COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995

Russian Foreign Ministry Documents previously published but were of lesser impon substantial addition to our documentary base and On the Cuban Missile Crisis than those already obtained.] some contribution to our understanding of the The 21 documents initially released com­ crisis. Introduction by Raymond L. GarthotT prise selections from six categories of material. These materials expand on the earlier re­ First are three cables from, and one message to, leased messages between President Kennedy and Among the new archival materials on the Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev in Ha­ Prime MinisterKhrushchev. Thereare, however. Cuban Missile Crisis recently made available by vana sent shonly prior to or during the crisis; no materials on Foreign Ministry evaluations or the Russian government are the first batch of second are seven cables sent from Ambassador other interagency deliberations in Moscow, in diplomatic documents, a selection of 21 docu­ Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington and one to him, contrast to the extensive releases of comparable ments totaling 147 pages; extensive translations also all prior to or during the crisis, and one from materials by the United States. of these materials (as well as of two other docu­ Soviet official Georgii Zhukov, also sent from Some of the Foreign Ministry documents ments released from the former CPSU Central Washington; third are one message from Ambas­ have been lightly sanitized, and a number ofthem Committee archives) follow this introduction. sador Valerian Zorin, Soviet representative to the are only excerpts, but excisions are not noted While certainly welcome, this represents only United Nations in New York, and one to him (and except where there is an internal blank space in a about twenty percent of a file of 734 pages of to Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov) paragraph. Documents are not identified by their Foreign Ministry (MID) documents declassified from Moscow; fourth are two messages from original designators (such as tele.gram numbers), in the fall of 1991 and in early 1992. Moreover, Foreign MinisterGromykoto Moscowjustbefore nor by their Foreign Ministry archive file loca­ many documents remain classified. Still, it is an the crisis broke; fifth are three messages from tions. important step fOlWard. Havana to Moscow reponing on First Deputy The precrisis reports of Ambassadors The documents were acquired through the Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan's negotiations Alekseev and Dobrynin help to set the stage, but efforts ofthe author and ofthe National security with PrimeMinisterFidel Castro and otherCuban they do not add much to what has been known. Archive (NSA), a non-governmental, privately­ leaders as the crisis was being ended; and finally, Gromyko's cabled repon of his meeting with funded research institute based at George Wash­ the sixth is a single message from Deputy Foreign President Kennedy (detailed in his memoir) is not ington University in Washington, D.C. [Ed. Minister Kuznetsov after his meeting with Presi­ inclUded, but his account of the discussion of note: Shortly beforepresstime, a second group of dent Kennedy on 9 January 1963, in effectclosing Cuba in his meeting that same evening with declassifiedForeign Ministry documents reached the post-crisis diplomatic negotiations.. A few of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and a message NSA; however, these consisted mostly of previ. these have been released earlier, in particular one giving Gromyko' s evaluation of the situation on ously-published Kennedy-Khrushchev corre­ on Mikoyan's talks with Castro. Nonetheless, October 19, are included. Both are quite reveal­ spondence and other materials that were not they are all of interest and together they make a continued on page 63 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 63

FOREIGN MINISTRY DOCUMENTS not, however, include the reports on Dobrynin's to 7 January 1963, by contrast. is completely continuedfrom page 58 delivery to Robert Kennedy on October 29 of a omitted, apart from .Kuznetsov's subsequent fi­ ing. Gromyko not only had obtained no hint of draft written agreement, and its sharp rejection in nal meeting with the president on 9 January 1963. the American discovery of the missiles, he re­ another meeting on October 30. This negotiation settled the issues ofdismantling ported that from all available infonnation, in­ The reporting on Mikoyan's talks in Cuba, and withdrawal of the missiles, bombers, and cluding Soviet intelligence (referred to by the while not complete, does give the main discus­ warheads, and verification of the withdrawal of usual circumlocation as infonnation received sions in considerable detail. Incidentally, apart missiles and bombers by cooperative measures, "through unofficial channels") and from other from Mikoyan's efforts to persuade Castro to but was unable to fonnulate agreed terms for countries (which would include Cuba), "theacute­ agree to the withdrawal ofSoviet IL-28 bombers assurances against a U.S. invasion of Cuba and ness of the anti-Cuban campaign in the United from Cuba and his reassurances on Soviet sup­ eventually left it to rest on the presidential state­ States has somewhat abated," and that under port on other matters, both Mikoyan and Castro ments. Kuznetsov's account of his meeting with prevailing conditions "a military adventure against discussed aspects ofthe crisis itselfthat shed light Kennedy not only deals with Cuba (including the Cuba is almost inconceivable." Notwithstanding on earlier Soviet and Cuban thinking and actions. question of the Soviet military presence remain­ his own knowledge of the secret missile deploy­ Both, for example. had clearly concluded by _ing there, a diplomatic dialogue on which contin­ ment underway, he even said, "Everything that October 27 that an American attack on Cuba was ued into April 1963) but also with the subject of we know about the position of the USA govern­ imminent-although they drew different conclu­ a nuclear test ban. A test ban was then being ment on the Cuban question permits the conclu­ sions on what the Soviet Union should do about discussed in the Kennedy-Khrushchevexchanges, sion that the situation in general is completely it. While not all statements made in that exchange some ofwhich (those messages in November and satisfactory." How did he think the United States were necessarily accurate. it is of interest to note December 1962 that also dealt with the Cuban would react when it found out about the missiles? that Mikoyan said, in answer to a Cuban question. crisis) have been declassified and released by the And this evaluation followed his meetings with "speaking frankly, we [the Soviet leaders] had two governments. Kennedy and Rusk. not thought at all about the bases in Turkey" as a It is not my purpose here to try to summarize Dobrynin's cables on his meetings with tradeoff until the Americans, specifically Walter or even note the many interesting matters on Robert Kennedy on October 23,27, and 28-or, Lippmann in a newspaper column on October 25. which these documents throw light. The specific rather, the excerpts that have been released­ had raised the matter. He also did not disclose to points [ have raised, as well as my references to help to clarify these important exchanges. Among Castr(}---who had found the idea of a tradeoff some aspects of the subject not dealt with, are other things, they make clear that there was not repugnant-the secret understanding reached with only illustrative. These documents. and others merely a statement by Kennedy, but "an under­ Kennedy on the withdrawal of the missiles from that should follow. will undoubtedly add to our 'standing" on withdrawing the American Jupiter Turkey. understanding. So. too. will the long overdue missiles in Turkey, but also that it had to be kept The reporting on the extensive U.S.-Soviet forthcoming two volumes of the Foreign Rela­ in "strict secrecy." The material released does negotiations in New York from 29 October 1962 tions of the United States series dealing with Cuba in 1962-63.

Telegram 01 Soviet ~ that this carneS.a great danger for Cuba. sinl;e it other public figures demand of the Kennedy A.I. Alek$eev tuthe gi\1es. thernost reactionat')'anti..Ql;ban au,thorities administration the revival of the MooroeDoc­ Foreign Affairs (MI'A)t'1 inth¢ USAan openitlg atanYlllom¢nttoorganize trine,establishment of a sea and air blockade of a provocation and unleash ~ressive actions CUba, the brinltingintoforce oftheTreatyotRio Recently. thePllingci~esot'theIJSAbave against Cuba. de Janeiro, and the rni'lital'y occupation ofCuba. noticeably activated aP'lllcy of pli;ol"ocation lnregardto theabovetwo lastactions\lllder~ Following the signing in Moscow of the agalnstCuba; militiU'ypt:ep~~s.~~ts,politi­ ~kenbythe USA. thegovemmem ofCuba came $oviet..cuDancommunique in which the agree­ cal lsolation..NelU'lyevery day. the aiJ; sP~eand focwatd withcOl'fesponding officialdeclarations ment of the Sovietgo\1emment to provide assis­ territorial wilters of C1,!~a an;v;ipla~.byAtneJj~ signed by fidel Castro. Both of th¢se declara­ tance instrengthenittg its armed forces is noted, can airplanes. subm~TJtsanll sl'UPS .trying to tionswerecirculated.as officialdQc.umentstothe Kennedy in a public statement on September 4 establish pennanentronwolqverti;lew:n.tory of UN. ~ goal.0fthesedeclarations is lnattraetthe p0intedtothedefensive natureofCuba'srnilitary Cuba and diverting pas~nileran~~sb~ps attention ofthe appropriate international organi­ prepmtionsandnoted thatSovietrnilitary spe­ bound for CUba. The landingofcounter.,revo!u­ ~tions and all of world Iilublic opinion to the cialistsareinCubatoteach theCubanshowtouse tionary bands of spies and arms. ·bas been m­ provQCationaland far-reaching acts of the USA, defensive equipment presented by the Soviet creased. tounrnask the.aggressive schemes of the United Union. $everalUSA press agencies. comment­ The constant adsofprovocation·/l;mcarried States in relation to Cuba. and to ward them off. ing 00 thatpmt ofKennedy's statemen~ under­ out from the territotyof the USAbiJ,Seat In these declarations the govemment of CUba line the evidence of thatthe fact the president of Guantanamo. mOst 0ften in the foan of shooting ptecisely makes the point that the anti-Cuban the USA obviously preferred an attempt to calm at Cuban patrols•.Especlally~wotthyaJnQtlg actions and schemes oftheUSApresents a threat downthosecirdesinthe USAwhichare support­ all these provocations.ate far .reaphingactslike ~.only to C~ba., but toth~ whole world. ing quick, decisive actions against Cuba. Along the August 24 shelling of..the hQteI i~~hich The serieS ofpTO\1ocatiof)sis.nowaccompa­ with this, in Kennedy'sstatemecuhere are can­ malnly live Sovietspecia!i~t~.and~othelies qiedbyawbippedup. broadanti..cubacampaign tamed insin.uations of purported aggressive Cu­ publiShed by the Kennedy Administration about itt the USA press,striving ~ithan its might to banschemesregardinginfluenee on the Ameri­ the alleged August 30 attack, in intetnational cony;irtce the population of ~ United States of can continent and a threat to use "all necessat')' waters. on an Americanab'plane from two small the.alieged presence in Cuba oflargecontingents means" to "defend" the continent. Cuban Ships. In the USAgoverJ$lent'.s.!iIn­ (jf Soviet troops and ·ofthe filCt that Cuba has According to certain information. the USA nouncement, it is DOted that in tbe.ev;ellt of a turned into a military base of "wodd Commu­ State DeplU'tnlent through its ambassadors noti­ repeat of "an incident of this type." the~ n1$111" which presents a grave threat to the USA Bed the governments ofl.atin American coun­ forces of the United States '\Viii take aUneces­ and all Latin American countries. Under this triesthattheycanexpect:changesinthesituationiin sary retaliatory measures. It is entirely evident pretext, the press, certain American senatorsand continued on next page 64 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

FOREIGN MINISTRY DOCUMENTS tic reaction. The realization of Kennedy's visit to to take part in any international forums at which continued from previous page Mexico, following which he was to have quickly there is a possibility to expose the aggressive visited Brazil too (this visit was put off to the last character of American imperialism; they are in the Caribbean basin "if Castro' s government months of the year). served the goals of determin­ strengthening Cuba's ties with African and Asian does not come to its senses." More probably, in ing the likelihood ofattracting these two countries countries, etc. the near future the USA, using the pretext of an to the anti-Cuban plans of the USA. The Cuban leadership believes. however, allegedly growing threat to the Western hemi­ Until now none ofthe attempts of the USA to that the main guarantee of the development ofthe sphere. will embark on a long process of increas­ attract Brazil and Mexico to its anti-Cuban adven­ Cuban Revolution under conditions of possible ing the pressure on governments of the Latin­ tures has had any success. direct American aggression is the readiness ofthe American countries and will probably convene a Under pressure from the USA. in a majority Soviet government to provide military assistance meeting of foreign ministers of the member­ of Latin American countries the local authorities to Cuba and simultaneously to warn the USA of countries of the OAS to work out supplementary are applying the harshest measures aimed at for­ that fact. From this position, the joint Soviet­ sanctions against Cuba. One can also assume bidding or tightly limiting visits of any groups or Cuban communique about [Ernesto "Che"] that the most wildly aggressive powers in the individuals to Cuba. and also their contacts with Guevara's visit to Moscow was greeted by the USA (the Pentagon, the Cuban external counter­ Cuban delegations in third countries. People who Cuban leaders and the vast majority of the Cuban revolution. and others) will continue to exert visit Cuba or make contact with Cuban delega­ people with great enthusiasm and gratitude. The pressure on Kennedy in order to realize the most tions in third countries are subject to arrest, re­ Cuban leadership and Fidel Castro himself sug­ decisive actions against Cuba. pression, investigations upon return to theirhome­ gest that these warnings will help to prevail those The campaign of anti-Cuban hysteria has land. The USA does not lack means for organiz­ forces in the USA which are warning of the been conveyed via American propaganda to Latin ing broad and loud provocations against Cuban outbreak now of a world conflict, and are staving American countries too. There the publication of delegations taking part in international quorums, offa direct attack American attack on Cuba in the articles and transmissions of radio programs of as took place recently in Finland and Jamaica. near future. anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet content is constantly Referring to the decision taken at the meet­ In our opinion, in the near future the ruling encouraged, while the external Cuban counter­ ing at Punta-del-Este about the exclusion of Cuba circles of the USA will continue to expand the revolution and local reaction put constant pres­ from the OAS. the USA is undertaking all mea­ attacks on Cuba by all the above-mentioned sure on the governments of those countries, con­ sures to deny Cuba participation in any organiza­ means: provocations, the propaganda campaign, duct loud demonstrations and terrorize individu­ tions connected with the inter-American system. military preparations, actions of the domestic als and organizations which speak out in defense i In particular, they recently undertook an attempt counter-revolution, political isolation, and so t ofthe Cuban revolution, and by means ofbribery to secure the exclusion of Cuba from the Pan forth. Their success in drawing the Latin Ameri­ and blackmail get a range of people who have ( American Health Organization (PAHO). The can countries into their aggressive actions will visited Cuba to make anti-Cuban statements, and . unlawful denial of Cuba's application to join the most depend on the positions of the governments so forth. f so-called Latin American Free Trade Association of Mexico and Brazil. Simultaneously, the USA continues actively 1. is another example. In response to the American We also suggest that the question of direct to conduct purely military preparations, aimed at [ policy towards Cuba of provocation, military American actions against Cuba will be decided I repressing possible centers of the national-lib­ threats, and political isolation, the Cuban govern­ by the correlation of forces in American ruling eration movement in Latin American, and. given h ment is intensifying its efforts on strengthening its circles which have differing approaches to ques­ ! the appropriate circumstances, the Cuban revo­ own armed forces, struggling with the internal tions of war and peace in the present period. and lution itself. This is shown by such facts as the counter-revolution, unmasking before world pub­ the struggle between them on these issues. organization by the United States of schools for lic opinion the aggressive designs ofthe USA, and The mood of the overwhelming majority of 1 instruction in methods ofstreet-fighting and anti­ broadening its anti-American propaganda in Latin the Cuban people is defiant, and regardless ofthe partisan struggle in many Latin American coun­ 1 America. At the end of August, taking into reality of the threat of intervention, no panic or tries (in Panama, Peru, Colombia, Equador, Bo­ account the activization of provocative actions by fear before the threat which is hanging over Cuba livia, and others); continuing intensive instruc­ the USA and the possible increase in the unleash­ is observed in the masses of the people. The tion of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in camps ing of counter-revolutionary bands and manifes­ American provocations make possible an ever­ located on the territory of the USA, in Puerto I tations of domestic counter-revolution, preven­ tighter unity of the Cuban workers and raise the Rico and in several Central American countries; tive arrests were carried out in the country and political consciousness of the masses. many inspection trips to these bases, schools, strengthened control was established over many Regarding the provocations, the influence and camps by responsible American military registered [known] counter-revolutionary ele­ of the Soviet Union in Cuba has grown as never officials and the heads of the Cuban counter­ ments and the places where they gather. before, and our cooperation with the Cuban lead­ revolution, including Miro Cardon; unflagging The Cuban leaders are paying serious atten­ ers has been strengthened even more. efforts of the USA aimed at strengthening the tion to the question of strengthening the devotion In the interest of future productive work unity of the external Cuban counterrevolution to the revolution of the cadres of its diplomatic with our Cuban friends it would be desirable to and unity in the action of counter-revolutionary missions, particularly in Latin American coun­ receive from you for dispatch to the Cuban lead­ organizations active in Cuba itself, etc. tries; they are taking every opportunity, as was the ers information which we have about the plans of At the same time, the USA is actively con­ case with their presentation at the Latin American the USA government toward Cuba. tinuing to conduct its efforts towards the political Free Trade Association, to widen the sphere of isolation of Cuba, particularly in Latin America. their activity in Latin America: they are strength­ 7.IX.62 ALEKSEEV The USA is concentrating on putting pressure on ening their connections with the Latin American the governments of Mexico and Brazil, which peoples by inviting to Cuba society delegations [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy of the Rus­ continue to express their support forthe principle and individual Latin American officials; in timely sian Federation (A VP RF). Moscow, copy cour­ of non-interference and self-determination of fashion and aggressively, they speak at interna­ tesy ofNational Security Archive (NSA), Wash­ peoples. This pressure is applied through eco­ tional organizations, unmasking the aggressive ington, D. c. .. translation by Mark H. Doetoroff.J nomic means, and also by exploiting the domes­ schemes and actions of the USA; they are striving COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 65

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba According to a dispatch by the Chairman of countries of Latin America and [Secretary of Alekseev to the USSR MFA, 11 September the Institute for Agricultural Reform C.R. [Carlos State Dean] Rusk which concluded yesterday 1962 Rafael] Rodriguez, the crews of Japanese fishing proceeded. according to information which we boats who are now in Cuba. citing the danger, received, amidst sharp disagreements. A particu­ TOP SECRET posed the question of leaving for their homeland larly big conflict arose around the text of the Making Copies Prohibited right after the first attack on Havana. communique. The reception which was sched­ Copy No.1 C.R. Rodriguez announced that he had just uled for 6 p.m. yesterday in honor of the partici­ spoken with Fidel Castro, who optimistically pants in the meeting ended in confusion-most of CIPHERED TELEGRAM evaluates the developing situation and asserts the guests had left, when at II p.m. the ministers that the Americans, following N.S. Khrushchev's finally appeared, having been unable to agree on In a conversation with me on September II conversation with Udall and the publication of the text of the communique. of this year, [Cuban Defense Minister] Raoul the TASS dispatch, will have to reject attempts to The draft of the communique which Rusk Castro, noting the publication in the Soviet press organize direct aggression against Cuba. proposed was subjected to significant changes, of the TASS report, announced that it had been F. Castro, according to Rodriguez. with great primarily as a result of the criticism from the met with great enthusiasm by the Cuban leader­ enthusiasm greeted these acts as a manifestation Mexican, Brazilian and Chilean representatives. ship as timely and well-argued. Castro said that of genuine friendship for Cuba from the Soviet There were changes along three main lines. de­ this report will be regarded by the whole Cuban government and personally from N.S. spite the fact that the USA got the "tough mea­ people and supporters ofthe Cuban Revolution in Khrushchev. and expressed for this his sincere sures" it was after. other countries as a reliable shield against the thanks. First, on trade-the USA did not manage to aggressive intrigues of the American imperial­ Rodriguez recounted that the TASS decla­ secure recommendations for a total cut-off of ists. ration had been received with great enthusiasm in trade with Cuba. The three countries mentioned Castro also asserts that the thesis put forth in the factories, in peoples' estates, establishments above put up strong resistance to that recommen­ the report allows opponents ofdirect intervention and military units, where demonstrations and dation, warning, by way of objection, that this in the United States itself-including Kennedy­ meetings are spontaneously conducted as a sign would create a precedent which could be used in to put up more decisive resistance to pressure of gratitude to the Soviet Union. the future by the USA-in particular against from the aggressive forces. Regarding this, he, Rodriguez believes that the publication of those countries' trade with the Soviet Union and nonetheless, is allowing a sharp increase in anti­ the TASS dispatch increases the authority of the other Socialist countries. Chile, which has the Soviet propaganda in the USA and in countries Soviet Union in the eyes of the Cuban and other most intensive trade with Cuba. was noteworthy under its influence. Latin American peoples and helps those not in­ for its insistence on its right to trade with Cuba. Raoul Castro believes that N.S. significant elements which are attracted to the Second, regarding so-called measures of Khrushchev's conversation with [U.S. Secretary unruliness of the revolutionism of our Chinese security. The USA tried in the communique to of the Interior Stewart] Udall on the Cuban ques­ friends understand the difference between a truly single out the Caribbean Basin region as the most tion. during which the government of the USA revolutionary policy and a policy of revolution­ "threatened" by Cuba and in need therefore of its was warned without any hint ofpropagandaabout ary phrases. own separate organizational measures. As is all the consequences which could result from its In Rodriguez' opinion, in Cuba for a long known, even on the eve ofthe meeting plans were treacherous actions towards Cuba, is even more time already Chinese representatives have had no put forth for the creation inside the OAS of an important. In Castro's opinion, the public an­ opportunities to cultivate any Cuban leaders, but independent regional organization for the Carib­ nouncement. as a consequence of this warning, the publication of the Soviet-Cuban communi­ bean Basin with a membership of 10 countries. will force the USA ruling circles to search for que and the TASS dispatch once and for all However, at the meeting Colombia and Venezu­ new means of strangling the Cuban revolution. undermines the ground beneath their feet and ela, in particular. came out against such an orga­ Castro considers as very important the part guarantees the unshakability of Cuban-Soviet nization, even though they were mentioned among ofthe announcement which deals with the Ameri­ friendship. the members of such an organization; seeing the can bases around the USSR, and also the USA's opposition to the idea from Brazil, Chile. and Sixth and Seventh fleets in foreign waters and its II.lX.62 ALEKSEEV Bolivia, [they] feared being isolated from the rest effort to convince public opinion that this is the of the countries of South America if they had inalienable right of the USA. [Source: A VP RF, copycourtesyofNSA; transla­ agreed to be included in an organization of the The use of this line of argument to explain tion by Mark H. DoctoroffJ countries ofCentral America, the governments of Soviet assistance to Cuba will be very easy for which had long before recommended themselves ordinary Latin Americans and for the people of ***** as lackeys of the USA. For the same reason the USA itself to understand. Mexico refused to participate in such an organi­ Raoul Castro asserts that in the course ofthe Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the zation. For a general understanding of Mexico's developing situation the Americans are trying to USA Anatoly F. Dobrynin to the USSR position. we should note that precisely at her isolate Cuba from the Latin American countries MFA, 4 October 1962 insistence the phrase (the end of the second para­ and to intensify the small-scale provocations graph of the communique, as transmitted by against Cuba allegedly carried out by irrespon­ TOP SECRET TASS) about recognition of the principle of non­ sible elements of the Cuban counter-revolution. Making Copies Prohibited interference in relations between Latin American the apparent shelling of populated areas and for­ Copy No.1 countries. eign ships bound for Cuban ports from the sea. Third, the USA attempt to formulate a point Today's pirate attack on Cuban and English CIPHERED TELEGRAM expressing a hope for a quick establishment of a ships in the Caribbean area. in Castro's opinion, Cuban government in exile also did not receive is aimed at frightening certain capitalist countries the necessary support from the biggest Latin and to give the governments of NATO a pretext The meeting in Washington on the question American countries. to forbid its ships to visit Cuban ports. of Cuba between the Foreign Ministers of the According to information received from sev­ I I• 66 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN I ! \ eral participants in the meeting, Rusk put much 4.x.62 A. DOBRYNIN among the population of Cuba itself; in the same i pressure on the meeting. The point of the com­ way the recognition of an exile government by \, munique about trade with Cuba, which elicited [Source: A VP RF, copy courtesy ofNSA; transla­ the United States "wouldconfuse" the issue ofthe e \ the most disagreement, was accepted only after tion by Mark H. Doctorojf.J American base at Guantanamo, depriving the I,' Rusk, referring to the mood in the USA Con­ USA of the formal right to demand of Castro's ! gress, threatened to cut off all American assis­ * * * * * government recognition of Cuba's obligations t: ~ tance to countries which would refuse to accept re: the agreement about that base. I that point. In addition to this, Rusk and Kennedy Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the 4. In spite of all the importance of the Cuba !• informed the participants in the meeting about USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 18 issue, it is not the main issue for the USA. The t the unilateral measures which the government of October 1962 West Berlin issue at present remains sharpest and ..! the USA itself is now considering regarding a most fraught with dangers. t maximum limitation on the use of ships of vari­ TOP SECRET ous countries in trade with Cuba. Making Copies Prohibited l8!X-62 A.DOBRYNIN As indicated by certain information which Copy No.1 we are now reconfirming, the following mea­ [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy ofNSA; sures were named: CIPHERED TELEGRAM translation by Mark H. Doctorojf.J I. American ports will be closed to ships of those countries of which even a single ship On October 15-16 a closed briefing (i.e. ***** would bring arms to Cuba. In essence, this is "instructional meeting") for editors and leading f J directed entirely against the USSR and socialist observers of American newspapers, radio, and Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. countries. television was held at the State Department. Ac­ Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 19 October 1962 t 2. Ships of all countries will not be allowed cording to information which we received, the ~ •\ into ports of the USA and will not be allowed to USA policy toward Cuba occupied a major place TOP SECRET \ 1 take on any cargo for the return voyage, if in the in the work of the meeting. The essence of the Making Copies Prohibited t past they carried goods to Cuba from the coun­ statements ofKennedy, Rusk, Taylor, and Martin Copy No.1 tries of the "Soviet-Chinese" bloc. This refers (aide to the Secretary of State) on this topic is equally to cargos of military supplies and those summarized as follows: CIPHERED TELEGRAM of consumer goods. I. "Don't joke about the idea of American 1. I 3. No cargo belonging to the government of intervention in Cuba," because such intervention the USA (for example, big shipments for "assis­ would unavoidably prompt serious counter-mea­ To the CC CPSU tance programs) may be carried on foreign ships, sures from the USSR, if not directly aimed at the Everything which we know about the posi­ if ships of the same owners are used for the USA, then in other regions of the world, particu­ tion of the USA government on the Cuban ques­ shipment ofgoods to Cuba. This point is directed larly in West Berlin; for many years [interven­ tion allows us to conclude that the overall situa­ against "non-communist" countries and allies of tion] would complicate the mutual relations of the tion is completely satisfactory. This is confirmed the USA, many of whom have now reluctantly USA with the countries of Latin America, Asia, by official announcements ofAmerican officials. given in to American pressure. and Africa, and overall would create more prob­ including Kennedy, in his discussion with us on 4. No American-flag ships or ships the lems than it solved. October 18, and all information which reaches us owners ofwhich are Americancitizens (although 2. At present Cuba is a political problem. and via unofficial channels and from representatives ships may sail under a different flag, as is often not a problem of security ofthe USA; thus, politi­ of other countries. done) are allowed to ship goods to or from Cuba. cal, economic and other means are needed to solve There is reason to believe that the USA is not Overall. this is a continuation of the prior it, rather than military. preparing an intervention in Cuba and has put its unyielding line of the Kennedy Administration Proceeding from this, the USA intends to money on obstructing Cuba's economic relations towards the tightening up ofthe economic block­ achieve the greatest possible political, economic, with the USSR and other countries, so as to ade of Cuba, which is viewed here as one of the and moral isolation of Cuba from other Latin destroy its economy and to cause hunger in the most effective means in the struggle with the American countries and other countries of the country, and in this way creating dissatisfaction Castro government and the increase in assistance "free world:' and also hinder the provision of among the population and prompting an uprising to him from the Soviet Union. assistance to Cuba from Socialist countries in all against the regime. This is based on a belief that The first reaction to the meeting in Wash­ possible ways (short of, however, a sea blockade). the Soviet Union will not over a long period be ington diplomatic circles is summarized as fol­ All this, in the calculations of the USA gov­ able to provide Cuba with everything it needs. lows: although the USA didn't get everything it ernment, should cause serious economic and po­ The main reason for this American position wanted, the decisions ofthe meeting will be used litical complications for Cuba and ultimately (not is that the Administration and the overall Ameri­ by the Kennedy Administration to the maximum in the coming weeks and months but in the next canruling circles are amazed by the SovietUnion's degree for the long-term isolation of Cuba from year or two) lead to the outbreak there of mass courage in assisting Cuba. Their reasoning is the countries of Latin America; for the strength­ dissatisfaction and to huge anti-government dem­ thus: The Soviet governmentrecognizes the great ening of all aspects of the struggle against the onstrations. The USA's concrete course in this importance which the Americans place on Cuba Castro government. It is revealing that Kennedy case will depend on the situation. and its situation, and how painful that issue is to today signed adeclaration, accepted by the Ameri­ 3. At the present time the USA has no plans the USA. But the fact that the USSR, even can Congress, to the effect that the USA can use to create "a provisional Cuban government in knowing all that, still provides such aid to Cuba, troops in order to "prevent the spread of Cuban exile," since in view of the mixed nature of the means that it is fully committed to repulsing any Communism to the American continent." At the Cuban emigration it would be hardly possible to American intervention in Cuba. There is no same time he signed a Congressional bill, giving form a sufficiently authoritative government and single opinion as to how and where that rebuff him the right to call up 150,000 reserves. in any case such a government, created on foreign will be given, but that it will be given-they do territory, could not count on broad popularity not doubt. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 67

In these last days the sharpness of the anti­ Rusk said that he does not agree that Cuba Cuban campaign in the USA has subsided some­ On October 18 a conversation with Rusk cannot present a threat to the USA. Cuba without what. while the sharpness of the West Berlin took place. the Soviet Union, he declared, is one thing; a question has stood out all the more. Newspapers Rusk, continuing my conversation with Cuba where "Soviet operators" run things is bleat about the approaching crisis vis a vis West Kennedy, touched on the Cuba issue. He said, something different. Berlin. the impending in the very near future that President Kennedy considers that issue very The USA government and he, Rusk, are signing of the agreement with the GDR, and so important, that it carries great significance for the baselessly scaring the American people with "So­ on. The goal of such a change in the work of the USA, since it concerns the security of the West­ viet operators," I answered. The Soviet Union is propaganda machine is to divert somewhat pub­ ern hemisphere. As the President said, the USA providing assistance to Cuba in only a few areas, lic attention from the Cuba issue. All this is not has no intention of intervening with its own including whatever we can do to strengthen its without the participation of the White House. armed forces in Cuba. But the USA proceeds defensive capability. The Cuban themselves are Even the rumor to the effect that the Soviet from the fact that everything that is happening in running everything on Cuba, and the USA knows Union has made it known that it can soften its Cuba is of a defensive nature and will not turn that perfectly well. position on the Cuban issue ifthe West will soften Cuba into an attack platform against the USA and The situation has rapidly worsened, declared its own position in West Berlin was basically the countries of Latin America. Rusk, since July of this year. Before July the intended to mollify the public vis a vis Cuba. Besides this, Rusk announced, the USA, in situation caused no alarm. But from July, Soviet The wide publication of the results of an defining its position on the Cuban issue, as an­ weapons have flowed into Cuba. So far it seems, election survey conducted here by the Gallup nounced by the President in his conversation with according to U.S. Government data, thatthese are (sic) Institute showing that the vast majority of us. proceeds also from the fact that Cuba will not defensive weapons. But it is unclear how the Americans are against an American intervention undertake actions aimed at foisting its system and situation will develop in the future. in Cuba serves this same goal. In this regard. we regime on the other countries of Latin America. Besides this, declared Rusk, according to have to note that the leadership of the institute in The government of the USA places ex­ precise data in American possession, the Cuban the past traditionally were more sympathetic to tremely high significance on these two condi­ regime continues to actively carry out subversive Republicans. Therefore, its publication in this tions. It would be hoped that neither the first, nor work against a number of Latin American coun­ case deserves special attention. This was not the second, would take place. tries. done without the encouragement of the White As far as the domestic regime on Cuba is I said that the Cubans should have come to House either; in this way a nudge was given to the concerned, the USA decisively views it as a conclusions about their own defense from the extremist groups in Congress which support ex­ regime which contradicts the interests of security intervention on Cuba by the immigrant riff-raff treme measures. in the Western hemisphere. organized by the Americans and financed by Also deserving of attention is the fact that Having heard Rusk out, I said that the Cuban them. They came to such a conclusion, deciding Congress has now "gone on recess." This sug­ issue had been caused by the hostile policy ofthe to strengthen their own defense capability. July gests that the pressure on Kennedy from the USA towards Cuba. The USA for some reason has no significance here. Cuba represented no extreme groups in Congress will be less during believes that it must dictate to the Cubans the sort threat to the USA either before July, or after July. the recess. ofdomestic regime that should exist in Cuba, and As far as the declarations regarding subver­ The position of the USA allies, particularly the social structureunder which the Cubans should sive work by the Cubans is concerned, I can only the British, also played a role. They did not live. But on what basis is the USA trying to say that these declarations are in contradiction support calls for the unleashing of aggression appropriate for itself the right to dictate to the with the information which we possess. against Cuba, although they equally approved of Cubans how to conduct their internal affairs? All the same, declared Rusk, in July some other anti-Cuban steps of the USA. There is no such basis, and such a basis cannot be. kind of sudden change took place. And that Itis not possible, ofcourse, to be completely Cuba belongs to the Cubans, not to Americans. sudden change significantly complicated the situ­ insured against USA surprises and adventures, Perhaps, Ideclared, Ruskcan tell me, whither ation. even in the Cuba issue; all the same, taking into the principles of the UN Charter in American Regarding the issue of the Cubans' subver­ account the undeniable objective facts and the policy towards Cuba? They're not there. The sive activities, said Rusk, the USA government corresponding official public statements, and also actions of the USA are in flagrant contradiction has irrefutable proof of the assistance provided the assurances given to us that the USA has no with these principles. The USA is undertaking by them to various subversive groups in Latin plans for intervention in Cuba (which undeniably steps to cause hunger in Cuba. The actions which America, up until the present day. For the gov­ commits them in many respects), it is possible to it is undertaking towards this end unmask the ernment ofthe USA there is nothing to discuss. It say that in these conditions a USA military ad­ USA policy even more clearly. The Cubans, with knows for sure that the Cubans provide such help venture against Cuba is almost impossible to ever more decisiveness, are speaking out and will and are carrying out subversive work against a imagine. continue to speak out in defense of their country number of Latin American countries. and will strengthen its defenses. Rusk expansively spoke ofthe "community 19/X-62 A. GROMYKO The Soviet Union is helping Cuba. It is of interests" of the countries of the Western trying to provide the Cubans with grain, and help Hemisphere. Not mentioning the "Monroe Doc­ to put its economy on a sound footing. This can trine." he essentially tried to defend it, stressing {Source: A VP RF, copy courtesy ofNSA; transla­ not present any danger to the USA. Soviet the solidarity of the countries of the Western tion by Mark H. Doctoroff] specialists are helping Cuban soldiers to master Hemisphere and the community of interests of certain types of defensive weapons. This can't their security. ***** present any threat to the USA either. Overall, so I said that in the policy of the USA and in far as the declaration that Cuba may present a Rusk's considerations regarding Cuba the coun­ Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister threat to the security of the USA and countries of tries somehow get lost, while the discussion is Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 20 October 1962 Latin America is concerned, such declarations about the hemisphere. But in this hemisphere are evidently intended for naive people. Even there are sovereign countries. Each one of them Americans themselves don't believe it. has a right to decide its own internal affairs upon 68 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN consideration by its people. Cuba is one ofthese every day American generals and several minis­ in 1956. sovereign states. ters speak about it. I deflected this effort to introduce an anal­ Besides that, I declared, ifRusk's reasoning Regarding Iran, I said to Rusk that we posi­ ogy and I briefly pointed out the groundlessness and the entire conception which the USA gov­ tively view the agreement between the Soviet of such an analogy. ernment defends were to be applied to Europe Union and Iran that foreign missile bases will not Rusk said that he did not agree with our and to Asia, then no doubt the conclusions which be built on Iranian territory. But Rusk will not, interpretation of the question and rejection ofthe would flow from that would not please the USA. apparently, deny that the Iranian Army is led by analogy. It comes out that the Americans consider them­ American military advisers, that Turkey has had He then began to speak on the subject of the selves to have a right to be in a number of such bases for a long time, that the territory of policy ofthe Soviet Union after the Second World I countries of Europe, Asia, and other regions of Japan has become an American military base, the War, partly trying to tie these musings with the I the world, if sometimes they don't even ask them territory of England and a number of other coun­ Cuban issue and partly with the issue of Ameri­ ~ about this, while certain others can not even tries have been military springboards ofthe USA can foreign military bases. respond to an appeal for assistance in providing for a long time. About the same could be said He said that "in the Stalinist period" the its own people with bread and strengthening its about many other countries. Soviet Union conducted a foreign policy which security in the face of a threat of intervention. Rusk declared that-whether I believe him forced the USA to create its bases overseas and to With such a conception the Soviet Union cannot or not-that's something else, but he categori­ deploy its forces there. He gave an alleged \ agree. It is hoped that the USA government too cally asserts that besides the territory of the USA example-Korea and the Korean peninsula. He I will more soberly approach the entire Cuban itself, American missiles and atomic weapons are said, that before the events in Korea the USA in issue and will reject a hostile policy toward in only three countries. fact did not have a single division up to strength. , Cuba. Here I said: without a doubt, of course, At that time the USA practically did not have a ,. r If the USA government has some sort of England is among those countries? battleworthy army available. But the situation ( claims toward Cuba, for instance, financial, then Yes, declared Rusk, England is one of them. changed because ofthe Korean War. Before this \• it can bring them up with the Cubans at negotia­ He didn't name the others. there was such a thing as the Berlin Blockade, tions aimed at settling them, and the Cubans, as As far as Japan is concerned, declared Rusk, which also played a definite role in the change in is known, are prepared for this. I categorically assert that neither missiles, nor the American policy. All this is reflected, said Yes, declared Rusk, but nonetheless Cuba nuclear weapons of the USA are in Japan. They Rusk, in the armament program. has violated the peace on the continent, nonethe­ don't have any of those weapons in South Korea He again began to speak about the influence less, beginning in July, the situation has taken a either, if, of course, the actions of North Korea ofthe "Stalinist policy" on the policy and actions dangerous turn. The Soviet Union appeared in will not make it necessary to change that situation. of the Western powers. The Western powers, Cuba. A large quantity of Soviet weapons ap­ In general, declared Rusk, the significance including the USA, cannot but take that into peared in Cuba. All this has complicated the of American foreign military bases is greatly account even now. situation. exaggerated, and they don't deserve it. In several Responding to these statements of Rusk, I No matter how often Rusk repeats, I de­ countries, in actual fact there are not such bases, stressed that the Secretary of State of the USA clared, the assertion about some sort of turn of while you, Rusk said, believe that there are. In had drawn an extremely depressing and one­ events in July, about the danger allegedly ema­ particular, the Scandinavian countries are among sided picture ofthe foreign policy ofthe USSR in nating from Cuba, in actuality, the situation those countries. the postwar period, including during the Stalin remains simpler. The Cubans want Cuba to Responding to that, I said, that in certain period. No doubt Rusk, like other U.S. officials, belong to them, and not to the USA. countries maybe there are not today, physically, will not deny a great historical fact: besides the Maybe Rusk will reject the presence of the those orothertypes ofweapons. You, Americans, fact that the army of the Soviet Union routed the USA, the presence of American military bases know better. But the USA has military agree­ Hitlerite army and as a powerful avalanche moved and numerous military advisers in such countries ments with those countries which include an ob­ into Western Europe, it was not used contrary to like Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, not even speaking ligation to let these types of American weapons the alliance agreements and had stopped follow­ about such countries as England, Italy, and a into the country at any time. This is hardly ing the defeat of Hitler's Germany. And in that number of other countries of Western Europe, different from the practical existence ofAmerican situation, if the Soviet Union, the Soviet govern­ and also Asia and Africa. It appears that the USA military bases in such countries, especially con­ ment, had had expansionist intentions, it could can have military bases in these countries, con­ sidering that certain types of weapons may at the have occupied all of Western Europe. But the clude with them military agreements, while the present time be delivered very quickly. Soviet Union had not done that and had not Soviet Union can not even provide assistance in Rusk did not respond to that statement, and started to do it. That already by itself is an support of the Cuban economy and for the overall it was evident that precisely that is the eloquent answer to the attempt to cast doubt on strengthening of the defense capability of Cuba. situation in several of the participants in the mili­ the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and on its Rusk said that the Soviet Union is exagger­ tary blocs of the Western powers. actions in the postwar period. ating the significance of American foreign mili­ And so, I declared, the Americans have no You know, I declared to Rusk, that our CC tary bases. believing that the USA has bases even grounds to reproach Cuba and the Cubans for and the Soviet government, at the initiative of in Pakistan, and practically in Iran. In many steps of a purely defensive character, and, more­ N.S. Khrushchev, have taken a numberofforeign countries, on the territory of which, in your over, to conduct toward Cuba a hostile and ag­ policy steps which earlier had not been taken. opinion, there are American military bases, in gressive policy. Cuba simply wants to be inde­ You are familiar, no doubt, with that which has actuality there are none. Iran, for example, pendent. That which the Cubans do to strengthen been done in the foreign policy of the USSR recently took a big step forward towards the their country and its independence-that doesn't regarding the condemnation of Stalin's Cult of Soviet Union. Overall, the significance of our present a danger to anyone, all the more to such a Personality. You know, in particular, about the bases is inflated. great power like the USA. Any assertions about signing of the Austrian State Treaty, which was To this statement I answered in such a way, the existence of such a danger are just absurd. evaluated positively throughout the world and that the USA foreign military bases-this is a Rusk said that the USA is interested in Cuba which helped to make possible an improvement subject which is pretty well known, practically just as the Soviet Union was interested in Hungary of the situation in central Europe. But we cat­ COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETiN 69

egorically reject any attempts to generalize or to Cuba, and that that greatly alarms the USA gov­ passing touched on Kennedy's declaration, made draw conclusions about Soviet foreign policy in ernment and Americans. in the conversation with us. about the fact that the the postwar period. which USA government offi­ Rusk further said, wouldn't it be possible to USA has no intentions to intervene in Cuba (with cials make with the intent, apparently. of white­ consider the issue of increasing the number of a reservation regarding the threat to the security washing its own policy. in this case towards Security Council member-countries from II to of the USA and the countries of Latin America). Cuba. 13, that is, in other words, increasing the number Rusk's reasoning revolved mostly around acircle Rusk did not challenge the declaration re­ of non-permanent members from six to eight. of questions related to Soviet assistance to Cuba, garding the capability of the Soviet army to From his comments it was clear that he was primarily arms. occupy all of Europe. if the Soviet Union had talking about a change in the membership of the By Rusk's behavior it was possible to ob­ striven for that after the rout of Hitler' s Germany. UN and introducing into the membership corre­ serve how painfully the American leaders are Nor did he challenge the significance of the sponding changes. suffering the fact that the Soviet Union decisively foreign policy steps of the Soviet Union intro­ I said that the step Rusk had mentioned was has stood on the side ofCuba, and that the Cubans duced after the condemnation of the cult of per­ impossible to implement, simply because the are conducting themselves bravely and confi­ sonality of Stalin. More to the point. he let it be PRC-one of the permanent members of the dently. Kennedy managed to hide his feelings understood that in general he shares these thoughts. Security Council-is not participating in the work better. But he too, when he spoke about Cuba, although he did not make any direct comments. of the UN because of the policy of the U.S. formulated his ideas with emphasis, slowly. ob­ However. he at this point started to talk Government. Without the PRe. I declared. we viously weighing every word. It is characteristic about the fact that the USA. at the end ofthe war. will not agree even to consider that issue. that Rusk, during our entire conversation with and also in the first postwar period to the greatest Rusk in fact did not challenge our declara­ Kennedy. sat absolutely silently. and red "like a extent conducted itself well. It, declared Rusk, tion, understanding that the step he had recom­ crab." In the conversation with him later he had not tried to use the advantage which it had at mended was not realistic in view of our objec­ couldn't hide his feelings very well. that time vis a vis its monopoly possession of the tions. Here he noted that China, evidently has atomic bomb. more than a few problems, including internal. 20.X.62 A. GROMYKO I let him know that that, apparently, had not economic ones. been so much because the United States had In response I said that they have certain [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy ofNSA; transla­ wanted to conduct itself well, as that the atomic difficulties, but the food situation had now sig­ tion by Mark H. Doctoroff] bomb at that time could not playa decisive role in nificantly improved and was not as difficult as it the serious standoff of the leading powers. was portrayed by certain organs of the American ***** Rusk did not challenge this declaration, but press. all the same expressed the thought that the USA Rusk touched on the question of the Chi­ Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the had had an advantage at that time in its possession nese-Indian border cont1ict. He asked what is USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, of the atomic bomb and that it had not even tried going on there and why did the argument arise? 22 October 1962 to use it politically. I said, that the argument, as is well known to In this connection he brought up the Baruch Rusk, was caused by mutual territorial claims in Plan, saying that he was wondering why the the border region. The Soviet government be­ TOP SECRET Soviet Union had not associated itself with the lieves that the sooner the sides come to an agree­ Making Copies Prohibited Baruch Plan. ment on a mutually acceptable basis, the better. I Copy No.1 I gave an appropriate answer and briefly set let Rusk know that our discussion of this issue CIPHERED TELEGRAM forth our position. I stressed the point that the apparently would hardly help the matter. Baruch Plan was a one-sided plan. advantageous Rusk agreed that yes, of course, this was an TOP PRIORITY only to the USA, that it had not even envisioned issue between the two countries-the PRC and the destruction of nuclear weapons, rather, under India-but that nonetheless there is some old a screen ofallegedIy international control had left agreed boundary. which. considering everything, At 6 in the evening Washington time Secre­ this weapon at the practical disposal of the USA, is the correct border line. tary of State Rusk invited me to his place. and even on the territory of the USA. Evidently, Rusk's own goal was to let us Rusk said that he had a commission from the Rusk did not go into details and limited know that the government of the USA looks president to send via me a personal presidential himself to the above comments about the Baruch favorably on the Indian position. But he spoke message to N.S. Khrushchev Ito be sent sepa­ Plan. about that as if offhandedly, obviously not want­ rately/. and also to provide for information the Suddenly Rusk jumped to the issue of the ing to create the impression that the USA was text of the president's address to the American Communist ideology and the influence of the greatly interested in that issue. He also jokingly people, which he intends to deliver at 7 this Soviet Union on other countries. He tried to observed that the Chinese-Indian border conflict evening on radio and television /transmitted by assert that the main reason of all the complica­ is, excuse me, the only issue on which the posi­ TASS/. tions in international affairs is that the Soviet tions of the PRC and Taiwan correspond. Rusk warned then that at this time he has Union by some or other means influences the With this, the conversation. which had con­ instructions not to answer any questions on the situation in other countries. inspires dissatisfac­ tinued with some difficulty for about two hours, text of both documents and not to comment on tion with the existing regimes and so on. He also ended. Further there was a conversation on the them. complained because the USA does not assert German Question, the contents of which are "These documents, he added, speak forthem­ such influence and cannot assert it, since it does submitted separately. selves." not enter into its political plans. Vis a vis this A short general evaluation of this conversa­ Rusk was told that the actions of the USA reasoning he again returned to Cuba, but basi­ tion with Rusk: Rusk tried again to stress, obvi­ government cannot be justified by the absolutely cally repeated what he had said earlier. He ended ously at Kennedy's behest, that the USA gives unconvincing motives which are not grounded in his argument by commenting again that July had great importance to the Cuban issue and consid­ the factual situation and to which the president brought a change for the worse to the events in ers it the most painful for the USA. He only in refers. and that these actions have a downright 70 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

provocative character, and that all responsibility [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy ofNSA; thrown down by the Soviet Union to the USA in for possible grave consequences of the afore­ translation by Mark H. Doctoro.ff.! the form of military deliveries to Cuba. Regard­ mentioned actions of the United States will be ing this, insofar as up to now a direct military entirely on the American administration. ***** attack by the USA on Cuba is not on the table (the I also expressed surprise that neither the President, as is known, also persistently stressed president nor Rusk found it necessary to have an Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the this during the meeting with A.A. Gromyko), open talk on all the questions raised in the ad­ USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, Kennedy evidently is counting on the Soviet dress, with A.A. Gromyko, with whom they met 23 October 1962 Union in this case not responding with military only a few days ago, while now the USA admin­ actions directly against the USA itself or by istration is seeking with artificial means to create delivering a blow to their positions in West Ber­ [ a grave crisis. The Soviet Union fears no threats TOP SECRET lin. As a result, in Kennedy's thinking, the United 1 and is prepared to meet them in an appropriate Making Copies Prohibited States will succeed in establishing at least in part I I, way, if the voice of reason would not triumph in Copy No. I the correlation of forces which existed in the t the governing circles of the USA. world before July, that is before the announce­ I • Rusk did not respond. He was clearly in a CIPHERED TELEGRAM ment of our military deliveries to Cuba, which rf nervous and agitated mood, even though he tried delivered a serious blow to the USA's positions I to conceal it. At that the meeting came to an end. as the leader ofthe capitalist world and even more { Then almost all ambassadors lexcept socialist! Following Kennedy's speech on the Cuban constrained their freedom ofaction on issues like ( were summoned to the State Department, and issue yesterday, a broad campaign was deployed the one in West Berlin. r they have been given, by groups, the text of the here, called forth in order to impart to the devel­ Kennedy apparently believes that a further president's address with corresponding com­ oping situation even more extraordinariness and demonstration by the United Statesofindecisive­ mentaries by the senior officials of the State seriousness than was done in Kennedy's speech ness and lack of will to risk a war with the Soviet Department. itself. Unionfor the sake ofits positions would unavoid­ Before I left, Rusk noted that there is no In a briefing conducted by the USA Ministry ably lead to an even quicker and more serious plan, so far, to publish the personal letter of of Defense yesterday evening, [Secretary of De­ undermining of their positions around the globe. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev, but overall this fense Robert S.] McNamara categorically de­ 2. That which Kennedy said yesterday in his cannot be excluded. clared that the USA will not stop short of sinking appeal to the American people and the complex Soviet ships which are bringing "offensive types" of measures which were announced in this con­ 22.x.62 A. DOBRYNIN of weapons to Cuba, if those ships will refuse to nection by the USA government in fact touch not obey the demands of American warships. only upon Cuba alone or our deliveries of weap­ [Source: A VP RF, copy courtesy ofNSA; It is reported that the President's official ons to it, or even our missiles for Cuba. More to translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.] proclamation about the introduction into force of the point, it is a decision connected with a certain measures to assert a quarantine on the delivery to risk and determined by a whiffofadventurism, to * * * * * Cuba of offensive types of weapons will be pub­ try to bring to a stop now the development of lished before the end ofthe day today or tomorrow events in the whole world, which are generally Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba morning after the formal agreement with other disadvantageous to the USA. Alekseev to the USSR MFA, 22 October 1962 members ofthe Organization ofAmerican States. In this regard, some information which we For the practical implementation of the quaran­ have just received by confidential means and tine in the area ofCuba, there has been assembled, which we are now reconfirming, may be interest­ TOP SECRET according to the reports of military observers, ing. According to this information, prior to the Making Copies Prohibited around 450 military ships, more than 1,200 air­ President's decision a hot discussion was con­ Copy No. 1 planes and around 200 thousand soldiers. ducted recently in the government regarding the Almost without interruption, the commen­ future foreign policy course of the USA follow­ CIPHERED TELEGRAM taries which are broadcast on radio and televi­ ing the appearance of information about the de­ sion-and also the commentaries which appeared liveries of Soviet missiles to Cuba. [Attorney in today's morning newspapers-are directed to­ General] R. Kennedy, McNamara, Rusk, Chief Regarding the threats of the USA toward wards supercharging the atmosphere and predic­ of the CIA [John] McCone, and the Chairman of Cuba, we remain in constant contact with Fidel tions of an early "test afforce," as soon as the first the Joint Chiefs ofStaffasserted that since Vienna Castro and Raoul Castro. Soviet ship approaches Cuba (we broadcast simi­ the status quo in the world had changed, and had The Cuban command gave an order for full lar commentaries via TASS). changed not to the benefit ofthe USA, as a result mobilization of the army and occupation of de­ An analysis of the public statements which of the well-known development of the Cuban fensive positions. Besides telegraphic dispatches Kennedy has made, his message to N.S. events, in particular the open deliveries ofSoviet ofinformation agencies and Kennedy's speeches, Khrushchev, and also the statements of officials weapons to Cuba. The issue is not the weapons our friends have no other information. who are close to the White House and the State themselves, insofar as they do not have much We will quickly inform you ofall new facts. allow us to make, as it is presented to us, a significance from a purely military point ofview, We are taking steps to ensure security and preliminary conclusion that the measures which rather it is that great political loss which the the organization of a duty roster in Soviet insti­ have been undertaken by the Kennedy Adminis­ Kennedy government suffered in the eyes of the tutions. tration in regard to Cubaare the product ofa range whole world and particularly of its American Please issue an order to the radio center to ofdomestic and foreign policy considerations, the allies and neighbors when it (the USA govern­ listen to us around the clock. most important of which, apparently, are the fol­ ment) turned out to be not in a position-for the lowing. first time in the history of the USA-to prevent 22.x.62 ALEKSEEV I. To try to "take up the gauntlet" of that "the penetration and establishment of influence" challenge which Kennedy believes has been by another great power, the USSR, in the Western COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 71

Hemisphere itself. What then of the obligations time. Brazil and Mexico are also departing from Besides this, taking into account the future of the USA in other parts of the world? And all their previous positions after having been subject development of events and as a means of putting this is happening at a moment-as asserted by to strong pressure from the USA, which is assert­ extra pressure on the USA government, it is representatives of the military brass-when ing that the Soviet missiles now threaten the Latin possible that it would make sense to undertake America for the time being still has an advantage American countries too. The decision of the such measures as, for instance, calling back from over the Soviet Union in nuclear missiles, an Organization of American States which was just the USA Soviet theatrical collectives and Soviet advantage which is gradually being liquidated by accepted (transmitted via TASS) in fact in sup­ students (sending for them a special airplane), the successes ofSovietweapons, and now also by port ofthe course ofaction ofthe USA shows that which should show to the Americans the serious­ the creation of a missile base in Cuba in direct the Kennedy administration is succeeding in bind­ ness of our intentions in regard to the events in proximity with the USA. This means, the Ameri­ ing the governments ofthese countries to its will Cuba. can chiefs of staff maintain, that time is not under conditions of the prewar psychosis which However, in our opinion it is not necessary waiting, if the Kennedy government really in­ has now been created in the USA. We should, it's to hurry on all the above measures, since an tends to prevent a further disadvantageous devel­ true, note that Brazil, Mexico and Bolivia ab­ extreme aggravation ofthe situation, it goes with­ opment of events. stained from the vote on the paragraph which out saying. would notbe in our interests. It would In Berlin also, the USA is constantly on the envisaged the application of force. make sense to use also the desire of neutral states, defensive, which does not add to the 4. On the domestic political plane, Kennedy and not only them, to find a way to settle the Administration's prestige. The latest meetings obviously is counting on his last step to pull the current conflict. Such moods are clearly felt not with A.A. Gromyko (this argument was attrib­ rug out from under the legs of the Republicans, only at the UN, but also among the diplomatic uted to Rusk) strengthened the President's and whose leadership in recent days officially an­ corps here. Rusk's belief that the Soviet Union seriously nounced that they consider the Cuban issue a Overall, here in Washington the tension intends to sign a peace treaty with the GDR, with fundamental issue of the election campaign, hav­ around this situation continues to grow. It seems all the consequences that will flow from that for ing in essence accused the administration ofinac­ as if the Americans themselves are beginning to the USA. This, almost unavoidably will bring tivity on that issue. worry a lot, anticipating the arrival in Cuba of the about a crisis at the end ofthe year, since the USA However, it is necessary to stress that the first Soviet ship (many people are expressing this will not withdraw its forces from West Berlin. events connected with Kennedy's announcement question directly to the Embassy) and how this Wouldn't it be better then to try to force the Soviet yesterday obviously have overtaken the signifi­ first "test of strength" will end. This atmosphere Union to retreat by "striking a blow on the Cuban cance of electoral considerations and that these of tense waiting entered a new phase with the issue ["-no close quotation mark---ed.], which considerations now are moving to the background. publication just now of the President's official gives more benefits to the USA than the Berlin Overall, the impression is being created proclamation which announces the entering into question, if the moods of public opinion and that, reserving a certain possibility not to let the force of the ban on delivering "offensive weap­ geographic and military-strategic factors are taken matter lead to an open military confrontation­ ons" to Cuba as of 14 hours [2 p.m.] (Greenwich into account[?] Precisely on the Cuban issue it is this can be seen in his proclamation in general Mean Time) on 24 October. best for President Kennedy to take a firm position form by the readiness which he expressed to and to "demonstrate his character." This ap­ continue "peace negotiations" with the Soviet 23.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN proximately was the basic argument of those side on settling controversial issues, including government representatives who support a more the Cuban issue and several other questions­ [Source: A VP RF, copy courtesy ojNSA; transla­ hard-line course ofaction (several ofthem specu­ Kennedy at the same time consciously and suffi­ tion by Mark H. Doctoroff] lated also thatthe President maintains the opinion ciently provocatively is aiming towards an abrupt that the Soviet government apparently does not aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union in ***** particularly believe in the President's steadfast­ accord with the above-mentioned considerations. ness following the failure of last year's incursion In this regard it is as if this time he is ready Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the in Cuba). It follOWS, evidently, to recognize that to go pretty far in a test of strength with the Soviet USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, the supporters of this course for the time being Union, hoping that in the location of the conflict 24 October 1962 have taken the upper hand in the USA govern­ (Cuba) which was chosen by him, the President, ment. the USA has a greater chance than the USSR, and TOP SECRET 3. Having created the extraordinary situa­ that in the final analysis the Soviet government Making Copies Prohibited tion around Cuba, the Kennedy administration is will refuse to increase the military power of Copy No. I hoping that in that situation it will be able quickly Cuba, not wishing to let a major war break out. to get from its NATO allies and from the Latin Under these conditions it is seen as expedient, CIPHERED TELEGRAM American countries support for its course to­ while observing the necessary precautions, to at wards the full isolation of Cuba from the "free the same time review certain steps which would Late in the evening of October 23, R. world," and the ultimate overthrow ofthe current demonstrate the resolve of the USSR to give an Kennedy came to visit me. He was in an obvi­ government of Cuba. In this regard it should be appropriate rebuff to the USA and which would ously excited condition and his speech was rich in noted that although the West European and Latin make the USA vulnerable to the possibility of repetitions and digressions.~:_ Kennedy said American diplomats express alarm aboutthe pos­ actions which we may take in response. In _approximately the following. sible consequences of realizing in practice the particular, as it seems to us, it would be possible I came on my own personal initiative with­ announced "quarantine" of Cuba, they express, to review the question ofhinting to Kennedy in no out any assignment from the President. I consid­ as a rule, confidence that their governments un­ uncertain terms about the possibility of repres­ ered it necessary to do this in order to clarify what der current conditions will not be able to deviate sions against the Western powers in West Berlin exactly led to the current, extremely serious de­ from support for the USA. In particular, it be­ (as a first step, the organization of a blockade of velopment of events. Most important is the fact came known to us that the Chilean representative ground routes, leaving out for the time being air that the personal relations between the President in the Organization of American States received routes so as not to give grounds for a quick and the Soviet premier have suffered heavy dam­ an instruction to support the USA proposals this confrontation). age. President Kennedy feels deceived and these \ 72 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETiN { feelings found their own reflection in his appeal or, speaking directly, a heavy blow to everything contacting you via the confidential channeL if, as to the American people. in which he had believed and which he had strived it appears, even the Ambassador, who has, as far 1 From the very beginning, continued R. to preserve in personal relations with the head of as we know, the full trust ofhis government, does Kennedy, the Soviet side-N.S. Khrushchev, the Sovietgovernment: mutual trust in eachother's not know that long-range missiles which can the Soviet government in its pronouncements personal assurances. As a result, the reaction strike the USA, rather than defensive missiles and the Soviet ambassador during confidential which had found its reflection in the President's which are capable of defending Cuba from any \ meetings - have stressed the defensive nature of declaration and the extremely serious current sort ofattack on the approaches to it, have already { the weapons which are being delivered to Cuba. events which are connected with it and which can been provided to Cuba[?] It comes out that when You, for instance, said R. Kennedy to me, told still lead no one knows where. you and I spoke earlier, you also did not have me about the exclusively defensive goals of the Stressing with great determination that I reliable information, although the conversation 1 \ delivery of Soviet weapons, in particular, the reject his assertions about some sort of "decep­ was about the defensive character of those weap­ I missile weapons, during our meeting at the be­ tion" as entirely not corresponding to reality and ons deliveries, including the future deliveries to ginning of September. I understood you then as as presenting the actions and motives ofthe Soviet Cuba, and everything about this was passed on to saying that we were talking only aboutland in the side in a perverted light, I asked R. Kennedy why the President. future, tool missiles of a relatively small range of the President - if he had some sort of doubts - had I categorically responded to R. Kennedy's action for the defense of Cuba itself and the not negotiated directly and openly with A. A. thoughts about the information which I had re­ approaches to it, but not about long range mis­ Gromyko, with whom there had been a meeting ceived from the government, stressing that this siles which could strike practically the entire just a few days ago, but rather had begun actions, was exclusively within the competence of the territory of the USA. I told this to the President, the seriousness of the consequences of which for Soviet government. Simultaneously, his thoughts who accepted it with satisfaction as the position the entire world are entirely unforeseeable. Be­ of "deception" were rejected again. Further, in of the Soviet government. There was a TASS fore setting off on that dangerous path, fraught calm but firm tones I set forth in detail our declaration in the name ofthe Sovietgovernment with a direct military confrontation between our position on the Cuban issue, taking into account in which it was clearly stated that all military countries, why not use, for instance, the confiden­ the Soviet government's latest announcement on deliveries to Cuba are intended exclusively for tial channels which we have and appeal directly to Cuba, N.S. Khrushchev's letter in response to the defensive goals. The President and the govern­ the head of the Soviet government. President, and also other speeches and conversa­ ment of the USA understood this as the true R. Kennedy said the President had decided tions of N.S. Khrushchev. position of the USSR. not to address A. A. Gromyko about this for the I particularly stressed the circumstance that, With even greater feelings of trust we took following two reasons: first, everything which the as far as is known to me, the head of the Soviet the corresponding declarations Ipublic and con­ Soviet minister had set forth had, evidently ac­ government values the warm relations with the fidentiaV of the head of the Soviet government, cording to the instructions of the Soviet govern­ President. N.S. Khrushchev recently spoke about who, despite the big disagreements and frequent ment, been expressed in very harsh tones, so a that in particular in a conversation with [U.S.] aggravations in relations between our countries, discussion with him hardly could have been of Ambassador [to Moscow Foy] Kohler. I hope the President has always trusted on a personal much use; second, he had once again asserted the that the President also maintains the same point of level. The message which had been sent by N.S. defensive character of the deliveries of Soviet view, - I added. On the relationships between the Khrushchev via the Soviet ambassador and weapons, although the President at that moment heads of our governments, on which history has [Kennedy adviser Theodore] Sorensen, about knew that this is not so, that they had deceived him placed special responsibility for the fate of the the fact that during the election campaign in the again. As far as the confidential channel is con­ world, a lot really does depend; in particular, USA the Soviet side would not do anything to cerned, what sense would that have made, ifon the whether there will be peace or war. The Soviet complicate the international situation and worsen highest level- the level of the Minister of Foreign government acts only in the interests of preserv­ relations between our countries, had made a Affairs - precisely the same is said, although the ing and strengthening peace and calls on the great impression on the President. facts are directly contradictory[?] To that same United States government to act this way too. All this led to the fact that the President point. added R. Kennedy,long ago I myselfin fact Stressing again the basic principles of our policy believed everything which was said from the received the same sort of assurances from the on which we will insist without any compromises Soviet side, and in essence staked on that card his Soviet ambassador, however, all that subsequently (in the spirit of our declaration and N.S. own political fate, having publicly announced to turned out to be entirely not so. Khrushchev's response letter), I simultaneously the USA, that the arms deliveries to Cuba carry - Tell me, - R. Kennedy said to me further­ expressed the hope that the USA government a purely defensive character, although a number [do] you. as the Soviet ambassador, have from show prudence and refrain from taking any ac­ of Republicans have asserted to the contrary. your government information about the presence tions which can lead to catastrophic consequences And then the President suddenly receives trust­ now in Cuba of around half a dozen (here he for peace in the whole world. worthy information to the effect that in Cuba, corrected himself, saying that that number may R. Kennedy, after repeating what he had contrary to everything which had been said by not be entirely accurate, but the fact remains a already said aboutthe President's moods (around the Soviet representatives, including the latest fact) missiles. capable of reaching almost any this time he cooled down a bit and spoke in calmer assurances. made very recently by A. A. Gromyko point in the United States? tones), said that the President also values his during his meeting with the President, there had In my turn I asked R. Kennedy why I should relations with N.S. Khrushchev. As far as the appeared Soviet missiles with a range of action believe his information. when he himselfdoes not future course of actions is concerned, then he, R. which cover almost the entire territory of the want to recognize or respect that which the other Kennedy, can not add anything to that which had USA. Is tl:Jis weapon really for the defensive side is saying to him. To that same point. even the been said by the President himself, who stressed purposes about which you, Mr. Ambassador, A. President himself in his speech in fact had spoken all the seriousness of the situation and under­ A. Gromyko. the Soviet government and N.S. only about some emplacements for missiles, which stands with what sort ofdangerous consequences Khrushchev had spoken? they allegedly had "observed," but not about the all this may be connected, but he can not act in any The President felt himself deceived, and missiles themselves. other way. deceived intentionally. He is convinced of that - There, you see - R. Kennedy quickly put I once again set forth to him our position in even now. Itwas for him a great disappointment, forth, - what would have been the point of us the above-mentioned spirit. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 73

Saying goodbye, already at the door of the the-clock broadcasts to Cuba-24 hours in Span­ Armed Forces at the highest state of military Embassy, R. Kennedy as ifby the way asked what ish and 12 hours in Russian. readiness. Commanders and military councils of sorts of orders the captajns of the SOviet ships We support the suggestion ofthe StateCom­ military regions, groups of troops, Air Defense bound for Cuba have jn li~ht of President mittee for Radio and Television Broadcasting of districts and fleets are ordered to delay the dis­ Kennedy's speech yesterday and the declaration the Council of Ministers about increasing the charge ofsoldiers, sailors and sergeants in the last which he had just signed aboutthe inadmissability radio transmissions from Moscow to Cuba. year of service, troops of the strategic rocket of bringing offensive weapons to Cuba. It is possible to increase Soviet radio trans­ forces, Air Defense forces, and the submarine I answered R. Kennedy with what I knew mission to Cuba partly on the basis of a redistri­ fleet; to cancel all leaves, and to increase military about the instructions which had been given ear­ bution of radio transmitters, which relay pro­ readiness and vigilance in all units and on every lier to the captains: not to obey any unlawful grams from Moscow to foreign countries, and ship. demands to stop or be searched on the open sea, also by using certain radio stations, which work At the present time commanders of the as a violation of international norms of freedom on the jamming of foreign radio transmissions. Armed Forces together with local party organs ofnavigation. This order. as far as I know, has not At the present time, one third of the entire Soviet work on explaining to military men the Declara­ been changed. radio transmitting capability is used to jam for­ tion of the Soviet government. In detachments, R. Kennedy, having waved his hand, said: I eign broadcasts to the USSR. The Ministry of on ships, in military schools and in military don't know how all this will end, for we intend to Communications of the USSR has no reserve institutions the Declaration ofthe USSR govern­ stop your ships. He left right after this. radio stations. ment was listened to collectively on the radio, Overall, his visit left a somewhat strange We request agreement. talks, meetings and gatherings are taking place, impression. He had not spoken about the future where members of military councils, command­ and paths toward a settlement of the conflict, Deputy Head, Department of Agitation and Pro­ ers and heads of political organs speak. In the making instead a "psychological" excursion, as if paganda for Allied Republics, CC CPSU country's Air Defense units, Secretaries of the he was trying to justify the actions ofhis brother, Sakhalin regional CPSU committee (comrade the President, and put the responsibility for his (signed) (A. Egorov) Evstratov), the Khabarovsk provincial commit­ hasty decision, in the correctness of which they tee (comrade comrade Klepikov), BerezovskCity and he, evidently, are not entirely confident, on Instructor of the Department Party Committee (comrade Uglov) spoke. In the us. military regions special leaflets with the text of We think that in the interests of the affair it (signed) (Y. Murav'ev) the Declaration of the Soviet government were would be useful, using this opportunity to pass on published and transfered by air to far-away de­ to the President, through R. Kennedy, with whom 24 October 1962 tachments and garrisons. I could meet again, in confidential form N.S. All servicemen passionately approve of the Khrushchev's thoughts on this matter, concern­ Handwritten at bottom ofp{lge: policies of the USSR government, support addi­ ing not only the issues which R. Kennedy had tional measures which it has undertaken and touched on, but a wider circle of issues in light of I report to the State Committee for Radio which are aimed at maintaining the troops in the the events which are going on now. and Television Broadcasting (Comrade state of maximum military readiness. At the Kharlamov) Nov. 24 that from Nov. 25 the amount same time Soviet soldiers express readiness to 24.x.62 A. DOBRYNIN of radio broadcasts to Cuba will be increased. fulfill without delay every order of the Mother­ land aimed at the crushing defeat ofthe American {Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy ofNSA; transla­ (signed) A. Egorov aggressors. tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.} (signed) Murav'ev Captain Padalko and Captain Sorkov, pilots of the Second Independent Air Defense Army, * * * * * {Source:F. 5, Op. 33, D. 206, L. J33, Centerfor and senior technical lieutenants Aziamov and the Storage of Contemporary Documentation Ovcharov declared: "At this alarming hour we Report to CPSU Central Committee From (TsKhSD), the former CPSU CC archives, Mos­ are at the highest state ofmilitary readiness. Ifthe Department of Agitation and Propaganda, cow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.J American adventurists unleash a war, they will 24 October 1962 be dealt the most powerful crippling blow. In ***** response to the ugly provcation of the warmon­ CCCPSU ger, we will strengthen even more our vigilence Report to CPSU Central Committee From and military preparedness, we will fulfill without The State Committee for Radio and Televi­ Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii delay any order of the Soviet government." sion Broadcasting of the Council of Ministers of and A. Epishev, 24 October 1962 The announcement of the Soviet Govern­ the USSR asks permission, in Iight ofthe aggres­ ment received broad support among soldiers, sive American actions against Cuba, to increase Secret sergeants and sailors due to be discharged from from October 25 of this year the amount ofradio Copy No.1 the Armed Forces. They all declare that they will broadcasts from Moscow to Cuba up to 10 hours serve as much as required in the interests of the per day. At the present time these transmissions CCCPSU strengthening of the preparedness of the troops. are conducted every day for two hours. Private Kovalenko (415th Air Force Com­ Onquestions relating to the strengthening of We report on work undertaken in connec­ bat Air Wing), prematurely released into the radio broadcasting to Cuba, the State Committee tion with the announcement ofthe Soviet govern­ reserves. returned to his base, gave back his consulted with Comrade Puerta, the leader of ment about the aggressive actions of American documents and announced, "At such a troubling Cuban Radio. who is now present in Moscow. imperialism against the Cuban republic. time, my responsibility is to be at my military The State Committee for Radio and Televi­ TheMinistry ofDefense,fulfilling the Coun­ post, and to defend the interests of the Mother­ sion Broadcasting also reports that the USA, cil ofMinisters decision of23 October 1962, has land with a weapon in my hands." starting October 23 ofthis year, organized round­ taken supplementary measures to support the Many senior soldiers, striving with all their 74 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN strength and knowledge to the increase in mili­ Making Copies Prohibited of "irrefutable" evidence of the presence in Cuba tary readiness, declare their willingness to re­ Copy No. I of nuclear-missile arms. We classified this ma­ main for additional service. After a meeting of neuver as an attempt to deflect the Security Coun­ the 15th Division of the Moscow District Air CIPHERED TELEGRAM cil away from the essence ofthe case, particularly Defense Forces 20 soldiers reported with a re­ from the aggressive actions of the USA, which quest to enlist for addional service. Following On 25 October in the Security Council, had violated the UN Charter and which had the example ofCommunists Sergeant Kaplin and Stevenson, speaking first, read out Kennedy's created a threat to peace. Junior Sergeant Afanas'ev. 18 soldiers who had answer to U Thanl's appeal, in which Kennedy In response to Stevenson's attempts to pose been discharged from the 345th anti-aircraft de­ welcomes U Thant's initiative and directs to us questions about whether we are placing tachment of the Bakinsk District Air Defense Stevenson quickly to consider with U Thant the nuclear weapons in Cuba we referred to the Forces requested permission to remain in the issue of conducting negotiations towards a settle­ corresponding situation in the TASS announce­ army. ment to the situation which has been created in the ment of II September /the texts of our speeches After the declaration of the Soviet govern­ Caribbean Sea region /the text of Kennedy's re­ were transmitted by teletype/. ment, at the bases and on the ships there was a sponse was transmitted via teletype/. The attempts of the USA representative to strengthened desire of individual soldiers to de­ From our side we made public Comr. N.S. turn the Council into a tribune for base propa­ fend Cuba as volunteers. On just one day in the Khrushchev's response to U Thant on his appeal, ganda met no support from other members of the 78th motorized infantry training division of the which was transmitted to U Thant before the Council. Ural Military District, 1240 requests to be sent to opening of the session. The representative of the UAR, [Gen. the Cuban Republic were received. At a meeting During the meeting and after it. representa­ Mahmoud] Riad, and the representative ofGhana, of the 300 and 302nd detachment (sic) of the tives of many African and Asian countries ap­ [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, noted the important sig­ Second Independent Air Defense Army of the proached us, noting the exceedingly important nificance of U Thanl's appeal and the responses Air Defense Forces the decision was made about significance for the preservation of peace in the of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, the readiness ofthe entire unit to leave for Cuba. Caribbean Sea region and in the whole world of stressing that as a result of that exchange of In response to the directions of the Soviet the message from the head of the Soviet govern­ messages a new situation had been created in the government relating to the aggressive actions of ment. Council. Riad and Quaison-Sackey proposed the American government, military personnel Stevenson's speech at today' s session, re­ suspending the session so as to allow all the heighten their vigilence and increase their per­ gardless of his attempts to assert once again that interested sides, with the participation ofU Thant, sonal responsibility for the maintenance of mili­ Cuba has at its disposal an offensive weapon, and to conduct the necessary negotiations, having in tary readiness. In the 3rd Corps of the Air that this creates a danger for the Western hemi­ mind that the Council sessions will be resumed Defense Forces ofthe Moscow Military District, sphere, had in essence a defensive character. He depending on the result and process of the nego­ soldiers work at night in fulfillment of daytime made a declaration as if the USA had not sought tiations. norms. In the 20 Ist anti-aircraft detachment of a pretextto raise the Cuban issue, thatthe USA did That proposal was supported by the Chilean the Ural Military District there has been a signifi­ not object to deliveries to Cuba of a defensive representative, [Daniel] Schweitzer. cant reduction in the time required for mainte­ weapon, and that everything which they are trying The proposal of the UAR and Ghana was nance work on military equipment. so hard to do is to implement "limited" actions. accepted withoutobjections by the Security Coun­ As an expression of the unprecedented trust Being in no position to disprove our accusations cil. When the adopted decision was announced, of the individuals of the Armed Forces in the of a violation by the USA of the UN Charter, I, as the Chairman ofthe Council, stressed that the CPSU there is a strengthened desire among front­ Stevenson declared that the USA could not slow Security Council could be convened by the Chair­ line soldiers to join the ranks of the Party and the down implementation of the planned measures in man of the Council depending on the course of Komsomol. Following the declaration of the expectation of a Soviet veto in the Security Coun­ the negotiations. In this way, no votes were taken Government of the USSR, the number of appli­ cil. He said further that the USA had come to the on any of the proposed resolutions lours, the cations tojoin the Party and the Komsomol grew. Security Council even before the Organization of American proposal, and the neutral one/, and they During the explanation of the declaration of the American States had started to work and had remained in the Security ~ouncil file. the Soviet Government, no sorts of negative given its approval for the "quarantine" measures. We received your x [word deleted--ed.] manifestations were noted. Stevenson tried to present the matter as if he was after it had already basically been decided that in We are reporting for your information. talking not about unilateral measures of the USA. relation to the start of negotiations between the but about the agreed actions of the Organization interested sides consideration of the issue in the (signed) R. MALINOVSKII of American States. Security Council is not ending, and that the issue (signed) A. EPISHEV In our speech we showed the lack offounda­ remains on the Security Council agenda, more­ tion ofall ofthese assertions by Stevenson, stress­ over, the Council sessions may be resume at any 24 October 1962 ing that, as the discussion in the Security Council time depending on the course of the negotiations had confirmed, the USA had no sort of justifica­ between the interested sides. At the present time, [Source: F.5, Op. 47, DAOO, Ll. 69-71, TsKhSD; tions for the aggressive actions which it had as we understand it, it would be premature to raise translation by Mark H. Doctoroff] undertaken, which had created a threat ofthermo­ the issue at the XVIIth session of the General nuclear war. We pointed out that the aggressive Assembly, insofar as the issue as before is on the * * * * * path down which the USA had set had met a rebuff Security Council agenda and we will always have from the side of the peoples and the majority of the possibility to demand that it be raised in the Telegram from the Soviet representative to UN members. Precisely this has now prompted Assembly if the possible new consideration by the United Nations, Valerian Zorin, to the the USA to give its agreement to enter into nego­ the Security Council will end without result. USSR MFA, 25 October 1962 tiations. We ridiculed the maneuver which After the session U Thant informed us that Stevenson had made at the session in showing the he intends to begin negotiations with us, the photographs which had been fabricated by Ameri­ Cubans, and the Americans tomorrow, 26 Octo­ Top Secret can intelligence which had been assigned the role ber. He will meet with each delegation individu­

) COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 75 ally. We will report our thoughts about this An analogous declaration was made in the name At the same time it is not possible to exclude meeting in supplementary fashion. of the Organization of American States, which. that the general American plan of actions really evidently. is aimed at giving that fact extra "legal may include the implementation ofsuch an over­ 25.X.62 V. ZORIN force"l. In their declarations there is made a flight. especially if the adventurist moods of pretty clear hint to the effect that the mentioned certain members ofthe circle which is close to the "fact" gives the USA government "a foundation" President are taken into account. In this regard xl Having in mind "Your telegram" to take further. more serious measures against we should note that judging by certain informa­ Cuba. tion, disagreements about participation in the [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy ojNSA; At the same time. amongjournalists who are negotiations in the UN are now growing in the translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.! close to the White House. State Department and USA government. since this is connected with Pentagon conversations about the possibility of dragging out the time and a weakening of the * * * * * implementing at the earliest possible time a mass acuteness of the moment, and means that the overflight ofAmerican aviation in the area where difficulty of taking "decisive measures" against Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the the missile platforms are deployed. with a pos­ Cuba unavoidably would grow. USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, sible commando raid, have received wide circu­ 27 October 1962 lation. Several of them in this regard express the opinion that an ultimatum to the Cuban govern­ 27,X,62 A. DOBRYNIN ment itself to disassemble the missile platforms TOP SECRET in a very short time might precede such an over­ [Source:AVP RF, copycourtesyojNSA; transla­ Making Copies Prohibited flight. As before, the real possibility of an immi­ tiol! by Mark H. DoctoroffJ Copy No. I nent incursion in Cuba is being asserted. but the theme of a bombardment of the missile bases has * * * * * CIPHERED TELEGRAM now moved to the fore. The wide circulation and the certain orienta­ For Dobyrnin's 27 October 1962 Cable tion of similar conversations under conditions of His Meeting with Robert F. Kennedy, During the entireday of26 Octoberin broad­ when. practically speaking, censorship has been see accompanying box casts of American radio, television, and in press introduced on reports concerning Cuba. and when reports, in accord with instructions from above. it constant instruction of journalists is going on, * * * * * is being ever more firmly asserted that in Cuba leads to the thought that these conversations are the construction of missile bases is being contin­ inspired by the government itself. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's ued under a forced tempo, and that the missiles Facilitating the circulation of these types of Instructions to the USSR Ambassador to the themselves are being brought to operational readi­ moods and rumors. the USA government, evi­ USA, 28 October 1962 ness. dently, is trying to show its determination to Toward the end ofthe day, the State Depart­ achieve at any price the liquidation of the missile Making Copies Prohibited ment representative White and the Secretary to emplacements in Cuba with the aim of putting on the President for questions of the press, [Pierre] that issue the maximum pressure on us and on CIPHERED TELEGRAM Salinger. made official declarations about that. I Cuba.

ANATOMY OF A CONTROVERSY: leader Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived Saturday blackmail. The U.S. presidentelectedto transmit morning demanding that the United States agree this sensitive message through his brother. Attor­ Anaroly F. Dobrynin·sMee:ting to remove its JUIJiter missiles from Turkey in ney General Robert Po Kennedy, who met in his With RobertF'. Kennedy. exchange for a Soviet removal of missiles from office at the Justice Department with Soviet am­ Saturday, 27 October 1962 Cuba. The letter struck U.S. officials as an bassador AnatolY Dobrynin. ominous hardening of the Soviet position from That meeting has long been recognized as a the previous day'sletterfrom Khrushcbev•which turning point in the crisis, but several aspects of by Jim Hershberg hadomittedany mention ofAmerican missiles in it have been shroud~in mystery and confusion. Turkeybuthadinsteadimplied thatWilshington's Oneconcerned the issue cOf tbe Jupiter missiles in If the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most pledge not to invade Cuba would be sufficient to Turkey: U.S. officials maintained that neither dangerous passage of the C<:lId War, the Blost obviate the need for Soviet nuclear protection of John nor Robert Kennedy promised to withdraw dangerous BlomenlcOf the. Cuban Mis.sile Crisis Castro's revolution. the Jupiters as a quid pro quo. or concession, in was the evening of smurday, 2toetober 1922, On Saturday evening. after a day of tense exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles when the resolutionofthecrisis-.."warorEQe­ discussions within the "ExComm" or Executive from Cuba. or as part of an explicit agreement, appeared to hang in theba1anee. While Soviet Committee·ofsenioradvisers.gresident Kenn~y deal.or pl~ge, buthadmerely informedDobrynin ships had nOI Attempted to break the lJ.S. nliVai decided on a dual strategy-a formal letter to that Kenn~y had planned to take out the Ameri­ blockade of Cubli, Soviet n~~ar missile bases l'hrusbchev. acc::epting the implicit terms of his can missiles in any event. This was the version of remained On the island andwete fapidlY!>eoom­ ~tober261etter(aU.s. non-invasion pl~ge in events depicted in the first published account of jni operational, Q;nd pressure on Presi~nt excbange for the verifiable departure of Soviet the RFK-Dobrynin meeting by oneofthe partici­ Kennedy to order lillair stdke c()r]nvasion Wlis nuclear missiles), coupled with private assur­ pants, in Robert F. Kennedy's Thirteen Days: A mounting, especially Q;{teran American D-2 re­ anceslol'hrushQbev thatthe UnitedStateswould Memoir oj the Cuban Missile Crisis. posthu­ connaissance plane was. $bot

Western hemisphere has gi ven a guarantee for the CONTROVERSY permanent preservation of a "Communist pre­ continued/rom page 75 serve" by the shores of the USA. In order to withdraw the Jupiters, this was also the first deflect these attacks, Kennedy must receive evi­ public indication that the issue had even been dence to the effect that Castro has no "offensive" privately discussed. weapons. With Dobrynin obviously unable to publish 4. Kennedy, as Salinger asserts, believes his own version-he remained Moscow's am­ that achieving a resolution to the Cuban crisis bassador in Washington until 1986, and Soviet "will open a completely new epoch in Soviet­ diplomats were not in the habit of publishing tell­ American relations." when mutual trust will be­ NEW RUSSIAN LAW all exposes prior to glasnost-the first important come the "basis of everything." One of the first AND THE Soviet account of the event to emerge was con­ issues to be resolved can and must be the issue of ARCHIVAL SITUATION tained in the tape-recorded memoirs of deposed a test ban. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, which were 5. Regarding a meeting between Kennedy On 25 January 1995 the Russian parlia­ smuggled to the West and published in 1970 and Khrushchev, before the Cuban crisis a major­ ment passed a "Federal Law on Information, (afterKhrushchev's death, additional installments ity of members of the government spoke out Information Systems, and the Protection of saw print in the West in 1974 and 1990). The against such a contact, although it had been Information." It was signed into law by account of the RFK-Dobrynin meeting in publicly stated that Kennedy will meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 20 February Khrushchev Remembers, in the form of a para­ Khrushchev if he comes to the General Assem­ 1995 and was published in Sobranie phrase from memory of Dobrynin's report, did bly. Kennedy himself had doubted that this Zakonodatel'stva Rossiskoi Federatsii 8 (20 not directly touch upon the secret discussions meeting will bring any sort of positive results. February 1995), pp. 1213-1225. concerning the Jupiters, but did raise eyebrows "Now, - said Salinger - the situation has The lengthy, 25-article law covers a wide with its claim that Robert F. Kennedy had fretted changed. The Cuban crisis showed that the issues range of topics, and much of it has no direct to Dobrynin that if his brother did not approve an on which the improvement of Soviet-American bearing on the archives. In a few places, attack on Cuba soon, the American military might relations depends must be resolved urgently. however, especially Article 13 ("Guarantees of "overthrow him and seize power." The second Therefore. it is will be necessary to review the the Provision of Information"), the law does volume of Khrushchev's memoirs (Khrushchev position in relation to a meeting in light of the have a direct--and, unfortunately, highly Remembers: The LastTestament). published post­ results ofthe settlement ofthe crisis. We were too negative--bearing on the archives. Points I and humously in 1974, touched only briefly on the close to war for it to be possible to forget about 2 of Article 13, which entitle "organs of state Robert Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, but included this and to allow ourselves to delay even longer in authority" to restrict access to "information the flat statement (on p. 512) that "President reaching a resolution to the problems which have resources pertaining to the activities of these Kennedy said that in exchange for the withdrawl become urgent. However, the President still does organs," effectively leave the individual state of our missiles, he would remove American mis­ not have a prepared decision about the expedi­ ministries and agencies with full discretion siles from Turkey and Italy," although he de­ ency of a meeting and about the issues which over their own archives. scribed this "pledge" as "symbolic" since the should be considered. We still have to think This provision may be consistent with rockets "were already obsolete." about that." legislation passed in the spring of 1994, but it Over the years, many scholars of the Cuban 6. Salinger, like other interlocutors in Wash­ runs counter to suggestions that the archival Missile Crisis came strongly to suspect that Rob­ ington, avoided touching on the German ques­ holdings of the various ministries and state ert Kennedy had, in fact, relayed a pledge from tion. He mentioned in passing only that "even in agencies be gradually transferred to the his brother to take out the Jupiters from Turkey in respect to Berlin we have always stressed our auspices of the State Archival Service of exchange for the Soviet removal of nuclear mis­ respect for the opposing point of view." Russia (Rosarkhiv). It also seems to run siles from Cuba, so long as Moscow kept the 7. Salinger stressed that even with all the counter to the decree that Yeltsin issued last .swap secret; yet senior former Kennedy Admin­ "shortcomings" of Kennedy and Khrushchev's September, which was published in the istration officials, such as then-National Security Vienna meeting, it had given a positive result, at previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (Fall Advisor McGeorge Bundy and then-Secretary of least insofar as on the basis of the agreement that 1994, pp. 89, 1(0). State Dean Rusk, continued to insist that RFK had been achieved there the Laos problem had It is difficult to say how strictly the law had passed on no more than an informal assur­ been settled, which prompted confidence that it is will be enforced, but it seems to be one further ance rather than an explicit promise or agree­ possible to develop our relations on the basis of indication that the proponents of archival ment. trust. For precisely this reason Kennedy had openness are losing ground, at least for now. The first authoritative admission on the U.S. withdrawn the forces from Thailand. side that the Jupiters had actually been part of a "The Cuban crisis undermined this develop­ --Mark Kramer "deal" came at a conference in Moscow in Janu­ ment of relations, but Khrushchev's wise deci­ ary 1989, after glasnost had led Soviet (and then sion may put the development of Soviet-Ameri­ Cuban) former officials to participate in interna­ can relations onto a basis of mutual trust," said tional scholarly efforts to reconstruct and assess Salinger. the history of the crisis. At that meeting, former 8. Salinger asked me to pass on to N.S. Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen (and Khrushchev his personal thanks for the hospital­ the uncredited editor of Thirteen Days) admitted, ity which had been given to him in Moscow. after prodding from Dobrynin. that he had taken it upon himself to edit out a "very explicit" XI.I.62 G. ZHUKOV reference to the inclusion of the Jupiters in the final deal to settle the crisis. [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy ojNSA; transla­ Now Dobrynin's original, contemporane­ tion by Mark H. Doctoroff] ous, and dramatic cable ofthe meeting, alluded to 1 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN e 78 I in some accounts by Soviets (such as Anatoly He asked me what offer the United States power. The American army could get out of Gromyko, son of the late foreign minister) with was making, and I told him of the letter that control. '" special access. has been declassified and is avail­ President Kennedy had just transmitted to able at the archi ves of the Russian Foreign Min­ Khrushchev. He raised the question ofour remov­ [Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, istry. It is reprinted in translation below, along ing the missiles from Turkey. I said that there and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. with relevant excerpts from the other publica­ could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; tions mentioned above. The Dobrynin cable's made under this kind ofthreat orpressure, and that citation from paperback edition, New York: Ban­ first publication in English, a copy obtained by in the last analysis this was a decision that would tam, 1971), pp. 551-52] the Japanese television network NHK, came last have to be made by NATO. However, I said, year in an appendix to We All Lost the Cold War, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove * * * * * a study by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, those missiles from Italy and Turkey for a long whose commentary is also excerpted. period of time. He had ordered their removal Sorensen's "Confession": some time ago, and it was our judgment that, * * * * * within a short time after this crisis was over, those ...the president [Kennedy] recognized that, missiles would be gone. for Chairman Khrushchev to withdraw the mis­ Robert F. Kennedy's (edited) Description I said President Kennedy wished to have siles from Cuba, it would be undoubtedly helpful peaceful relations between our two countries. He to him if he could say at the same time to his I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin about wished to resolve the problems that confronted us colleagues on the Presidium, "And we have been 7: 15 P.M. and asked him to come to the Depart­ in Europe and Southeast Asia. He wished to move assured that the missiles will be coming out of ment of Justice. We met in my office at 7:45. I forward on the control of nuclear weapons. How­ Turkey," And so,_ after the ExComm meeting [on told him first that we knew that work was con­ ever, we could make progress on these matters the evening of 27 October 1962), as I'm sure tinuing on the missile bases in Cuba and that in only when the crisis was behind us. Time was almost all of you know, a small group met in the last few days it had been expedited. I said that running out. We had only a few more hours-we President Kennedy's office, and he instructed in the last few hours we had learned that our needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Robert Kennedy-at the suggestion of Secretary reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been Union. I said we must have it the next day. of State [Dean] Rusk to deliver the letter to fired upon and that one ofour U-2s had been shot I returned to the White House.... Ambassador Dobrynin for referral to Chairman down and the pilot killed. That for us was a most Khrushchev. but to add orally what was not in the serious turn of events. [Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of letter: that the missiles would come out of Tur­ President Kennedy did not want a military the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: New Ameri­ ) m L conflict. He had done everything possible to can Library, 1969), 107-109.J avoid a military engagement with Cuba and with Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert ( the Soviet Union, but now they had forced our ***** Kennedy's book did not adequately express that hand. Because of the deception of the Soviet the "deal" on the Turkish missiles was part of the 1 Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes Khrushchev's Description resolution of the crisis. And here I have a confes­ would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and if sion to make to my colleagues on the American the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then The climax came after five or six days, when side, as well as to others who are present. Jwas we would have to shoot back. This would inevi­ ourambassadorto Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, the editor of Robert Kennedy's book. It was, in tably lead to further incidents and to escalation of reported that the President's brother, Robert fact, a diary of those thirteen days. And his diary the conflict, the implications of which were very Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial was very explicit that this was part ofthe deal; but grave indeed. visit. Dobrynin' s report went something like this: at that time it was still a secret even on the He said the Cubans resented the fact that we "Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One American side, except for the six of us who had were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if could see from his eyes that he had not slept for been present at that meeting. So I took it upon we had not violated Cuban air space, we would days. He himself said that he had not been home myself to edit that out of his diaries, and that is still be believing what Khrushchev had said­ for six days and nights. 'The President is in a why the Ambassador is somewhat justified in that there would be no missiles placed in Cuba. grave situation,' Robert Kennedy said, 'and does saying that the diaries are not as explicit as his In any case, I said, this matter was far more not know how to get out of it. We are under very conversation. serious than the air space of Cuba-it involved severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from the peoples of both of our countries and, in fact, our military to use force against Cuba. Probably [Sorensen comments, in BruceJ. Allyn, James G. people all over the globe. at this very moment the President is sitting down Blight, and David A. Welch, eds., Back to the The Soviet Union had secretly established to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference missile bases in Cuba while at the same time want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, proclaiming privately and publicly that this would Kennedy's message to Chairman Khrushchev 1989 (Lanham, MD: University Press ofAmerica, never be done. We had to have a commitment by through unofficial channels. President Kennedy 1992), pp. 92-93] tomorrow that those bases would be removed. I implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his of­ was not giving them an ultimatum but a state­ fer and to take into consideration the peculiarities * * * * * ment of fact. He should understand that if they of the American system. Even though the Presi­ did not remove those bases, we would remove dent himself is very much against starting a war Accounts of Former U.S. Officials: them. President Kennedy had great respect for over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could the Ambassador's country and the courage of its occur against his will. That is why the President McGeorge Bundy: people. Perhaps his country might feel it neces­ is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for sary to take retaliatory action; but before that was his help in liquidating this conflict. Ifthe situation ... Later [on Saturday], accepting a proposal from over, there would be not only dead Americans continues much longer, the President is not sure Dean Rusk, [John F.] Kennedy instructed his but dead Russians as well. that the military will not overthrow him and seize brother to tell Ambassador Dobrynin that while COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 79 there could be no bargain over the missiles that a pistol to Khrushchev's head and say, "Mr. people themselves established and maintained had been supplied to Turkey, the president him­ Chairman, launch those missiles or we'll blow [their system]. "The OAS resolution is a direct self was determined to have them removed and your head off!" violation of the UN Charter," I added, "and you, would attend to the matter once the present crisis .. .In framing a response [to Khrushchev's as the Attorney General of the USA, the highest was resolved-as long as no one in Moscow second letter of Saturday, October 27], the presi­ American legal entity, should certainly know called that action part of a bargain. [po 406] dent, Bundy, McNamara, Bobby Kennedy, and I that." met in the Oval Office, where after some discus­ R. Kennedy said that he realized that we had ...Theotherpart ofthe oral message [to DobryninJ sion I suggested that since the Jupiters in Turkey different approaches to these problems and it was was proposed by Dean Rusk; that we should tell were coming out in any event, we should inform not likely that we could convince each other. But Khrushchev that while there could be no deal the Russians ofthis so that this irrelevantquestion now the matter is not in these differences, since over the Turkish missiles, the president was de­ would not complicate the solution of the missile time is of the essence. "I want," R. Kennedy termined to get them out and would do so once the sites in Cuba. We agreed that Bobby should stressed, "to layout the current alarming situation Cuban crisis was resolved. The proposal was inform Ambassador Dobrynin orally. Shortly the way the president sees it. He wants N.S. quickly supported by the rest of us [in addition to after we returned to our offices, I telephoned K!}rushchev to know this. This is the thrust ofthe Bundy and Rusk, those present included Presi­ Bobby to underline that he should pass this along situation now." dent Kennedy, McNamara, RFK, George Ball, to Dobrynin only as information, not a public "Because of the plane that was shot down, Roswell Gilpatrick, Llewellyn Thompson, and pledge. Bobby told me that he was then sitting there is now strong pressure on the president to Theodore Sorensen]. Concerned as we all were with Dobrynin and had already talked with him. give an order to respond with fire if fired upon by the cost of a public bargain struck under Bobby later told me that Dobrynin called this when American reconnaissance planes are flying pressure at the apparent expense ofthe Turks, and message "very important information." over Cuba. The USA can't stop these flights, aware as we were from the day's discussion that because this is the only way we can quickly get for some, even in our own closest councils, even [Dean Rusk as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It information about the state ofconstruction ofthe this unilateral private assurance might appear to (New York: Norton & Co.. 1990), pp. 238-240] missile bases in Cuba, which we believe pose a betray an ally, we agreed without hesitation that very serious threat to our national security. But if no one not in the room was to be informed of this * * * * * we start to fire in response-a chain reaction will additional message. Robert Kennedy was in­ quickly start that will be very hard to stop. The structed to make it plain to Dobrynin that the Dobrynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign same thing in regard to the essence of the issue of same secrecy must be observed on the other side, Ministry, the missile bases in Cuba. The USA government and that any Soviet reference to our assurance 27 October 1962: is determined to get rid of those bases-up to, in would simply make it null and void. [pp. 432-44] the extreme case, of bombing them, since, I ...There was no leak. As far as as I know, repeat, they pose a great threat to the security of none of the nine of us told anyone else what had TOP SECRET the USA. But in response to the bombing ofthese happened. We denied in every forum that there Making Copies Prohibited bases, in the course of which Soviet specialists was any deal, and in the narrowest sense what we Copy No.1 might suffer, the Soviet government will un­ said was usually true, as far as it went. When the doubtedly respond with the same against us, orders were passed that the Jupiters must come CIPHERED TELEGRAM somewhere in Europe. A real war will begin, in out. we gave the plausible and accurate-if in­ which millions of Americans and Russians will complete---explanation that the missile crisis had die. We want to avoid that any way we can, I'm convinced the president once and for all that he Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come sure that the government of the USSR has the did not want those missiles there.... [po 434] see him. We talked alone. same wish. However, taking time to find a way The Cuban crisis. R. Kennedy began, con­ out [ofthe situation] is very risky (here R. Kennedy [from McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: tinues to quickly worsen. We have just received mentioned as if in passing that there are many Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years a report that an unarmed American plane was shot unreasonable heads among the generals, and not (New York: Random House, 1988] down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight only among the generals, who are 'itching for a over Cuba. The military is demanding that the fight'). The situation might get out of control, President arm such planes and respond to fire with irreversible consequences." Dean Rusk: with fire. The USA government will have to do "In this regard." R. Kennedy said, "the presi­ this. dent considers that a suitable basis for regulating Even though Sovietships had turned around, I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him, the entire Cuban conflict might be the letter N.S. time was running out. We made this very clear to what right American planes had to fly over Cuba Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in Khrushchev. Earlierin the week Bobby Kennedy at all, crudely violating its sovereignty and ac­ response from the President. which was sent off told Ambassador Dobrynin that if the missile cepted international norms? How would the today to N.S. Khrushchev through the US Em­ were not withdrawn immediately, the crisis would USA have reacted ifforeign planes appeared over bassy in Moscow. The most important thing for move into a different and dangerous military its territory? us," R. Kennedy stressed. "is to get as soon as phase. In his book Khrushchev Remembers, "We have a resolution of the Organization possible the agreement of the Soviet government Khrushchev states that Robert Kennedy told of American states that gives us the right to such to halt further work on the construction of the Dobrynin that the military might take over. overflights." R. Kennedy quickly replied. missile bases in Cuba and take measures under Khrushchev either genuinely misunderstood or I told him that the Soviet Union, like all international control that would make it impos­ deliberately misused Bobby's statement. Obvi­ peace-loving countries, resolutely rejects such a sible to use these weapons. In exchange the ously there was never any threat of a military "right" or, to be more exact, this kind of true government of the USA is ready, in addition to takeover in this country. We wondered about lawlessness, when people who don't like the repealing all measures on the "quarantine," to Khrushchev's situation, even whether some So­ social-political situation in a country try to im­ give the assurances that there will not be any viet general ormemberofthe Politburo would put pose their will on it-a small state where the invasion of Cuba and that other countries of the 80 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN l ~estern Hemisphere are ready to give the same ing this question. Then I told R. Kennedy that the very least, Kennedy suggested that he thought assurances-the US government is certain of president's thoughts would be brought to the that Soviet retaliation was likely. Such an admis­ ~' attention of the head of the Soviet government. 1 sion was still damaging to compellence. It seems 1 \ "And what about Turkey?" I asked R. also said that I would contact him as soon as there likely that Kennedy was trying to establish the It Kennedy. was a reply. In this regard, R. Kennedy gave me basis for a more cooperative approach to crisis i "If that is the only obstacle to achieving the a number of a direct telephone line to the White resolution. His brother, he made clear, was under L regulation I mentioned earlier, then the president House. enormous pressure from a coterie ofgenerals and • doesn't see any unsurmountable difficulties in In thecourse ofthe conversation, R. Kennedy civilian officials who were "itching for a fight." resolving this issue," replied R. Kennedy. "The noted that he knew about the conversation that This also was a remarkable admission for the , greatest difficulty for the president is the public television commentator Scali had yesterday with attorney general to make. The pressure on the \ discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the an Embassy adviser on possible ways to regulate president to attack Cuba, as Kennedy explained 1 deployment ofmissile bases in Turkey was done the Cuban conflict [one-and-a-half lines whited at the beginning of the meeting, had been greatly ! ~ by a special decision of the NATO Council. To out] intensified by the destruction of an unarmed l announce now a unilateral decision by the pre~i­ I should say that during our meeting R. American reconnaissance plane. The president t dent of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I've never did not want to use force, in part because he (" Turkey-this would damage the entire structure seen him like this before. True, about twice he recognized the terrible consequences of escala­ ,I of NATO and the US position as the leader 2f tried to return to the topic of "deception," (that he tion, and was therefore requesting Soviet assis­ {" NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows talked about so persistently during our previous tance to make it unnecessary. very well. there are many arguments. In short, if meeting), but he did so in passing and without any This interpretation is supported by the , such a decision were announced now it would edge to it. He didn't even try to get into fights on president's willingness to remove the Jupiter I seriously tear apart NATO." various subjects, as he usually does, and only missiles as a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of I I "However, President Kennedy is ready to persistently returned to one topic: time is of the missiles in Cuba, and his brother's frank confes­ I come to agree on that question with N.S. essence and we shouldn't miss the chance. sion that the only obstacle to dismantling the f Khrushchev, too. ! think that in order to with­ After meeting with me he immediately went Jupiters were political. "Public discussion" of a ( draw these bases from Turkey," R. Kennedy to see the president, with whom, as R. Kennedy missile exchange would damage the United States' said, "we need 4-5 months. This is the minimal said, he spends almost all his time now. position in NATO. For this reason, Kennedy ( amount oftime necessary for the US government revealed, "besides himself and his brother, only to do this, taking into account the procedures that 27/X-62 A. DOBRYNIN 2-3 people know about it in Washington." exist within the NATO framework. On the Khrushchev would have to cooperate with the whole Turkey issue," R. Kennedy added, "if [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, trans­ administration to keep the American concession Premier N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I've lation from copy provided by NHK, in Richard a secret. said, we can continue to exchange opinions be­ Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost Most extraordinary of all is the apparent tween him and the president, using him, R. the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer­ agreement between Dobrynin and Kennedy to Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. "However, sity Press. 1994), appendix, pp. 523-526, with treat Kennedy's de facto ultimatum as "a request, the president can't say anything public in this minor revisions. J and not an ultimatum." This was a deliberate regard about Turkey," R. Kennedy said again. R. attempt to defuse as much as possible the hostility Kennedy then warned that his comments about * * * * * that Kennedy's request for an answer by the next Turkey are extremely confidential; besides him day was likely to provoke in Moscow. So too was and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Lebow and Stein comment, Dobrynin's next sentence: "I noted that it went Washington. We All Lost the Cold War (excerpt): without saying that the Soviet government would "That's all that he asked me to pass on to not accept any ultimatum and it was good that the N.S. Khrushchev," R. Kennedy said in conclu­ The cable testifies to the concern ofJohn and American government realized that." sion. 'Thepresidentalso askedN.S. Khrushchev Robert Kennedy that military action would trig­ Prior meetings between Dobrynin and to give him an answer (through the Soviet am­ ger runaway escalation. Robert Kennedy told Kennedy had sometimes degenerated into shout­ bassador and R. Kennedy) if possible within the Dobrynin of his government's determination to ing matches. On this occasion, Dobrynin indi­ next day (Sunday) on these thoughts in order to ensure the removal ofthe Soviet missiles in Cuba, cates. the attorney general kept his emotions in have a business-like. clear answer in principle. and his beliefthatthe Soviet Union "will undoubt­ check and took the ambassador into his confi­ [He asked him] not to get into a wordy discus­ edly respond with the same against us, some­ dence in an attempt to cooperate on the resolution sion, which might drag things out. The current where in Europe." Such an admission seems of the crisis. This two-pronged strategy suc­ serious situation, unfortunately. is such that there illogical ifthe administration was using the threat ceeded where compellence alone might have is very little time to resolve this whole issue. of force to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw failed. It gave Khrushchev positive incentives to Unfortunately. events are developing too quickly. its missiles from Cuba. It significantly raised the remove the Soviet missiles and reduced the emo­ The request for a reply tomorrow," stressed R. expected cost to the United States of an attack tional cost to him of the withdrawal. He re­ Kennedy, "is just that-a request, and not an against the missiles, thereby weakening the cred­ sponded as Kennedy and Dobrynin had hoped. ,ultimatum. The president hopes that the head of ibility of the American threat. To maintain or the Soviet government will understand him cor­ enhance that credibility, Kennedy would have rectly." had to discount the probability of Soviet retalia­ I noted that it went without saying that the tion to Dobrynin. That nobody in the government Soviet government would not accept any ultima­ was certain of Khrushchev's reponse makes tums and it was good that the American govern­ Kennedy's statement all the more remarkable. ment realized that. I also reminded him of N.S. It is possible that Dobrynin misquoted Rob­ Khrushchev's appeal in his last letter to the ert Kennedy. However, the Soviet ambassador president to demonstrate state wisdom in resolv­ was a careful and responsible diplomat. At the