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Ahrar Al-Sham: the “Syrian Taliban”. Al-Nusra Ally Seeks Partnership

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Ahrar Al-Sham: the “Syrian Taliban”. Al-Nusra Ally Seeks Partnership www.ssoar.info Ahrar al-Sham - the "Syrian Taliban": Al-Nusra ally seeks partnership with West Steinberg, Guido Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Arbeitspapier / working paper Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Steinberg, G. (2016). Ahrar al-Sham - the "Syrian Taliban": Al-Nusra ally seeks partnership with West. (SWP-Aktuell, 27/2016). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46961-0 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Ahrar al-Sham: The “Syrian Taliban” WP Al-Nusra Ally Seeks Partnership with West Guido Steinberg S President Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to step down and open the door to compromise is not the only obstacle to a resolution of the Syrian conflict. Various Islamist groups focused on outright military victory also play a major role. Since 2012 they have come to dominate the uprising. The international community agrees that there can be no ne- gotiations with the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), nor with the al-Nusra Front, which is close to al-Qaeda. The open question is how to treat Ahrar al-Sham, as the largest rebel group alongside ISIS. Its militant Salafist orientation, which makes it the al-Nusra Front’s closest ally, speaks against involving it in talks. Although Ahrar has been seeking since 2015 to position itself as a partner for the United States and its allies, there is no sign that it intends to abandon its alliance with the jihadists. Since 2012 Ahrar al-Sham (“The Free Men Rise of an Organisation of Syria”) has established itself as one of the The emergence of Ahrar al-Sham can be strongest forces in the Syrian uprising. Like traced indirectly to the regime’s decision most other rebel groups it has suffered to amnesty prisoners, including many of from the rise of ISIS since April 2013, and the thousands of incarcerated Islamists. for some time its best days appeared to be The later leader of Ahrar al-Sham, Hassan over. Yet it managed to hold onto northern, Abbud, and other leading figures were central and southern parts of the country released from the notorious Saidnaya prison in 2013 and 2014. In spring 2015 a joint outside Damascus in May 2011. In June 2011 offensive by Ahrar and the al-Nusra Front some of the Islamists, most of whom origi- captured the provincial capital of Idlib nated from Hama and Idlib, founded an in the north. The territorial gains of the armed formation calling itself “Battalions Islamist alliance – “the Army of Conquest” of the Free Men of Syria” (Kata’ib Ahrar (Jaish al-Fath) – in north-western Syria al-Sham). presented such a threat to the regime that Islamists soon represented the strongest Moscow started deploying troops in April current in the Syrian uprising, and by early 2015 and began air strikes against the 2013 Ahrar was already one of the most rebels at the end of September. important groups. One reason for this was the group’s judicious alliances, which have Dr. Guido Steinberg is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 27 May 2016 1 become one of its trademarks. In December Militant Salafists 2012 Ahrar founded the Syrian Islamic Ahrar al-Sham belongs to the Islamist/ Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya as-Suriya), along Salafist part of the rebel spectrum. It aims with ten smaller Islamist and Salafist to topple Asad and replace his regime with organisations. Although the constituent an Islamic state based on sharia. While its groups retained their independence, three leadership has never spelled out in detail of them merged into the dominant Ahrar what the political system of such a state the very next month, and Ahrar renamed would look like, it is sure to be strongly itself the Islamic Movement of the Free Men authoritarian. of Syria (Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya). Until recently, Ahrar al-Sham regarded It was now able to expand its influence from the armed struggle as the only means to Idlib and Hama to the city and province of achieve its ends. Well into 2015 it was still Aleppo and later also to the east and south categorically excluding talks with the of the country. By summer 2013 it was pres- regime, and leading representatives regu- ent wherever Syrian rebels were fighting. larly criticised the exile opposition’s wil- In the course of 2013 Ahrar al-Sham lingness to compromise. In this respect became the strongest force in the Syrian Ahrar closely resembles the al-Nusra Front, uprising, with ten to twenty thousand which also wants an Islamic state and whose fighters. It participated in numerous major concept of political order is probably largely battles with regime forces, including the identical with Ahrar’s. One important dif- capture of several important military bases ference is that Ahrar al-Sham pursues no and the provincial capital of Raqqa in objectives outside of Syria. Its arguments March 2013. Encouraged by its successes, are largely nationalistic and its military the organisation abandoned its policy of activities to date give no grounds to suggest strict secrecy. In an interview with the – if it succeeded in toppling Asad – that it Qatari broadcaster al-Jazeera on 8 June 2013, would threaten neighbouring states. Hassan Abbud – whose identity had until Ahrar al-Sham also shares the sectarian then been completely unknown – spoke hatred of the jihadists. Although Ahrar freely about the organisation, its goals and has repeatedly asserted that it has nothing ideology, showed his face and allowed his in principle against the country’s religious full name to be revealed. minorities, bigotry towards Christians, This public turn was accompanied by Alawites and Shiites is often apparent in an intensification of contacts with other its statements. This is even reflected in its Salafist groups, culminating in November vocabulary: the Ahrar leadership uses the 2013 in the founding of the second Islamic negative term “Nazarenes” (nasrani) – which Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya). As well as Ahrar is popular among Salafists – to describe and the other members of the first Islamic Christians, rather than the usual Arabic Front, this formation now also included the masihi. Alawites and Shiites are dismissed as armed groups Suqur al-Sham (Idlib), Liwa nusairi and rafida. So when Ahrar describes al-Tauhid (Aleppo), Jaish al-Islam (Damascus the Asad regime as Alawite (nusairi) it is and environs), Ansar al-Sham (Latakia) and clearly thinking in the categories of reli- Liwa al-Haqq (Homs). While Ahrar al-Sham gious strife. Ahrar regards the fight against remained the most important single group Asad and the Syrian Alawites as a “holy within the new alliance, it lost the domi- war” against the expansion of Shiite Islam nance it had enjoyed in the first Islamic and Tehran’s supposed plan to create a Front. Together with its new allies, Ahrar Shiite state extending from Palestine made an immediate mark in December through Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to Iran. 2013, capturing the crucial border crossing Events during the August 2013 offensive of Bab al-Hawa from the Free Syrian Army by a broad alliance of rebel groups in the (FSA). coastal mountains, in which Ahrar al-Sham SWP Comments 27 May 2016 2 played a decisive role, demonstrate that Ahrar’s fighters refused to turn against these indications of an anti-Alawite and ISIS, having fought together with members anti-Shiite ideology are more than mere of the new organisation when they still rhetoric. In Alawite villages captured belonged to the al-Nusra Front or other during the first days of the operation, the smaller jihadist groups. Ideological affin- rebels committed numerous murders and ities, too, discouraged many members of other atrocities against innocent civilians Ahrar from fighting against the jihadists. and abducted more than two hundred to Eventually, though, a confrontation was pressure the government. To this day the inevitable, spurred on by pressure from fate of most of the hostages remains a other members of the Islamic Front. By the mystery. end of 2013 they were demanding increas- Ahrar al-Sham demonstrated similar ingly vehemently that Ahrar join the fight brutality against Shiite villages in Aleppo against ISIS. Gradually escalating skirmish- and Idlib provinces. Rebel groups including es with ISIS began in December 2013 after Ahrar al-Sham besieged Nubul and Zahra in the Islamic Front captured the border Aleppo province from July 2012 to February post at Bab al-Hawa.
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