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Home , Army of Conquest, Free Syrian Army, Islamic Front (Syria)

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Ahrar al-Sham: The “Syrian ” WP Al-Nusra Ally Seeks Partnership with West

Guido Steinberg S

President Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to step down and open the door to compromise is not the only obstacle to a resolution of the Syrian conflict. Various Islamist groups focused on outright military victory also play a major role. Since 2012 they have come to dominate the uprising. The international community agrees that there can be no ne- gotiations with the so-called in Iraq and (ISIS), nor with the al-Nusra Front, which is close to al-Qaeda. The open question is how to treat Ahrar al-Sham, as the largest rebel group alongside ISIS. Its militant Salafist orientation, which makes it the al-Nusra Front’s closest ally, speaks against involving it in talks. Although Ahrar has been seeking since 2015 to position itself as a partner for the and its allies, there is no sign that it intends to abandon its alliance with the jihadists.

Since 2012 Ahrar al-Sham (“The Free Men Rise of an Organisation of Syria”) has established itself as one of the The emergence of Ahrar al-Sham can be strongest forces in the Syrian uprising. Like traced indirectly to the regime’s decision most other rebel groups it has suffered to amnesty prisoners, including many of from the rise of ISIS since April 2013, and the thousands of incarcerated Islamists. for some time its best days appeared to be The later leader of Ahrar al-Sham, Hassan over. Yet it managed to hold onto northern, Abbud, and other leading figures were central and southern parts of the country released from the notorious Saidnaya prison in 2013 and 2014. In spring 2015 a joint outside in May 2011. In June 2011 offensive by Ahrar and the al-Nusra Front some of the Islamists, most of whom origi- captured the provincial capital of nated from and Idlib, founded an in the north. The territorial gains of the armed formation calling itself “Battalions Islamist alliance – “the ” of the Free Men of Syria” (Kata’ib Ahrar (Jaish al-Fath) – in north-western Syria al-Sham). presented such a threat to the regime that Islamists soon represented the strongest Moscow started deploying troops in April current in the Syrian uprising, and by early 2015 and began air strikes against the 2013 Ahrar was already one of the most rebels at the end of September. important groups. One reason for this was the group’s judicious alliances, which have

Dr. Guido Steinberg is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 27 May 2016

1 become one of its trademarks. In December Militant Salafists 2012 Ahrar founded the Syrian Islamic Ahrar al-Sham belongs to the Islamist/ Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya as-Suriya), along Salafist part of the rebel spectrum. It aims with ten smaller Islamist and Salafist to topple Asad and replace his regime with organisations. Although the constituent an Islamic state based on . While its groups retained their independence, three leadership has never spelled out in detail of them merged into the dominant Ahrar what the political system of such a state the very next month, and Ahrar renamed would look like, it is sure to be strongly itself the Islamic Movement of the Free Men authoritarian. of Syria (Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya). Until recently, Ahrar al-Sham regarded It was now able to expand its influence from the armed struggle as the only means to Idlib and Hama to the city and province of achieve its ends. Well into 2015 it was still and later also to the east and south categorically excluding talks with the of the country. By summer 2013 it was pres- regime, and leading representatives regu- ent wherever Syrian rebels were fighting. larly criticised the exile opposition’s wil- In the course of 2013 Ahrar al-Sham lingness to compromise. In this respect became the strongest force in the Syrian Ahrar closely resembles the al-Nusra Front, uprising, with ten to twenty thousand which also wants an Islamic state and whose fighters. It participated in numerous major concept of political order is probably largely with regime forces, including the identical with Ahrar’s. One important dif- capture of several important military bases ference is that Ahrar al-Sham pursues no and the provincial capital of in objectives outside of Syria. Its arguments March 2013. Encouraged by its successes, are largely nationalistic and its military the organisation abandoned its policy of activities to date give no grounds to suggest strict secrecy. In an interview with the – if it succeeded in toppling Asad – that it Qatari broadcaster al-Jazeera on 8 June 2013, would threaten neighbouring states. Hassan Abbud – whose identity had until Ahrar al-Sham also shares the sectarian then been completely unknown – spoke hatred of the jihadists. Although Ahrar freely about the organisation, its goals and has repeatedly asserted that it has nothing ideology, showed his face and allowed his in principle against the country’s religious full name to be revealed. minorities, bigotry towards Christians, This public turn was accompanied by and Shiites is often apparent in an intensification of contacts with other its statements. This is even reflected in its Salafist groups, culminating in November vocabulary: the Ahrar leadership uses the 2013 in the founding of the second Islamic negative term “Nazarenes” (nasrani) – which Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya). As well as Ahrar is popular among Salafists – to describe and the other members of the first Islamic Christians, rather than the usual Front, this formation now also included the masihi. Alawites and Shiites are dismissed as armed groups Suqur al-Sham (Idlib), Liwa nusairi and . So when Ahrar describes al-Tauhid (Aleppo), Jaish al-Islam (Damascus the Asad regime as Alawite (nusairi) it is and environs), Ansar al-Sham () and clearly thinking in the categories of reli- Liwa al-Haqq (). While Ahrar al-Sham gious strife. Ahrar regards the fight against remained the most important single group Asad and the Syrian Alawites as a “holy within the new alliance, it lost the domi- war” against the expansion of Shiite Islam nance it had enjoyed in the first Islamic and Tehran’s supposed plan to create a Front. Together with its new allies, Ahrar Shiite state extending from Palestine made an immediate mark in December through , Syria and Iraq to . 2013, capturing the crucial border crossing Events during the August 2013 offensive of Bab al-Hawa from the Free by a broad alliance of rebel groups in the (FSA). coastal mountains, in which Ahrar al-Sham

SWP Comments 27 May 2016

2 played a decisive role, demonstrate that Ahrar’s fighters refused to turn against these indications of an anti-Alawite and ISIS, having fought together with members anti-Shiite ideology are more than mere of the new organisation when they still rhetoric. In Alawite villages captured belonged to the al-Nusra Front or other during the first days of the operation, the smaller jihadist groups. Ideological affin- rebels committed numerous murders and ities, too, discouraged many members of other atrocities against innocent civilians Ahrar from fighting against the jihadists. and abducted more than two hundred to Eventually, though, a confrontation was pressure the government. To this day the inevitable, spurred on by pressure from fate of most of the hostages remains a other members of the . By the mystery. end of 2013 they were demanding increas- Ahrar al-Sham demonstrated similar ingly vehemently that Ahrar join the fight brutality against Shiite villages in Aleppo against ISIS. Gradually escalating skirmish- and Idlib provinces. Rebel groups including es with ISIS began in December 2013 after Ahrar al-Sham besieged Nubul and Zahra in the Islamic Front captured the border Aleppo province from July 2012 to February post at Bab al-Hawa. But the trigger for 2016. The defenders, supported by the Leba- major conflict was the murder of the Ahrar nese and Iraqi Shiite militias, al-Sham commander Husain Sulaiman (Abu succeeded in repelling repeated rebel Rayyan) later the same month. As Ahrar’s assaults. The Islamic Front abducted at least emir in Maskana in eastern Aleppo prov- fifty-six civilians from Zahra, few of whom ince, Abu Rayyan had gone to ISIS as an have yet been released. The rebels also in- emissary to negotiate over clashes between tentionally shelled non-military targets in the groups there. He was abducted by ISIS Nubul and Zahra, causing many civilian members, brutally tortured, and killed. victims and great harm to civil infrastruc- In response, Ahrar al-Sham decided to ture. Ahrar al-Sham and its allies acted openly fight ISIS. A broad campaign led by similarly in the siege of the Shiite towns the Islamic Front began at the beginning of Foua and Kefraya in Idlib province, which January 2014, with the participation of FSA began in March 2015. groups and – after some delay – the al-Nusra Front. By the end of February this alliance had driven ISIS out of Idlib, Latakia, the city Conflict with ISIS of Aleppo and the areas extending north of The prominence of Ahrar al-Sham as prob- Aleppo to the Turkish border. The defeated ably the largest rebel group and leader of ISIS forces withdrew to the east, where they the Islamic Front forced it to take sides in overcame initial pressure to eventually win the conflict with ISIS (see SWP Comment the for Raqqa. Although Nusra and 19/2014). After ISIS first appeared in April Ahrar outnumbered and surrounded the 2013, it quickly became clear that the new ISIS forces, they pulled back, probably be- force had no intention of joining with cause they were unwilling to fight against existing anti-regime formations. Instead it the jihadists. Disunity within Ahrar was a first established itself in rebel-held areas, crucial factor allowing ISIS to drive all its exhibiting no inhibitions against attacking rivals out of eastern and northern Syria by other rebels. Rather than fighting Asad, ISIS July 2014 and consolidate its rule there. concentrated on controlling territory and establishing a state. Although it was clear by July 2013 that Resistant Structures cooperation with ISIS was impossible, Despite massive losses in that conflict, Ahrar al-Sham hesitated to respond, fearing Ahrar al-Sham remained the strongest that open confrontation would weaken the group alongside ISIS, because it was very uprising as a whole. Moreover, many of well organised, structured and disciplined.

SWP Comments 27 May 2016

3 Since 2012 Ahrar’s main area of opera- created a structure capable of surviving grave tions has been Idlib and the northern part losses of individual leaders and fighters. of Hama province, which are also the areas Abbud’s successor Hashim al-Shaikh where most of its fighters and leaders come was replaced in September 2015 by a new from. Its headquarters also lies in this region. leader, Muhannad al-Masri (alias Abu Yahia Ahrar al-Sham’s leadership manages to con- al-Hamawi). trol all parts of the organisation, despite it having been joined by numerous smaller groups in almost all parts of the country Alliance with the al-Nusra Front (especially the north and centre). Communi- Ahrar al-Sham has cooperated closely with cation with local subgroups appears to func- the al-Nusra Front since 2012. One reason tion without a hitch, and its top and broader for this is that while both organisations are leadership are able to meet in person. concentrated in the northern provinces of While many of the rebel groups are com- Aleppo, Idlib and Hama, neither was ever manded by single authoritarian leaders, strong enough to resist the regime forces Ahrar has a number of influential figures on its own. Both therefore sought broad organised in a shura council (Majlis al-Shura). alliances. The ideological closeness of Ahrar These are with long records in the and Nusra facilitated that process. Islamist opposition, most of whom were Most of Ahrar al-Sham’s military suc- imprisoned at Saidnaya until 2011. cesses derived from this cooperation. They Until his death Hassan Abbud (alias Abu included the storming of Taftanaz air base Abdallah al-Hamawi) was the “general in Idlib province in January 2013 and the leader” (al-qa‘id al-amm) of Ahrar al-Sham. capture of Raqqa in March 2013 (the only Before mid-2013, when the group aban- provincial capital taken by the rebels before doned its strict secrecy, he was known only 2015). But the alliance’s greatest moment under his nom de guerre. From then on, to date came in March 2015, when Ahrar in a series of interviews in particular with al-Sham, the al-Nusra Front and numerous al-Jazeera, he presented his organisation’s smaller groups joined forces in the “Army goals and ideology and outlined his views of Conquest” (Jaish al-Fath) to launch a on the conflict in Syria. Within a few major offensive in Idlib province. In quick months Abbud had become one of the best- succession between March and May 2015 known faces of the Syrian uprising. they captured Idlib city, Jisr al-Shughur and On 9 September 2014 Abbud and thir- , bringing the province almost com- teen other leaders – almost the whole of pletely under their control. Ahrar’s top leadership – were killed at a Ahrar and Nusra operated in unison but meeting in Idlib province. To this day it is divided tasks between them. The al-Nusra unknown what and who caused the explo- Front possesses between five and eight sion, although ISIS remains the prime thousand fighters, considerably fewer than suspect. In the subsequent months Ahrar Ahrar whose strength today is still esti- demonstrated astonishing resilience. The mated to lie between ten and twenty thou- largely unknown Hashim al-Shaikh (alias sand men. The jihadists initiated assaults Abu Jabir) was named as its new leader, Abu with suicide attacks at regime checkpoints Salih al-Tahhan its new military chief. Most and entrances to military bases. Then the observers expected Ahrar to be significantly numerically much stronger forces of Ahrar weakened, but that turned out not to be and its allies followed to take control of the case. In spring 2015, together with the strongholds and settlements. Neither Ahrar al-Nusra Front, it achieved significant gains nor Nusra would have been capable of in fighting with the regime, and retained achieving such successes without the other. its presence wherever rebel forces were The alliance has now lasted about four strong. Abbud and his comrades had plainly years.

SWP Comments 27 May 2016

4 One reason why the 2015 spring offen- its many suicide bombers to sacrifice their sive was so effective was that shortly before- lives. Like the Afghan Taliban, Ahrar is in hand , and had the main a nationalist formation, but stepped up their support for Ahrar al-Sham. has a strong wing tending more towards Turkey and Qatar have been supporting al-Qaeda’s international . Other Ahrar since 2012/13, and appear to have shared features are strong hatred of non- selected it as their most important recipi- Sunni Muslims and outbursts of religiously ent of arms and funding. Despite frequent and politically motivated violence against reports in 2014 that Ankara and had Alawites and Shiites. reduced their assistance in response to US Further evidence of Ahrar’s particular pressure, both abandoned any caution fol- affinity to the Taliban is found in the career lowing the assassination of the Ahrar-al- of its commander Abu Khalid as-Suri (origi- Sham leadership in September 2014. nally Muhammad Bahaia, killed 2014). For Additionally, after King Salman succeeded a long time he served as the right hand of to the throne in January 2015, the new the jihadist strategist Abu Musab as-Suri, Saudi leadership noticeably relaxed rela- and prior to 2001 was a trainer for al-Qaeda tions with Turkey and increased its support in Afghanistan. But he appears never to for the rebels in northern Syria in concert have joined al-Qaeda, belonging instead to with Ankara. This policy shift left the a group of Arab jihadists that were closer to groups comprising Jaish al-Fath better the Taliban. After his release from Saidnaya armed than ever, including with armour- Prison it was logical to join Ahrar al-Sham, piercing . where he advanced to become an important The successful offensive was to have leader. In June 2013 al-Qaeda leader Aiman dramatic consequences for the war in Syria. al-Zawahiri appointed him his envoy in In early summer 2015 the rebel coalition Syria, to mediate between the al-Nusra Front advanced into the Ghab Plain in northern and ISIS. Hama province and quickly posed a serious The comparison with the Taliban also threat to regime positions in the coastal reveals a number of differences, however. mountains and the centre of the country. Ahrar is more reserved than the Taliban in Concerns that the regime’s forces were its use of violence against military adver- facing collapse led Moscow to begin sending saries and civilians, and leaves suicide troops to Syria in April 2015, with Russian attacks to the al-Nusra Front. Nor does it air strikes against the rebels beginning at attempt to impose its Salafist interpretation the end of September 2015. Despite asser- of Islam and Islamic law by force, instead tions to the contrary, the air strikes were seeking to win over the civilian population directed above all against Jaish al-Fath by offering protection from regime forces rather than ISIS positions. and doing its best to provide services. Whether that would remain the case if it – like the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1996 The “Syrian Taliban” to 2001 – actually came to power remains On account of its ideological closeness and speculation. Since 2013 Ahrar has more or almost symbiotic relationship with the al- less openly asserted that political power in Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham is frequently Syria must lie in the hands of (Sunni) Islam- described as the “Syrian Taliban”. Ahrar ist Muslims. As suggested by its atrocities al-Sham’s position vis-à-vis the al-Nusra during the coastal offensive and actions Front is indeed similar to that of the Afghan against Shiite villages in Aleppo and Idlib, Taliban and al-Qaeda. Like the Taliban, it is dubious whether that would leave any Ahrar is the numerically stronger forma- future in Syria for the hated Alawites and tion, and profits from the al-Nusra Front’s Shiites. terrorist expertise and the willingness of

SWP Comments 27 May 2016

5 A PR Offensive before returning to Syria in 2010. The charge that it was acting as an enabler After Liwa al-Haqq joined Ahrar he became for al-Qaeda in Syria became an increasing its chief of foreign political relations in problem for Ahrar al-Sham (and its foreign 2015, working to present Ahrar as a moder- backers). It felt forced to correct its public ate Islamist group in numerous discussions image and present itself as a moderate with Western politicians. He even succeeded Islamist group that had not the slightest in presenting his views in two widely noted intention of imposing an Islamist dictator- opinion pieces in and ship, and would also protect the rights of the British Telegraph. In line with this stance, religious minorities. Ahrar also abandoned its uncompromising Such ideas were already circulating in rejection of talks with the regime and par- 2014, following reports that Qatar had ticipated in the meeting of opposition rep- reduced its support under pressure from resentatives in Riyadh on 9 and 10 December Washington. The fighting with ISIS may 2015, which established a “high negotia- also have played a role, as many jihadists tions committee” to select a delegation for who had previously fought with Ahrar the planned talks in Geneva. al-Sham now switched to ISIS and thus weakened Ahrar’s more militant wing. Ahrar also found itself forced to take a Negotiations in Riyadh and Geneva stance against its openly hostile new rival Ahrar’s internal divisions were exposed and seek new allies. during the Riyadh talks, in the preparations The first signs of “moderation” in Ahrar for Geneva and in the actual negotiations al-Sham came in 2014, with the process on a cease-fire and its implementation. Sup- accelerated by the loss of almost the entire porters of negotiations and cooperation leadership in September 2014 and the with the non-Islamist opposition faced off emergence of new figures to replace them. with jihadist hardliners and supporters of In a widely noted interview with al-Jazeera the alliance with the al-Nusra Front. in April 2015, the new Ahrar al-Sham leader Despite the efforts to garner international Hashim al-Shaikh expressed veiled criticism recognition, the hardliners remained a sig- of the al-Nusra Front: Its ties to al-Qaeda, nificant force in 2015 and 2016, as evidenced he said, harmed the Syrian people because by the continuing close alliance with the they supplied the “international communi- al-Nusra Front. While proponents of more ty” with an excuse to fight the Syrian “revo- moderate positions were found above all in lution” as “terrorism”. He promised reli- the politburo, military figures and religious gious minorities “their rights” in a future scholars took the harder line. The opponents Islamic Syrian state, but underlined that of a moderate course were led by the well- such a state’s political leadership belonged known military chief Abu Salih Tahhan and purely in the hands of Sunni Muslims. One the prominent preacher Abu Muhammad would have to be very sympathetic towards al-Sadiq. Ahrar al-Sham to regard these statements as The vehemence of the conflict was im- any real retreat from its Salafist course and possible to overlook at the Riyadh confer- alliance with the al-Nusra Front. But even ence. Although Ahrar agreed to the talks this cautious criticism was a new departure. and sent Nahhas as its representative, the A great deal more effective were the activ- organisation pulled out shortly before ities of the organisation’s new spokesman, the conclusion of the discussions. Nahhas Labib an-Nahhas (Abu Izzaddin al-Ansari) stayed anyway and signed the final declara- from Homs, whose group Liwa al-Haqq only tion, creating great confusion. Senior lead- joined Ahrar in December 2014. His mother ers in Turkey and Syria insisted that they was Spanish and he lived and studied in the rejected the agreement. Whether and how United States, Britain, the and Ahrar would participate in further talks

SWP Comments 27 May 2016

6 remained uncertain in the subsequent Nusra remains intact and both know they months. are dependent on one another if they wish Ahrar’s attitude towards the cessation to continue to enjoy military successes of hostilities that came into effect on 27 against the regime and defend themselves February 2016 after agreement between against ISIS. Another is that Ahrar itself the United States and also remains uses terrorist means such as car bombs unclear. While Ahrar stands on the list of against regime forces, and has been respon- ninety-three groups that have signalled sible for numerous crimes against innocent their willingness to observe the cease-fire, civilians during its assaults on Alawite and known hardliners like Sadiq and Tahhan Shiite towns and villages. have spoken out against it. A public clari- This constellation speaks for a dual fication in the name of the organisation has strategy towards Ahrar. Firstly, it should not been forthcoming. But with the Russian participate in talks with the regime and the leadership, in whose eyes Ahrar is a terror- international community, if it is willing to. ist organisation, nonetheless including it It is an important success that the cease-fire © Stiftung Wissenschaft und the cessation of hostilities, the agreement of 27 February 2016 held for several weeks Politik, 2016 has initially held. before it collapsed in April. It would be a All rights reserved Another factor driving this internal con- positive side-effect if that caused tensions These Comments reflect flict is pincer-like pressure from the al-Nusra between Ahrar and Nusra to grow. the author’s views. Front and Turkey: Nusra continues to reject The second objective of Western policy SWP any talks with the regime, whereas Turkey should be to bring about a break between Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik supports them. Ahrar’s leaders plainly fear Ahrar and Nusra. It must be made clear to German Institute for that taking a clear position would harm in- Ahrar that its alliance with the al-Nusra International and Security Affairs ternal cohesion and relations with one or Front – and its own crimes – will have con- other of its two most important allies. sequences. It is therefore right for Germany Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 to criminalise membership of and support 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 for Ahrar as a terrorist organisation, and it Fax +49 30 880 07-100 A Dual Strategy should seek to persuade its partners in the www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] There is no golden rule for dealing with an EU and ideally also in NATO to do the same. organisation like Ahrar al-Sham. The West At the same time Germany should clearly ISSN 1861-1761 finds it extremely difficult, and that is un- communicate that Ahrar al-Sham’s classifi- Translation by Meredith Dale likely to change in the longer term. At the cation as a terrorist organisation could be (English version of same time, anyone interested in a resolu- reversed if it changed its behaviour. SWP-Aktuell 28/2016) tion of the conflict in Syria must find a way forward. The main reason to allow Ahrar to par- ticipate in the Geneva talks is that it is the strongest rebel group apart from ISIS. Although the role of the Islamic Front as an alliance has declined, Ahrar still influences numerous partners and possesses great sup- port in the Syrian Sunni population. With- out it, the search for a solution will become even more difficult than it already is. Also, the movement in Ahrar’s positions since 2014 demonstrates that change is possible. One factor speaking against talks with Ahrar is that that would indirectly strengthen the al-Nusra Front and thus al-Qaeda. The alliance between Ahrar and

SWP Comments 27 May 2016

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