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asdf PMUNC 2015 Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USA Chair: Seamus Daniels JCC PMUNC 2015 Contents Chair Letter…………………………………………………………………...3 U.S. Policy In The Cold War………………………………………………….4 The U.S. And Cuba……………………………………….…………………..6 Other Policy Challenges…………………...………………….………………7 External Challenges……………………………....………………….....7 Internal Challenges…………………………………………......……..11 Committee Members….……………………………………………………..13 2 JCC PMUNC 2015 Chair’s Letter Dear Delegates, Hello! My name is Seamus Daniels and I will be your chair for the USA section of the Cuban Missile Crisis Joint Crisis Committee. First a little about myself: I hail from Albany, the great capital of the Empire State of New York. I’m a huge fan of Manchester United Football Club and the TV show Archer. At Princeton, I am a senior in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and am pursuing a Certificate in Near Eastern Studies. On campus, I served as Secretary-General for PMUNC 2014, and am also a member of the Princeton Tower Club and the Princeton Men’s Club Soccer Team. I’m very excited to be one of the chairs for this year’s JCC on the Cuban Missile Crisis. It’s an event that we all learn about in our US History textbooks, but we often forget why the conflict still captivates the public imagination: it could have easily turned out very differently. Depending on how the Americans, Soviets, and Cubans reacted, the Cuban Missile Crisis could easily have resulted in nuclear war. Simulating this committee will allow us to consider the “what-ifs”—in other words, how history might have played out in an alternative universe. I urge you to consider these alternate possibilities, and look forward to seeing how our committee plays out at the conference! All the best, Seamus Daniels 3 JCC PMUNC 2015 JCC: USA U.S. Policy in the Cold War permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the The date is January 20, 1961. The U.S. is internal harmony of our society be currently embroiled in the Cold War with disrupted, our traditional way of the Soviet Union, a struggle for global life be destroyed, the international influence and domination. It’s not only a authority of our state be broken, if conflict between two superpowers; it’s a Soviet power is to be secure. This battle of ideologies. Capitalism versus political force has complete power Communism. The world is divided into of disposition over energies of one two spheres of influence, the allies of the of world's greatest peoples and United States and the West, and the resources of world's richest satellite states of the Soviet Union. national territory, and is borne George Kennan, the Deputy Chief of the along by deep and powerful Mission of the United States to the currents of Russian nationalism. U.S.S.R., outlines the struggle in the In addition, it has an elaborate and following excerpt from his 1946 “Long far flung apparatus for exertion of Telegram”: its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility “In summary, we have here a and versatility, managed by people political force committed whose experience and skill in fanatically to the belief that with underground methods are US there can be no presumably without parallel in 4 JCC PMUNC 2015 history. Finally, it is seemingly problem in war, and if necessary, inaccessible to considerations of with no smaller outlay in planning reality in its basic reactions. For it, effort. I cannot attempt to suggest the vast fund of objective fact all answers here. But I would like about human society is not, as to record my conviction that with us, the measure against which problem is within our power to outlook is constantly being tested solve--and that without recourse and re-formed, but a grab bag to any general military conflict..”1 from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and The current U.S. strategy in the Cold War tendenciously to bolster an is one of containment. In his 1947 Foreign outlook already preconceived. Affairs article entitled “The Sources of This is admittedly not a pleasant Soviet Conflict,” Kennan wrote “the main picture. Problem of how to cope element of any United States policy with this force in [is] undoubtedly toward the Soviet Union must be that of a greatest task our diplomacy has long-term, patient but firm and vigilant ever faced and probably greatest it containment of Russian expansive will ever have to face. It should be tendencies.”2 To that end, the U.S. needs point of departure from which our to stand firm and counter any potential political general staff work at expansion to the Soviet sphere of present juncture should proceed. influence. It should be approached with 1 same thoroughness and care as http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/ep isode-1/kennan.htm solution of major strategic 2 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian- federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct 5 JCC PMUNC 2015 The U.S.S.R., however, recognized the The U.S. and Cuba new government on May 7, 1960 and appeared to be pushing the Caribbean On January 1, 1959, the Cuban nation into its sphere of influence.4 Revolution forced President Fulgencio Batista and his U.S.-backed regime from These fears were confirmed on December power. Batista controlled an authoritarian 19, 1960 when Cuba and the U.S.S.R. state, seizing power in a coup in 1952. The aligned itself with the Soviet state U.S. had a long relationship with Cuba following the establishment of trade since the Spanish-American War in 1898. relations and the distribution of economic Cuba became independent in 1902, credit.5 though the U.S. reserved the right to intervene in its internal affairs. By 1958, Following the nationalization of all however, the U.S. ceased providing American property in Cuba in 1960,6 the military aid to the Batista regime.3 U.S. to end diplomatic relations with Cuba and to close its embassy in Havana on Following Batista’s ousting, government January 3, 1961.7 control was taken over by the leader of the rebel forces, Fidel Castro. At this point, it is unclear as to the status of the 4 http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/ti Cuban government under Castro; it has meline/ 5 Ibid. not declared itself as communist as of yet. 6 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1203355.st m 7 3 http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/ti http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1203355.st meline/ m 6 JCC PMUNC 2015 ExComm must determine U.S. policy on Cuba. A nation so closely aligned with the Soviet Union just below the Southern Other Policy Challenges coastline poses serious national security concerns. Cuba cannot become a base for External Challenges Soviet arms and missiles. Such a location Germany would place major American cities Though the Allies agreed in principle to including the capital in range. an eventual unified German state after the Additionally, Cuba cannot become a hub end of World War II, in 1949 the Soviet for further communist expansion in Union declared that the zone of Germany Central and Latin America. Cuba poses it was occupying would be a fully enough of a threat on American national independent "German Democratic security for the entire region to be Republic" (GDR, or German Deutsche exposed to Soviet influence. Demokratische Republik DDR). In response, the United States, the UK, and France This committee must decided the next merged their three zones and declared the steps to take in addressing the threat of Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or Cuba. Should our government adopt a German Bundesrepublik Deutschland hardline that threatens escalating the BRD). Colloquially, these Germanys are conflict? known as East and West Germany, respectively. At any moment there are roughly 50,000 soldiers on either side of the Inner 7 JCC PMUNC 2015 German border, including troops from seem incapable of administering the both Germanys and from their state territory as efficiently as the West sponsors. For the first decade or so of Germans. At the end of World War II, the East and West German history, the USSR Soviets also stripped East Germany of any had held the advantage in numbers of capital (e.g. machinery) and wealth they conventional troops and ground forces could find; this impeded East German along this border and along other borders economic growth. in Europe. The only thing that has kept them at bay has been the threat of nuclear As a result of this huge disparity, East retaliation. Unclassified estimations Germany is particularly vulnerable to indicate that the United States may have Western propaganda. The United States several hundred nuclear weapons has been broadcasting Radio Free Europe stationed in West Germany, deliverable and Radio Liberty into East Germany either by bomber or by missile. These from the West German border and from weapons remain under American lock and West Berlin (see below), as well as from key; the Germans themselves have no say some ships. in their use. Ultimately, the US and allies' goal is a fully Quality of life in West Germany remains sovereign unified German state. somewhat below US quality, since Unfortunately, we don't expect the Soviets Germany suffered more during the to agree to this anytime soon. In the Second World War, but quality of life in meantime, we aim to maintain the current East Germany is far lower. The Soviets status quo, while minimizing the risk of and their proxy German Communist Party 8 JCC PMUNC 2015 direct conflict between the two major are a huge incentive to East Germans to Cold War powers.
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