DOCSLIB.ORG

Shiite Foreign Militias in Syria

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Shiite Foreign Militias in Syria Shiite Foreign Militias in Syria Iran's role in the Syrian conflict and the ISIS fight By Aaron Hesse- Research Fellow August 2015 Introduction: This paper seeks to identify and elucidate the role that Iran-backed Shiite foreign fighters play in Syria and to compare how often they target the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and the Syrian opposition. Shiite foreign fighters inside Syria present a major problem for the Syrian opposition forces due to their generally superior morale and fighting abilities. They also pose a long-term threat to American and Western interests due to their role in expanding the Syrian conflict and increasing its sectarian content. Many of these militias arose in Syria for the stated purpose of protecting Shiite religious shrines.i When ISIS burst onto the scene in summer 2014, the goal of fighting ISIS brutality was added on as a second ostensible purpose of the militias. However, contrary to the prevailing narrative that is based mainly on Iraq, the Iran-backed Shiite militias have been of extremely limited value in the ISIS fight in Syria. This paper will attempt to show that these groups work and perform military duties on behalf of the government of Bashar al-Assad and their benefactors in Iran almost exclusively to target the Syrian rebels. The Iran-backed militias have no real interest in fighting ISIS in Syria. This makes Assad, as well as Iran, unreliable partners in the fight to destroy ISIS. Metrics: This paper will focus on the outsized role that Iran-backed Shiite foreign fighters are playing in Syria. In attempting to quantify this role and whether it has increased, decreased or stayed the same, this paper analyzes information that specified whether or not Iran, Hezbollah or another Iran-backed Shiite militia led the fighting; whether their role increased or decreased; and which groups (Syrian rebels or ISIS) they targeted. The Players: Various Shiite foreign fighter organizations have played a role in combat operations inside Syria. They range from Hezbollah, an Iranian-sponsored militant group based in Lebanon, to the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades from Iraq, to Houthi militants from Yemen and the Zaynebiyun Brigades from Pakistan. These forces mostly operate in the western portion of Syria on a north-south axis that runs from Deraa in the south through Damascus, Homs, Hama and Idlib before ending at Aleppo in the north. It should be noted that many fighters comprising these militias today are Shia fighters who directly or indirectly fought against U.S. soldiers during the Iraq War.ii Below is a listing of the most notable Shiite militia groups now operating in Syria: 1. Iran: The Quds Forces (led by Qassem Suleimani): The Al-Quds Forces are an elite Iranian Special Forces unit born out of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran. The Quds forces are Iran’s extra-territorial operations unit and play a vital role in organizing virtually every foreign Shiite militia operating in Syria. Reports on the extent of Quds Force operations in Syria have led some analysts to conclude that dictator Bashar al-Assad is no longer in control of his military operations to preserve his own regime. 2. Lebanon: Hezbollah (led by Hassan Nasrallah): Hezbollah is probably the most powerful Shiite foreign force, behind the Quds forces, working inside Syria today. Hezbollah initially entered Syria in late 2012 under the guise of defending Shiite villages on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Lebanese border. However, the group is now deployed all across Syria. When the armed Syrian opposition appears close to turning the tide in a vital region, Hezbollah will likely be deployed to stanch the tide. Hezbollah has received heavy political and military support from Iran since the early 1980s. 3: Iraq: Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade (LAFA; led by Abu Ajeeb Abu Hajjariii): Originally organized as the “Defenders of the Sayyida Zeinab Shrine” south of Damascus, Liwa Abu Fadl al- Abbas laid the original groundwork and established the narrative for many of the Shiite militias that subsequently entered the Syrian conflict from across the region. 4. Iraq: Asaib Ahl al-Haq (led by Akram al-Kabi): Commanded by Iran’s Quds Forces, Asaib Ahl al-Haq is an Iraqi Shiite paramilitary group operating in Iraq and Syria. It is an offshoot of Muqtada al- Sadr’s Mahdi Army and its Promised Day Brigade (below).With a size estimated at between 2,000- 4,000 militants, Asaib Ahl al-Haq receives direct support from Hezbollah and Iran’s Quds Forces. 5. Iraq: Haidar al-Karar (led by Akram al-Kabiiv): This is Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s main Syrian military branch. This group fights mainly in Aleppo and was responsible for ending the armed opposition's siege on Aleppo International Airport in early 2014. 6. Iraq: Kataib Hezbollah: A 400-500 fighter strong elite unit of Iraqi Shia fighters operating in Syria and Iraq and directly reporting to the leadership of Hezbollah and the Quds Force. 7. Iraq: Badr Organization (led by Hadi al-Amiri): While technically an Iraqi political party, the Badr Organization also has a massive military wing. It operates mostly in Iraq, and is one of the leading Shiite militant groups actively taking the fight to ISIS inside Iraq, however, it has also made forays into Syria. Estimates of its strength vary widely between 10,000 and 50,000 fighters. 8. Iraq: Al-Youm al-Mawud Brigade (Promised Day Brigade; led by Muqtada al-Sadrv) One of the most powerful and successful Shiite groups in Iraq. Formed after the dissolution of Muqtada al- Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Believed to have sent around 5,000-7,000 fighters into Syria. 9. Afghanistan: Zulfiqar Brigade (led by "Abu Shahed" and "Abu Hajar"vi): This group is significant in that it marked the entry of Afghani Shiites, mostly of Hazara ethnicity, into the conflict in Syria. Before the Liwa Zulfiqar group was formed in mid-2013, most Afghani Shiites fought alongside the Iraqi Shiites in the Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade. 10. Afghanistan: Fatimiyun Brigade: This brigade, comprised of thousands of Aghani Shiites of mainly Hazara ethnicity, was formed following the fall of Mosul to ease the manpower shortages of the Iraqi Shiite foreign fighters in Syria. To date, the brigade's main offensive has been its massive February 2015 attack on the moderate armed opposition in Deraa. 11. Pakistan: Zeinabiyun Brigade: This first-ever brigade for Pakistani Shiite fighters began appearing in Syria in spring 2015. The Beginning: Many Iran-backed foreign fighter organizations have been fighting in Syria for years in an effort to cement the power of the Assad regime and retard the progress of rebels throughout the course of the conflict. Groups like Hezbollah have played integral parts in several Syrian Army operations including the siege of Homs, the battles of the Damascus suburbs and the back and forth stalemate in Aleppo. Some groups have formed, or rather, re-formed, since the rise of ISIS as a powerful force in 2014. The end of 2011 in Syria, when armed clashes between regime forces and the rebel Free Syrian Army began to pick up, marked the beginning of a conflict that would come to embroil most of the Middle East. In 2012 and 2013, it looked as if the rule of Bashar al-Assad was close to ending. He looked to be losing key allies, rebels had captured key border posts, and his hold on several key parts of the country was gone or in serious contention. By the end of 2014, these trends seemed to have been completely reversed, with forces allied to Assad having reclaimed much lost territory. However, as of February 2015, rebels appear to have re-gained the upper hand due mainly to the new Jaish al-Fatah coalition. Many of the Iran-backed foreign fighting groups first entered Syria on the pretense of protecting the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab in Damascus and other Shiite holy sites. Certain Sunni extremist groups consider worship at a shrine or the worship of relics to be takfir, or an impure practice. The extremists within the Afghani Taliban, the Ansar al-Dine militia in Mali, and ISIS in Iraq and Syria have each destroyed shrines and relics for this reason. However, while there were grounds for Shiites to be concerned about the Sayyida Zeinab shrine, the Shiite militias' relevance quickly extended far beyond the protection of Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine. The Trajectory: There is no exact zero moment for the entry of Shiite militias into Syria. In 2012, foreign fighters first began to appear, albeit only in small trickles. In 2013, the trickle became a torrent when Hezbollah announced its direct involvement in Syria1 and stormed the Syrian town of Qusayr, in Homs near the Lebanese border.vii This signaled a larger movement of Shiite foreigners coming into Syria to participate in combat operations. With this offensive, Hezbollah doubled the total number of foreign fighters in Syria in the span of a week. Since the Battle of Qusair, Iran-backed foreign fighter involvement in Syria has steadily increased under the aegis of Iran’s Al-Quds Brigade,viii which is commanded by the powerful and shadowy Iran- Iraq War veteran Qassem Suleimani. Suleimani has reportedly been running several ground operations inside Iraq in an attempt to push ISIS out of northern Iraq and back into Syria.ix He was also reported to have been in southern Syria, in the Deraa area, running operations there as well.x Both the Aghani Zulfiqar Brigade and the Iraqi Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade were formed in the aftermath of Hezbollah's striking victory at Qusair.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iran's Evolving Military Forces
    CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 To download further data: CSIS.ORG To contact author: [email protected] Iran's Evolving Military Forces Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy July 2004 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Cordesman: Iran's Military forces 7/15/2004 Page ii Table of Contents I. IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE: THE “FOUR CORNERED” BALANCING ACT..........1 The Dynamics of the Gulf Military Balance ..........................................................................................................1 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH GULF ........................................................................................................................2 II. IRAN’S ERRATIC MILITARY MODERNIZATION.......................................................................................9 THE IRANIAN ARMY ...................................................................................................................................................9 THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS (PASDARAN).................................................................................14 THE QUDS (QODS) FORCES ......................................................................................................................................15 THE BASIJ AND OTHER PARAMILITARY FORCES ......................................................................................................15 THE IRANIAN
    [Show full text]
  • Hezbollah's Syrian Quagmire
    Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire BY MATTHEW LEVITT ezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things. It is one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and fore- Hmost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Hezbollah is also Lebanon’s largest militia, the only one to maintain its weapons and rebrand its armed elements as an “Islamic resistance” in response to the terms of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war and called for all militias to disarm.1 While the various wings of the group are intended to complement one another, the reality is often messier. In part, that has to do with compartmen- talization of the group’s covert activities. But it is also a factor of the group’s multiple identities – Lebanese, pan-Shi’a, pro-Iranian – and the group’s multiple and sometimes competing goals tied to these different identities. Hezbollah insists that it is Lebanese first, but in fact, it is an organization that always acts out of its self-interests above its purported Lebanese interests. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Hezbollah also has an “expansive global network” that “is sending money and operatives to carry out terrorist attacks around the world.”2 Over the past few years, a series of events has exposed some of Hezbollah’s covert and militant enterprises in the region and around the world, challenging the group’s standing at home and abroad. Hezbollah operatives have been indicted for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague,3 arrested on charges of plotting attacks in Nigeria,4 and convicted on similar charges in Thailand and Cyprus.5 Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises, including drug running and money laundering from South America to Africa to the Middle East, have been targeted by law enforcement and regulatory agen- cies.
    [Show full text]
  • The Resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq
    December 2012 Sam Wyer MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 7 THE RESURGENCE OF ASA’IB AHL AL-HAQ Photo Credit: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq protest in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, September 2012. Photo posted on Twitter by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ©2012 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2012 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036. http://www.understandingwar.org Sam Wyer MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 7 THE RESURGENCE OF ASA’IB AHL AL-HAQ ABOUT THE AUTHOR Sam Wyer is a Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, where he focuses on Iraqi security and political matters. Prior to joining ISW, he worked as a Research Intern at AEI’s Critical Threats Project where he researched Iraqi Shi’a militia groups and Iranian proxy strategy. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from Middlebury College in Vermont and studied Arabic at Middlebury’s school in Alexandria, Egypt. ABOUT THE INSTITUTE The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. ISW is committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Syrian National Council: a Victorious Opposition?
    THE INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES IMES CAPSTONE PAPER SERIES THE SYRIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL: A VICTORIOUS OPPOSITION? JARED MARKLAND KRITTIKA LALWANEY MAY 2012 THE INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT OF THE AUTHOR(S), 2012 THE SYRIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL: A VICTORIOUS OPPOSITION? Jared Markland & Krittika Lalwaney Introduction The Syrian National Council (SNC) emerged as an opposition movement representing the democratic uprisings in Syria calling for regime change. The Assad regime’s forceful measures against Syrians have delegitimized the government and empowered the revolution. The success of the revolution, in overthrowing the regime hinges on the Syrian opposition’s ability to overcome its deficiencies. This paper analyzes the performance of the SNC by determining SNC success or failure to launch a successful opposition movement against the regime. The SNC’s probability of success in the overthrow of the regime is contingent on its ability to unify internally, obtain financial capacity, establish international recognition, and build internal popular support. Methodology The methods used to examine the prospects for success of the SNC as a viable opposition movement consist of comparative case studies and qualitative field research. We examined four case studies, including Nicaragua, Libya, El Salvador and Guatemala. These cases establish a set of core factors necessary for an opposition movement to succeed. The utilization of these factors allows us to create a comparative assessment of the overall performance of the SNC. Our qualitative fieldwork entailed a total of 32 interviews with current SNC members, Syrian activists, refugees, Free Syrian Army members, academic experts, and government officials.
    [Show full text]
  • Syria: "Torture Was My Punishment": Abductions, Torture and Summary
    ‘TORTURE WAS MY PUNISHMENT’ ABDUCTIONS, TORTURE AND SUMMARY KILLINGS UNDER ARMED GROUP RULE IN ALEPPO AND IDLEB, SYRIA Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. © Amnesty International 2016 Cover photo: Armed group fighters prepare to launch a rocket in the Saif al-Dawla district of the Except where otherwise noted, content in this document is licensed under a Creative Commons northern Syrian city of Aleppo, on 21 April 2013. (attribution, non-commercial, no derivatives, international 4.0) licence. © Miguel Medina/AFP/Getty Images https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode For more information please visit the permissions page on our website: www.amnesty.org Where material is attributed to a copyright owner other than Amnesty International this material is not subject to the Creative Commons licence. First published in 2016 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW, UK Index: MDE 24/4227/2016 July 2016 Original language: English amnesty.org CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 METHODOLOGY 7 1. BACKGROUND 9 1.1 Armed group rule in Aleppo and Idleb 9 1.2 Violations by other actors 13 2. ABDUCTIONS 15 2.1 Journalists and media activists 15 2.2 Lawyers, political activists and others 18 2.3 Children 21 2.4 Minorities 22 3.
    [Show full text]
  • In Numbers Highlights
    WFP Syria Crisis Regional Response Situation Report September 2018 In Numbers Highlights 5.6 million refugees from Syria • In September, WFP reached more than 3.2 million refugees – out of a total of 5.6 million registered Syrian refugees – and 3.2 million Syrian refugees assisted in July host community members across Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, USD 4.0 billion injected into local economies of and Turkey through various food and cash-based assistance Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey programmes under the Country Strategic Plan (CSPs) in Egypt and Lebanon, and Transitional Interim CSPs in the three through cash-based transfers, local food countries. procurement and other expenditure since 2012. • Self-organized refugee returns verified by UNHCR in 2018 totalled 28,251 as of September 2018. Results from UNHCR People assisted 49% 51% return intention surveys showed that voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity remains the preferred durable solution for September 2018 Syrian refugees in the region. Overall: Situation Update Regional Refugee US$ 4.4 billion and Resilience Plan Regional WFP share: • As of September 2018, there are around 5.6 million refugees (3RP) 2018-2019 US$ 1.5 billion from Syria in the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. • According to UNHCR’s Return Perception and Intention WFP Net Funding Requirements Surveys conducted in 2018, 76 percent of Syrian refugees (November 2018 – April 2019)* hoped to return to Syria one day, up from 51 percent in 2017, while 19 percent noted that they do not want to come back. Voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity remains the Regional US$ 307.4 million preferred durable solution for Syrian refugees in the region.
    [Show full text]
  • A Case Study on Demographic Engineering in Syria No Return to Homs a Case Study on Demographic Engineering in Syria
    No Return to Homs A case study on demographic engineering in Syria No Return to Homs A case study on demographic engineering in Syria Colophon ISBN/EAN: 978-94-92487-09-4 NUR 689 PAX serial number: PAX/2017/01 Cover photo: Bab Hood, Homs, 21 December 2013 by Young Homsi Lens About PAX PAX works with committed citizens and partners to protect civilians against acts of war, to end armed violence, and to build just peace. PAX operates independently of political interests. www.paxforpeace.nl / P.O. Box 19318 / 3501 DH Utrecht, The Netherlands / [email protected] About TSI The Syria Institute (TSI) is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan research organization based in Washington, DC. TSI seeks to address the information and understanding gaps that to hinder effective policymaking and drive public reaction to the ongoing Syria crisis. We do this by producing timely, high quality, accessible, data-driven research, analysis, and policy options that empower decision-makers and advance the public’s understanding. To learn more visit www.syriainstitute.org or contact TSI at [email protected]. Executive Summary 8 Table of Contents Introduction 12 Methodology 13 Challenges 14 Homs 16 Country Context 16 Pre-War Homs 17 Protest & Violence 20 Displacement 24 Population Transfers 27 The Aftermath 30 The UN, Rehabilitation, and the Rights of the Displaced 32 Discussion 34 Legal and Bureaucratic Justifications 38 On Returning 39 International Law 47 Conclusion 48 Recommendations 49 Index of Maps & Graphics Map 1: Syria 17 Map 2: Homs city at the start of 2012 22 Map 3: Homs city depopulation patterns in mid-2012 25 Map 4: Stages of the siege of Homs city, 2012-2014 27 Map 5: Damage assessment showing targeted destruction of Homs city, 2014 31 Graphic 1: Key Events from 2011-2012 21 Graphic 2: Key Events from 2012-2014 26 This report was prepared by The Syria Institute with support from the PAX team.
    [Show full text]
  • Pdf （2012 年 7 月 29 日にアクセス）
    2014年 2 月 The 1st volume 【編集ボード】 委員長： 鈴木均 内部委員： 土屋一樹、齋藤純、ダルウィッシュ ホサム、石黒大岳、 渡邊祥子、福田安志 外部委員： 内藤正典 本誌に掲載されている論文などの内容や意見は、外部からの論稿を含め、執筆者 個人に属すものであり、日本貿易振興機構あるいはアジア経済研究所の公式見解を 示すものではありません。 中東レビュー 第 1 号 2014 年 2 月 28 日発行© 編集： 『中東レビュー』編集ボード 発行： アジア経済研究所 独立行政法人日本貿易振興機構 〒261-8545 千葉県千葉市美浜区若葉 3-2-2 URL: http://www.ide.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Periodicals/Me_review/ ISSN: 2188-4595 ウェブ雑誌『中東レビュー』の創刊にあたって 日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所では 2011 年初頭に始まったいわゆる「アラブの春」と その後の中東地域の政治的変動に対応して、これまで国際シンポジウムや政策提言研究、アジ 研フォーラムなどさまざまな形で研究成果の発信と新たな研究ネットワークの形成に取り組ん できた。今回、中東地域に関するウェブ雑誌『中東レビュー』を新たな構想と装いのもとで創 刊しようとするのも、こうした取り組みの一環である。 当研究所は 1975 年 9 月刊行の『中東総合研究』第 1 号以来、中東地域に関する研究成果を 定期的に刊行される雑誌の形態で公開･提供してきた。1986 年 9 月以降は『現代の中東』およ び『中東レビュー』として年 2 回の刊行を重ねてきたが、諸般の事情により『現代の中東』は 2010 年 1 月刊行の第 48 号をもって休刊している。『中東レビュー』はこれらの過去の成果を 直接･間接に継承し、新たな環境のもとでさらに展開させていこうと企図するものである。 今回、不定期刊行のウェブ雑誌『中東レビュー』を新たに企画するにあたり、そのひとつの 核として位置づけているのが「中東政治経済レポート」の連載である。「中東政治経済レポート」 はアジ研の中東関係の若手研究者を中心に、担当する国･地域の政治･経済および社会について の情勢レポートを随時ウェブ発信し、これを年に一度再編集して年次レポートとして継続的に 提供していく予定である。 『中東レビュー』のもうひとつの核は、変動しつつある現代中東を対象とした社会科学的な 論稿の掲載である。論稿についても随時ウェブサイトに掲載していくことで、執筆から発表ま でのタイムラグを短縮し、かつこれを『中東レビュー』の総集編に収録する段階で最終的にテ キストを確定するという二段階方式を採用する。なお使用言語は当面日本語と英語の２カ国語 を想定しており、これによって従来よりも広範囲の知的交流を図っていきたいと考えている。 『中東レビュー』はアジア経済研究所内外にあって中東地域に関心を寄せる方々の、知的･ 情報的な交流のフォーラムとなることを目指している。この小さな試みが中東地域の現状につ いてのバランスの取れた理解とアジ研における中東研究の新たな深化･発展に繋がりますよう、 改めて皆様の温かいご理解とご支援をお願いいたします。 『中東レビュー』編集ボード 委員長 鈴木 均 1 目 次 ウェブ雑誌『中東レビュー』の創刊にあたって 鈴木 均 Hitoshi Suzuki･･･････････････････････････････････････････1 ページ 中東政治経済レポート 中東政治の変容とイスラーム主義の限界 Paradigm Shift of the Middle
    [Show full text]
  • The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Beyond
    THE JIHADI THREAT ISIS, AL QAEDA, AND BEYOND The Jihadi Threat ISIS, al- Qaeda, and Beyond Robin Wright William McCants United States Institute of Peace Brookings Institution Woodrow Wilson Center Garrett Nada J. M. Berger United States Institute of Peace International Centre for Counter- Terrorism Jacob Olidort The Hague Washington Institute for Near East Policy William Braniff Alexander Thurston START Consortium, University of Mary land Georgetown University Cole Bunzel Clinton Watts Prince ton University Foreign Policy Research Institute Daniel Byman Frederic Wehrey Brookings Institution and Georgetown University Car ne gie Endowment for International Peace Jennifer Cafarella Craig Whiteside Institute for the Study of War Naval War College Harleen Gambhir Graeme Wood Institute for the Study of War Yale University Daveed Gartenstein- Ross Aaron Y. Zelin Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Washington Institute for Near East Policy Hassan Hassan Katherine Zimmerman Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy American Enterprise Institute Charles Lister Middle East Institute Making Peace Possible December 2016/January 2017 CONTENTS Source: Image by Peter Hermes Furian, www . iStockphoto. com. The West failed to predict the emergence of al- Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate— and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strate- gies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analy sis and diverse views.
    [Show full text]
  • In Numbers Highlights
    WFP Syria Crisis Regional Response Situation Report August 2018 In Numbers Highlights 5.6 million refugees from Syria • In August, WFP reached an estimated 3.0 million refugees – out of a total of 5.6 million registered Syrian refugees – and 3.0 million Syrian refugees assisted in July host community members across Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, USD 4.0 billion injected into local economies of and Turkey through various food and cash-based assistance Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey programmes under the Country Strategic Plan (CSPs) in Egypt and Lebanon and Transitional Interim CSPs in the three through cash-based transfers, local food countries. procurement and other expenditure since 2012. • Self-organized refugee returns registered by UNHCR in 2018 totalled 23,416 as of August 2018. The United Nations People assisted 49% 51% maintains that it does not promote refugee returns to Syria until conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified returns are in August 2018 place. Overall: Situation Update Regional Refugee US$ 4.4 billion and Resilience Plan Regional WFP share: • As of August 2018, there are around 5.6 million refugees from (3RP) 2018-2019 US$ 1.5 billion Syria in the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. WFP Net Funding Requirements Jordan (October 2018 – March 2019)* • The Nasib border crossing between Syria and Jordan remains closed for now. Media reports in August said that the crossing is ready to receive Syrian refugees’ return from Jordan. Nasib Regional US$ 256.4 million has been vital for the transport of goods from Lebanon and Syria to Jordan and the Gulf states until it was closed off in Egypt US$ 14.8 million 2015, when it fell to Syrian opposition factions.
    [Show full text]
  • Syrian Armed Opposition Powerbrokers
    March 2016 Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 29 SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION POWERBROKERS Cover: A rebel fighter of the Southern Front of the Free Syrian Army gestures while standing with his fellow fighter near their weapons at the front line in the north-west countryside of Deraa March 3, 2015. Syrian government forces have taken control of villages in southern Syria, state media said on Saturday, part of a campaign they started this month against insurgents posing one of the biggest remaining threats to Damascus. Picture taken March 3, 2015. REUTERS/Stringer All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. ©2016 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2016 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 | Washington, DC 20036 www.understandingwar.org Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 29 SYRIAN ARMED OPPOSITION POWERBROKERS ABOUT THE AUTHORS Jennifer Cafarella is the Evans Hanson Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War where she focuses on the Syrian Civil War and opposition groups. Her research focuses particularly on the al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra and their military capabilities, modes of governance, and long-term strategic vision. She is the author of Likely Courses of Action in the Syrian Civil War: June-December 2015, and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: An Islamic Emirate for al-Qaeda.
    [Show full text]
  • Shia Strength - Iraqi Militants Adapt to the US Drawdown
    TERRORISM & INSURGENCY Date Posted: 30-Sep-2011 Jane's Intelligence Review Shia strength - Iraqi militants adapt to the US drawdown Key Points Iranian-backed Shia militants in Iraq are responsible for a disproportionately high number of the US casualties suffered in recent months. Kataib Hizbullah, the most sophisticated group, is considered a direct extension of Iran's Qods Force and could become involved in international operations in support of Iranian goals. Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Promised Day Brigades are Iraqi Shia insurgent groups, whose links to Iran peaked in 2008 and have slowly reduced since then. Iraq's 'special groups', such as Kataib Hizbullah and Promised Day Brigades, have stepped up attacks as US forces look to withdraw. Michael Knights looks at Iran's support for the Shia militants, their operations and their post-US future. The US military suffered its heaviest monthly casualties in Iraq in three years in June, when 14 of its soldiers were killed in action. At least 12 of them were killed by Iranian-backed 'special groups', prompting fresh complaints from the US that Iran was encouraging its Iraqi allies to step up their attacks as the scheduled withdrawal of all US forces from Iraq looms. The surge in attacks highlighted the threat posed by Shia militants, especially if the US and Iraqi governments sign an agreement allowing US forces to stay beyond the 31 December withdrawal deadline. Even if the US leaves as previously agreed, Iran is expected to continue to back Iraqi proxies in order to influence the political situation and retain an ability to strike Western assets in the country and possibly elsewhere.
    [Show full text]