How to Support the Opposition in Syria New Models for Understanding Syria

BY SUSANNA BLUME

mericans’ understanding of the current civil war in Syria is firmly rooted in their recent military history: the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the past Adecade. These conflicts have made U.S. policy makers painfully aware of the costs of the kind of intervention required by modern counterinsurgency doctrine, and of the limits of U.S. ability to create enduring political change in foreign lands. However, another slightly older case exists that may be more relevant to the civil war currently raging in Syria. U.S. intervention during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was successful in achieving its proximate goal (Soviet withdrawal), though the consequences of that conflict have been grave and far-reaching. This article explores similarities and differences between these two conflicts, and offers lessons learned from U.S. intervention during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Specifically, to support the opposition in Syria, the United States should: 1) vet and select recip- ients of U.S. military aid itself; 2) provide military assistance overtly under Title 10 military and Title 22 diplomatic authorities, vice covertly under Title 50 intelligence authorities; 3) carefully consider the type and number of weapons to be provided in order to maximize their account- ability and recoverability; and 4) continue to work with Syrian factions as well as other interested parties to develop a lasting political resolution to the conflict. Lastly, this article examines how these lessons might be applied to the current conflict in Syria to achieve the U.S. long-term stra- tegic objective: a democratic Syria with a robust civil society that is a stabilizing force in the greater Middle East.

Susanna Blume is Senior Advisor in the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The views in this article are her own and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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Importance of Stability in Syria to U.S. greater Middle East, or whether it will devolve National Security further into chaos, becoming a haven not just for Hezbollah, but for extremists of all stripes After a decade mired in Middle Eastern and ambitions, with destabilizing effects to be and South Asian conflicts with uncertain out- felt certainly throughout the region, and comes, it is easy to see why so much of the potentially on a global scale. This instability American public, not to mention the punditry could manifest itself in countless ways: pro- and policy-making class, is deeply skeptical of tracted civil war and ethnic cleansing; contin- yet another intervention in the region. The ued instability and loss of life caused by terror- conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria can all ist organizations with local, regional or even accurately be described as civil wars, to greater global ambitions; or worsening prospects for or lesser degrees. What stake does the United the global economy and the global economic States have in these conflicts? Hasn’t recent recovery as a result of continued instability in history demonstrated that U.S. intervention oil markets. only makes things worse for the affected popu- Perhaps even more disconcerting is the lations? What can the United States really do fact that the conflict has not been, and will not to resolve these conflicts? be, confined neatly within Syria’s borders. The While it is still too soon to tell whether, in massive influx of nearly 525,000 Syrian refu- the long run, the benefits of the wars in Iraq gees (and counting) into neighboring Jordan and Afghanistan will outweigh the tremendous has placed the already precarious Hashemite costs in both lives and treasure, one can justly dynasty, a stalwart friend of the United States describe the outcomes as at best mixed. The and consistent supporter of shared interests, in U.S. military is extraordinarily efficient at further peril.1 Approximately 760,000 refugees deposing tyrannical regimes such as those of have fled to Lebanon, stretching government Saddam Hussein or the Taliban, but the U.S. resources and distorting local economies.2 government as a whole is far less adept at the Turkey is host to nearly 500,000 Syrian refu- exponentially more difficult task of bringing gees, as well as the headquarters of the Free about lasting political solutions that might Syrian Army.3 Skirmishes across the Syrian/ allow these countries to flourish post-conflict. Turkish border, combined with long-standing Regardless, this mixed track record is not a tension between not only Turkish Kurds, but license to revert to isolationism, nor is it a rea- the Kurdish populations of Syria, Iraq, and son to assume that the United States, along Iran, could draw all of NATO into the conflict, with partners who are equally interested in the at a time and under circumstances not of our stability and prosperity of the greater Middle choosing. The emergence of a de facto East are unable to help unstable countries Kurdistan spanning northern Iraq and north- build stable civil societies. eastern Syria could have a profoundly destabi- So, why indeed, should the United States lizing effect on Turkey. Finally, the current care about the now three year old conflict in power vacuum in Syria has resulted in an envi- Syria? The outcome of the current conflict will ronment highly permissive of the activities of determine whether Syria will ultimately extremist groups (e.g., Hezbollah, al-Nusra) become a force for peace and stability in the and their state backers (Iran, and some Gulf

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states) whose ambitions, to depose both auto- public reticence has been mirrored in a cau- cratic and democratic regimes replacing them tious Executive. with highly restrictive Islamic theocracies, When confronted with the Soviet invasion extend far beyond Syria’s borders. of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Carter Administration’s response was shaped by a Parallels between 1980s Afghanistan and Syria Today recent history rife with very public foreign policy disasters. The Vietnam War tops the list, Admittedly, the Cold War geopolitical cli- manifest in deep reluctance by both the mate surrounding Afghanistan in the 1980s is Administration and the public to engage in more different from than similar to the current another large-scale intervention in a far off conflict in Syria. However, there are several rel- land. More proximate were the Iran hostage evant common currents worth noting, as they crisis and the storming of the U.S. Embassy in indicate potential to apply lessons learned Islamabad, both of which occurred that same from U.S. intervention in the Afghan conflict year. Made cautious by that history, when first to Syria’s current civil war. alerted to the fact that the Soviets were becom- Perhaps most obvious is the similarity in ing involved in the Afghan conflict, the Carter the U.S. domestic political climate of the two Administration elected to provide only non- eras, particularly the public’s lack of appetite lethal aid to anti-communist forces. To avoid for foreign policy generally, and costly military openly provoking the Soviet Union, it did so commitments in particular. In both cases, covertly.4 It was not until Ronald Reagan was wikimedia.org

President Reagan meeting with Afghan Freedom Fighters to discuss Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan

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elected in 1980 that the United States began covertly through Pakistani intermediaries. providing arms to the mujahideen fighting President Obama has the additional burden of against the Soviets; at first only Enfield rifles in having to convince the American people that small quantities. It was not until the interven- the potential harm to U.S. interests warrants tion of the now famous Representative Charlie intervention. Wilson that the United States began providing, On a positive note, both conflicts are char- through Pakistani intermediaries, the surface- acterized by a deeply committed indigenous to-air Stinger missiles that would steadily opposition that prefers to fight its own battles, erode Soviet dominance of the airspace over requiring only materiel assistance from foreign Afghanistan, a contributing factor in the Soviet governments. Both the Afghan mujahideen and Union’s decision to withdraw from the Syrian opposition were/are fighting for the Afghanistan in February 1989.5 right to control the fate of their country. The Mirroring the triple specter haunting the existence of these vested local leaders and Carter Administration, the Obama fighters with robust domestic constituencies Administration is also faced with three cau- indicates that Syrians, like the Afghans before tionary tales from recent history: Operation them, currently have and will retain ownership Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, over the conflict now and into the post-conflict and the attack against the U.S. diplomatic reconstruction phase. This state of affairs con- compound in Benghazi, Libya. Like the Carter trasts starkly with Operation Iraqi Freedom, Administration before him, President Obama where the United States led the invasion to has exercised caution, initially determining depose Saddam Hussein’s regime backed by that the safest course of action, and the most only a handful of Iraqi expatriates. Iraqis did palatable to the American public, was to pro- not own the deposition of Saddam Hussein vide only non-lethal aid to the Syrian opposi- and were thus poorly positioned to create a tion. And, just as in Afghanistan in the 1980s, lasting political reconciliation after his fall. this non-lethal aid was not enough to alleviate Unfortunately, both the Afghan mujahi‑ the suffering of hundreds of thousands of peo- deen and the Free Syrian Army and its affiliates ple displaced by the conflict, nor did it appre- are also characterized by deep divisions within ciably help to weaken the regime. Rather, as their ranks, a lack of clear leadership and com- reported in the press, even additional military mand and control, and widely divergent polit- and non-military aid from other supporters ical positions ranging from extremist funda- such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, has mentalists to moderate secularists, and not prevented the tide from turning against the covering much ground in between. The frac- Free Syrian Army and its affiliates.6 tured nature of the opposition is one of the Also in both cases U.S. national security primary challenges to foreign governments interests in the outcome of the conflicts were wishing to aid the rebellion. How can the real, arguably even more so in Syria. But these United States know who it is arming, and what interests remain profoundly difficult to explain kind of Syria they will create should Bashar to a deeply skeptical public. This public reluc- al-Assad fall? tance was less an issue for the Carter and Reagan Administrations, who provided aid

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U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan moderate elements in the anti-communist opposition and toward those who would ulti- Though the Soviet-backed regime per- mately become enemies of the United States sisted after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal until two decades later. the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, what Secondly, U.S., Soviet, and United Nations came after (a protracted period of civil war that efforts to create a lasting political solution to resulted in the rise of the Taliban and created the conflict in Afghanistan failed. While the a safe haven for al-Qaeda) could hardly be United States did not maliciously abandon the called success, by the Soviet Union, its succes- Afghan opposition following Soviet with- sors, or the United States. However, it would drawal, a series of domestic political factors led be revisionist to overlook the fact that U.S. to decreased interest in the subject in military assistance to the mujahideen was suc- Washington, reduced funding, and a devolu- cessful in achieving its proximate goal: to tion of decision making authority that led to make the conflict in Afghanistan as costly as inconsistencies in U.S. policy.9 In particular, possible for the Soviet Union.7 U.S. military the United States devoted considerable effort assistance to the Afghan mujahideen is a rela- to recovering the Stinger surface-to-air missiles tively rare example of a policy that was success- distributed to the mujahideen during the Soviet ful in bringing about its strategic objective, in occupation.10 As the country devolved into a a relatively short time and with relatively little bloody, protracted civil war, the United States cost to the United States. The civil war that fol- continued to fund warlords with interests lowed Soviet withdrawal, allowing the Taliban completely contrary to its own by buying back to rise to power in Afghanistan and creating a Stinger missiles under the Central Intelligence safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his asso- Agency’s (CIA) recovery program. As for the ciates, might have had a less catastrophic out- Soviets, though they continued to support the come if the United States and other interested communist regime for three years after the parties had acted differently in two key withdrawal of Soviet forces, the collapse of the instances during and immediately following Soviet Union in 1991 derailed the U.S.-Soviet the Soviet-Afghan War. dialogue on Afghan transition.11 Without First, the U.S. Government did not vet and strong U.S. or Soviet leadership, the UN’s select recipients of U.S. military aid itself, peace plan collapsed under pressure from rival instead giving U.S. funds and weapons to Afghan and Pakistani factions.12 Thus, the fun- Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to damentalist cancer that emerged in the 1980s distribute to recipients of its own choosing. was left to metastasize in the highly permissive Doing so allowed the United States to main- environment created by the protracted period tain plausible deniability of involvement in of civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal the conflict. Unfortunately the ISI’s selection from Afghanistan. criteria diverged significantly from what our 8 Lessons Learned, Applied to the Syrian own might have been. Seeking to strengthen Civil War and empower extremist elements within the mujahideen to be used as proxies against India, So, what can we learn from the U.S. expe- the ISI channeled U.S. resources away from rience during the Soviet invasion and

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 89 BLUME occupation of Afghanistan? First, providing Title 50 intelligence authorities as was the case arms to a committed, indigenous opposition in Afghanistan; 3) the United States should force can be an effective way to advance carefully consider the type and number of mutual interests limited to the scope of the weapons to be provided in order to maximize conflict in question (e.g., forcing the Soviets their accountability and recoverability; and 4) out of Afghanistan; deposing Bashar al-Assad). the United States must continue to work with This model is far less resource-intensive (for Syrian factions as well as other interested par- the United States) than the counterinsurgency ties to develop a lasting political resolution to doctrine developed during Operation Iraqi the current conflict. Freedom, and ensures that the local popula- The United States must not rely on tion retains ownership of the conflict, and thus regional partners to designate recipients of ownership of an eventual political solution. military assistance; it must vet and select recip- However, there are several key adjustments the ients itself. Though U.S. partners in the region, United States should make to this model such as Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, may before applying it to the current conflict in understand the Syrian insurgency better than Syria: 1) the United States must vet and select the United States does, their interests in select- recipients of U.S. military aid itself; 2) the ing recipients of military aid may be different, United States should provide military assis- or worse, contrary to U.S. interests in a demo- tance overtly under Title 10 military and Title cratic Syria. Currently, extremist organizations 22 diplomatic authorities, vice covertly under are receiving the bulk of foreign military aid Public domain photograph from defenseimagery.mil

U.S. Airmen with the 386th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron load pallets of nonlethal aid for the Syrian Opposition Coalition

90 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL HOW TO SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION IN SYRIA from individuals, organizations, and even potentially altering the decision calculus in the some governments. For example, Qatar’s Gulf rebels’ favor, not only for the Assad regime, but neighbors have accused it of funding the al- also for Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. In addi- Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front.13 In order to tion, the transparency gained by working ensure that moderate factions have a robust through Title 10 and Title 22 authorities would role in shaping post-Assad Syria, the odds make it easier to hold recipients of military aid must be evened. Particularly if the United accountable for the whereabouts of weapons, States and like-minded partners wish to have reducing the risk of U.S. military hardware fall- any influence over what shape the political ing into the hands of those who would use it resolution will take, we must ensure that mod- against the U.S., its allies, and partners. erates and secularists are strong enough mili- To further mitigate the risk that U.S. weap- tarily to make their voices heard in the process ons could come to be possessed by extremist of developing that political resolution, or, in factions, the United States should carefully the worst case, that moderate factions are able consider the ability to account for and recover to hold their own if a post-Assad struggle for different types of weapons when deciding power becomes violent. U.S. envoys must work what kind and how much military assistance closely with the Syrian Military Council and to provide. The Stingers provided to the muja‑ collect intelligence independently to ensure hideen were highly effective even in relatively that U.S. military aid is put against objectives small numbers; the United States only pro- common to the Syrian opposition and the vided between 2,000 and 2,500 in total.14 United States – ending the Assad dynasty and Because the Stingers were few in number and replacing it with an inclusive democratic sys- rare in the environment in which they were tem supported by a robust civil society. distributed, they could be tracked relatively Second, any military assistance provided easily by the CIA using unique serial num- should be executed by the Department of State bers.15 The United States should consider these and the Department of Defense under Title 10 factors when determining what to provide the military and Title 22 diplomatic authorities, Syrian opposition, as well as what types of not covertly under Title 50 intelligence author- weapons would offer the opposition a decisive ities. During the Soviet invasion and occupa- advantage over the Assad regime. tion of Afghanistan, U.S. military assistance to Finally, providing military assistance does the mujahideen had to be covert; overt assis- not obviate the need to work aggressively tance would have demanded a reaction from towards an enduring political resolution to the the Soviets, at a minimum resulting in escala- conflict. As the past decade of war has demon- tion and potentially in contagion of the strated, military victory is not adequate to Afghan conflict. At worst, the result could have secure lasting stability. Without reconciliation been open war between the two superpowers. and an inclusive, representative political sys- Conversely, the circumstances surrounding the tem backed by a robust civil society, old pat- current conflict in Syria encourage public terns of conflict will continue to reemerge, acknowledgement of U.S. military aid to the often manifest in violence. Building this kind opposition. Overt U.S. intervention could have of a system is exponentially more difficult than significant impact on the course of the conflict, achieving military victory, and only the Syrians

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 91 BLUME can do it. Post-conflict reconciliation and Conclusion reconstruction is not a process that can be led by outsiders; it must be wholly owned by the There are plenty of reasons to proceed domestic constituencies in Syria, with foreign with extreme caution when contemplating parties in clearly supporting roles. military assistance to the Syrian opposition. As Consequently, the U.S. role is limited to ensur- the U.S. intervention during the Soviet occupa- ing that moderate factions have what they tion of Afghanistan demonstrates, military need, and creating space in the international assistance to insurgents with weak command system for change in Syria to occur. Specifically, and control is a dangerous undertaking. the United States must do what it can diplo- However, failure to intervene can have equally matically to prevent spoilers (like Russia, Iran, severe consequences. Foreign fighters and arms Qatar, and Hezbollah) from obstructing Syria’s continue to flow into Syria, further bolstering democratic development. Though the U.S. dip- the capability and capacity of the regime’s lomatic role in this political space is necessar- forces, as well as extremists in opposition. ily limited, it is equally if not more important Asking the rebels to come to the negotiating than any military assistance the United States table when they are obviously weak, and can provide. moreover when moderate factions within the opposition are weaker still, could have disas- trous consequences for the future of Syria as a Commons: FIA Novosti

Last Soviet troop column crosses Soviet border after leaving Afghanistan

92 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL HOW TO SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION IN SYRIA democratic state supported by a robust civil NOTES society. Because of Syria’s vital role in the greater Middle East, extremist dominance post- Assad could further destabilize the already 1 According to the United Nations Refugee fragile region, with significant implications Agency, as of September 24, 2013. http://data.unhcr. org/syrianrefugees/regional.php most immediately for Israel’s security, but also 2 Ibid. for the global security environment as a whole. 3 Ibid. There is some hope that democratic societies 4 Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the outside the region can help avoid this outcome CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Books: New by ensuring that moderate factions within the York, 2004. opposition are militarily strong enough to be 5 Ibid. credible actors in the political process should 6 Sly, Liz. "Syrian Regime Gains Ground." Washington Post, 12 May 2013, page 1. the Assad regime fall. In so doing, policy mak- 7 Grau, Lester W. and Michael A. Gress. The ers should consider both the successes and Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. failures of prior U.S. intervention during the University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 2002. 8 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Bearden, Milt. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB. and be guided by their lessons. PRISM Presidio Press: New York, 2004. 9 Maley, William. The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2002. 10 Coll. 11 Maley. 12 Ibid. 13 Khalafa, Roula, and Abigail Fielding-Smith. “How a Tiny Oil-Rich Gulf State Siezed Control of the Syrian Revolution.” Financial Times Magazine, 18 May 2013, page FTM12. 14 Coll. 15 Ibid. 16 Barnard, Anne, and Hwaida Saad. “Hezbollah Aids Syrian Military in a Key Battle.” New York Times, 20 May 2013, page 1.

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Gravestone without name symbolizing children killed in the war