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Home , Space command, Space Race

Christoph Schwarz, Sofia-Maria Satanakis

FOKUS | 6/2020

Space Race 2.0 – Renewed Great Power Competition in the Earth’s

Introduction In recent years, however, this clause is in- However, a critical turning point occurred creasingly being drawn into question and with the First in 1990-1991, when With the successful launch of Soviet competition is once again on the agenda. space-based capabilities shifted from pu- into in 1957, modern civili- While building on the technological legacy rely strategic to tactical significance during zation eventually arrived in outer space, the of the allows for ever more wartime. Signals intelligence (the intercep- final frontier of exploration. A step sophisticated space-based application, an tion of adversarial signals), telecommuni- which would herald the start of a new era, increasingly hostile environment in the cations, positioning/navigation, and seve- an age of relentless competition among the international system has spurred the mili- ral other novel technical advancements, great powers, marked by unprecedented tarization of space. Especially the growing for the first time, allowed the heights in scientific endeavor. The Space distrust between the United States and near real-time support of ground forces Race, as this period is referred to, pushed its declared great power rivals, China and with intelligence and the effective use of the United States and the to , has led to a recent overhaul of the precision-guided munitions. The efficacy devote immensurable resources into their countries’ military doctrines, organizations of these ground-breaking weapons and space programs, thus generating techno- and capabilities in order to meet this new intelligence systems based on space-appli- logical advancements that would forever reality, in which “space is a warfighting do- cations naturally did not remain unnoticed transform human capabilities. From compu- main just like air, land and sea”, as General by other nations. Consequentially, as ca- ter technology to telecommunications and John Raymond, commander of the U.S. Air pability fuels the development of counter- navigation, the chase for the stars in the Force , stated in 2017.2 capability, Russia and China initiated ASAT latter half of the enabled the What we can observe in space today is a programs that were significantly extended discovery and advancement of countless classic security dilemma among the great over the past three decades, advancing applications that impacted both the civil powers, with space capabilities represen- the militarization of, and magnifying the and the military domains in an unparalleled ting both an increasing vulnerability as security dilemma in, space. To better un- manner. After the Space Race peaked in well as during military con- derstand space as a potential warfighting 1969, with the United States successfully flict. This paper shall provide an overview domain, two concepts need to be further landing 11 on the , the fierce of space-related military developments in elaborated on, namely Space for Defence competition defining the early years of the the USA, China, Russia and the European and Defence of Space.4 was increasingly replaced by co- Union, shedding light on the current state operation. In 1972, the US and the Soviets of the militarization of space. Space for Defence refers to the aforementi- launched the cooperative Apollo- Test oned space-based capabilities that serve Project and other collaborative initiatives, Space as a Warfighting Domain as a force enabler during military conflict such as the International and can be broadly summarized into three (ISS), followed in the years to come. Also, The story of humanity in space has many categories: Intelligence, Reconnaissance the legal character of space activities star- dimensions and it’s use for military purpo- and Surveillance (ISR); Positioning, Naviga- ted to take shape. The , ses has been one since the very beginning. tion and Timing (PNT); and Satellite Com- formally known as the “Treaty on Principles Sputnik 1 unleashed fear in the United munications (SATCOMs). ISR, for example, Governing the Activities of States in the Ex- States that it could represent a harbinger includes earth observation, early missile ploration and Use of Outer Space, including for space-based nuclear weapons, leading warning systems, meteorology or signals the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies“, was to the first anti-satellite (ASAT) program intelligence. PNT facilitates the precise exe- signed by the U.S., the UK and the USSR in the US in 1958, with the Soviets quickly cution of military operations and weapon in 1967, which, as of now, 109 nations are following suit. Although several ASAT strikes, continuously providing decision- parties to. This UN treaty, forming the basic systems were deployed by both sides makers of armed forces with enhanced legal framework for international space over the course of the , space situational awareness. The U.S. Global law, prohibits weapons of mass destruction as a domain for military conflict was not Positioning System (GPS) is a primary ex- from being placed in space, as well as estab- seriously considered by either party. If ample of this kind. SATCOMs represent an lishes that “the exploration and use of outer anything, satellite technology was rather essential competence for command and space shall be carried out for the benefit considered a stabilizing element, allowing control during military conflict, allowing and in the interests of all countries and shall for the de-escalation of conflicts through for the consistent and quick transmission be the province of all mankind“.1 enhanced intelligence on the adversary3. of critical intelligence and orders in any en-

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vironment. What becomes apparent when USA strengthen deterrence and warfighting looking at these various capabilities is that, options, improve foundational capabilities while providing nations that are in posses- The 20th century witnessed the United Sta- (such as PNT and ISR), and foster a condu- sion of it with tremendous leverage in and tes’ rise to hegemony, asserting politico- cive environment for the U.S. commercial out of combat, they equally represent a military dominance in practically every . serious vulnerability. Defence of Space thus domain. A superiority which would also refers to the protection of the Achilles’ heel manifest itself in space, be it for scientific, As part of this broader move to overhaul that space-based applications have be- commercial or military ends. Building on the U.S. military approach to space, Trump come for countries increasingly reliant on the experiences of the Gulf War, outer issued the creation of the U.S. them, most notably the United States, and space was declared a vital interest for U.S (USSF), which was approved by Congress “consists of all active and passive measures by the end of the 1990s. in December 2019. The USSF therefore taken to protect friendly space capabilities Around that time, a Commission headed constitutes the now sixth branch of the from attack, interference, or unintentional by Defense Secretary-designate Donald U.S. Armed Forces and co-exists with the hazards“5. Besides unintentional hazards, Rumsfeld submitted a report to Congress, U.S. Air Force within the Department of the such as solar winds or , the assessing the “U.S. National Security Space Air Force, similar to the U.S. Navy and the threat scenario that militaries encounter Management and Organization”6. Warning U.S. Marine Corps within the Department in space is continuously expanding, due to against a potential “space Pearl Harbor”, of the Navy. This would allow the Space technological that has conside- the report advocated for an overhaul of Force to mature within the pre-existing rably increased the spectrum of counter- the U.S. space organization and doctrine, structures of the Air Force, before even- space-capabilities in recent years. Broadly, in order to meet the increasing threat tually being transitioned into an inde- one can discern between four different ty- posed by other nations’ counterspace pendent Department of the Space Force. pes of such counterspace weapons, which capabilities. Consequentially, the “space As such, the USSF “will be responsible differentiate in the intended consequen- dominance” doctrine was adopted by the for organizing, training, and equipping ces for space assets and in varying degrees Bush administration in 2004, stressing that military space forces of the United States of technical sophistication. Kinetic physical the use of space assets shall not be denied to provide for freedom of operation in, weapons, such as direct-ascent ballistic by adversaries during conflict. Although from, and to the space domain, inclu- missiles or co-orbital , represent the United States embraced a generally ding both combat and combat-support the oldest and most overt form of ASAT more collaborative stance in space affairs functions to enable prompt and sustained capability. The second type, non-kinetic with Obama taking charge of the White offensive and defensive space operations.”9 physical weapons, are a more sophisticated House, the notion of offensive as well as Additionally, the U.S. Space Command alternative to physically damage assets, defensive space control continued throug- was re-established, tasked to develop a including electromagnetic pulse weapons hout subsequent strategy papers. It was revised space defense doctrine and over- (EMP), high-powered microwave weapons not until Donald Trump assumed office, see warfighting operations in space. The (HPM) and high-powered laser weapons. however, that organizational as well as third institutional reform to support the The third type, electronic counterspace wea- doctrinal change on a more fundamental modernization of the U.S. space architec- pons, aim to jam or spoof radio frequency level took place and the National Space ture was the establishment of the Space signals necessary for the transmission of Council was revived by the President for Development Agency (SDA) to accelerate data between the satellite and the terrest- the first time in 24 years. Instead of merely innovation and development of next- rial end-user. The fourth and last type of seeing space-based applications as a criti- generation space capabilities and conduct counterspace capabilities are cyberattacks, cal support function during military con- space acquisition for the USSF. targeting both the system and the data its- flict, space itself being the theatre of such elf. As such, satellite data can be intercep- became the commonly held presumption. The United States unquestionably main- ted, monitored and corrupted. In the worst The 2018 US National Defense Strate- tains the most advanced space capabilities case, a cyberattack can even result in the gy (NDS) thus “recognizes great power worldwide, demonstrating by far the seizure of control of a satellite. Defensive competition with China and Russia as the most operational experience in space- efforts to counter these threats include central challenge to U.S. national security integrated warfighting, as well as a highly measures to deceive, degrade and destroy and highlights space as a critical domain sophisticated worldwide Space Situational enemy targeting systems, physically pro- in which this competition will occur.”7 Buil- Awareness (SSA) system. Whereas only tect space assets, as well as distribute and ding on the NDS, the Trump administrati- 10% of American missiles were guided diversify the platforms, orbits and systems on furthermore issued the 2018 “America by satellites in the Gulf War, this number used for the fulfilment of certain capabili- First National Space Strategy”. Claiming increased to almost 70% during the war in ties. The operability of GPS, for instance, is that “competitors and adversaries have Iraq10. As of 2018, the U.S. operated more not reliant on a single satellite or ground turned space into a warfighting domain”8, than 350 civil and military ISR-satellites, station, making it highly resilient against the strategy essentially proclaims to incre- providing space-based image intelligence interference. ase the resilience of space architectures, (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGNIT), and

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measurement and signatures intelligence also emphasized on China’s opposition to COMs, China operates over 30 satellites (MASINT). In terms of PNT, GPS satellites an in space and advocated for and has initiated testing of next-genera- represent the backbone of U.S. capabilities, the peaceful use of space, it became clear tion quantum-enabled communications, being integrated into a multitude of we- that space-related military capabilities are putting the country at the forefront of the apons systems and operational practices, being viewed as vital in serving national global satellite communications indust- but also support a wide range of commer- interests. This position was reaffirmed in ry. This year, China is set to complete its cial and civil applications. According to the China’s subsequent defense white paper in global constellation of 27 Beidou satellites SDA, it is currently developing the National 2019, expressing that “space security pro­ facilitating worldwide PNT, a system simi- Defense (NDSA). Bud- vides strategic assurance for national and lar to the GPS. In terms of counterspace geted at around $11 billion, 250 satellites social development.”13 Moreover, official capabilities, China caught the world’s will be launched until 2025, providing documents by the People’s Liberation attention for the first time in 2007, when it global next-generation communication Army (PLA) indicate that counterspace destroyed one of its own meteorological services to the U.S. military, including operations are viewed as a critical means satellites with a direct-ascent ASAT missile. and PNT capabilities to to counter possible US intervention during An act for which it was heavily criticized for supplement GPS11. Regarding counter- military conflict, suggesting the destruc- by the international community, as more space capabilities, the U.S. does not have tion of communication, reconnaissance than 3000 pieces of debris now orbiting officially acknowledged co-orbital or and navigation satellites to “blind and in (LEO) were produced. direct-ascent ASAT weapons, it does howe- deafen the enemy.”14 Possibly because of this backlash, testing ver possess the means to make use of such and development of kinetic physical capabilities in short time if it chooses so. In This doctrinal change was accompanied weapons appear to have abated in recent terms of electronic counterspace capabili- by an organizational change, as the years. Instead, reports suggest that China ty, the U.S. operates the Counter Commu- People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support has seriously stepped up its efforts in the nication System (CCS), providing up-link Force (PLA SSF) was established in 2015 areas of non-kinetic physical and elect- jamming which has proven to be effective and became operational the following ronic counterspace capabilities, such as against Russian (GLONASS) and Chinese year. Under direct authority of the Central directed-energy weapons (lasers) and (Beidou) navigation satellite systems. Military Commission, the national defense jamming-technology against enemy ISR, Also, significant R&D efforts have gone organization of the PRC, it is independent navigation and communication satelli- into ground-based high energy lasers for from other branches of the military and tes. Additionally, cyberwarfare has been counterspace purposes in recent years. combines the management of cyber emphasized as a key asset in space-related Considering the current resurgence in U.S. space, electromagnetic space and outer military operations by the PLA. In space, space military ambitions and the claim to space capabilities into a single entity. The China and its SSF are most certainly a force supremacy in space, U.S. space capabilities merger of these areas under one umbrella to be reckoned with. will most certainly advance remarkably in highlights China’s understanding of mo- the foreseeable future. dern “informationized warfare”, a highly re- Russia current theme in Chinese strategy papers. China Besides the development of military space With the Soviet Union having been a doctrine, the SSF is responsible for R&D pioneer in the space domain, activities In China’s self-conception as a rising and of certain space capabilities, in space, be it for military or scientific increasingly competitive power, civil as and support, navigation, ISR operations, purposes, have a longstanding tradition in well as military ambitions in space are SATCOMs, as well as space attack and its successor state Russia. Although space firmly established. The latter was first defense. As many space applications have capabilities deteriorated after the collapse acknowledged on paper by a doctrinal dual-use properties, “civil-military integ- of the USSR due to budgetary constraints change in 2015, as China’s Military Strategy ration” has been increasingly emphasized and other setbacks, Russia remains a stated that “outer space and cyber space by China. Thus, the PLA SFF collaborates global leader in space affairs, not only due have become new commanding heights closely with the Chinese civil and com- to its heavy involvement in the ISS and in strategic competition among all parties. mercial space sector, with the intent of the recent announcement to build a new Countries concerned are developing their leveraging potential synergies. space station in the foreseeable future. space forces and instruments, and the The Russian military doctrine and other first signs of weaponization of outer space In terms of capabilities, China is well on strategic documents have long recognized have appeared.”12 This change in doctrine track to seriously challenge the United Sta- space as a warfighting domain, stating is merely a reaffirmation of preceding de- tes’ longstanding superiority in space. With that “no goal will be achieved in future velopments, in that China has been inves- more than 120 ISR satellites as of 2018, of wars unless one belligerent gains informa- ting heavily in ASAT capabilities to counter which around half are owned by the PLA, tion superiority over the other”15, which information-enabled warfare ever since China possesses the means for worldwide consequentially translates into superiority the Gulf War. Although the strategy paper situational awareness. Regarding SAT- in space. Together with China, Russia has

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repeatedly called for a space arms control Russian ISR satellites still surpass Chinese operational context, be it through bilateral agreement to curb the weaponization models in individual capability, providing and multilateral arrangements or within of outer space, a development for which Russia with high proficiency in global SSA. the framework of NATO, a defining cha- it essentially blames the United States. Russian SATCOM, on the other hand, com- racteristic. Furthermore, the urgency with However, the U.S. dismissed two attempts pares poorly to other global powers, which which security in space is regarded by EU to reach such an agreement in 2008 and is why recent modernization efforts have member states varies depending on nati- 2014. On the one hand, Russia perceives been initiated, including partnerships with onal interests and differing strategic cul- the tremendous might of U.S. space ca- European satellite manufactures. Russia’s tures. Whereas France adopted the Space pabilities as undermining global strategic PNT capabilities rely on the navigational Defence Strategy and created a Space stability, while on the other hand, it reco- satellite constellation GLONASS, which is Command in 2019, other countries, such gnizes the vulnerability that an American currently being updated with next-gene- as Germany or Spain, have so far been overdependence on space-based services ration navigation satellites for improved more reluctant to pursue military ambi- represents. Russia has therefore been accuracy. What Russia lacks in terms of tions in space. However, supranational putting great emphasis on counterspace space-enabled warfare, it attempts to cooperation is becoming an increasingly capabilities ever since the Gulf War, while compensate with counterspace capability. prominent feature, as the concurrently avoiding to becoming exces- Russia possesses over an exhaustive range is incrementally emerging as a key player sively reliant on space-based applications of kinetic physical counterspace weapons, in the space domain, which was defined themselves. The notion being that if Russia including ground and air-launched direct- as a shared competence between the EU could deny the adversary space-enabled ascent ASAT missiles, as well as co-orbital and its members through the Lisbon Tre- warfare, its conventional weapons systems satellites. The country has furthermore aty in 2007. The EU’s ambitions in space would prevail in military conflict. invested heavily in electronic warfare ca- affairs were underpinned by the 2016 pabilities, such as the Krashuka-4 mobile Space Strategy for . Among other Organizational change to accommoda- jammer, viewing the disruption of enemy things, the paper highlighted Europe’s te the new realities in space happened communications, command, control and need for freedom of action and autonomy around the same time as in China. In navigation capabilities as crucial during in space, emphasizing that “space capa- 2015, Russia merged the Air Force and the military conflict. In July 2018, the Russian cities are strategically important to civil, Aerospace Defense Troops (which existed Aerospace Forces presented the Peresvet commercial, security and defence-related since the founding of the Russian Fede- high energy laser weapon, praised by policy objectives.”19 Building on the Space ration, making it the oldest space force Putin as a new type of strategic weapon Strategy, the Commission proposed the in the world) into the Aerospace Forces. to destroy or disrupt enemy satellites. As EU Space Programme in 2018, which The Space Force within this new military information warfare is a cornerstone of would improve existing initiatives and department is responsible for maintaining Russia’s general approach to conflict, also allocate €16 billion to EU space activities the early warning system, cyber-attack and -defense capabilities during the next multiannual financial the space surveillance network, the satel- in the space domain have undergone framework 2021-2027 (MFF). Conside- lite control network, as well as space laun- serious modernization efforts in recent ring prospective budgetary constraints ches. Russian Minister of Defense, Sergey years. Although Russia may not be able due to the Covid-19 crisis, however, Shoygu, explained this reorganization to compete with other space powers expenditures for space could be at risk of by stating that the center of gravity had in terms of availability of resources and significant curtailment. Furthermore, the shifted to the aerospace sphere and was scope, it nevertheless maintains a robust Von der Leyen Commission created the needed to counter the U.S. Prompt Global spectrum of capabilities based on deca- Directorate-General for Defence Industry Strike (PGS) doctrine, a program that aims des of experience from the Soviet era. A and Space headed by Thierry Breton, to allow the United States to deliver mili- potential game changer in the current with the goal to “improve the crucial link tary strikes globally in less than an hour.16 dynamics of global power competition between space, defence and security.”20 A In terms of capability development, Russia in outer space could be enhanced space step which underscores the EU’s under- relies almost exclusively on state-owned cooperation between Russia and China, standing for the intertwined areas of companies, which are managed by the as joint aerospace projects, such as lunar space and defense and most certainly state enterprise , the organiza- exploration, have been envisaged by the carries significant potential for synergies tion also responsible for Russia’s civil space two countries18. in key industries. The ’s program. future involvement in European space European Union affairs is still clouded by Brexit. Although Russia ranks third in number of operati- cooperation on certain initiatives will onal satellites behind the U.S. and China, In Europe, military space doctrine and presumably persist, the country has de- with 140 satellites in various orbits provi- governance are still largely determi- monstrated closer alignment towards the ding SATCOMs, ISR, navigation and other ned by the individual nation states and U.S. in recent years, especially in the area services17. Although fewer in numbers, intergovernmental cooperation in an of space defense.

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Operationally, the European Commission is facilitated through the EU Space Sur- prevention of offensive space military manages EU space programs and policy, veillance and Tracking initiative (EU SST), action, the EU should therefore continue with the (ESA) as programs to detect and predict the move- to engage in defensive space efforts and a partner for technical implementation. ment of objects orbiting earth. As in other develop its own space programs and The European Satellite Centre (SatCen), areas of security and defense, the EU yet assets for a number of reasons: under operational authority of the High remains a marginal actor in space military Representative of the Union for Foreign affairs. However, spurred an increasingly  Enhancing European strategic Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), gathers hostile environment in space, a sense of autonomy, for Europe’s free access to data from EU and Member State sources urgency has developed in recent years for space underpins the implementation to support EU operations and decision- a need to protect shared European space of many EU policies, the competitiven- making in Common Foreign and Security assets and interests. Enhanced EU coope- ess of the European industry sector, as Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and ration and ambitions in the space domain well as the Union’s overall security and Defence Policy (CSDP) contexts. The Eu- can thus be expected. defense. Space reinforces the EU’s role ropean GNSS Agency (GSA) manages the as a strong and reliable global actor. EU’s Global Navigation Satellite Systems, Outlook and Recommendations  Improving the EU’s crisis response the European Geostationary Navigation and risk management to enhance Overlay Service (EGNOS) and Galileo. In Considering the current trajectory of mi- Europe’s resilience. terms of capability development, two Per- litary developments in the space domain,  Increasing overall European security manent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) the assessment that outer space has once by eliminating vulnerabilities related projects are dedicated to space affairs, again returned as a theatre for great power to critical space infrastructure. namely the EU radio navigation solution to competition is absolutely warranted. Most  Fostering an innovative European improve military PNT capabilities and the notably the U.S., China and Russia, but also space industry to compete in global European Military Space Surveillance Aware- other relevant actors, such as India or Ja- markets and preserve technological ness Network to develop an autonomous, pan, have all acknowledged this fact both independence. sovereign EU military SSA capability. Also, in terms of strategic alignment and capa- one of the 11 priorities in the Capability bilities. The Space Race was never actually Development Plan (CDP) of the European won. The United States merely trium- Defence Agency (EDA) is “Space-based phed in the first lap and, due to renewed information and communication services” strategic rivalry paired with the necessary to further develop ISR, PNT, SATCOMs, SSA technical requirements, we are now en- and cyber defence capabilities21. tering round two. That this development bears great potential for future conflict to At the heart of EU space capabilities are the detriment of all mankind goes without two flagship programs – Galileo and saying. As for a lack of international ag- Copernicus. Under ownership of the EU, reements governing military activities in these two initiatives represent a real miles- space, the current state of affairs nurtures tone in a supranational approach to space belligerent sentiments rather than the activities. Galileo, set to become fully ope- peaceful co-existence of all nations, as rational in 2020, is a state-of-the-art global originally laid out in the UN Outer Space navigation constellation providing PNT for Treaty. The European Union, instead of joi- primarily civilian purposes. Nevertheless, ning the global arms race, would therefore Galileo could potentially be used militarily serve its own interests best in propagating if member states choose to do so. Coper- international arms control agreements nicus provides ISR capabilities through involving all actors, in order to curb the earth observation and monitoring, already anarchical nature of international relations serving security and defense purposes in space. Nevertheless, preparation for through providing border surveillance, the worst case is most certainly crucial, maritime surveillance and support to the as , services and data EU External Action Service. Furthermore, in have become indispensable for Europeans terms of SATCOMs, the GOVSATCOM pro- and the functioning of all societies in the gram, managed by the Commission, the digital age, which is why developing a EDA and ESA, provides satellite communi- robust spectrum of capabilities to protect cation to CSDP actors in both civilian and European space assets is of paramount military missions. Also, space surveillance importance. Besides advocating for the

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Endnotes

1United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs. Treaty on Princip- les Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. (1966). https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/ treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html 2) Harrison, Todd et. al. Space Threat Assessment 2020. (2020). https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publi- cation/200330_SpaceThreatAssessment20_WEB_FINAL1.pdf 3) bid. 4) European Institute. Europe Space and Defence. (2020). https://espi.or.at/publications/espi-public-reports/ send/2-public-espi-reports/502-europe-space-and-defence 5) Joint Chiefs of Staff. Space Operations. (2018). https://www. jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14.pdf 6) Rumsfeld, Donald H. et. al. Report to the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization. (2001). https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/09/RumsfeldCommission.pdf 7) U.S. Department of Defence. United States Space Force. (2019). https://media.defense.gov/2019/Mar/01/2002095012/- 1/-1/1/UNITED-STATES-SPACE-FORCE-STRATEGIC-OVERVIEW.PDF 8) The White House. President Donald J. Trump is Unveiling an America First National Space Strategy. (2018). https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j- trump-unveiling-america-first-national-space-strategy/ 9) U.S. Department of Defence. United States Space Force. (2019). https://media.defense.gov/2019/Mar/01/2002095012/- 1/-1/1/UNITED-STATES-SPACE-FORCE-STRATEGIC-OVERVIEW.PDF 10) Easton, Ian. The Great Game in Space – China’s Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strate- gy. (2009). https://project2049.net/documents/china_asat_wea- pons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf 11) Erwin, Sandra. Space Development Agency lays out five-year plan in $11 billion proposed budget. (2019). https://spacenews. com/space-development-agency-lays-out-five-year-plan-in- 11-billion-proposed-budget/ 12) The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Military Strategy. (2015).http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm 13) Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China. China’s National Defense in the New Era (2019).http:// eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-07/24/content_4846443.htm. 14) Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to Con- gress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019. (2019). https://media.defense.gov/2019/ May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POW- ER_REPORT.pdf 15) Chekinov, Sergey.; Bogdanov, Sergey. The Nature and Content of War. (2013). https://pdfs.semanticscho- lar.org/c887/4593b1860de12fa40dadcae8e96861de8 ebd.pdf?_ga=2.196889772.1060611014.1589376040- 1595758396.1589376040 16) McDermott, Roger. US Prompt Global Strike Moves Center Stage in Russian Security Planning. (2014). https://jamestown. org/program/us-prompt-global-strike-moves-center-stage-in- russian-security-planning/ 17) Defence Intelligence Agency. Challenges to Security in © Austria Institut für Europa- Space. (2019).https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/up- und Sicherheitspolitik, 2020 loads/2019/03/20190101_ChallengestoSecurityinSpace_DIA.pdf 18) Ishikawa, Yohei. Hadano, Tsukasa. Russia pulls China closer Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck oder ver­ with ties in and energy. (2020).https://asia. gleich­bare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Russia-pulls-China- Austria Instituts für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik closer-with-ties-in-space-exploration-and-energy 19) European Commission. Space Strategy for Europe. (2016). (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM- Genehmigung gestattet. Die im AIES-Fokus 2016-705-F1-EN-MAIN.PDF veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die 20) European Commission. Thierry Breton. (2020). https:// Meinung der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/breton_en wieder. 21) European Defence Agency. Capability Development Plan Fact Sheet. (2018). https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default- Dr. Langweg 3, 2410 Hainburg/Donau source/eda-factsheets/2018-06-28-factsheet_cdpb020b03fa4d- Tel. +43 (1) 3583080 264cfa776ff000087ef0f E-Mail: [email protected] Website: www.aies.at

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