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A Perfect Proxy? the United States–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership

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A Perfect Proxy? the United States–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership PWP Conflict Studies A Perfect Proxy? The United States–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership Dylan Maguire PWP Conflict Studies The Proxy Wars Project (PWP) aims to develop new insights for resolving the wars that beset the Arab world. While the conflicts in Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Iraq have internal roots, the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and others have all provided mil- itary and economic support to various belligerents. PWP Conflict Studies are papers written by recognized area experts that are designed to elucidate the complex rela- tionship between internal proxies and external sponsors. PWP is jointly directed by Ariel Ahram (Virginia Tech) and Ranj Alaaldin (Brookings Doha Center) and funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Dylan Maguire is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University and a 2020–2021 USIP-Minerva Peace and Security Scholar. His dissertation examines transnational political-military partnerships between militias and states and focuses on the Lebanese and Syrian civil wars. The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not in any way reflect the views of the institutions referred to or represented within this paper. Copyright © 2020 Dylan Maguire First published 2020 by the Virginia Tech School of Public and International Affairs in Association with Virginia Tech Publishing Virginia Tech School of Public and International Affairs Blacksburg, VA 24061 Virginia Tech Publishing University Libraries at Virginia Tech 560 Drillfield Dr. Blacksburg, VA 24061 DOI: https://doi.org/10.21061/proxy-wars-maguire Suggested Citation: Maguire, A. (2020). A Perfect Proxy? The United States–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership. The Proxy Wars Project. doi: https://doi.org/10.21061/proxy-wars-maguire. This publiction is covered by the following Creative Commons License: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) You are free to: Share — Copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format. The licensor cannot revoke these free- doms as long as you follow the license terms. Under the following terms: Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. NoDerivatives — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material. No additional restrictions — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits. The above is a summary of the full license, which is available at the following URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Cover illustration: Kurdish YPG Fighters, March 16, 2018. Photo by Kurdishstruggle. This photo is licensed un- der the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 International license. Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/kurd- ishstruggle/40131445204/in/photostream/. Map illustration page 8: SDF-controlled territory (green) and Turkish-occupied territory (red) in October 2019, April 2, 2020. Image by Editor abcdef. This photo is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 International license. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Claimed_and_de_facto_ter- ritory_of_Rojava.png. Introduction the United States’ equivocal relationship with the SDF. The United States delegated ground force In January 2020 General Mazloum Kobani, responsibility to SDF fighters, which allowed US commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces soldiers to play a more enabling role.5 But the re- 1 (SDF), remarked that outside interests, namely lationship between the United States and the SDF the United States, Russia, and Turkey, had been was never stable. The US-SDF partnership broke the determining factor in the search for a politi- down when the United States (1) chose to ignore cal solution to Syria’s civil war. These powers, he the long-term political interests of the SDF during said, “cast aside the sacrifices of our people in the the proxy-selection process; (2) changed its own name of such interests, setting the stage for the short-term preferences for its Syria mission; and 2 betrayal of the Kurds.” His observation came as (3) failed to reconcile the conflicting ambitions his militia pivoted from its frontline role with the and expectations of Turkey and the SDF. US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to a tacit partnership with Damascus and Moscow to expel The US-SDF proxy relationship, therefore, is Turkish forces from northern Syria.3 instructive of what the United States must do to succeed in proxy warfare. When selecting proxies, Why did a militia offshoot of the Kurdistan the United States must ensure that its long-term Workers’ Party (PKK), a US-designated foreign interests align with those of potential partners, terrorist organization bent on Kurdish separatists’ or risk divergence after immediate goals are demands, shift from a partnership with the Unit- achieved. Better knowledge about a proxy can ed States to one with Syria and Russia? General help identify ideological core beliefs. The United Mazloum’s comments underscore the importance States must also have realistic expectations about of state interests in shaping the landscape in a proxy’s ability to deliver. Maximalist US goals which militias operate. Turkey regarded Kurdish are unlikely to be achieved using a minimalist separatism as fundamentally antithetical to its model. If the United States chooses to ignore interests. Neither the United States nor Russia long-term interest alignments during proxy was prepared to back a Kurdish region in Syria. selection and instead keeps relationships strictly But the interests of the Democratic Union Party transactional, or makes unreasonable demands, it (PYD), the main political faction within the SDF, must be willing to suffer the reputational costs of also factored into the equation. The PYD’s chang- abandoning proxies and may find valuable part- ing preferences for state partners had a major role nerships increasingly scarce.6 in shaping the situation in Syria. Syria’s civil war occurred at a critical juncture Principals and Proxies, a Selection for US policymakers. An interest in reducing US Imperative expeditionary operations, rooted in operational Both the Obama and Trump administrations fatigue from waging two counterinsurgencies, col- staked a great deal on the idea of a partnership lided with a short-term preference for an activist “led by our partners … with enabling support policy in Syria. Population-centric counterinsur- from the United States … [and] through … part- gency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq called ner agreements.”7 The aim was, as US general for massive numbers of US forces.4 By 2009, the Joseph Votel put it, to “keep the ownership of Obama administration viewed this approach as the problem, and its aftermath, with the affected overly costly and yielding only marginal gain. people.”8 Marketed as both flexible and scalable, However, lessons gleaned from the 2005–2008 the doctrine relies on the comparative advantage Sunni Awakening, when US forces empowered of local forces to address local problems, allowing militias in western Iraq to fight al-Qaeda, re- the US military to employ its technological superi- mained trenchant. Instead of dispatching a large ority and avoid “owning complicated scenarios.”9 contingent of US forces, the United States would In this way, US forces can cost-effectively combat work “by, with, and through” local proxies. insurgency by delegating certain responsibilities Considered a cost-effective means for fighting to a proxy. insurgents, this model provided the conceptual Navigating the delegation process is the crux of blueprint for future operations in Syria. It fed into any proxy relationship. Principal-Agent Theory 4 explains the mechanism of delegation to model to focus solely on threats. However, it is much relationship dynamics between a principal (the more difficult to subsume division of overt politi- state) and an agent (the militia). The sine qua non cal interests in a transactional relationship.18 in delegation is selecting an agent that is willing to fight, militarily capable, politically appropriate, The Syrian Democratic Forces Emerge 10 and cheaper than the principal acting alone. After the 2011 repression of peaceful demonstra- 11 However, delegation is not cost free. Principals tions in Syria, President Barack Obama called on will never have perfect information about an Syrian president Bashir al-Assad to “step aside,”19 agent’s actions, efforts, and interests, as agents a call echoed by Turkish premier Recep Tayyip keep some information private to improve their Erdogan.20 This initial US-Turkish preference for 12 bargaining position and extract more resources. regime change led both to back Arab nationalist Agents will pursue their own interests, even when militias that eventually formed under the umbrel- they diverge from those of the principal. Thus, la of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Concerns over principals work hard to monitor and track agent FSA political goals and disorganization within compliance. Principals offer rewards to improve its ranks spurred the United States to shift to a capabilities and mete out punishments when more hands-on model of recruiting, training, and agents divert resources from pursuing a princi- equipping heavily scrutinized
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