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Hama Governorate, February 2018 OVERALL FINDINGS1

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Hama Governorate, February 2018 OVERALL FINDINGS1 Hama Governorate, February 2018 Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS) OVERALL FINDINGS1 Coverage Hama Governorate, located on the banks of the Orontes River, is positioned to the south of Idleb Governorate and the north of Homs Governorate. An offensive against the group known as the Islamic Ziyara State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in late August 2017, followed by a rapid escalation in conflict in northern ALEPPO Hama in mid-September, resulted in large-scale displacement, both within and out of the governorate to IDLEB neighbouring Idleb. For further information on displacement trends in Hama governorate in the second Shat-ha half of 2017, please refer to the northern Hama HSOS Trends Analysis. In February 2018, 14 of the 49 LATTAKIA assessed communities, primarily in Hama district, reported that only 1-25% of the pre-conflict population Madiq Castle remained. Additionally, over half of the assessed communities stated that further pre-conflict populations Hamra left their communities in February, primarily due to an escalation in conflict. Approximately 200 - 375 IDPs As-Suqaylabiyah returned to their communities of origin, Jeb Ramleh, Zaytuneh and Kanfo2. Of the assessed communities, KarnazKafr Zeita seven reported hosting IDPs in February. Across these communities, IDPs reportedly most commonly lived Suran in shared apartments our houses that they were renting or that they owned. Tell Salhib Muhradah Of the assessed communities, five reported that between 51-100% of the buildings in their community Jeb Ramleh were damaged. Of these communities, Harbanifse reported that there was no electricity source available Hama Saboura As-Saan in the community and Al Amiqiyah and Hawash reported relying primarily on generators. The remaining Hama two communities stated that they were able to access the network as their main source of electricity Masyaf As-Salamiyeh in February. Of the assessed communities, 14 reported that there were no health services available to Eastern Wadi El-oyoun residents. Prosthetics and orthotics, rehabilitation services and orthopaedic assistance were listed as the Harbanifse Bari most needed services in 20 of the assessed communities, primarily in Hama district that was strongly Ein Oqeirbat affected by conflict in previous months. Additionally,15 of the assessed communities reported that residents Halaqim Oj coped with a lack of medical services by recycling medical items, using non-medical items for treatment or TARTOUS carrying out operations without anaesthetics. The majority of communities assessed in Hama stated that HOMS their most common source of water was the network or water trucking. Two communities, Mazhal and Ein Communities assessed (49 of 553) Eljern, primarily relied on rainwater, which was reportedly fine to drink in Mazhal but tasted and/or smelled Subdistricts with communities assessed (15 of 22) bad in Ein Eljern. Six communities, mainly in Hama district, stated that water tasted and/or smelled bad, and 22 reported that they had an insufficient amount of water to meet household needs. Top 3 reported priority needs Demographics* Of the assessed communities, 20 reported that a lack of resources to purchase available foods and/or the high cost of some items were the primary challenges faced by residents in accessing sufficient amounts of Food security food, while 15 of these communities reported that residents lacked access to markets. Overall, 17 of the 1. 1,466,242 people in need assessed communities reported that the majority of household incomes in their community were insufficient 2. Healthcare in February. The majority of these communities stated that residents coped with the lack of income by 747,783 718,459 reducing the size of meals or selling household assets, while five of them reported that children were being 3. Water security * 3 Figures based on HNO 2018 population data for the sent to work or beg . entire governorate. KEY EVENTS First Hama offensive launched Second Hama offensive launched Heavy fighting between ISIL-held pocket in northern ISIL-held pocket in northern north of Hama city, resulting in ISIL comes under siege in north of Hama city, resulting in opposition groups and regime Hama governorate continues to Hama decreases as offensive to the displacement of over 40,000 Oqeirbat5. the displacement of over 120,000 forces in northern Hama grow8. expel the group intensifies9. individuals4. individuals6. countryside7. 21 March 2017 18 August 2017 19 September 2017 6 November 2017 January 2018 Early February 2018 Hama Governorate, February 2018 Governorate areas of influence: Area of influence TURKEY Sourced from Live UA Map, 28 February 2018 Opposition - Free Syrian Army (FSA) Opposition - Free Syrian Army AR RAQQA (Olive Branch/Idleb Shield) ALEPPO IDLEB Democratic Federation of Northern Syria - Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF-coalition) Democratic Federation of Northern Syria - Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ISIL-affiliated groups Assessed Community Hama City HOMS 2 Hama Governorate, February 2018 DISPLACEMENT Estimated percent of pre-conflict population (PCP) displaced from community: Estimated number of IDP arrivals 0 in assessed communities in February. ALEPPO Estimated number of spontaneous 200 - 375 returns in assessed communities IDLEB in February2. Communities with the largest estimated number of IDP arrivals: No reported IDP arrivals Top 3 subdistricts of origin of most IDPs arrivals3,4: Hama No reported IDP arrivals 22 communities reported no PCP departures. HOMS Top 3 reasons for PCP displacement in the remaining 27 assessed communities3,4: Neighbourhood reporting spontaneous returns this month Estimated % of pre-conflict population displaced Escalation of conflict 85% from community Subdistrict with one or more assessed communities reporting spontaneous returns this month Loss of income 33% 0-24% 25-49% 75-100% 50-74% Subdistrict with no assessed communities reporting spontaneous returns this month Loss of assets 26% 3 Multiple choices allowed. 3 4 By percent of communities reporting. Hama Governorate, February 2018 SHELTER AND NFI Fuel sufficiency: Primary source of electricity 11 communities reported no lack of fuel. Most reported:4 common strategies to cope with a lack of fuel in the remaining 37 assessed communities3,4: 42% Network 65+49+38+27+22 Burning furniture not in use 65% 37% Generator Burning furniture in use 49% 21% No source Burning plastic 38% Burning waste 27% 42+37+21+++A Cutting trees to burn 22% Hama Governorate average reported rent price in Syrian Pounds (SYP) across 12,625 SYP assessed communities.5 6,319 SYP Syrian average reported rent price in SYP across assessed communities.5 Most commonly reported shelter type for PCP (in red) and IDP (in grey) households4: 72+ Independent apartment/ house 43 72% Insufficient fuel reported Subdistrict with assessed communities +23+ 43% Sufficient fuel reported Subdistrict with no assessed communities Shared apartment/ house 57 23% Governorate capital +2+ 57% Collective public space 0 2% Reported fuel prices (in SYP)5: +2+ 0% Tent 0 2% Governorate average Governorate average Syrian average price +0+ 0% Fuel type: price in February: price in January: in February: 0 Coal (1 kilogram) 313 347 345 +0+ Diesel (1 litre) 367 438 321 0 Butane (1 canister) 6,626 6,093 6,997 +0+ 0 Firewood (1 tonne) 56,550 55,036 64,533 3 Multiple choices allowed. 4 4 By percent of communities reporting. 5 1 USD = 434 SYP (UN operational rates of exchange as of 1 March 2018) Hama Governorate, February 2018 HEALTH Presence of health facilities in assessed communities: 14 Communities reported that no assessed medical items were available in their community. Communities reported that the majority of women did not have access to formal health facilities 23 to give birth. 15 communities reported that residents experienced no barriers to accessing healthcare services. The barriers in the remaining 32 assessed communities were3,4: 69+44+25+16+13+9+9+3 No health facilities available in the area 69% High cost of transportation to facilities 44% Hama Security concerns when traveling to facilities 25% Healthcare services too expensive 16% Lack of transportation to facilities 13% Old age 9% Disability/injuries/illness preventing travel 9% No health facilities reportedly available in area Subdistrict with assessed communities Security concerns to enter/remain in facilities 3% Health facilities reportedly available in area Governorate capital Subdistrict with no assessed communities 24 communities reported that residents were not using coping strategies to deal Top 3 most needed healthcare Top 3 most common health with a lack of medical supplies. The coping strategies used in the remaining 15 services reported3,4: problems reported3,4: communities were3,4: 80+73+33 Psychiatric care 37% Diarrhoea 41% Using non-medical items for treatment 80% Recycling medical items 73% Orthopedic services 33% Malnutrition 37% Carrying out operations without anaesthesia 33% Chronic disease support 33% Chronic diseases 27% 3 Multiple choices allowed. 5 4 By percent of communities reporting. Hama Governorate, February 2018 WASH Water sufficiency for household needs: 6 Communities reported that water from their primary source tasted and/or smelled bad. 0 Communities reported that drinking water from their primary source made people sick. 25 communities reported that residents had no problems with latrines. The most prevalent problems with latrines in the remaining 21 assessed communities were3,4: 76+19+19+10+10+10+10+ Inability to empty septic
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