent conflict among the rebel groups. This has strengthened the position of President Assad, who has been arguing ever since 2011 that his adversaries are terrorists. Today there are indeed Islamist terrorists on the ground, enormously complicating the West’s search for a Syria strategy. Neither the continuation of the Assad regime nor a take-over by the insurgents would be in the German interest. As long as this dilemma continues, Germany should concentrate on humanitarian aid and counter-terrorism, and to that end improve cooperation with Turkey.

Late 2013 and early 2014 saw heavy fight- marked the provisional high point of ing in Syria pitting the Islamic State of Iraq the rise of Islamist and jihadist groups, and Syria (ISIS) against the Nusra Front and a process which had been observed since an alliance of Islamists calling itself the 2012. Islamic Front. This drew the West’s atten- tion to the Islamist and jihadist forces that have come to dominate an uprising that First Protests (February to mid-2011) began as a peaceful and unideological pro- The first significant protests in Syria test movement against the Assad regime. occurred in March 2011, initially in rural areas and small towns in the country’s largely Sunni-populated regions in the Four Phases of Insurgency north and east. Although the demonstra- The strengthening of ISIS is the most im- tions were peaceful, the regime cracked portant characteristic of the latest phase of down brutally. Army deserters and armed the Syrian uprising, which began in April civilians responded by attempting to pro- 2013 with the proclamation of the Islamic tect demonstrations, firing at advancing State of Iraq and Syria by the leader of security forces to delay or stop them. al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This

Dr. Guido Steinberg is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 19 April 2014

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From Protest Movement to Insurgency The Insurgent Groups (mid- to late 2011) The local insurgent organisations have By the end of 2011 the protests had devel- established themselves as the central oped into an armed insurgency, whose opposition actors and are impervious to protagonists were organised in local groups any political control. The exile opposition without central control. The rebellion organised in the Syrian National Coalition spread to the cities of Hama and Homs in has little influence on the situation in the the centre of the country, and by late 2011 country. Homs had become its first major strong- The biggest current problem for the hold. insurgents is their lack of central coordina- tion. Their movement is a conglomerate of at least several dozen groups of different Nascent Civil War and the Rise of the sizes and strengths, entering into changing Islamists (early 2012 to spring 2013) alliances and subject to frequent splits. Yet By early 2012 the uprising had reached despite sometimes considerable ideological large parts of the country and was turn- and strategic differences, for a long time ing into civil war. The rebels now took to the rebels succeeded in pursuing their com- the offensive from their rural strongholds, mon goal – toppling the Assad regime – attempting to cut the regime’s lines of com- without major confrontations. munication in the east, north and centre Most estimates put the total number and capture its military bases there. By sum- of insurgents at 80,000 to 100,000; at the mer 2012 they were also attacking Aleppo, beginning of 2014 this included at least where the outcome was a stalemate with 8,000 foreigners, most of them Arabs (other regime forces continuing to hold parts of estimates claim up to 17,000). The rebel the city and its airport. movement comprises three currents: The situation at the end of 2012 was the Free Syrian Army, the Islamists and mixed. The regime had recaptured large Salafists, and the jihadists. parts of Homs and stopped the rebel ad- vance in Aleppo. But the insurgents were now on the offensive in Damascus too, and Free Syrian Army it was becoming increasingly apparent that The Free Syrian Army (FSA) emerged in Islamist groups were growing in strength. July 2011 as an umbrella organisation for the resistance groups that were forming in most parts of the country that summer. Regime Recovery and Rebel Infighting Most of its fighters are army deserters or (April 2013 to spring 2014) civilians with experience of military ser- In the latest phase the regime has been vice. The FSA has no strong ideological able to further consolidate its position profile, even if its leaders are secularist through territorial gains in the centre of officers, and its affiliated groups belong the country. In August the first larger-scale to a broad spectrum that until 2012 also use of chemical weapons by the regime included many more moderate Islamists. represented a major escalation. An autono- The FSA initially set up its headquarters mous force of jihadists calling itself the in Turkey, attracting criticism for staying Islamic State of Iraq and Syria quickly grew far from the fighting until it moved into to become a major challenge to all other Syria in September 2012. At the same time, rebel organisations, leading to clashes many groups hoped to receive access to between insurgent groups. In November international support channelled via the a number of groups joined to form the FSA. When, despite numerous announce- Islamic Front, which has since launched ments, little in the way of foreign aid massive operations against ISIS. arrived, many groups turned away in dis-

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appointment to seek funding opportunities The Islamic Front is supported primarily elsewhere. by the Arab Gulf states. Ahrar al-Sham Nonetheless, with probably tens of thou- receives aid from Qatar and Turkey, while sands of fighters still affiliated to the FSA it Jaish al-Islam is a Saudi protégé. is too soon to proclaim its demise. Its last bastion is in the south of the country, from where there have been repeated reports Jihadists of forthcoming offensives since the end of What distinguishes the jihadists from all 2013. the other rebel organisations is their con- viction that the war in Syria is merely part of a larger struggle that will not end with Islamists and Salafists the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The importance From the outset many of the fighters were of the fighting in Syria to al-Qaeda is dem- Islamists and Salafists. Some groups ini- onstrated by a widely viewed video message tially joined the FSA, but left again in 2012/ from its new leader Aiman al-Zawahiri, 2013. Others always rejected any collabora- published in February 2012 under the title tion with defecting officers on the basis of “Go Forward O Lions of Syria” (Ila l-amam ideological differences. ya usud al-Sham). The reference to the After the FSA set up its Supreme Military jihadist lions is a play on words, for the Council in December 2012, the Islamists name of the dictator of Damascus, Assad, and Salafists quickly responded by pro- means “lion”. claiming the Syrian Islamic Front (al-Jabha Absolutely in line with their mother al-Islamiya al-Suriya), whose founding mem- organisation, the Nusra Front and ISIS hope bers included not only the Salafists of Ahrar to expand the armed struggle to the neigh- al-Sham (The Free Men of the Levant), but bouring states and above all to attack Israel. also Suqur al-Sham (Falcons of the Levant), As both share the ideology of al-Qaeda, it which had been part of the FSA until 2012. must also to be feared that they intend to This move was the first clear sign of sharp- carry the armed struggle beyond the Middle ening rivalries among the Syrian insurgents. East to the Western world. They also dis- In November 2013 a new Islamic Front tinguish themselves from the Islamists and in Syria (al-Jabha al-Islamiya fi Suriya) was Salafists by their routine use of suicide founded by Islamists and Salafists like bombers. Ahrar al-Sham, Suqur al-Sham and Liwa The jihadists have probably ceased to al-Tawhid (Battalion of Monotheism), as receive state support. Until 2013 Turkey well as Zahran Allush’s Jaish al-Islam (Army and Qatar appear to have been supplying of Islam) founded two months earlier in the Nusra Front with money and arms. September. It is estimated that the new Even if this is no longer the case, the Nusra Islamic Front commands 40,000 to 60,000 Front continues to profit from the tolera- fighters. tion of its fighters on Turkish soil and all The groups that make up the Islamic the jihadists exploit the extensive freedom Front all share military objectives largely of movement they enjoy in Turkey. restricted to Syria itself. Their most im- Donations from private supporters in portant stated goal is to topple the Assad the Gulf region reach Syria largely via regime and establish an Islamic state, the Kuwait and represent an important source details of whose political system have yet of jihadist funding. They also finance them- to be outlined. Groups orientated on the selves through taxes and levies raised in the Muslim Brotherhood are still present, but areas they control. The number of jihadists have lost influence since 2012. Instead today is probably between 10,000 and Salafists like Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish 30,000. al-Islam now dominate.

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Al-Qaeda versus al-Qaeda Syrians, and Lebanese to al-Qaeda – nation- Syria is the only country where there have alities from which until 2004 it won few ever been two al-Qaeda “affiliates” oper- recruits because they felt it was not fight- ating in competition. This situation stems ing for their interests, especially the from a conflict between the al-Qaeda leader- struggle against Israel. There was in fact ship in Pakistan and the regional organi- much truth in that complaint, in the sense sation in Iraq which has been festering that al-Qaeda was fighting first and fore- since 2004. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is not, as often most to drive the Americans out of the asserted, a “branch” of al-Qaeda, but an Middle East and then to topple the regimes independent organisation that competes in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Accordingly, with al-Qaeda’s central leadership for con- until 2004 al-Qaeda was frequently seen trol of the jihadist movement. as an Egyptian and Gulf Arab organisation, Al-Qaeda in Iraq has existed since 2004, which it indeed was in terms of its person- when the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab nel structure: it consisted largely of Saudis, al-Zarqawi (killed 2006) swore allegiance Yemenis, Kuwaitis and Egyptians. to Bin Laden and renamed his Iraq-based The Jordanian Zarqawi in contrast organisation al-Tauhid wa-l-Jihad into aimed to follow victory in Iraq by carrying al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (al-Qaida fi Bilad the struggle to Syria, Jordan and Lebanon al-Nahrain). Since 2010 the group, now and then “liberate Jerusalem”. To the al- operating as the Islamic State of Iraq Qaeda leadership, the new recruitment (al-Daula al-Islamiya fi l-Iraq), has been pool appeared attractive compensation for led by the Iraqi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. its lack of control over Zarqawi’s activities, Despite their al-Qaeda connections, so they allowed him to carry on. Zarqawi and his successor never submitted After lying dormant for years, the con- to the authority of al-Qaeda’s central flict between Zawahiri (believed to be in leadership. By renaming his group in 2004, Pakistan) and the new leader of al-Qaeda Zarqawi hoped to gain recruits and dona- in Iraq, Baghdadi, exploded in 2013 over tions from the Gulf region. But he pursued the question of the correct strategy for his own strategy in Iraq, based on maximis- Syria. The Nusra Front stood for Zawahiri’s ing casualties in headline-grabbing bomb- approach of avoiding excessive violence, ings designed to provoke the Shiites to winning over the population and cooper- retaliate against the Sunnis and instigate a ating closely with other insurgents. ISIS sectarian civil war in which, he calculated, under Baghdadi remained true to his un- his group would assume sole leadership compromising stance already known from of the Sunni population. Al-Qaeda’s central Iraq, and pursued a strategy of massive leadership repeatedly called on its com- violence, terrorising the population and mander in Iraq to abandon that plan to fighting against any group that refused avoid making enemies of the Shiites, and to submit to his command. criticised his group’s excessive brutality. But neither Zarqawi nor his successors were to be persuaded. The Nusra Front Zarqawi’s strength was what led the The Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Qaeda leadership to continue tolerating al-Sham) is one of the strongest insurgent his organisation within its network. The groups in Syria, and until April 2013 was activities of al-Qaeda in Iraq gave the world by far the most important jihadist organi- the impression that it was dealing with a sation. While its main areas of operations global network capable of bringing the lay in the north (Aleppo and Idlib), along American superpower to the brink of defeat the Euphrates Valley (Raqqa) and in the in Iraq. Also, as well as Iraqis, Zarqawi also east (Deir ez-Zor), it was also (and remains) tied in particular Jordanians, Palestinians, present in Damascus and in the south of

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the country. In March 2013, jointly with transit of jihadists into Iraq, until 2007 Ahrar al-Sham, it succeeded in capturing they themselves sent many Syrians to fight the major city of Raqqa on the middle against the Americans there. In at least one Euphrates. case there is also evidence to suggest that The involvement of jihadists in the Syrian the Syrian security services conducted a uprising first became apparent around the spectacular bombing, for which they sub- end of 2011, with the first major suicide sequently blamed the jihadists. None- car bombings in Damascus and Aleppo. The theless, the Nusra Front was responsible group must have still been very small at for the huge majority of major attacks that point, but it grew steadily until spring between 2011 and 2014. 2014 and could number between 5,000 and As well as toppling the regime and estab- 15,000 fighters today. Its attacks quickly lishing an Islamic state, the Nusra Front’s earned it a name that attracted volunteers objectives include “liberating” neighbour- from Syria and abroad, and it also profited ing countries, although this transnational from its reputation as one of the few armed aspect has to date played only a minor role groups to protect the population effectively in its propaganda. To achieve its goals the against Assad’s government forces. The Nusra Front seeks close cooperation with weaker the FSA became, the more recruits other insurgent groups. It concentrates the Nusra Front gained. on attacking Syrian government security The leader of the Nusra Front, Abu forces and military facilities and tries to Muhammad al-Jaulani, is a Syrian who avoid civilian victims, in order to retain fought with al-Qaeda in Iraq and received popular support, as well as organising permission in 2011 to take some of his fol- supplies for the towns and quarters it con- lowers to Syria to establish a jihadist organi- trols and where possible providing munici- sation there. When Jaulani arrived in Syria pal services. In this way the Nusra Front in August 2011 he profited from the well- shows that it has learned from the experi- developed infrastructure that al-Qaeda in ence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which quickly lost Iraq already possessed there. During the its support among the Iraqi Sunnis after post-2003 Iraqi insurgency against the US 2006 because of its insistence on exclusive occupation Syrians represented the largest leadership of all insurgents and its brutal foreign contingent alongside the Saudis, attacks against civilians. and Syrians organised the transit of thou- sands of volunteers from elsewhere through their country into Iraq. From 2011 the The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Nusra Front was able to draw on these net- Like the Nusra Front, the Islamic State works in eastern and northern Syria. It of Iraq and Syria (al-Daula al-Islamiya fi grew quickly after its official founding in l-Iraq wa-l-Sham, ISIS) also emerged out January 2012, and the number of attacks of al-Qaeda in Iraq. But it was founded later, it conducted rose from April. as the result of the attempt by Abu Bakr The rapid advance of the Nusra Front al-Baghdadi to regain control over his was also aided by the government’s release followers in Syria. of numerous militant Islamists in 2011 In a communiqué in April 2013 the emir and 2012. The only plausible explanation of the Islamic State of Iraq declared that for this step is that the regime hoped to the Nusra Front had emerged from it, but strengthen the Salafist and jihadist forces that both organisations would now form in order to divide the rebel movement and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria under bolster Assad’s argument that the rebels Baghdadi’s command. The leader of the were terrorists. The Syrian intelligence ser- Nusra Front, Jaulani, responded a few days vices have a long record of manipulating later, confirming the origins of his group jihadist groups. As well as tolerating the but refusing to place it under Baghdadi’s

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authority. Instead he sought support from From May 2013 ISIS units took over al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri, to whom he swore many positions from the Nusra Front in loyalty. The Nusra Front had actually hoped Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo, and to avoid such an acknowledgement of ties entrenched themselves in smaller towns to al-Qaeda, out of fear of losing support in like Azaz and Jarabulus north of Aleppo Syria. on the Turkish border. Although ISIS tried Zawahiri in turn felt forced to intervene to emulate the Nusra Front’s methods of in the conflict between the two al-Qaeda- winning over the population through social “branches”. In a communiqué in May 2013 services and integrating itself into the up- he backed Jaulani’s position, decreeing that rising through tactical cooperation, the both organisations should operate indepen- brutality and aggressiveness of the ISIS dently of one another in their respective fighters – already familiar from Iraq – homelands. But Baghdadi refused to obey quickly came to the fore. They enforced the orders from Pakistan and insisted that a regime of terror in the areas they con- ISIS continue to operate in both Iraq and trolled, executed opponents and destroyed Syria. In response, in January 2014, Zawa- non-Sunni places of worship and shrines. hiri declared the expulsion of the Islamic They even attacked non-jihadist rebels, as State from al-Qaeda. seen first in July 2013 when ISIS fighters To this day ISIS stands for extreme killed a prominent FSA commander. hatred of Shiites (including the Syrian This and similar incidents caused grow- Alawis), terrorist attacks of the greatest ing tensions between ISIS and the other brutality, an iron fist in the areas it con- insurgents. While the FSA was already too trols, and the vision of immanent war on weak to defend itself effectively, clashes Israel. To many fighters in Syria this orien- with Islamist and Salafist groups intensi- tation appears more attractive than the fied, especially with Ahrar al-Sham, which more moderate approach of the Nusra has a strong presence in and around Aleppo Front and consequently many of them and suffered greatly under ISIS attacks. joined ISIS from April 2013, including an The conflicts increased after the estab- overwhelming majority of the foreign lishment of the Islamic Front in November. fighters. Ahrar al-Sham now moved more decisively Until spring 2013 most foreign fighters against ISIS under pressure from its new joined the ranks of the Nusra Front. In the partners, especially the Army of Islam. early days North Africans predominated, December saw large-scale fighting between above all from Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Ahrar and ISIS in eastern Aleppo province. Jordanians and Gulf Arabs were also strong- After ISIS units kidnapped, tortured and ly represented, and the European contin- killed a senior commander of Ahrar al-Sham gent of up to 2,000 is believed to include at the end of December, the tensions erupted about 300 Germans. But despite their large into large-scale fighting. numbers foreigners always remained a minority in the Syrian-led groups. In ISIS the proportion of foreigners was higher. Ahrar al-Sham Rough estimates put their strength in its The example of the “The Free Men of the Syrian section at about 30 to 60 percent. Levant” demonstrates how difficult it is to But the rapid gains made by ISIS from distinguish between jihadists and Salafists spring 2013 and its staying power through in practice if the latter take up armed 2014 suggest that Syrians continue to rep- struggle. resent a majority. Many Syrians are also Ahrar al-Sham is the most important represented in the leadership alongside member of the Islamic Front, and with Iraqis. Altogether ISIS could also comprise 10,000 to 20,000 men probably the strongest between 5,000 and 15,000 fighters. insurgent group of all. Since it first became

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clearly visible in January 2012 it has been the saddle than at any time since the rebel- involved in most of the decisive military lion broke out. Reality has increasingly clashes. The Ahrar says its aims go no come to resemble the regime’s propaganda further than overthrowing Assad and estab- that from the outset branded its opponents lishing an Islamic state in Syria. Although as terrorists and advertised itself as a bas- it is indeed more strongly focused on the tion of stability and legitimacy. Washing- local situation than the jihadists, the dif- ton finds itself forced by the latest develop- ference is only one of degree, as its procla- ments to approach Syria with greater mations reveal that Ahrar al-Sham rejects caution, while the conflicts between the Syria’s contemporary borders. Reflecting Islamic Front and the jihadists weaken the their ideological closeness, its leader Hassan insurgency as a whole. For these reasons, Abbud has repeatedly spoken positively Assad could hold on for years to come. about the Nusra Front and the two groups This conclusion is hard to bear if one routinely work together in the current considers that the Assad regime does not fighting. shrink from mass murder of civilians. None- The relative nature of the differences to theless, Germany and Europe must respond the jihadists is also reflected in personnel to the danger posed by the jihadists, not questions. When al-Qaeda leader Aiman least because many European Islamists have al-Zawahiri appointed a personal envoy gone to fight in Syria. The Nusra Front and in Syria in June 2013, he chose the veteran ISIS are becoming the biggest problem, Abu Khalid al-Suri (alias Muhammad having attracted the largest numbers of Bahaia). Suri was not, as would have been foreign fighters, but Europe should also expected, a member of the Nusra Front, but keep a close eye on Ahrar al-Sham which a leader of Ahrar al-Sham. The best-known is close to the jihadists. Its differences with religious theoretician of the Islamic Front the Nusra Front in particular are so mar- and Ahrar, the prominent cleric Abu Basir ginal that assistance for Ahrar represents al-Tartusi, is also regarded as a jihadist. indirect support for the Nusra Front and Unlike the religious advisers of the Nusra must be avoided at all costs. Front and ISIS, however, Tartusi rejects The most important challenge in this suicide attacks. But in joint operations the connection is the difficult relationship with Nusra Front will sometimes deploy suicide the Turkish government. Although repre- bombers in ways that also benefit Ahrar. sentatives of Western security agencies Unlike the two jihadist groups, Ahrar report progress on cooperation they still al-Sham also receives state support from see it as far from satisfactory, largely on Turkey and Qatar, as well as private dona- account of the Turkish political leadership. tions from the Gulf states. This aid has put Since the beginning of the rebellion Turkey the organisation in a position to be able to has supported various insurgent forces challenge ISIS together with its allies in including the jihadists. The latter maintain the Islamic Front. But the Islamists and their most important rear bases in Turkey Salafists have not been able to defeat ISIS, and foreign fighters transit largely unhin- which had to give up important positions dered through the country. Ankara only in winter 2013/2014 but retained control stopped giving direct support to the Nusra of large parts of Raqqa and other towns in Front a few months ago. The most impor- eastern Syria. tant recipients of Turkish (and Qatari) assis- tance are now Ahrar al-Sham and the Islamic Front. Consequences for German Policies Its toleration of jihadists and promotion The most important consequence of the of Salafist groups must raise doubts about strengthening of the jihadists is that the soundness of the Turkish government’s the Assad regime is today more firmly in judgement on security matters. Even before

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the Syrian uprising, militant Islamists were only regarded as problematic if they attacked Turkey. It will therefore be im- portant for Germany and other European governments to convince Ankara that this line is also endangering its own security – not least because there are also several hundred Turks fighting with the jihadists.

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2014 All rights reserved

These Comments reflect solely the author’s views.

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Translation by Meredith Dale

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 18/2014)

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