TURKEY: ORCHESTRATING VIOLENCE BEYOND BORDERS By RETHINKING Mohammed Sami POLICY BRIEF Middle East Analyst January 2020 SECURITY IN 2020 SERIES INTRODUCTION KEY TAKEAWAYS In late December 2019, the Tripoli based-UN backed- • Turkey continues its deployment of Government of National Accord (GNA) appealed for Syrian rebels to Libya. Turkey to intervene in Libya. As a response, the Turkish rd Parliament held an emergency session on January 3 , • Syrian rebels are deployed with attractive 2020, and voted to authorize President Recep Tayep Er- salaries to fight in Libya. dogan to deploy Turkish troops to Libya. Soon after, the deployment of troops materialized. However, not only • The selection process of rebels was based were Turkish military forces deployed but Syrian rebels on a specific criterion. from northern Syria too. In recent months, Turkey’s military activities, such as its expatriation of Syrian ref- • Private military contractors played a role in ugees to their war-torn country and the deployment of preparing and deploying Syrian rebels to Turkish-backed Syrian rebels to fight along the GNA in Libya. Libya, pose serious risks of escalation in the region. While the European Union remains committed to fund its Facility for Refugees in Turkey, these activities re- local activists, partners, and local population, this pol- quire greater scrutiny on its financial support provided icy brief explores Turkey’s deployment of Syrian rebels to Turkey. Based on first-hand data collected through to Libya, its deportation of refugees to Syria and ques- interviews conducted by the BIC research team with tions the implications these developments have on the EU’s Facility for Refugees in Turkey. 1 POLICY BRIEF January 2020 TURKEY’S SNA: Reports of Syrian rebels deployed to Libya began to PROXIES IN SYRIA, spread on the 27th of December 2019. While scant in- formation was available to confirm or deny their pres- MERCENARIES IN LIBYA ence, the SNA responded by issuing a statement repu- diating its involvement in Libya. Yet within no time, Turkey finds the manpower of its proxy in Syria, the documented pictures and footage loomed to highlight Syrian National Army (SNA), a less costly mean of inter- the presence of armed Syrian rebels fighting in Libya. vention in Libya. The SNA is a Syrian rebel coalition Furthermore, official statements on Syrian rebels made formed in December 2017 and fights under the com- by French President Macron, the United States Em- mand of the Syrian Interim Government’s Ministry of bassy in Libya, and a former GNA minister all challenge Defence.1 The SNA is composed of 41 rebel groups and SNA’s repudiations. comprise Arab and Turkmen fighters.2 While some of these groups include fighters from eastern and south- Debates on whether or not Syrian rebels were de- ern Syria, these groups have recruited rebels who orig- ployed to Libya soon turned into debates on the exact inate from northern Syria, and who received support number of Syrian rebels in Libya. Some estimates sug- from Turkey prior to the formation of the SNA. gest that Turkey deployed and prepared to deploy 2,000 rebels. 5 Initially, Turkey’s selection of groups The nature of ties between Turkey and the SNA is re- from within the SNA wasn’t conducted randomly. Par- markable. The extent of President Erdogan’s influence ticipating in the deployment of rebels to Libya was lim- over the SNA is not far from the extent of his influence ited to specific groups from within the SNA. The pri- over the Turkish army itself. It is not uncommon that mary groups are Sultan Murad Brigade, Firqa al-Hamza or, al-Hamza Division), Firqat al-Mu’tasim) ( ﺔﻗﺮﻓ ةﺰﻤﺤﻟا ) observers would refer to the SNA as a Turkish proxy in -or, al-Mu’tasim Division) along with Sul) ( ﺔﻗﺮﻓ ﻢﺼﺘﻌﻤﻟا ) -Syria. 3 President Erdogan’s pictures along with Tur key’s flags can be seen in various SNA leaders’ bureaus. tan Sulaiman Shah Brigade) from the SNA’s 2nd and 1st Moreover, several groups from within SNA such as legions respectively (see Map-1). -or, the Sultan Mu) ( ءاﻮﻟ نﺎﻄﻠﺴﻟا ﺮﻣ ا د ) Liwa’ Sultan Murad This, nonetheless, brings an important question to the ( ءاﻮﻟ rad Brigade) and Liwa’ al-Sultan Sulaiman Shah or, the Sultan Sulaiman Shah Brigade) forefront: Why did Turkey choose to deploy fighters) نﺎﻄﻠﺴﻟا ﻠﺳ نﺎﻤﯿ ﺎﺷ ه ) hold the names of Ottoman Sultans. Their loyalty was from these particular groups? There appears to be sev- put to the test in various occasions, particularly, as they eral commonalities between these groups. First, north- were the spearhead of Turkey’s cross-border opera- west Syria is the birthplace of these groups. Second, tions against the Islamic State (IS) and Quwat Soreya with the exception of Firqat al-Mu’tasim, these groups ,or, Syrian feature Turkmen fighters amongst their ranks. Third) ( تاﻮﻗ رﻮﺳ ﯾ ﺎ ﺔﯿطاﺮﻗﻮﻤﯾﺪﻟا ) al-Demoqrateya Democratic Forces SDF) in Syria. Ahmed al-Shihabi, a the activities of these groups were limited to battling IS prominent leader in the SNA, openly stated in an inter- and the SDF following Turkey’s cross-border operation view that “we would go and fight wherever there is Ji- Euphrates Shield between August 2016 and March 4 had", adding that they are willing to sacrifice their 2017. According to several local activists based in lives and their children for the Ottoman Caliphate, in Aleppo’s suburbs, who talked to BIC on condition of an- response to whether or not his comrades will fight onymity for security reasons, these groups didn’t en- Libya. gage in any operation against the Syrian government 1 ömer özkizilcik, “Uniting the Syrian Opposition: The Components 4 “Opposition leader video: We sacrifice our lives and children of the Nationaly Army and the Implications of the Unification” from the Ottoman Caliphate (in Arabic),” Syrian Snack, January 19, (SETA, 2019), https://setav.org/en/assets/up- 2020, https://bit.ly/2OmsLXB. loads/2019/10/A54En.pdf. 5 “Shipped by Turkey from Syria: 14 Turkish-Backed Mercenaries 2 özkizilcik. Killed in Libya Battles,” The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights 3 Engin Yüksel, “Strategies of Turkish Proxy Warfare in Northern (blog), January 14, 2020, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=152905. Syria,” 2019, 24. BRUSSELS INTERNATIONAL CENTER Avenue Louise, 89 - 1050, Brussels Tel: +32 027258466 | bic-rhr.com DDDDD Figure 1 Key Syrian rebel groups deploying forces to Libya and their headquarters Source: Interviews with BIC forces ever since Euphrates Shield: “they didn’t fire a interviewee added that the margin in salaries between single bullet against the regime.”, as explained by one remaining in Syria (around $65) and fighting in Libya of them.6 In line with the decline of IS and suspension serves as a motivating factor for rebels to find the Libya of Turkey’s cross-border military operations, the activ- option more appealing. While as previously men- ities of these groups in northern Syria declined in scale. tioned, only specific groups were approached for de- As such, Turkey pursued benefiting from their services ployment. However, the high salaries motivated more through employing their utility in Libya. rebel groups to deploy fighters. The deployment of troops eventually expanded to include most of the SNA groups. This, however, was only limited to groups that RECRUITMENT AND were established in northern Syria. Rebel groups such (or, the Army of Islam) ( ﺶﯿﺟ مﻼﺳﻹا ) DEPLOYMENT: as Jaysh al-Islam or the, Free Men) ( راﺮﺣا ﺔﯿﻗﺮﺸﻟا ) and Ahrar al-Sharqiya WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE? of the East) that were established in southern and east- ern Syria were not part of the groups that deployed Fighters were recruited from the headquarters of their fighters to Libya. Interestingly, the high salaries alleg- respective rebel groups. To attract these fighters to edly have also attracted civilians to offer their services fight in Libya, Turkey made appealing offers that vary to fight in Libya, according to an interview with a local from high salaries to Turkish citizenship. Reports esti- activist in Afrin.9 mate that they were offered $2,000 for fighting in Libya based on 6-months contracts signed with the GNA.7 Another crucial point worth highlighting is the process However, according to a local activist who maintains by which Turkey is transferring Syrian rebels to Libya. close contacts with northern Syria’s rebel command- According to The Guardian, fighters sign six-month con- ers, the rebels were deployed based on contracts that tracts directly with the GNA rather than with the Turk- grant a monthly salary of $600 per fighter. 8 The ish military. 10 In contrast, data obtained by the BIC 6 Interview with local activist, Aleppo, January 2020. 9 Interview with local activist, Aleppo, January 2020. 7 Bethan McKernan and Hussein Akoush, “Exclusive: 2,000 Syrian 10 Bethan McKernan and Hussein Akoush, “Exclusive: 2,000 Syrian Fighters Deployed to Libya to Support Government | World News Fighters Deployed to Libya to Support Government | World News | The Guardian,” accessed February 2, 2020, | The Guardian,” accessed February 2, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/exclusive- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/exclusive- 2000-syrian-troops-deployed-to-libya-to-support-regime. 2000-syrian-troops-deployed-to-libya-to-support-regime. 8 Interview with local activist, Aleppo, January 2020. 3 suggest that fighters are deployed based on three- month contracts that are signed with Turkey’s private KEY INSIGHTS AND military contractor SADAT International Defense Con- sulting. SADAT is chaired by President Erdogan’s previ- CONCLUSION ous chief military counselor Brigadier General Adnan Tanriverdi and was active in Libya prior to the latest de- Turkey’s recent decision to deploy Syrian rebels into velopments.11 While the exact nature of its activities in Libya risks wider escalation in the region.