When Is Power-Sharing Not Enough? Military Inclusion and Coup-Conflict Link

By Anastasiia Soboleva

Submitted to Central European University Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Political Science

Supervisor: Professor Matthijs Bogaards

Vienna, Austria

CEU eTD Collection (2021)

Abstract: The thesis addresses conflict-promoting military defection through the link

between coup d'état and civil conflict. As the Arab Spring shows, disobedience by the ruler’s

ethnic rivals hitherto included in the army is puzzling because they should have enjoyed their

intra-regime strategic position. This research develops a framework of power-sharing between

the incumbent and non-dominant factions in fractionalized, potentially unstable societies by

adapting Svolik’s (2012) model. As argued, defection becomes preferable when credibility of

a coup threat is diminished – i.e., when the ruler reneges via enhancing own praetorian forces,

which is coupled by the faction’s low initial capabilities and present social unrest offering a

moment for defection. Illustration of the model on Syria reveals that a decent place of Sunni

officers and concurrent strength of security forces produced lasting co-habitation under Hafez

al-Assad, accompanied by a lacking opportunity for defection. Thirty years later, however, the

Arab Uprising gave Sunnis a good chance to abandon Bashar al-Assad, which had been

preceded by disempowerment and parallel enhancement of elite units. Quantitative analysis

on Roessler’s (2011) data supports the role of the praetorian build-up in inducing defection

and rebellion, such that reneging features greater explanatory power than the extent of

inclusion alone. Whereas unrest and the parameters’ interrelation are not evidenced

statistically, it might indicate limited applicability of the framework or equally the need for a

more case-oriented approach. Greater attention is therefore required to the ruler’s interaction

with opponents who can prefer insurgency once capabilities turn insufficient for a credible

coup threat. CEU eTD Collection

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 1 1. Constructing the framework ...... 4 1.1 Coup-conflict link and Power-sharing ...... 4 1.2 Military inclusion ...... 6 1.3 Coup-proofing ...... 7 1.4 Reneging: Security forces build-up ...... 10 1.5 Defection and Background social mobilization ...... 11 2. Formal modelling ...... 14 2.1 Game description ...... 14 2.2 Equilibrium and Hypotheses ...... 16 3. Qualitative analysis ...... 18 3.1 Methodology ...... 18 3.2 Illustrative case study of Syria ...... 19 3.2.1 Military and Sunni under Hafez al-Assad ( ) ...... 20 3.2.2 Elite units ( ) and Instability of the late 1970s ( ) ...... 21 3.2.3 Disempowerment under Bashar al-Assad ( ) ...... 25 3.2.4 Elite units ( ) and the Arab Spring ( ) ...... 26 4. Quantitative analysis ...... 30 4.1 Methodology ...... 30 4.1.1 Parameters operationalization ...... 30 4.1.2 Control variables ...... 32 4.2 Results ...... 33 Conclusion ...... 41 Appendix 1: Formal modelling ...... 46 1.1 Payoffs calculation ...... 46 1.2 Game solution ...... 47 CEU eTD Collection Appendix 2: Quantitative analysis ...... 49 Bibliography ...... 55

iii

Introduction

In the early 2010s, a number of Arab countries witnessed how its military personnel preferred

to abandon the incumbent in the face of mass mobilization. The decision to defect during the

Arab Upheaval became crucial for the ultimate removal of long-standing leaders in Tunisia,

Egypt, Libya, and Yemen [Barany 2011; Bellin 2012; Lutterbeck 2013]. Yet in some cases,

military defection also precipitated full-blown civil conflict.

In Syria, Libya, and Yemen – the countries that experienced such a scourge – the division of

armed forces ultimately led to anti-government insurgency. Though defection was of varying

degrees and within different ranks, disobedient behaviour in all the three states markedly

featured group (tribal or sectarian) affiliation distinct from that of the incumbent [Ibid.].1 An

especially illustrative case in this respect is Syria, where defection of Sunni mid- and low-

ranking officers from the Alawite regime eventually induced the formation of the Free Syrian

Army, a loose network of militias, in July 2011 [Albrecht, Ohl 2016: 47]. While pointing to

the presence of post-defection rebellion, the countries actually help to enlighten an interesting

route – that civil conflict and military coup, both headed by the faction non-affiliated with the

ruler, are closely interweaved. Drawing on the notion of power-sharing in fractionalized

societies, the thesis presents a broader framework for the link between civil war and

overthrow by rival groups included in the army,2 which occurs against the backdrop of

feasible full-fledged instability.

CEU eTD Collection On a par with civil war, coup threat posed by soldiers embodies another conspicuous

repertoire of political violence [Kalyvas 2019]. Problematized as a lack of civilian control

1 Though, the Yemeni case may be not a perfect example because one of the first top-brass defectors was General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, hailing from the same tribe as President Saleh [Barany 2011:30; Albrecht, Ohl 2016:46]. 2 The “army” is used as an equivalent to “military” and “armed forces”.

over the army and its resulting interference in politics [Feaver 1999], civil-military relations

have focused on different tools aimed at deterring subversion – i.e. coup-proofing [Quinlivan

1999: 133]. More recently, scholars have also addressed the pernicious effect of coup

aversion on civil strife. It is thus found to enfeeble peace not only through reduced

effectiveness in combating insurgents [Gaub 2013; Rwengabo 2013], but crucially, through

conflict promotion as such due to an exclusionary policy within the state apparatus.

In this latter perspective, Roessler (2011, 2016) ruminates upon the dilemma permeating

ethnically divided, weak states, such as in sub-Saharan Africa. Those countries are caught in a

coup-civil war trap: a dominant group either shares power with rival factions – admitting

them to coercive resources and unwillingly enhancing their coup capabilities – or excludes

them from participation, relying on co-ethnics but thereby augmenting civil war risk [Roessler

2016: 5-6]. However, sometimes representatives of non-ruling groups in the army prefer to

rebel, even though they factually partake in power-sharing. These factions embark on a riskier

path of defection and full-scale violence, whereas in theory they should enjoy access to state

resources through which they can threaten a leader with an ouster [Geddes 2009; Svolik

2013]. The extreme examples of this pattern are exactly the Arab Spring’s Syria, Libya and

Yemen, where rival groups, though then represented in the army, abandoned the regime in

order to challenge it from outside through insurgency. Such a puzzle prompts us to elaborate a

wider framework for military inclusion and coup-conflict link in weak fractionalized societies

[Roessler 2016: 6], which would consider the interplay between the government and

personnel amongst potentially eruptive instability. This entails the question: when is inclusion CEU eTD Collection unable to prevent defection and further rebellion?

To answer this, the work elaborates a logic of power-sharing between the incumbent and non-

dominant social factions3 by adapting the formal model of Svolik (2012). Thus, the ruler

shares power with the rival faction through incorporating it in the military, i.e. giving access

to coercive resources and hence enabling the group to present the threat of an overthrow.

What matters, though, is that success of an attempted coup must be feasible, or credible. Such

a property declines when the ruler starts to renege on power-sharing by augmenting praetorian

security forces, loyal based on origin and protecting the regime against subversion. As argued,

defection of the military faction and challenge from outside become an option when those

anti-coup-forces, coupled by insufficient capabilities granted upon power-sharing, preclude

the very possibility of success – while there is some background social unrest permitting

wide-scale defection to happen.

The work proceeds as follows. First, it covers major concepts that are necessary for arriving at

an understanding of military inclusion and the coup-conflict alternative in fractionalized

societies. Second, the logic is presented in the form of a game-theoretic model, based on

which main expectations about the probability of defection are inferred. Third, the model is

illustrated through a case study of Syria, the country used to introduce the research puzzle and

thus deemed a typical case [Gerring, Cojocaru 2016: 395] for the current framework. Fourth,

the implications are tested in statistical analysis on Roessler’s (2011) data covering sub-

Saharan Africa’s ethnic groups, which is supposed to be an evaluation sample for the model

guided by the MENA country. The final section concludes.

CEU eTD Collection

3 Which can be ethnicities, sects, or tribes.

1. Constructing the framework

1.1 Coup-conflict link and Power-sharing

Till today, military coups and civil conflict have been largely addressed as separate

phenomena. This, however, tends to overlook an intriguing and not less practical realm –

namely, the link between the two [Sudduth 2016]. Amongst recent scholarship, some studies

revolve around reduced battleground effectiveness of troops as a result of coup-proofing

measures.4 Others look at diverse interactions between external threats to the regime and

soldiers’ proneness to conspiracy.5 Yet, one more branch worth deeper examination is that

coup aversion is found to be closely associated with conflict promotion.

In this perspective, one of the insights is articulated by Roessler (2011, 2016) who suggests

the existence of a so-called coup-civil war trap in weak fractionalized societies, of which sub-

Saharan Africa is a good example. The basic logic of the argument states that a typical ruler is

faced with a tough political choice since she stems from some ethnic group possessing akin

ethnic rivals. The dilemma is therefore between sharing power with these latter, admitting

them to state coercive resources but thereby unwittingly enhancing coup capabilities – and

political exclusion featured by reliance on the ruler’s co-ethnics in relevant institutions,

which, though, provokes those excluded to challenge the regime via rebellion. As shown,

newly-minted leaders taking power in a coup usually feel themselves highly insecure so that

they are predisposed to purge the most menacing factions, their former co-conspirators, and

4 For instance, Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) test the level of domestic counterbalancing and war outcomes over

CEU eTD Collection 1967-1999, revealing poorer performance under higher coup-proofing. Rwengabo (2013) discusses reduced effectiveness of the Ugandan army in combating insurgents, tracing that to techniques that President Museveni has deployed. In turn, Gaub (2013) reveals the similar debilitating impact in Libya under Muammar Qaddafi. 5 This line largely concerns moral hazard between the military and the ruler. Particularly, Acemoglu et al. (2010) address decision-making about the army size upon looming civil war, which in turn translates into institutional power vis-à-vis the incumbent. Thus, coups occur when the military is medium-sized: then its capacity is enough to suppress insurgency but insufficient to push the ruler not to downsize troops later. Similarly, Svolik (2013) posits that military intervention is most likely at the middle levels of mass threats, when repression resources allocated to soldiers are inadequate to deter the leader from reneging, while being sufficient to portend the successful coup outcome. For a comprehensive literature review on the topic, see Sudduth (2016).

thus instigate future civil war. Moreover, exclusive politics also hampers counterinsurgency

measures because poor ethnic brokerage at localities undermines territorial control, leading to

a greater amount of indiscriminate state violence [Roessler 2011: 316,332; Roessler 2016: 5-

6, 99].

Roessler’s argument illuminates an important security dilemma, which essentially helps

depart to a broader framework of credible commitment. As the author himself puts it,

“credible powersharing emerges when rivals gain no significant strategic advantage from

ethnopolitical exclusion”, i.e. both ruling and opponent groups have comparably strong threat

capacities such that the leader gets dissuaded from risking a devastating civil war [Roessler

2016: 271]. That is, what makes power-sharing durable is the real ability of contenders to

threaten the incumbent with an ouster. By permitting the existence of such an ability and,

furthermore, guaranteeing its long-run presence through institutionalization, the ruler aims to

signal her genuine commitment to the agreement.

This intentional tightening of own hands has become a renowned strand in the literature on

autocracies, where the mechanism of credible commitment is reputed to be a major source of

regime stability. Particularly, being suspicious of the dictator who himself cannot trust

anyone, the winning coalition may require some assurance against a feasible abuse such as

expropriation or direct purge. It is hence a rational decision by the dictator to establish an

independent dominant party that would provide autonomous recruitment and rents distribution

[Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012] as well as allow for collective leader-challenging action if

CEU eTD Collection elites perceive a danger [Brownlee 2008; Gehlbach, Keefer 2011]. The argument also

transcends the political realm, engaging with the economy too. Autocrats, who are distrusted

by private investors, can rely on third institutions and ensure good economic climate to show

readiness to co-operate and rule out the possibility of expropriation [Gilson, Milhaupt 2011;

Cooley, Heathershaw 2017].

Although power-sharing is usually understood in the strict sense whereupon a party to such

agreement becomes involved in the country’s leadership, here we allow for a broader

conception. Power-sharing – also referred to as a power-sharing pact – is treated as inclusion

in the state apparatus which might possibly come to the strategic advantage of the non-ruling

group and respective disadvantage of the incumbent. In other words, it is incorporation in the

state system taken generally, not necessarily a place within the elite.

1.2 Military inclusion

Power-sharing can be organized along various dimensions, such as political, economic,

territorial, or – what is discussed further – military [Hartzell, Hoddie 2003]. This latter site

can become an apposite means to incorporate diverse groups, especially when society in

question features pronounced ethnic/religious/tribal fractionalization. Indeed, while the army

has been studied either as an actor opposing the leader in view of own interests [Geddes 1999;

Svolik 2013; Johnson, Thyne 2018] or, conversely, the one subjected to manipulative coup-

proofing strategies [Feaver 1999; Makara 2013, 2016; Albrecht 2015] – it is useful to draw

revamped attention to the function of representation.

Such a republican understanding of public institutions presumes that the armed forces have to

reflect society at large and possess the link to it [Janowitz 1960; Eitelberg 1989]. For instance,

the army turns out to be a critical venue for power-sharing in the aftermath of civil conflicts

through proportional distribution of positions [Hartzell, Hoddie 2003: 320]. In this work, the

function of group representation is intertwined with the emphasis on strategic calculation of

CEU eTD Collection the ruler. Similarly to Roessler’s proposition, incorporation in the military comes as a way to

share power with rival factions that would otherwise try to ouster the regime from outside via

rebellion. Specifically, by inclusion we imply both the action of inclusion, as well as

preservation of the presence if group members are already included. Moreover, even though

power-sharing may connote representation in the top brass, here we consider professional

military personnel on the whole, i.e. the entire officer corps.6

What is crucial is that realization of power-sharing via granting a place in the army translates

not just in direct regime patronage and professional benefits. It renders a faction an ace up its

sleeve, which is the access to state resources that can be helpful in mounting a coup. That is, it

should turn into the mechanism of commitment whereupon outside groups become wittingly

able to threaten the ruler with an overthrow. And indeed, the coercive apparatus is the very

site where subversion-related resources are concentrated, making this venue one of most apt

in communicating the leader’s desire to co-operate.

However, intentional weakening of the capacity to pose a credible threat should imply that the

ruler does not follow the initial pact. It is here where coup-proofing which invalidates the

agreement comes in.

1.3 Coup-proofing

Taken broadly, coup-proofing techniques can be of two types – those reducing soldiers’

ability to conspire, and those diminishing the willingness to do so [Feaver 1999: 225]. The

first type is usually referred to as institutional (structural) coup-proofing, under which the

coercive apparatus is divided into “rival organizations that check and balance each other”

[Belkin, Schofer 2003: 613]. Either by obstructing schemers’ coordination and concerted

action, essentially required for the takeover [Pilster, Böhmelt 2011; Gaub 2013], or by

promoting competition between security branches and hence the desire to oppose rival CEU eTD Collection conspirators [Belkin, Schofer 2003, 2005; De Bruin 2018] – institutional coup-proofing

occupies a vital place in the regime’s toolkit.

6 Rank-and-file members are not taken into account since they are primary subordinates and thus are not deemed a party to the pact.

Specifically, Belkin and Schofer’s (2003, 2005) counterbalancing index, which accounts for

military and paramilitary7 bodies coupled by the proportion of their personnel, is found to

prevent coup attempts from succeeding [Powell 2012: 1033]. The same is true for the relative

number of paramilitary vs. military manpower, which can moreover impede the emergence of

bids themselves [Ibid.].8 Further, Böhmelt and Pilster (2015) point to a U-shape relation

between subversion and the number of ground-combat organizations within the coercive

sector. The feasibility that a new bid9 will arise is minimized when there are two comparably

powerful organizations, which thus become quite wary of open conflict [Böhmelt, Pilster

2015: 165-6]. De Bruin (2018) uncovers that coup success is less likely the more there are

counterweighs to the traditional army, as inter-institutional rivalry produces actors ready to

intercept emergent attempts [De Bruin 2018: 1450]. Based on this brief description, the

establishment of paramilitary structures should provide a potent counterforce against plotters.

Yet, the ruler may want to target not just the ability but the very disposition to step in politics.

This can be accomplished through two routes, which are creation of material incentives

promoting loyalty or exploitation of (socially meaningful) traits that may link individuals with

the incumbent [Feaver 1999: 226]. While the former implies diverse regime patronage and

spoils [Collier, Hoeffler 2007; Powell 2012], the latter relies on “communal” recruitment

patterns, keeping positions for people of the same ethnic/religious/tribal descent as the ruler.

Such stacking may target senior ranks only, some special units, or even the whole military –

yet its effectiveness is maximized when it can enact the mechanism of “we-others” distinction

vis-à-vis regime challengers for sufficient personnel. Being bound to the incumbent through CEU eTD Collection identity, they feel own insecurity and therefore turn into prime resisters to government

7 I.e. those commanded outside of the regular armed forces. 8 In quantitative analysis, coup attempts and successful coups are usually tested individually. Here, we do not separate them strictly since the attention is to the whole overthrow enterprise. 9 Though, not a government takeover itself.

opponents, be it protesters or plotters [Makara 2016: 215; Barany 2011; Albrecht 2015].

Indeed, the very argument of ethnic politics elaborated by Roessler (2011, 2016) rests on such

an identity-based mechanism.10

Since fractionalization occupies a vital place in our discussion of power-sharing, the given

framework particularly emphasizes the communal stacking technique. Though the strategy is

usually viewed as directed at the army itself, here we do not treat the latter as evincing the

ruler’s reneging on the pact. If the technique is applied to the military institution itself,

exactly as in the case of Roessler (2011, 2016), then it is assumed to be part of initial power-

sharing. Specifically, it would mean that overrepresentation of the rule’s ethnicity (vs. the

faction’s) in the command does not rule out the existence of power-sharing through inclusion.

The skewed composition of military personnel would then indicate a lower level of power

allotted to the faction – but the very fact of inclusion, even if limited, would still remain.

Rather, what is considered to be non-compliance is establishment of security praetorian

(elite) units staffed exclusively with people of the incumbent’s origin. These security forces

should represent a united body capable of intercepting coup attempts, such as

presidential/republican guards, interior troops, other special combat units, including

distinguishable parts of the regular army. Though part of the state coercive apparatus, they are

primarily charged with defence of the regime against domestic foes rather than external

threats to the country [Droz-Vincent 2011: 3; Bou Nassif 2015: 631; De Bruin 2020: 1]. Thus,

the power-sharing agreement is violated when the leader starts to counterbalance the army –

CEU eTD Collection and particularly the faction present there – via separate ready-for-combat units, which is

combined with communal stacking within those units. In effect, whenever these forces are

viewed as an overwhelmingly stronger than potential conspirators, the faction is expected to

10 The literature review on coup-proofing is substantially assisted by my bachelor thesis [Soboleva 2020:27-9].

refrain from seizing power in a coup, instead preferring to do it from outside (opportunities

permitting).

1.4 Reneging: Security forces build-up

Some conceptual moments need to be highlighted. First, formal independence from the

traditional military is not deemed a strict criterion for elite units. In the study of security

counterweights, De Bruin defines them as “independent [from the military]”, i.e. “operational

control rests with the executive, interior ministry, or other government body besides the

defense ministry, which controls the military” [De Bruin 2018: 1440]. However, we opt for a

broader understanding so that those units may be both formally independent and not. Indeed,

De Bruin does exactly this in her dataset on state security forces, where she allows them to be

of either kind.11 Qualitatively speaking, those forces should be characterized as operating

independently, even if officially reporting within the chain of command of the regular army

(e.g., military divisions, brigades, battalions, etc. can fall in this category) [De Bruin 2020,

Appendix: 3].

Second, the major emphasis is on units’ effectiveness in upsetting subversion.12 Thus, they

should represent a separate cohesive force (even if formally part of the army) sufficient to

shield the government from being toppled. The accent on effectiveness is also in line with the

above assumption that communal coup-proofing targeting military personnel at large – such

as stacking within the senior leadership – is not counted as non-compliance. Indeed, dispersed

occupation of command positions by loyalists still would not be enough to prevent or disrupt

CEU eTD Collection a coordinated action of plotters. Conversely, this task would be more realistically

accomplished by entire units of allegiant combatants, who are tied with the regime through

11 “Where the security force reports to the regime through at least one chain of command distinct from that of the military, it is coded as ‘Independent’ from the military” [De Bruin 2020, Appendix:4]. 12 Particularly, De Bruin pinpoints effectiveness in explaining why she focuses on some modes of counterbalancing but not others [De Bruin 2018:1453].

their origin. Once discerning a threat, these will resist a takeover at all cost, since in case of

coup success they become the first ones to be purged.

Moreover, the focus is on physical counteraction, rather than that working through

convincing. The latter mechanism implies creation of a counter-narrative to the one delivered

by conspirators, which dissuades neutral personnel from joining an attempt and hence

precipitates the failure of the whole enterprise [De Bruin 2018: 1438; Singh 2014: 57]. While

this approach is undoubtedly important, we presume that security forces addressed here are

distinguished primarily by utilization of direct force.

1.5 Defection and Background social mobilization

It is therefore this impotence in deterring the ruler that should drive the faction to defect rather

than stage an overthrow from within. Yet, outright escape is not that easy in an ordinary

situation. Besides appearing too extraordinary and drawing unwanted attention, future

insurgents may have something more crucial in mind: they do not want to rebel against a

mighty government. The authority possessing strong hold on power has an advantage over

challengers, especially those stemming from outside of the system, such that insurgency

might even turn hopeless. This expectation of regime persistence thus discourages

manifestation of dissent. On the contrary, a weakened government is viewed as a more

feasible target, which should dispose opponents towards action [Nepstad 2013; Albrecht, Ohl

2016: 44,47].

It is hence surmised that dawning political instability,13 primarily in terms of social unrest or CEU eTD Collection mobilization, can serve as a good indication of the regime’s loosened grip. The lack of

tranquillity on the street should evince that the state machine possesses some flaws, be it the

inability to pre-empt unrest, to instil the fear in the masses, or to ensure genuine legitimacy.

13 But not the full-fledged one, which is presumed to be the stage of rebellion.

Recent literature indeed points out the signaling function of protests, but in relation to coups.

Since takeover is a risky enterprise, the cues which provide credible information about public

opinion come in handy. Exhibition of discontent through mobilization thus assists coups by

facilitating coordination amongst conspirators as well as justifying the leadership removal

because it is proved to be unpopular [Casper, Tyson 2014; Johnson, Thyne 2018].

Here, however, we relocate attention from plotting towards the faction’s defection to the

masses and (potential) rebels. That is, the situation of incipient instability should equally

provide for the possibility of external challenge, beside the one staged from within the state

apparatus. Given constraints for the latter option, such as elite combat units, the group is then

offered a valuable chance to join protesters and try an ouster already not as part of the

military. Social mobilization turns into a favourable point in time for abandoning the ruler,

which becomes preferred because subversion has been rendered increasingly costly. The

moment of opportunity may also concur with protests as a physical focal point for defection.

I.e., the faction that cannot resolve to initiate rebellion in normal times should think otherwise

once the public is ready for action and there are signs of a looming revolt.14

The next section describes a formal model schematizing the idea elaborated up to that point.

The game is based on the model of authoritarian power-sharing suggested by Svolik (2012:

65-6), which is further adapted to our purpose. First of all, whereas the scholar considers the

winning coalition as a part to the agreement with the dictator, we focus on some rival non-

dominant faction(s) that is likely to rebel unless granted a place in the regime through military

CEU eTD Collection inclusion. Second, whereas Svolik addresses the prospect of a coup by the coalition, here the

main line concerns the coup-conflict link highlighting the possibility of defection as an

alternative to plotting. This aspect implies one more decision on the part of the faction, i.e.

14 However, we are wary to make incipient instability a strict necessary condition. In other words, it may still be the case that the group risks defecting and launching rebellion without any prior unrest. Further empirical analysis is required to see the general trend.

stay within the regime or try an ouster from outside the state system, which therefore becomes

the primary focus of solution. Third, since social fractionalization substantially affects

politics, we further specify reneging as a policy that particularly features the communal coup-

proofing element.

Besides, Svolik’s initial model is simplified from a dynamic game of incomplete information

involving a low/high signal about the ruler’s decision and having a perfect Bayesian

equilibrium – to an extensive-form game with an information set for the second player (the

faction). However, we still presume that both actors play mixed strategies. Moreover,

although we want to preserve a sequential nature of decision-making, the presence of

information set for the faction makes our solution closely resemble a mixed-strategy Nash

equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game.15

CEU eTD Collection

15 I.e., the probability of each actor’s decision is such that another actor is indifferent between its available options.

2. Formal modelling

2.1 Game description

Figure 1: The game of power-sharing in extensive form

The game of power-sharing is an extensive game of imperfect information with an

equilibrium in mixed strategies. There are two main actors – the incumbent and the rival

faction(s) included in the armed forces. For simplicity, the utility of retaining/seizing full

power (i.e. the one not conditioned by any power-sharing) equals while losing/failing to

assume it – .

The game unfolds as follows:

1. The incumbent reneges on or complies with a previously agreed pact, which has reserved

the share for her and for the faction,16 with the probability and ,

CEU eTD Collection respectively. If the latter option is preferred, the ruler starts to build up own praetorian

16 The shares denote the actors’ corresponding power and are thus supposed to match the likelihood of success for any undertakings.

forces by the level , such that her power rises to while the faction’s one

diminishes to .17

2. The military faction – which by assumption does not perfectly know the incumbent’s

choice and finds itself in the information set – defects with the probability to outsiders,

who may already launch or not social unrest of the scale ,18 or remains loyal with the

probability . Defection of the group ultimately leads to civil conflict, and the game

ends with the payoffs dependent on whether the incumbent initially reneges or complies.

Thus, when there is no violation of the pact through raised , the war outcome renders

to the ruler and to the faction. When violation of the pact does take

place, the respective payoffs are and . (For calculation

of all the payoffs, please see Appendix 1.)

3. If staying within the regime, with some probability the faction may try to seize power in

a coup,19 which succeeds or not accordingly to capabilities of the actors. Here again, the

payoffs are conditional on the incumbent’s initial decision. When the pact is complied

with, the coup option gives for the ruler and for the faction, chances of success

being considered. When the pact is violated, the attempted ouster provides to the

ruler and to the faction, chances of success being considered.

With the opposite probability , the military group preserves loyalty till the end, not

staging a coup. The resulting status quo leaves and for the incumbent and the

faction if the pact is observed – while and if it is not.

17 CEU eTD Collection The issue with is that it does not capture the possibility of diminishing marginal returns from additional coup-proofing when the ruler’s power is getting large enough. However, not to complicate the calculation, we stay with Svolik’s version of utility. 18 Importantly, this social unrest is not (yet) the large-scale violence or conflict. *Multiplier is supposed to enlarge the likelihood of victory since ongoing mobilization should add to the faction’s capabilities, i.e. . However, because protests act as a feasible focal point, we allow to equal 0 as well, meaning that background political stability should substantially discourage the faction from defection. 19 For the sake of simplicity, is introduced as an external parameter to obtain the subgame-perfect equilibrium. It will not be in the focus of solution.

The parameters mentioned – , , , – are public knowledge.

2.2 Equilibrium and Hypotheses

As a result of solution (see Appendix 1), the game has the following mixed-strategy Nash

equilibrium:

Implications for is of main concern here. Let us substitute the similar terms:

Since the effect of ( ) in the numerator and denominator is mutually exclusive, the main

attention is to ( ):

As can be seen, the term features in the denominator, meaning that an increase in any of

the variables should amplify the probability of defection . The following implications, aka CEU eTD Collection

hypotheses, are therefore inferred:

(1) The bigger the build-up of praetorian forces , the higher the probability of conflict-

prompting defection by the faction;

(2) The bigger the scale of incipient full-blown instability (i.e. social unrest) , the higher

the probability of defection;

(3) The bigger the incumbent’s power upon the pact , and hence the smaller inclusion

, the higher the probability of defection.

Relational, or compensatory, dynamics between the parameters can be expected. For instance,

if (the strength of the faction) is sufficient while is substantial too, then a sort of a

stand-off might emerge. Thus, the effect of reneging on raising proneness to defection is less

than in would be in case of minor .

Besides, because it is a product, the absence of any of the parameters should overshadow

others. I.e., if there is no reneging by the ruler ( ), or there is no indication of background

unrest ( ), or the initial pact reserves no real power for the incumbent ( )20 – then

this factor comes to the fore, thus diminishing the probability of defection despite other

rationales. CEU eTD Collection

20 Which is quite an unfeasible situation.

3. Qualitative analysis

3.1 Methodology

The next section aims to demonstrate the model and its implications on the case of Syria

under the two presidents, Hafez al-Assad (1971-2000) and Bashar al-Assad (2000-). It is

supposed to be a typical case [Gerring, Cojocaru 2016: 395] for the current theoretical

framework, used to introduce the puzzle in the very beginning. First, the country features

marked sectarian fractionalization, with the Assad family being Alawi and the big majority of

population being Sunni [McLauchlin 2010: 341]. Second, Sunni representatives in fact

occupied a large part of the mid- and lower-ranking officer corps [Bou Nassif 2015], which

was stable since the last decades of the 20thc. till 2012 [Johnson, Thurber 2017]. Third, the

Syrian army has been subjected to pronounced coup-proofing, communal stacking in

particular [Barany 2011; Makara 2013, 2016]. Last but not least, the country provides a

pertinent example of military defection during the Arab Spring, which was withal

spearheaded by Sunni contingents [Bou Nassif 2015].

The analysis is based on documents drawn from the WikiLeaks repository, which turned out

to be the main source of primary information on coup-proofing in Syria.21 Furthermore, there

is a row of secondary literature about civil-military relations in the country. The WikiLeaks

search was performed for the two time spans, 1971-2000 and 2000-2012,22 via key words

denoting the name of the respective incumbent and different names of security forces, such as

“elite units”, “defense companies”, “special forces”, etc., and also “Alawi”, “coup”, CEU eTD Collection “protests”. As it turned out, the indication of praetorian bodies largely sufficed because they

have been principally linked to coup threat, Alawite composition, and also protest activity in

21 Although there is a possibility of some bias in reports, overall evidence still largely concurs with the existing literature. 22 The civil war years are not covered as defection had already taken place then.

some documents. With minor alterations in word-combinations and spelling, search results

stayed mostly the same. Temporal points used for analysis were inferred from the information

available after the search process. In terms of operationalization, the ruler’s reneging was to

be evinced by the account of security forces; the strength of the faction in power-sharing – by

the group’s place within the military (ranks, representation in the command, link to the regime

elite) and the mention of its coup proneness/capacities (overall assessment of coup risk and

prospects for success); the scale of social unrest – by the description of such events in reports.

3.2 Illustrative case study of Syria

Though holding office for eleven years prior to the Arab Spring, Bashar al-Assad by no

means built his political system from scratch. Conditions permitting, Syria witnessed factual

leadership succession in 2000, when the reins were picked by son Bashar after the death of his

father, president Hafez al-Assad. Even though since then the system was being tailored for the

young incumbent, its very foundations should be traced about thirty years back, when the

country was first gripped by the sway of the Assad family. The major event in the Syrian

history became the 1963 military coup led by members of the Syrian Regional Branch of the

Ba’ath Party. While during the first seven years the Ba’athist-military rule was still supreme,

the tandem was finally infringed by an initiative of Hafez al-Assad. A participant of the 1963

overthrow, he rose to the rank of General within the new regime and formed a substantial

coalition for seizing power in 1970 [Reich 1990: 54]. An accompanying reshuffle paved the

way for concentration of authority in the hands of Assad – the president since 1971,

concurrent secretary-general of Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, and the factual superior of Syria’s CEU eTD Collection

politico-economic realm [Reich 1990: 55; Bou Nassif 2015b: 268].

The Syrian regime has been characterized as “party-personal-military” ever since, with the

armed forces constituting its important pillar [Geddes et al. 2014, Codebook: 14]. Yet, given

the persistent problem of dictatorships when the guardians themselves turn against the

autocrat, which Hafez evidently acknowledged, the army was targeted by profound coup-

proofing purposed to prevent subversion. From service-related perks and covert enrichment

opportunities [Mora, Wiktorowicz 2003: 113; Haddad 2012: 239; Albrecht 2015: 47], to

relative marginalization vis-à-vis police/intelligence and extensive surveillance within the

army [Kamrava 2000: 71; Droz-Vincent 2011: 3-4; Droz-Vincent 2016: 172] – all that

appears to prove effective in regime protection. However, this is arguably not the end of the

story. Coup risk could well be discerned due to the presence of many Sunni officers, who,

differing from the leader by descent, had every reason to embark on plotting. This might

allude to a nuanced power structure organized with the help of the armed forces.

3.2.1 Military and Sunni under Hafez al-Assad ( )

It is widely known that in politics Hafez relied on own sect, the Alawite minority, which was

particularly true for recruitment in the military top brass. Sectarian stacking is an often-cited

feature in reports by foreign diplomats, who note that “Assad has placed loyal Alawite

followers in key positions” [WikiLeaks, 16/09/1979: 4; WikiLeaks, 22/12/1978:3]. Thus

proceeding, upon the death of the president, about 90% of personnel in the rank of general

were Alawi [McLauchlin 2010: 341]. Such skewness evidently allowed Hafez to concentrate

control over principal vantage points [WikiLeaks, 14/09/1979:3; Quinlivan 1999: 141; Bou

Nassif 2015b: 268-9].

However, it does not mean that there was no place for Sunnis. Not to speak about their

CEU eTD Collection marked presence in the rank-and-file due to conscription, they were an integral part of the

officer corps. Prior to the 70s, the latter had been dominated by Sunni personnel [Bou Nassif

2015: 630], which was worth considering unless the newly-minted leader wanted to be

toppled outright. Massive purge upon ascendance seemed not to be an option, given the size

of the corps as well as the lack of new allegiant substitutes. The realistic solution, which was

arguably endorsed by President Hafez, became arrival at an agreement with this significant

faction and granting it a share in the new order.

Therefore, Sunni officers – especially those hailing from rural areas – represented an entire

social stratum incorporated in the military by the Assad regime. Besides, the very places they

originated in, e.g. Dara‘a, Idlib, towns near Homs and Hama, were usually viewed as Hafez’s

strongholds [Droz-Vincent 2016: 174-5]. Though having an Alawi bias with regards to the top

brass, military recruitment at large featured an elaborate system of checks and balances. For

example, the command of a unit (itself composed predominantly of Sunnis) was supposed to

be balanced between a Sunni, an Alawi and possibly some other minority, so that each of

them kept a watchful eye on a colleague [Ibid.; Droz-Vincent 2011: 5]. Furthermore, senior

positions such as defence minister, army chief of staff or chief of the air force were by no

means banned for Sunnis. Quite on the contrary, they got high-level promotions whenever

there were public fears that the system was being "Alawitized" [WikiLeaks, 8/07/1977: 5;

Reich 1990: 55-6; Gambill 2002]. These personally controlled reshuffles and appointments

even did not spare Alawis if the move was deemed necessary [WikiLeaks, 14/09/1979:4].

When “there are too many citizens both in the Alawite regime and the Sunni majority who

think first of how to hold on to, or attain power” [WikiLeaks, 12/12/1977:3], creation of “a

sectarian equilibrium” [Droz-Vincent 2016: 175] seems to be a proper strategy on Assad’s

part.

3.2.2 Elite units ( ) and Instability of the late 1970s ( )

CEU eTD Collection Sunni personnel was intuitively the first to be suspected in subversion. Such a prospect hence

necessitated “a buffer between the president and ambitious military officers who might

contemplate a move against the regime” [WikiLeaks, 9/11/1977:3]. As suggested throughout

the reports, separate elite units of the security apparatus embodied the principal “anti-coup

force” [WikiLeaks, 29/10/1977:3]. Their inherent characteristic is they were almost entirely

composed of Alawis [Ibid.; WikiLeaks, 14/09/1979:5; WikiLeaks, 16/09/1979], which was

supposed to trigger the mechanism of self-defense under the “fear that a coup would be

directed at the Alawite community itself” [WikiLeaks, 27/12/1979:4].

There were five major praetorian units responsible for regime security: the Defense

Companies, the Special Forces, the Republican (or Presidential) Guard, the 4rd Armored

Division, and Unit 549 [Bou Nassif 2015b: 268].23, 24 In the documents used here, which

mostly cover the late 1970s, the main attention is paid to the first two bodies. Though

sometimes mentioned as part of the army [e.g., WikiLeaks, 27/12/1979:4], authors probably

subsume them under a broader notion of the coercive apparatus, juxtaposing “elite units” vs.

“non-elite [i.e. all the other] units” [Ibid.:3] and implying these anti-coup forces when

pinpointing “the system of Alawite control within the military” [WikiLeaks, 16/09/1979:4]. In

fact, both the Defense Companies (DC) and the Special Forces (SF) were formally

independent from the regular army,25 which should be clear from the note that “the DC [were]

not responsive to general staff order and are widely believed in Syria to act as a law unto

themselves” [WikiLeaks, 9/11/1977:3]. The DC, comprising over 20,000 troops, were headed

by Hafez’s brother, Rifaat,26 while the SF, with around 7,000 troops, were led by “another

Alawite loyalist, Ali Haydar” [WikiLeaks, 14/09/1979:5; WikiLeaks, 16/09/1979:3]. Both

were stationed in/around Damascus, received lavish allowances with bonuses, and had

priority in getting new equipment and modern arms [Ibid.; WikiLeaks, 9/11/1977:3]. This

said, quite unsurprising is the remark that “with these advantages, Assad [would] have a good

chance of defeating an attempted coup” [WikiLeaks, 14/09/1979:5]. CEU eTD Collection

23 In her dataset (2020), De Bruin also mention Struggle Companies. 24 Yet, according to some other accounts, they did not exist strictly at the same time. Particularly, after 1984, the Defence Companies (their reliable contingents) were incorporated in the 4th Division and the Republican Guard [Quinlivan 1999:148; Bou Nassif 2015:633], whereas the Special forces are said to be transformed into the military’s Unit 549 [Droz-Vincent 2016:176]. 25 Based on De Bruin’s dataset (2020), Google search, as well as some other literature. 26 Rifaat al-Assad would then fall into disgrace after an attempted coup in 1984 [Bou Nassif 2015:633].

All the material considered touch upon the issue of regime survival and takeover threat

particularly. Indeed, the late 70s were associated with sporadic sectarian tensions and social

turmoil,27 which represented a test moment for Assad’s system. As written in one report, “a

more potentially dangerous situation <...> is rioting in one city spreading rapidly <...> and

Assad’s elite units being stretched too thin to effectively control the violence. At that point the

regular army has to be called in with the attendant risk that units would turn against the

regime. The outcome of such a possibility would very likely be a bloody civil war between

pro- and anti-Assad units with the outcome in doubt” [WikiLeaks, 16/09/1979:3]. The very

situation thus described is strikingly identical to what happened over thirty years later, but

that time to Bashar.

One of main places where intercommunal violence occurred was Lattakia, located near the

hometown of Hafez. To keep the things under control and crush any unrest, the government

traditionally resorted to its praetorian units rather than the military [Droz-Vincent 2011: 5].

Both the Defence Companies and the Special Forces are said to be deployed to Lattakia,

which evidently resulted in prevention of further conflict [WikiLeaks, 5/09/1979:3-4]. Their

utilization became vital for several reasons. First, the riots had to be nipped in the bud given

the “fear that once intercommunal violence [began] one place, it might easily spread

elsewhere” [Ibid.:4], coupled by the fact that “continuing inability to maintain social order is

calling into question his [Assad’s] fitness to govern Syria” [WikiLeaks, 14/09/1979:4]. Since

those allegiant units were simultaneously best-equipped, they became the prime ones to enact.

Second, and crucially, the regime was to avoid engaging the army because its parts might CEU eTD Collection

have turned against the government [WikiLeaks, 16/09/1979:3]. That is, they could be

tempted to defect.

27 Though the tensions were mostly not anti-government per se, Sunni-Alawite confrontation had a direct political reference. Moreover, Assad is indeed claimed to be unpopular [WikiLeaks, 27/12/1979:4].

In parallel with this, the documents persistently invoke the threat of a takeover arising from

(Sunni) military personnel. In immediate response, however, authors next refer to the elite

forces – especially those led by Rifaat – as an ace allowing Assad to stay “a formidable

opponent for would-be challengers” [WikiLeaks, 27/12/1979:4; WikiLeaks, 14/09/1979:5].

As directly stated about a Sunni-led coup, it had a “little chance of success, given <…> the

system of Alawite control” [WikiLeaks, 16/09/1979:4]. Yet withal, the president needed to

keep the loyal troops in the very vicinity, and in sufficient numbers [WikiLeaks, 5/09/1979:4].

Thus, on the other hand, defection opportunities were restricted – since the unrest was quelled

and the wider army not called in – while on the other, the Sunni faction continued to menace

Hafez from within, which was in turn countered by the mighty praetorian guards. The overall

result became the absence of defection as well as pre-emption of ouster attempts. Though we

cannot check the proneness to joining rebels (vs. remaining in the regime) directly,28 it might

be claimed that own place within Assad’s order could enable the group to stage an overthrow,

with some greater exertions made to offset security forces.29 Indeed, Sunnis appear to possess

non-negligible capabilities as provided by the initial pact with the ruler. They even made

possible “a power struggle between Rifaat and a number of Sunni command members”

[WikiLeaks, 29/10/1977:4; WikiLeaks, 9/11/1977:3]. Moreover, the president tried to heed

officers’ disaffection with corruptive practices of the elite, which often led to appeasing

policies such as anti-corruption campaigns [WikiLeaks, 9/11/1977:3-4; WikiLeaks,

14/09/1979:3]. Deeming the relative power of the faction, the proneness to defection should

hence be less pronounced compared to the case when there is no chance of success. Still, CEU eTD Collection deeming the effective suppression of the turmoil, there was even no real opportunity to defect

in the late 70s, whereas the strength of the elite units discouraged personnel from subversion.

28 Because such a possibility was prevented. 29 For instance, Sunni plotters could build an alliance with some Alawi officers, which is mentioned as a pre- requisite for a successful coup attempt [WikiLeaks, 14/09/1979:4].

Produced co-habitation majorly evinces that Assad’s strategies worked for a long time

thereafter, allowing him to stay in power till the death in 2000.

3.2.3 Disempowerment under Bashar al-Assad ( )

With ascendance of Bashar to power in 2000, the regime has steadily moved to a renewed and

narrower winning coalition, as well as more personalistic rule. Besides debilitation of the old

Baath guard, increased reliance on business cronies and the Assad–Makhlouf clan, the system

was becoming ever more disposed towards the Alawite sect [Hinnebusch 2012: 99]. In the

emergent class of the “state bourgeoisie” – the regime’s vital pillar consisting of Syria’s top

leadership, coercive apparatus, and administrative-bureaucratic sector – the most powerful

and affluent members have been Alawis [Haddad 2012: 238-9].

Being closely interweaved with a more exclusivist order, the whole machine of coup-proofing

hence took a stronger turn. Although during the first years Bashar stroke some balance within

the military-intelligence establishment, such as the promotion of Maj. Gen. Hassan Turkmani

to army chief of staff or appointment of Maj. Gen. Hisham Bakhtiar as the head of the

General Intelligence Directorate (both Sunnis) [Gambill 2002], these moves were largely the

reaction by the risk-aversive incumbent to the critique of his father’s late designations.30 The

younger Assad still arrived at a more “Alawitized” system, with the striking

overrepresentation of his sect among high-ranking officers and the very military leadership

[Bou Nassif 2015: 636]. Indeed, the mentioned “state bourgeoisie” has essentially involved

the senior command of the coercive apparatus, including the “military-merchant complex”

CEU eTD Collection where big business has become tightly intertwined with security elites [Mora, Wiktorowicz

2003: 113; Haddad 2012: 239]. These most fruitful venues of enrichment were made

increasingly restricted and, critically, linked to the fact of being Alawi.

30 Arguably, the trend towards marginalization of Sunni officers began under Hafez’s late rule. However, we view Bashar al-Assad as a distinct incumbent, who in principle could opt for greater military inclusion.

While Sunnis were virtually disqualified for entering the upper echelon, the bias consequently

permeated overall distribution of service-related perks and opportunities. Post-graduation

allocation usually sent Sunnis to more desolate and work-demanding places with inferior or

even deficient weaponry, whereas well-paid and well-equipped units were reserved for Alawi

personnel. The general organization of promotions gave preference to the latter, as did the

system of special training and foreign education. Besides, even prominent positions did not

guarantee an equal amount of spoils for Sunnis and Alawis [Bou Nassif 2015: 634-5,638].

Thus, while under Hafez al-Assad discriminative tendencies were more “crafted” so that

excessive moves producing discontent got rolled back next – the son turned out to be less

wary of Sunnis’ frustration. This is a risky strategy, though, since own disempowerment, the

restricted and corrupted regime could not help but backfire at some point [Ibid.; Droz-Vincent

2011: 6].

3.2.4 Elite units ( ) and the Arab Spring ( )

Simultaneously, the regime preserved its mighty praetorian forces. After some reconfiguration

(see [24]) they were incorporated in the regular army, which, however, not only preserved

their elite nature but possibly facilitated funding and maintenance. Beside such troops as Unit

549, the Airborne Special Forces, the 90th Mechanized Division, etc., two actors have come

to the forefront of regime security – the Republican (Presidential) Guard and the 4th Armoured

Division [Bou Nassif 2015: 633; Droz-Vincent 2016: 176]. Numbering some 12,000 and

14,000, respectively, and being composed wholly of Alawis, they are deemed “the force of

last resort in protecting the ruling Assad clan” [WikiLeaks, 11/06/2011; WikiLeaks, CEU eTD Collection 6/08/2011]. Indeed, throughout the reports, these two units are characterized as “best-

equipped and most highly trained” [WikiLeaks, 16/06/2011], “the only military divisions that

are definitely loyal” [WikiLeaks, 8/06/2011], which furthermore embody “the state’s pillars”

[Ibid.]. Quite predictably, their head is none other than Bashar’s brother, Maher, who is

considered “a major figure on both the domestic and international fronts” [WikiLeaks,

6/08/2011]. As one journalist said, “He [Maher] is the commander of the army’s two most

powerful units. It is normal if he has the last word” [Ibid.].

Prior to 2011, there was no mass unrest that would enable broad-based personnel’s defection.

With the onset of the Arab protests in March, the president, like his father thirty years ago,

deployed the elite forces in the hope to suppress mobilization outright. Over the first months

of the upheaval, it was chiefly the 4th Division and the former Special Forces that cracked

down on protesters under the command of Maher al-Assad [WikiLeaks, 11/06/2011; Droz-

Vincent 2016: 170]. In the meantime, the regime strived to rehabilitate its capacity to govern,

while creating some perception of normality among the public and organization of pro-Bashar

demonstrations [Droz-Vincent 2014: 37]. All that was to prevent the spread of unrest and,

most importantly, to avoid calling in the army.

Yet, the continuing diffusion of violence dictated otherwise. Ultimate deployment of “a

largely Sunni corps” which “has never been trusted by the regime” [WikiLeaks, 11/06/2011]

produced a much feared result – that “elements of the armed forces [were] defecting”,

paralleled by “clashes between the soldiers on one side and security men <…> on the other”

[Ibid.; WikiLeaks, 8/06/2011]. As noted about defectors, “they seem to have fed off

longstanding grievances within the military over poor pay, wretched conditions, official

neglect and low morale” [WikiLeaks, 8/06/2011]. Furthermore, the reports point out that

while Assad could count on coup-proofed parts of the coercive apparatus, “lower- and

CEU eTD Collection middle-ranking defections [would] increase as the regime seeks to crush the provinces”

[WikiLeaks, 17/06/2011]. These latter were the very locales which Sunni officers, included in

the pact by Hafez, traditionally hailed from [Droz-Vincent 2016: 174-5]. The subsequent

establishment of the Free Syrian Army in July 2011 by the Sunni military faction, previously

the regime’s partner, was a direct sign that the challenge would proceed from outside. Newly-

minted rebels themselves announced that the FSA was founded “with the aim of ousting the

regime of President Bashar al-Assad and protecting civilians from his forces” [WikiLeaks,

16/11/2011 (a)]. Such a development was by no means unexpected for the leadership, and

indeed, had been arguably generated by curtailed resources of the group to stage a coup,

coupled by the ever stronger elite units that would be impossible to surmount. In turn, the

background mass unrest served as a moment when defection became a viable alternative.

The challenge, however, turned out to be hardly realizable: “unless serious cracks in the army

occur among this Alawite command, it [would] be very difficult for lower ranking Sunni

members to find the opening they need to wage a successful” ouster [WikiLeaks, 16/11/2011

(b)]. As can be seen from today, initial concerns about the future of insurgency have

eventually proved true.

Overall, Syria’s case study has aimed to demonstrate that conflict-promoting defection is

more likely with the greater (1) strengthening of elite units, (2) force of background social

unrest, and (3) initial power of the incumbent (at the expense of the faction). Thus, the late

1970s’ sectarian violence that faced Hafez al-Assad resulted in the absence of defection, as

well as absent coup attempts on the part of Sunni personnel. Such an outcome was arguably

conditioned by the initial place of Sunnis in Assad’s order, which in principle provided

sufficient capabilities to mount an overthrow – but also concurrently potent elite units that

would intercept emergent attempts. Together with the fact that there was no real opportunity CEU eTD Collection to defect in that time, the faction stayed within the system and avoided trying to take over.

Thirty years later, social mobilization befell Bashar al-Assad, who was more unfortunate as

the army was eventually invited for suppression. The 2011 mass uprising, however, was

preceded by the disempowerment of Sunnis through enhanced communal stacking in the army

and consequently diminished coup capabilities. This coincided with the ever-increased

strength of praetorian guards that could not be rivalled by the initial power of Sunni officers.

Given the lack of any credible threat of an overthrow, the faction hence leaped at the

opportunity offered by looming rebellion and defected to fight the regime from outside.

While the case study has been presupposed for a qualitative illustration, it may also be

required to test the three inferences quantitatively. Indeed, since formal modelling usually

aspires to generalizability, we should proceed with examination of a larger set of

fractionalized, weak, and potentially instable states [Roessler 2016: 6], which is the main

scope of the current power-sharing framework.

CEU eTD Collection

4. Quantitative analysis

4.1 Methodology

The section aims to test the three hypotheses (p.16-17) via regression analysis. As particularly

implied by the Syrian case study, the current research puzzle and model specification

markedly appeal to the MENA region. Because of that, a sample for quantitative evaluation

should cover other locales featuring social fractionalization and low state capacity. The thesis

therefore borrows Roessler’s (2011) country/group/year data which comprise sub-Saharan

African ethnic groups31 since countries’ independence till 2005. The dataset is very

comprehensive given the number of derivative variables the author has constructed by

drawing on additional primary and secondary sources, e.g. the information that a group rebels

in a given year. Our quantitative analysis thus replicates his original study to a certain extent.

4.1.1 Parameters operationalization

The main dependent variable – defection of the group for a consequent challenge from outside

– is proxied through Roessler’s variable Group Rebel showing “whether members of a given

ethnic group are the leading and significant participants in a large-scale insurgency (that is,

one that leads to a civil war) against the central government”[Roessler 2011: 319]. As the

design necessitates present military inclusion, we try to approximate this condition by the

indicator of power-sharing in the military from the “Power-sharing in democracies and

autocracies [PO-SH]” data.32 The latter is composed of countries/groups/years and covers

representation of ethnic groups33 within the executive, legislature, and armed forces. The CEU eTD Collection

31 Based on the groups of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. 32 The dataset has been kindly provided by Prof. Daniel Bochsler for exclusive use in this thesis. It has not been released yet and is still subject to some editorial work. However, deeming the neat specificity of the data – power-sharing in the military as well as at the group level – we opted for that source in particular. 33 They are mostly identical to the EPR groups.

variable of our interest looks mainly at the military high ranks,34 with the values 0 (non-

represented), 0.25 (underrepresented), 0.75 (represented), 1.0 (overrepresented).35 Therefore,

in addition to our initial non-filtered dataset, we create another one filtered by PO-SH’s

representation in the military greater than zero. Although we cannot certainly ensure that a

rebelling faction (i.e. some part of a larger ethnic group) is the very one that has been

included in the army, the assumption is that the existence of such power-sharing with a whole

ethnic group should provide its representatives with a real possibility to enrol in the service.

is operationalized as the number of regime-affiliated security forces from De Bruin’s (2020)

dataset referred to in the theory section. More specifically, the initial variable evinces whether

members of a particular body are “recruited disproportionately from the executive’s

hometown, region, ethnic group, or <…> affiliated with his or her political party” [De Bruin

2020, Appendix: 4]. Though such a description implies multiple relationships, we presuppose

that these categories (especially the first three) may overlap, whereas the lack of more suitable

alternatives makes us neglect possible links which are not based on ethnicity.

Incipient instability or social unrest is drawn from Clark and Regan’s (2016) mass

mobilization data. Given the country/year/protest structure, such that a year is broken into

several protest events, we have to create a composite observation for each year in order to join

resulting country-years with Roessler’s data. However, since the variable for the figure of

participants is multi-level character and is hence difficult to transform in a numeric format, we

assume that the mobilization scale can be adequately proxied by the annual number of CEU eTD Collection

34 Low ranks are used only when there is no information on the higher ranks. 35 Some missing observations are imputed from other variables that are found to closely correlate with power- sharing in the military.

protests. In addition, the latter is filtered by the variable “Protesters demands” such that only

politics-related agendas are left.36

Finally, the faction’s share or inclusion is operationalized through the mentioned PO-

SH variable (see above). It is tested as a separate predictor to assess the effect of the extent of

military inclusion.

Because the PO-SH and mobilization data start from 1990, Roessler’s initial dataset is now

aligned with the latter. Thus, assessment of defection begins with the year 1991, as all the

independent variables are lagged, and proceeds till 2005. The resulting number of

observations is 3170 in the non-filtered dataset, and 1669 in the filtered dataset. (Yet, since

some rows have missing values, much fewer observations become actually used for

estimation).

4.1.2 Control variables

We consider a row of control variables Roessler himself uses in the analysis of rebellion,

which are the size of a group as a share of population; the total of ethnic groups partaking in

the central government; country-level data for the level of income and population size; finally,

the years passed since a group was involved in civil war the last time [Roessler 2011:

322,324]. Moreover, to control for insurgency that follows a purge – that is, the main finding

of Roessler – there is a dummy where 1 indicates the presence of such exclusion within the

three preceding years based on the “Exclude Dynamic” variable.37

CEU eTD Collection 36 That is, we leave only "police brutality", "political behavior, process", "removal of politician". The removed four are “labor wage dispute", "land farm issue”, "price increases, tax policy", and "social restrictions". Moreover, even if “social restrictions” are also included, all the models stay largely the same while in many of them p-value for the significant variable and AIC become slightly bigger. 37 This number of years is particularly highlighted in Roessler’s findings. The count also involves the year when defection/rebellion is examined. “Exclude Dynamic” is “a dummy variable indicating if for a given country-year a group is coded as Discriminated or Powerless but in the previous year was coded as Monopoly, Dominant, Senior Partner, or Junior Partner or coded as Coconspirator“ [Roessler 2011:340].

Besides, some other controls are added. Deeming the role of patronage for co-optation of

opponents [Gerschewski 2013], its lack might cost a lot to the incumbent. As mentioned in

the Syrian case, personnel seemed to “feed off longstanding grievances within the military

over poor pay, wretched conditions, official neglect” [WikiLeaks, 8/06/2011], such that

insufficient funding could be another reason provoking defection. Regime patronage is

therefore proxied by the change in military spending and logged military spending to total

personnel drawn from the Correlates of War’s “National Material Capabilities” (v5.0) [Powell

2012; De Bruin 2018]. Also, we want to check for the impact of full-scale armed conflict

(already ongoing rather than the one spurred by defection) on disobedient behaviour. For that,

we create a dummy variable corresponding to the intensity of civil war in the internal armed

conflict and internationalized internal armed conflict types from the PRIO Dataset (Version 3-

2005) [Singh 2014: 346]. All the measures aside from Group Rebel are lagged by one year.

Descriptive statistics for both of the datasets is presented in Tables A1 & A2;38 the variables

summary and sources – in Table A3 (Appendix 2).

In order to assess the likelihood that a faction (which has previously defected) rebels in a

given year, the work applies logistic regression.

4.2 Results

Overall we run several models – without controls and with them, as well as using the non-

filtered dataset and the one where military inclusion is greater than zero. When tested without

controls (Table 1), all the four models reveal significance of the Security Forces variable with

CEU eTD Collection a positive coefficient. In other words, a growing number of affiliated units indeed tends to

amplify the probability of rebellion by a group during the next year. The difference between

38 Some variables, such as Group Rebel, Protests, Security Forces, Civil War, and Exclusion, are right-skewed so that their standard deviation produces the value below the minimum. Although it is not good from the statistical viewpoint, we allow us to tolerate this fact, not least because Roessler’s original analysis involves many such skewed variables. For instance, his “Exclude Dynamic” variable has Mean = 0.009, St. Dev. = 0.096, and Minimum = 0 [Roessler 2011:342].

Model 1 and Model 2 (both tested on the non-filtered data) is that the latter omits the Military

Inclusion variable, which in turn raises the significance of Security Forces, though the Akaike

Information Criterion (AIC) gets markedly bigger.39 Once power-sharing through the military

is fixed in Models 3 & 4, Security Forces stay significant at the same level in both models –

with Military Inclusion incorporated and not – while the AIC does not diverge much. A

negative coefficient of Military Inclusion would imply that greater power-sharing indeed

diminishes the probability of defection and insurgency; this, however, cannot be stated due to

the lack of significance. The same holds for the Protests variable, which is found insignificant

and, interestingly, featuring a negative coefficient.40 Though high p-value does not allow to

claim that mobilization actually decreases the chances of rebellion by defectors, such a result

opposes our initial expectation about a contributing role of social unrest.

Table 1: Results CEU eTD Collection

39 The smaller the AIC, the better the model is usually deemed. 40 The similar result stays when current instability is proxied by the first two levels in the internal and internationalized internal armed conflict from the PRIO Data (Version 3-2005).

Yet, when Roessler’s controls are included (Table A4, Appendix 2), neither predictor gets

enough statistical evidence. Tested on either the non-filtered (Model 5) or filtered (Models 6

& 7) data, previously significant Security Forces now observe p-value around 0.3. The control

variables also fail to draw support, which does not differ much from the article’s output,

though [Roessler 2011: 323]. However, it is worth mentioning that our main parameters

preserve coefficient signs revealed in Table 1. Besides, Models 6 & 7 taking into account

power-sharing are characterized by the somewhat better AIC and lower p-value for Security

Forces, Protests (Model 6), and Military Inclusion (Model 7).

Table 2: Results CEU eTD Collection

Further, we control for the fact of a purge over the past three years. Thus, if tested on the non-

filtered data with all the three predictors present (Model 10, Table 2), as well as on the filtered

data either with the three predictors (Model 12) or only the two of them (Model 11), Security

Forces are largely significant and positive whereas Exclusion features a negative sign and a

large error. Protests preserve a negative coefficient, as does Military Inclusion (except Model

10). When Roessler’s controls are incorporated, there are no significant variables left, and the

result for Exclusion holds. (However, the output changes once Military Inclusion is removed

from Model 10 so that Exclusion becomes significant and positive (Model 8, Table A4) –

which is actually in line with Roessler’s findings. Moreover, after his controls are added,

Exclusion stays the sole significant variable (Model 9, Table A4). Yet, such output is based

on the non-filtered data that do not account for power-sharing in the army. Importantly to

note, Security Forces are still significant (Model 8) and positive while Protests remain

insignificant with a negative coefficient.) The exclusion variable thus tends to loose its

relevance when our three parameters are considered.

Additionally, we test the explanatory variables with the financial and armed conflict controls.

The result for both the non-filtered (Model 13, Table 2) and filtered data (Model 14)

corroborates the above pattern – significant Security Forces with a positive sign, coupled by

insignificant Military Inclusion and Protests having a negative sign. Either of the patronage

variables is highly insignificant, but positive, which might counter the logic of co-optation

was there enough statistical support. Negative and insignificant Civil War is quite similar in

its output to the protest variable. Such a resemblance seems to concur with the robustness CEU eTD Collection check when current turmoil is operationalized through minor and intermediate-level conflict

from the PRIO (see [40]).41

41 Besides, there is no problem of multicollinerarity between Protests and Civil War as the VIF test does not reveal any variable with a value larger than 1.05.

Thus, in all the model variations (without Roessler’s controls), a higher number of affiliated

security forces tends to increase the likelihood of rebellion. Importantly, the result holds when

the data are filtered to account for preceding military inclusion, meaning that insurgency can

be seen as an alternative to the within-regime challenge involving defection from the state

apparatus. Although incorporation of Roessler’s controls leaves no significant variables, all

the full models feature the greater AIC and can hence be supposed to be less informative than

those without the controls. The extent of power-sharing in the army tested via Military

Inclusion fails to draw sufficient empirical support.42 Still, its negative sign is indeed in line

with the third hypothesis stating that greater power of the faction should diminish its

proneness to defection.

Praetorian build-up therefore seems to have a strong effect on rebellion-prompting defection,

obtaining significance even when tested on the current subsample of Roessler’s original data.

Moreover, once we also add the scholar’s Inclusion in the central government to our main

Models 1, 3 & 4, neither of the two inclusion variables is significant – whereas Security

Forces are throughout all the regressions (Table A5).43 That is, for the time span considered,

the elite units enhancement becomes more important in promoting defection and rebellion

than (low) inclusion or exclusion alone, which in turn points to comparably greater

explanatory power of reneging.

The Protests variable (as well as the Civil War control), besides being insignificant too,

possesses negative coefficients contrary to what is expected in the second hypothesis. Since

CEU eTD Collection the formal model is rooted in the MENA case(s), which have been reputed for their

authoritarian trend [Bellin 2004; Lust 2009], a considerable number of anocracies and

democracies in our dataset for sub-Saharan Africa (Figure A1, Appendix 2) may potentially

42 The lack of significance may be partially explained by an insufficient number of observations: beside limiting the data to 1990, there are quite a lot of omitted rows due to missingness. 43 Notably, Inclusion manages to get significance in Roessler’s original analysis.

influence the calculation. Therefore, we add the Polity2 regime score from Polity IV to check

whether defection in reaction to protests is associated to a greater extent with autocracies

(Table A6). This integration is done in two ways: by creating the "regime-protests" interaction

where a larger mobilization in a more autocratic setting44 is supposed to promote defection

(Model 18 – non-filtered data; Model 19 – filtered data); and by leaving only the regimes with

the Polity2 score [-10; 0] as deemed more authoritarian than democratic (Models 20 & 21).

Either in interaction or in the restricted sample, the number of protests is still found with a

negative coefficient.45

That is, even in (African) autocracies, mass mobilization as a sign of dawning instability does

not seem to contribute to defection and rebellion. Overall, it points to the deviation from the

initial expectation based on the Arab Upheaval. In particular, the latter might become

problematic to ground the model in due to the relative rarity of the 2011 events, as well as

contextual divergence between the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa. Taken broadly, there can

also be different scenarios of how regime interacts with defection. On a minor note, a further

test of the “more violence in the middle” thesis [Fearon, Laitin 2003; Wimmer et al. 2009:

329] evinces a negative sign for Polity Squared (Model 22 – non-filtered data; Model 23 –

filtered data), which would denote that anocracies indeed observe most of rebellions was it

not the variable’s insignificance. Moreover, its p-value is considerably lower than when

Polity2 is not squared in Models 20 & 21.

Since the variables have so far been examined separately – according to each of the three

CEU eTD Collection theoretical inferences – there is a need to check their interactions, too. We therefore finally

test the triple term Protests*Security Forces*Military Inclusion in Model 24 and Model 25

44 I.e., Polity2 is reversed through multiplication by -1 (Polity Reversed variable). 45 Even when Polity2 is restricted to [-10;-6], which stands for full autocracies, mobilization still features a negative sign.

(Table A7), as based on Model 1 and Model 4 respectively,46 which should render the result

for pair-wise interactions withal. As can be seen, neither predictor obtains significance while

featuring vast standard errors. Speaking of coefficients, not only the Security Forces variable

changes its sign to the opposite, the interactions in both Models 24 & 25 evince quite a mixed

pattern. Protests*Security Forces possess a positive coefficient, which would concur with the

expectation about the two parameters if not the large p-value. In turn, Security

Forces*Military Inclusion might reveal an interesting relation where greater power-sharing

coupled by the praetorian build-up are conducive to greater conflict. That is, reneging would

then be perceived more acutely compared to the situation with less pronounced

representation. In interaction with Protests, inclusion also has a positive coefficient, which

could mean that a potent military faction, when faced with mass social mobilization, gets

more disposed to defection and rebellion. It may possibly indicate an autonomous group that

is not appeased by extensive power-sharing – akin to personnel’s behavior upon the Arab

Spring in Egypt.

However, once all the three parameters are present simultaneously, the sign unexpectedly

turns negative. In this sense, Military Inclusion could be supposed to override the contributing

effect of Protests with Security Forces and thus discourage defection, as predicted by the

third hypothesis. Yet, this interpretation is not valid so long as the terms fail to draw enough

statistical support. With Roessler’s controls added, the output remains substantially the same

(Models 26 & 27). Thus, while the preceding case study has been quite apt in showing the

simultaneous effect of the parameters, poor results of the last models do not allow to CEU eTD Collection corroborate interaction statistically. Conclusions of the statistical analysis are therefore based

on the simple additive regressions (Table 3).

46 When we examine the double interaction Protests*Security Forces on the basis of Model 3, the result does not substantially alter.

Table 3: Statistical findings

CEU eTD Collection

Conclusion

Though a decade has passed since the protests erupted in the streets of Arab countries, those

events are worth renewed attention. The remarkable phenomenon of military defection, which

has occupied a vital place in recent scholarship, can be a clue towards a broader framework to

understand the complex, and interweaving, scenarios of political violence. Indeed,

abandoning of the regime by soldiers non-aligned with it by origin became a crucial step in

promoting full-blown insurgency in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, with defectors being its major

participants. The thesis hence addresses personnel’s defection leading to consequent rebellion

through one more angle – which is the link between civil conflict and coup d'état by rival

factions represented in the army.

The connection between these two scenarios is particularly illuminated in the argument of

Roessler (2011, 2016) stating that a decreased risk of an overthrow, achieved through political

exclusion of ethnic rivals, is traded for an increased prospect of civil war. That is, the foes

whom the ruler agrees to share power with are supposed to enjoy the access to state resources,

thus posing a threat of a takeover, rather than embark on a destructive anti-government

insurgency. Yet, it is here where the Arab Spring presents a puzzle: in the country such as

Syria, the faction that continued to struggle against the regime had actually been represented

in the military and therefore should have benefitted from its strategic position within the

coercive apparatus. This behaviour of Syrian Sunni officers leads us to ask when inclusion is

unable to prevent defection and further rebellion? CEU eTD Collection In an attempt to answer the question, the thesis expands on Roessler’s argument and suggests

a logic of power-sharing between the ruler and non-dominant ethnic/religious/tribal group(s)

in fractionalized and potentially eruptive societies. By adjusting Svolik’s (2012) formal model

of authoritarian power-sharing, we theorize this relation as a game where the incumbent

incorporates her rivals in the army, in anticipation of them being contended with own place

and consequent prevention of conflict-prompting defection. As presumed, however, this move

of inclusion alone is insufficient to secure peace. What matters is to what extent the threat of

an ouster, i.e. successful coup, posed by the faction is credible. Takeover credibility

diminishes once the ruler decides to renege on the pact by aggrandizing praetorian guards,

allegiant based on their origin and charged with warding off a regime overthrow. Given such

anti-coup forces, which are seen as even more potent if the plotters’ capabilities reserved in

power-sharing are too low, the faction is expected to prefer a challenge from outside, while

background protests (as a form of potential large-scale instability) should provide a

favourable moment for defection.

That is, the three hypotheses inferred from the solution are that defection is more likely upon

(1) a build-up of praetorian units, (2) a higher level of social unrest, and (3) a smaller share of

power granted to the faction initially – with anticipated relational dynamics between the

parameters. The case study of Syria under Presidents Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad has

aimed to illustrate the model inferences, drawing upon primary sources located on WikiLeaks.

As the analysis suggests, the balancing of the Alawite regime and Sunni officers by Hafez

produced enduring co-habitation: the decent place of the faction in Assad’s order made the

praetorian build-up not that hazardous in terms of prompting disobedience, though sufficient

to contain coup activity by Sunnis. Importantly, there was still little opportunity for defection

as the 1970s’ protests ended without meaningful participation of the army. During the 2011

upheaval faced by Bashar, the situation changed because the wider military became deployed CEU eTD Collection for a crack-down. Critically, this focal point had also been preceded by pronounced coup-

proofing which disempowered Sunni personnel in the military, while strengthening elite units

to the degree incompatible with Sunnis’ capabilities. The resulting shortage of a credible coup

threat arguably spurred the faction to join protesters for opposing the regime through

insurgency.

Furthermore, the implications have been tested in a statistical analysis on Roessler’s data

(2011) for sub-Saharan African ethnic groups, used as an evaluation sample of similarly

fractionalized and weak states for the MENA-driven game. Thus, we have assessed the

likelihood of rebellion during the next year based on both the original dataset and the one

fixing the presence of a group in the army. The findings revealed by the additive regressions

support our hypothesis about the defection-promoting role of security units. Crucially, the

result holds once prior military inclusion is provided for, as well as when we control for

financial patronage, ongoing civil war, and recent purge. Hence, reneging through the

security forces build-up turns out to have a greater explanatory capacity compared to the

extent of inclusion taken alone. Though power-sharing in the army is insignificant as a

separate predictor within a given sample, it still features the expected negative sign, and

critically, it helps to verify the finding for anti-coup forces. While incorporation of Roessler’s

controls leaves no significant predictors, this might be due to a relatively small number of

observations. Besides, the full models can be deemed less informative if judging by the bigger

AIC.

However, the contribution of unrest as a sign of dawning full-fledged conflict, proxied

through an annual score of protests, fails to obtain statistical evidence. The variable is not

only insignificant, it is characterized by negative coefficients which run counter to the second

CEU eTD Collection hypothesis. After some robustness checks for political regime, the results still evince that

mobilization does not induce defection and rebellion even in SSA states that are autocracies.

Such an output may point to limited generalizability of the theory grounded in the Arab

Spring, given the specificity of either the historical moment or the region broadly taken.

Finally, we have considered regressions with interaction to test the simultaneous effect of the

parameters. Yet, there is no predictor getting enough significance, whereas the output features

large standard errors and some unexpected coefficient signs. Therefore, the anticipated logic

of interaction cannot be confirmed within this statistical analysis. Deeming the latter, a more

case-oriented approach could be needed to adequately examine how the three parameters

interrelate. The same appears true for the existence of background unrest, which has proved to

be a prominent factor in the Syrian case particularly.

Thus, following Roessler’s seminal argument, the thesis speaks to the fruitfulness of the

venue where different scenarios of anti-government behaviour are viewed as interweaving.

While the existence of the coup-civil war dichotomy per se is beyond question – our findings,

however, point to the value of credible commitment element in this story. Particularly, we

address the phenomenon of defection from the state for a further challenge from outside,

whereas Roessler does not touch upon such wilful abandoning and focuses on the fact of

being recently purged. Inspired by the Arab Spring example, we therefore show the

possibility of existing inclusion nonetheless changing to insurgency, which draws on the vital

condition that the faction’s capability vis-à-vis the ruler is insufficient to render a coup threat

credible. Though alone out of the three parameters, the praetorian build-up indeed obtains

strong statistical support and thus emphasizes the leader’s compliance with power-sharing by

allowing for the real risk of removal. This, in turn, points to the relevance of politico-

economic categories through which the interaction between the ruler and her opponents can

be conceptualized. CEU eTD Collection

As a further step in the present topic, it may be worthwhile to incorporate the aspect of co-

optation through financial resources in the formal model. While the current game considers

the sheer amount of capabilities versus , they can be adapted to account for the

patronage distribution, which would in turn affect the proneness to defection as well as

plotting. Thus, some resource multiplier should be such that the faction gets dissuaded from

trying any disloyal action, even when initial 1-b is not that big. On the incumbent’s part, the

parameter should be proportional to the available co-opting capacity, while simultaneously

capturing the rising greed for rents. Even if resources are presupposed not solely for the leader

but for her immediate ruling coalition, it still implies a diminished share going to the rival

faction. Besides, another option could be incorporation of the ruling coalition (which is the

very actor considered by Svolik (2012)), which means one more arena of bargaining with the

incumbent. Such a formulation would need a sort of the nested game approach when

interactions are analysed first per each principal arena and then jointly [Jesse et al. 2002].

On a substantial ground, although the current framework is largely positivist, it should not

rule out the importance of the ideational strand. Indeed, starting from the fact that group

identity plays a vital role in the whole story, it would be reasonable to address the faction’s

identification with the discontent masses. The Arab Upheaval again provides a pertinent

example: military disobedience in Syria and Libya is reputed to feature shared group

affiliation of defectors and protesters [Gaub 2013; Albrecht, Ohl 2016]. In this respect, the

resistance to suppression of own group-mates or the perception of common grievances might

well contribute to siding with the public. Though drawing on a different logic, the ideational

factor should not necessarily be detached from the power-sharing rationale. In terms of

empirics, it would most likely require a comprehensive qualitative account of cases with CEU eTD Collection social unrest. While for statistical analysis Clark and Regan’s (2016) data used here may

come in handy, such an endeavour would necessitate a rigorous review of the “Protester

identity” variable whose coding is not uniform.

Appendix 1: Formal modelling

1.1 Payoffs calculation

The game unfolds as follows:

4. The incumbent reneges on or complies with a previously agreed pact, which has reserved

the share for her and for the faction through inclusion, with the

probability and , respectively. (The shares denote corresponding power of the

actors and are thus assumed to match the likelihood of success for particular

undertakings.) If the latter option is preferred, the ruler starts to build up own praetorian

forces by the level , such that her power rises to while the faction’s one

diminishes to .

5. The military faction – which by assumption does not perfectly know the incumbent’s

choice and finds itself in the information set – defects with the probability to outsiders,

who may already launch or not social unrest of the scale , or remains loyal with the

probability . Defection of the group ultimately leads to civil conflict, and the game

ends with the payoffs dependent on whether the incumbent initially reneges or complies.

Thus, when there is no violation of the pact through raised , the war outcome renders

to the ruler and to the faction.47 When violation of the pact does

take place, the respective payoffs are and .48

6. If staying allegiant to the regime, with some probability the faction may try to seize

CEU eTD Collection power via a coup, which in turn succeeds or not accordingly to capabilities of the actors.

47 Given that the faction has power , its payoff is then , where is the utility in case of victory and in case of failure. For simplicity, the incumbent’s payoff is derived from that of the group as . Though such derivation might counter algebraic rules in terms of value intervals, this should not hinder overall model inferences as we primarily look at the sign (positive/negative) of parameters. 48 That is, and .

Here again, the payoffs are conditional on the incumbent’s initial decision. When the pact

is complied with, the coup option gives for the ruler and for the faction, chances

of success being considered.49 When the pact is reneged on, the attempted ouster provides

to the ruler and to the faction, chances of success being

considered.50

With the opposite probability , the military group preserves loyalty till the end, not

staging a coup. The resulting status quo leaves and for the incumbent and the faction

if the pact is followed – while and if it is not.

1.2 Game solution

In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, is such that the incumbent is indifferent between

compliance and reneging:

CEU eTD Collection

49 I.e., failure of a coup leaves the ruler with and the faction with – whereas coup success changes these payoffs vice versa. Since the likelihood of failure is presumed to be (aka the incumbent’s power) while the likelihood of success is (aka the group’s power), on the whole the incumbent gets and the group gets . 50 Similarly to [48], but with the incumbent’s power of and the group’s power of , respective payoffs are and .

]

In turn, is such that the faction is indifferent between defection and loyalty:

Thus, the game has the following mixed-strategy equilibrium:

CEU eTD Collection

Appendix 2: Quantitative analysis

Table A1: Descriptive statistics (non-filtered data)

Table A2: Descriptive statistics (filtered data) CEU eTD Collection

Table A3: Variables summary

CEU eTD Collection

Table A4: Results

Figure A1: Distribution of regimes based on Polity IV CEU eTD Collection

Table A5: Results

CEU eTD Collection

Table A6: Results

CEU eTD Collection

Table A7: Results

CEU eTD Collection

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