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Home , Army of Conquest, Free Syrian Army, Hamza Division (Aleppo), Hauran, Retribution Army, Rukban

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Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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The Military Topography of ’s South WP Fickle External Support for Moderates; Resurgent Islamic State in Birthplace of the Revolt

Khaled Yacoub Oweis S

The Russian air attacks on have diverted attention from Moscow’s intervention intended to secure Bashar al-Assad’s position in . Extending beyond northern Syria, Moscow’s direct military involvement has instilled fear in the countries backing the non-Jihadist rebel units in the south. Known as the Southern Front, they are based in the area stretching from south of the capital to the Jordanian border and close to the Israeli border. Hardline Islamist rebels, as well as so-called Islamic State (IS), are poised to gain as moderates are undermined. A rethink on ways to empower the Southern Front and once more put pressure on Assad is overdue if the and its civil struc- tures are to escape capture by the regime and further penetration by the Jihadists is to be prevented – scenarios that could create a new wave of refugees towards . Due to the south’s strategic importance, has emerged as a veto player in the neigh- borhood, helping to curb Russian bombing as Moscow acts with different interests in the south and the north.

Southern Syria has been spared the war of the Southern Front. The formation is all-against-all that has plagued many non- backed by a disjointed grouping known regime controlled areas in Syria. Inter-rebel as the Military Operations Centre (MOC). violence has been relatively contained, part- Based in Jordan, it consists of Western ly due to the societal nature of the south. A nations (, culture of tolerance, higher education and and ), Arab countries (Jordan, , strong family links has helped to produce a and the United Arab Emirates) backbone of moderate forces in the and . Jordanian intelligence has Plain (see Map, p. 4), where the first mass helped to keep hardline Islamist rebels protests against four decades of Assad fami- in the south, such as the al-Qaeda-linked ly rule broke out in March 2011. The area Nusra Front, in check, in contrast with stretches from the outskirts of Damascus to northern on the border with Tur- the border with Jordan and the foothills of key. The spread of Islamic State (IS) was the Israeli-occupied Heights. In 2014, also contained to two pockets straddling two years after the revolt had become mili- Deraa governorate. But in 2016, the group tarized, non-Jihadist rebel groups formed mounted a sustained infiltration from the

Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project “Local, regional and international dynamics in the Syria conflict” SWP Comments 56 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and funded by the German Foreign Office December 2016

1 River basin that brought it closer to the Hauran Plain and the Jordanian The Southern Front border. Nominally includes more than 50 bri- gades, comprising most of the units Rebel Setbacks fighting under the Free Syrian Support for the moderate rebels in the (FSA) banner in . A few south lost momentum after the Russian large , with an estimated com- intervention, which re-opened a recruiting bined strength of 8,000 fighters, form avenue for the Nusra Front and other ultra- the core of the formation. They are hardline rebels who market themselves as drawn from FSA units in the southern unwavering in their against the suburbs of Damascus, the Qunaitira Assad regime. In July 2016, the Nusra Front and Deraa governorates. The main renamed itself the “Front for the Conquest components of the Southern Front in- of the ” and broke off organizational clude: ties with al-Qaeda. Shabab al-Sunna: spearheaded a The non-Jihadists had stolen a march on Southern Front attack in 2015 that the hardliners by playing a more pro-active captured the ancient city of Busra al- role in the war against Assad since the for- Sham. Shabab al-Sunna is strongly mation of the Southern Front. As outside supported by the United Arab Emirates. support for the new formation grew, reli- The Regiment: The only ance on the Nusra Front to help fight rebel unit with a substantial arsenal Assad’s forces lessened. But Moscow’s inter- of artillery and rockets. vention has reversed strategic rebel gains Al-Furqan : Pragmatic that had the potential to threaten Assad’s Salafists who cooperate with more hold on Damascus. Despite internal rival- secular brigades and have been in a ries and the competing interests of the de-facto truce with the regime in their MOC members, the Southern Front had home region of Kanaker since 2014. kept growing as a force – until the Russian Al-Mutaz Billah: One of the first intervention in September 2015. rebel units in Syria to operate under At the beginning of 2015, Southern Front the FSA banner. Headed by Khaled al- units along with other rebels captured Nabulsi, a who defected from Shaykh Maskeen, a hub for Assad’s forces Assad’s air force. on the old Deraa-Damascus road. By mid- Al-Yarmouk Army: A large forma- 2015, the rebels had encroached on the tion seen as close to the Syrian Muslim regime’s buffer zone around Damascus Brotherhood and linked to Turkey and through an area called the Triangle of Qatar. Death. This covers southern approaches to The Syria Revolutionaries Front: the capital in the Qunaitira and Deraa Suffered a blow in March 2016 when governorates, and has its pivot at the town its head, Captain Abu Hamza al-Nuaimi, of Kanaker, 30 kilometers from Damascus. was killed in car-bomb attack in the As the Russian bombardment hit the rebel governorate of Qunaitira. But the group backlines in the south, the backers of the remains a player in the area. Southern Front made it clear to their allies Al-Hamza Brigade: Based in the town that they would not support operations in of Ankhil, scene of an attack blamed the Triangle of Death. Assad’s forces and on IS that killed nine members of the their Iranian-backed ally cap- group. tured Shaykh Maskeen in January 2016, after the town was pulverized by Russian aerial bombardment.

SWP Comments 56 December 2016

2 In another major gain for regime forces, Map: Southern Syria in November 2016 rebels evacuated the Palestinian refugee camp of Khan Eshieh, 20 kilometers southwest of Damascus, after a two-month siege. Under a surrender deal guaranteed by , 2,000 to 3,000 people were transferred by buses, mainly to the northern province of . They mostly comprised fighters from the Southern Front, the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham group and the Nusra Front, as well as their families. By the time of the evacuation, 8,000 Pales- tinian refugees were still in the camp, along with several thousand who had fled Damascus suburbs overrun by the regime. Ahrar al-Sham, which is not in the Southern Front, traded blame with the other rebels for failing to open a supply line to Khan Eshieh from the south. Ultimately, it was local commanders from the various rebel factions in the camp who decided that they could no longer cope with the siege and the aerial bombardment. however, with salaries being cut and re- The capture of Khan Eshieh highlighted sources dwindling, several Southern Front the Russian-backed ‘piecemeal’ strategy commanders reported increased employed by the regime and its Shiite from their units. The defectors mainly allies from and . The headed to Qunaitira governorate and were strategy focuses on attacking and besieging recruited by the more radical Ahrar al- a single rebel city, town or neighborhood Sham. Organized criminality is also re- at a time, destroying it, and then moving ported to be on the rise on the Hauran on to adjacent areas. In the areas around Plain as a result of the rebels being forced Damascus, for example, the fall of Khan to abandon some fronts against the regime, Eshieh was preceded by the fall of the sub- creating larger numbers of idle fighters. urb of Daraya, which was besieged for years. But Russia’s halting of rebel advances from the south was crucial for the regime, Operational Failures as it added a layer to the buffer zone The retreat of the southern rebels has high- around Assad’s seat of power. lighted the growing military asymmetry The other – and more high-profile – goal generated by the upgraded weaponry that of Moscow’s intervention was to push back the regime has been receiving from Russia a Turkish and Gulf-backed rebel alliance and , and the difficulty of taking re- in northern Syria. The alliance, named the gime bases without air support. (Jaish al-Fath), had ad- Organizationally, the Southern Front has vanced through the coastal province of suffered from huge gaps in coordination , home to Russia’s main military and from mistrust between its different bases in Syria. The core of the alliance con- local and ideological components, which sisted of the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, retain strong allegiances to their home which have been less significant players areas, even if the latter have been a barrier in Deraa and other rural regions in south- against the Jihadists. These flaws came to ern Syria. After the Russian intervention, the fore just before the Russian interven-

SWP Comments 56 December 2016

3 tion in the failure of a major offensive, chosen, headed by Hassan Ibrahim, a for- dubbed the ‘Storm of the South’, to take mer major who had defected from Assad’s the provincial capital of Deraa. The offen- army and eventually joined the opposi- sive was launched despite lacking an over- tion’s High Negotiation Committee (HNC) all command. Several rebel clusters failed for the Geneva peace talks. By the end of to move together from different directions, the year, the joint command had become leaving the regime able to concentrate on defunct. None of the Arab countries sup- repelling individual attacks. posedly on board gave it serious practical Lacking firepower, the Southern Front backing, with each country regarding cer- has mostly stopped outright its attacks to tain members of staff in the nascent com- take cities and towns from the regime. The mand as untrustworthy or ideologically rebels have instead shifted to trying to iso- unsuitable. late regime areas by controlling roads. In A major divide has centered on rebel turn, the regime has increasingly protected connections with the . roads with fortifications and dugouts. In Qatari and Turkish support for the Brother- the fall of 2016, the rebels sought to restrict hood has pitted the two countries against the regime’s access by road to Deraa city, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates with- which – like the rest of the Hauran Plain – in the MOC. Lacking the financial might of has been divided for years, with loyalist Gulf countries, Jordan still punches above forces holding about three quarters of the its weight in the shaping of the Southern city and the rebels the rest. The operation Front. Jordan also hosts US squadrons that depended on taking a regime fortification attack Syrian Jihadists from its bases. In southwest of Shaykh Maskeen. The attack a deepening of the ideological rifts, in failed, and up to 50 rebels who had trained December 2016 the Yarmouk Army, one as assault troops were killed. of the large players within the Southern Front, announced the formation of a new alliance belonging to the Free Squabbling Arab Backers (FSA). The FSA is an umbrella grouping of Lack of agreement among the Arab and non-Jihadist rebels across the country that Western countries supporting the Southern has seldom functioned as an organization Front on strategic goals has exacerbated since it was founded in 2011. But the Yar- the fragmentation of the rebels. Most MOC mouk Army has left the door open by not members were scared off by the Russian officially breaking off from the Southern intervention, with Jordan and the United Front. On the civilian side, the Brotherhood Arab Emirates initially seeing an oppor- ended up dominating many of the opposi- tunity to ally with Moscow and cut off sup- tion’s local councils in the south. Increas- port for the rebels. Others, particularly ing religiosity in the population amidst the Qatar and Saudi Arabia, were not as keen. violence played into the group’s hand on The differences have been especially acute the local level. But there remain substantial between the MOC’s Arab members – Jordan, civic organizations on the Hauran Plain Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab that operate outside the Brotherhood’s Emirates — who often push rebels in dif- influence. ferent directions and play off one group Meanwhile Israel, which is outside the against the other. In May 2016, the four MOC, has played a role Israeli officials countries supported a US-led drive to create describe as reliant on “soft power”. It has a joint leadership for the Southern Front, propped up some brigades to keep the but then contributed to undermining it peace on the front and pla- when it came to implementation and move- cated others by receiving wounded civilians ment of staff. After a series of meetings in and fighters. The Israeli establishment does Jordan, a seven-member command was not want to see Iran or Hezbollah on the

SWP Comments 56 December 2016

4 Golan Heights frontier and has in general four months, until the Nusra Front scaled learned to live with the Sunni rebels, in- down its participation in July 2016. The cluding the more hardline ones. In a rare pullout came as the US started to target the incident in November 2016, Israel said its leadership of the Nusra Front in northern troops killed four militants linked to the Syria more heavily. On social media, Jihad- Yarmouk Martyrs Brigades, an IS affiliate, ist clerics also criticized the preoccupation after they attacked an Israeli patrol on the with fighting IS in the south while the Golan Heights. regime consolidated and the FSA weakened. The Nusra Front appears to view this as an opening to increase its support in the south IS Rises from the Ashes by taking on the Assad regime. The non-Jihadists in the south have been Despite IS’s many foes, the rough terrain further undermined by having to fight a and clan-based social mores of the area two-pronged war against the regime and IS. have played to its advantage. The Southern The group, under pressure in Iraq and east- Front or anyone else taking on the group ern Syria, experienced a resurgence in the would require a heavy numerical advantage south in 2016. It remains on the periphery to wage a decisive against the 800 or of the Hauran Plain, but it has reconsoli- so IS fighters in the basin. dated in its hub in the Yarmouk River The MOC has been pushing the Southern basin. IS also has fighters based in al-Lajah, Front to take on IS, but not enough fighters a rugged region between the governorates appear willing to risk blood feuds with of Suwaida and Deraa. It appears to be aim- established families in the Yarmouk River ing to link its foothold in Lajah with for- basin, whose members have joined the IS ward positions it has set up in al-Badiya, the affiliates. semi-desert steppe extending to the border point where Syria, Jordan and Iraq meet. Al-Lajah Similar factors of terrain and society have The Yarmouk River basin protected IS in a foothold it has carved out IS was on the verge of extinction on the in the volcanic al-Lajah region on the north- Hauran Plain in 2015 after the top leader- eastern edge of Deraa. The region is inhab- ship of its main affiliate, the Yarmouk ited by , many of whom have sided Martyrs Brigades, was assassinated by the with the FSA, which has strengthened the Nusra Front (SWP Comments 34/2016, July Bedouins’ hands in historic land disputes 2016). A smaller affiliate, Jaish al-Jihad, with the inhabitants in the nearby was routed by the FSA, and a third affiliate, governorate of Suwaida. the Islamic Muthanna Movement, had suf- fered high casualties. But the three groups consolidated in the Yarmouk River basin, Al-Badiya which borders Jordan and the Golan The most marked IS movement of 2106 has Heights, in mid-2016. They formed the been its buildup in the expanse of Badiya Army of Khaled bin al-Walid, named after region to the east of Suwaida. This trian- the Arab Muslim commander who defeated gular area stretches from the town of al- the Byzantines in the area. Dumair, northeast of Damascus, to Suwaida In a boost to IS, a tactical alliance be- and on to the point where the Syrian, Iraqi tween the Southern Front and the Nusra and Jordanian borders meet. FSA sources Front in the Yarmouk River basin appears have been observing an influx of IS fighters to have broken down. FSA units, needing from the Euphrates River basin into the all the support they could muster, fought Badiya. The group has set up posts at water along the same frontlines against IS for resources, in areas that could serve as

SWP Comments 56 December 2016

5 supply points, and in cave territory that With IS potentially straddling a long provides natural cover. IS’s recapture of the stretch of the Jordanian border, Jordan has desert city of from the regime in set its own proxies to create a buffer in the December 2016 could enhance supply lines Badiya region. But their fighting ability to Badiya. The group appears to be prepar- remains largely modest. One hastily put ing the region as an alternative base for together group, the US and Jordanian- redeployment in case the largest two cities backed New Syrian Army, failed in its debut under its control – the Iraqi city of Mosul in March 2016 to make a dent against IS in and the Syrian city of – should fall. the Syrian town of al-Tanf, despite being supported by US . Three months later, a desert camp belonging to the New Strategy of Local Liquidations Syrian Army was hit by what the US has Lacking the depth and outright numbers to described as a Russian air strike. By the mount a pincer movement on the Hauran end of the year, the group had dwindled Plain, IS has resorted to assassinations of in numbers from a few hundred to a few FSA commanders on the and town dozen. Another force has been the Army level to weaken the FSA at its core. Scores of of the Clans (Jaish al-Asha’er), a Jordanian FSA officers, most of whom were affiliated proxy led by Rakan al-Khudair, a former with the Southern Front, were targeted in businessman from Deraa who tried to 2016. With the objective of undermining mediate a peaceful solution to grievances opposition structures, the campaign has of Deraa in 2011 and was rebuffed by the also targeted officials in the opposition’s regime. Jordan assigned the Army of the Syrian Interim Government and the justice Clans, along with other proxies, to policing system (Dar al-‘Adel), which in rebel areas the Rukban border refugee camp and al- have replaced the regime. One of the more Hadalat, a smaller camp that had sprung spectacular assassinations linked to IS came in the Badiya as Jordan continued in its close to wiping out the top military and refusal to let in the refugees. civic tier of the opposition in the south By contrast, one group with a track re- when a young suicide bomber blew himself cord of fighting IS was the Forces of Martyr up at a ceremony marking the opening of Ahmad al-‘Abdu, which belongs to the a police station in the town of Ankhil. The Southern Front. The unit received strong attack in September 2016 killed 16 people, support from the MOC until their leader including Yacoub Ammar, the minister Bakkour al-Salim was killed at his camp in for local administration in the opposition Badiya in a suicide attack blamed on IS. government. The rest of the dead were Bakkour was also part of the opposition’s mostly members of the Hamza , peace-talks team. His rebel group could not a Southern Front formation. compensate for his death and lost its luster.

The Scramble Against IS Missing Incentives for Fighting IS The United States, Jordan and other MOC The Western response to the IS advances in members rushed to respond to the IS ad- the south has been mostly to replicate the vances in Badiya largely by building new approach the US employed in northern forces outside the Southern Front with Syria with the Kurdish PYD militia (the little familiarity with the local terrain. So Syrian branch of the Turkish PKK). It mainly far, these have amounted to little more consists of arms, air support and political than forces more interested in cover. Washington has shown little objec- making quick money through the tion to the militia’s drive for a Kurdish trade or other smuggling than in getting territorial and political ascendency in involved in serious combat. northern Syria. In the mainly Arab Sunni

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6 south, US support for the rebels’ cause – the Syria. But in the south, Russia is unlikely to toppling of the Assad regime – has been far give Assad a green light, or unleash bom- less consistent. Even while Washington bardments on the scale it deployed in the was facilitating the supply of the Southern north to allow pro-Assad forces to retake Front with weapons, it made it clear that, large tracts of territory. If Russia levels as long as the Southern Front was commit- more rebel ground from the air, Hezbollah ted to fighting Assad, it would not receive and Iran could reach the Golan Heights any air support even against IS. Diplomati- frontier – something both Moscow and cally, Washington has been paying lip ser- Israel oppose. New refugees could also put vice since 2015 to a political transition that more pressure on Jordan, with which could ease the grip of Assad and his pre- Moscow is keen to maintain good ties. But dominantly Alawite entourage on the state the regime could still pursue its strategy of and security apparatus. Yet, on the south- trying to take towns one by one, or seek a ern local scene, the Assad regime has had a symbolic victory, such as capturing a bor- free hand to hit town after town while the der crossing with Jordan. One vulnerable mainly Sunni would-be recruits were ex- spot, due to the regime’s presence in the pected to forego any retribution and fight city, is a crossing point on the southern IS – even though IS was not responsible for outskirts of Deraa. the destruction in their communities. While Washington was willing to extend a de-facto safe zone over Kurdish regions to Options for External Actors prevent regime air attacks when the PYD The countries nominally supporting the clashed briefly with Assad’s forces in al- stood by as Russia and Hasaka (northeastern Syria) in August 2016, the Assad regime destroyed East Aleppo. it has shown no inclination to do so in the Now they will have the chance to take a south. With little motivation among Sunnis more active part in preventing a meltdown to fight their IS coreligionists, few observers in the south that could cause mass dis- have confidence in the ability of the Jor- placement and loss of life, and have huge danian-backed auxiliaries to fight an all-out geopolitical repercussions. war against IS. Southern Syria is too important strategi- Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and IS cally to let the Southern Front lose its role seem to have adopted a strategy of avoiding as the lynchpin of the region’s rebels. A confrontation with each other in the south. Jihadi takeover or Hezbollah advance would Even if IS, driven by a quest for resources, risk triggering an Israeli intervention to were to push through Badiya to the agri- shield its forces on the Golan Heights and culturally more productive Suwaida region, in the Israeli interior and/or to protect the the regime would be unlikely to commit Druze in Suwaida. Jordan could also be significant troops to defending Druze popu- drawn into sending troops into southern lation centers in Suwaida if they came Syria as the establishment faces an increas- under a concerted IS attack, as this would ingly fragile situation domestically. raise the possibility of intervention by Even if chances of success are low, efforts Israel. The Druze of Israel have members in should be made to get Moscow to keep its the Israeli army, and the Israel has signaled planes from doling out more destruction that it would consider military action to and at least preserve the existing front protect the Druze in Syria. lines. In its operations in the south, Moscow This leaves the Assad regime with a has yielded to a de-facto Israeli veto on how balance of power. Flush from the capture far it can go and will most likely not allow of Aleppo, it would like to build on this for an open Iranian corridor stretching momentum by showing that it will live up from Iran to the Golan Heights. to its commitment to regain the whole of

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7 Moscow also needs to be reminded that a despite Assad’s recent advances, the Syrian stable Jordan is in everyone’s interests and conflict could yet continue for the long that maintaining a balance of power in the term. The creation of an overall interna- south prevents more pressure from being tional organization based in Jordan, with put on Jordan in terms of refugees and the the donors and backers as its members, rise of Jihadism next doors. could help manage the flows of aid and Given the regime’s post-Aleppo euphoria civic support, and make it easier for the and the mounting Iranian influence within support to get through Jordan to its desti- loyalist circles, Assad might be tempted to nation. Jordan’s security concerns have re-conquer the south, starting with the line lessened its initial welcome of the Syrian of control with Israel (Qunaitira) and the opposition after the revolt. As more region- border crossings with Jordan. Western al actors have got involved in the Syrian reactions to Aleppo are therefore crucial, conflict, Jordan has sometimes put the including symbolically, for the future peaceful civic activists as well as the officers

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und dynamics in the south. As the regime was who have fled there who lack connections Politik, 2016 gloatingly delivering the fatal blow in with influential patrons in its own version All rights reserved Aleppo, a helpless and divided EU declared of the Soviet Hotel Lux. With the unspoken These Comments reflect that it would help to reconstruct Syria threat of being thrown back into Syria the author’s views. provided the country moved toward a hanging over them, they have little room SWP political transition – which no one in West- to maneuver independently or open lines Stiftung Wissenschaft und ern policy-making seriously believes is of contact and act as liaisons to help the Politik German Institute for likely with Assad so strengthened. Instead regions they came from. Their situation International and of resigning itself to an “Assad-only future”, could be normalized if efforts were made to Security Affairs the EU could turn its attention to protect- solve the animosity hanging over the rela- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 ing the contiguous civic structures that tions between the Arab MOC members. 10719 Berlin have so far escaped annihilation by the re- Militarily and politically, little could be Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 gime, most widely in the south. achieved to streamline the MOC without www.swp-berlin.org could contribute to stabilizing the weight of the US. It is not clear if the [email protected] the rebel regions and limiting the appeal of incoming US Administration will listen to ISSN 1861-1761 Jihadists to local populations by restoring advice from the established governments of the Southern Front as the bulwark against Europe, especially as more refugees would Assad. A trust deficit between Washington boost Trump-style politics on the . and the rebels has prevented FSA units But it is essential for the Trump team to get from being extended the dedicated backing the message that the fight against terror enjoyed by the Kurdish militia in the north. needs to go beyond the ongoing air cam- Deepening the scope of military support paign and support for the Kurdish militia could prevent the regime from making if it is to stop the Jihadists and IS from even symbolic victories and would send a becoming the only game in town for those signal to the southern population that they opposing the regime. will not be abandoned. Building trust with the opposition and local population and strengthening the Southern Front may be the only effective measure against the pos- sible relocation of massive IS contingents from Iraq and the Euphrates River Valley to Badiya and beyond. Here again, the streamlining of inter- national backing would help unify the local structures and make them more demo- cratic. It also needs to be recognized that,

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