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A/HRC/40/70 Advance Edited Version A/HRC/40/70 Advance Edited Version Distr.: General 31 January 2019 Original: English Human Rights Council Fortieth session 25 February–22 March 2019 Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, ** Summary Extensive military gains made by pro-government forces throughout the first half of 2018, coupled with an agreement between Turkey and the Russian Federation to establish a demilitarized zone in the north-west, led to a significant decrease in armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in the period from mid July 2018 to mid January 2019. Hostilities elsewhere, however, remain ongoing. Attacks by pro-government forces in Idlib and western Aleppo Governorates, and those carried out by the Syrian Democratic Forces and the international coalition in Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, continue to cause scores of civilian casualties. In the aftermath of bombardments, civilians countrywide suffered the effects of a general absence of the rule of law. Numerous civilians were detained arbitrarily or abducted by members of armed groups and criminal gangs and held hostage for ransom in their strongholds in Idlib and northern Aleppo. Similarly, with the conclusion of Operation Olive Branch by Turkey in March 2018, arbitrary arrests and detentions became pervasive throughout Afrin District (Aleppo). In areas recently retaken by pro-government forces, including eastern Ghouta (Rif Dimashq) and Dar’a Governorate, cases of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance were perpetrated with impunity. After years of living under siege, many civilians in areas recaptured by pro-government forces also faced numerous administrative and legal obstacles to access key services. The foregoing violations and general absence of the rule of law paint a stark reality for civilians countrywide, including for 6.2 million internally displaced persons and 5.6 million refugees seeking to return. For these reasons, any plans for the return of those displaced both within and outside of the Syrian Arab Republic must incorporate a rights- based approach. In order to address effectively the complex issue of returns, the Commission makes a series of pragmatic recommendations for the sustainable return of all displaced Syrian women, men and children. * Agreement was reached to publish the present report after the standard publication date owing to circumstances beyond the submitter’s control. ** The annex to the present report is being circulated as received, in the language of submission only. A/HRC/40/70 Contents I. Mandate and methodology ............................................................................................................ 3 II. Introductory remarks ..................................................................................................................... 3 III. Political and military developments .............................................................................................. 5 IV. Protection of civilians.................................................................................................................... 6 V. Life behind the frontlines .............................................................................................................. 11 VI. Internally displaced persons and refugees ..................................................................................... 17 VII. Ongoing investigations into chemical attack ................................................................................. 18 VIII. Recommendations ......................................................................................................................... 19 Annex Map of the Syrian Arab Republic .................................................................................................. 20 2 A/HRC/40/70 I. Mandate and methodology 1. In the present report, submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to Council resolution 34/26, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic presents its findings based on investigations conducted from 11 July 2018 to 10 January 2019.1 The methodology employed by the Commission was based on best practices of commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions. 2. The information contained herein is based on 271 interviews conducted in the region and from Geneva. The Commission collected, reviewed and analysed satellite imagery, photographs, videos and medical records. Communications from Governments and non- governmental organizations were taken into consideration, as were United Nations reports. 3. The standard of proof was considered met when the Commission obtained and corroborated a reliable body of information sufficient to conclude that there were reasonable grounds to believe the incidents occurred as described and that violations were committed by the warring party identified. The Commission’s investigations remain curtailed by the denial of access to the Syrian Arab Republic. Protection concerns in relation to interviewees further affected the Commission’s inquiry. In all cases, the Commission remained guided by the principle of “do no harm”. II. Introductory remarks 4. Extensive military gains made by pro-government forces throughout the first half of 2018 coupled with the agreement to establish a demilitarized zone in the north-west (see paras. 14–15 below) led to a marked decrease in violence during the latter half of the reporting period. Pro-government forces 2 carried out a number of attacks against the demilitarized zone in November, however, which killed and injured numerous civilians, including women and children. The security situation in the north-west also remained critical due to infighting between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Levant Liberation Organization)3 terrorists and armed groups. While the Commission welcomes the demilitarization agreement, it remains concerned over the impact of continued hostilities on civilians. Elsewhere, including in the eastern part of the country, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the international coalition4 continue to carry out attacks with devastating consequences. 5. For over seven years, the Commission has meticulously documented the flagrant abuse of military power displayed by all parties to the conflict. All territorial gains resulting from these clashes have come at a severe cost in terms of civilian lives and livelihoods, including due to unlawful siege warfare.5 At the same time, the situation for hundreds of thousands of Syrian women, men and children remains precarious, even in areas where hostilities have abated. 6. In the aftermath of bombardments, civilians in both the demilitarized zone and areas recently retaken by pro-government forces have been suffering the entrenched effects of a 1 The commissioners are Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro (Chair), Karen Koning AbuZayd and Hanny Megally. 2 In instances where it was not clear whether it was the Syrian air force or Russian Aerospace Defence Forces that was responsible for a specific attack, responsibility has been attributed to pro-government forces. 3 The Commission continues to regard the group as a terrorist entity, as designated by the Security Council in its resolution 2170 (2014) and subsequent entries on its sanctions lists (available from www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13365.doc.htm). Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham currently comprises Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (also known as Jabhat al-Nusra and previously as the Al Nusrah Front), Ansar al-Sham and Ajnad al-Sham, among others. Its estimated military strength is 10,000 to 12,000 fighters. 4 Since 2014, an international coalition of more than 60 countries joined together to combat Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant through a variety of means, including air strikes. 5 “The siege and recapture of eastern Ghouta”, conference room paper (A/HRC/38/CRP.3), paras. 75– 77. Available from www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/iicisyria/pages/independentinternational commission.aspx. 3 A/HRC/40/70 general absence of the rule of law. Indeed, seven years of prolonged hostilities 6 have spawned numerous security vacuums, elevating the risk of both continued violence in many areas and impunity for serious human rights violations. During the period under review, the Commission documented several incidents of civilians detained arbitrarily by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or abducted by members of armed groups and criminal gangs and held hostage for ransom in their strongholds in Idlib and northern Aleppo. Civilians in Idlib also suffered from the lack of a centralized system of governance under the parallel structures of two dominant systems: the opposition’s “interim government” and the “salvation government” of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Under the oppressive rule of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham terrorists, girls in Idlib were also denied access to education. 7. Similarly, with the conclusion of Operation Olive Branch by Turkey in March 2018, arbitrary arrests, detention and pillaging became pervasive throughout Afrin District (Aleppo). The lack of effective complaint mechanisms and a centralized judiciary, coupled with the presence of dozens of armed actors power-sharing on the sub-district level, created confusion among civilians about which institution was responsible for addressing specific grievances, including in cases of detention and property appropriation. Infighting among armed groups and a series of car bombs exacerbated an already unstable security situation. As in Idlib, abductions for ransom
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