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Six Scenarios for Pro-Regime Militias in 'Post-War' Syria

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Six Scenarios for Pro-Regime Militias in 'Post-War' Syria MARCH 2019 Six scenarios for pro-regime CRU Policy Brief militias in ‘post-war’ Syria Pro-regime militias have played a key role in military offensives and local security enforcement during the Syrian civil war. They proved crucial tools in ensuring the survival of the regime of President Assad and shaped the course of the war. Today, the regime and its allies are seeking to bring their ‘war on terrorism’ against remaining rebel forces to a conclusion. In parallel, the future role of pro-regime militias in Syria’s political order has become contested between the Syrian regime and its main international backers – Iran and Russia. This has left Western European policy makers uncertain about the true nature of the political and military forces that will run the Syrian state. Israel watches the situation closely as it takes an understandable interest in the future political order of its neighbour. This policy brief identifies the most important interests of Russia, Iran and the Syrian regime in respect of pro-regime Samar Batrawi & Nick Grinstead militias. Their visions for the future of these militias are explored through six possible scenarios. The potential effects of each scenario carry important ramifications for the future of the Syrian state and its people, including possibilities for the safe and voluntary return of refugees. Introduction1 150,000.2 At the same time, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) had fallen from its pre-war size At the end of 2017, fighters in local and of 220,000 troops to around 25,000 active foreign pro-regime militias in Syria were and deployable troops.3 Pro-regime militias estimated to number between 100,000 and played a key role in many military offensives and local security enforcement throughout the Syrian civil war. They essentially helped guarantee the regime’s survival. Without pro- regime militias, Assad would probably have 1 The authors are grateful to Nanar Hawach (Uppsala University) for his contribution to this brief, as 2 Lister, C. & Nelson, D. (2017), All the President’s well as to Erwin van Veen (Clingendael) and Neda Militias: Assad’s Militiafication of Syria. Online: Bolourchi (Rutger University’s Center for Middle http://www.mei.edu/content/article/all- Eastern Studies) for their peer review. The brief is president-s-militias-assad-s-militiafication- part of Clingendael’s Levant research programme, syria (Accessed 15-08-2018); Alaaldin, R. et al., which examines the role of coercive organisations A 10-degree shift in Syria strategy, Washington DC: in relation to the political orders of Syria and Iraq. Brookings Policy Brief, 2018. Its research results to date can be accessed here. 3 Ibid. CRU Policy Brief been unable to secure the Damascus-Homs- reduced the SAA to half its size by mid-2013.7 Aleppo axis, coastal regions, Hama and large Desperate for more manpower to battle parts of southern Syria; all key economic the increasing myriad of armed opposition locations that together hold the majority of groups, the regime began to mobilise and the Syrian population. These victories have, enlist pro-regime militias. This was a survival however, come at a cost to its central power strategy that eroded the regime’s monopoly and monopoly on violence. on violence and magnified the influence of foreign pro-regime sponsors such as Iran. During recent months, Syria’s war has entered a new phase. As the guns have fallen Unlike in many other countries, the use largely silent, relative stability appears to be of militias is legally possible under Syria’s spreading across the country.4 The situation Military Service law. According to Chatham offers the Syrian regime an opportunity to House’s Kheder Khaddour, the language of portray itself as the only legitimate, sovereign the law permits the use of ‘auxiliary forces’ and, crucially, capable centre of rule of what and ‘other forces that are necessitated by it refers to as ‘post-war’ Syria.5 And now that circumstances’ to fight within the SAA’s the Syrian regime and its allies are steering a framework.8 Hence, this law provided political process to conclude ‘Syria’s war on the legal basis for the proliferation of terrorism’, the future of pro-regime militias local militias as the SAA lost troops at an has become an important area of friction astonishing rate and proved unsuccessful between the regime’s key allies, Russia and in recruiting fresh manpower. In contrast, Iran. 6 This brief examines these frictions and local militias have been more successful maps pathways for their resolution in the in mobilising Syrians to fight since they form of six scenarios. often rely on communal networks and allow fighters to stay close to home. In addition to being stationed closer to home, joining Loyalist militias and the Syrian a militia also offered better financial and civil war social benefits, which grew as the conflict continued. During the first months of the Syrian civil While the SAA was able to offer various war, prospects of a regime victory were financial and social benefits to its officers slim. Border provinces fell rapidly to the prior to 2011, these gradually diminished Syrian opposition and, according to the during the conflict.9 Such benefits were International Institute for Strategic Studies, facilitated by the networks of new elites that military casualties and defections had emerged from Assad’s neoliberal reforms 4 Polianskaya, A. (2018), Syrian President Assad Flies to Russia to Meet for Talks with Putin. 7 Lund, A. (2015), Who Are the Pro-Assad Militias? Online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ Online: http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/59215 world/europe/syria-assad-russia-putin-talks- (Accessed 15-08-2018); see also: https://www. latest-war-recovery-economy-a8357596.html middleeasteye.net/news/who-are-pro-assad- (Accessed 15-08-2018). militias-syria (2015) (Accessed 14 March 2019). 5 Leenders, R. & Mansour, K. (2018), 8 Khaddour, K. (2016), Strength in Weakness: ‘Humanitarianism, State Sovereignty, and The Syrian Army’s Accidental Resilience, Authoritarian Regime Maintenance in the Syrian Carnegie Middle East Center. Online: War’, in Political Science Quarterly, 133, 2, p. 225. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ACMR_ 6 Polianskaya, A. (2018), Syrian President Assad Khaddour.pdf (Accessed 22-08-2018). Flies to Russia to Meet for Talks with Putin. 9 Khaddour, K. (2016), Strength in Weakness: Online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ The Syrian Army’s Accidental Resilience, world/europe/syria-assad-russia-putin-talks- Carnegie Middle East Center. Online: latest-war-recovery-economy-a8357596.html https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ACMR_ (Accessed 15-08-2018). Khaddour.pdf (Accessed 22-08-2018). 2 CRU Policy Brief in the early and mid-2000s.10 The rise of has become a bone of contention between these elites also deepened patronage Russia and Iran. As many of these militias networks throughout the SAA and, as a represent the interests of their sponsors, result, nepotism and clientelism became which have significant leverage through a crucial mechanisms for promotion into the widespread territorial footprint, their future army’s upper ranks.11 After 2011, these same place in Syria’s military and political order networks facilitated the smooth incorporation matters. of militias into the SAA’s structure and chain of command. The model of command for President Assad’s forces shifted from Russian and Iranian visions professional military leadership in charge for Syria of classic warfare to leadership by loyalist individuals with either a military or business background who fused traditional military It is easy to oversimplify Russia’s and Iran’s and new paramilitary forces to fight more interests in Syria. Both states are driven by flexibly and locally, while investing significant numerous, sometimes overlapping, interests ‘personal’ funds in the creation of new that go beyond mere ideological dogmatism. units. For example, the pro-regime militias The key interests behind Russia’s vision for Tiger Forces was initially funded by Bashar Syria are: al-Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf and led by top Alawite general Suheil al-Hassan. Militias • Projecting legitimacy in the Middle East should therefore be seen as both a product as a direct challenge to the US. Russia and a beneficiary of the neo-patrimonial wishes to promote its international image networks that gradually infiltrated the SAA as a capable great power able to manage from the early 2000s. and solve the Syrian war; something the US has been unable or unwilling to do. This means that the current status of pro- Russia also portrays itself as being in a regime militias in Syria is one of hybridity more legitimate position than the US, rather than irregularity. In other words, pro- since the Syrian state ‘invited’ Russian regime militias are not irregular units that assistance operate outside the preexisting structures of the SAA. Rather, many loyalist regime • Undermining the UN-led political militias were fostered by the regime and have processes without destroying them ‘operated within the same structures’ as the completely by creating parallel tracks SAA.12 Moreover, as the conflict progressed, (e.g. Astana) that can ultimately present a many militias have benefited from Russian, fait accompli to the UN at a later date Iranian, regime or regime-affiliated support. Now that the SAA, together with Russian • Fostering US and EU recognition of and Iranian forces, has regained control Russia as an important and credible actor over substantial parts of Syrian territory, in the fight against terrorism the future of Syria’s pro-regime militias • Upholding the principle of the supremacy of state sovereignty by supporting the Syrian state over the (liberal) notion that 10 See for example: Hadidi, S., Z. Majed and a state’s sovereignty can be abrogated in F.
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