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Shiite Foreign Militias in

Iran's role in the Syrian conflict and the ISIS fight

By Aaron Hesse- Research Fellow August 2015

Introduction: This paper seeks to identify and elucidate the role that -backed Shiite foreign fighters play in Syria and to compare how often they target the Islamic State in and Sham (ISIS) and the . Shiite foreign fighters inside Syria present a major problem for the Syrian opposition forces due to their generally superior morale and fighting abilities. They also pose a long-term threat to American and Western interests due to their role in expanding the Syrian conflict and increasing its sectarian content.

Many of these militias arose in Syria for the stated purpose of protecting Shiite religious shrines.i When ISIS burst onto the scene in summer 2014, the goal of fighting ISIS brutality was added on as a second ostensible purpose of the militias. However, contrary to the prevailing narrative that is based mainly on Iraq, the Iran-backed Shiite militias have been of extremely limited value in the ISIS fight in Syria.

This paper will attempt to show that these groups work and perform military duties on behalf of the government of Bashar al-Assad and their benefactors in Iran almost exclusively to target the Syrian rebels. The Iran-backed militias have no real interest in fighting ISIS in Syria. This makes Assad, as well as Iran, unreliable partners in the fight to destroy ISIS.

Metrics: This paper will focus on the outsized role that Iran-backed Shiite foreign fighters are playing in Syria. In attempting to quantify this role and whether it has increased, decreased or stayed the same, this paper analyzes information that specified whether or not Iran, or another Iran-backed Shiite militia led the fighting; whether their role increased or decreased; and which groups (Syrian rebels or ISIS) they targeted.

The Players: Various Shiite foreign fighter organizations have played a role in combat operations inside Syria. They range from Hezbollah, an Iranian-sponsored group based in , to the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades from Iraq, to Houthi from and the Zaynebiyun Brigades from . These forces mostly operate in the western portion of Syria on a north-south axis that runs from Deraa in the south through , , and before ending at in the north. It should be noted that many fighters comprising these militias today are Shia fighters who directly or indirectly fought against U.S. soldiers during the .ii Below is a listing of the most notable Shiite militia groups now operating in Syria:

1. Iran: The Quds Forces (led by Qassem Suleimani): The Al-Quds Forces are an elite Iranian Special Forces unit born out of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran. The Quds forces are Iran’s extra-territorial operations unit and play a vital role in organizing virtually every foreign Shiite militia operating in Syria. Reports on the extent of operations in Syria have led some analysts to conclude that dictator Bashar al-Assad is no longer in control of his military operations to preserve his own regime.

2. Lebanon: Hezbollah (led by ): Hezbollah is probably the most powerful Shiite foreign force, behind the Quds forces, working inside Syria today. Hezbollah initially entered Syria in late 2012 under the guise of defending Shiite villages on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Lebanese border. However, the group is now deployed all across Syria. When the armed Syrian opposition appears close to turning the tide in a vital region, Hezbollah will likely be deployed to stanch the tide. Hezbollah has received heavy political and military support from Iran since the early 1980s.

3: Iraq: Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade (LAFA; led by Abu Ajeeb Abu Hajjariii): Originally organized as the “Defenders of the Sayyida Zeinab Shrine” south of Damascus, Liwa Abu Fadl al- Abbas laid the original groundwork and established the narrative for many of the Shiite militias that subsequently entered the Syrian conflict from across the region.

4. Iraq: Asaib Ahl al-Haq (led by Akram al-Kabi): Commanded by Iran’s Quds Forces, Asaib Ahl al-Haq is an Iraqi Shiite group operating in Iraq and Syria. It is an offshoot of Muqtada al- Sadr’s Mahdi Army and its (below).With a size estimated at between 2,000- 4,000 militants, Asaib Ahl al-Haq receives direct support from Hezbollah and Iran’s Quds Forces.

5. Iraq: Haidar al-Karar (led by Akram al-Kabiiv): This is Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s main Syrian military branch. This group fights mainly in Aleppo and was responsible for ending the armed opposition's on Aleppo International Airport in early 2014.

6. Iraq: Kataib Hezbollah: A 400-500 fighter strong elite unit of Iraqi Shia fighters operating in Syria and Iraq and directly reporting to the leadership of Hezbollah and the Quds Force.

7. Iraq: (led by Hadi al-Amiri): While technically an Iraqi political party, the Badr Organization also has a massive military wing. It operates mostly in Iraq, and is one of the leading Shiite militant groups actively taking the fight to ISIS inside Iraq, however, it has also made forays into Syria. Estimates of its strength vary widely between 10,000 and 50,000 fighters.

8. Iraq: Al-Youm al-Mawud Brigade (Promised Day Brigade; led by Muqtada al-Sadrv) One of the most powerful and successful Shiite groups in Iraq. Formed after the dissolution of Muqtada al- Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Believed to have sent around 5,000-7,000 fighters into Syria.

9. : Zulfiqar Brigade (led by "Abu Shahed" and "Abu Hajar"vi): This group is significant in that it marked the entry of Afghani Shiites, mostly of Hazara ethnicity, into the conflict in Syria. Before the Liwa Zulfiqar group was formed in mid-2013, most Afghani Shiites fought alongside the Iraqi Shiites in the Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade.

10. Afghanistan: Fatimiyun Brigade: This brigade, comprised of thousands of Aghani Shiites of mainly Hazara ethnicity, was formed following the fall of Mosul to ease the manpower shortages of the Iraqi Shiite foreign fighters in Syria. To date, the brigade's main offensive has been its massive February 2015 attack on the moderate armed opposition in Deraa.

11. Pakistan: Zeinabiyun Brigade: This first-ever brigade for Pakistani Shiite fighters began appearing in Syria in spring 2015.

The Beginning: Many Iran-backed foreign fighter organizations have been fighting in Syria for years in an effort to cement the power of the Assad regime and retard the progress of rebels throughout the course of the conflict. Groups like Hezbollah have played integral parts in several operations including the , the of the Damascus suburbs and the back and forth stalemate in Aleppo. Some groups have formed, or rather, re-formed, since the rise of ISIS as a powerful force in 2014.

The end of 2011 in Syria, when armed clashes between regime forces and the rebel began to pick up, marked the beginning of a conflict that would come to embroil most of the Middle East. In 2012 and 2013, it looked as if the rule of Bashar al-Assad was close to ending. He looked to be losing key allies, rebels had captured key border posts, and his hold on several key parts of the country was gone or in serious contention. By the end of 2014, these trends seemed to have been completely reversed, with forces allied to Assad having reclaimed much lost territory. However, as of February 2015, rebels appear to have re-gained the upper hand due mainly to the new Jaish al- coalition.

Many of the Iran-backed foreign fighting groups first entered Syria on the pretense of protecting the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab in Damascus and other Shiite holy sites. Certain Sunni extremist groups consider worship at a shrine or the worship of relics to be takfir, or an impure practice. The extremists within the Afghani , the Ansar al-Dine militia in Mali, and ISIS in Iraq and Syria have each destroyed shrines and relics for this reason. However, while there were grounds for Shiites to be concerned about the Sayyida Zeinab shrine, the Shiite militias' relevance quickly extended far beyond the protection of Sayyida Zeinab’s shrine.

The Trajectory: There is no exact zero moment for the entry of Shiite militias into Syria. In 2012, foreign fighters first began to appear, albeit only in small trickles. In 2013, the trickle became a torrent when Hezbollah announced its direct involvement in Syria1 and stormed the Syrian town of Qusayr, in Homs near the Lebanese border.vii This signaled a larger movement of Shiite foreigners coming into Syria to participate in combat operations. With this offensive, Hezbollah doubled the total number of foreign fighters in Syria in the span of a week.

Since the of Qusair, Iran-backed foreign fighter involvement in Syria has steadily increased under the aegis of Iran’s Al-Quds Brigade,viii which is commanded by the powerful and shadowy Iran- Iraq War veteran Qassem Suleimani. Suleimani has reportedly been running several ground operations inside Iraq in an attempt to push ISIS out of northern Iraq and back into Syria.ix He was also reported to have been in southern Syria, in the Deraa area, running operations there as well.x

Both the Aghani Zulfiqar Brigade and the Iraqi Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade were formed in the aftermath of Hezbollah's striking victory at Qusair. When the rise of ISIS in mid-2014 forced many Iraqi Shiite fighters to return home, Iran attempted to plug the gaps by expanding Afghani recruitment and introducing the first-ever brigade for Pakistani Shiites, the Zainebiyun Brigade. A recent report

** However, rumors and reports of Hezbollah and Iraqi militias’ presence inside Syria have been dated to as far back as mid-2011. One of the earliest videos of Hezbollah’s presence in Syria, published in July 2011, shows Hezbollah fighters with machine guns and in Horan in southern Syria.

also documented several Iranian Revolutionary Guards-sponsored contingents of Yemeni Houthis entering Syria to receive training and participate in fighting.xi The report indicated that as many as 3,000 to 4,000 Houthis have received training, and it is believed that there are always around 400 Houthi fighters in Syria at any given moment. Ultimately, the membership of Iran-backed foreign militia groups in Syria is truly global, with reports of foreign fighters from as far away as and Africa.xii

In addition to the deluge of Iran-backed foreign fighters, Iran has also increasingly solidified its control over Syrian members of the Alawite sect, which constitutes the Assad dictatorship's main support base. Iran trained an all-Syrian Alawite militia called the National Defense Forces in late 2012. The militia has since surpassed the regular Syrian regime forces in terms of size. In recent months, Iran has also begun recruitment for additional Alawite militias called the "Shield" Forces. These forces appear to have even more direct Iranian control.

In February 2014, Iranian MP Seyyed Mahmoud Nabavian estimated that Iran had trained some 150,000 Syrian regime fighters in Iran and another 150,000 inside Syria, in addition to some 50,000 Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon.xiii These numbers, although surely an exaggeration, give some idea of the massive scale of Iranian recruitment in Syria.

The South: Southern Syria, and more specifically, the city of Deraa, is commonly called the “Cradle of the Revolution.” Deraa is where protests first broke out in 2011, where the first protesters were killed, where tanks first rolled into populated areas, and where the first Syrian soldiers defected to the Free Syrian Army rebel group.xiv Today, Deraa is the last major stronghold of the Free Syrian Army, which has since been endorsed by the U.S. Over 30,000 rebel fighters in Deraa have unified under the Free Syrian Army-affiliated Southern Front, creating the largest Free Syrian Army operations room in the history of the Syrian conflict.

However, Iran and the Assad regime have responded by launching what is probably the largest Shiite foreign fighter offensive in the history of the Syrian conflict. This Iran-backed offensive began in early February 2015, at a time when the Southern Front had been making sustained military gains and were just 10 miles from the most crucial suburbs of the capital Damascus. During the course of this offensive, 8,000 foreign fighters consisting mainly of Afghani Shiites (now organized under the Fatemiyun Brigade) and Iraqi Shiites massed against the Southern Front. They had only minimal assistance from Assad regime forces, a sign of the Assad regime's desperation and its increasing loss of control over military operations to defend its rule.xv

Iran's massive offensive against the Free Syrian Army scored some initial successes before stalling. In the end, the offensive pushed back Southern Front forces 6 miles before the Southern Front held the lines and achieved compensatory gains near the Jordanian border. Since the offensive, the Southern Front has seized control of the ; conquered the ancient city of al-Sham; and stormed and captured the crucial Base 52, which is the main regime military base in the Jordanian border area. The importance of the Southern Front cannot be overstated. The Shiite militias operating in Deraa fully understand that holding the south is the key to the eventual fate of Damascus and Assad's ultimate survival in power.

At the time of writing, is in the midst of its most extensive series of bombing raids yet against Hezbollah targets inside Syria. Some think that the Shiite encroachment into the south points to an Iranian plot to open up a second front in the with Israel,xvi and the recent Israeli air raids are widely considered to be reflective of this concern.

The North: In the north, the story is far more fluid and complex. Due to the continued stalemate in Aleppo, the rise of ISIS and the presence of so many diverse actors working at cross-purposes, the calculus on the ground has shifted for all of the groups involved. These groups include the armed Kurdish battalions (chiefly the PYD), the and Free Syrian Army groups, Assad regime forces, ISIS and a great many of the Shiite militias under discussion.

In the north, the Shiite militias have been extremely advantageous to the Assad regime. They have effectively ensured the current stalemate while continuing to provide damaging on-the ground- intelligence against rebel locations. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, (AHH) which is based out of Aleppo, has been instrumental in several operations north of Aleppo City including the operation to take the Sheikh Najar industrial areaxvii and the conquest of Aleppo Prison. As mentioned above, Haidar al-Karar contributed by ending the rebel siege on Aleppo International Airport.xviii The Shiite militias have even taken over the training of much of the pro-regime militias operating in the north.xix

The complications and factional divides that have plagued the rebels in the North present an almost polar opposite to the unified, moderate nature of the rebels in the south. For a large majority of the conflict, both the regime and the rebels have hotly contested the countryside surrounding Aleppo as well as the province of Idlib just south of Aleppo. Since March 2015, however, rebels in the province of Idlib have unified under the Jaish al-Fatah coalition to score a series of rapid gains, seize control of Idlib Province almost in full, and begin to encroach on the main mountain pass to the Assad regime's coastal heartland.

The , or militia fighters loyal to Assad, have recently been quite ineffective, especially in the north.xx These under-trained fighters are known and reviled for their indiscriminate use of violence. Some reports indicate that the Pasdaran have employed Hezbollah to train Shabiha fighters on how to use violence strategically instead of gratuitously so as to prevent unintended unrest.xxi This is a clear case of Iranian troops and Iranian sponsored troops training Syrian militants and assuming large roles in combat operations.

The Results: Shiite militias have been playing an increasingly vital role in combat operations throughout Syria, especially since the rise of ISIS. The main turn of events really came when, in late 2012 and early 2013, it looked as if the Assad regime was in real danger of collapsing. Iran increased its economic, logistical and material support to provide fighters, oil and gas supplies, credit lines, infrastructure maintenance, combat command and control support, , and other forms of support.

When ISIS stormed Mosul from Syria in mid-2014, Iran saw its client government in as severely threatened. ISIS's invasion of Iraq from Syria led to a greater involvement by Iran’s Quds forces in the ISIS fight and the direct involvement of Quds Force commander Qassem Suleimani to shore up the Iraqi government in Baghdad. This was a very important and telling move, indicating that Iran saw ISIS as a real threat to its influence over Iraq that had been built up over the previous decade.

However, this renewed focus on ISIS from Iran-backed militias did not extend to Syria, as the data below will soon indicate. Instead, Iranian-backed militias trained their fire mainly on the moderate rebels. To maintain focus, the data will examine only the period immediately before and after July 2014, when ISIS stormed back into Syria fresh from its dramatic conquest of Mosul. At that point, ISIS clearly posed a major threat to the region and to the Iraqi Shiite militias fighting with Assad, so Iran had a clear choice to make in Syria between continuing to fight the Syrian rebels or shifting the fight to ISIS. By comparing the time periods before and after the fall of Mosul, we can understand what changes, if any, that Iran made in its Syria strategy in response to this event.

We took a random sampling of 50 news sources (in and English) on battlefield engagement sin Syria in the six months before ISIS conquered Mosul and the six months after. Prior to ISIS conquering Mosul, we found that 11 of the 50 articles mentioned Shiite militias, Hezbollah or Iran’s Quds Forces playing a significant role in combat against the Syrian rebels. In a random sampling of sources six months later, we found 18 articles out of 50 that contained information asserting that Shiite militias, Hezbollah or Quds brigades had played a significant role in combat against the Syrian rebels.

Therefore, as ISIS took more Syrian territory throughout 2014, the Assad regime gave more and more command responsibilities to Hezbollah and other Shiite militias. These militias were not deployed to target ISIS, but increasingly targeted the Syrian rebels. The focus, for Iran and Assad, became about fighting Syrian rebels in strategically significant territories (i.e., Damascus, central Syria and the north around Aleppo and Idlib) and leaving the East to the desolation of Daesh. After the new Jaish al-Fatah rebel coalition scored rapid gains in Idlib, Assad essentially abandoned this area as well.

Conclusion: As in early 2013, Assad today looks to be in serious trouble once again. His forces have lost near-total control of Idlib Province and, at the time of writing, the Jaish al-Fatah coalition has advanced south from Idlib to score massive gains against the regime in the Ghab Plain. Jaish al-Fatah is now just 4 miles away from the Joureen army base, which guards a mountain pass to the Assad regime's coastal heartland and is reportedly a key military base for Iran-backed foreign fighters in Syria.

Add to this the Southern Front's repulsion of Hezbollah advances and subsequent gains near the Jordanian border; the resistance of rebels in the Zabadani suburb of Damascus to a massive and heavily publicized Hezbollah offensive; the recent gains by rebel forces in Daraya, on the doorstep of downtown Damascus; and the crumbling of Assad regime forces in the town of Tadmur like so many ancient ruins; and the Assad regime could very well be under more threat than ever before, especially since these setbacks for the regime are occurring despite the best efforts of Iran-backed Shiite foreign fighters in Syria.

Many of these Shiite militias were deployed with the express purpose of protecting Syria’s Shia shrines. However, many of them have been playing a far more nefarious role for years now. Groups like Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Haidar al-Karar overwhelmingly serve just one purpose: protecting and supporting the survival of the Assad regime. Indeed, one of the founding members of the Pasdaran, Moshen Sazagara has been quoted as saying: “One of Iran’s wings will be broken if Assad falls. They are now using all their contacts from Iraq to Lebanon to keep him in power.”

The presence of these groups also raises the broader, more salient question about the intentions, interests and goals of the Iranian government. As in 2013, Iran appears to be ready to spend more of its own oil, blood and treasure to keep Assad and Damascus from falling. Quds commander Qassem Suleiman has said: “In the coming days the world will be surprised by what we are preparing, in cooperation with Syrian military leaders,” as reports of as many as 10,000 Iranian-backed soldiers have come to act as Assad reinforcements. Unprecedented bombardments on various Damascus suburbs closely followed, signifying the Iran may have plans for a rump state that protects the capital Damascus, the Assad regime's coastal heartland, and Hezbollah's supply line into Lebanon.

Effectively, the Syrian conflict, and by association, the Assad regime itself, has been allowed to fester due in large part to Iran. The nuclear negotiations have prevented extra U.S. pressure on Assad, and perhaps more importantly, on Iran’s support for Assad. Shiite militias have been used to devastating effect all over the country to divide people along sectarian lines and prolong the suffering of all . If the Syria crisis is going to be solved, the Shiite militias must be checked and Iran must be held to account for its role in prolonging this conflict. The real problem that needs addressing and surely will need a solution, is figuring out how to curb Iran’s influence in Syria even after Assad falls.

The Economist. “Unsavory Allies: The growing power of Shia militias in Iraq and Syria poses a tricky problem.” . September 16, 2014.

Alaaldin, Ranj. “Blood on their hands: Are Shia militias the right allies for the U.S.?”CNN. April 8, 2015.

Smythe, Philip. “Phases of Shiite Militia development and Deployment in Syria and Iraq, Appendix A.” From: The Shiite in Syria and Its Regional Effects, Policy Focus #138. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. January 2015. See also: Knights, Michael. “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraq’s Shiite Militias in Syria.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 27, 2013.

Syria Direct. “Shiite Militias are a Major Player in Syria.” September 10, 2014.

Jordan Times. From . “Iraqi Shiite Militants Acknowledge Role in Syria.” April 15, 2015.

Smyth, Philip. “Liwa’a Zulfiqar: Birth of A New Shia Militia in Syria?” Hizbollah Cavalcade. June 20, 2013.

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “The Return of Iraqi Shi’I Militias to Syria.” The Middle East Institute. , 2015.

Smyth, Philip. 2015. The Shiite Jihad in Syria.

Black, Ian and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Qassem Suleimani: Commander of Quds force, Puppeteer of the Middle East.” . June 16, 2014.

Rosen, Armin. “The myth behind Iran’s military mastermind is getting out of control.” Business Insider. March 16, 2015.

Now Media. “Houthis Receive Syria Training.” March 3, 2015.

Slavin, Barbara. “Shiite Militias Mixed Blessing in Iraq, Syria.” Al-Monitor. February 9, 2015.

Naame Shaam, Iran in Syria: From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force. 1st ed. September, 2014.

Helberg, Kristin. “Four Years of War in Syria: Where the Uprising Began and Still Lives On.” Qantara. March 22, 2015.

Ibid.

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “The Return of Iraqi Shi’I Militias to Syria.”

Al-Tamimi, Aymen Jawad, “Iraq: Who are Asaib Ahl Al-Haq’s Islamists?” March 6, 2014. : The author indicates that AHH is operating in Aleppo under the banner of an alternate organization called Liwa Kafeel Zeinab, part of the Badr Organization.

Al-Jaffal, . “Iraqi Shiites Join Syria War.” October 29, 2013. ; See Also: Seattle Times. “Iraqi Shiites get more involved in Syrian Struggle.” May 26, 2013.

Baker, Aryn. Syria’s Assad May Be Losing Control Over His Deadly Militias.” TIME. September 11, 2013.

‘Hezbollah shifts tactics, narrative for Syria fight’, AFP, April 14, 2014, available:

Stratfor, ‘The Use of in Syria’s Crackdown’, Ocnus. Net, 15 January 2012.