The Military Topography of Syria's South

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The Military Topography of Syria's South Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments The Military Topography of Syria’s South WP Fickle External Support for Moderates; Resurgent Islamic State in Birthplace of the Revolt Khaled Yacoub Oweis S The Russian air attacks on Aleppo have diverted attention from Moscow’s intervention intended to secure Bashar al-Assad’s position in Damascus. Extending beyond northern Syria, Moscow’s direct military involvement has instilled fear in the countries backing the non-Jihadist rebel units in the south. Known as the Southern Front, they are based in the area stretching from south of the capital to the Jordanian border and close to the Israeli border. Hardline Islamist rebels, as well as so-called Islamic State (IS), are poised to gain as moderates are undermined. A rethink on ways to empower the Southern Front and once more put pressure on Assad is overdue if the region and its civil struc- tures are to escape capture by the regime and further penetration by the Jihadists is to be prevented – scenarios that could create a new wave of refugees towards Jordan. Due to the south’s strategic importance, Israel has emerged as a veto player in the neigh- borhood, helping to curb Russian bombing as Moscow acts with different interests in the south and the north. Southern Syria has been spared the war of the Southern Front. The formation is all-against-all that has plagued many non- backed by a disjointed grouping known regime controlled areas in Syria. Inter-rebel as the Military Operations Centre (MOC). violence has been relatively contained, part- Based in Jordan, it consists of Western ly due to the societal nature of the south. A nations (United States, United Kingdom culture of tolerance, higher education and and France), Arab countries (Jordan, Qatar, strong family links has helped to produce a Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) backbone of moderate forces in the Hauran and Turkey. Jordanian intelligence has Plain (see Map, p. 4), where the first mass helped to keep hardline Islamist rebels protests against four decades of Assad fami- in the south, such as the al-Qaeda-linked ly rule broke out in March 2011. The area Nusra Front, in check, in contrast with stretches from the outskirts of Damascus to northern regions on the border with Tur- the border with Jordan and the foothills of key. The spread of Islamic State (IS) was the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. In 2014, also contained to two pockets straddling two years after the revolt had become mili- Deraa governorate. But in 2016, the group tarized, non-Jihadist rebel groups formed mounted a sustained infiltration from the Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project “Local, regional and international dynamics in the Syria conflict” SWP Comments 56 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and funded by the German Foreign Office December 2016 1 Euphrates River basin that brought it closer to the Hauran Plain and the Jordanian The Southern Front border. Nominally includes more than 50 bri- gades, comprising most of the units Rebel Setbacks fighting under the Free Syrian Army Support for the moderate rebels in the (FSA) banner in southern Syria. A few south lost momentum after the Russian large brigades, with an estimated com- intervention, which re-opened a recruiting bined strength of 8,000 fighters, form avenue for the Nusra Front and other ultra- the core of the formation. They are hardline rebels who market themselves as drawn from FSA units in the southern unwavering in their Jihadism against the suburbs of Damascus, the Qunaitira Assad regime. In July 2016, the Nusra Front and Deraa governorates. The main renamed itself the “Front for the Conquest components of the Southern Front in- of the Levant” and broke off organizational clude: ties with al-Qaeda. Shabab al-Sunna: spearheaded a The non-Jihadists had stolen a march on Southern Front attack in 2015 that the hardliners by playing a more pro-active captured the ancient city of Busra al- role in the war against Assad since the for- Sham. Shabab al-Sunna is strongly mation of the Southern Front. As outside supported by the United Arab Emirates. support for the new formation grew, reli- The Artillery Regiment: The only ance on the Nusra Front to help fight rebel unit with a substantial arsenal Assad’s forces lessened. But Moscow’s inter- of artillery and rockets. vention has reversed strategic rebel gains Al-Furqan Brigade: Pragmatic that had the potential to threaten Assad’s Salafists who cooperate with more hold on Damascus. Despite internal rival- secular brigades and have been in a ries and the competing interests of the de-facto truce with the regime in their MOC members, the Southern Front had home region of Kanaker since 2014. kept growing as a force – until the Russian Al-Mutaz Billah: One of the first intervention in September 2015. rebel units in Syria to operate under At the beginning of 2015, Southern Front the FSA banner. Headed by Khaled al- units along with other rebels captured Nabulsi, a colonel who defected from Shaykh Maskeen, a hub for Assad’s forces Assad’s air force. on the old Deraa-Damascus road. By mid- Al-Yarmouk Army: A large forma- 2015, the rebels had encroached on the tion seen as close to the Syrian Muslim regime’s buffer zone around Damascus Brotherhood and linked to Turkey and through an area called the Triangle of Qatar. Death. This covers southern approaches to The Syria Revolutionaries Front: the capital in the Qunaitira and Deraa Suffered a blow in March 2016 when governorates, and has its pivot at the town its head, Captain Abu Hamza al-Nuaimi, of Kanaker, 30 kilometers from Damascus. was killed in car-bomb attack in the As the Russian bombardment hit the rebel governorate of Qunaitira. But the group backlines in the south, the backers of the remains a player in the area. Southern Front made it clear to their allies Al-Hamza Brigade: Based in the town that they would not support operations in of Ankhil, scene of an attack blamed the Triangle of Death. Assad’s forces and on IS that killed nine members of the their Iranian-backed Hezbollah ally cap- group. tured Shaykh Maskeen in January 2016, after the town was pulverized by Russian aerial bombardment. SWP Comments 56 December 2016 2 In another major gain for regime forces, Map: Southern Syria in November 2016 rebels evacuated the Palestinian refugee camp of Khan Eshieh, 20 kilometers southwest of Damascus, after a two-month siege. Under a surrender deal guaranteed by Russia, 2,000 to 3,000 people were transferred by buses, mainly to the northern province of Idlib. They mostly comprised fighters from the Southern Front, the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham group and the Nusra Front, as well as their families. By the time of the evacuation, 8,000 Pales- tinian refugees were still in the camp, along with several thousand Syrians who had fled Damascus suburbs overrun by the regime. Ahrar al-Sham, which is not in the Southern Front, traded blame with the other rebels for failing to open a supply line to Khan Eshieh from the south. Ultimately, it was local commanders from the various rebel factions in the camp who decided that they could no longer cope with the siege and the aerial bombardment. however, with salaries being cut and re- The capture of Khan Eshieh highlighted sources dwindling, several Southern Front the Russian-backed ‘piecemeal’ strategy commanders reported increased defections employed by the regime and its Shiite from their units. The defectors mainly militia allies from Lebanon and Iraq. The headed to Qunaitira governorate and were strategy focuses on attacking and besieging recruited by the more radical Ahrar al- a single rebel city, town or neighborhood Sham. Organized criminality is also re- at a time, destroying it, and then moving ported to be on the rise on the Hauran on to adjacent areas. In the areas around Plain as a result of the rebels being forced Damascus, for example, the fall of Khan to abandon some fronts against the regime, Eshieh was preceded by the fall of the sub- creating larger numbers of idle fighters. urb of Daraya, which was besieged for years. But Russia’s halting of rebel advances from the south was crucial for the regime, Operational Failures as it added a layer to the buffer zone The retreat of the southern rebels has high- around Assad’s seat of power. lighted the growing military asymmetry The other – and more high-profile – goal generated by the upgraded weaponry that of Moscow’s intervention was to push back the regime has been receiving from Russia a Turkish and Gulf-backed rebel alliance and Iran, and the difficulty of taking re- in northern Syria. The alliance, named the gime bases without air support. Army of Conquest (Jaish al-Fath), had ad- Organizationally, the Southern Front has vanced through the coastal province of suffered from huge gaps in coordination Latakia, home to Russia’s main military and from mistrust between its different bases in Syria. The core of the alliance con- local and ideological components, which sisted of the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, retain strong allegiances to their home which have been less significant players areas, even if the latter have been a barrier in Deraa and other rural regions in south- against the Jihadists. These flaws came to ern Syria. After the Russian intervention, the fore just before the Russian interven- SWP Comments 56 December 2016 3 tion in the failure of a major offensive, chosen, headed by Hassan Ibrahim, a for- dubbed the ‘Storm of the South’, to take mer major who had defected from Assad’s the provincial capital of Deraa.
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