Russia's Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

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NOVEMBER 2019

Jennifer Cafarella with Jason Zhou RUSSIA’S DEAD-END DIPLOMACY IN SYRIA

Jennifer Cafarella with Jason Zhou, Institute for the Study of War RUSSIA’S DEAD-END DIPLOMACY IN SYRIA Cover: Russian military vehicle is seen nearby a poster of Syrian President Bashar al Assad and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin during reopening of the road between Homs and Hama in Rastan, Syria, June 6, 2018. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing or from the publisher. ©2019 by the Institute for the Study of War. Published in 2019 in the United States of America by the Institute for the Study of War. 1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 | Washington, DC 20036 understandingwar.org ABOUT THE AUTHORS Jennifer Cafarella is the Research Director at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). She is responsible for setting the organization’s research priorities and overseeing their execution by the ISW Research Team. She also leads its simulation exercises and efforts to develop detailed policy recommendations for critical theaters abroad. She has conducted these exercises for various military units deploying overseas and regularly briefs military units preparing to deploy on a range of subjects including Syria, ISIS, and Russia. She has written extensively in various outlets including Foreign Affairs, The Hill, and Fox News, and appeared on several media programs including C-SPAN, CNN, and Fox News. Ms. Cafarella previously worked as ISW’s Director of Intelligence Planning in 2018 – 2019 as well as an ISW Syria Analyst from 2014 to 2017. She is an alumna of ISW's Hertog War Studies Program and the first ISW Evans Hanson Fellow, which sponsors outstanding alumni of the Hertog Program. She received her B.A. in Global Studies from the University of Minnesota- Twin Cities with a focus on the Middle East. Jason Zhou is the Evans Hanson Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). His work focuses on supporting forecasting and intelligence planning efforts across the portfolios covered by ISW. Jason contributed to ISW’s most recent report on ISIS resurgence in Iraq and Syria, titled “ISIS’s Second Comeback.” He has also conducted research on Iraqi politics and ISIS’s global network. Jason is an alumnus of ISW’s Hertog War Studies Program and received his B.A. in Public Policy from the University of Chicago.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank John Dunford for his research support to this paper and Nataliya Bugayova for her insightful analysis, which helped frame this undertaking. The authors would also like to thank Michael Land and Blane Wallace for their daily support to understanding developments on the ground and in the Syrian diplomatic track. Thank you to Colonel Ketti Davison (U.S. Army, Retired) for helpful feedback on multiple versions of this paper. Thank you also to ISW’s incredible operations team, including Caitlin Forrest, Maseh Zarif, Christopher Kozak, and Lisa Suchy, without whose help this paper would not be published. Finally, thank you to Dr. Kimberly Kagan, whose leadership, mentorship, and expertise make it all possible.

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8 Executive Summary 10 Introduction 11 Russia, Iran, and Assad: A Fragile Interdependence 11 Goals 12 Friction Points 14 Balance of Power 16 Russia’s Linked Military & Diplomatic Campaigns 16 Russia’s Initial Entry into Syria 17 1. Russia’s 2017 Astana Attempt 18 2. Russia’s 2018 Sochi Conference 21 3. Russia’s 2018 Reconciliation Experiment 27 4. Russia’s First Reconstruction Attempt 28 5. Russia’s Second Reconstruction Attempt 30 A “Breakthrough” Implementing 2254 33 Implications 36 Endnotes

List of Maps and Charts

19 De-Escalation Zones in Syria as of May 2017 24 Pro-Assad Regime Offensives 2011–November 2019 32 The False Promise of the Syrian Constitutional Committee 36 Syria Locator Map

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 7 RUSSIA’S DEAD-END DIPLOMACY IN SYRIA Executive Summary

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains the primary obstacle to peace in Syria. He has consistently spoiled any diplomatic process. His actions show that he will accept only the full defeat of his opponents. Even then, he will punish those who previously defied him, as he has done in former pro-opposition communities including in Aleppo and Dera’a Provinces. Yet he cannot win the war, so the West cannot resign itself to accepting his “victory” for the sake of stability. He does not have the resources to reconquer and reintegrate all of Syria. U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump mistakenly expected Russia to compel Assad to accept a diplomatic process. The Kremlin seeks to thwart any Western effort to replace Assad and to instead reach a superficial political settlement that legitimizes his regime and neutralizes his opposition. Buying into Russian- driven efforts thus empowers Russia to undermine American interests. Russia cannot deliver Assad to the negotiating table, moreover. Assad depends on Russian (and Iranian) military help but is not controlled by them. A fragile power balance exists between them in which Assad often gains an upper hand. Russia has limited bandwidth and resources to commit to Syria, which Assad knows and exploits. Russia has waged a sophisticated campaign of linked military and diplomatic efforts to shape the trajectory of the war in accord with its interests since 2015. Russia has strengthened Assad’s military position, shaped international negotiations, and gained recognition as a diplomatic arbiter. The U.S. still has an opportunity to displace Russia from the center of Syrian diplomacy, however. Russia’s inability to persuade or compel Assad to respect the terms it brokers is costing it influence within opposition communities. The West’s current diplomatic framework in Syria, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, may do more harm than good under current circumstances. UNSCR 2254 calls for a ceasefire and the drafting of a new Syrian Constitution followed by UN-monitored elections. These fall far short of the opposition’s initial demands, which included Assad’s departure and a transitional government, and thus represent a major compromise to Assad’s backers. The implemen- American policymakers tation of UNSCR 2254 will likely alienate opposition communities are biased toward viewing and empower Salafi-Jihadist Groups. Assad will manipulate it to allow his further consolidation. a cessation of hostilities • UNSCR 2254’s notion of a free, fair, and internationally- as the most important monitored election in Syria, is particularly unrealistic. Assad sign of diplomatic openly opposes the notion of election monitors and has scheduled his own presidential election for 2021, which he will progress in Syria and thus almost certainly rig. Most dangerously, he may try to coopt the UNSCR 2254 process to legitimize his election with monitors overlook opportunities to from friendly countries in Russia’s orbit. shape Syria’s long-term • Assad will spoil the implementation of UNSCR 2254 while trajectory. The U.S. must continuing to consolidate power slowly. He allowed the Syrian Constitutional Committee to form in September 2019 only widen its aperture for what after manipulating its composition to give himselfde facto veto power over its deliberations. He will use this leverage to deny diplomacy in Syria can and meaningful progress towards reform. must achieve.

8 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019 • Continuing forward with UNSCR 2254 risks making a settlement even more difficult by further discrediting the few opposition figures still willing to negotiate with the regime, even indirectly. Syria’s prospects for a political compromise grow more distant as the number of opposition leaders willing to accept one shrinks. • The existence of a diplomatic process that opposition groups view as credible is essential to denying recruitment opportunities to Salafi-Jihadists. Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have doubled down on their longstanding claim that Syrians face only two credible options: jihad or subjugation to Assad. This narrative will only be further entrenched if the international community falsely trumpets superficial diplomatic progress as meaningful change in the lives of Syrians. The U.S. is pursuing the wrong diplomatic goal. American policymakers are biased toward viewing a cessation of hostilities as the most important sign of diplomatic progress in Syria and thus overlook opportunities to shape Syria’s long-term trajectory. The U.S. must widen its aperture for what diplomacy in Syria can and must achieve. The U.S. should set as its overarching goal keeping space open for political competition within Syria and reinvigorating and relegitimizing a stale and discredited diplomatic process. The U.S. can shape Syria’s long-term trajectory with relatively limited resources. American economic pressure limits the scope and scale of what Assad and his backers can achieve, thereby preserving space for competition. The U.S. should further constrain Assad’s access to funds, including through sanctions and pressing the UN to apply greater scrutiny to the misappropriation of humanitarian aid in Syria. The U.S. should also continue to prevent the normalization of the regime’s atrocities by supporting European efforts to prosecute former and current regime members for war crimes at minimum. The U.S. should work with the UN and other partners to launch a new diplomatic initiative to begin an intra- Syrian dialogue through conferences and Track II initiatives that include as much of Syrian society as possible. The existence of such a process is valuable even though it will not soon end the war nor gain wide participation at first. It can provide an outlet for Syrian civil society to remain active as well as a mechanism for the U.S., UN and other Western states to apply political pressure on Assad and his backers. It can isolate states with problematic roles such as Turkey and incentivize changes in their behavior in the future. It could also provide a new way to incorporate groups currently excluded from the UNSCR 2254 process, such as the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Within Syria, the U.S. should do more to gain local leverage and connect it to a reinvigorated diplomatic framework. The U.S. should recommit to its partnership with the SDF in Eastern Syria to build credible and inclusive governance as an alternative to both Assad and Salafi-Jihadist Groups. The U.S. should deploy additional forces to work with the SDF to stabilize the east and block further Turkish incursions. The U.S. State Department should also expand its local dialogue with Syrian communities in order to broaden America’s understanding of their needs and goals, including in Eastern Syria where U.S. forces operate, and should explore ways to support civil society groups in Northwest Syria attempting to dampen Al Qaeda’s influence. The U.S. should also seek opportunities to reengage in other parts of Syria as conditions on the ground change. For example, the brewing insurgency in Southern Syria may generate new local leaders with whom the U.S. can engage. President Trump is unlikely to take these steps given his desire to disengage from the Middle East. Yet the U.S. does indeed have vital national security interests in Syria including preventing the growth of ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist Groups; blocking and ultimately reversing the long-term military presence of Iran and Russia in Syria; and halting attacks that amount to ethnic cleansing against the Syrian Kurds. If the Trump Administration remains committed to its current course, it is virtually certain to fail to secure the vital interests of the U.S. in Syria, including reaching an enduring diplomatic settlement to the war.

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 9 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria Introduction

Two U.S. administrations have mistakenly looked to Russia for help solving the fundamental obstacle to a political compromise in Syria: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to accept any outcome short of total military victory. Both U.S. President Barack Obama and U.S. President Donald Trump pursued diplomatic strategies that hinged on an assumption that Russia could — and would — compel Assad to accept a compromise. They correctly judged that Russia seeks to limit its military costs in Syria but overestimated its ability to shape Assad’s behavior. Russia cannot deliver Assad to the negotiating table. Russia is playing a complex diplomatic game. The Assad’s intransigence has not changed Russia’s Kremlin’s ultimate goals in Syria include thwarting commitment to his regime but does illustrate the any Western effort to replace Assad. It has deliberately limits of the Kremlin’s influence in Syria. Russia drawn the U.S. and UN into diplomatic processes has pursued five major diplomatic efforts in Syria on Syria to buy time until conditions are suitable for since 2015. Assad has opposed — and often actively it to either coopt the peace process or make a diplo- thwarted — them all. Russia has adapted after diplomatic push of its own that preserves Assad’s regime. matic setbacks and focused on learning to influence Russia worked with the Obama Administration to Assad’s opposition far more than Assad. Russia has pass a new UN Security Council Resolution on offered guarantees to opposition groups multiple Syria in December 2015, three months after Russia times and then failed to prevent Assad from spoiling. intervened in Syria in September 2015.1 The res- Russia’s overpromising is further discrediting the olution — UNSCR 2254 — calls for a ceasefire, notion of a meaningful political settlement among constitutional revisions, and new free and fair elec- the population that rebelled against the regime and tions monitored by the UN.2 These terms fall far thereby fueling its radicalization. Assad undoubt- short of opposition demands for edly favors this outcome, which a transitional government and the sustains a requirement for removal of Assad.3 UNSCR 2254 Russian military support to his thus provided a diplomatic track Assad eagerly accepts regime. favorable to Assad and vulnerable Russia’s military support President Trump’s recent deci- to manipulation by Russia. but not its diplomatic sion to reverse the American Assad eagerly accepts Russia’s withdrawal from Eastern Syria military support but not its dip- agenda. He has shown in provides a new opportunity for lomatic agenda. He has shown the past eight years of war the U.S. to craft a more effective in the past eight years of war that that he would rather see policy to shape the trajectory of he would rather see the com- the war in Syria. The complex plete destruction of his country the complete destruction of interactions between Assad, than step down or compromise his country than step down Russia, and Syrian opposition with his opposition. Often, he groups since 2015 provide a case exploits gaps between Russia and or compromise with his study in how military and dip- Iran to play his backers against opposition. lomatic efforts can – and cannot one another. His intransigence – determine outcomes. The ensures that the armed insurgency U.S. has typically overlooked the against him will continue and radicalize further. He value of even limited action. American decision- does not have the strength to win outright, however, makers should learn from these examples to develop even with aid from Russia and Iran. He has thus put a more tailored approach to affecting both the war Syria on a path toward generational conflict. and its conclusion.

10 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019 Russia, Iran, and Assad: A Fragile Interdependence

Differences between Assad and Russia exist but are He seeks to preserve the dominance of the ruling not exploitable in the ways the U.S. has assumed. (but minority) Alawites and reestablish the patron- A complex and dynamic power balance exists in age networks among both minorities and the regime-held Syria. The relationships between majority Sunni Arabs that have enabled his family’s Assad, Russia, and Iran depend on a complicated dominance since the 1970s. He intends to com- interaction between their relative goals and balance pletely reconquer Syria and expel uninvited foreign of power, which evolve as the situation changes on forces (i.e. the U.S. and Turkey), and is willing to the ground. This fragile interdependence limits the spend decades fighting if necessary.4 As of November effectiveness of their coalition but makes it resilient 2019, ISW assesses that Assad’s immediate strategic against pressure from the West. Each has leverage objectives are: over the others that they can — and do — use to spoil • Eliminating current and future threats to his policies that they oppose. These complex relation- regime by retaking all of Syria; ships will determine the trajectory of Assad’s Syria • Regaining international legitimacy by ending and possibly of the wider conflict. his isolation and status as a pariah-state; Western observers must be careful not to make • Reestablishing basic mechanisms of regime assumptions about what happens behind closed control including patronage networks, local doors. There is much we do not know from public governance structures, and restrictive population controls; information about how Russia, Assad, and Iran interact in Syria. More robust conversations cer- • Securing limited economic relief for his regime and its support base; tainly occur between them than are observable publicly, especially because each state controls its • Protecting his sovereignty by resisting Russian domestic information space and withholds details of and Iranian co-optation of his regime. deliberations. Yet it is still possible to analyze how Assad pursues these objectives by accepting Russia all three actors interact and make decisions based and Iran’s military help while taking independent on their observable activity. action to shape the trajectory of the war toward his interests — even when that conflicts with the objectives of his backers. He is stronger in November Goals 2019 than at any point since 2011, but he still faces Assad, Russia, and Iran cooperate closely in pursuit serious challenges as discussed below. of shared objectives while simultaneously pursuing independent lines of effort toward separate national interests. This tension occasionally causes them to Russia work at cross-purposes. At times, it causes paralysis. Russia deployed to Syria to save Assad but also to Overall, it generates a balance of power that keeps accomplish wider goals for which Assad’s regime is their coalition aligned toward the regime’s recov- a useful tool. Russia’s grand strategic objectives that ery but risks turning Syria into a battleground for relate to Syria include reestablishing its standing as regional and great power confrontations. a great power and diminishing the global influence of the U.S. and NATO. Its subordinate strategic objectives in Syria focus on using the Middle East Assad to expand its military and diplomatic influence.5 Assad retains an uncompromising determination These include: to recover his regime’s pre-war grip on power but remains militarily weak and economically crippled.

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 11 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

Military Iran • Expanding Russia’s global access to strategic Iran sees the survival of Assad’s Alawite-dominated basing; regime as an existential requirement for its own • Rebuilding Russia’s military power & develop- interests. It has at least four grand strategic objec- ing new military capabilities; tives at stake in Syria: • Increasing Russia’s weapons sales. • Preserving and exporting the Islamic Revolution; Political • Establishing regional hegemony at the expense Disrupting and dividing NATO; of Saudi Arabia and (to a lesser degree) • Turkey; • Legitimizing Russia as an international mediator; • Expelling the U.S. from the Middle East; • Broadening Russia’s influence in the Middle • Eliminating the state of Israel. East and Europe; Beyond preserving Assad, Iran’s priorities in Syria • Normalizing Russia’s violations of interna- include expanding its regional Axis of Resistance tional norms; – its network of largely Shi’a militant groups includ- • Creating a constellation of international alli- ing Lebanese Hezbollah that give it strategic depth ances that gravitate toward Russia. and leverage against Israel.10 After 2011, Iran sig- Moscow has pursued these goals by building a mil- nificantly expanded its proxy deployments to Syria itary hub in Syria to project power in the Levant to augment the failing Syrian Arab Army (SAA), and beyond while reestablishing its former sphere which in turn increased its ability to threaten the of influence in the Middle East. Russia secured for- U.S. and Israel from Syria. Iran has invested ty-nine-year leases from Assad for the Hmeimim heavily in building long-term military infrastruc- Airbase and the Tartus Naval Facility on the Syrian ture across Syria; recruiting for a new branch of Coast in 2017 and 2019, respectively.6 Russia can use Syrian Hezbollah; and conducting religious and these bases to contest NATO in the Mediterranean cultural outreach to Syrian Sunnis located in the Sea and challenge Turkish and U.S. aerial domi- Golan Heights and Eastern Syria.11 In 2019, Iran nance in the Levant by extending its anti-access / began shifting some missile factories from Syria to area denial network.7 Russia is already using this Iraq after repeated strikes in Syria by Israel.12 U.S. infrastructure to project force into Africa.8 It is also officials later reported Israel conducted multiple using the conflict to train its military and market its airstrikes in Iraq targeting arms depots run by Iran’s weapons before a global audience. proxies in Iraq beginning in July 2019.13 Moscow has used its involvement in Syria to increase its stature as an international mediator. Friction Points Russia has repurposed diplomatic processes osten- Assad aligns more closely with Iran than Russia. sibly focused on resolving the Syrian war to advance Russia and Assad are on the same side of the war its wider objectives, such as co-opting Turkey from but disagree on the desired endstate and means to NATO and gaining access to reconstruction funds. achieve it. Russia does not share Assad’s maximal- Moscow’s campaign to exploit its role in Syria inter- ist goal to reconquer all of Syria. Russia is largely nationally has been so successful that it has even content if it can secure its bases on the Syrian Coast, used it to draw states far outside the Middle East the Assad regime remains intact enough to guaran- with limited interests in Syria deeper into its orbit. tee their long-term presence, and the West fails at The most prominent example is Belarus, which removing Assad. Everything else is a bonus. Russia’s attended a Russian-brokered meeting on Syria in metrics for success are thus much lower than those November 2018.9 Subsequent sections of this report of Assad and Iran. Moscow has pursued a diplomatic will examine these successes. settlement of the war that legitimizes Assad in part to

12 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

Figure 1. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Embraces Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali al-Khamenei in Tehran in February 2019

help reduce its military expenditures and lift some the Golan Heights in March 2019.14 Iran’s hegemonic international pressure on both Russia and Assad. goals do not align with Russia’s desire to play a mediat- Russia is willing to grant concessions in pursuit of ing role in the Middle East. The Kremlin has pursued this goal that Assad refuses to consider. Iran sim- close relationships with both Israel and Saudi Arabia ilarly shares Assad’s desire to expand the regime’s in order to position itself as the key international control deeper into Eastern Syria and does not interlocutor and dampen the regional conflicts fueled share Russia’s interest in a diplomatic settlement. by Iran. Russia has provided assurances to Israel that it will work to constrain Iran in Syria in order to dis- Assad actively supports Iran’s wider regional goals, suade further escalation.15 Moscow has bought time while Russia seeks to dampen the escalation cycle with these pledges but has failed to deliver meaning- between Iran and Israel. Assad views Iran as a useful fully on its promises to Israel. tool against Israel. This alignment deepened after President Trump recognized Israel’s annexation of

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 13 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

Moscow does not have enough independent combat Balance of Power power in Syria to secure its bases or defeat the Neither Assad, Russia, nor Iran have a clear upper opposition to Assad, making it reliant on forces hand over the other members of their coalition. loyal to Assad and Iran. Russia’s military presence Assad does depend on Russia and Iran for sur- relies at minimum upon infrastructure and logistics vival but is not controlled by them. Each actor support from Syria. The Kremlin has accepted this needs support from the others to accomplish its dependence due to resource constraints but also to own objectives. All three have advantages that they train its military on how to fight within a coalition.18 can — and do — use to outmaneuver and gain more Russia also benefits from the plausible deniability leverage over the others when it suits them. This of embedding with Syrians. Assad similarly cannot competition is intensifying in recaptured areas of provide enough capable military forces to secure the Syria as all three compete for revenue streams and Syrian Coast — a fact that appears to have originally other sources of power. Assad may hold the ultimate surprised Moscow. Former Russian Commander in advantage in the post-conquest phase. Syria Col. Gen. Aleksander Dvornikov commented Russia’s greatest source of leverage over its part- publicly that Russia was disappointed to discover the ners is its military support (particularly airpower) true extent of the regime’s weakness after interven- 19 for the design and execution of operations that ing in Syria. Moscow thus also depends on Iran Assad and Iran could not conduct on their own. to secure its bases on the Syrian Coast and thereby Without Moscow’s intervention in 2015, Assad advance its wider regional campaigns to constrain likely would have needed to contract his regime to NATO’s freedom of movement in the Mediterranean the Syrian Coast, which would have significantly Sea and project force into Africa. disrupted Iran’s goals in Syria.16 Russia also has Russia has repeatedly attempted to mitigate this vul- diplomatic leverage through its nerability with limited success veto in the UN Security Council, since 2015. The Kremlin tried which insulates both Assad and to reform the scattered array of Iran from greater international Moscow was able to draw pro-regime militias into a more pressure. Russia’s support has the U.S. and the UN into capable and centralized force preserved the Assad regime and responsive to the Government through it Iran’s regional agenda. multiple ceasefire deals, of Syria in late 2015. Iran Russia cannot dictate terms to each ostensibly a building blocked the effort, having either Assad or Iran, however, block toward implementing invested heavily in the creation and it similarly depends on them of the pro-regime militias that to enable its operations in Syria. UNSCR 2254, without Russia attempted to reorga- 20 Moscow frames its intervention demonstrating any serious nize and repurpose. Russia later adopted a new approach as a request from the ‘legitimate’ ability to force Assad to Government of Syria and there- to recruit irregular pro-regime fore depends — though to a lesser uphold them. militiamen and former opposi- extent — on Assad’s permission tion fighters into two new units: to operate in Syria. Russia likely the SAA Fourth Corps and Fifth would not withdraw its military forces if asked by Corps. These efforts achieved only limited success 21 Assad, but retaining at least superficial legal justi- and often faced resistance from Iran. The full fication strengthens Russia’s international effort to extent of these tensions is not visible from pub- legitimize its activity and discredit America’s.17 licly available sources, which cannot penetrate opaque funding mechanisms and covert forms of influence and competition within these structures.

14 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

The observable activity nonetheless illustrates a Iran likely has more leverage over Assad than complicated and fragile interdependence between Russia. Assad cultivated a close relationship with Russia and Iran. Tehran before the Syrian Revolution and relied on increasing levels of Iranian military involvement to Russia and Iran are both working to generate new keep his regime afloat long before Russia’s inter- military forces for Assad, ameliorating some of vention in 2015. Even Iran’s influence in Syria has his manpower shortage while extending their own limits, however. As in Iraq and Lebanon, Iran and patronage networks within Syria. However, Russia its proxies have infiltrated state institutions and and Iran are competing — rather than cooperat- thereby subverted some of the sovereignty of Syria. ing — to generate these forces. Their competition The old guard of the Syrian Ba’ath Party, the vehicle also extends to economic opportunities in regime- of the regime’s control, has a deep discomfort with held areas, including smuggling networks that perceived domination by Iran.26 Assad margin- overlap with paramilitary groups.22 Russia seeks to alized some of these leading figures early in the use the forces it generates to offset its reliance on conflict, but aversion to Iranian influence remains Iran, which in turn is enlisting the forces it gen- and internal pushback at minimum can apply some erates into its Axis of Resistance. Russia and Iran’s constraints on Iran.27 Furthermore, U.S. sanctions force generation provides them additional influ- on Iran have already disrupted Tehran’s economic ence on the ground in Syria insofar as their forces lifeline to Syria, which could decrease the relative support new offensive operations by Assad. Russia value of Iran’s support to Assad. Assad does not have has thus far experienced relatively limited success good alternatives to replenish these losses, however. in generating combat-capable formal fighting formations. Iran has experienced more success due Assad retains his own leverage over Russia and to its relatively more limited model, which seeks to Iran. He maintains deep patronage networks across augment and infiltrate state structures rather than many sectors of society, including the Sunni Arab build brand-new military units. majority and the Christian and Druze minorities. His outright control over powerbrokers within his Assad relies on Russia and Iran’s military assistance regime has frayed considerably over the course of but still acts independently to advance his own inter- the conflict due to his reliance upon quasi-inde- ests.23 He cooperates with Moscow’s efforts when it pendent militias funded by key oligarchs to hold and suits him and undermines them when it does not. reclaim terrain. These alternate centers of power He will often support Russian-designed military developed some ability to check Assad’s behavior. operations up to a point and then sabotage them or He is far more adept at navigating these complex otherwise shape their outcome. His behavior reflects dynamics than Russia, however. The EU noted in his intent to retain as much freedom of action as May 2019 that Assad “presides over a system that possible but also reflects tensions in his relation- comprises competing and complementary — formal ship with Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin and informal — networks, creating symbiotic rela- has stood alongside Assad but does not view him as tionships predicated on both his survival and their an equal. In one prominent case, a Russian mili- continued cooperation.”28 He is able to manipulate tary officer even constrained Assad from walking this web of loyal powerbrokers and create new ones alongside Putin during a visit to Russia’s Hmeimim from the informal militias that have emerged since Airbase in Syria.24 Anti-regime media widely dis- the start of the conflict. This skill is an important tributed a photograph of the incident, which almost source of influence that he can — and does — use to certainly inflamed Assad’s commitment to preserv- outmaneuver Russia and Iran. ing his independence and his claim to sovereignty.25

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 15 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria Russia’s Linked Military & Diplomatic Campaigns

Russia used its intervention in September 2015 to naval base on the Syrian Coast. It then set the objec- shape international negotiations over Syria while tive to seize Aleppo City and thereby eliminate a key preserving and strengthening Assad on the ground. stronghold for opposition groups backed by Turkey Putin stated in October 2015 that Russia aimed and the U.S.33 to “stabilize the legitimate authorities and create Russia and Assad worked to mitigate their resource conditions for finding a political compromise” in shortages by establishing mechanisms for oppo- Syria.29 Russia designed and supported a series of sition groups to surrender.34 Moscow opened the key pro-regime military operations over five phases Russian Reconciliation Center at the Hmeimim from 2015 to 2019. The Kremlin attempted to Airbase in February 2016 to negotiate with oppo- broker a wider political settlement at the end of sition groups in close coordination with the Syrian each phase but failed each time to secure buy-in Ministry of National Reconciliation and Turkey.35 from either Assad or his opponents in Syria. In July 2016, Assad expanded a preexisting amnesty Russia did achieve significant diplomatic traction law to grant formal pardons to fighters who surren- in the West, however. The West’s desperation for a dered and agreed to “regularize their status” with the cessation of hostilities in Syria made it vulnerable state.36 This process included submitting to investi- to manipulation by Russia. Moscow was able to draw gation and agreeing formally not to conduct future the U.S. and the UN into multiple ceasefire deals, anti-regime activity. The law stated that fighters who each ostensibly a building block toward imple- agreed to the amnesty would be “exempted from full menting UNSCR 2254, without demonstrating any punishment” for what the regime considered acts of serious ability to force Assad to uphold them. The terrorism, which implied that participants would U.S. and Europe repeatedly accepted these super- not suffer severe reprisals. ficial attempts to reduce the violence in Syria. Yet Meanwhile, international efforts to broker talks Russia simultaneously continued to improve Assad’s between the regime and its opposition broke down position on the ground, making him more uncom- in early 2016. The UN attempted to convene a new promising and unwilling to grant even limited round of talks in January 2016 but suspended the concessions to end war. effort in less than a month after the opposition refused to attend, citing the regime’s refusal to grant Russia’s Initial Entry good-faith concessions such as a halt to airstrikes.37 Then-High Negotiating Committee (HNC) Chair into Syria Riyad Hijab — the head of a joint bloc of politi- Russia designed its first phase of major military oper- cal and armed opposition — reiterated opposition ations to soften international and local resistance to demands for political concessions that far exceeded a diplomatic settlement favorable to Assad. Russia’s UNSCR 2254, stressing that “the opposition will intervention enabled Syria and Iran to establish only talk about a ceasefire when there is a political secure defensive lines in Latakia, Hama, and Homs transition that does not involve Bashar al-Assad.”38 Provinces in Northwest Syria.30 These operations stabilized the regime, which had lost control of The U.S. nonetheless launched a bilateral effort Idlib City in April 2015 and faced a major jihadist with Russia to implement a ceasefire and draft a new threat to Hama City and the Alawite heartland on Syrian Constitution in accordance with UNSCR 39 the Syrian Coast.31 Assad was also losing territory 2254. Moscow played along with this effort to to ISIS in Central Syria, creating a potential future distract the West while it bolstered Assad. The U.S. threat to Damascus.32 Moscow initially prioritized and Russia released a joint statement on February efforts to secure its new airbase and long-standing 22, 2016, announcing a ceasefire and establishing a “Ceasefire Task Force” to “develop effective

16 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019 mechanisms to promote and monitor compliance and chose instead to evacuate to Idlib Province. with the ceasefire” by the regime “and other forces Pro-regime forces initially disrupted the evacuation supporting [it]” as well as the armed opposition.40 and then retaliated against civilians by detaining Russia violated the ceasefire repeatedly with air- and executing numerous military-aged males and strikes, including several targeting the headquarters conducting additional extrajudicial killings in for- of a U.S.-backed opposition group.41 Russia later merly opposition-held areas of Aleppo City.50 These announced a military withdrawal from Syria that abuses occurred despite guarantees of safe passage drew praise from the UN. Yet its withdrawal was offered by Russia, signaling Assad’s unrestrained actually a troop rotation in preparation for a major ability to punish his citizens for their resistance pro-regime offensive to retake opposition-held despite his reliance upon Russia and Iran.51 Eastern Aleppo City.42 Russia’s manipulation muddied the diplomatic waters and bought time for its military operations in Syria. 1. Russia’s 2017 Astana The Obama Administration continued to try to Attempt work with Russia even as it ramped up the offen- Russia made its first attempt to reach a diplomatic sive on Aleppo City. In July 2016, the U.S. offered settlement to the conflict immediately after the Russia cooperation against ISIS and Al Qaeda in recapture of Aleppo City. Putin once again pos- exchange for a cessation of pro-regime airstrikes, tured by claiming a partial military withdrawal hoping to avoid further bloodshed in Aleppo.43 from Syria in late December 2016.52 Russia later Russia viewed the offer as an opportunity to legiti- hosted a meeting with Turkey and Iran in Moscow mize its role in Syria through a military partnership on December 20 to form a new diplomatic mech- with the U.S.44 The U.S. and Russia announced an anism on Syria separate from the UN. The three agreement in mid-September 2016 to establish a states released a joint statement declaring that they Joint Implementation Center (JIC) that would share would cooperate to “facilitate and become guaran- intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against ISIS tors” of an agreement between the Syrian regime and Al Qaeda in return for a Russian-guaranteed and its opposition in what became known as the “genuine reduction of violence” in Syria.45 Russia Astana Talks, as its meetings were hosted in Astana, used this process to buy time to soften opposition Kazakhstan.53 The Kremlin aimed to use the Astana defenses and set conditions for the upcoming urban Talks to draw the UN into a Russian-driven process assault on Aleppo City through mid-2016.46 that would allow it to shape the ultimate implementation of UNSCR 2254. Assad and Russia quickly violated the agreement with the Obama Administration. Regime warplanes Russia, Turkey, and Iran convened the first set of conducted airstrikes within hours of the start of the Astana Talks in January 2017 but failed in their ceasefire on September 12.47 Russia similarly con- attempts to dictate a settlement to the conflict. The tinued its airstrikes, including a strike against a UN, Syrian regime, and opposition all attended the humanitarian aid convoy headed to Aleppo City on meeting — the latter demonstrating its weakened posi- September 19.48 The U.S. withdrew from the deal tion after the loss of Aleppo City.54 Russia circulated on October 3, stating that Russia was “either unwill- its own unilateral draft of a new Syrian Constitution ing or unable to ensure Assad’s adherence to the and argued that the parties should accept it as the arrangements to which Moscow agreed.”49 The state- start of implementation of UNSCR 2254.55 Turkey ment did not cite Russia’s own violations of the deal. and the opposition delegation rejected the draft and began to pull back from the process by March 2017.56 Assad, Russia, and Iran succeeded in capturing all The Syrian regime took no public stance on the of Aleppo City in December 2016. However, this draft but likely also opposed it given the document’s victory did not lead to the political breakthrough emphasis on decentralization, which Assad publicly sought by Russia. Opposition groups and civilians rejects.57 refused to accept a reconciliation deal with Assad

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 17 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

The Astana Talks nonetheless proved a success to reassert Assad’s control over oil and natural gas for Russia’s wider goal to gain diplomatic stature reserves held by ISIS in Eastern Syria.60 Assad would through its role in Syria. Russia used the frame- exploit Russia’s military assistance but once again act work of the talks to start a successful long-term to spoil its wider diplomatic line of effort. effort to co-opt Turkey away from NATO towards Russia helped spoil an attempt by the UN to convene an alignment with Russia and to gain dispropor- yet another set of intra-Syrian talks in February tionate influence within international efforts to 2017. Russia pushed to invite the Syrian Kurdish implement UNSCR 2254. The UN released a state- Democratic Union Party (PYD) — a stance rejected ment in late January 2017 praising the Astana Talks by the opposition, Assad, and Turkey.61 The PYD is as an “important step towards the resumption of affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) intra-Syrian negotiations under the auspices of the currently waging an insurgency in Turkey.62 It also United Nations.”58 Finally, Russia used the Astana seeks to establish a semi-autonomous region in Talks as a valuable proof of concept for its future Northern Syria. Russia held a round of Astana Talks efforts to pull additional states into its independent on February 15 – 16, 2017, one week before the talks diplomatic track on Syria. began on February 23. UN Special Envoy to Syria Russia adjusted its military and political strategy in Staffan de Mistura met separately with regime and subsequent phases based on the outcomes in Aleppo opposition delegations but made no meaningful City and the Astana Talks. Several Russian com- diplomatic progress.63 manders have described Aleppo City as a “Syrian Russia, Iran, and Turkey later agreed to establish Stalingrad” and noted that it necessitated a new four de-escalation zones in parts of opposition-held approach to military operations in Syria, citing Western Syria at a new set of Astana Talks on May the high casualties suffered by the pro-regime coa- 6, 2017. The zones included (1) Greater Idlib lition. Former Russian Commander in Syria Col. Province; (2) Northern Homs Province; (3) the Gen. Alexander Zhuravlev, who served during the Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus; and (4) Battle for Aleppo City, stated that Russia learned Southern Syria.64 The agreement called for an to “simultaneously plan and carry out measures to indefinite ceasefire in these zones, although the remove civilians … while carrying out combat mis- parties did not finalize their boundaries and terms sions” during the fighting in Aleppo. Pro-Kremlin until September 17.65 The deal catapulted Astana to experts also openly discussed Russia’s initial failure the center of international negotiations over Syria. at Astana as a lesson learned in Syria.59 Yet the opposition delegation refused to attend Russia would continue to hold the Astana Talks, but the Astana Talks.66 They condemned the agree- it adjusted its overall approach in 2017 to focus on ment over to its failure to cover all parts of Syria, a more limited way forward that combined narrow its lack of constraints on Assad, and its inclusion military operations with a new diplomatic effort of Iran.67 Assad did not negotiate or sign the deal focused on convening an intra-Syrian dialogue to and his forces would violate its provisions repeat- implement UNSCR 2254. edly despite his public claims to support the results reached at Astana.68 2. Russia’s 2018 Sochi Turkey’s support for the de-escalation zones marked a turning point in the conflict and brought Ankara Conference closer to Moscow. The deal reduced the military Russia undertook a yearlong campaign to set dip- pressure against areas in Northwest Syria where lomatic and military conditions before its next Turkey supported anti-regime groups, which helped attempt to reach a political settlement to the conflict it regain credibility among its proxies after failing in January 2018. First, it established a new frame- to intervene in Aleppo City. Turkey exploited the work of de-escalation zones in Western Syria via the reduction in violence to develop and reinforce Astana Talks. Second, it enabled a military campaign

18 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

De-Escalation Zones in Syria as of May 2017 Turkey Qamishli

Manbij Al-Hasakah Aleppo

Idlib 1 Ar-Raqqa

Latakia

Deir ez-Zor Hama Tartus 2 IRAQ Homs Palmyra Hajin

Abu Kamal Areas of Control on may 10, 2017 Russia-Iran-Assad 3 Mixed Anti-Assad Kurdish Forces Damascus Tanaf L e b a n o n ISIS Anti-Assad Quneitra 4 De-escalation Zones 1 Greater Idlib I s r a e l Daraa Suwayda 2 Northern Homs J o r d a n 3 Eastern Ghouta 40 km Al qaeda-linked groups control nearly all governance and military structures in greater idlib provicne. 4 Southern Syria various local actors assert limited control over isolated areas of Greater Idlib. ©2019 by the Institute for the Study of War its client opposition groups in Northern Syria.69 Syria, this time with the Trump Administration. It also used the Astana Talks to negotiate with The Kremlin once again sought to coopt the U.S. Russia for freedom of action to fight the Kurdish into a diplomatic alignment focused on counterter- PYD-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, which rorism. President Trump had stressed a desire for constituted the primary ground partner of the U.S. de-escalation in Syria following a phone call with Anti-ISIS Campaign. In January 2018, Moscow Putin on May 2, 2017, opening the door for Russia conceded to a military operation by Turkey to to make him an offer.71 Russian Foreign Minister invade and ethnically cleanse majority-Kurdish Sergey Lavrov stressed that Russia intended to stay Afrin Canton on the Syrian-Turkish Border.70 in Syria for the indefinite future and that the West should work with Russia rather than try to remove Russia also used the negotiations over the de-es- Assad. Lavrov stressed this point after a meeting calation zones to resume talks with the U.S. over with President Trump on May 10, declaring: “We do

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 19 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria not have a notion of an exit strategy. The obsession The Trump Administration sent a clear signal in with ousting particular leaders — look what it has mid-January 2018 that it lacked the will to pursue led to. Why don’t we try to learn from our mistakes, a more aggressive policy in Syria. Then-Secretary focus on process, defeating terrorism?”72 of State Rex Tillerson provided the first (and only) clear articulation of the administration’s goals in Russia, Jordan, and the U.S. agreed to implement Syria on January 17, 2018, affirming that America’s a separate ceasefire in Southern Syria in July 2017 priority remained the defeat of ISIS while also to augment the original deal reached by Russia, framing a desire to use economic and diplomatic Iran, and Turkey at Astana.73 The new deal called pressure to achieve a “post-Assad” Syria.83 President for a military de-escalation zone in Southern Syria Trump would not take serious action to change the that Russia had already agreed to in principle with course of the war or force the departure of Assad. Turkey.74 Moscow also agreed to exclude Iran and Tillerson also added additional objectives — includ- Lebanese Hezbollah from the Golan Heights.75 The ing diminishing Iran’s influence in Syria, enabling U.S. stressed that the agreement aimed to prevent refugees and internally displaced persons to return a buildup by Iran and Hezbollah in Southern Syria home, and eliminating the regime’s weapons of mass that could ignite a broader conflict with Israel.76 Yet destruction — but outlined no new steps to achieve the deal also helped legitimize Russia’s role as medi- these goals. President Trump later fired Tillerson, ator and guarantor in Syria despite its involvement but the Trump Administration and new Secretary of as a belligerent fighting on behalf of Assad. Syrian State Michael Pompeo have continued to articulate opposition leaders condemned the new deal for these expansive goals.84 excluding them from the negotiations and creating new channels outside of the UN.77 The Kremlin made its second major diplomatic attempt in Syria in January 2018. Putin declared Russia, Iran, and Assad exploited the de-escala- victory in Syria during a trip to the Hmeimim tion zones to mitigate their military risk in Western Airbase on the Syrian Coast in December 2017 Syria as they shifted forces east to seize lucrative and yet again claimed to order a withdrawal from oil and natural gas infrastructure from ISIS and Syria.85 Moscow then attempted to convene an block further gains by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition intra-Syrian “Syrian People’s Congress” in Sochi on in Eastern Syria in May 2017.78 They began this January 30.86 Its stated purpose was the formation shift while still negotiating the details of the de-es- of a committee to revise the Syrian Constitution in calation agreements in Astana. Moscow shifted accordance with UNSCR 2254.87 Russia’s true goal the focus of its airstrikes in the first weeks of May was once again to assert control over the implemen- 2017 to target ISIS in Eastern Syria while pro-re- tation of UNSCR 2254 to shape an outcome that gime forces moved over the next several months would preserve the Syrian regime. The symbology to secure oil fields and logistics routes in Central of the conference was overtly pro-regime, including Syria, Southern Raqqa Province, and the Middle regime flags.88 Euphrates River Valley.79 Pro-regime forces broke ISIS’s siege of Deir ez-Zour City in early September However, Russia failed to secure meaningful partic- 2017.80 They later seized the Abu Kamal Border ipation from either the regime or the opposition in Crossing with Iraq in early November 2017.81 Russia Sochi. Moscow successfully convened 1,500 Syrians and Iran thus gained access to key oil and natural but most were marginal or pro-regime figures with gas infrastructure, for which Assad granted them no significant influence.89 Opposition leaders operating contracts.82 These gains also strengthened largely refused to participate on terms so openly Assad’s claim to power in Syria. Russia likely hoped favorable to Assad despite pressure from Turkey.90 that these gains would force new concessions from Despite the favorable orientation of the confer- opposition groups. However, Assad’s newfound ence, the Syrian regime gave strict orders to the strength further deepened his resistance to a diplo- pro-regime delegates (none of whom officially rep- matic settlement. resented the regime) to accept only modifications

20 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019 to the existing constitution rather than a complete of several opposition groups. One of Russia’s com- rewrite.91 manders in Syria directly stated that the experience gained in Aleppo enabled the success of subsequent Russia recalibrated again after its failure in Sochi. reconciliation efforts.96 Russia’s play was a gamble, Kremlin-linked analysts observed that the confer- however. Moscow lacked enough leverage over Assad ence had attempted to accomplish too much, too and Iran to ensure they would abide by the terms of fast.92 Russia did not focus on gaining buy-in from any deal brokered by Russia. Assad and Iran would Assad. It concluded that the opposition’s distrust of extensively violate most of these deals. the regime would preclude its desired diplomatic resolution of the war. But the opposition’s general Moscow used its Russian Reconciliation Center to willingness to accept Russia as a mediator presented execute a new phase of local reconciliation agree- an opportunity. Moscow began to seek new ways to ments in the de-escalation zones in Western Syria. expand the regime’s control while gaining accep- The Kremlin framed the deals as a stepping-stone tance among opposition communities ahead of yet toward a meaningful negotiated settlement and another attempt at a diplomatic solution in Syria. exploited a widespread perception among opposition leaders that Russia was “seriously interested The Sochi Conference nonetheless marked a in the political process” in Syria.97 Russia’s second victory for Russia’s efforts to assert greater Commander in Syria from October 2018 to April control over the implementation of UNSCR 2254 2019 attributed the success of reconciliation nego- and bolster its international standing regardless tiations to the “personal guarantees of [Russian] of the outcome in Syria. Russia released a list of officers.”98 Each successful offer of reconciliation twelve principles reached at the conference, includ- reduced the required military cost to capture oppo- ing the need to establish a committee to “reform” sition-held areas by convincing large numbers of the Syrian Constitution — a stance consistent with the opposition, who were genuinely interested in a Assad’s demands.93 Faced with gridlock at the Sochi diplomatic settlement, to accept a return of regime Conference, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the UN took control upon guarantees from Russia. The Syrian it upon themselves to organize a constitutional com- regime still faced resistance from Al Qaeda-linked mittee composed of fifty members each from the groups, who refused to reconcile with Assad. regime, opposition, and civil society. The UN took responsibility for compiling the civil society list.94 Russia’s strategy enabled pro-regime forces to seize The UN moved forward with this vision despite the three of the four de-escalation zones in quick suc- fact that neither the regime nor prominent oppo- cession from February 2018 to July 2018. Assad, sition groups had accepted the process itself. The Russia, and Iran first prioritized recapturing the Syrian regime consistently spoiled the effort to form Eastern Ghouta Suburbs of Damascus in order the constitutional committee throughout 2018.95 to solidify their military and political strangle- hold over the capital.99 They then targeted the de-escalation zone in Northern Homs Province 3. Russia’s 2018 to secure the strategic M5 Highway connecting Reconciliation Experiment Damascus to Hama City.100 Finally, they forced After Sochi, Russia redirected its attempts to broker the surrender of opposition-held Southern Syria, a favorable diplomatic settlement away from major which held symbolic value as the birthplace of the international conferences toward local recon- Syrian Revolution and economic value due to the 101 ciliation deals aimed at neutralizing opposition Syrian-Jordanian Border. However, they failed strongholds. Russia implemented its lessons learned to repeat this success in the final de-escalation zone from Aleppo City and positioned the Russian in Greater Idlib Province in August 2018, where Armed Forces as interlocutors and guarantors of Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham on-the-ground deals with opposition communities. (HTS) and the Turkish-backed National Liberation This approach succeeded in changing the calculus Front (NLF) successfully pressured civilians and

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 21 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria other opposition groups to reject the reconciliation “turning point.”108 Russia withdrew many of these offers from Russia.102 units after an initial six-month period, however, and thus did not sustain long-term stability in the Russia sought to co-opt reconciled opposition reconciled de-escalation zones.109 leaders into a regime-tolerated internal opposition that could participate in a future intra-Syrian dialogue per the terms of UNSCR 2254.103 Assad Case Study: Southern Syria seems to have supported this effort, likely because Southern Syria offers a valuable case study of the it excluded the UN and the West and because he failure of Russia’s reconciliation efforts. It also had already demonstrated that Russia could not provides illustrative examples of how the complex force him to grant major concessions. Beginning interdependence of Assad, Russia, and Iran shaped in September 2018, Syrian regime figures worked ground events in Syria. Southern Syria is a com- with Russia to hold a series of meetings to build pelling example of their disingenuous approach to support for a new national dialogue among recon- de-escalation. ciled opposition members in Southern Syria.104 Southern Syria was the most difficult de-escalation Assad and Iran almost immediately violated the zone for pro-regime forces to seize and the most terms of the reconciliation agreements, however, symbolically important to the Syrian Revolution. thereby undermining once again Russia’s ability to In 2018, Southern Syria remained a stronghold of parlay its victory into a diplomatic settlement. It is moderate opposition groups that posed a political unclear from publicly available information whether threat to Assad and that had previously received Russia had negotiated an agreement with Assad and covert support from the West. Russia rightly identi- Iran to uphold the reconciliation deals or if it know- fied that the outcome of reconciliation in Southern ingly accepted the risks of providing guarantees that Syria would determine the shape of a future diplo- Assad and Iran might disregard. The latter seems matic resolution to the conflict. Russia also sought more likely. Assad and Iran’s violations of Russia’s to position itself as the mediator who could de-esca- promises rapidly destabilized late rising tensions between Israel the reconciled de-escalation and Iran (exacerbated by Iran’s zones, in turn undermining military buildup in Southern Moscow’s attempt to build a new Assad’s continued violation Syria) as well as between the West intra-Syrian political process. of the reconciliation deals and Iran. Russia deployed Russian Russia brokered the reconciliation Military Police to the recon- prompted the resumption of opposition-held Dera’a and ciled areas but was unable of an insurgency in Dera’a Quneitra Provinces in Southern to provide adequate security Province in October 2018. Syria in July 2018. The Russian or control other pro-regime Reconciliation Center estab- forces. The Military Police were lished a subordinate Supervisory composed primarily of Russian and Follow-up Committee (SFC) Sunni Muslims from Dagestan, Ingushetia, and in mid-2018 to organize and conduct the talks.110 Chechnya.105 Their presence provided a buffer Russia’s officer responsible for the “southern between former opposition fighters and pro-regime region” in Syria likely oversaw this effort.111 Russian forces.106 They also appealed to the local population officers worked closely with regime officials, exiled on religious grounds, praying openly in public spaces opposition leaders, and local notables to negoti- and providing humanitarian aid to traumatized ate with military and civilian opposition leaders.112 civilians. They played a key role in local-level diplo- Russia’s approach was consistent with its involve- matic outreach, convening meetings and mediating ment in reconciliation deals in Homs Province and directly between conflicting parties.107 One Russian Eastern Ghouta but occurred on a much greater Commander in Syria praised these operations as a scale in Southern Syria.113

22 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

The specific terms of the reconciliation deals varied stabilization mechanisms that included former somewhat across Southern Syria, but the first major opposition members who previously received agreement offers a general framework. Major oppo- humanitarian or military aid from Israel.120 sition figures based in Eastern Dera’a Province Assad immediately began an aggressive effort to signed a reconciliation deal in Busra al-Sham on reestablish his intelligence services in Southern July 6, 2018. The terms of the deal as reported in Syria. He also sought to intimidate the now-rec- pro-opposition media demonstrated that Russia’s onciled population and demonstrate to them his guarantees were the decisive factor in gaining buy-in intent to return to the pre-war status quo. He dis- from armed opposition groups. 114 The reported patched agents into reconciled areas of Southern terms offered to local opposition fighters included: Syria to ensure that former opposition fighters • an immediate ceasefire; and their supporters “settled” their status with the • a gradual handover of heavy and medium regime by submitting to questioning and an eval- weapons; uation of whether they could be detained for any • a guarantee of safe return for internally crimes against the state. displaced persons;115 Syrian Air Force Intelligence quickly took the lead • an accelerated return for civil society in Southern Syria. It established fixed and mobile organizations; “settlement centers” and issued deadlines of ten-to- • a six-month grace period before residents fifteen days for locals to present their paperwork for needed to enroll for conscription; review.121 This process occurred in piecemeal over • an opportunity to volunteer for irregular units the next two months from late July 2018 through backed by Russia such as the Fifth Corps; September 2018.122 The definition of who needed • the withdrawal of pro-regime forces from to settle their status varied, ranging from all mil- several towns on the Syrian-Jordanian itary-aged males to every man and woman in a Border;116 locality.123 Russia mediated new rounds of techni- • an agreement that pro-regime forces would cal negotiations between local leaders and regime not enter Busra al-Sham or its countryside; officials over the settlement process.124 Local nego- • the restoration of state institutions including tiation committees that had agreed to reconciliation police, health, and “security” (presum- ably intelligence services) in Eastern Dera’a often provided lists of former opposition fighters Province;117 to the authorities to identify individuals who would 125 • the deployment of Russian Military Police to need to settle their status. Eastern Dera’a Province;118 The Syrian regime imposed harsh requirements for • a guarantee of safe evacuation for fighters and residents to successfully settle their status. Syrian civilians who refused to accept these terms to Air Force Intelligence required participants to 119 Greater Idlib Province in Northern Syria. answer extensive questions regarding their involve- Assad and Iran did not fully align with Russia in ment in anti-regime activities and inform on others Southern Syria. They supported Russia’s general by providing the personal information and funding approach to reconciliation, rightly calculating that sources of civilian activists and armed opposition it would accelerate the recapture of opposition-held fighters.126 It also required participants to sign an areas and could lead to new economic opportuni- agreement vowing “not to carry out any activities ties via cross-border trade with Jordan. Assad and that harm the internal or the external security of the Iran nonetheless contested Russia’s relationship Syrian Arab Republic.” 127 These terms were consis- with Israel. Both Assad and Iran opposed Israel’s tent with terms the regime imposed in Homs City in control of the Golan Heights. They therefore 2014. Syrian Air Force Intelligence also issued lists worked together against Russia after agreeing to the of names of individuals wanted for “desertion” since reconciliation agreements in Southern Syria. They the start of the Syrian Revolution and demanded that acted jointly to undermine Russia’s ability to build they report immediately to a settlement center.128

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 23 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria 10/9/19 of Peace Recapture of Recapture Khan Sheikhun and Morek 2019 2019 Turkey begins Turkey Notes 10/30/2019 ﬁrst meeting ﬁrst Operation Spring Operation

1. Committee holds Syrian Constitutional 13 © 2019 Institute for the Study of War Capture of Al-Safa Capture 9/17/2018 12 Full recapture of Dera’a and of Dera’a recapture Full Provinces Quneitra on Greater Idlib on Greater 11 5 de-militarized zone Russia-Turkey agree Russia-Turkey 2018 2018 8 Recapture of Yarmouk Camp of Yarmouk Recapture Capture of Dumayr Capture strike for strike 4/14/2018 Camp to Al-Safa Provinces and Quneitra Dera’a and Jordan; to Idlib Province to Al-Safa ISIS displaced Syria Desert Central ISIS displaced from Yarmouk Yarmouk from ISIS displaced from displaced Anti-Assad forces Al-Safa to from ISIS displaced 10 Sochi Douma attack 2 1/29/2018 Western retaliatory Western Conference Russia hosts Russia 4/7/2018 11 12 13 Assad chlorine attack on Douma Recapture of Abu Dhuhur Airbase Recapture Idlib Province and Southeastern Recapture of Deir ez-Zour City of Deir ez-Zour Recapture and west bank of Euphrates 7 7/19/2017 CIA ends United States Unsuccessful Pro-Assad Offensive Regime support to Clearing of outskirtsArsal Syrian rebels Graphic by Jason Zhou Graphic by Jason 7/7/2017 Recapture of Jirah Airbase, of Jirah Recapture Maskanah, and Resafa of Recapture Uqayribat 6 Attempted recapture of Dera’a Attempted recapture City Camp Palestinian 5/4/2017 4 2017 2017 4/7/2017 escalation zones escalation zones agree on four de-agree Russia-Turkey-Iran in Southwestern Syria Recapture of Sukhna on de-escalation zone strike for Khan strike U.S.-Russia-Jordan agree U.S.-Russia-Jordan U.S. retaliatory Sheikhun attackSheikhun Recapture of Recapture Dayr Hafir 4/4/2017 Sheikhun 1 Assad sarin 2nd recapture of Palmyra attack on Khan 1/23/2017 Clearing operations in Damascus suburbs Clearing operations 9 Siege of Aleppo Russia-Turkey- of Astana talks 9/9/2016 Syria Iran hold first set first hold Iran 8/24/2016 Attempted recapture of Tabqa Airport of Tabqa Attempted recapture on nationwide Turkish military Turkish 2016 2016 ceasefire in Syria ceasefire U.S.-Russia agree U.S.-Russia enters Northern enters - November 2019 1 Recapture of Palmyra Recapture and Qaryatayn deploy 4/4/2016 Attempted recapture of Tabqa Airport of Tabqa Attempted recapture to Aleppo Iranian Artesh Iranian Full recapture of recapture Full Maskin Sheikh 2/28/2016 Aleppo encirclement Recapture of Salma, Rabia, and Kinsabba of Salma, Rabia, Recapture Attempted recapture of Kafr Attempted recapture Nabouda and Lataminah 12/18/2015

Relief of Kuweires AirbaseRelief of Kuweires Russia establishes Russia 10/9/2015 for rebels UNSC passes Reconciliation Center Reconciliation T&E program Resolution 2254 Resolution Attempted recapture of Palmyra 9/30/2015 U.S. DoD suspends * Anti-Assad forces include moderate opposition forces as well as Al Qaeda-linked groups. as well Al Qaeda-linked opposition forces include moderate * Anti-Assad forces Syria begins Clearing of Syria-Lebanon Border 2015 2015 intervention in Russian militaryRussian KEY Attempted recapture al-Hara of Tel Joint United States and Russia Pro-Assad Regime Siege Regime Pro-Assad Partial recapture of Sheikh Maskin of Sheikh Partial recapture Attempted Aleppo encirclement Anti-Assad forces displaced from Qalamoun Mountains from displaced Anti-Assad forces and Eastern Qalamoun Mountains; to Idlib Province Province to Deir ez-Zour ISIS displaced Dumayr to Northern from displaced Anti-Assad forces Aleppo Province to Idlib Darayya from displaced Anti-Assad forces Province to Eastern Ghouta from displaced Anti-Assad forces and Northern Aleppo Province Idlib Province 9/23/2014 1st recapture of Morek 1st recapture Syria begins campaign in U.S. anti-ISIS 2nd recapture of Zabadani 2nd recapture Major Opposition and events Western Recapture of Arsal Recapture 9/17/2014 7 8 9 10 Siege of Wa’er 2014 2014 3 program for rebels program Congress approves U.S. approves Congress DoD Train and Equip (T&E) DoD Train Recapture of Recapture Najjar Sheikh 1st recapture of 1st recapture Khanaser and Safira 9/14/2013 8/21/2013 attack on Assad sarin 2013 2013 U.S.-Russia agree U.S.-Russia Recapture of Halfaya Recapture chemical weapons chemical Eastern Ghouta Eastern Ghouta Recapture of Qusayr Recapture on removal of Syrian on removal Siege of Eastern Ghouta deploys 5/19/2013 to Qusayr Hezbollah Recapture of Qara, Yabroud, of Qara, Recapture of Zabadani and 1st recapture Surrenders and Withdrawals to Pro-Assad Regime Forces Surrenders and Withdrawals 1/7/2013 Siege of Darayya peace plan Assad proposes Siege of Homs Old City 7/2012 Siege of Rastan and Talbisah Siege of Rastan for Syrian 2012 2012 6/30/2012 Pro-Assad Regime Offensives Regime 201 Pro-Assad CIA support rebels begins rebels Group releases Group UN Syria Action Pro-Assad Regime Offensive Regime Pro-Assad Russia Geneva Communique Recapture of Recapture Baba Amr 12/19/2011 Syria signs Arab 7/29/2011 League Monitoring Plan Free Syrian Free Army forms 2 011 2 011 begins Syrian 3/18/2011 Anti-Assad forces* displaced from Aleppo City from to displaced Anti-Assad forces* and Idlib Province Aleppo Province Western to Idlib Northern Hama Province from ISIS displaced Province Homs Old City from to displaced Anti-Assad forces Northern Homs Province to Idlib Province Wa’er from displaced Anti-Assad forces to and Talbisah Rastan from displaced Anti-Assad forces Idlib Province to Idlib Zabadani from displaced Anti-Assad forces Province 24 Revolution UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Major Military Inflections and Political Diplomatic Inflections Aleppo Province Idlib and Northern Hama Province Latakia Province Homs Province Qalamoun Mountains Damascus City and Suburbs and Dera’a Provinces Quneitra and Province Deir ez-Zour Eastern Homs Province Province Ar-Raqqa Suwayda Province 1 2 3 4 5 6 NOVEMBER 2019 10/9/19 of Peace Recapture of Recapture Khan Sheikhun and Morek 2019 2019 Turkey begins Turkey 10/30/2019 first meeting first Operation Spring Operation Committee holds Syrian Constitutional 13 © 2019 Institute for the Study of War Capture of Al-Safa Capture 9/17/2018 12 Full recapture of Dera’a and of Dera’a recapture Full Provinces Quneitra on Greater Idlib on Greater 11 5 de-militarized zone Russia-Turkey agree Russia-Turkey 2018 2018 8 Recapture of Yarmouk Camp of Yarmouk Recapture Capture of Dumayr Capture strike for strike 4/14/2018 Camp to Al-Safa Provinces and Quneitra Dera’a and Jordan; to Idlib Province to Al-Safa ISIS displaced Syria Desert Central ISIS displaced from Yarmouk Yarmouk from ISIS displaced from displaced Anti-Assad forces Al-Safa to from ISIS displaced 10 Sochi Douma attack 2 1/29/2018 Western retaliatory Western Conference Russia hosts Russia 4/7/2018 11 12 13 Assad chlorine attack on Douma Recapture of Abu Dhuhur Airbase Recapture Idlib Province and Southeastern Recapture of Deir ez-Zour City of Deir ez-Zour Recapture and west bank of Euphrates 7 7/19/2017 CIA ends United States Unsuccessful Pro-Assad Offensive Regime support to Clearing of outskirtsArsal Syrian rebels Graphic by Jason Zhou Graphic by Jason 7/7/2017 Recapture of Jirah Airbase, of Jirah Recapture Maskanah, and Resafa of Recapture Uqayribat 6 Attempted recapture of Dera’a Attempted recapture City Camp Palestinian 5/4/2017 4 2017 2017 4/7/2017 escalation zones escalation zones agree on four de-agree Russia-Turkey-Iran in Southwestern Syria Recapture of Sukhna on de-escalation zone strike for Khan strike U.S.-Russia-Jordan agree U.S.-Russia-Jordan U.S. retaliatory Sheikhun attackSheikhun Recapture of Recapture Dayr Hafir 4/4/2017 Sheikhun 1 Assad sarin 2nd recapture of Palmyra attack on Khan 1/23/2017 Clearing operations in Damascus suburbs Clearing operations 9 Siege of Aleppo Russia-Turkey- of Astana talks 9/9/2016 Syria Iran hold first set first hold Iran 8/24/2016 Attempted recapture of Tabqa Airport of Tabqa Attempted recapture on nationwide Turkish military Turkish 2016 2016 ceasefire in Syria ceasefire U.S.-Russia agree U.S.-Russia enters Northern enters - November 2019 1 Recapture of Palmyra Recapture and Qaryatayn deploy 4/4/2016 Attempted recapture of Tabqa Airport of Tabqa Attempted recapture to Aleppo Iranian Artesh Iranian Full recapture of recapture Full Maskin Sheikh 2/28/2016 Aleppo encirclement Recapture of Salma, Rabia, and Kinsabba of Salma, Rabia, Recapture Attempted recapture of Kafr Attempted recapture Nabouda and Lataminah 12/18/2015

Russia attempted to use its relationship with Syrian of Southern Syria. He also fired large numbers Military Intelligence to uphold the terms of its rec- of public employees who had worked in oppo- onciliation deals but could not compel cooperation sition-held areas but remained on the regime’s from other regime intelligence agencies. Moscow payroll and required them to submit for screening had cultivated a close working relationship with by the Syrian National Security Directorate.139 Assad Syrian Military Intelligence Chief in Southern Syria used these harsh measures to signal his willingness Luay Ali.129 Syrian Military Intelligence participated to quash further insubordination and punish those in the settlement process and some reports sug- who had aided the opposition, regardless of the gested occasional direct participation by Russia.130 guarantees offered by Moscow. It issued “settlement cards” to individuals who had Russia, Assad, and Iran competed intensively to gen- completed the process and removed their names erate combat power from reconciled communities from the regime’s wanted lists. These cards in in Southern Syria. Russia recruited many former principle authorized freedom of movement within opposition fighters into the Fifth Corps, which it Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces.131 In practice, other established in 2015 to coalesce fractious pro-regime regime intelligence agencies and pro-regime forces militias and augment the faltering SAA.140 The Fifth disregarded them.132 The Syrian regime’s uncon- Corps opened recruitment centers with support strained ability to impose these intimidation tactics from members of local negotiations committees demonstrated yet again the relative lack of leverage and some prominent opposition commanders.141 held by Russia. Russia issued identification cards to members of the Pro-regime forces beholden to both Assad and Fifth Corps to protect them from conscription and Iran began retaliating against the reconciled pop- arrest.142 It also recruited former opposition fight- ulation even while the settlement process remained ers to other groups it favored including the Tiger underway, forcing Russia to intervene repeatedly to Forces, one of the most capable units fighting on dampen tensions in Southern Syria. Pro-regime behalf of Assad.143 forces quickly began arresting former opposi- Assad immediately began efforts forcibly to con- tion leaders and refused to withdraw from parts of script civilians in Southern Syria into the SAA, Eastern Dera’a Province.133 The Syrian regime also thereby violating Russia’s promise to exempt rec- sent forces into Busra al-Sham on July 17.134 These onciled individuals from conscription for six actions constituted direct violations of the reconcil- months.144 Iran also recruited in reconciled areas iation agreements. Jizah in Eastern Dera’a Province in Southern Syria via Lebanese Hezbollah, which asked Russia to enable an evacuation to Greater funneled recruits toward the SAA 4th Armored Idlib Province on August 2 after weeks of retalia- Division and Syrian Air Force Intelligence.145 These tion and looting by pro-regime forces.135 A similar recruits reportedly received funding from the convoy departed Jassim north of Dera’a City on Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) August 11.136 Pro-regime forces reportedly stopped separate from the Syrian regime and thus consti- several of these convoys and made some arrests, tuted yet another effort by Iran to infiltrate the state taking advantage of the absence of escorts from the apparatus in Syria.146 These recruits also reportedly Russian Military Police.137 remained under the command of officers from Iran Assad took other steps to signal to reconciled popu- or Hezbollah, suggesting that Iran has direct control lations that no one — not even Russia — could protect over specific elements of the th4 Armored Division them from the regime’s wrath. He publicized the and Syrian Air Force Intelligence.147 Iran has regime’s mass executions of detainees by sending reportedly extended protection guarantees to these death notices to their families in July 2018.138 He fighters, competing with the offers from Russia.148 reestablished statues of his father, former Syrian Assad and Iran have more leverage in Southern President Hafez al-Assad, in reconciled areas Syria than Russia. Assad and Iran focused their

26 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019 conscription and recruitment efforts on expanding their military capability in Southern Syria. Russia 4. Russia’s First meanwhile committed its new combat power to Reconstruction Attempt other parts of Syria rather than developing deeper Russia also attempted to gain access to international institutional capacity in Southern Syria. It has reconstruction funds even as it helped Assad seize deployed reconciled fighters who joined the Fifth the remaining de-escalation zones in Syria. Russia 149 Corps to fight in Idlib and Suwayda Provinces. offered to help resettle Syrian refugees from Europe Moscow thus still lacks independent capacity to if Europe invested in reconstruction in Syria.154 either enforce its will in Southern Syria or imme- Moscow sought to exploit the refugee crisis and diately mitigate its continued dependence on Iran growing anti-refugee sentiment in Europe to extract in Syria. financial concessions for itself, Assad, and Iran. If Russia’s reconciliation efforts in Southern Syria successful, the flow of international reconstruction broke down in late 2018. Assad’s continued vio- funds could have further dampened any momen- lation of the reconciliation deals prompted the tum towards even half-hearted diplomatic efforts to resumption of an insurgency in Dera’a Province in resolve the conflict, despite the fact that Assad still 155 October 2018. A new insurgent group called the controlled only half of the country. Russia could Popular Resistance in Dera’a announced its for- also have used the funds to complement its efforts to mation on November 15, noting that it intended coopt reconciled opposition groups into an internal to deter abuses by Assad and Iran in Southern intra-Syrian settlement. However, Assad yet again Syria.150 The group later condemned opposition rejected Moscow’s bid to help resettle refugees in figures who cooperate with Russia as traitors who Syria in exchange for reconstruction funds. The have given up the values of the Syrian Revolution.151 Trump Administration also pressured Europe to Pro-opposition media outlets have claimed that the refuse the offer. organization is prioritizing attacks against Iran in The Trump Administration instead intensified Southern Syria, but its targets have also included efforts to prevent Russia and Assad from access- other pro-regime forces and reconciled opposition ing reconstruction funds until they implemented 152 figures. The insurgency continues as of November UNSCR 2254. It increased sanctions on key regime 2019 with consistent low-level attacks including figures and actively blocked the delivery of recon- ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and raids struction funds to Syria by threatening to add on military positions. sanctions on states or companies that invested 156 Popular protests also reemerged in Dera’a City in Syria. It intensified diplomatic pressure on in December 2018, a major turning point. Local Russia meant to hold it accountable for abuses by residents including tribal elders and former oppo- Assad, such as the use of violence against civilians 157 sition fighters held a public demonstration in and its resistance to UNSCR 2254. The Trump Dera’a al-Balad District calling for strict adher- Administration hoped that Assad would be more ence to the reconciliation agreements and the likely to negotiate if he remained economically weak removal of Assad.153 They also demanded concrete and Russia faced greater pressure to curb his behav- confidence-building measures including a halt to ior. The U.S. — and ultimately the EU — argued that forced conscription and the release of detainees. reconstruction first required meaningful imple- 158 The protest harkened back to the start of the Syrian mentation of UNSCR 2254. Russia accused the Revolution in 2011 and demonstrated the inher- West of tying humanitarian aid to geopolitics and 159 ent fragility of the reconciliation deals in Southern increased its own pressure on the U.S. Syria. Civil disobedience spread across Southern The Kremlin attempted to convince the Trump Syria throughout 2019. Administration to support reconstruction as an expansion of a preexisting military de-confliction

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 27 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria mechanism established to prevent an unintentional period for citizens to prove property ownership air incident over Syria. Russian Chief of the General under pressure from Russia.167 The Syrian regime Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov sent a letter to this has nonetheless continued to seize property and effect to then U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of even resettle loyalist families in recaptured areas Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford in July 2018. The letter to entrench demographic change.168 It has also detailed a proposal for the U.S. and Jordan to build stipulated that its intelligence services must vet all on the de-escalation agreement in Southern Syria individuals returning to claim property, deterring (which Russia had violated) to form a new joint voluntary returns by most Syrians. committee to reconstruct regime-held areas and The Syrian regime allowed limited numbers of ref- return refugees.160 It also asked the U.S. to form a ugees to return from Lebanon after July 2018 in separate joint group with Russia to finance infra- order to relieve pressure on Lebanese Hezbollah structure in regime-held areas.161 Russia reportedly and demonstrate how it would treat refugees from falsely attempted to portray the offer as an outcome Europe. Syrians in Lebanon faced more desper- of the July 16 Helsinki Summit between President ate conditions than those in Europe and thus they Trump and Putin.162 The Trump Administration were willing to take greater risks by returning to rejected the offer and reaffirmed that the U.S. Syria. Lebanese Hezbollah also compelled some would only provide reconstruction aid linked to the refugees to depart Lebanon.169 The Syrian regime implementation of UNSCR 2254. conscripted many of the returnees into military Assad also acted to spoil this reconstruction pitch service and forced others to sign loyalty pledges and despite his need for funds. He likely expected the provide detailed documentation of their political West to attach conditions to reconstruction funds history.170 This behavior effectively deterred large- that could potentially create pretexts for future scale returns by Syrian refugees living in Europe. action against his regime. Furthermore, Assad does not want his dissident population to return, especially since he has not reestablished sufficient 5. Russia’s Second security in recaptured areas to suppress a renewed Reconstruction Attempt insurgency. Former Syrian Air Force Intelligence Russia adjusted its strategy yet again in late 2018. Director Jamil Hassan — a close adviser to Assad – Russia and Assad attacked Greater Idlib Province reportedly told a closed-door meeting in 2018 that in Northwest Syria — the last of the de-escalation the regime would prefer to govern ten million com- zones brokered at Astana. Russia used the leverage it pliant citizens than accept the return of the over six gained from these attacks to extract limited conces- 163 million refugees back to Syria. sions from Turkey, including greater trade between Assad thus signaled to Europe that he would retali- Idlib Province and the remainder of regime-held ate against refugees if they returned home regardless Western Syria. Russia used this agreement with of guarantees from Russia. The Syrian Parliament Turkey to ask once again for reconstruction funds passed a law in April 2018 that allowed the state from Europe. Europe once again refused the offer. to designate zones for reconstruction and seize Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan 164 privately owned property. It ostensibly allowed reached an agreement on a roadmap for Greater Syrians able to prove their ownership to receive Idlib Province on September 17, 2018. This shares in new properties, but nearly three-quar- Sochi Agreement sought to reopen trade (after a ters of all property deeds have been lost during the period of demilitarization) between regime-held 165 war. The law thus ensured that millions of dis- and opposition-held parts of Northwest Syria.171 sident refugees and internally displaced persons Russia promised to “take all necessary measures 166 would be unable to reclaim their land. The Syrian to ensure that military operations and attacks on Parliament later passed a one-year extension to the

28 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

Idlib [Province would] be avoided and the existing Russia used this time to make a renewed pitch for status quo [would] be maintained.” The agree- reconstruction aid. ment required a withdrawal of all heavy weapons, Turkey also conducted a failed attempt to revive tanks, and artillery from frontlines by October Russia’s proposal for Europe to invest in Syria in 10 and of all “radical” fighters — including Hay’at exchange for help implementing UNSCR 2254 in Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — by October 15, but it did October 2018. On October 27, Turkey held a mul- not explicitly place this responsibility on Turkey.172 tilateral summit in Istanbul with Russia, France, and The deal also committed Russia and Turkey to joint Germany to discuss the possibility of reconstruction patrols along the frontlines to restore “trade and support for Syria.179 Turkey and Russia likely sought economic relations” in Northwest Syria, including to use the Sochi Agreement to gain a new revenue reopening two major highways connecting Aleppo stream for Syria. The summit itself marked a limited City, Hama City, and the Syrian Coast by the end diplomatic victory for Putin because it expanded the of 2018.173 Astana Talks and brought in France and Germany. Al Qaeda and Assad both acted to spoil the Sochi Neither France nor Germany contributed recon- Agreement. HTS and other Al Qaeda-affiliated struction funds, however, and neither has attended groups refused to withdraw from the frontlines in subsequent Astana Talks. Instead, they reaffirmed Greater Idlib Province.174 Assad for his part sig- the U.S. and UN demand for the formation of a naled support for a temporary demilitarization but constitutional committee by the end of 2018. Assad reiterated his intent to regain control of all of Syria refused to accept any such committee and the dead- during a meeting of the Syrian Ba’ath Party Central line passed with no tangible progress. Committee on October 7.175 Assad likely sought to The Sochi Agreement began to break down in reap the economic benefits of even a short-term January 2019. Russia and Turkey partially reopened resumption of trade. His forces nonetheless con- trade between Greater Idlib Province and Hama City ducted repeated artillery barrages targeting Greater via the Morek Crossing in November 2018. Russian Idlib Province, likely to demonstrate his indepen- Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu later pressured dence from Russia.176 His violations of the deal Turkey to compel HTS to comply further justified HTS’s own with the terms of the deal during refusal to abide by the Sochi a meeting in Sochi on November Agreement. Assad will meter the 20.180 Turkey successfully com- The UN’s work to reach a break- implementation of UNSCR pelled HTS to vacate the Morek through on a constitutional Crossing on December 7.181 committee also stalled in October 2254 so that it either fails Morek remained open intermit- 2018. UN Special Envoy for Syria or supports his interests. tently until May 2019, allowing Staffan de Mistura announced His influence within the a temporary resumption of some his intent to resign at the end trade in accordance with the of November 2018, although Syrian Constitutional Sochi Agreement. However, he later agreed to remain until Committee enables him to HTS moved aggressively to con- December 2018 in order to facil- solidate its control of terrain and itate a final push by the U.S. and stall the process at will and dominance over opposition fac- UN to convene a constitutional limit the outcome to only tions elsewhere in Greater Idlib committee in accordance with superficial reforms. Province.182 The Turkish-backed UNSCR 2254.177 De Mistura National Liberation Front sur- noted before this departure that rendered to HTS following a it “may not be possible to form a constitutional wave of clashes across Greater Idlib Province in committee, credible and inclusive, at this stage.”178 early January 2019.183 The Russian Air Force ended

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 29 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria a four-month pause of airstrikes in Idlib Province permitting overflights by the Turkish Air Force over on January 20, likely in response to gains by HTS.184 Syria.189 The Syrian Arab Air Force resumed its own air- Russia and Turkey’s attempt to save the Sochi strikes in Idlib Province on February 24. Agreement failed, however. Russia, Turkey, and Putin and Erdogan attempted to salvage the Sochi Iran held a new round of Astana Talks in April Agreement at the next two rounds of Astana Talks in 2019 and Russia demanded new concessions that January 2019 and February 2019.185 They focused Turkey would never be able to compel or convince their talks on opening a new trade route between HTS to support.190 Russia pressed Turkey to accept Aleppo City and the Syrian-Turkish Border, aban- joint patrols (rather than separate coordinated doning previous plans to open a route between patrols) inside opposition-held areas of Greater Aleppo City and the Syrian Coast. 186 Turkey and Idlib Province.191 HTS and local opposition coun- Russia conducted joint military patrols on the cils rejected this proposal outright.192 Assad and frontline near Tel Rifaat north of Aleppo City on Russia responded by significantly intensifying their February 14.187 On March 5, Turkey announced the air campaign against Idlib Province.193 Pro-regime reopening of the key Bab al-Salama Border Crossing media claimed on April 30 that Turkey had “defin- north of Aleppo City.188 Turkey and Russia also con- itively aborted” the Sochi Agreement.194 Russia’s ducted the first of a series of coordinated frontline reversal demonstrated that it had lost patience with patrols in Idlib Province on March 8, with Russia the agreement and was ready to begin a new military escalation in Northwest Syria.

A “Breakthrough” Implementing 2254

Russia and Assad began a new ground assault against of thousands of civilians toward the Syrian-Turkish Idlib Province in May 2019 that became their largest Border, threatening to create a new refugee crisis military offensive since the 2016 Campaign for for Turkey and Europe.200 Russia announced a uni- Aleppo City.195 HTS and Turkish-backed opposition lateral ceasefire on August 30 in order to return to groups resisted fiercely and imposed a grueling stale- negotiations via the Astana Talks, now with greater mate on pro-regime forces through June 2019.196 military leverage.201 Russian Spetznaz in turn increased their involve- Putin, Erdogan, and Iranian President Hassan ment on the ground sometime in July 2019.197 Russia Rouhani met in Ankara in September 2019 to used the renewed military pressure on Greater Idlib discuss the situation in Idlib Province and Eastern Province to shape a new round of negotiations over Syria.202 Putin reaffirmed his intent to continue international aid in Syria. Russia held the thir- military operations in Greater Idlib Province after teenth round of Astana Talks with Turkey and Iran the meeting, stressing the “need to take additional in August 2019. The participants discussed holding measures to completely eliminate the security threats an international conference on humanitarian assis- coming from the Idlib de-escalation zone.” 203 tance to Syria, which Russia hoped would occur in Russian Private Military Contractors (PMCs) began October or November 2019.198 The talks concluded a build-up in Syria in early September 2019 to without a deal, however. prepare for possible future operations into Idlib Russia and Assad launched a more successful push Province.204 Erdogan may have agreed to accept gains into Southern Idlib Province after the Astana by Russia and Assad in Idlib Province in exchange Talks in August 2019. Pro-regime forces seized the for a green light for his own intervention against the urban center of Khan Sheikhun in Idlib Province Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northern Syria, on August 22.199 Its fall drove a new wave of tens

30 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019 which began on October 9.205 Russia has allowed the and limit the outcome to only superficial reforms. Turkish Air Force to support this operation.206 He may intend to delay the political process until he reaches the scheduled 2021 Syrian Presidential Russia’s decision to commit more force to the fight Elections.213 He may even attempt to legitimize in Greater Idlib Province appears to have changed his planned election by hijacking UNSCR 2254’s Assad’s calculus regarding the implementation of requirement for a UN-monitored election as the UNSCR 2254. After nearly two years of stalling, next step after amending the Syrian Constitution. Assad finally accepted the list of names to form a Assad rejected the demand for international elec- committee responsible for revising the Syrian tion monitors in an interview with state media on Constitution on September 23.207 The Syrian October 31.214 He may attempt to shape the imple- Constitutional Committee nominally represents mentation of UNSCR 2254 to bypass election the first meaningful step toward implementing observers or invite only observers from friendly UNSCR 2254. New UN Special Envoy to Syria Geir nations such as Russia. Pedersen described the body as “Syrian-led, Syrian- owned, credible, balanced & inclusive.”208 The U.S. Assad will also use force to shape the implemen- praised it as an “encouraging step toward reaching a tation of UNSCR 2254. He has already begun political solution to the Syrian conflict.”209 intimidating committee delegates and their family members, leading to the resignation thus far of four However, Assad accepted the Syrian Constitutional members of the civil society list.215 He also detained Committee only after shaping its composition a member of the opposition delegation on October and procedures to give regime loyalists de facto veto 8.216 Assad likely intends to leverage UNSCR 2254 power over its proposals. The Committee techni- to reduce international pressure as he pushes deeper cally includes three separate “lists” of fifty members into Greater Idlib Province. The U.S. and Europe each drawn from the regime, the opposition, and have consistently condemned ongoing military civil society. The regime list includes pro-regime operations in Idlib Province, and a more aggres- figures, but Assad does not recognize them as an sive offensive will aggravate the humanitarian crisis official regime delegation (which would legitimize and attract additional attention from the West.217 the process). Turkey nominated the opposition list, Assad likely calculates that granting some progress which includes sixteen regime-tolerated opposi- on the Constitutional Committee could help reduce tion figures who nominally pursue reform but who international pressure over Idlib, enabling him to are willing to work within the existing system led expand his control on the ground and drive rad- by Assad.210 The UN also granted approval power icalization in Idlib that he could use to discredit over the civil society list to Assad, allowing the opposition groups. regime to determine its members. 211 ISW assesses that at least eight members of the civil society list are The U.S. risks doing more harm than good to highly likely to support pro-regime positions, while the chances of a diplomatic settlement in Syria by another thirteen are vulnerable to intimidation by implementing UNSCR 2254 under these con- Assad or amenable to compromises that favor Assad. ditions. The U.S. is overpromising by calling ISW thus assesses that Assad can influence just over the Syrian Constitutional Committee a “door to half of the delegates to the Syrian Constitutional peace.”218 This rhetoric rings hollow when Assad Committee, which requires a three-quarters vote to shows no sign of accepting anything less than the approve changes to the Syrian Constitution.212 full and unconditional surrender of his opponents. The U.S. is similarly not credible with its calls for Assad will meter the implementation of UNSCR a nationwide ceasefire in the context of UNSCR 2254 so that it either fails or supports his inter- 2254. The U.S. has displayed no willingness to ests. His influence within the Syrian Constitutional enforce previous ceasefires or punish violations Committee enables him to stall the process at will by Assad, Russia, and Iran. Pro-regime forces

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 31 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

The False Promise of the Syrian Constitutional Committee

Key Takeaway: The UN announced the formation of a Syrian Constitutional Committee in September 2019 aer nearly two years of negotiations facilitated by Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The Syrian Constitutional Committee will debate and approve amendments to the Syrian Constitution or possibly dra a new constitution as part of the Geneva Process to end the war in Syria. Assad retains inﬂuence over more than half the committee, however. Assad will likely use progress on the committee in the short term as diplomatic cover for a renewed oﬀensive in Greater Idlib Province. Assad may stall the process in the long term, potentially forcing the UN to recognize as legitimate the planned 2021 Presidential Elections in Syria that he will likely win. Syrian Constitutional Committee 150 Delegates

Opposition Delegation Civil Society Delegation Regime Delegation Selected by Turkey with Selected by the United Nations and Selected by Assad with support support om the West approved by the Assad Regime rom Russia and Iran

Each of the three delegations have selected ﬁeen members to participate in a forty-ﬁve person subcommittee tasked with draing constitutional reforms. Dra proposals must then be approved by a three-quarters majority of the full committee.

Dra ing Subcommittee 45 Delegates

KEY* Votes Assad Can Inﬂuence (88) Assad-Aligned Individuals (58): Assad-Amenable Individuals (30): Resigned om Individuals with close relations to the Syrian Individuals whom the regime tolerates or who are Committee; replacement regime who are highly likely to support pro-Assad likely under Assad’s inﬂuence. (e.g. Academics in unknown (4) positions. (e.g. Members of the Syrian parliament.) Syria, regime-tolerated opposition.)

Anti-Assad Votes (41) Members of Syrian Armed Syrian Political Humanitarian Actors with Dra ing Subcommittee Opposition (4): Opposition (28): ties to Syrian Political Individuals who fought Political opposition members Opposition (9): against Assad as members living abroad and/or in Humanitarian activists and advocates * ISW’s assessments of committee of former armed rebel Turkish-protected zones. who seek Assad’s removal or work members’ affiliations are based on groups. (e.g. Former Free (e.g. Members of the National closely with the Syrian political public statements, previously held opposition. (e.g. Leaders of NGOs Syrian Army leaders.) Coalition and Syrian Interim positions, and other publicly Government.) operating in Idlib Province.) available information. Voter Position Unclear (17) Position Unknown (17): Graphic by Jason Zhou Individuals for whom ISW was unable to ﬁnd suﬃcient information to assess likely political position. 2019 © Institute for the Study of War

32 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019 have systematically violated prior ceasefire deals discrediting the few opposition figures still willing in Aleppo City, Eastern Ghouta, Northern Homs to negotiate with the regime. The High Negotiating Province, and Southern Syria. Assad’s targeting of Committee previously lost credibility after its par- opposition members on the constitutional commit- ticipation in international talks in 2016 – 2018 tee sends another clear signal of his intransigence. that achieved no progress while Assad, Russia, and This stark disconnect between rhetoric and reality Iran conquered more of Syria. Multiple leaders in alienates Syrians, who have no true protection from the body resigned in protest.219 The current process abuses by Assad. As a result, UNSCR 2254 already will likely have a similar effect on the limited oppo- lacks support from the core constituencies it was sition cadre participating in the Constitutional intended to help protect — the communities that Committee. Syria’s prospects for a political com- rebelled against Assad. promise grow more distant as the number of opposition leaders willing to accept one shrinks. Turkey also will not be able to build support for UNSCR 2254 despite its influence with the surviv- The U.S. also risks fueling Salafi-Jihadist Groups in ing opposition groups in Syria. Turkey is focused Syria through its policy on UNSCR 2254. The exis- primarily on fighting the Syrian Kurds and it is tence of a diplomatic process that opposition groups willing to let Assad manipulate the political process view as credible is essential to denying recruitment in exchange for a free hand in Northern Syria. It opportunities to Salafi-Jihadists. Al Qaeda and might even accept a superficial election in Syria that affiliated groups have doubled down on their long- reelects Assad. Turkey’s actions on the ground will standing claim that Syrians face only two credible nonetheless ensure a long-term divide in Syria. Its options: jihad or subjugation to Assad. One Al client opposition groups remain committed to the Qaeda-aligned coalition in Northern Syria recently Syrian Revolution. They will likely reject any deal condemned the diplomatic process as “suicide” on that rehabilitates Assad. Salafi-Jihadist Groups that October 10, 2019.220 This narrative will only be operate among their ranks will also likely act to spoil further entrenched if the international community any settlement between Turkey and Assad. falsely trumpets superficial diplomatic progress as meaningful change in the lives of Syrians. Continuing forward with UNSCR 2254 risks making a settlement even more difficult by further

Implications

Russia and Assad’s relationship provides valuable affect the trajectory of the war to suit his own inter- insight into how to shape the trajectory of the war in ests. Their success is far from given, however. Syria. Russia’s frequent recalibration of its military The U.S. is failing to exploit opportunity in Syria operations and diplomatic efforts reflects a sophis- because its policy framework is misaligned with ticated campaign to shape the decisions of Syrians the realities of the war and wartime diplomacy. who are calculating in both military and political American expectations are biased towards ending terms. Russia has been unable to change the basic the violence as the most important measure of calculus of Assad or his opposition but has reset the effectiveness. This premise causes the U.S. to over- terms of their conflict in ways that favor Russia’s look ways to affect the war short of this threshold interests, a major accomplishment. Under similar with both military and diplomatic tools. Russia’s but even more severe constraints, Assad has con- approach is much more realistic. Assad’s is even ducted complex military and political maneuvers to more calibrated. The U.S. must develop a new set

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 33 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria of policy goals based on a recognition that an end to requires disrupting Al Qaeda-linked groups who the war is not achievable in the near term but that are currently governing in Northwest Syria and who America can nonetheless have a valuable impact on likely will expand operations into Southern and Syria’s future. Eastern Syria in coming months. A more constructive policy framework must disen- American presence in Eastern Syria is essential to tangle diplomacy from the near-term expectation of setting long-term conditions for a future diplo- a cessation of hostilities. It is abundantly clear that matic settlement of the war. Turkey’s incursion is Assad and his backers will not grant one and that the destabilizing areas regained from ISIS and creat- U.S. is not willing – nor likely to become willing – to ing new opportunity for Assad, Russia, and Iran to impose one. The U.S. will continue to fail in Syria expand their influence. President Trump decided if it subordinates its actions to this near-term goal. to retain a small military force to garrison oil and Civilian protection should, of course, remain a natural gas fields in Eastern Syria in October 2019, focal point of U.S. policy and of wider international which has applied important constraints on these action. The systematic killing of Syrian civilians by trends.221 The U.S. should do much more. The Assad and his backers, plus similar abuses by jihad- U.S. should recommit to its partnership with the ists and others, is unacceptable. The demand of SDF and deploy additional soldiers and diplomats Syrian opposition groups to prioritize this issue is to help stabilize Eastern Syria. It should work with morally justifiable. The complete subordination the SDF to build credible and inclusive governance of the diplomatic process to it has discredited the structures that can provide a political alternative to process and failed to achieve an both Assad and Salafi-Jihadist end to the violence, however. Groups. This policy would be The U.S. must widen its aper- difficult and require serious ture for what diplomacy in Syria The U.S. must develop commitment. The U.S. would can achieve in order to be more need to halt Turkey’s interven- effective in halting and reversing a new set of policy goals tion into Northern Syria and the momentum of Assad and his based on a recognition find a way to address its legiti- backers. that an end to the war is mate security concerns, which would likely require significant The U.S. should set as its over- not achievable in the near concessions from the SDF. Yet it arching goal keeping space open remains possible if the U.S. has for political competition within term but that America the will to sustain its engagement Syria. Assad and his backers can nonetheless have a in Syria. cannot win the war outright valuable impact on but can do further damage to The U.S. must also sustain a dip- Syrian society and make peace Syria’s future. lomatic process that upholds the even harder to achieve. The U.S. principles of basic human rights should constrain their efforts and justice that Syrians deserve. to seize more of Syria and reimpose authoritarian The existence of such a process provides a valuable structures in recaptured areas. American economic outlet for Syrian opposition groups and a mecha- pressure limits the scope and scale of what they can nism for the U.S., UN and other Western states to achieve in the near term, thereby preserving space for apply political pressure on Assad and his backers competition. Salafi-Jihadist Groups also threaten even though it will not end the war soon. A fresh political freedom in Syria. The U.S. must constrain diplomatic start is necessary, however. The current and ultimately defeat jihadist groups seeking their UNSCR 2254 process is already too compromised own authoritarian rule at the expense of all Syrians. by Russia and Assad's manipulation of it. The U.S. In addition to preventing an ISIS resurgence, this must re-legitimize Western-backed diplomacy in

34 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

Syria by resetting its terms. The U.S. is not con- the UN within Syrian opposition communities.223 strained to UNSCR 2254. The U.S. should work The U.S. should pressure the UN to apply greater with the UN, EU and other partners to launch a scrutiny to humanitarian aid in Syria to ensure new diplomatic initiative to begin a pan-Syrian that pro-regime forces do not further expand their dialogue. The U.S. can help convene conferences control of distribution mechanisms or subject ship- and Track II initiatives to broaden the conversation ments to extortion and seizure.224 The U.S. should to represent as much of Syrian society as possible. condition its own humanitarian support on such The purpose would not be to reach an immediate guarantees. political compromise but rather to create a new The U.S. should also engage diplomatically on local diplomatic arena that can interact with changing levels in Syria wherever possible. In Eastern Syria, conditions within Syria. the U.S. has done too little to gain insight and A new U.S.-led diplomatic effort in Syria could credibility by engaging populations liberated from put Russia and Assad back on the defensive. Russia ISIS. It is not enough for the SDF to implement will likely veto any U.S. efforts to pass revisions to good governance. The U.S. should also expand its UNSCR 2254 in the Security Council, but that own dialogue within Syrian communities in order could suit U.S. interests. Russia’s current diplo- to broaden America’s understanding of their needs matic role as a convener and arbiter enables it to and goals. The U.S. should also seek opportunities shape the terms, timing, and outcome of Syrian to re-engage in other parts of Syria as conditions negotiations in ways that deny Western interests. on the ground change. The brewing insurgency in Russia has overreached in some ways and begun to Southern Syria may generate new local leaders with lose credibility in Syria, however. The U.S. should whom the U.S. can engage diplomatically if not exploit this opportunity to displace Russia from the support outright. The U.S. should explore oppor- center of the Syrian peace process and constrain its tunities to support civil society groups attempting to influence to Assad’s camp. Maneuvering in a way constrain Al Qaeda’s influence in Idlib, moreover. that requires Russia to begin transparently spoiling This kind of diplomacy will not immediately change diplomacy could advantage the U.S. in a new phase ground realities but can help shape the trajectory of of competition. A new and more credible U.S.- Syria’s future. backed diplomatic effort may even create follow-on President Trump is unlikely to take these steps given opportunities within Syria by helping to overstretch his desire to disengage from the Middle East. Yet the Russia’s bandwidth. U.S. does indeed have vital national security inter- The U.S. should continue to affirm publicly the ests in Syria. These interests include preventing the need to hold the regime and its backers accountable growth of ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist for war crimes in order to reaffirm American values Groups; blocking and ultimately reversing the long- and prevent the normalization of the brutality seen term military presence of Iran and Russia in Syria; and in Syria. The U.S. should at minimum support halting attacks that amount to ethnic cleansing against efforts by Europe to prosecute former and current the Syrian Kurds. These goals — and the requirements regime members in order to sustain political pres- to achieve them — have not changed despite the with- sure on Assad, Russia, and Iran.222 The U.S. should drawal announced by President Trump. If the Trump also do more to support civil society and human- Administration remains committed to its current itarian operations within Syria. Regime predation course, it is virtually certain to fail to secure the vital of humanitarian aid remains an unchecked source interests of the U.S. in Syria, including reaching a of Assad’s income and a source of rising distrust of diplomatic settlement to the war.

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 35 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

Syria Locator Map

Afrin Tel Rifat Hasaka Manbij Aleppo Idlib Ar-Raqqa

M-4 Latakia Khan Sheikhun Hmeimim Morek Deir ez-Zour Hama

Tartus M-5 Homs

Abu Kamal

KEY Damascus River Eastern Ghouta Road

Quneitra M-5 Capital Sanamayn Jassim Nawa Provincial Capital Karak Suwayda Other City Dera’a Jizah Busra al-Sham Airbase

36 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019 Endnotes

1. “Statement of the International Syria Support Group,” European Union, November D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A7/; [“Military Sources 14, 2015, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/3088/ Reveal Details of a Second Israeli Attack on Iranian Target in Iraq,”] Baghdad Post, statement-international-syria-support-group_en; “Security Council July 29, 2019, https://www.thebaghdadpost(.)com/ar/Story/175591/%D9%85% Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2254 (2015), Endorsing Road Map for Peace D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1% Process in Syria, Setting Timetable for Talks,” United Nations, December 28, 2015, D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81% https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm. D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85- 2. The UN Special Envoy for Syria is responsible in broad terms for overseeing and %D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9 advancing the implementation of UNSCR 2254, which did not include a specific %8A-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89- roadmap for how to accomplish its component processes. %D8%A3%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B 1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9% 3. “Final Communique of the Action Group for Syria (Geneva Communique),” 84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82; [“Iraqi Sources: 40 Revolutionary Peace Agreements Database, June 30, 2012, https://www.peaceagreements.org/ Guards Killed by Israeli Attack on a Military Base in Iraq,”] I24 News, July 29, wview/784/Final%20Communiqu%C3%A9%20of%20the%20Action%20 2019, https://www.i24news(.)tv/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8 Group%20for%20Syria%20(Geneva%20Communiqu%C3%A9); Genevieve %B1/middle-east/1564387792-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1- Casagrande, “The Syrian Opposition’s Political Demands,” Institute for the Study %D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-40- of War, December 29, 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ %D9%82%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86- syrian-opposition%E2%80%99s-political-demands. %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB 4. Christopher Kozak, “An Army in All Corners: Assad’s Campaign Strategy in %D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85- Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, April 18, 2015, http://www.understandingwar. %D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A- org/report/army-all-corners-assads-campaign-strategy-syria. %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9- 5. Frederick W. Kagan, Nataliya Bugayova, and Jennifer Cafarella, “Confronting %D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7% the Russian Challenge: A New Approach for the U.S.” Institute for the Study of War D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82; Yaniv Kubovich, “With Missiles / Critical Threats Project, June 19, 2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/ More Accurate than Hezbollah’s, Iran Entrenchment in Iraq Threatens Israel,” default/files/ISW%20CTP%20Report%20-%20Confronting%20the%20 Haaretz, August 1, 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-iran- Russian%20Challenge%20-%20June%202019.pdf; Nataliya Bugayova, “How missiles-hezbollah-in-iraq-threaten-israel-1.7606916; Aaron Kliegman, “The We Got Here with Russia: The Kremlin’s Worldview,” Institute for the Study of War / War Between Iran and Israel Moves to Iraq,” Washington Free Beacon, February 14, Critical Threats Project, March 13, 2019, https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/ 2019, https://freebeacon.com/blog/war-between-iran-israel-moves-iraq/. uploads/2019/03/The-Kremlin%E2%80%99s-Foreign-Policy-Worldview_v5-1. 13. Alissa J. Rubin and Ronen Bergman, “Israeli Airstrike Hits Weapons Depot in pdf. Iraq,” New York Times, August 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/ 6. “Moscow Cements Deal With Damascus To Keep 49-Year Presence At world/middleeast/israel-iraq-iran-airstrike.html. Syrian Naval And Air Bases,” TASS, January 20, 2017, http://tass(.)com/ 14. “Syria Strongly Condemns U.S. President’s Statements on the Occupied Syrian defense/926348; “Moscow Close To Finalizing Deal To Lease Syria’s Tartus Golan,” SANA, March 22, 2019, https://sana(.)sy/en/?p=161419. Port For 49 Years,” RFE/RL, April 21, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow- 15. Russia seeks to maintain a similar delicate balance in its relationships with damascus-near-deal-on-lease-syrian-port-tartus/29894114.html. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. See: Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, Dan 7. Matti Suomenaro and Jennifer Cafarella with the ISW Russia Team, “Russia De Luce, and Paul McLeary, “Secret Details of Trump-Putin Syria Ceasefire Expands Its Air Defense Network in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, November Focus on Iranian Proxies,” Foreign Policy, July 11, 2017, https://foreignpolicy. 30, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/11/russia-expands-its-air- com/2017/07/11/exclusive-trump-putin-ceasefire-agreement-focuses-on- defense-network.html. iranian-backed-fighters-middle-east/. 8. Nataliya Bugayova with Jack Ulses and Chase Johnson, “The Kremlin’s Campaign 16. Christopher Kozak, “Forecasting the Syrian Civil War,” Institute for the Study of in Africa,” Institute for the Study of War, October 18, 2018, http://iswresearch. War, September 17, 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ blogspot.com/2018/10/the-kremlins-campaign-in-africa_18.html. Forecasting%20the%20Syrian%20Civil%20War.pdf. 9. “Lukashenko Unveils Topics Discussed at CTSO Summit in Astana,” Government 17. Nataliya Bugayova, “How We Got Here with Russia: The Kremlin’s Worldview,” of Belarus, November 12, 2018, https://www.belarus(.)by/en/press-center/news/ Institute for the Study of War / Critical Threats Project, March 13, 2019, https://www. lukashenko-unveils-topics-discussed-at-csto-summit-in-astana_i_88865.html. criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/The-Kremlin%E2%80%99s- 10. Iran also supports Sunni Arab militant groups such as Hamas in Palestine as Foreign-Policy-Worldview_v5-1.pdf. well as other minority proxy forces in Iraq. See: Seth Jones, “War by Proxy: 18. Gennady Zhidko, [“Task - Massive, Mood - Combat,”] Red Star, March 11, 2019, Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East,” Center for Strategic and International http://redstar(.)ru/zadachi-masshtabnye-nastroj-boevoj/?attempt=1; Alexander Studies, March 11, 2019, https://www.csis.org/war-by-proxy; Michael Knights, Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Wars,”] VPK, July 28, 2018, https://vpk-news(.) “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups,” CTC Sentinel, ru/articles/43971; Alexander Lapin, [“Syrian Academy,”] VPK, April 24, 2018, August 3, 2019, https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq- https://vpk-news(.)ru/articles/42359. new-special-groups/; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Quwat al-Aouda: Interview,” 19. Dvornikov stated in July 2018 that prior to the Russia’s intervention in Syria Aymenn Jawad, August 11, 2018, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2018/08/ “the Armed Forces of Syria had completely exhausted themselves, the personnel quwat-al-aouda-interview. were demoralized, the officer corps degraded, and the leadership ... showed 11. “Iran Conducts Religious Lessons and Opens a Kindergarten in Al-Bukamal,” extremely low efficiency in command and control.” Dvornikov noted that this Deir ez-Zor 24, August 12, 2019, https://en.deirezzor24.net/archives/8161; situation “forced” Russia to rely on “the most efficient units of the militia” rather Abdullah Ghadawi, “Iran Is Winning Deir ez-Zor by Default,” Chatham House, than advising the formal Syrian Arab Army (SAA), turning “scattered irregular February 2019, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/iran-is-winning-deir- armed formations” into an “integrated grouping” under the direct control of ez-zor-by-default; “From the Military Support to the Culture and Economy: Iran Russia. Dvornikov further claims that the “low effectiveness” of the SAA General Controls Syria’s Entire Joints,” SOHR, July 17, 2019, http://www.syriahr.com/ Staff required a “serious correction,” forcing Russia to take on “all the work on en/?p=135020; Raja Abdulrahim and Benoit Faucon, “Iran Moves to Cement preparing operations” in Syria. See: Alexander Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Its Influence in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/ Wars,”] VPK, July 28, 2018, https://vpk-news(.)ru/articles/43971. articles/iran-moves-to-cement-its-influence-in-syria-11553632926. 20. Aaron Lund, “Who Are the Pro-Assad Militias?” Carnegie Middle East Center, 12. Israel may have conducted two reported strikes that targeted Iranian missile sites March 2, 2015, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/59215; “Insight: Syrian in Iraq on July 19 and July 28. See: “Israel Expands Its Targets Against Iran in Government Guerrilla Fighters Being Sent to Iran for Training,” Reuters, April Iraq, Syria,” Asharq al-Awsat, July 30, 2019, https://aawsat.com/english/home/ 4, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-iran-training-insight/ article/1835736/israel-expands-its-targets-against-iran-iraq-syria; [“Popular insight-syrian-government-guerrilla-fighters-being-sent-to-iran-for- Mobilization Factions Resort to a ‘Preemptive Plan’ to Avoid Air Strikes,”] training-idUSBRE9330DW20130404; Jonathan Spyer, “Getting Iran Out Shaafaq, July 28, 2019,https://shafaaq(.)com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80% of Syria Is No Easy Task,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/ D9%86/%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%A7% articles/getting-iran-out-of-syria-is-no-easy-task-11562713507; Mona Alami, D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9% “The Superficial Removal of Iranian Troops from Southern Syria,”Atlantic D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A3-%D9%84%D9%80- Council, June 13, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/ %D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7 the-superficial-removal-of-iranian-troops-from-southern-syria. %D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7- %D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 37 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

21. Abdulrahman al-Masri, “Analysis: The Fifth Corps and the State of the 31. Omar Abu Khalil, [“Why Do the Regime and Russia Insist on Subduing the Syrian Army,” Atlantic Council, January 13, 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil. Countryside of Latakia?”] Al-Jazeera, January 2, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.net/ org/blogs/syriasource/analysis-the-fifth-corps-and-the-state-of-the-syrian- news/reportsandinterviews/2016/1/2/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0% army; Gregory Waters, “The Lion and the Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army’s D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8 Destruction and Rebirth,” Middle East Institute, July 18, 2019, https://www. %D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7- mei.edu/publications/lion-and-eagle-syrian-arab-armys-destruction-and- %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D8%AE%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B9- rebirth; Grigory Lukyanov and Ruslan Mamedov, “The Fifth Assault Corps: %D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B0% Back to Order in Syria?” Russian International Affairs Council,June 16, 2017, https:// D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9. russiancouncil(.)ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/the-fifth-assault- 32. Cassandra Vinograd, “Analysis: ISIS Gains Momentum with Palmyra, Assad corps-back-to-order-in-syria-/; Abdullah al-Jabassini, “From Insurgents Squeezed on Multiple Fronts,” NBC News, May 23, 2015, https://www.nbcnews. to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in Daraa, Southern Syria”Middle East com/storyline/isis-terror/analysis-isis-gains-momentum-palmyra-assad- Directions, May 14, 2019, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/62964/ squeezed-multiple-fronts-n363066. RR_2019_09_EN.pdf; Alexey Khlebnikov, “Evolution of the Syrian Military: 33. Patrick Lawrence, “The Russian Blitzkrieg on Aleppo Is a Direct Challenge Main Trends and Challenges,” Russian International Affairs Council,November 19, to Washington,” The Nation, September 29, 2016, https://www.thenation.com/ 2018, https://russiancouncil(.)ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ article/the-russian-blitzkrieg-on-aleppo-is-a-direct-challenge-to-washington/; evolution-of-the-syrian-military-main-trends-and-challenges/. Lyse Doucet, “Why Is Russia Engaged in Aleppo?” BBC, November 16, 2016, 22. Sirwan Kajjo, “Tensions Grow Between Russian, Iran in Syria,” Voice https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37995780. of America, May 27, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/ 34. Russian military theorists commonly discuss the need to exploit differences tensions-grow-between-russia-iran-syria. between “irreconcilable and moderate opposition” groups using limited ceasefires 23. Nour Samaha, “Can Assad Win the Peace?” European Council on Foreign and reconciliation agreements. See: A. V. Vdovin, [“An Adaptive Approach to Relations, May 15, 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/ the Use of Forces and Means to Combat Terrorists from the Experience of Armed can_assad_win_the_peace_syria. Conflicts Outside of Russia,”]Voennaya Mysl’, May 2018, https://dlib.eastview.com/ 24. Ruptly, “Syria: Putin Meets Assad at Russian Military Base in Surprise browse/doc/51082222. Visit to Syria,” YouTube, December 11, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ 35. The Russian Reconciliation Center Head as of July 2019 is reportedly Maj. watch?v=JmrfbmcN0pI. Gen. Alexei Pachin. The Russian Reconciliation Center Deputy Head as 25. Bashar Jaber, [“After Insulting Assad in Hmeimim: We Will Not of October 2018 was Maj. Gen. Yevgeny Karachenko. See: [“On the Base Sing for Them Again,”] Al-Modon, December 13, 2017, https:// Hmeimim Began the Focal Point for the Reconciliation of the Warring Parties www.almodon.com/arabworld/2017/12/13/%D8%A8%D8%B in Syria,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, February 24, 2016, https://function.mil(.)ru/ 9%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9- news_page/country/more.htm?id=12079277@egNews; [“Unknown Attackers %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A- Target Russian Patrol in East Deraa,”] SNN, July 13, 2019, http://www.shaam(.) %D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%86- org/news/syria-news/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D %D9%86%D8%BA%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%87%D9%85- 9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9% %D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7; [“Why Did Putin and 81%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9- His Army Publicly Insult Bashar al-Assad?”] SNN, December 18, 2017, %D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA- http://www.shaam.org/articles/opinion-articles/%D9%84%D9%85% %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9- D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86- %D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- %D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A.html; [“Conflict %D9%88%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%- Between the Statements of the Governor of Deraa and the Hmeimim Base on B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF- the Return of Refugees from Jordan,”] SNN, February 13, 2018, http://www. %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%9F.html; [“Shlash’s Justification shaam.org/news/syria-news/%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8- for ‘Humiliating Bashar al-Assad’ in Hmeimim Provokes New Wave of %D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8 Cynicism,” El-Dorar, December 24, 2017, https://eldorar.com/node/116715. %AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8- 26. Sam Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country (New York, NY: Little, Brown and %D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9 Company, 2019) %D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85- %D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9- 27. Ibid. %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%86- 28. Nour Samaha, “Can Assad Win the Peace?” European Council on Foreign %D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86- Relations, May 15, 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/ %D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82 can_assad_win_the_peace_syria. %D8%9F.html. 29. “Putin: Russia Will Not Conduct Ground Operation in Syria,” AFP, October 36. Assad had issued previous (and more limited) amnesties for individuals holding 11, 2015, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2015/10/11/ captives and deserters from the Syrian Arab Army. See: [“President al-Assad putin-russia-will-not-conduct-ground-operation-in-syria/. Issues Legislative Decree to Extend Work for 3 Months by Decree No. 15 of 30. Andrew Rother and Erin Cunningham, “Syrian Forces Begin Ground 2016,”] Syrian Parliament, October 27, 2016, http://www.parliament.gov(.)sy/ Offensive Backed by Russia Air and Sea Power,”Washington Post, October 7, arabic/index.php?node=554&nid=17002&; [“Legislative Decree 20 of 2013 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-activists-russian-air- Criminalizes and Punishes the Kidnapping of Persons,”] Syrian Parliament, April 2, strikes-pound-rebel-zones-in-latest-blows/2015/10/07/fb3be168-5cf3-4e38- 2013, http://www.parliament(.)gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=55151&cat=4278. 98f3-f6b75ed53871_story.html; Genevieve Casagrande, “Russian Airstrikes 37. “Syria Conflict: Opposition Sets Terms for Geneva Peace Talks,”BBC , January 31, in Syria: September 30, 2015 - September 19, 2016,” Institute for the Study of 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35452640; Karen Zraick, War, September 21, 2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/ “Syria Talks Are Complicated by Competing Opposition Groups,” New York Times, files/Russian%20Airstrikes%20Maps%20SEPT%202015-SEPT%202016. January 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/world/middleeast/ pdf; “Russian Warplanes in Syria Destroy U.S.-Trained Rebels’ Weapons syria-talks-geneva-opposition.html. Depots: Commander,” Reuters, October 7, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/ 38. “Syria Peace Talks Plunged Into New Crisis,” February 3, 2016, Al-Jazeera, https:// article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels-idUSKCN0S111020151007; Dominic www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/envoy-declares-temporary-pause-syria-peace- Evans and Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Syrian Army and Russian Jets Target Rebel talks-160203151042311.html. Towns North of Homs,” Reuters, October 15 , 2015, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-homs/syrian-army-and-russian-jets-target- 39. Doris Carrion, “Shift on Syrian Constitution Could Help Assad Survive,” rebel-towns-north-of-homs-idUSKCN0S90JG20151015; Omar Abu Khalil, Chatham House, May 17, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/ [“Why Do the Regime and Russia Insist on Subduing the Countryside of shift-syrian-constitution-could-help-assad-survive; “Syria Conflict: U.S. and Latakia?”] Al-Jazeera, January 2, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/repor Russia Want Draft Constitution by August,”BBC, March 24, 2016, https://www. tsandinterviews/2016/1/2/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7- bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35897667. %D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8 40. “Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation, as Co-Chairs %A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7- of the ISSG, on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria,” U.S. Department of State, February %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D8%AE%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B9- 22, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253115.htm. %D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B0% 41. Genevieve Casagrande and Jodi Brignola, “Russian Airstrikes from February D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9. 17 - 28, 2016: Pre and Post Cessation of Hostilities,” Institute for the Study of War, February 29, 2016, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/02/russian-airstrikes- in-syria-from.html; Genevieve Casagrande, “Russian Airstrikes in Syria:

38 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

February 27 - March 7, 2016,” Institute for the Study of War, March 10, 2016, http:// http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/03/russian-syrian-iranian-coalition- iswresearch.blogspot.com/2016/03/russian-airstrikes-in-syria-february-27. seizes.html; “Syria Conflict: Assad Forces Make ‘Significant Gains’,”BBC , html. October 11, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34500516. 42. Russia claimed to begin a military withdrawal from Syria on March 14. UN 47. Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung, “Syrian Ceasefire Backed by U.S. and Russia Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura described the announced withdrawal Gets Off to Rocky Start,” Washington Post, September 12, 2016, https://www. as a “significant development” toward a diplomatic settlement in Syria. Russia washingtonpost.com/world/ceasefire-in-syria-set-to-take-hold-as-scores-die-in- in reality only rotated forces in preparation for operations against Aleppo air-strikes/2016/09/12/c93bbf4e-7850-11e6-8064-c1ddc8a724bb_story.html; City and seized the key town of Palmyra from ISIS in Central Syria. See: Bill Neely, “No Sign of Syria Ceasefire or Humanitarian Aid in Aleppo,”NBC Christopher Kozak, “Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held News, September 19, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/aleppos-children/ Palmyra,” Institute for the Study of War, March 27, 2016, http://iswresearch.blogspot. no-sign-syria-cease-fire-or-humanitarian-aid-aleppo-n650446. com/2016/03/russian-syrian-iranian-coalition-seizes.html; Jodi Brignola and 48. Genevieve Casagrande, “Russian Airstrikes in Syria: Pre- and Post Cessation Genevieve Casagrande, “Russian Military Activity in Syria: March 15 - April of Hostilities,” Institute for the Study of War, September 21, 2016, http://iswresearch. 18, 2016,” Institute for the Study of War, April 19, 2016, http://iswresearch.blogspot. blogspot.com/2016/09/russian-airstrikes-in-syria-pre-and.html; Denis com/2016/04/russian-military-activity-in-syria.html; Dmitry Solovyov, Tom Dyomkin and Angus McDowall, “Russian Aircraft Believed to Hit Syria Convoy, Perry, and Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Russian Warplanes Leave Syria, Raising UN U.S. Officials Say,”Reuters, September 20, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/ Hopes for Peace Talks,” Reuters, March 15, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-syria/russian-aircraft-believed-to-hit-syria-convoy-u-s- us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-idUSKCN0WH0LT/; “Putin: Russian Troops officials-say-idUSKCN11Q1NR. to Withdraw from Syria,”BBC , March 14, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/ 49. Tracy Wilkinson and Mansur Mirovalev, “U.S. Breaks off Diplomatic Talks with world-middle-east-35806626/putin-russian-troops-to-withdraw-from-syria. Russia to End Bloodshed in Syria,” Los Angeles Times, October 3, 2016, https://www. 43. Karen DeYoung, “U.S., Russia Reach Deal on Ceasefire in Syria,”Washington Post, latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-us-russia-syria-20161003-snap-story.html. September 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-foreign- 50. Jason Malsin, “Ceasefire Agreed to Allow Fighters to Leave Aleppo to Syria’s minister-lavrov-says-he-was-thinking-of-calling-it-a-day-on-syria-talks-with- Regime,” Time, December 13, 2016, http://new.time.com/4598889/aleppo-syria- the-united-states/2016/09/09/f37ca320-75ff-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story. regime-killings-assad/; “‘We Leave or We Die’: Forced Displacements Under html. Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements,” Amnesty International, November 12, 2017, 44. Anna Borshchevskaya, “How Putin Checkmated the U.S. in https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2473092017ENGLISH. Syria,” Forbes, September 26, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ pdf; Maksymilian Czuperski, Faysal Itani, Ben Nimmo, Eliot Higgins, and Emma annaborshchevskaya/2017/09/26/how-putin-checkmated-the-us-in- Beals, “Breaking Aleppo: Evacuation,” Atlantic Council, February 27, 2017, http:// syria/#65aea781767e; Steven Heydemann, “U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Syria www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingaleppo/evacuation/; Laila Bassam, Can’t Stop at Counterterrorism,” Brookings, July 19, 2016, https://www.brookings. Angus McDowall, and Stephanie Nebehay, “Battle of Aleppo Ends After Years edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/19/u-s-russian-cooperation-in-syria-cant-stop-at- of Bloodshed with Rebel Withdrawal,” Reuters, December 13, 2016, https://www. counterterrorism/. reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria/battle-of-aleppo-ends-after-years- 45. Karen DeYoung, “U.S., Russia Reach Deal on Ceasefire in Syria,”Washington Post, of-bloodshed-with-rebel-withdrawal-idUSKBN1420H5; Abdullah al-Mousa, September 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-foreign- “Lessons Learned: A Year After the Fall of Aleppo,” Atlantic Council, January 17, minister-lavrov-says-he-was-thinking-of-calling-it-a-day-on-syria-talks-with- 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/lessons-learned-a-year- the-united-states/2016/09/09/f37ca320-75ff-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story. after-the-fall-of-aleppo; Anne Barnard, “Battle Over Aleppo Is Over, Russia html; Felicia Schwartz and Paul Stone, “U.S., Russia Reach Syria Ceasefire Says, As Evacuation Deal Reached,” New York Times, December 13, 2016, https:// Deal,” Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u- www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/world/middleeast/syria-aleppo-civilians.html. s-russia-say-they-have-reached-syria-cease-fire-deal-1473461383; David E. 51. Negotiations in Aleppo City reportedly occurred via phone calls over a ten-day Sanger and Anne Barnard, “Russia and the United States Reach New Agreement period. An Ahrar al-Sham commander named Al-Farouq Abu Bakr represented on Syria Conflict,”New York Times, September 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes. the opposition in Aleppo City. Abu Bakr reported that the negotiations involved com/2016/09/10/world/middleeast/syria-john-kerry-ceasefire-deal-russia. a former rebel intermediary working with Russia as well as representatives of html; Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, “Pentagon Grudgingly Accepts Syria Deal Iran. Turkey also reportedly supported the negotiations. See: Jared Malsin, Amid Deep Mistrust of Russia,” Washington Post, September 15, 2016, https://www. “Aleppo Ceasefire Collapses Just as End Seemed in Sight,”Time, December 14, washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-grudgingly-accepts- 2016, https://time.com/4601872/aleppo-ceasefire-collapse-syria-regime/; syria-deal-amid-deep-mistrust-of-russia/2016/09/15/e2ac735c-7a98-11e6-beac- Sam Heller, “Aleppo’s Bitter Lessons,” The Century Foundation, January 27, 2017, 57a4a412e93a_story.html; Bradley Klapper, “Officials Unsure of Deal as Kerry https://tcf.org/content/report/aleppos-bitter-lessons/; “‘We Leave or We Die’: Arrives for Syria Talks,” AP, September 9, 2016, https://www.businessinsider. Forced Displacements Under Syria’s ‘Reconciliation’ Agreements,” Amnesty com/ap-officials-unsure-of-deal-as-kerry-arrives-for-syria-talks-2016-9; Ryan International, November 12, 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ Browne, “U.S. Suspends Talks with Russia Over Syria,” CNN, October 4, 2016, MDE2473092017ENGLISH.pdf; [“Al-Farouq Abu Bakr: We Left Aleppo Due to https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/03/politics/us-suspends-talks-with-russia- the Civilians,”] Al-Jazeera, January 5, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/ over-syria/index.html; “UN Envoy: First Full Day of Syrian Ceasefire Sees ‘A today-interview/2017/1/5/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D Significant Drop in Violence,’ But Humanitarian Access Still Needed,”United 9%88%D9%82-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%B1- Nations, September 13, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/09/538912- %D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%85%D- un-envoy-first-full-day-syrian-ceasefire-sees-significant-drop-violence; 9%86-%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%84- Yasmeen Serhan, “The Syrian Ceasefire’s Humanitarian Crisis,” The Atlantic, %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86; September 15, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/09/ Halab Today, [“Special Meeting with Al-Farouk Abu Bakr on the Siege of Aleppo syria-ceasefire-humanitarian-crisis/500147/. and the Negotiations,”] YouTube, January 1, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ 46. Christopher Kozak, “Syrian Regime Launches Ground Offensive with Russian watch?v=Pu4b2jsH2mA. Air Support,” Institute for the Study of War, October 7, 2015, http://iswresearch. 52. Patrick Wintour, “Russia Begins Military Withdrawal from Syria,”The Guardian, blogspot.com/2015/10/syrian-regime-starts-ground-offensive.html; Christopher January 6, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/06/russia- Kozak, “Joint Syrian-Iranian-Russian Offensive Achieves Only Limited Initial aircraft-carrier-mediterranean-syria-admiral-kuznetsov; “Syria Conflict: Russia Gains,” Institute for the Study of War, October 14, 2015, http://iswresearch. ‘Withdrawing Aircraft Carrier Group’,”BBC , January 6, 2017, https://www.bbc. blogspot.com/2015/10/joint-syrian-iranian-russian-offensive.html; Jennifer com/news/world-middle-east-38528654. Cafarella, Genevieve Casagrande, and Jodi Brignola, “The Military Situation in 53. “Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syria’s Aleppo Province,” Institute for the Study of War, December 30, 2015, http:// Russian Federation, and the Republic of Turkey on Agreed Steps to Revitalize iswresearch.blogspot.com/2015/12/the-military-situation-in-syrias-aleppo. the Political Process to End the Syrian Conflict,”Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, html; Genevieve Casagrande, Christopher Kozak, and Jennifer Cafarella, “Syria December 20, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov(.)tr/joint-statement-by-the-foreign- 90-Day Forecast: The Assad Regime and Allies in Northern Syria,” Institute for the ministers-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran_-the-russian-federation-and-the- Study of War, February 24, 2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ republic-of-turkey-on-agreed-steps-to-revitalize-the-political-process-to-end- syria-90-day-forecast-assad-regime-and-allies-northern-syria; Jennifer the-syrian-conflict_-20-december-2016_-moscow.en.mfa; Ben Hubbard and Cafarella with Christopher Kozak, Hugo Spaulding, and Genevieve Casagrande, David E. Sanger, “Russia, Iran and Turkey Meet for Syria Talks, Excluding U.S.,” “Turkey Shoots Down Russian Jet Supporting Syrian Regime Offensive,”Institute New York Times, December 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/world/ for the Study of War, November 24, 2015, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2015/11/ middleeast/russia-iran-and-turkey-meet-for-syria-talks-excluding-us.html. turkey-shoots-down-russian-jet.html; Christopher Kozak, “Regime and Iranian Forces Launch Multi-Pronged Offensive in Aleppo,”Institute for the Study of War, 54. The Syrian regime’s delegation included Syrian Ambassador to the UN Bashar October 21, 2015, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2015/10/regime-and- al-Jaafari and nine other officials including military and judicial figures. See: iranian-forces-launch-multi.html; Christopher Kozak, “Russian-Syrian-Iranian Basma Atassi, “Syria: What You Need to Know About the Astana Talks,” CNN, Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra,” Institute for the Study of War, March 27, 2016, January 22, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/middleeast/explaining- astana-talks/index.html.

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 39 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

55. “Russia Draft Proposal for a New Syrian Constitution,”MEMRI, February 9, 2017, 67. “Russia, Iran, Turkey Set Up Syria De-Escalation Zones for at Least Six https://www.memri.org/reports/russian-draft-proposal-new-syrian-constitution. Months: Memorandum,” Reuters, May 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ 56. Daniel Schearf, “Astana Talks on Syria to Continue Despite Setbacks,” Voice of us-mideast-crisis-syria-memorandum/russia-iran-turkey-set-up-syria-de- America, February 18, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/astana-talks- escalation-zones-for-at-least-six-months-memorandum-idUSKBN1820C0; syria-continue-despite-setbacks; “Syria Peace Talks in Astana Close with No Sign 68. Alec Luhn and Patrick Wintour, “Syrian Rebels Walk Out of Press Conference as of Rebels,” Reuters, March 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- ‘Safe Zone’ Deal Is Signed,” The Guardian, May 4, 2017, https://www.theguardian. crisis-syria-astana/syria-peace-talks-in-astana-close-with-no-sign-of-rebels- com/world/2017/may/04/syrian-opposition-rejects-deal-to-create-safe-zones. idUSKBN16M0M8; “Syrian Government Delegations Says Turkey, Rebels Aim 69. Fatima Taskomur, “What Is the New Syrian National Army?” TRT to Disrupt Astana Talks,” Reuters, February 16, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/ World, January 27, 2018, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/ article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-astana/syrian-government-delegation-says- what-is-the-new-syrian-national-army--14648. turkey-rebels-aim-to-disrupt-astana-talks-idUSKBN15V1XY. 70. Jennifer Cafarella, Elizabeth Teoman, and Bradley Hanlon, “Syria’s ‘War after 57. [“President Al-Assad: The War Was Between Us Syrians and Terrorism ISIS’ Begins as Turkey Attacks America’s Anti-ISIS Partner,” Institute for the Study Exclusively ... We Win with Each Other, We Do Not Win Over Each Other, of War, January 20, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/01/syrias-war- and Any Victory Is Exclusively on Terrorism Regardless of Nationality,”] SANA, after-isis-begins-as-turkey.html. February 17, 2019, https://www.sana(.)sy/?p=896762. 71. David Smith and Alec Luhn, “Trump and Putin Had ‘Good’ Talk 58. “Security Council Press Statement on International Meeting on Syria in About Ending Syria War, White House Says,” The Guardian, May 2, 2017, Astana,” United Nations, January 31, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/ https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/02/donald-trump- sc12701.doc.htm. vladimir-putin-conversation-syria-civil-war; Thomas Grove and Felicia 59. Alexander Zhuravlev, [“Learning Syria,”] Red Star, May 27, 2019, Schwartz, “U.S. Dismisses Russia’s Ban on Aircraft Over Syrian Safe http://redstar(.)ru/s-uchyotom-sirijskogo-opyta-2/?attempt=1#content. Zones,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ Yuri Barmin, “The Syrian Congress in Sochi: Too Much Too russia-u-s-aircraft-barred-from-syria-safe-zones-1493983021. Soon,” Russian International Affairs Council, February 2, 2018, https:// 72. Ali Vitali, Abigail Williams, and Halimah Abdullah, “Trump and russiancouncil(.)ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ Lavrov Meet Amid Scrutiny of Campaign, Russia Ties,” NBC News, the-syrian-congress-in-sochi-too-much-too-soon/?sphrase_id=31123656. May 10, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/ 60. Ben Hubbard and David E. Sanger, “Russia, Iran and Turkey Meet for Syria lavrov-sarcastically-reacts-comey-was-he-fired-n757321. Talks, Excluding U.S.,” New York Times, December 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes. 73. “Press Briefing on the President’s Meetings at the G20,” White House, com/2016/12/20/world/middleeast/russia-iran-and-turkey-meet-for-syria- July 7, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ talks-excluding-us.html; Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “First Day of Syria press-briefing-presidents-meetings-g20-070717. Peace Talks Quickly Descends Into Quarreling,” New York Times, January 23, 2017, 74. “Russia, Iran, Turkey Set Up Syria De-escalation Zones for at Least Six https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/world/middleeast/syria-astana-talks- Months: Memorandum,” Reuters, May 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ russia-turkey.html; Liz Sly, “Hezbollah, Russia and the U.S. Help Syria Retake us-mideast-crisis-syria-memorandum/russia-iran-turkey-set-up-syria-de- Palmyra,” Washington Post, March 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ escalation-zones-for-at-least-six-months-memorandum-idUSKBN1820C0; world/syrian-army-retakes-the-ancient-city-of-palmyra-from-the-islamic- Gardiner Harris, “U.S., Russia and Jordan Reach Deal for Ceasefire in Part of state/2017/03/02/fe770c78-ff63-11e6-9b78-824ccab94435_story.html; Hassan Syria,” New York Times, July 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/us/ Hassan, “A Hollow Victory Over the Islamic State in Syria? The High Risk of politics/syria-ceasefire-agreement.html; “Final De-Escalation Zones Agreed Jihadi Revival in Deir ez-Zor’s Euphrates River Valley,” CTC Sentinel, February 10, on in Astana,” Al-Jazeera, September 15, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/ 2019, https://ctc.usma.edu/hollow-victory-islamic-state-syria-high-risk-jihadi- news/2017/09/final-de-escalation-zones-agreed-astana-170915102811730.html. revival-deir-ez-zors-euphrates-river-valley/; Chris Tomson, “ISIS on Its Last Legs as the Syrian Army Imposes Full Control Over Gas Field in East Homs,” 75. Judah Ari Gross, “Hezbollah Has 10,000 Fighters in Syria Ready to Confront Al-Masdar, April 28, 2017, https://www.almasdarnews(.)com/article/isis-last- Israel, Commander Says,” Times of Israel, September 21, 2017, https://www. legs-syrian-army-imposes-full-control-gas-field-east-homs/; “In Their Quest to timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-has-10000-fighters-in-syria-ready-to-confront- Control Oil and Gas Fields in the Syrian Desert, Russian Warplanes Carry Out israel-commander-says/; “Israel Says ‘Understandings’ with Russia Reached Hundreds of Airstrikes During 17 Days of Escalation East of Hama,” SOHR, July 6, Over Syria,” Times of Israel, December 12, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/ 2017, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=69489. israel-says-understandings-with-russia-reached-over-syria/; “A Tripartite Agreement to Back the Ceasefire in Southwest Syria,” Petra News Agency, July 61. “Russia Pushes Hard to Include Syria’s Kurds in Geneva Talks,” Rudaw, February 7, 2017, http://jordanembassyus(.)org/news/tripartite-agreement-back- 10, 2017, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/10022017. ceasefire-south-west-syria; Josh Lederman, “U.S., Russia Announce Syria 62. Patrick Martin and Christopher Kozak, “The Pitfalls of Relying on Kurdish Ceasefire After Trump-Putin Talks,”AP , July 7, 2017, https://www.apnews.com/ Forces to Counter ISIS,” Institute for the Study of War, February 3, 2016, http://www. eaa310ccb6e04e0580759d4ce36e778b; “Background Briefing on the Ceasefire understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Pitfalls%20of%20Relying%20 in Syria,” U.S. Department of State, July 7, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ on%20Kurdish%20Forces%20to%20Counter%20ISIS.pdf. ps/2017/07/272433.htm; Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce, Colum Lynch, and 63. “Syria Peace Talks: Sides Fail to Meet on First Day in Geneva,” BBC, February 23, Paul Mcleary, “Secret Details of Trump-Putin Syria Ceasefire Focus on Iranian 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39037609; Dylan Collins, Proxies,”Foreign Policy, July 11, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/11/ “De Mistura: Syria Talks in Geneva End with Clear Agenda,” Al-Jazeera, March 3, exclusive-trump-putin-ceasefire-agreement-focuses-on-iranian-backed- 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/de-mistura-syria-talks-geneva- fighters-middle-east/; “Russia, U.S. Move Ahead to Hammer Out Details in clear-agenda-170303202045570.html. Setting up Syrian De-Escalation Zones,” TASS, July 10, 2017, https://tass(.) 64. The original terms called for a six-month de-escalation. See: “Russia, com/politics/955619; “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Iran, Turkey Set Up Syria De-Escalation Zones for at Least Six Months: Zakharova, Moscow, July 14, 2017,” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 14, 2017, Memorandum,” Reuters, May 6, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ http://www.mid(.)ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/asset_publisher/ us-mideast-crisis-syria-memorandum/russia-iran-turkey-set-up-syria-de- D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/id/2815668. escalation-zones-for-at-least-six-months-memorandum-idUSKBN1820C0; 76. Michael Wilner, “Former Trump Aide Warned of ‘Existential’ Hezbollah Threat Nathan Hodge and Margaret Coker, “Russia, Turkey and Iran Sign Syria to Israel,” Jerusalem Post, September 12, 2018, https://www.jpost.com/International/ ‘De-Escalation Zone’ Deal,” Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2017, https://www. Former-Trump-aide-warned-of-existential-Hezbollah-threat-to-Israel-567084. wsj.com/articles/russia-turkey-and-iran-sign-syria-de-escalation-zone- 77. “On Latest Political Developments & Ceasefire Agreement in Southern Syria,” deal-1493910483; Alec Luhn and Patrick Wintour, “Syrian Rebels Walk Out Etilaf, July 14, 2017, https://en.etilaf.org/press/on-latest-political-developments- of Press Conference as ‘Safe Zone’ Deal Is Signed,” The Guardian, May 4, 2017, ceasefire-agreement-in-southern-syria.html. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/04/syrian-opposition-rejects- 78. Genevieve Casagrande and Ellen Stockert, “Russia Lays a Trap in Syria,” Institute deal-to-create-safe-zones; “Russian Defence Ministry Held a Briefing Titled for the Study of War, May 21, 2017, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/05/ ‘Principles of Implementation of the Memorandum on Syria De-Escalation russia-lays-trap-in-syria.html; Ellen Stockert and ISW Syria Team, “Russia’s Signed in Astana’,” Russian Ministry of Defense, May 5, 2017, https://eng.mil(.)ru/en/ Maneuvers in Syria: May 1 - June 7, 2017,” Institute for the Study of War, June 8, news_page/country/more.htm?id=12121964@egNews. 2017, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/06/russias-maneuvers-in-syria- 65. “Press Release Regarding the Declaration of the Idlib De-Escalation Area at may-1-june-7.html; ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct, “Syria Situation Report: the Sixth Astana Meeting Held on 14 - 15 September 2017,” Turkish Ministry of June 7 - 29, 2017,” Institute for the Study of War, July 31, 2017, http://iswresearch. Foreign Affairs, September 15, 2017, http://www.mfa.gov(.)tr/no_-288_-14-15- blogspot.com/2017/07/syria-situation-report-june-15-22-2017.html; Jennifer eylul-2017-tarihlerinde-gerceklestirilen-altinci-astana-toplantisinda-idlib- Cafarella with Bradon Wallace and Jason Zhou, “ISIS’s Second Comeback: catismasizlik-bolgesinin-ilani-hk_en.en.mfa. Assessing the Next ISIS Insurgency,” Institute for the Study of War, July 23, 2019, 66. “Syria Diplomatic Talks: A Timeline,” Al-Jazeera, September 15, 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/syria-diplomatic-talks- -%20ISIS%27s%20Second%20Comeback%20-%20June%202019.pdf; timeline-170915083153934.html. Faysal Itani and Ali Marhoon, “The Perilous Race for Post-ISIS Syria,” Atlantic Council, June 16, 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/ the-perilous-race-for-post-isis-syria/.

40 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

79. Leith Aboufadel, “Syrian Army Resumes Offensive in Southern Raqqa,” 93. “Final Statement of the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue, 30 January Al-Masdar, July 19, 2017, https://www.almasdarnews(.)com/article/syrian-army- 2018,” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,January 30, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov(.) resumes-offensive-southern-raqqa/; Hasan Khat, “Breaking: Syrian Army, Allies tr/final-statement-of-the-congress-of-the-syrian-national-dialogue_en.en. Liberate Al-Sukhnah Town from ISIS in East Homs,”Al-Masdar, August 6, 2017, mfa; Sangar Ali, “Participants of Sochi Conference Adopt 12-Point Plan on https://www.almasdarnews(.)com/article/breaking-syrian-army-fully-captures- Syria’s Future,” Kurdistan24, January 31, 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/ isis-stronghold-al-sukhnah-east-homs-countryside/. en/news/62213b25-7ef4-4e9c-90cc-e4caf052a289; “Sochi Conference Backs 80. Frederik Pleigen, “Deir Ezzor: Relief in Parts of Syrian City after 3-Year ISIS Syria’s Territorial Unity, ‘Democratic’ Path,” Reuters, January 30, 2018, https:// Siege is Broken,” CNN, September 16, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/16/ www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-sochi/sochi-conference-backs- middleeast/syria-deir-ezzor-siege-isis/index.html. syrias-territorial-unity-democratic-path-idUSKBN1FJ2L5; Kinda Makieh and Maria Tsvetkova, “Rocky Syria Talks in Russia End, Ignore Key Opposition 81. Lail Bassam and Angus McDowall, “Syrian Army, Allies Take Last IS Stronghold Demands,” Reuters, January 30, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ in Syria: Commander,” Reuters, November 8, 2017, https://www.reuters. us-mideast-crisis-syria-congress/rocky-syria-talks-in-russia-end-ignore-key- com/article/us-mideast-crisis-islamic-state/syrian-army-allies-take-last-is- opposition-demands-idUSKBN1FJ0WJ. stronghold-in-syria-commander-idUSKBN1D81NM. 94. “Note to Correspondents from Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy for Syria from 82. Chloe Cornish, Asser Khattab, and Henry Foy, “Moscow Collects Its Spoils of Sochi,” United Nations, January 30, 2018, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/ War in Assad’s Syria,” Financial Times, September 1, 2019, https://www.ft.com/ note-correspondents/2018-01-30/note-correspondents-staffan-de-mistura- content/30ddfdd0-b83e-11e9-96bd-8e884d3ea203; Andrew E. Kramer, special-envoy-syria; Marianna Belenkaya, “Russia, UN Take Another Stab at “Russia Deploys a Potent Weapon in Syria: The Profit Motive,”New York Times, Forming Syria’s Constitutional Committee,” Al-Monitor, July 16, 2019, https:// June 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/middleeast/ www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/07/russia-un-syria-constitution- russia-syria-oil-isis.html; Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Thousands of Russian Private committee.html. Contractors Fighting in Syria,” AP, December 12, 2017, https://www.apnews. com/7f9e63cb14a54dfa9148b6430d89e873; Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, 95. Marianna Belenkaya, “Russia, UN Take Another Stab at Forming Syria’s “Syrian Reconstruction Spells Juicy Contracts for Russian, Iranian Firms,” Constitutional Committee,” Al-Monitor, July 16, 2019, https://www.al-monitor. Foreign Policy, October 20, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/20/syrian- com/pulse/originals/2019/07/russia-un-syria-constitution-committee.html; reconstruction-spells-juicy-contracts-for-russian-iranian-firms-china-civil- “Syrian Government Rejects UN-Led Committee to Alter Constitution,” war/. Reuters, February 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis- syria-constitution/syrian-government-rejects-u-n-led-committee-to-alter- 83. “Remarks on the Way Forward for the United States Regarding constitution-idUSKBN1FX1EO; “Damascus Has Rejected Prospective Members Syria,” U.S. Department of State, January 17, 2018, https://www.state.gov/ of Proposed Constitutional Committee, Special Envoy for Syria Tells Security remarks-on-the-way-forward-for-the-united-states-regarding-syria/. Council in Briefing,” United Nations, October 26, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/ 84. Quint Forgey, “Pompeo: U.S. Withdrawal from Syria ‘Incredibly en/2018/sc13556.doc.htm. Clear’,” Politico, January 12, 2019, https://www.politico.com/ 96. Alexander Lapin, [“Syrian Academy,”] VPK, April 24, 2018, https://vpk-news(.) story/2019/01/12/pompeo-us-withdrawal-syria-isis-1098640; James ru/articles/42359. Jeffrey, “Searching for Solutions in Syria: The Trump Administration’s Strategy,” U.S. Embassy in Syria, May 22, 2019, https://sy.usembassy.gov/ 97. Suha Ma’ayeh, “Jordan Mediating Russia and Rebel Talks for Southern searching-for-solutions-in-syria-the-trump-administrations-strategy/. Syria Handover,” The National, July 4, 2018, https://www.thenational. ae/world/mena/jordan-mediating-russia-and-rebel-talks-for- 85. Steven Rosenborg, “Syria War: Putin’s Russian Mission Accomplished,” BBC, southern-syria-handover-1.747127; Ghaith al-Ahmad, “Russian and December 13, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42330551; Iranian Calculations Surrounding Eastern Ghouta,” Atlantic Council, Nathan Hodge, “Putin Declares Victory in Surprise Stopover in Syria,” March 14, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/ Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ russian-and-iranian-calculations-surrounding-eastern-ghouta. putin-declares-victory-in-surprise-stopover-in-syria-1512994876. 98. A.P. Lapin, [“Syrian Academy,”] VPK, April 24, 2018, https://vpk-news(.)ru/ 86. Anne Barnard, “Syrian Peace Talks in Russia: 1,500 Delegates, Mostly Pro- articles/42359. Assad,” New York Times, January 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/ world/middleeast/syria-russia-sochi-talks.html. 99. “Scores of Rebels, Hostages Leave Syria’s Douma Under Deal: State Media,” Reuters, April 9, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria- 87. “Final Statement of the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue, 30 January douma/scores-of-rebels-hostages-leave-syrias-douma-under-deal-state-media- 2018,” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,January 30, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov(.)tr/ idUSKBN1HG32C. final-statement-of-the-congress-of-the-syrian-national-dialogue_en.en.mfa. 100. “Syrian Rebels Pull Out of their Last Besieged Area,” Reuters, May 88. Ammar Hamou and Avery Edlman, “With Government Flags Flying in Sochi, 16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria/ Opposition Delegation Leaves in Protest, Citing ‘Unfufilled Promises’,”Syria syrian-rebels-pull-out-of-their-last-besieged-area-idUSKCN1IH14K. Direct, January 30, 2018, https://syriadirect.org/news/opposition-delegation- departs-sochi-in-protest-citing-flags-unfulfilled-promises-and-attacks-on- 101. Assad’s gains in Southern Syria also helped him secure the capital, as opposition rebel-territory/; Neil Hauer, Twitter, January 30, 2018, https://twitter.com/ groups historically used their strongholds in Dera’a and Quneitra Provinces neilphauer/status/958237005925765120. to threaten Damascus. Opposition forces seized much of Southern and Central Quneitra Province in August - September 2014. Then-U.S.-backed 89. Anne Barnard, “Syrian Peace Talks in Russia: 1,500 Delegates, Mostly Pro- opposition groups subsequently launched a series of offensives aimed at seizing Assad,” New York Times, January 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/ the M5 Highway between Damascus and Dera’a City, and linking opposition- world/middleeast/syria-russia-sochi-talks.html. held areas in Southern Syria with the Damascus Suburbs. The offensive was 90. The opposition delegates protested the framing and symbology of the ultimately unsuccessful in its aims, although opposition groups seized significant conference, which included the regime flag but no opposition flag. Some amounts of terrain in Northern Dera’a Province and reached as far as the opposition leaders traveled to Sochi but later refused to leave the airport village of Kanaker, approximately twenty miles southwest of Damascus and to attend the conference. Russia also invited the Syrian Kurdish PYD but fifteen miles from the then-besieged opposition stronghold of Darayya. The rescinded the invitation as a concession to Turkey. See: Patrick Wintour, Syrian regime launched a counteroffensive that partially succeeded in reversing “Russia’s Syrian Peace Conference Teeters on Farce,” The Guardian, January 30, opposition gains south of Damascus, but opposition groups maintained 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/30/russia-syria-peace- control of most of Northern Dera’a Province until 2018. See: Liz Sly and conference-sochi-foreign-minister; Yuri Barmin, “The Syrian Congress Ruth Eglash, “Syrian Rebels Capture Sole Border Crossing Between Israel in Sochi: Too Much Too Soon,” Russian International Affairs Council, February 2, and Syria in Golan Heights,” Washington Post, August 27, 2014, https://www. 2018, https://russiancouncil(.)ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrian-rebels-capture-sole-border- the-syrian-congress-in-sochi-too-much-too-soon/. crossing-between-israel-and-syria-in-golan-heights/2014/08/27/529a3be5- 91. Anne Barnard, “Syrian Peace Talks in Russia: 1,500 Delegates, Mostly Pro- 2ac5-4656-bf8c-62dd7bfbc4d0_story.html; Bassem Mroue, “U.S.-Backed Assad,” New York Times, January 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/ Rebels Push Forward in Southern Syria,” AP, November 29, 2014, https:// world/middleeast/syria-russia-sochi-talks.html. www.timesofisrael.com/us-backed-rebels-push-forward-in-southern-syria/; 92. Yuri Barmin, “The Syrian Congress in Sochi: Too Much Too Leith Aboufadel, “The Syrian Army Begins an Offensive in Northern Dara’a,” Soon,” Russian International Affairs Council, February 2, 2018, https:// Al-Masdar, February 9, 2015, https://www.almasdarnews(.)com/article/ russiancouncil(.)ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/ syrian-army-begins-offensive-northern-daraa/; Taylor Luck, “Syrian Rebels’ the-syrian-congress-in-sochi-too-much-too-soon/. March on Damascus Becomes Fight for Their Survival,” Christian Science Monitor, March 11, 2015, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0311/ Syrian-rebels-march-on-Damascus-becomes-fight-for-their-survival.

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 41 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

102. The U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2018 identifies D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89- Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham as an alias for Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. %D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9 See: “Country Reports on Terrorism 2018,” U.S. Department of State, October %85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA; [“Orient 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Country-Reports-on- Reveals Details of New ‘Frogs’ Headed by the Branches of Assad’s Security in Terrorism-2018-FINAL.pdf; Noor Nahas, “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Attempting Dera’a,”] Orient News, December 22, 2018, https://orient-news(.)net/ar/news_ to Consolidate Power Ahead of Idlib Offensive,”Bellingcat, August 22, 2018, show/158743/0/%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AA- https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/08/22/hts-consolidation/; Louisa %D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8% Loveluck and Ghalia al-Alwani, “Syrian Rebels in Idlib Target Those Who Might B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%- Surrender as Government Assault Looms,” Washington Post, September 7, 2018, D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-rebels-in-idlib-target-those- %D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%87%D8%A7- who-might-surrender-as-government-assault-looms/2018/09/07/1ba47e00- %D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%A3%D9%85% b07c-11e8-8b53-50116768e499_story.html; [“Tahrir al-Sham Arrests Engineer D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%AF Mustafa Setif in Ma’arat Misreen and Activists Denounce It”] SNN, August %D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1; [“Serious Leaks 19, 2018, http://www.shaam.org/news/syria-news/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D ... The Visit of the Head of Assad’s Intelligence Division to Daraa ... What Are 8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85- They Weaving in the Region?”] Al-Taqrir Al-Arabi, February 26, 2019, https:// %D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84 www.altaqreir.com/2019/02/blog-post_550.html; [“Are Russia and Assad %D9%85%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%B5% Seeking to Create Internal Opposition from Southern Syria?”]Baladi News, D8%B7%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B5%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%81- March 27, 2019, https://www.baladi-news.com/ar/news/details/43222/; %D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8 Suleiman al-Hourani, [“They Are a New Syrian: A Gathering of the Domestic %B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8% Opposition ... Sponsored by Russia and the Emirates,”] Al-Modon, January A7%D8%A1-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86.html. 3, 2019, https://www.almodon(.)com/arabworld/2019/1/3/%D8%AF%D8 103. [“Orient Reveals Details of A New ‘Frog’ Cell Directed by Assad Security %B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7- Branches,”] Orient News, December 22, 2018, https://orient-news.net/ar/ %D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF- news_show/158743/0/%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86%D %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF- 8%AA-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8% %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84 A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9- %D9%88%D9%87%D9%85. %D8%B6%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B9- 111. His full name is not available from public reports. Pro-opposition sources %D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D refer to him merely as General Sergey. See: [“Formation of a Force 8%AC%D9%87%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9- Belonging Directly to Hmeimim Base Composed of Elements of ‘Reconciled %D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF- Factions’ in Dera’a,”] SNN, October 7, 2018, http://www.shaam(.)org/ %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1; news/syria-news/%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84- [“They Are a New Syrian: A Gathering of the Domestic Opposition ... %D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9- Sponsored by Russia and the Emirates,”] Al-Modon, January 3, 2019, %D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9- https://www.almodon(.)com/arabworld/2019/1/3/%D8%AF%D8%B1 %D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%85%D8% %D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7- A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D %D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF- 9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1- %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF- %D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9 %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9- %84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA- %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%87%D9%85; [“Are Russia and Assad Seeking %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7.html; [“’Negotiating to Create Internal Opposition from Southern Syria?”]Baladi News, March 27, Committee’ Meets Russian Delegation to Discuss the ‘Settlement’ in 2019, https://www.baladi-news.com/ar/news/details/43222/; [“Russia Seeks to Dera’a City,”] SMART, September 4, 2019, https://smartnews-agency(.) Establish Opposition Under Assad in Southern Syria,”] Baladi News, December 5, com/ar/wires/322378/%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9- 2018, https://www.baladi-news.com/ar/news/details/38516/%D8%B1%D9%88 %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6- %D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7_%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%89_%D9%84 %D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B9- %D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3_%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7 %D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%84 %D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9_%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA_%D9%83%D9%86 %D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B4%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AC %D9%81_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF_%D8%AC%D9%86 %D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA %D9%88%D8%A8_%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7; [“Serious %D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A Leaks ... The Visit of the Head of Assad’s Intelligence Division to Daraa ... What %D9%86%D8%A9. Are They Weaving in the Region?”] Al-Taqrir Al-Arabi, February 26, 2019, https:// 112. It remains unclear whether Russia worked directly with the Syrian regime’s www.altaqreir.com/2019/02/blog-post_550.html. “security committee” in Dera’a City, which includes all branches of the regime’s 104. “Syrian Government Invites Figures in Daraa to Attend intelligence and security services. See: “Members of Fourth Division of Syrian National Dialogue Conference in Damascus,” SMART, December Government Forces Commit Infringements in Dera’a and Residents Call to 5, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/en/wires/350291/ Expel Them,” SMART, August 24, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/en/ syrian-government-invites-figures-in-daraa-to-attend-national-dialogue. wires/319146/members-of-fourth-division-of-syrian-government-forces- 105. The first Russian Military Police deployed to Syria in December 2016. See: commit-infringements. One pro-regime figure involved in the reconciliation Mark Galeotti, “Not-So-Soft Power: Russia’s Military Police in Syria,”War on the negotiations was the journalist Kenana Hawija. See: [“Media Millionaire Rocks, October 2, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/not-so-soft-power- Receives Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars Annexing City in the Dera’a russias-military-police-in-syria/; “Ingush Authorities Report Sending a Military Countryside to the Control Areas of the Pro-Assad Forces, Which Amount to Police Battalion to Syria,” Caucasion Knot, May 16, 2018, http://www.eng.kavkaz- More Than 84% of the Province’s Area,”] SOHR, July 14, 2018, http://www. uzel(.)eu/articles/43199/. syriahr.com/?p=275196. 106. “Kadryov Says Chechens in Russian Military Policy in Syria,” RFE/RL, January 113. The Russian Reconciliation Center had previously secured reconciliation and 24, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/kadyrov-chechens-in-russian-military-police- evacuation agreements with several groups in Eastern Ghouta in February - syria/28254337.html; “Russian Military Police Battalion Fulfills Task in Syria, March 2018. The Russian Armed Forces had sent feelers into Eastern Ghouta Returns to Dagestan,” SANA, December 12, 2017, https://sana(.)sy/en/?p=121051; to assess the possibility of a local agreement as early as 2015. See: Aron Lund, “Ingush Authorities Report Sending a Military Police Battalion to Syria,” Caucasion “Into the Tunnels: The Rise and Fall of Syria’s Rebel Enclave in Eastern Ghouta,” Knot, May 16, 2018, http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel(.)eu/articles/43199/. The Century Foundation, December 21, 2016, https://tcf.org/content/report/ into-the-tunnels/; “Talks to End Conflict in Syria’s Eastern Ghouta Break 107. Neil Hauer, “Russian Diplomacy in Syria Bolstered by Muslim Minority Down: Russia,” Reuters, February 21, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ Outreach,” Middle East Institute, February 6, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/ us-mideast-crisis-syria-ghouta-russia/talks-to-end-conflict-in-syrias-eastern- publications/russian-diplomacy-syria-bolstered-muslim-minority-outreach. ghouta-break-down-russia-idUSKCN1G52ME; “Syria Rebels Depart Eastern 108. Alexander Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Wars,”]VPK , July 28, 2018, https://vpk- Ghouta Town on Government Buses in First Surrender,” Reuters, March 22, news(.)ru/articles/43971. 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-ghouta/syria- 109. It is unclear to where these forces relocated. See: [“Military Police Battalion rebels-depart-eastern-ghouta-town-on-government-buses-in-first-surrender- Returned to Chechnya from Syria Without Loss,”]Caucasian Knot, June 27, 2017, idUSKBN1GY10H; “Syrian Rebels Failaq al-Rahman Say Will Talk to Russians https://www.kavkaz-uzel(.)eu/articles/304999/. on Friday: Al-Hadath,” Reuters, March 23, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ 110. Khalid al-Zoubi, [“Dera’a ‘Self Management’ and ‘Tiger of the us-mideast-crisis-syria-ghouta-failaq/syrian-rebels-failaq-al-rahman-say-will- South’ at the Negotiating Table,”] Al-Modon, July 3, 2018, https:// talk-to-russians-on-friday-al-hadath-idUSKBN1GZ18R; [“Russian Agreement www.almodon(.)com/arabworld/2018/7/3/%D8%AF%D8%B1%D with Faylaq al-Rahman to Leave Ghouta,”] Enab Baladi, March 23, 2018, https:// 8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9- www.enabbaladi.net/archives/215511; Bassem Mroue and Nataliya Vasilyeva, %D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88- “Russia Expects Deal with Major Rebel Group in Syria’s Ghouta,” AP, March 27, %D9%86%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%- 2018, https://apnews.com/5fc316f62eef4c9593a6f680017ba7f3.

42 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

114. Opposition sources did not refer to the previous amnesties and reconciliation 117. [“Agreement Between Factions in Nawa City and Russia ... With Provisions, law offered by Assad, indicating the deep skepticism with which opposition and Displacement Is One,”] SNN, July 18, 2018, http://www.shaam(.) leaders continued to treat the regime and the central role of Russia’s guarantees org/news/syria-news/%D8%A5%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82- to the success of the negotiations in Southern Syria. Syrian state media did not %D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84- mention Russia’s role in the negotiations. The agreements called for opposition %D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%88% groups to turn over all heavy and medium weapons. Russian MPs would also D9%89-%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7- enter Busra al-Sham and the surrounding area. See: Leith Aboufadel, “Full %D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D8 Report from Southwest Syria Battle - Map,” Al-Masdar, July 7, 2018, https:// %AF-%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88% www.almasdarnews(.)com/article/full-report-from-southwest-syria-battle- D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1- map/; [“An Agreement Is Reached to Hand Over Weapons in the Area of Busra %D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7.html; [“An Agreement Is al-Sham and Return All State Institutions to It,”] SANA, July 6, 2018, https:// Reached to Hand Over Weapons in the Area of Busra al-Sham and Return All sana(.)sy/?p=778394. [“Russia Meeting - Dera’a Agrees to Ceasefire, Hand State Institutions to It,”] SANA, July 6, 2018, https://sana(.)sy/?p=778394. Over of Heavy Weapons, Partial Withdrawal of Regime,”] SOHR, July 6, 2018, 118. [“In Exchange for the Withdrawal of the Regime from the Southeast of the http://www.syriahr.com/?p=273602; Suleiman al-Khalidi and Laila Bassam, Province, Opening of a Corridor for Those Who Reject the Agreement to “South Syrian Rebels Agree Surrender Deal, Assad Takes Crossing,” Reuters, the North of Syria ... Russia - Dera’a Meeting Comes Out with Full and Final July 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria/syria- Agreement,”] SOHR, July 6, 2018, http://www.syriahr.com/?p=273607; Suleiman government-forces-close-to-seizing-jordan-border-crossing-pro-damascus- al-Khalidi and Laila Bassam, “South Syrian Rebels Agree Surrender Deal, commander-idUSKBN1JW108; Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Syrian Rebels Say Army Assad Takes Crossing,” Reuters, July 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ Besieging Their Enclave in Southern City Deraa,” Reuters, July 9, 2018, https:// us-mideast-crisis-syria/syria-government-forces-close-to-seizing-jordan- www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-deraa/syrian-rebels-say-army- border-crossing-pro-damascus-commander-idUSKBN1JW108; Suleiman besieging-their-enclave-in-the-southern-city-of-deraa-idUSKBN1JZ0QU; al-Khalidi, “Syrian Rebels Say Army Besieging Their Enclave in Southern Alice Su, “Confronting Horror at the Jordan-Syria Border,” The Atlantic, July City Deraa,” Reuters, July 9, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- 8, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/daraa- crisis-syria-deraa/syrian-rebels-say-army-besieging-their-enclave-in-the- assad-jordan-israel-rebels/564611/; [“The First Statement from ‘Central southern-city-of-deraa-idUSKBN1JZ0QU; Alice Su, “Confronting Horror at Operations’ After Signing an Agreement with Russia to End the Battles of the the Jordan-Syria Border,” The Atlantic, July 8, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ South,”] El-Dorar, July 6, 2018, https://eldorar.com/node/123760; “Russia Will international/archive/2018/07/daraa-assad-jordan-israel-rebels/564611/. Guarantee Return of Displaced Syrians in South - Rebel Sources,” Reuters, July 119. Russian Military Police escorted at least some of the buses out of Dera’a Province. 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-displaced/ See: [“Displacement Buses in Quneitra and Thousands Are Preparing to Leave russia-will-guarantee-return-of-displaced-syrians-in-south-rebel-sources- After Refusing Reconciliation,”]SNN , July 20, 2018, http://www.shaam(.)org/ idUSKBN1JW1X2; Omar Akour and Bassem Mroue, “Syrian Troops Recapture news/syria-news/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7% Vital Border Crossing with Jordan,” AP, July 6, 2018, https://www.apnews. D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A- com/72bd66d3478e40f38979030930f3550b. %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D 115. Russian officers did escort some internally displaced persons back to their 8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81- homes in Eastern Dera’a Province. See: [“Residents Return to Eastern %D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86- Dera’a Under Russian Auspices,”] SMART, July 28, 2018, https://smartnews- %D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9- agency(.)com/ar/wires/311605/%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9- %D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%87%D9%85- %D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89- %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D %D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- 8%A9.html; [“Russia Is Preparing to Bring Out 1,000 Fighters from the %D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9- South to Idlib,”] Enab Baladi, July 9, 2018, https://www.enabbaladi.net/ %D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9; [“New Cities and archives/240008; “Syria to Take Control of Southern Areas after Reaching Towns North of Dera’a Reach Settlement Agreement with the Russian Deal with Militants,” Press TV, July 6, 2018, https://www.presstv(.)com/ Side,”] SNN, July 14, 2018, http://www.shaam(.)org/news/syria- Detail/2018/07/06/567286/Syria-daraa-militants-; [“To Unify the Military news/%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A and Political Decisions ... Several Factions in the Western Countryside of F%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9- Dera’a Disintegrate and Merge Within ‘Army of the South’,”] SNN, July 8, 2018, %D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- http://www.shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8 %D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA %AD%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7% %D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9- D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A- %D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%A7% %D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A- D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A.html; [“More Than 200,000 %D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%AF Displaced People Return to their Towns and Villages Which Were Displaced After %D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8 the Regime Expanded Its Control of More Than 72% of the Area of Dera’a and %B9%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9 the Deployment of Its Forces on the Border with Jordan,”] SOHR, July 9, 2018, %8A-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%AA% http://www.syriahr.com/?p=274225; [“Russian Patrols Guarantee Settlements of D9%86%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86- the South ... And People are Looking for Services,”] Asharq al-Awsat, August 30, %D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88 2018, https://aawsat.com/home/article/1377946/%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1% %D8%A8.html. D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9- 120. Judah Ari Gross, “IDF Chief Finally Acknowledges That Israel Supplied %D8%AA%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%C2%AB%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88 Weapons to Syrian Rebels,” Times of Israel, January 14, 2019, https://www. %D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88 timesofisrael.com/idf-chief-acknowledges-long-claimed-weapons-supply- %D8%A8%C2%BB-%D9%88%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8D- to-syrian-rebels/; Tom O’Connor, “Israel Secretly Armed Syrian Rebels and %D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86- Then Abandoned Them, Report Says,” Newsweek, September 6, 2018, https:// %D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA. www.newsweek.com/israel-secretly-armed-syrian-rebels-then-abandoned- 116. The towns are: Kahil, Sahwah, Jizah, and Musayfrah. See: [“The them-reports-say-1109858; Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Air Gives an Unexpected Free Army in Southern Syria Reaches an Agreement with the Russian ‘Glimmer of Hope’ for Syrians,” New York Times, July 20, 2017, https://www. Side According to Several Provisions,”] SNN, July 6, 2018, http:// nytimes.com/2017/07/20/world/middleeast/israel-syria-humanitarian-aid. www.shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A html; Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Inside Israel’s Secret Program to Back Syrian Rebels,” C%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1- Foreign Policy, September 6, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/ %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D in-secret-program-israel-armed-and-funded-rebel-groups-in-southern-syria/. 9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%- 121. For example, the deadline for submission in Tel al-Hara was July 19, less B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84- than a week after the town surrendered. See: “Lessons from the Syrian State’s %D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82- Return to the South,” International Crisis Group, February 24, 2019, https://www. %D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81- crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/196- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A- lessons-syrian-states-return-south; [“’Air Force Intelligence’ Summons Two %D9%88%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9- ‘Settlement’ Sites in Nawa City in Dera’a,”] SMART, July 29, 2018, https:// %D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF.html; Arwa Ibrahim, “Syria Truce Deal smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/311747/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8% ‘Breached’ as Western Deraa Clashes Intensify,” Al-Jazeera, July 8, 2018, https:// AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8 www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/syria-truce-deal-breached-western-deraa- %AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AF% clashes-intensify-180708112158789.html. D8%B9%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86- %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 43 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A- 125. Haid Haid, “Joining the Enemy: How the Syrian Regime Reintegrates Former %D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89- Rebel Fighters,” Chatham House, July 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/ %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7; [“Regime Begins the research/joining-the-enemy-how-the-syrian-regime-reintegrates-former-rebel- ‘Settlement’ of the ‘FSA’ in Nawa City in Dera’a,”] SMART, July 23, 2018, fighters; Haid Haid, “The Details of ‘Reconciliation Deals’ Expose How They https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/310346/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9 Are Anything But,” Chatham House, August 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/ %86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3- research/the-details-of-reconciliation-deals-expose-how-they-are-anything- %D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9 but-a-closer-look-at-the-regimes-process-reveals-its-real-goal-retribution- %8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1- and-control; Bassem Mroue, “In Syria, Ex-Rebels and Government Enter Era %D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9- of Uneasy ‘Reconciliation’,” AP, July 19, 2018, https://www.csmonitor.com/ %D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7; World/Middle-East/2018/0719/In-Syria-ex-rebels-and-government-enter-era- [“Regime Forces Begin ‘Settlement’ in Different Parts of Dera’a,”]SMART , of-uneasy-reconciliation; Abdullah al-Jabassini, “From Rebel Rule to a Post- July 19, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/308585/%D9%82 Capitulation Era in Daraa Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of Rebel %D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8 Behaviour During Negotiations,” Middle East Directions, June 2019, https://cadmus. %A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8%A5 eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/60664/RSCAS_2019_06.pdf. %D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9 126. Haid Haid, “The Details of ‘Reconciliation Deals’ Expose How They Are %84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A- Anything But,” Chatham House, August 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse. %D8%A3%D9%86%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%AA org/research/the-details-of-reconciliation-deals-expose-how-they- %D9%84%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- are-anything-but-a-closer-look-at-the-regimes-process-reveals-its- (%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88). real-goal-retribution-and-control; [“Regime Begins the ‘Settlement’ 122. Abdullah al-Jabassini, “From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa of the ‘FSA’ in Nawa City in Dera’a,”] SMART, July 23, 2018, https:// Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of Rebel Behaviour during smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/310346/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8 Negotiations,” Middle East Directions, https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/60664. 6%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3- 123. Haid Haid, “The Details of ‘Reconciliation Deals’ Expose How They Are %D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9 Anything But,” Chatham House, August 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/ %8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1- research/the-details-of-reconciliation-deals-expose-how-they-are-anything-but- %D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9- a-closer-look-at-the-regimes-process-reveals-its-real-goal-retribution-and-c- %D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7; ontrol. [“Regime Forces Use ‘Settlement’ to Obtain Security Information in Dera’a,”] SMART, July 20, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/ 124. The Syrian regime seems to have enjoyed relative impunity in other areas, 309073/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9 however. Locals reported the entry of pro-regime forces into areas of %86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81- Southeast Dera’a Province on July 23 in violation of the reconciliation %D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D- agreement, possibly referring to a detachment of intelligence services 8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84% conducting this settlement procedure. See: Qutaybah Haj Ali, [“’Fursan D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89- al-Joulan’ Supported by Israel Remain in Their Positions!”] Al-Modon, July %D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8 20, 2018, https://www.almodon(.)com/arabworld/2018/7/20/%D9%86% %AA-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A. D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9% 86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1- 127. Sulafa Jabbour, [“Resolving Status: A New Nightmare for the Residents of %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8% the Areas Surrounding Damascus,”] Al-Jazeera, June 17, 2018, https://www. AA%D8%B1%D9%83-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%87%D aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2018/6/17/%D8%AA%D8%B3%D 8%A7-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%88- 9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9- %D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7% %D9%83%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D8%AF D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86- %D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%A4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%B3% %D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%89; [“Regime Restricts D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7- Those Wishing to Emigrate from the South and the Unjust Conditions of %D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82; Haid Haid, “The Details of Reconciliation,”] STEP News, July 23, 2018, https://stepagency-sy(.)net/2018/07/2 ‘Reconciliation Deals’ Expose How They Are Anything But,” Chatham House, 3/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%8F August 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/the-details-of- %D9%82%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7% reconciliation-deals-expose-how-they-are-anything-but-a-closer-look-at-the- D8%BA%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA% regimes-process-reveals-its-real-goal-retribution-and-control. D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84/. 128. “Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South,”International Crisis Known examples of subsequent negotiations by Russia occurred in Jassim and Group, February 24, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north- Nawa. See: [“Regime Forces Begin ‘Settlement’ in Different Parts of Dera’a,”] africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/196-lessons-syrian-states-return- SMART, July 19, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/308585/%D south; [“’Air Force Intelligence’ Summons Two ‘Settlement’ Sites in Nawa 9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8% City in Dera’a,”] SMART, July 29, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8% ar/wires/311747/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8% A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8 9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A- 8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B %D8%A3%D9%86%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D8%AE%D 9%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86- 8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%- %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA B9%D8%A7-(%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88); %D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A- [“Consultative Meeting Between Regime Officers and Faction Leaders in %D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89- Nawa City in Dera’a (Video),”] SMART, July 23, 2018, https://smartnews- %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7; [“Regime Begins the agency(.)com/ar/wires/310052/%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85% ‘Settlement’ of the ‘FSA’ in Nawa City in Dera’a,”] SMART News, July 23, 2018, D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D9 https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/310346/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9 %8A-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B6%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7- %86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3- %D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8 %D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9 %A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9- %8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1- %D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A- %D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9- %D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9; [“Meeting with %D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7; No Results Between the Regime and Faction Leaders in Dera’a,”] [“Regime Forces Begin ‘Settlement’ in Different Parts of Dera’a,”]SMART , SMART, August 5, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/3 July 19, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/308585/%D9% 14203/%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9- 82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B %D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AC- 8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D8%A %D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D- 8%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA- 8%A7%D9%85-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9- %D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A- %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A1- %D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7. %D9%85%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A9- %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-(%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF %D9%8A%D9%88).

44 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

129. [“Orient Reveals Details of New ‘Frogs’ Headed by the Branches of Assad’s 2%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%83%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8 Security in Dera’a,”] Orient News, December 22, 2018, https://orient-news(.)net/ %A1.html; [“The Free Army in Southern Syria Reaches an Agreement ar/news_show/158743/0/%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86%D8 with the Russian Side According to Several Provisions,”] SNN, July 6, %AA-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D 2018, http://www.shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/%D8%A7%D9%84% 8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B6%- D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1- D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D %D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%87% 9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%- D8%A7-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%A3%D9%85 B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84- %D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A8% %D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82- D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1; “Syrian %D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81- Regime Assigns Leader Held Reconciliation in Establishing the Largest Militia of %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A- Daraa,” Nedaa Syria, March 25, 2019, https://nedaa-sy.com/en/news/12508. %D9%88%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9- 130. “Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South,”International Crisis Group, %D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF.html. February 24, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/ 134. The timeline of when, if at all, regime forces would be able to enter the eastern-mediterranean/syria/196-lessons-syrian-states-return-south. remaining opposition-held areas in Dera’a Province was unclear under 131. Mais Noor Aldeen, “Syrian Government Delays Distribution of National the deal reached on July 6, 2018. One pro-opposition report claimed Security Settlement Card for Daraa Residents to Leave Governorate,” that regime forces would not enter opposition-held areas “in the coming SMART, October 25, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/en/wires/339283/ months” in Southeast Dera’a Province. The Syrian regime declared Busra syrian-government-delays-distribution-of-national-security-settlement-card-for. al-Sham “liberated” under the framework of the reconciliation agreement on July 17 and published videos of regime forces raising of a regime flag in 132. This harassment included rampant targeting of the Fifth Corps. See: the town. Regime forces later disrupted opposition evacuations from Busra “Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South,”International Crisis al-Sham on July 21. See: [“The Free Army in Southern Syria Reaches an Group, February 24, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north- Agreement with the Russian Side According to Several Provisions,”] SNN, africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/196-lessons-syrian-states-return- July 6, 2018, http://www.shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/%D8%A7%D9%8 south; [“Clashes and Disputes Between the Leaders of the ‘Fifth Corps’ 4%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1- in Eastern Dera’a on the Background of Separation from the Corps,”] %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D Horan Free League, January 22, 2019, https://www.horanfree.com/?p=3251; 9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%- [“Regime Forces Arrest 4 Leaders of the Fifth Corps Supported by the B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84- Russians Who Conducted ‘Reconciliation and Compromises’ in Dera’a,”] %D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82- SOHR, June 28, 2019, http://www.syriahr.com/?p=326568; [“Unknown %D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81- Persons Assassinate the Head of ‘Reconciliation’ Committees in Dera’a”] %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A- SMART, June 17, 2019, https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/387211 %D9%88%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9- /%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86- %D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF.html; SANA, [“With Wide %D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86- Popular Participation … Raise the National Flag in Busra al-Sham in %D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9- Dera’a Countryside,”] YouTube, July 17, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/ %86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D watch?v=jgVCTpmXO3s; “Pro-Government Forces Fully Secured Busra al-Sham 8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7. and Hrak, Entered Aqrabah in Southern Syria,” South Front, July 17, 2018, https:// 133. The first widely reported raid occurred in the Lajat Region of Northern Dera’a southfront(.)org/pro-government-forces-fully-secured-busra-al-sham-and- Province. The reconciliation agreement included a regime withdrawal from hrak-entered-aqrabah-in-southern-syria-map/; [“Syria: Army Takes Over Kahil, Sahwah, Jizah, and Musayfrah in Dera’a Province, but pro-regime forces the Strategic City of Busra al-Sham,”] Al-Manar, July 18, 2018, https://french. remained in these towns and conducted a series of raids in Jizah on July 12. almanar.com(.)lb/967969; [“Regime Restricts Those Wishing to Emigrate from There are no reports that regime forces ever fully or partially withdrew from the South and the Unjust Conditions of Reconciliation,”] STEP News, https:// these towns. See: [“Arrests Continue in Eastern Dera’a, Lajat Region, and stepagency-sy(.)net/2018/07/23/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D the Perimeter of Khalkhalah Airbase in Suweida, and Reach More Than 230 8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%8F%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%AF- People in Less Than 24 Hours,”] SOHR, August 3, 2018, http://www.syriahr. %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86- com/?p=278460; [“Regime Forces Arrest Dozens of Youths from the Villages of %D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D Lajat in Dera’a,”] SMART, August 2, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wir 8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84/. es/313064/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86 135. [“The Agreements Are Ink on Paper ... Arrests in Jizah in Dera’a and %D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84- the Russians Have Broken Everything,”] SNN, July 12, 2018, http://www. %D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AA%D9 8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9 %81%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B1- %89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A9- %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%82- %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7; [“Assad %D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA- Regime Continues Arrests in Lajat Area of Dera’a Countryside, Russian %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8 Enemy Shirks Responsibility,”] SNN, August 4, 2018, http://www. %B2%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85- %D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%8- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8% 6%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%83%D9%84- A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D %D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A1.html; [“People of the Town of Jizah in 9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D Dera’a Are Waiting for Russia to Respond to Their Demands or Send the 8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9- Displacement Busses,”] SMART, August 4, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.) %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8% com/ar/wires/313468/%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A- B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%88%D %D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9 8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1 %8A%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- %D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%84%D9% %D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B8%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86- 91%D8%B5-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D %D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9- 9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87.html. Pro-regime forces later %D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D8 arrested a senior member of the FSA Southern Front in Dera’a City for refusing %B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A3%D9%88- to settle his status in June 2019. See: [“Assad Forces Arrest Former Leaders in %D8%A5%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84; [“Russian Police Register Dera’a Province,”] Enab Baladi, June 281, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/ the Names of Those Who Reject the ‘Dera’a Agreement’ in the Town of archives/310950; [“Assad Arrests Senior Leader of the Southern Front,”] Zaman Jizah in Preparation for Their Displacement,”] SMART, July 23, 2018, al-Wasl, June 29, 2019, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/107538/; Arwa https://smartnews-agency(.)com/ar/wires/310140/%D8%B4%D8%B1 Ibrahim, “Syria Truce Deal ‘Breached’ as Western Deraa Clashes Intensify,” %D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9- Al-Jazeera, July 8, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/syria-truce- %D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%B3% deal-breached-western-deraa-clashes-intensify-180708112158789.html; [“The D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8% Agreements Are Ink on Paper ... Arrests in Jizah in Dera’a and the Russians Have A7%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%80- Broken Everything,”] SNN, July 12, 2018, http://www.shaam(.)org/news/syria- %D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AF%D8% news/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%84 8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89- %D8%AF%D8%A9. %D9%88%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82% D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A9- %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84% D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3-%D9%86%D9%8

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 45 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

136. “New Convoy of Forcibly Displaced People Prepares to Leave Daraa 86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7- Towards Idlib,” SMART, August 11, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/en/ %D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9- wires/316049/new-convoy-of-forcibly-displaced-people-prepares-to-leave- %D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9- daraa; [“No Guarantees ... Assad’s Forces Arrest 10 People from the Last %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85; “Lessons from the Convoy of Displaced People in Dera’a,”] SNN, August 11, 2018, http://www. Syrian State’s Return to the South,” International Crisis Group, February 24, 2019, shaam(.)org/news/syria-news/%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%B6%D9%85%D8 https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/ %A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA- syria/196-lessons-syrian-states-return-south; [“After the Deadline for %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8% Settlement, Assad Arrested Fifth Corps Leaders and Fighters in Dera’a,”]Zaman B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84-10-%D8%A3%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8 al-Wasl, June 29, 2019, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/107579/; [“After %A7%D8%B5-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81%D an Israeli Meeting with the Fifth Corps, Arrests Target Leaders in the th4 Division 9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D8%AC%D8%B1%D in Southern Syria,”] Nedaa Syria, July 3, 2019, https://nedaa-sy.com/news/14486; 9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D Abdullah al-Jabassini, “From Insurgents to Soldiers: The Fifth Assault Corps in 8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7.html. Daraa Southern Syria,” Middle East Directions, May 14, 2019, https://cadmus.eui.eu/ 137. “Syrian Government Forces Stop Buses of Displaced People bitstream/handle/1814/62964/RR_2019_09_EN.pdf. from Daraa and Arrest Several Passengers,” SMART, August 143. [“Former Commanders in Dera’a Promote Fighting with Regime Forces 11, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/en/wires/316378/ in Northern Syria,”] SMART, August 25, 2018, https://smartnews- syrian-government-forces-stop-buses-of-displaced-people-from-daraa. agency(.)com/ar/wires/319410/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D 138. Louisa Loveluck and Zakaria Zakaria, “Death Notices for Syrian Prisoners 8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%82%D9%88%D9%86- Are Suddenly Piling Up. It’s a Sign Assad Has Won the War,” Washington Post, %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- July 26, 2018, https://beta.washingtonpost.com/world/death-notices- %D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%86-%D9% for-syrian-prisoners-are-suddenly-piling-up-its-a-sign-assads-won-the- 84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84- war/2018/07/25/43ee2154-8930-11e8-8b20-60521f27434e_story.html; “UN %D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA- Commission of Inquiry on Syria Stress the Need to Account for the Fate and %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85- Whereabouts of Detained and Mission Individuals Countrywide,” United Nations %D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A; [“Settlement Factions Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights,November 28, 2018, https://www.ohchr. from Dera’a to Idlib: Proof of Loyalty,”]Al-Modon, August 24, 2018, https:// org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23940&LangID=E; Anne https://www.almodon(.)com/arabworld/2018/8/24/%D9%81%D8%B5%D8 Barnard, “Inside Syria’s Secret Torture Prisons: How Bashar Al-Assad Crushed %A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9- Dissent,” New York Times, May 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/ %D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- world/middleeast/syria-torture-prisons.html; Heather Nauert, “Issuance of %D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A8- Death Notices in Syria,” U.S. Embassy in Syria, August 6, 2018, https://sy.usembassy. %D8%A5%D8%AB%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9% gov/issuance-of-death-notices-in-syria/. 88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A1; [“Brigadier General Suhail al-Hassan Leads Formation of Reconciled with the Regime Near Idlib,”] Al-Quds Al-Arabi, August 139. “Syria to Reopen Jordan Border Crossing, Custom Fees Soar,” Al-Araby, 26, 2018, https://www.alquds.co.uk/%EF%BB%BF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8 September 29, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/9/29/ %B9%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%84- syria-to-reopen-jordan-border-crossing-customs-fees-soar; Murad Abdul %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86- Jalil, Ahmed Jamal, and Dia Odeh, “Syria’s Transit: Proactive Fees for %D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82- Hindered Transit,” Enab Baladi, July 24, 2019, https://english.enabbaladi. %D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9% net/archives/2019/07/syrias-transit-proactive-fees-for-hindered-transit/; 83%D9%8A%D9%84/; [“Hezbollah Reproduces Itself in Southern “Syrian Government’s Checkpoints in Daraa Impose Royalties on Civilians,” Syria ... And War of Recruitment in Dera’a,”] Arabi21, July 26, 2018, SMART, August 30, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/en/wires/320510/ https://arabi21.com/story/1111624/%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8- syrian-governments-checkpoints-in-daraa-impose-royalties-on-civilians. %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA 140. “South Front - Russia Hiding Being Russian,” EU vs Disinfo, April 8, 2019, https:// %D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%87- th euvsdisinfo.eu/south-front-russia-hiding-being-russian/; “Syrian Army’s 5 %D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8- Assault Corps: Formation, Operations, Capabilities,” South Front, April 22, 2017, %D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7- https://southfront(.)org/syrian-armys-5th-assault-corps-formation-operations- %D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8- capabilities/; Alexander Dvornikov, [“Staffs for New Wars,”] VPK, July 28, 2018, %D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AF- https://vpk-news(.)ru/articles/43971. %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7. 141. [“150 People Submitted Their Papers West of Dera’a to Be Inducted 144. “After Controlling Daraa and Quneitra, The Regime Forces Recruit More into ‘Fifth Corps’,”]SMART , July 28, 2018, https://smartnews-agency(.) Than 3800 People in Their Ranks from Both Provinces and Raises to com/ar/wires/311640/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-150- About 23,000 Number of People They Recruited So Far,” SOHR, August %D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A3%D9%88%D8 10, 2018, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=100085; “Syrian Government %B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8- Forces Arrests Dozens of Men in Dera’a to Enlist Them in Military Service,” %D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC SMART, December 3, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/en/wires/349512/ %D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%80-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8 syrian-government-forces-arrest-dozens-of-men-in-daraa-to. 1%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%8 145. Suha Ma’ayeh and Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Iran Ally Hezbollah Pays 5%D8%B3. Syrian Rebels to Switch Sides,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2018, 142. [“Dera’a: Individual Agreements with Separate Clauses,”] Al-Modon, July https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-ally-hezbollah-pays-syrian-rebels-to- 17, 2018, https://www.almodon(.)com/arabworld/2018/7/17/%D8%A switch-sides-1541073600; [“Hezbollah Penetrates Silently in Southern F%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7 Syria,”] Al-Jazeera, October 15, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/ %D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1% reportsandinterviews/2018/10/15/%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8- D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF- %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9% %D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A9; [“Dera’a Province in 84%D8%BA%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%AA-%D9%81%- Southern Syria Witnesses New Arrests Targeting More Citizens by the Regime’s D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8- Intelligence Despite ‘Reconciliation’,”] SOHR, October 1, 2018, http://www. %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A; [“Terrorist syriahr.com/?p=286012; [“Assad’s Elements Slap Reconciled Fighters in Hezbollah Continues to Recruit Young Men to Work Under Its Command Dera’a,”] El-Dorar, June 21, 2019, https://eldorar.com/node/136848; [“Despite in Daraa,”] SNN, October 16, 2018, http://www.shaam.org/news/syria- Settlement Cards, Regime, Russia, and Iran Are Chasing Reconciled Rebels news/%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87- and Thousands of Young Syrians Are Terrified of Conscription,”]Arabic Post, %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9 December 10, 2018, https://arabicpost(.)net/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3 %8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%- %D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/2018/12/10/%D8%B3%D9%88%D B9%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8 8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%8 A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86- 6%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%84%D8%B2%D %D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA- 8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A/; [“Obsession with Arrests Haunts the People of %D8%A5%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A- Southern Syria One Year After the Regime Returned,”]Asharq al-Awsat, July %D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7.html; [“Militias Loyal to Hezbollah 24, 2019, https://aawsat.com/home/article/1826881/%D9%87%D8%A7% and Iran Continue to Recruit Scores in Daraa, Raising the Number of D8%AC%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9 Volunteers and Recruits to 2,660 of Them in Southern Syria,”] SOHR, April %82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF- 9, 2019, http://www.syriahr.com/?p=317901; [“A Former FSA Leader Recruits %D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%

46 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

Youths to the Hezbollah Militia in Daraa,”] SMART, January 21, 2019, https:// %B1%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7- smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/359353/%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8 %D8%AA%D8% %AF%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A- AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%82-%D8% %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF- A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9% %D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%8A 84%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A- %D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8- 7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87; “Lessons from the Syrian State’s 7%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87. Return to the South,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2019, https:// 150. Pro-opposition media outlets reported that the group had conducted multiple www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/ attacks against checkpoints in Jassim, Sanamayn, and Karak in Southern Syria syria/196-lessons-syrian-states-return-south. since October 2018. See: [“Popular Resistance in the South Sends Message to the 146. “Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South,”International Crisis People of Houran,”] Orient News, November 22, 2018, https://orient-news.net/ Group, February 25, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north- ar/news_show/156885/0/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9 africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/196-lessons-syrian-states-return- %88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9 south; [“Recognize the Arms of Iran and Hezbollah in Reconciliation with %8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D- Dera’a (Photos),”] Orient News, January 10, 2019, https://orient-news.net/ 9%88%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%91%D9%87- ar/news_show/159773/0/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%91%D9%81- %D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9- %D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A3%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%B9- %D9%84%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A- %D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86- %D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86; [“Are ‘Dera’a Reconciliation %D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87- Factions’ Fighting Iranian Militias with Russian Support?”] Orient News, October -لئاصف-لتاقت-له/D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7 27, 2018, https://orient-news.net/ar/news_show/155519/0% The First Operation of the ‘Popular“] ;؟يسور-معدب-ةيناريإلا-تايشيليملا-اعرد-تاحلاصم -D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA% %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1; Resistance’ Against the Regime in Dera’a ... Targeting Military Checkpoint,”] Kirill Semenov, “Russia, Iran in Tug of War Over Syria Military Reform,” El-Dorar, October 16, 2018, https://eldorar.com/node/126956; “Daraa: Rebels Al-Monitor, June 10, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/ Attack Regime Army Checkpoints in Al-Sanamayn,” Zaman al-Wasl, November 25, russia-iran-syria-military-reform.html. 2018, https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/38935/. 147. Kirill Semenov, “Russia, Iran in Tug of War Over Syria Military Reform,” 151. Popular Resistance [“A Special Message from the Popular Resistance in Al-Monitor, June 10, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/ Southern Syria to Our People in Houran,”] Facebook, November 21, 2018, russia-iran-syria-military-reform.html; [“Hezbollah Militia Camp South of https://www.facebook.com/PopularResistance1/posts/314935052444146; Syria ... Capabilities and Numbers,”] Syria TV, April 17, 2019, https://www.syria. [“Popular Resistance in the South Sends Message to the People of Houran,”] tv/content/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A Orient News, November 22, 2018, https://orient-news.net/ar/news_show/15 %D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8- 6885/0/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9% %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%- 85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8% %D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D- A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B5 9%88%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%91%D9%87- %D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9% %D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9- D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF; [“Maps and Pictures ... The Positions of the %D9%84%D8%A3%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A- Hezbollah Militia and Its Agents South of Syria,”] Syria TV, March 21, 2019, %D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86. https://www.syria.tv/content/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D 152. [“Are ‘Dera’a Reconciliation Factions’ Fighting Iranian Militias with Russian 8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8% Support?”] Orient News, October 27, 2018, https://orient-news(.)net/ar/news_ B5%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9- show/155519/0/%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8 %D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7- %A7%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84- %D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87- %D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA- %D9%88%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8 %D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9% 7%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%B3%D9- 8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D %88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7; [“Militias Loyal to Hezbollah and Iran 9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9- Continue to Recruit Scores in Daraa, Raising the Number of Volunteers %D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A and Recruits to 2,660 of Them in Southern Syria,”] SOHR, April 9, 2019, %D8%9F. http://www.syriahr.com/?p=317901; “Lessons from the Syrian State’s 153. Former Southern Front Rockets and Artillery Regiment commander Adham Return to the South,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2019, https:// al-Krad (Abu Qusay) led the demonstrations. He is a known associate of www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/ the Russian Armed Forces in Southern Syria. See: Elizabeth Tsurkov, Twitter, syria/196-lessons-syrian-states-return-south. March 10, 2019, https://twitter.com/Elizrael/status/1104850696237694981; 148. “Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South,”International Crisis [“Demonstration in Dera’a City Condemning the Ranks of the Regime Group, February 25, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east- Forces,”] SMART, December 12, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/ north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/196-lessons-syrian-states- wires/353356/%D9%85%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9- return-south; [“Dera’a: Individual Agreements with Separate Clauses,”] %D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9- Al-Modon, July 17, 2018, https://www.almodon.com/arabworld/2018/7/17/ %D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AF% %D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD 8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%81%D8% %D9%82%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%88%D9%81- B1%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF- %D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D %D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B6%D8%A9; [“Former Commanders 9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85; [“Demonstration in Dera’a Calling for in Dera’a Promote Fighting with Regime Forces in Northern Syria,”] SMART, Detainees and Volunteers in Assad’s Ranks Traitors,”] Enab Baladi, December August 25, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/319410/%D9%82 21, 2018, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/271429; [“Dera’a to the Front %D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%82%D9 Again ... The Regime Is Unable to Suppress Its Demonstrations ... Reason %88%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- is Russia,”] Al-Quds Al-Arabi, December 23, 2018, https://www.alquds(.) %D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%86-%D9% co.uk/%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89- 84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84- %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%8 %D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA- 5%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9- %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85- %86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1- %D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A. %D9%82%D8%A7/; [“A Few Meters from the Omari Mosque ... The 149. “Syria’s 5th Corps Conducted Special Operation Against ISIS Cells North Slogans of the Revolution and the Demands to Overthrow the Regime Back of Al-Suwayda,” South Front, August 17, 2018, https://southfront(.)org/ to Dera’a (Video),”] Al-Souria, December 21, 2018, https://www.alsouria(.) syrias-5th-corps-conducted-special-operation-against-isis-cells-north- net/content/%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF- of-al-suwayda-photos/; [“Preparation in Dera’a to Transfer ‘Settlement %D8%A3%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7 Groups’ to Idlib,”] Enab Baladi, August 23, 2018, https://www.enabbaladi.net/ %D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9- archives/248109; “Lessons from the Syrian State’s Return to the South,” %D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1 International Crisis Group, February 24, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/ %D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1 middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/196-lessons-syrian- %D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8- states-return-south; [“Dera’a: Russia Dissolves the Fifth Corps ... The th4 %D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9 Division Attracts Its Fighters,”] Al-Modon, September 17, 2018, https:// %86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF- www.almodon(.)com/arabworld/2018/9/17/%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81- %D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7- %D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8 %D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88.

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 47 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

154. Edith M. Lederer, “Russia and West Spar Over Reconstruction of Syria,” AP, July 165. “Q&A: Syria’s New Property Law,” Human Rights Watch, May 29, 2018, https://www. 27, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/6fa0762530274c48937817d77a10c7e8. hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law. 155. ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct, “Syria Situation Report: May 2 - May 29, 166. Leith Aboufadel, “East Ghouta Officially Under the Syrian Army’s Control After 2018,” Institute for the Study of War, June 1, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot. Last Militant Convoy Leaves Douma,” Al-Masdar, April 14, 2018, https://www. com/2018/06/syria-situation-report-may-2-29-2018.html. almasdarnews(.)com/article/east-ghouta-officially-under-the-syrian-armys- 156. “Treasury Designates Syrian Oligarch Samer Foz and His Luxury Reconstruction control-after-last-militant-convoy-leaves-douma/. Business Empire,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 11, 2019, https://home. 167. UN Senior Adviser Jan Egeland stated that Russia informed the UN of the treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm704; “U.S. Warns Businesses Against changes to Law 10 on October 18. Egeland noted that Russia had claimed Taking Part in Damascus Fair,” AP, August 28, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/ that “there were mistakes done” in Syria’s implementation of Law 10. See: middle-east/us-warns-businesses-against-taking-part-damascus-fair. “Transcript of Press Stakeout by United Nations Senior Advisor Jan Egeland,” 157. “U.S. Says Syrians Built Crematorium at Prison to Dispose of Bodies,” Reuters, United Nations, October 18, 2018, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note- May 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria- correspondents/2018-10-18/transcript-press-stakeout-united-nations-senior- usa/u-s-says-syrians-built-crematorium-at-prison-to-dispose-of-bodies- advisor; Alexander Decina, “How Should the West Play a Weak Hand in Syria idUSKCN18B20E; Holly Ellyatt, “U.S. Hits Back at Russia Claims, Says Moscow Reconstruction?” War on the Rocks, February 1, 2019, https://warontherocks. Is ‘Complicit’ in Syrian Atrocities,” CNBC, March 13, 2018, https://www.cnbc. com/2019/02/how-should-the-west-play-a-weak-hand-in-syria-reconstruction/; com/2018/03/13/us-hits-back-at-russia-claims-says-moscow-is-complicit- “Assad Amends Law 10, Giving Syrians a Year to Claim Their Property,” Middle in-syrian-atrocities.html; Abigail Williams, “Secretary Tillerson on Russia: East Eye, November 13, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/assad-amends- ‘Complicit or Simply Incompetent’ on Syrian Chemical Weapons,” NBC News, law-10-giving-syrians-year-claim-their-property; Tom Miles and Stephanie April 7, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/secretary-tillerson-russia- Nebehay, “Russia and Turkey Give More Time for Idlib Deal in Syria: UN,” complicit-or-simply-incompetent-syrian-chemical-weapons-n743686; Richard Reuters, October 18, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis- Roth, “Nikki Haley Says Russia Is Complicit in Syrian Atrocities,” CNN, January syria-un/russia-and-turkey-give-more-time-for-idlib-deal-in-syria-un- 24, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/23/middleeast/us-russia-un-chemical- idUSKCN1MS1MT. weapons-syria/index.html; James Jeffrey, “Testimony Before the House Foreign 168. Hasan Arfeh, “The Institutionalization of Demographic Change in Syria,” Affairs Committee,”House Foreign Affairs Committee,November 29, 2018, https:// Atlantic Council, April 4, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/ docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20181129/108766/HHRG-115-FA13-Wstate- the-institutionalization-of-demographic-change-in-syria; “How a Victorious JeffreyJ-20181129.pdf. Bashar Al-Assad Is Changing Syria,” The Economist, June 28, 2018, https://www. 158. Edith M. Lederer, “Russia and West Spar Over Reconstruction of Syria,” AP, July economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/06/28/how-a-victorious-bashar- 27, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/6fa0762530274c48937817d77a10c7e8. al-assad-is-changing-syria; Maha Yahya, “The Politics of Dispossession,” Carnegie Middle East Center, May 9, 2018, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/76290. 159. Ibid. 169. “Lebanon’s Hezbollah to Work with Syrian State on Refugee Returns,” 160. Arshad Mohammed and Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: Despite Tensions, Russia Seeks Reuters, June 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis- U.S. Help to Rebuild Syria,” Reuters, August 3, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ lebanon-syria-refugees/lebanons-hezbollah-to-work-with-syrian-state- article/us-usa-russia-syria-exclusive/exclusive-despite-tensions-russia-seeks-u- on-refugee-returns-idUSKBN1JP29Q; David Enders, “Pressure to Return s-help-to-rebuild-syria-idUSKBN1KO2JP. Builds on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” The New Humanitarian, August 20, 161. Ibid. 2018, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2018/08/20/ 162. Ibid. return-syrian-refugees-lebanon-hezbollah; Martin Chulov, “Thousands 163. Louisa Loveluck, “Syria Is Ready to Court Investors, But Europe Wants to of Refugees and Militants Return to Syria from Lebanon,” The Guardian, Prevent That,” Washington Post, January 23, 2019, https://beta.washingtonpost. August 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/14/ com/world/middle_east/syria-is-ready-to-court-investors-but-europe-wants- thousands-refugees-militants-return-syria-from-lebanon-hezbollah. to-prevent-that/2019/01/23/a40abe52-1e4b-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story. 170. Louisa Loveluck, “Assad Urged Syrian Refugees to Come Home. Many Are Being html; “Syrian Refugee Crisis,” United Nations High Commission on Refugees, Accessed on Welcomed with Arrest and Interrogation.” Washington Post, June 2, 2019, https:// November 10, 2019, https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/syria/. beta.washingtonpost.com/world/assad-urged-syrian-refugees-to-come-home- 164. Assad has greatly leveraged Law 10 in former opposition-held areas around many-are-being-welcomed-with-arrest-and-interrogation/2019/06/02/54b Damascus. The Syrian regime designated locations for reconstruction as early d696a-7bea-11e9-b1f3-b233fe5811ef_story.html; Q&A: Why Are Returns of as April 2018 in Darayya in Western Ghouta as well as Homs City. Opposition Refugees from Lebanon to Syria Premature?” Amnesty International, June 12, 2019, activists claimed that the regime also notified farmers outside of Hama City that https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1804812019ENGLISH. their land was being designated for development under Law 10 as early as July pdf; Laila Bassam, “Fifty Thousand Syrians Returned to Syria from Lebanon 2018. The Syrian regime has also used the process to seize the properties of This Year: Official,”Reuters, September 25, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ exiled members of the Syrian Interim Government in Southern Syria. Law 10 article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-lebanon-refugees-idUSKCN1M51OM. required property owners to prove their ownership of any designated properties 171. Maria Tsvetkova, “Russia and Turkey Agree to Create Buffer Zone in within thirty days of the issuance of development plans. The Syrian regime is Syria’s Idlib,” Reuters, September 17, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ able to restrict individuals from obtaining this documentation, assuming it article/us-mideast-crisis-putin-erdogan-hope/russia-and-turkey-agree- hadn’t already been destroyed during the war. See: Maha Yahya, “The Politics to-create-buffer-zone-in-syrias-idlib-idUSKCN1LX1BU; Joyce Karam, of Dispossession,” Carnegie Middle East Center, May 9, 2018, https://carnegie-mec. “Full Text of Turkey-Russia Memorandum on Idlib Revealed,” The org/diwan/76290; “Syria: Residents Blocked from Returning,”Human Rights National, September 19, 2018, https://www.thenational(.)ae/world/mena/ Watch, October 16, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/16/syria-residents- full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-idlib-revealed-1.771953. blocked-returning; “Syrian Government Seizes Properties of Former Members 172. Maria Tsvetkova, “Russia and Turkey Agree to Create Buffer Zone in Syria’s of Organizations and Syrian Interim Government in Dera’a,” SMART, October Idlib,” Reuters, September 17, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- 12, 2018, https://smartnews-agency.com/en/wires/336371/syrian-government- crisis-putin-erdogan-hope/russia-and-turkey-agree-to-create-buffer-zone-in- seizes-properties-of-former-members-of-organizations-and; Reem Ahmad, syrias-idlib-idUSKCN1LX1BU. Noura Hourani, and Sage Smiley, “‘A New Syria’: Law 10 Reconstruction Projects 173. Ibid.; Joyce Karam, “Full Text of Turkey-Russia Memorandum on Idlib to Commence in Damascus, Backed by Arsenal of Demolition, Expropriation Revealed,” The National, September 19, 2018, https://www.thenational(.)ae/world/ Legislation,” Syria Direct, November 19, 2018, https://syriadirect.org/ mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-idlib-revealed-1.771953. news/%E2%80%98a-new-syria%E2%80%99-law-10-reconstruction-projects- to-commence-in-damascus-backed-by-arsenal-of-demolition-expropriation- 174. “Jihadists ‘Still in Syria’s Idlib’ as Withdrawal Deadline Passes,” France24, October legislation/; [“A Law Regulating the Reconfiguration of a Lost or Damaged Real 15, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20181015-syria-jihadists-still-idlib- Estate Document,”] SANA, October 27, 2017, https://www.sana(.)sy/?p=649244; buffer-zone-deadline-passes; Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Extremists Hold Out “Q&A: Syria’s New Property Law,” Human Rights Watch, May 29, 2018, https:// in Syria as Russia Tries to Avoid More Fighting,” Wall Street Journal, October 15, www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law; Ibrahim Abu 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/extremists-hold-out-in-syria-as-russia- Ahmad, “Assad’s Law 10: Reshaping Syria’s Demographics, Washington Institute, tries-to-avoid-more-fighting-1539621924; “Southeast of Idlib, The Northern https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/assads-law-10-reshaping- and Northwestern Countryside of Hama Are Free of Visible Weapons, Latakia syrias-demographics; Kersten Knipp, “Syria: Expropriation Is ‘Punishment Factions Continue Burying Their Heavy Weapons in Its Mountains,” SOHR, for Those Who Protested’,” DW, April 28, 218, https://www.dw.com/en/syria- October 8, 2018, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=104196; [“In Response to the expropriation-is-punishment-for-those-who-protested/a-43572305; Ian P. Shelling ... ‘Tahrir al-Sham’ Attacks Assad’s Forces East of Idlib,”] Enab Baladi, Johnson, “Germany Fuming Over Syrian President Bashar Assad’s Plan to Seize November 1, 2018, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/260555. Property from Exiles,”DW , April 27, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/germany- 175. “Syria President Says Russia-Turkey Idlib Deal ‘Temporary’,” AP, October 7, fuming-over-syrian-president-bashar-assads-plan-to-seize-property-from- 2018, https://apnews.com/0a8b14051ecf4917a38eef307312c07e. exiles/a-43557682.

48 UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG NOVEMBER 2019

176. Sune Engel Rasmussen and Thomas Grove, “Fragile Syria Ceasefire Tests Russia- in Syria’s Idlib,” Reuters, February 14, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/ Turkey Ties,” Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ us-mideast-crisis-russia-turkey-iran/kremlin-after-summit-says-no-offensive- fragile-syria-cease-fire-tests-russia-turkey-ties-1543160387; Harun al-Aswad, planned-in-syrias-idlib-idUSKCN1Q31JC; “Russia, Turkey Agree to ‘Take “Southern Idlib Pounded by Russian Jets and Syrian Artillery Despite Turkish Decisive Measures’ in Syria’s Idlib,” Al-Jazeera, February 11, 2019, https://www. Patrols,” Middle East Eye, March 13, 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/russia-turkey-agree-decisive-measures-syria- southern-idlib-pounded-russian-jets-and-syrian-artillery-despite-turkish- idlib-190207150418773.html; Olesya Astakhova, “Russia and Turkey to Act patrols. to Stabilize Syria’s Idlib Province: Putin,” Reuters, January 23, 2019, https:// 177. Megan Specia and Nick Cummings-Bruce, “UN Syria Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-putin-erdogan/russia-and-turkey- Announces Resignation,” New York Times, October 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes. to-act-to-stabilize-syrias-idlib-province-putin-idUSKCN1PH2C8; “Erdogan com/2018/10/17/world/middleeast/mistura-resign-united-nations-syria.html. Meets Putin, Rouhani in Sochi Ahead of Trilateral Syria Summit,” Daily Sabah, February 14, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/02/14/ 178. “Turkish, Russian Defense Ministers Meet in Sochi Over Idlib Agreement,” erdogan-meets-putin-rouhani-in-sochi-ahead-of-trilateral-syria-summit. Hurriyet Daily News, November 20, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ turkish-russian-defense-ministers-meet-in-sochi-139038. 186. Harun al-Aswad, “Southern Idlib Pounded by Russian Jets and Syrian Artillery Despite Turkish Patrols,” Middle East Eye, March 13, 2019, https:// 179. Sune Engel Rasmusse, “At Istanbul Summit, Russia Seeks Role as Mediator of www.middleeasteye.net/news/southern-idlib-pounded-russian-jets-and- Syria War,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ syrian-artillery-despite-turkish-patrols; [“Preparation for Joint Patrol with at-istanbul-summit-russia-seeks-role-as-mediator-of-syria-war-1540625897. Russia at Tel Rifaat,”] NTV, March 12, 2019, https://www.ntv(.)com.tr/turkiye/ 180. Sune Engel Rasmussen and Thomas Grove, “Fragile Syria Ceasefire Tests tel-rifatta-rusya-ile-ortak-devriye-hazirligi%2cYtnFYw2DJkaMosCWj1QmPA. Russia-Turkey Ties,” Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2018, https://www.wsj. 187. [“Turkey Conducts Its First Patrol with Russia in Manbij,”] Enab Baladi, February com/articles/fragile-syria-cease-fire-tests-russia-turkey-ties-1543160387; 2, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/282027. “Turkish, Russian Defense Ministers Meet in Sochi Over Idlib Agreement,” Hurriyet Daily News, November 20, 2018, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ 188. Izzet Mazi, “Turkey Reopens Key Border Crossing with Syria,” turkish-russian-defense-ministers-meet-in-sochi-139038. Anadolu Agency, March 5, 2019, https://www.aa.com(.)tr/en/economy/ turkey-reopens-key-border-crossing-with-syria/1409698. 181. [“’Tahrir al-Sham’ Evacuates Its Offices at the Morek Crossing in the Hama Countryside,”] Enab Baladi, December 7, 2018, https://www.enabbaladi.net/ 189. Elizabeth Teoman, “Turkey and Russia Prepared to Launch Joint Military archives/268472; Josko Baric, “Syrian War Daily - 7th of December 2018,” Patrols in Syria’s Idlib,” Institute for the Study of War, March 9, 2019, http:// Syrian War Daily, December 7, 2018, https://syrianwardaily.com/2018/12/07/ iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/03/turkey-and-russia-prepared-to-launch. syrian-war-daily-7th-of-december-2018/. html; Halab Today, Twitter, March 17, 2019, https://twitter.com/HalabTodayTV/ status/1107214299494260736; Selen Temizer and Levent Tok, “Turkish 182. “HTS Sending Trucks of ‘Gas Cylinders’ to Syrian Regime-Held Areas,” Military Begins Patrols in Syria’s Idlib,” Anadolu Agency, March 8, 2019, https:// Nedaa Syria, January 27, 2019, https://nedaa-sy.com/en/reports/238; “Syria’s www.aa.com(.)tr/en/middle-east/turkish-military-begins-patrols-in-syria-s- International Highways: ‘Tahrir al-Sham’s’ Latest Battlefield,” Enab Baladi, idlib/1412871; [“Idlib Conflict in the Area for the Patrol of the Turkish Soldiers December 9, 2018, https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2018/12/syrias- Who Entered the Village of Tel Touqan,”] TRT Haber, March 8, 2019, https://www. international-highways-tahrir-al-shams-latest-battlefield/; “’Tahrir al-Sham’ trthaber(.)com/haber/turkiye/tel-tokanda-turk-askerine-sevgi-gosterisi-407747. Seeks to Complete Its Control over the Damascus-Aleppo International html. Highway,” Enab Baladi, November 27, 2018, https://english.enabbaladi.net/ archives/2018/11/tahrir-al-sham-seeks-to-complete-its-control-over-the- 190. Kirill Semenov, “New Name, Same Old Problems: Syria Talks Kick Off damascus-aleppo-international-highway/; Bethan McKernan, “Aid Agencies in Kazakh Capital,” Al-Monitor, April 30, 2019, https://www.al-monitor. Pull Out of Idlib in Face of New Terror Threat,” The Guardian, February 12, 2019, com/pulse/originals/2019/04/russia-turkey-iran-nursultan-astana-talks. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/12/aid-agencies-pull-out-of- html; “Joint Statement by Iran, Russia and Turkey on the International idlib-in-face-of-new-terror-threat-syria; Mohammad Abdulssattar Ibrahim Meeting on Syria in the Astana Format (25 - 26 April 2019),” Relief and Tom Rollins, “Turkey Attempts to Salvage Sochi Agreements as Bombing Web, April 26, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/ Devastates Idlib,” Syria Direct, March 13, 2019, https://syriadirect.org/news/ joint-statement-iran-russia-and-turkey-international-meeting-syria-0. turkey-attempts-to-salvage-sochi-agreement-as-bombing-devastates-idlib/. 191. [“Regime Dead and Wounded in Hama and Aleppo, and Local Councils in 183. [“A New Agreement to Break the Era of Internal Fighting in the Liberated Hama and Idlib Refuse Entry of Russian Forces to Its Areas,”] SMART, April North,”] Ebaa News, January 9, 2019, https://ebaa(.)news/news/2019/01/27719/; 29, 2019, https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/reports/378147/%D9%82%D8 “’Tahrir al Sham’ and ‘National Liberation Front’ Reach a Final Agreement %AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%89- ... And These Are the Terms,”] Nedaa Syria, January 10, 2019, https://nedaa-sy. %D9%84%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85- com/news/10957; [“’Salvation Government’ ... From Establishment to %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A9- Control of Idlib,”] Enab Baladi, January 10, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/ -%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AC%D8 archives/275762. %A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9- %D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A9- 184. [“50,000 People Are Deprived of Their Bread in Jisr al-Shughour,”] Enab Baladi, %D9%88%D8%A5%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A8; [“’Salvation Government’ January 27, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/278877; [“Compiled Refuses to Guide Russian Patrols on the Outskirts of Idlib”] Enab Baladi, April 30, Bulletin on Sunday for All Field and Military Events in Syria 20-01-2019,”] 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/297650; [“An Opposition Faction SNN, January 21, 2019, http://www.shaam(.)org/news/bulletins/%D9%8 Closes International Road to Prevent Russian Patrols in Idlib,”] Enab Baladi, April 6%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF- 28, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/297290. %D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF- %D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3 192. Ibid. %D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A 193. “Syrian Regime Barrel Bombs Batter Idlib for the First Time in Six Months,” %D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84 Asharq Al-Awsat, May 1, 2019, https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1702916/ %D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A- syria-regime-barrel-bombs-batter-idlib-first-time-6-months; [“Russian %D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-20-01-2019.html; Suleiman Aviation Continues Its Raids on the Countryside of Hama and Idlib,”] Enab al-Khalidi, “Syrian Jihadists Cement Grip, Forcing Deal on Idlib Rebels,” Reuters, Baladi, April 28, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/297247; [“Putin: A January 10, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idlib/ Massive Attack on Idlib Is Currently Inappropriate,”] Enab Baladi, April 27, 2019, syrian-jihadists-cement-grip-forcing-deal-on-idlib-rebels-idUSKCN1P41RK; https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/297053. [“Booby-Trap Aborts Demonstrations in Idlib and Assad’s Planes Are Escalating 194. [“Turkey Aborts Final Idlib Agreement ... Army Sends Reinforcements to the Again,”] Zaman al-Wasl, February 24, 2019, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/ North and Confronts the Terrorists at Qalaat al-Mudiq,”]Al-Watan, April 30, article/102118/; [“Regime’s Warplanes Come Back to Bomb Idlib,”] Enab Baladi, 2019, http://alwatan(.)sy/archives/196370. February 25, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/283875. 195. Michael Land, “Pro-Regime Air Campaign in Greater Idlib Province,” Institute 185. Russia and Turkey released a joint statement on February 11, 2019, agreeing for the Study of War, May 25, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/05/pro- to take “decisive measures” to secure the demilitarized zone in Idlib Province regime-air-campaign-in-greater.html; Michael Land, Matti Suomenaro, Mason ahead of planned Astana Talks on February 14. A Kremlin spokesperson later Clark, and Elizabeth Teoman, “Pro-Assad Regime Forces Locked in Battle announced that no new military operation was planned in Idlib Province but of Attrition in Idlib Province,” Institute for the Study of War, July 2, 2019, http:// left the door open for future operations. See: “Joint Statement by the President iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/06/pro-assad-regime-forces-locked-in.html. of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the President of the Russian Federation and 196. Michael Land, Matti Suomenaro, Mason Clark, and Elizabeth Teoman, “Pro- the President of the Republic of Turkey,” Kremlin, February 14, 2019, http:// Assad Regime Forces Locked in Battle of Attrition in Idlib Province,” Institute for the en.kremlin(.)ru/supplement/5388; “Erdogan, Putin Reaffirm ‘Joint Fight’ in Study of War, June 28, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/06/pro-assad- Syria’s Idlib,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 23, 2019, http://www.hurriyetdailynews. regime-forces-locked-in.html. com/turkish-russian-presidents-meet-in-moscow-140729; Vladimir Soldatkin and Andrew Osborn, “Kremlin, After Summit, Says No Offensive Planned

UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 49 Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria

197. Anton Mardasov, “What Are Russian Special Operations Forces Doing in Idlib?” %84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9; [“HNC Reveals the Names Al-Jazeera, August 29, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/indepth/opinion/ of Its Delegates to the Constitutional Drafting Sub-Committee,”] Zaman al-Wasl, russian-special-operations-forces-idlib-190828144800497.html. October 16, 2019, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/114850/; Stephanie 198. Marianna Belenkaya, “Astana Talks Show Russia Eager to Keep Plugging Away Nebehay, “Syria Ceasefire Holding Ahead of Constitutional Committee, UN at Idlib,” Al-Monitor, August 5, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ Envoy Tells Reuters,” Reuters, October 24, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ originals/2019/08/russia-syria-turkey-astana-talks.html. article/us-syria-security-un/syria-ceasefire-holding-ahead-of-constitutional- committee-u-n-envoy-tells-reuters-idUSKBN1X327C; [“Syrians Are Mandated 199. Liz Sly, “Syrian Military Recaptures Strategic Town Held by Rebels as Civilians to Draft the New Constitution … What Are the Qualifications of the 45?”]Enab Flee,” Washington Post, August 22, 2019, https://beta.washingtonpost.com/ Baladi, November 4, 2019, https://enabbaladi.net/archives/340010. world/syrian-military-recaptures-strategic-town-held-by-rebels-as-civilians- flee/2019/08/22/7c0cd614-c4e1-11e9-8bf7-cde2d9e09055_story.html. 213. Anne Barnard, “Assad in Person: Confident, Friendly, No Regrets,” New York Times, November 1, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/world/ 200. Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Khan Sheikhoun a Ghost Town as Syrian Regime middleeast/bashar -assad-syria-civil-war.html. Advances,” The Defense Post, August 16, 2019, https://thedefensepost. com/2019/08/16/syria-khan-sheikhoun-refugees-idlib/. 214. “President Al-Assad’s Interview Given to Al-Souriya and Al-Ikhbariya TVs,” SANA, October 31, 2019, https://sana(.)sy/en/?p=177331. 201. “Syria War: Russia Announces Ceasefire in Idlib Rebel Stronghold,”BBC , August 30, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49527419. 215. [“Do Withdrawals Affect the Work of the Constitutional Committee?”]Enab Baladi, October 13, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/334763. 202. Maixm A. Suchkov, “How Latest Astana Talks Between Turkey, Russia, Iran Went Beyond Syria,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2019, https://www.al-monitor. 216. [“Syrian Regime Arrests Member of the Constitutional Committee com/pulse/originals/2019/09/turkey-iran-russia-astana-talks-syria-war.html; for the Opposition Delegation,”] Anadolu Agency, October 8, 2019, [“Joint Statement by the Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian https://www.aa.com(.)tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8 Federation, and the Republic of Turkey,”] Kremlin, September 16, 2019, http:// 8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D www.kremlin(.)ru/supplement/5439?fbclid=IwAR21LLfk-HFY1WqdrGpioJX82T 9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A c7PbEugcDXyOQk7RX3OhDfkjpHZpxtUT0. 7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A- %D9%8A%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF- 203. Maixm A. Suchkov, “How Latest Astana Talks Between Turkey, Russia, Iran Went %D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9% Beyond Syria,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/ 84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D- pulse/originals/2019/09/turkey-iran-russia-astana-talks-syria-war.html. 8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86- 204. Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin Controls the Pace of Operations %D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8% in Syria’s Idlib,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2019, http://iswresearch. A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9/1606206; [“Regime Releases Member of the blogspot.com/2019/09/russia-in-review-kremlin-controls-pace.html. Constitutional Committee After Being Detained for Hours,”] Jesr Press, October 205. Ben Hubbard and Carlotta Gall, “Turkey Launches Offensive Against U.S.- 24, 2019, https://www.jesrpress(.)com/2019/10/09/%D8%A7%D9%84%D Backed Syrian Militia, New York Times, October 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes. 9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%AC- com/2019/10/09/world/middleeast/turkey-attacks-syria.html. %D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88-%D9%81%D9%8A- 206. Saphora Smith, “Turkey Launches Military Operation %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84 in Northeast Syria after U.S. Withdraws,” NBC News, %D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/. October 9, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ 217. Julia Harte and Katanga Johnson, “Trump Calls on Russia, Syria to Stop turkey-launches-operation-syria-3-days-after-trump-announces-u-n1063576. Bombing Idlib Province,” Reuters, June 2, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ 207. “UN Chief Announces Progress on Committee to Shape Syria’s Political article/us-usa-trump-syria/trump-calls-on-russia-syria-to-stop-bombing- Future,” United Nations, September 23, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/ idlib-province-idUSKCN1T404S; “Statement by the Spokesperson on story/2019/09/1047092. the Deterioration of the Situation in Idlib, Syria,” European Union, July 24, 208. UN Envoy for Syria, Twitter, September 30, 2019, https://twitter.com/ 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/65814/ unenvoysyria/status/1178674384938176512?s=11. statement-spokesperson-deterioration-situation-idlib-syria_en. 209. Morgan Ortagus, “Statement Welcoming UN Secretary General’s Announcement 218. “Statement by Joel Rayburn, Special Envoy for Syria, Deputy Assistant of an Agreement Between the Government of Syria and the Syrian Negotiations Secretary for Levant Affairs,”U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Committee to Form a Constitutional Committee,” U.S. Department of State, Geneva, October 29, 2019, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/10/30/ September 23, 2019, https://www.state.gov/statement-welcoming-un-secretary- das-joel-rayburn-at-a-press-stakeout-in-geneva/. generals-announcement-of-an-agreement-between-the-government-of-syria- 219. “Syria Conflict: Chief Opposition Negotiator Resigns,”BBC , May 30, 2016, and-the-syrian-negotiations-committee-to-form-a-constitutional-committee/. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36410564; Tom Perry, “Head 210. This assessment is based in part on ISW’s evaluation of the delegates to the Syrian of Syrian Opposition’s HNC Resigns: Statement,” Reuters, November 20, 2017, Constitutional Committee. Additional sourcing available from the authors upon https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-hnc/head-of-syrian- request. See: Mohammed Hussainy, “Did Guterres Announce Goood News for oppositions-hnc-resigns-statement-idUSKBN1DK26N; Khaled al-Khateb, Syrians?” Jordan Times, October 1, 2019, https://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/ “Syrian High Negotiations Committee Under Fire,” Al-Monitor, October mohammed-hussainy/did-guterres-announce-good-news-syrians. 22, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/syrian- negotiations-committee-opposition-dissolution.html. 211. Ibid. 220. “AQ-Aligned Jihadi Coalition Group Labels Political Solutions for Syria 212. The Syrian Constitutional Committee will vote on proposals drafted by a forty- ‘Suicide’,” SITE, October 10, 2019, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/ .fve person sub-committee. All draft proposals must first receive approval aq-aligned-jihadi-coalition-group-labels-political-solutions-for-syria-suicide from three-quarters of sub-committee delegates. The sub-committee contains html. fifteen members nominated by each delegation. ISW assesses that the subcommittee contains nineteen Assad-aligned individuals and ten Assad-amenable 221. Julian Borger and Martin Chulov, “U.S. Deploying More Troops Around Syria individuals, giving the regime a majority of twenty-nine delegates on the agenda- Oil Fields After Killing of ISIS Leader,” The Guardian, October 28, 2019, https:// setting body. The Syrian Constitutional Committee also has two co-chairs drawn www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/28/syria-us-troops-oil-fields-isis. from the regime and opposition delegations — former Syrian National Coalition 222. For example, Germany and France arrested three members of Syrian regime President Hadi al-Bahra and Syrian Member of Parliament Ahmed Kuzbari. intelligence accused of crimes against humanity in February 2019. See: Riham The co-chairs are supposed to make their decisions “in consensus” with one Alkousaa, “Three Syrians Arrested in Germany and France for Suspected Crimes another. These mechanisms will give Assad additional levers by which to stall the Against Humanity,” Reuters, February 13, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/ proceedings of the Syrian Constitutional Committee. See: Antonio Guterres, us-germany-syria/two-syrians-arrested-in-germany-for-suspected-crimes- “Letter Dated 26 September 2019 from the Secretary-General Addressed to against-humanity-prosecutors-idUSKCN1Q21FO. the President of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, September 223. Annie Sparrow, “How UN Humanitarian Aid Has Propped Up Assad,” 27, 2019, https://undocs.org/en/S/2019/775; [“Pedersen: Constitutional Foreign Affairs, September 20, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ Committee Is a Historical Moment, and the Syrian People Are the Source of syria/2018-09-20/how-un-humanitarian-aid-has-propped-assad. Legitimacy,”] Asharq Al-Awsat, October 24, 2019, https://aawsat.com/home/article 224. Ibid. /1959031/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%A7 %D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84 %D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%C2%BB- %D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9 %8A%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4 %D8%B9%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9- %8A-%D9%87%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9

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