On 10 March 1952, the Soviet Leader Iosif Stalin Proposed—Or

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RuggentThe 1952ha Stalerlin Note on German Unification

The 1952 Stalin Note on German Uniªcation The Ongoing Debate

✣ Peter Ruggenthaler

On 10 March 1952, the Soviet leader Iosif Stalin proposed—or seemed to propose—a peace treaty that made the reuniªcation of Germany contingent on establishing a neutral status for the country, an offer that surprised much of the world and seemed appealing on the surface. In Moscow, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko handed identi- cally worded notes containing a draft version of a German peace treaty to diplomatic representatives of the Western powers (the United States, Great Brit- ain, and France). Politicians, diplomats, and, above all, historians have long debated whether Stalin was sincere about the goals he laid out in the so-called Stalin Note.1 In the ensuing “Battle of Notes” that dragged on well into the autumn of 1952, the U.S., British, and French governments declined to engage with Sta- lin’s offer and demanded instead binding guarantees that free elections be held everywhere in Germany. After years in which the Soviet Union had shown itself averse to holding free elections in Germany, Western leaders considered Stalin’s “offer” a propaganda coup at best and a proposal fraught with dangers at worst. Washington in particular was unwilling to abandon the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with the West. The treaties that were to make West Germany part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) via the European Defense Community (EDC) were ready for signing.2 Relationships between Western governments and the USSR had been

1. The debate that has gone on for decades in the extensive research literature is succinctly summarized in Jürgen Zarusky, ed., Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952: Neue Quellen und Analysen, Mit Beiträgen von Wilfried Loth, Hermann Graml und Gerhard Wettig, Vol. 84 of Schriftenreihe der Viertel- jahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002). 2. See, above all, Gerhard Wettig, Bereitschaft zu Einheit in Freiheit? Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1955 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); and Rolf Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte: Darstellung und Dokumente in vier Bänden, Vol. 2, 1948–1955 (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2002).

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marked by truly glacial temperatures since the Berlin blockade in 1948–1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The Cold War was in full swing. The Soviet Union in its turn intended to install powerful armed forces in East Germany that would be “capable of delivering a lightning blow to NATO armies and of occupying Western Europe all the way to the English Channel.”3 By early 1952 the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was integrated in practical terms into the crash military buildup under way in the Eastern bloc. Stalin is said to have decided as early as 1951 in favor of integrating the paramilitary police force (KVP) that had been taking shape clan- destinely since 1948 into a grand coalition army for a possible war with the West. As in the case of other unpopular measures, he was only biding his time in order to be able to pass off whatever step he was planning as a reaction to the behavior of the West.4 The signing of the General Treaty in May 1952 between the Western powers and the FRG, a treaty that was to end the Federal Republic’s status as an occupied territory and give it the rights of a federal state, provided Moscow with the ideal pretext to start constructing and forti- fying a ªve-kilometer-wide cordon sanitaire along the German-German border, a step that could not but deepen the rift between the two German political entities. The Stalin Note was an additional propaganda maneuver to shore up Sta- lin’s claim that he had given the West the option of German reuniªcation and that the Western governments had refused and moved ahead instead with “West German remilitarization.” The Soviet Union thus could not be held responsible for Germany’s division and could present itself as the champion of German unity. To this day, some historians blame Western politicians, notably FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, for not having shown themselves more ready to enter into a dialogue with Moscow about the Stalin Note.5 According to these critics, the West lost an opportunity for Germany’s reuniªcation without even fully exploring the position of the Soviet government. Western leaders also al- lowed the Soviet Union to take on the mantle of a standard-bearer of German uniªcation and to deºect responsibility for the division of Germany.

3. Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire, The Soviet Union from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: Univer- sity of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 81. 4. See Gerhard Wettig, “Stalins Aufrüstungsbeschluss: Die Moskauer Beratungen mit den Parteichefs und Verteidigungsministern der ‘Volksdemokratien’ vom 9. bis 12. Januar 1951,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (VfZ), Vol. 41, No. 4 (2005), pp. 635–650. 5. See esp. Rolf Steininger, Eine Chance zur Wiedervereinigung? Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952: Darstellung und Dokumentation auf der Grundlage unveröffentlichter britischer und amerikanischer Akten (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1986).

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The State of Research

For a long time the only course open to historians was to speculate about what went on behind the Kremlin’s walls, the goals Stalin was trying to pursue with his note, and the reasons for his ostensible willingness to tolerate a united, neutral Germany on the basis of a peace treaty. After 1991, when historians were given sporadic access to the relevant holdings of the Soviet Min- istry of Foreign Affairs, a certain amount of light crept in. Gerhard Wettig, Aleksei Filitov, Vladislav Zubok, Bernd Bonwetsch, Jochen Laufer, Stein Bjørnstad, and Wilfried Loth were among those who imparted signiªcant early impulses to research through their work in Russian archives.6 What they could not give to the community of historians was consensus. The debate became heated on several occasions, particularly among German historians. Wettig saw the results of his research borne out by the new ªndings and argued that the ªles of the Soviet Foreign Ministry showed no trace of sincerity behind the note. Loth took a diametrically opposed view. Laufer was largely in accord with Wettig, emphasizing the continuity of Soviet leaders’ attitudes toward Germany. Stalin, in Laufer’s view, consistently pursued the goal of Germany’s lasting division from 1944–1945 onward. Filitov, a senior scholar at the Russian Institute of Universal History, referred until only a few years ago to “potential opportunities for a breakthrough on the German question” in regard to the Stalin Note and was one of Wettig’s most outspoken critics.7 Filitov’s views have since changed considerably in keeping with the re-

6. Gerhard Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: The Emergence and Development of East-West Conºict, 1939–1953 (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littleªeld Publishers, 2008); Gerhard Wettig, “Die Note vom 10. März 1952 im Kontext von Stalins Deutschlandpolitik seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Jürgen Zarusky, ed., Stalin und die Deutschen: Neue Beiträge der Forschung, special issue of Schriften- reihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), pp. 139–196; Aleksei M. Filitov, “Sovetskii Soyuz i germanskii vopros v period pozdnego stalinizma (K voprosu o genezise ‘stalinskoy noty’ 10 marta 1952 goda),” in A. O. Chubaryan, ed., Stalin i kholodnaya voina (Moscow: IVI RAN, 1998), pp. 315–349; A. M. Filitov, “Die Note vom 10. März 1952: Eine Diskussion, die nicht endet,” in Zarusky, ed., Stalin und die Deutschen, pp. 159–172; Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 80– 99; Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Vladislav Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Information, 1952–1953,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 127–140; Bernd Bonwetsch, “‘Skostit’ polovinu summy reparatsii...my mozhem’: Vstrechi Stalina s rukovodstvom SEPG,” Istochnik, No. 3 (2003), pp. 100–128; Jochen Laufer, “Stalins Friedensziele und die Kontinuität der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik 1941–1953,” in Zarusky, ed., Stalin und die Deutschen, pp. 131–157; Stein Bjørnstad, “Soviet Policy and the Stalin Note of 10 March 1952,” University of Oslo, Hovedoppgrave, 1996; Wilfried Loth, “Die Entstehung der ‘Stalin-Note’: Dokumente aus Moskauer Archiven,” in Zarusky, ed., Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952, pp. 19–115; Wilfried Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage: Studien zur sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik von Stalin bis Chruschtschow (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007); and Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994). 7. A. M. Filitov, “SSSR i germanskii vopros: Povorotnye punkty (1941–1961gg.),” in N. I. Egorova

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lease of formerly classiªed documents. His most recent interpretation of the Stalin Note paints it as an “instrument of torture” brought into play to ensure the loyalty of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) headed by Walter Ulbricht. This interpretation is incompatible with the thesis that Moscow would have been prepared to “sacriªce” the GDR. In Filitov’s view, Vyache- slav Molotov played a leading role in the genesis of the Stalin Note.8 Zubok, whose work is based on thorough study of the Soviet sources, recently said that “Stalin’s policies in Germany in 1952 made sense for only one contingency—total war mobilization. Stalin’s actions at the end of his life, as well as documented activities of his regime, suggest that the dictator believed in the inevitability of war.” In Zubok’s assessment, the Stalin Note was “an attempt to give a second life to the sputtering Soviet propaganda of German unity, undermine the Western alliance, and sow discord among Western Ger- mans.”9 Vojtech Mastny, an expert on Soviet foreign policy, cited documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archive to buttress his claim that even though Stalin would have been ready in 1952 to consider certain compromises with the West, these compromises would probably have stopped short of German uniªcation. Mastny contends that the Stalin Note was a reaction to the Western governments’ statement at the September 1951 Conference of Foreign Ministers in Washington that they would be lifting the occupation regime in West Germany and integrating the FRG into the EDC.10 Norman Naimark argues that the Soviet Union did not have any long- term objectives in mind in the immediate wake of the Red Army’s occupation of Germany. Stalin potentially was interested in reaching a compromise with the Western powers but did not pursue this outcome energetically enough to achieve anything meaningful. The gradual Sovietization of the USSR’s zone of occupation was the consequence—at times intentional, at other times inadvertent—of steps taken by the Soviet occupation authorities. In Naimark’s view, the establishment of a demilitarized, neutral Germany would have been incompatible with the USSR’s main objectives, which included, above all, economic exploitation.11

and A. O. Chubaryan, Kholodnaya voina: 1945–1963gg. Istoricheskaya retrospektiva (Moscow: Olma- Press, 2003), p. 247. 8. Filitov, “Die Note vom 10. März 1952,” pp. 159–172. 9. Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 84–85. 10. Vojtech Mastny, “Die NATO im sowjetischen Denken und Handeln 1949 bis 1956,” in Vojtech Mastny and Gustav Schmidt, Konfrontationsmuster des Kalten Krieges 1946 bis 1956 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), pp. 383–471, esp. 415–416; and Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Inse- curity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 11. Norman M. Naimark, Die Russen in Deutschland: Die sowjetische Besatzungszone 1945 bis 1949 (Pößneck, Germany: Ullstein Buchverlage GmbH, 1997), pp. 583–584. The original English version is Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945– 1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

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Loth, Geoffrey Roberts, and others have insisted that Stalin really meant what he appeared to be offering in the note of 10 March: a nonaligned, neutral Germany.12 Rolf Steininger does not decidedly come down against this view and is above all critical of Adenauer’s attitude and role.13 In recent historical surveys of the Cold War by British and American historians, Loth’s basic thesis has generally prevailed,14 in part because leading experts like John Lewis Gaddis fail for linguistic reasons to take note of special- ized research in German and Russian. The work of German historians is hardly ever translated into English. Analytical surveys of the status quo of research, such as those by Mark Kramer and Ruud Van Dijk, are the exception rather than the rule.15 One of the latest contributions to the debate is the publication in Ger- man translation of 141 documents relating to the decisions of the Soviet leadership. Most of the documents were originally in the possession of Molotov (and now form part of his personal papers stored in the former Central Party Archive in Moscow) and of the Politburo of the Communist Party (VKP(b)), including resolutions now kept in the “osobye papki” (special ªles with a higher level of classiªcation).16 Until recently, these documents had been stored in the inaccessible Russian Presidential Archive. The Austrian question, one of the most important in the early stages of

12. Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage. Geoffrey Roberts claims that the security of the USSR was uppermost in Stalin’s mind and that he had been looking for ways of breaking the impasse “even at the cost of sacriªcing communist-controlled East Germany.” Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 348. 13. Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte. Darstellung und Dokumente in vier Bänden, Vol. 2. 1948–1955; and Steininger, Eine Chance zur Wiedervereinigung? 14. John Lewis Gaddis, for instance, states that “it is clear now that Stalin never wanted a separate East German state.” See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 127. See also Gaddis’s more recent book, Der Kalte Krieg: Eine neue Geschichte (Munich: Siedler, 2007), p. 134. In 1992 Melvyn Lefºer was still hedging his bets on the Stalin Note (“Whether Stalin’s note offered an opportunity to unify Germany and reduce cold war tensions remains controversial”), but in his recent survey he argues—on the basis of the views of Loth, Naimark, and Vadim Volkov on Stalin’s planning in regard to Germany—that “[Stalin’s] aim was a uniªed, demilitarized Germany in the Soviet sphere of inºuence, which he now believed would com- pete with Britain and America and constrain their domination of the international economy.” See Melvyn P.Lefºer, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 457; Melvyn P. Lefºer, For the Soul of Man- kind: The United States, The Soviet Union and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), pp. 54– 55. An exception is Uri Bar-Noi’s study that draws also on Soviet sources, The Cold War and Soviet Mistrust of Churchill’s Pursuit of Détente, 1951–1955 (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2008). 15. Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the Founding of the German Democratic Republic: 50 Years Later—A Review Article,” Europe-Asia-Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1999), pp. 1093–1107; and Ruud Van Dijk, “The 1952 Stalin Note Debate: Myth or Missed Opportunity for German Uniªcat- ion? CWIHP Working Paper No. 14 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, 1994). 16. Peter Ruggenthaler, ed., Stalins großer Bluff: Die Geschichte der Stalin-Note in Dokumenten der sowjetischen Führung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007).

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the Cold War owing to Austria’s close links to Germany, has been unjustly rel- egated to the margins in the international historiography. Until 1955 Austria was a general “test ground” for Soviet policy toward Germany. Günter Bischof was the ªrst to draw attention to the connections between Austria and the Stalin Note, showing that the key actors on both sides used Austria to probe the other side’s intentions vis-à-vis Germany.17

Four Theses of the “Stalin’s Sincerity” School

The four key theses advanced by historians who believe the Stalin Note was a sincere attempt to achieve German neutrality may be summarized as follows: 1. The leaders of the GDR were not apprised of the exact wording of the Stalin Note until 9 March 1952, less than 24 hours before it was given to Western envoys. Historians of this school maintain that Stalin was planning to surprise the SED leaders and to demonstrate his disregard for them by presenting a proposal for German neutrality that would require sacriªcing the GDR. 2. Before the SED leaders’ departure for Moscow in late March 1952, the GDR’s state president, Wilhelm Pieck, voiced “cautious optimism about the conclusion of a peace treaty” with Germany. 3. The hardline Construction of Socialism policy in the GDR was not adopted until Stalin concluded that the Western powers would not sign a Soviet-backed peace treaty with Germany and that the FRG’s integration into the West was becoming irrevocable. 4. The GDR army was created with a view to ultimately being integrated into a future all-German army. The purpose of it was not to guard the German-German border. The decision to seal the borders of the GDR was not made until after the West rejected the Stalin Note on 25 March 1952. The debate over the Stalin Note has rarely focused on the question of Austria, including the USSR’s simultaneous rejection of a proposed solution to an apparently minor issue. Three days after the delivery of the Stalin Note the Western powers proposed the evacuation of the occupation forces from Austria in the so-called Abbreviated Treaty. By failing to take up this

17. See Günter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945–55: The Leverage of the Weak (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 104–129; and esp. Günter Bischof, “Karl Gruber und die Anfänge des ‘Neuen Kurses’ in der österreichischen Außenpolitik 1952/53,” in Lothar Höbelt and Othmar Huber, eds., Für Österreichs Freiheit: Karl Gruber—Landeshauptmann und Außenminister 1945–1953 (Inns- bruck: Haymon Verlag 1991), pp. 143–183.

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proposal, Stalin possibly missed an opportunity to inºuence the West’s policy on Germany. The assumption that the highly effective Soviet spy network enabled Sta- lin to keep abreast of the West’s every move in 1951–1952 has long been held but has proved notoriously difªcult to substantiate.18 Loth’s claim that Stalin’s understanding of the term democracy was basically the same as the West’s is left uncommented here,19 as is the question of what precisely was meant by the “strengthening of the democratic order in the German Democratic Re- public,” which the SED in 1952 declared one of its most important future tasks.20 Another issue that has hardly featured in the debate is the parallel between Soviet policy on Germany and the activities of the SED and the Com- munist Party in West Germany (KPD) in the early 1950s. The Soviet Military Administration and the SED told the KPD in May 1949 that its primary task was to “help prevent the Western integration of the nascent Federal Republic and at the same time to support the construction of the GDR in the West through propaganda.”21 Soviet ofªcials and the KPD were still hopeful that they would emerge victorious from the competition between the two systems. After the FRG was set up, the SED’s 3rd Party Congress in July 1950 passed a resolution proclaiming “the struggle for Germany’s national unity.” Not only did the resolution target the FRG’s Western integration and projected entry into NATO; it also named preconditions for the uniªcation of Germany on a democratic basis, such as ending the country’s “bondage” to the Western powers and the “disempowerment of the sworn enemies of the democratic rights of the people, the hyenas of the ªnancial markets, and the junkers, and the ex- pulsion of their political henchmen, the Heusses, Adenauers, Schumachers, Reuters & Co.”22 The SED’s “phase of illusions,” in Michael Lemke’s phrase, lasted approximately until mid-1951.23 Intra-German policy was not yet understood “exclusively as a defensive mechanism for the beneªt of the GDR...

18. For more details, see Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff. 19. See Mark Kramer’s comments on Loth’s theses in Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the Founding of the German Democratic Republic,” pp. 1093–1106. 20. Proposals of the SED Politburo in connection with the preparations for the 2nd Party Conference, theses for the Party Conference enclosed, 20 March 1952, with an accompanying letter from Ulbricht to Chuikov, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), Fond (F.) 82, Opis’ (Op.) 2, Delo (D.) 1185, Llisty (Ll.) 53–101. 21. Till Kössler, Abschied von der Revolution: Kommunisten und Gesellschaft in Westdeutschland 1945– 1968 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005), p. 226. I am grateful to Manfred Wilke for this quotation. 22. Wilhelm Pieck, “Bericht an den III. Parteitag der SED 20.–24. Juli 1950,” in Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (East Berlin: DDV, 1952), Vol. III, p. 94. 23. Michael Lemke, “Die Dinge sind leider nicht so gelaufen, wie wir es wollten: Grundlinien der SED-Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1961,” in Daniel Küchenmeister, ed., Der Mauerbau; Krisenverlauf— Weichenstellung—Resultate (Berlin: Berliner Debatte Wissenschaftsverlag, 2001), p. 47. The new evi-

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but was still clearly committed to the idea of the SED’s ‘historical mission’ in Germany and to the revolutionary expansion of the new order to the as yet unconsolidated Federal Republic.”24 This article does not seek to determine whether the Soviet note was addressed ªrst and foremost to the French public to fuel existing anxiety about Germany. In early 1951 the Soviet Union had sent a note to Paris alluding to the unease felt by the French and others “who were only recently forced to ex- perience the unspeakable horrors of World War II.”25 The note attempted to play up the contradictions within the “capitalist system” and afªrmed that the Soviet Union was opposed to the creation of a regular German army of the kind favored by the three Western powers. A year later, Stalin “con- ceded” the possibility that a neutral Germany would have an army of its own, knowing full well that “for France the prospect of a reunited, unaligned Ger- many was the worst-case scenario par excellence.” The French doctrine of two-pronged security on the basis of a permanently divided Germany—in a tacit understanding with Moscow—was going to permit the solution of two problems at one stroke: the FRG’s Western integration ensured a weakening of Germany while simultaneously drawing West Germany into the U.S. sphere of inºuence, which improved France’s security vis-à-vis Moscow.26

Ulbricht, Stalin, and the Drafting of the Note

The leader of the SED, Walter Ulbricht, had proposed in early 1951— entirely in keeping with the intra-German policy notions of the SED and the KPD—that the Soviet Union produce a blueprint for German neutrality in order to impede the FRG’s “remilitarization” and unmask the “American warmongers.” Ulbricht knew that any such proposal would not prevent the FRG’s political-military integration into the West, and he said he harbored no illusions about the U.S. government’s determination to “remilitarize” West Germany. By this point, the “phase of illusions” was over. In early September 1951, after deliberating future Soviet policy toward

dence regarding the genesis of the Stalin Note suggests that the “phase of illusions” was near its end in February 1951. 24. Ibid. 25. Reply note to the French note of 23 January 1951, Politburo Resolution P 80 (182), 3 February 1951, in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 3, D. 1087, Ll. 125–128. 26. Georges-Henri Soutou, “Frankreich und der Albtraum eines wiedervereinigten und neutralisierten Deutschlands 1952–1990,” in Dominik Geppert and Udo Wengst, eds., Neutralität—Chance oder Chimäre? Konzepte des Dritten Weges für Deutschland und die Welt 1945–1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), pp. 265–266; and Lars-Broder Keil and Sven Felix Kellerhoff, Deutsche Legenden: Vom “Dolchstoß” und anderen Mythen der Geschichte (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2002), p. 176.

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Germany and planning to introduce a draft “Proposals of a Peace Treaty,” Sta- lin ªnalized an “action plan” that carefully stipulated the role the GDR was to play, including Otto Grotewohl’s hastily delivered government policy statement of 15 September 1951. The request Grotewohl addressed to the four powers on behalf of the GDR asking for the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty for Germany was timed to coincide with the concluding stages of talks on a general treaty. The SED leaders were therefore aware of the Stalin Note and realized that their policy was playing an integral part in it. What they were not aware of was the note’s precise wording, which they did not learn about until the text and the “Proposals for a Peace Treaty” were handed to them on 9 March 1952.27 The Stalin Note project had a lead time of more than a year. On 14 Feb- ruary 1951 the head of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, General Vasilii Chuikov, and his political adviser Vladimir Semenov sent to Moscow a proposal devised by Ulbricht. This highly unconventional proposal was to become Stalin’s greatest propaganda coup a year later when he needed to vindi- cate his claim of being an agent of peace. From then on he and his successors were able to point to their good intentions, claiming that Germany would have been reuniªed if the West had not been so intransigent. After the rejection of Stalin’s “proposals,” the way was clear to the GDR’s smooth integration into the Eastern bloc, the last obstacles were removed for the Construc- tion of Socialism in the GDR, and the division of Germany was ªrmer than ever. Ulbricht had proposed that the SED, rather than arguing against the advocates of German neutrality, “should attempt ...tomake common cause with them in the struggle against West Germany’s remilitarization and against its integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”28 He explicitly suggested that “the Soviet Union itself” come up “in one form or another with a proposal for Germany’s neutralization in order to unmask the Ameri- can warmongers.”29 The idea of the Stalin Note was born. Ulbricht’s proposals came under scrutiny at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii advised Molotov, the Politburo member overseeing foreign affairs, to exploit the movement of German neutralists in order to “impede the realization of the Anglo-American plans for Germany’s remilitarization.”30 He claimed that the United States, Great Britain, and

27. For details, see Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, pp. 36–38. 28. Vyshinskii to Molotov, 18 February 1951, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1182, Ll. 40–48, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 3. 29. Ibid. 30. Vyshinskii to Molotov, 18 February 1951, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1182, Ll. 54–55, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 5.

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France were bound to oppose German neutrality in any case. After a few days of deliberations, Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko told Stalin on 24 Febru- ary 1951 that the best way forward was for the GDR People’s Chamber to contact the government in Bonn and propose a joint démarche to the four great powers regarding the “the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.” This step, Gromyko argued, would be sure “to meet with broad support in West Germany and to pave the way to a referendum against militarization.”31 Molotov and Stalin signaled their agreement, ordering Chuikov and Semenov to tell Pieck, Grotewohl, and Ulbricht “that Moscow welcomed . . . their proposals.” On 5 March 1951 the head of the People’s Chamber, Johannes Dieck- mann, contacted the four powers.32 In subsequent months the GDR gave support to the neutralization movement in the FRG, as had been proposed. A trip to Moscow by the neutralization movement’s chief spokesman, Bishop Martin Niemöller, marked the climax of this particular development. Playing on the themes of neutrality and opposition to “remilitarization,” Soviet and East German propaganda made a considerable impact on West German public opinion. They were to remain the only themes the Communists were able to exploit to their advantage. On 30 July 1951, Pieck, Ulbricht, and Grotewohl had another meeting with Chuikov and Semenov. The GDR leaders proposed to broaden the cam- paigns in West Germany against “remilitarization.” They suggested that the Soviet Union table a plan for a peace treaty with Germany together with a draft of such a treaty. The Soviet Foreign Ministry set to work under Molo- tov’s aegis, elaborating proposals on the German question. In late August and early September 1951 these proposals appeared repeatedly on the VKP(b) Po- litburo’s agenda. On 8 September 1951 the Politburo, with Stalin presiding, adopted an “action plan” (plan deystvii) that shaped Soviet policy decisions in the months ahead, largely in accordance with the SED proposals.33 According to the action plan, the GDR People’s Chamber was to propose to the Bundestag that they convene a joint panel consisting of representatives of the East and West German governments who would discuss holding general elec-

31. Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, p. 67. 32. Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage, p. 105. 33. Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, p. 36, esp. n. 54 and Doc. 30. See, also, Filitov, “Sovetskii Soyuz i germanskii vopros v period pozdnego stalinizma,” p. 335. How serious the matter was for the USSR is also clearly in evidence in the procedural tactics adopted on this occasion. The Politburo had already given a green light to the Foreign Ministry’s draft instructions for Chuikov and Semenov regarding the next moves, and it now gave orders to Foreign Minister Vyshinskii to explore the views of Pieck and Ulbricht before Chuikov and Semenov took action. Judging from the way events unfolded, SED leaders gave their unqualiªed approval straightaway.

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tions and facilitating a peace treaty. In case this proposal was not accepted— an outcome taken for granted by the East Germans34—the GDR government was to approach the four powers and urge them “to speed up the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany to be followed by the evacuation of occupation forces from Germany.”35 In addition, the VKP(b) Politburo “recom- mended” measures for the “further unmasking of the antidemocratic nature of the West German government in Bonn.”36 The newly accessible Soviet documents show that Soviet leaders were well aware in 1951 that they could not count on the KPD, because the party was much too weak to turn West Germans’ desire for neutrality into a serious obstacle for the FRG government.37 Ulbricht, who as SED General Secretary was ultimately responsible for the KPD’s policies from 1950 on, told Chuikov and Semenov that he could not prevent the United States from pushing through the rearmament of the FRG.38 In the logic of propaganda, the only move that stood any chance of stymieing the FRG’s integration into the West- ern bloc was a proposal for neutrality combined with German unity. To dis- rupt the “remilitarization” efforts, the SED needed the advocates of neutralization to welcome an offer put forward by the Soviet Union. In raising this idea, Ulbricht was seeking to consolidate his own position and to present himself as the only reliable guarantor of Soviet interests in Ger- many. Ulbricht and his SED exercised their power over the GDR as a discrete political entity but were beholden to Moscow. They had no maneuvering space independent of the USSR. Whenever historians refer to a strategy pursued jointly by the USSR and the GDR in the German-German context, what they are really saying is that Ulbricht was acting on the Soviet Union’s behalf. He submitted proposals and had to wait for them to be endorsed by Stalin. This is what Stalin had in mind after the end of the Battle of Notes when he said about Ulbricht: “He is a real friend of the USSR; we do not have the least reason not to trust him.”39 Although Ulbricht, like countless others,

34. Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, p. 37 n. 57. 35. VKP(b) Politburo Resolution P 82 (452-op), 8 September 1951, in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 162, D. 46, Ll. 46, 131–133. The resolution states, in part: “We propose the following action plan [plan deistvii].” For comments on the Soviet Foreign Ministry ªles, see also Wettig, “Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 nach sowjetischen Akten,” pp. 97–98; and Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage, pp. 119–120. 36. VKP(b) Politburo Resolution P 82 (452-op), L. 46. 37. Grigor’yan to Stalin, 12 February 1951, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1337, Ll. 24–31, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 2; and Grigor’yan to Stalin, 15 March 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1337, Ll. 45–51, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 78. 38. Gromyko to Molotov, 20 February 1951, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1333, Ll. 161–168, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 6. 39. Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow: Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mis- sion 1939–1991 (Berlin: Nicolai, 1995), p. 279.

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could never be entirely sure of remaining in Stalin’s good graces, the creative touch he showed in impeding West Germany’s “remilitarization” came in handy at a time when Communist leaders elsewhere in the Soviet bloc— notably, Rudolf Slánský, the Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Commu- nist Party, who was arrested on trumped-up charges of high treason in No- vember 1951 and put to death in late 1952—were falling victim to Stalin’s wrath.40 Not only were SED leaders informed about the role the GDR was supposed to play under the “action plan,” their views on what moves to take next were actively sought. Ulbricht was the one who had originally proposed to broaden the campaign against “remilitarization” in West Germany, based on his assumption that opposition to rearmament in the aftermath of World War II had a distinct potential for mass mobilization. The advocates of rearmament pointed to the threat from the Soviet Union. However, if the USSR itself proposed a peace treaty and offered a draft version, the supporters of rearmament would have a much harder time justifying their position. The next move came when, in accordance with the “action plan” and “program of further measures” (“plan deistvii” and “plan dalneishikh meropriyatii”) decreed by Moscow and coordinated with the SED, the GDR Peo- ple’s Chamber invited the delegates of the Bundestag on 15 September 1951 to agree to the establishment of a German-German panel. The ostensible goal of this appeal was to arrange “general free elections in Germany of a National Assembly.”41 Chancellor Adenauer, having sensed that the appeal was a mere propaganda ploy, chose to disregard it. On 31 October 1951, Moscow gave the SED a green light to condemn the Bundestag’s rejection of the appeal.42 The next step was for the president of the GDR to propose to the West Ger- man president that they convene a pan-German conference to discuss general elections and a peace treaty. To ensure that this propaganda measure did not backªre—ofªcial West German acceptance of the proposal would have been disastrous for the GDR—Soviet leaders devised an exit strategy. The VKP(b) Politburo told

40. For a typical example, see the account of the power struggle inside the SED Politbüro in 1951– 1952 by Ulrich Mählert, “Der ‘Fall Lohagen’ und der Machtkampf im SED-Politbüro zur Jahreswende 1951/52,” in Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 2008 (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2008), pp. 131–145. 41. Heike Amos, Die Westpolitik der SED 1948/49–1961 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1999), p. 88. Amos notes that “these offers were preceded by intensive debates in the Soviet leadership. They were part of an extensive diplomatic and propagandistic plan that was to come to fruition in the ªrst Stalin Note.” 42. Politburo Resolution P 84 (203-op.), 31 October 1951, in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 162, D. 47, L. 8 (and F. 17, Op. 163, D. 1604, L. 9). Excerpts from the resolution were sent to Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Gromyko, and Grigor’yan.

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GDR leaders that they were responsible for forming a “German commission for the preparation of the draft of an electoral law.” The draft was to be presented “for discussion at the pan-German conference,” giving the West Ger- man government ample reason to reject the GDR proposal of a pan-German conference: “The publication of this draft, which might inspired public discussion of it, could provide a pretext for the Bonn government to reject the entire proposal of a pan-German conference by citing one or the other detail of the draft.”43 Clearly, a discussion of pan-German elections was not in Moscow’s interest. On 23 January 1952 the Politburo had refused to allow Chuikov to speak with the Western high commissioners about the convening of an occupation- power conference to consider “holding pan-German elections.” Because such elections would have resulted in the SED’s loss of power, they were something the Soviet Union could not risk. Holding free elections in 1951–1952 would have led to Germany’s reuniªcation—but not on socialist terms.44 Soviet leaders had known this since at least March 1951 (i.e., immedi- ately after the idea of presenting the neutralization of a uniªed Germany as an option was ªrst proposed). In a memorandum to the Politburo, Soviet For- eign Ministry ofªcials analyzed the drawbacks of repeating in Germany the free elections experiment the USSR had conducted in occupied Austria. If the Soviet Union were to pursue the same course in the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany, the memorandum warned, “the representatives of the GDR would be decidedly in the minority and would be unable to exercise any signiªcant inºuence on the decisions of a pan-German government.”45 In early 1952 the “Proposals for a Peace Treaty” were still being worked out under Molotov’s auspices at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and the strategy was the subject of debate. Finally, on 8 February 1952, Soviet leaders issued a “recommendation” for the SED to appeal to the four occupying powers to conclude a peace treaty with Germany as soon as possible.46

43. Ibid. 44. Hermann Weber, “Die DDR und die deutsche Frage 1945–1961,” in Andreas H. Apelt et al., eds., Die deutsche Frage in der SBZ und DDR: Deutschlandpolitische Vorstellungen von Bevölkerung und Opposition 1945–1990 (Berlin: Metropol, 2010), pp. 57–58. 45. Bjørnstad, “Soviet policy and the Stalin note of 10 March 1952,” p. 55. The memorandum was presumably compiled at the behest of Molotov, who the previous day had asked to see a dossier of U.S., British, and French press reports on the “Austrianization of Germany.” Among other passages, Molotov underlined the following paragraph: “If the Soviet government were to withhold its consent from such a solution of the German question,...theroleofthesponsor of German uniªcation would fall to the West, that of its opponent to the East.” See V. Zorin to V. Molotov (with attached report, “International Press Reports on the Transfer of the Occupation Regime Applied in Austria to Ger- many”), 20 March 1951, in RGASPI, F. 1182, Op. 2, D. 1182, Ll. 58–76. 46. Politburo Resolution P 85 (425-op), 8 February 1952, in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 162, D. 48, L. 18,

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Semen Ignat’ev, the head of the Soviet Ministry for State Security (MGB), reported to the VKP(b) Politburo in early 1952 that negotiations on the General Treaty were in danger of getting bogged down and that the U.S. government did not exclude the possibility of having to scrap its plans for a European army. The MGB also reported the existence of a fallback plan for this kind of emergency and that Adenauer worried about a “specious Soviet offer” being tabled in the closing stages of the negotiations on the EDC.47 On 3 March 1952, after the GDR’s appeal and the Soviet government’s response had evoked favorable reactions in the FRG, Gromyko felt the time had come for the USSR to present its “offer” of a German peace treaty to the Western powers. The Adenauer government was now forced “to tack and veer and to conceal its real position.”48 Because the FRG had not publicly rejected the proposals put forward by the GDR, the situation was, in Gromyko’s words, unpropitious for the “speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Ger- many.”49 The Western powers had not ofªcially reacted to the GDR’s initiative and had made no public announcement after the NATO meeting in Lis- bon. The plans to create a European army, which would include West German armed forces and ultimately make the FRG a member of NATO, seemed ready to move forward. Gromyko interpreted all this as a concerted attempt by the Western powers to minimize the impact of the Soviet Union’s measures concerning a peace treaty and announcement of the General Treaty. He warned Stalin to anticipate the imminent signing of the General Treaty, which would be a separate peace treaty between the Western powers and the FRG. If the “Soviet government were to table proposals for a peace treaty with Germany, the situation of the three powers and the Bonn government would become even more complicated.”50 On 8 March the VKP(b) Politburo approved the wording of both the note and the “Proposals for a Peace Treaty.” The note underwent ªnal revisions during the Politburo session. In the ªnal sentence—“The government

ll. 70–72 (and Op. 163, D. 1612, L. 153). The ªnal version also can be found in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1170, L. 52. A draft with Molotov’s revisions (without instructions to Chuikov and Semenov), 8 February 1952, is stored in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1170, Ll. 20–21, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 32. A draft dated 6 February is reprinted in Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage, pp. 298–300. The latter draft’s wording is identical to that of the ªnal version. 47. Report of Ignat’ev to the “the Group of Eight,” 27 January 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1042, L. 25, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 25. 48. Draft letter written by Gromyko to Stalin for vetting by Molotov, with a draft of the note attached, 3 March 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1170, Ll. 48–52, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 48. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid.

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of the USSR hopes to receive a response from the US government to the proposal mentioned above at the latter’s earliest convenience”—“hopes to receive” was replaced by “counts on receiving.” Evidently, an expression signify- ing hope appeared too risky in Stalin’s eyes.51 On Sunday, 9 March, the GDR leaders were informed in advance of the precise wording of the note, as were the Czechoslovak and Polish governments. The next day, the note was given to the Western envoys. The Western powers turned down the “offer” of negotiations for a peace treaty with Germany and instead requested details and above all free elections. The assertion that “a pan-German unitary government” would be based on “free elections” had been deleted by Molotov at the last moment, no doubt because he worried that the Western governments might embrace the offer.52 The demand for free elections in both Germanys was therefore the most important single item in the West’s reply.53 In short, the relevant Soviet sources have undermined the notion that Stalin was intending to surprise Ulbricht. The ªrst suggestion for what was to become the Stalin Note came from Ulbricht. When he suggested in February 1951 that the Soviet Union devise a proposal for German neutrality, he was convinced that Washington would oppose it. The memoranda from February 1951 contain concrete objectives that the Soviet Foreign Ministry and GDR leaders hoped to achieve with Stalin’s approval and encouragement. Not a single Soviet document discusses the possibility of preventing West Germany’s rearmament, let alone the advantages and disadvantages of a neutral Ger- many.54 Nor is there a single statement of hope that the struggle against West Germany’s rearming was going to pave the way to a uniªed, neutral Germany. Ulbricht’s actions suggest an attempt to elicit Soviet support in overcoming the SED’s blunders. The East Germans had failed to make timely use of the KPD in mobilizing sympathizers in the West against rearmament and the FRG’s military integration into the Western bloc. The declassiªed records do not bear out the emphasis that scholars such

51. Politburo Resolution P 85 (47), with Gromyko’s handwritten remark: “To Comrade Poskrebyshev for dispatch. 8.III. A. Gromyko,” 8 March 1952, in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 3, D. 1093, Ll. 11, 53–56 (and F. 17, Op. 163, D. 1614, Ll. 102–110). 52. Gromyko to Molotov, 6 March 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1170, Ll. 69–95. 53. On the “anxiety” felt in the West that Soviet leaders might actually be prepared to pay the price of free elections, see Steininger, Eine Chance zur Wiedervereinigung, pp. 52–53. 54. To date, not a single document has been found that would justify the inference that Soviet leaders or the Soviet Foreign Ministry ever engaged in an internal assessment of the pros and cons of Ger- many’s neutralization. Almost all sources referring to the activities of Molotov and the Politburo in 1951–1952, as well as the ªnding aids, are now accessible. The “evidence” quoted by those who think Stalin was sincere about a neutral, uniªed Germany consists mostly of documents that tell us a great deal about how the VKP(b) Politburo wanted its dealings to be perceived by the outside world but next to nothing about what really went on.

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as Loth give to the role supposedly played by Ulbricht and the inºuence the East German leader may have had on Stalin. The Stalin Note was formulated in Moscow, and the “action plan” was debated by the VKP(b) Politburo with Stalin presiding. Ideas and suggestions from East Berlin were welcome and were frequently, though not always, heeded.55 Every measure required Stalin’s consent, from the ªrst conception of the idea to the presentation of the Stalin Note on 10 March 1952. Ulbricht’s behavior was in line with what Stalin wanted and expected. Both men regarded the Stalin Note as a diversionary maneuver to create the conditions required for the Construction of Socialism in the GDR and to bring the country irreversibly into the Soviet orbit. Thus, even though GDR leaders were closely involved in the Stalin Note from the start, they played no direct role in the ªnal wording of the note or of the “Proposals for a German Peace Treaty.” But the basic idea behind the note, far from being unknown to the leaders of the SED, was in fact supplied by them—and certainly not with a view to depriving themselves of their power. In mid-January 1952 the East Germans suggested a modiªcation of the action plan: Why not allow the GDR People’s Chamber rather than the So- viet government to come up with the draft peace plan? Gromyko rejected this for several reasons. It was in contravention of a Soviet resolution “that had been coordinated with the GDR leadership and adopted in September 1951,” as Gromyko told Stalin, and it would also mean allowing “a vanquished state to draw up the draft of a peace plan for itself.”56 The concrete terms of the draft peace treaty attached to the Stalin Note surprised no one in East Berlin. SED ofªcials were thoroughly familiar with the Soviet lexicon and knew that the epithets “democratic” and “peace-loving” bestowed on a theoretically reunited Germany excluded the creation of a Western-style democratic polity. From the dawn of the Cold War, East Ger- man ofªcials had used Stalin’s vocabulary as seals of approval reserved for those who followed his ideas on both foreign and domestic policies. Liberally applied to the GDR, they never featured in descriptions of the FRG. The Stalin Note aimed to achieve several objectives, but a neutral Ger- many was deªnitely not one of them.

55. For example, Soviet leaders disregarded the proposal put forward in mid-January 1952 by SED leaders to switch the focus of propaganda to the prevention of the Generalvertrag Treaty. See Gerhard Wettig, “Die Deutschlandnote vom 10. März 1952 nach sowjetischen Akten,” in Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1994), pp. 98–99; and Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, pp. 38–39. 56. Draft of a letter written to Stalin submitted by Gromyko to Molotov for vetting, 25 January 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1169, Ll. 108–111.

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April 1952 Meetings

In late March 1952, before GDR leaders met with Stalin, did they really har- bor “cautious optimism about the conclusion of a peace treaty”? Was the decision to proceed with the Construction of Socialism in the GDR really deferred until after the “rejection” of the Stalin Note? The answer to both questions is negative. Ulbricht and his colleagues took for granted not only that the Western powers would complete their negotiations and sign treaties with the FRG; but also that in the talks with Stalin countermeasures would be at the top of the agenda. The SED had already ad- justed its political compass in a more easterly orientation the month before the presentation of the Stalin Note. In the run-up to the visit in Moscow in early April the SED leaders had sent a position paper on the Construction of Socialism to Moscow for approval. By doing so, the East Germans demonstrated that they did not feel they had to wait for the Western powers to react to Stalin’s putative offer. So- viet internal assessments also indicate that the Construction of Socialism was a done deal and cannot be seen as the result of the GDR comrades’ impetuous bid for Stalin’s approval of the Construction of Socialism. On 31 March 1952 Pieck, Grotewohl, and Ulbricht arrived in Moscow. The trip had been prepared well in advance. In mid-February the SED leaders had asked Stalin when they might come to Moscow to discuss the SED’s 2nd Party Conference, which was planned for July. Stalin told them they were welcome “in Moscow at any time that was convenient for them toward the end of April.”57 In the end their trip was moved forward by several weeks. The travel arrangements were made during the allegedly decisive period in which the die was cast in regard to the Western powers’ reaction to Stalin’s offer. A memorandum with proposals for the 2nd Party Conference, covering several dozen pages, was forwarded by the East Germans to Moscow on 20 March without any indication of a need on their part to wait for the West to react. Following the usual course, the memorandum was relayed to all VKP(b) Politburo members by the head of the VKP(b) Department of Foreign Relations, Vagan Grigor’yan.58 Molotov closely reviewed the SED’s proposals “in connection with the 2nd Party Conference.”59

57. Grigor’yan to Stalin, 13 February 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1185, L. 48, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 35. 58. Ulbricht to Chuikov, 20 March 1952, forwarded by Grigor’yan to all VKP(b) Politburo members, 24 March 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1185, Ll. 52–104. 59. Proposals of the SED Politburo concerning the preparation of the 2nd Party Congress, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1185, Ll. 54–57. The documents arrived in Molotov’s secretariat on 25 March.

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On the day the GDR leaders arrived, Grigor’yan submitted to Stalin and the members of the VKP(b) Politburo his comments on the SED proposals, which he believed were deªcient in several respects.60 According to Grigor’yan, the section dealing with the “political and economic consolidation of the German Democratic Republic, which was to serve as the basis for the struggle for a uniªed Germany,” was too weak and did not sufªciently emphasize “the signiªcance of expanding links to other countries in the democratic camp [i.e., the Eastern bloc] and of consolidating the GDR’s international reputation.” Grigor’yan also was concerned that the proposals did not specify the “tasks of the party in regard to overcoming Social Democracy” and the “struggle against the ideology of the enemy” and “against Trotskyite, Titoist and other enemy agents.”61 Grigor’yan in effect was advocating the Construction of Socialism in East Germany and tighter integration of the GDR into the Eastern camp. His report does not suggest any major recent change in Soviet policy toward Germany: “The draft proposals comprise, generally speaking, all issues relevant to Germany’s present-day political life and quite rightly draw attention to...therequired consolidation of the German Democratic Republic.”62 In Moscow, Pieck, Ulbricht, and Grotewohl met ªrst with Vladimir Semenov and Andrei Smirnov.63 The East Germans mentioned the issues they were hoping to discuss with Stalin, giving top priority to the creation of a national army. Pieck emphasized the importance of moving ahead with the “creation of a national army” in order for the GDR to counter the signing of the General Treaty.64 Neither in Moscow nor in East Berlin did anyone doubt that the General Treaty would be signed. It is not true that Pieck harbored “cautious optimism regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty” when he and his colleagues left for Moscow at the end of March 1952.65 Instead, the Stalin

60. Grigor’yan to Stalin, 31 March 1952, in F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1185, Ll. 110–114. All VKP(b) Polit- buro members received a copy. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid., L. 114. 63. Semenov was the chief political adviser to the supreme commander of the Soviet Military Admin- istration in Germany, a body that was replaced by the Soviet Control Commission after the GDR was founded in 1949. Smirnov resigned from his post in the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1949 and took up a post in the VKP(b) Foreign Policy Department. 64. Semenov and Smirnov to Molotov, 31 March 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1170, L. 123, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 91. For details, see Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, pp. 155–156. Elke Scherstjanoi and Rolf Semmelmann point out that “according to SED documents...theattention of the SED leadership subsequently” (i.e., after the Western reply of 25 March) shifted “to military issues.” See Elke Scherstjanoi and Rolf Semmelmann, “Die Gespräche Stalins mit der SED-Führung im Dezember 1948 und im April 1952,” Zeitschrift für Geschichte (ZfG), Vol. 52 (2004), Part 2, p. 239. 65. Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage, pp. 152, 171.

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Note was being used as a suitable platform to publicize the GDR’s creation of a national army on the basis of paramilitary police units.66 Germany’s right to have national military forces was one of the postulates in the note. There was no longer any need to be secretive about steps the GDR had already taken. On 1 and 7 April the GDR leaders met with Stalin. The ªrst meeting dealt only with topics pertaining to the de facto consolidation of the SED dic- tatorship. Stalin said there would be plenty of time “for such topics as the situation in West Germany, its prospects, and the General Treaty” at the second meeting.67 They discussed the forthcoming steps toward the consolidation of the GDR and the perpetuation of the German division as measures to counter the FRG’s Western integration. In the meantime Foreign Minister Vyshinskii and Molotov were drafting a letter that would derail the Western governments’ push for free elections.68 On 7 April, Ulbricht, Pieck, and Grotewohl had a second meeting with Sta- lin, who agreed to approve the GDR’s road to socialism. Stalin assured the East Germans that the Soviet government wanted to “tear the mask from the faces of the Americans” and would not cease to make proposals regarding “issues affecting the unity of Germany.”69 In reply to Grotewohl’s question whether “the present situation did not call for an adjustment of our reasoning concerning Germany’s unity and the GDR government’s stance vis-à-vis Ger- man reuniªcation” Stalin said that nothing of the sort was needed, and he al- luded to the forthcoming second Stalin Note (out of a total of four in 1952).70 “The propagandistic pressure for German reuniªcation must be kept up,” he said. “This is exceptionally valuable in inºuencing the masses in West Ger- many. It is a weapon you must not lay aside on any account for the time being.”71 The next turn of the propaganda screw came two days later, when the next Stalin Note was dispatched.

66. Ibid., p. 241. 67. The minutes of the meeting are reprinted in Scherstjanoi and Semmelmann, “Die Gespräche Stalins mit der SED-Führung,” p. 260. For the missing parts, see Bernd Bonwetsch and Sergej Kudrjašov, “Stalin und die II. Parteikonferenz der SED,” in Zarusky, ed., Stalin und die Deutschen, pp. 173–206. 68. For details, see Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, pp. 158–162. 69. Bonwetsch and Kudrjašov, “Stalin und die II. Parteikonferenz der SED,” pp. 199–206. 70. The question about Soviet policy toward Germany is sometimes answered by imputing to the GDR leadership a deªcient understanding of that policy. The decisive fact here is surely Pieck’s question of what the “ofªcial” attitude of the GDR government was supposed to be. Until then, the ofªcial attitude had undoubtedly been the unqualiªed endorsement of German reuniªcation. The open switch to the construction of socialism led Pieck to question the appropriateness of the “ofªcial” attitude. This was what he wanted Stalin to comment on. The “unofªcial” attitude of setting up two Ger- man states needed no elaboration. Stalin’s answer left no room for doubt. No change in propaganda was planned. Business would proceed as usual. 71. Bonwetsch and Kudrjašov, “Stalin und die II. Parteikonferenz der SED,” p. 206.

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The notion that Stalin reluctantly gave in to the SED comrades’ persis- tent pleading when they begged him to give a green light for the Construction of Socialism, or that “he gave his approval only at the very last minute,” has been undermined by the recently declassiªed documents. For the GDR leaders, the Construction of Socialism was hardly a new topic.72 They went to Moscow to discuss that very matter on the basis of the memorandum they had sent to Moscow prior to their visit.73 The possible acceptance of the Stalin Note by the Western powers would not have induced the SED to forgo the Construction of Socialism.

National Army and Separation

Those who insist that the Stalin Note was a sincere offer have rejected the notion that the GDR’s early creation of prototypical armed forces guaranteed Germany’s permanent division from the start.74 In Stalin’s eyes, the argument goes, rearming the GDR did not preclude an agreement on Germany’s neutralization.75 Supposedly, the GDR’s nascent army could have formed the core of a pan-German army and could even have “convinced the Germans of the sincerity of the Soviet offer.” Elke Scherstjanoi and Rolf Semmelmann imply that Stalin naturally would have preferred the conclusion of a peace treaty to the militarization of the German-German demarcation line. But they concede that “the ‘Stalin Note,’ with its reference to the legality of national armed forces, provided the opportunity to make public the existence of this nascent army.”76 Wettig has recently pointed out that Stalin decided no later than mid- 1951 to integrate the GDR into the crash military buildup he had initiated in

72. On the basis of restricted access to the sources at the time of writing, Steininger notes: “In view of the preparations for the 2nd Party Conference in July [the Construction of Socialism] had not been on the agenda” before the SED leadership’s visit in Moscow in March–April 1952. In Moscow, however, “it was not only put on the agenda, it came to dominate it.” Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte, Vol. 2, p. 194. 73. This has rightly been noted by Wettig. Wettig, “Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten,” p. 802. 74. See the seminal work by Torsten Dietrich and Rüdiger Wenzke, Die getarnte Armee: Geschichte der Kasernierten Volkspolizei der DDR 1952–1956 (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2003). 75. This has been read into the following remark by Stalin: “If you’re suddenly discovered to have an army at your command, there will be a sudden change of tune—they will acknowledge you and even get to like you, as everyone likes power.” The context, however, makes all the difference. Stalin had re- marked “that people in the West believe you are unarmed, that you have no [military] strength and that conquering you is no great deal.” This favors the interpretation that Stalin was in fact concerned with boosting the GDR’s security. Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage, p. 171. 76. Scherstjanoi and Semmelmann, “Die Gespräche Stalins mit der SED-Führung,” pp. 240–241.

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the Eastern bloc.77 Originally the GDR had not been part of the massive ar- mament program that Stalin had conceived in early January 1951, when he ordered the other East-bloc states to embark on a headlong buildup.78 But he changed his plans sometime in mid-1951 and decided to include the GDR. The demand for the creation of pan-German national armed forces, which was part of the Stalin Note of 10 March 1952, was designed to justify the GDR’s earlier formation of an army. In keeping with this approach, the East German authorities initiated a massive campaign in favor of “national armed forces.” The campaign was aimed not only at the recruitment of military per- sonnel but also at the implementation of other measures of militarization.79 Starting in 1948, tens of thousands of “Volkspolizisten” were trained in the GDR, and ofªcers attended secret specialist training courses in the Soviet Union. In 1951–1952 the ªrst phase of the military buildup was completed according to plan. The indirect rejection of the Stalin Note by the West created ideal conditions for the reestablishment in July 1952 of the paramilitary police force as the GDR’s “national armed forces.” The transition proceeded smoothly. The Kasernierte Volkspolizei, with their military structure, organization, and training, had always been an elite force that had little in common with a traditional police force. The formation of a military “was conceived by the SED from the start to double as an instrument to secure its own domestic power and as an element of East German sovereignty politics,” according to Torsten Dietrich and Rüdiger Wenzke.80 Measures to tighten the border control regime were deferred until the So- viet Union judged the time right; but were planned well in advance. In Janu- ary 1952, Soviet leaders started to focus on possible remedies for “the unsatis- factorily guarded demarcation line of the German Democratic Republic.”81 In their view the GDR border police were so poorly equipped they could not do their job properly, and the “unreliable elements” in the police lacked disci- pline and were prone to alcohol abuse.82 Molotov, who was casting about for ways to “prevent infringements of the regulations,” jotted in the margin of one of Gromyko’s relevant reports a note of puzzlement that the border was

77. Wettig, “Stalins Aufrüstungsbeschluss.” 78. Zubok, A Failed Empire, p. 81. 79. Wettig, “Stalins Aufrüstungsbeschluss.” 80. Dietrich and Wenzke, Die getarnte Armee. 81. Ignat’ev to Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev, 9 January 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1182, Ll. 91–93; and Gromyko to Molotov, 9 January 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1182, L. 94. Both documents are reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 75, 76. 82. Ignat’ev to Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beriia, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev, 9 January 1952.

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guarded by “German instead of Soviet soldiers” and underlined the word So- viet twice. The sealing of the German-German border was therefore a done deal two months ahead of the SED comrades’ visit to Moscow.83

Austria and Stalin’s Policy toward Germany

Stalin was not prepared either before or during the Battle of Notes to enter into negotiations on Austria. Not until after the Battle of Notes did his in- transigence on Austria ease. In January 1952 the Soviet Union declined to discuss Austria in a new round of negotiations that were to have been organized by the United States. The declassiªed materials show that Stalin was simply not interested in an Austrian treaty so long as the Stalin Note was in the works. A state treaty would have meant the evacuation of the Soviet occupation troops, which might have led to similar hopes in the GDR, thereby com- pounding the SED regime’s troubles. Only after the GDR’s consolidation and the cementing of Germany’s double statehood did Soviet leaders begin to see the viability and even the usefulness of neutrality as a solution to the Austrian problem. The post-1945 developments in Austria had evolved in complete contrast to Germany. From 1947 the four powers negotiated on and off about a treaty that was to restore the country’s sovereignty. The Moscow Declaration (Octo- ber 1943) cast Austria in a conºicting role as the ªrst victim of German ag- gression on one hand and as jointly responsible for the crimes of Nazism on the other. For the Allies, Austria was neither an ally nor an enemy, which ex- plains why negotiations in accordance with international law centered on a state treaty and not on a peace treaty.84 In 1945 Austria was divided into four occupation zones in the same way as Germany. Unlike in Germany, however, general elections were held in Aus- tria in November 1945 and ended in a crushing defeat for the Communists. The Austrian government had a relatively large domestic maneuvering space after 1946.85 The rising tensions created by the Cold War inevitably slowed

83. Ibid. This has only recently been ªnally established as a fact but was always anticipated as such by Wettig. See Wettig, Bereitschaft zu Freiheit in Einheit? p. 229. Bonwetsch and Kudrjašov also assume that “preparatory talks...hadquite obviously taken place, involving Moscow, the SCC, and the SED.” See Bonwetsch and Kudrjašov, “Stalin und die II. Parteikonferenz der SED,” p. 177. 84. Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, pp. 34–57. See also Bischof et al., eds., New Perspectives on Aus- tria(ns) and World War II. 85. See the studies that are extensively based on source material made available for the ªrst time to the bilateral Austrian-Russian research project on the “Red Army in Austria”: Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler, “Unter sowjetischer Kontrolle: Zur Regierungsbildung in Österreich 1945,” in Stefan Karner and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, eds., Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Sowjetische Besatzung 1945–1955:

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negotiations for a state treaty and the evacuation of Allied troops from Aus- tria. Moscow supported Yugoslav territorial claims against Austria, thereby ex- acerbating a precarious situation for the USSR that dated back to 1945, when Josip Broz Tito’s partisans had been among the forces that occupied Austria’s south. But the British pressured Tito to withdraw his troops from Austrian soil. After the split between Tito and Stalin in 1948 the Soviet Union supported Yugoslavia’s territorial claims in the negotiations on Austria, but only as a matter of form. Eventually, Stalin abandoned the claims.86 In Paris the four powers agreed in June 1949 to have an Austrian treaty ready for endorsement by the autumn. Agreement had already been reached on nearly all disputed points. In October 1949, shortly before the ªnal touches could be added in negotiations on relatively minor points, Stalin halted the process.87 This was partly because of concern that the treaty might deprive the Soviet Union of the right to keep troops stationed in Hungary and Romania. Stalin also did not want Tito to beneªt from an Austrian state treaty.88 There is substantial evidence that the USSR was considering remov- ing its occupation troops from Austria in 1949, but it is also conceivable that Stalin simply wanted to create the impression that he was ready to enter into negotiations for tactical reasons.89 Contrary to the West’s expectations,90 he ultimately refrained from reaping the allegedly substantial economic beneªts that would have been linked to the conclusion of a treaty.91 At the time (and

Beiträge, Vol. 4 of Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgen-Forschung (Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 2005), pp. 97–140. Key documents are reprinted in Russian and German in Stefan Karner et al., eds., Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Sowjetische Besatzung 1945–1955, Vol. 2, Dokumente (Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 2005). 86. Was the main obstacle that delayed the conclusion of the State Treaty in the period up to 1948 and thereafter really the border issue, or was the Soviet occupation of eastern Austria so important a factor in the consolidation of Eastern Europe that the Soviet Union could not afford to give up? In addition, what role did Tito’s behavior in the question of Carinthia play in helping to bring about the split between Tito and Stalin? See Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler, “Stalin und Österreich: Sowjetische Österreich-Politik 1938 bis 1953,” in Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2005), pp. 102–140. 87. For details, see Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, pp. 175–179. 88. Politburo Resolution P 71 (479-op.), 24 October 1949, in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 162, D. 42, L. 103. For details, see Peter Ruggenthaler, “Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert wurde: Sowjetische Österreich-Politik 1945 bis 1953/55,” in Karner and Stelzl-Marx, eds., Die Rote Armee in Österreich, pp. 674–686. 89. For details, see Ruggenthaler, “Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert wurde,” pp. 675–676. 90. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Eine verpasste Chance? Die Großmächte und die Verhandlungen über den Staatsvertrag im Jahre 1949,” in Günter Bischof and Josef Leidenfrost, eds., Die bevormundete Na- tion: Österreich und die Alliierten 1945–1949 (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1988), p. 356. 91. It is therefore impossible to agree with the main thrust of Naimark’s views on Soviet policy toward Austria when he states: “If he [Stalin] could have found a face-saving way to sign a State Treaty on Austria in 1946, in 1949 or 1952, he might well have done so. He understood completely that under occupation the Austrians and the Austrian state were more a burden than a beneªt to Soviet interests. Khrushchev’s views that the occupation did nothing but make the Soviets more unpopular among the

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until 1951), Soviet companies in Austria were still yielding substantial proªts. The compensation payment of 150 million U.S. dollars stipulated in the 1949 draft of the State Treaty would have been an enormous price for Austria to pay but was apparently not substantial enough to sway Moscow’s decision on the basis of economic considerations. Austria was economically important to the USSR because its oil reserves were the largest in Europe except for Ro- mania and the USSR itself. The Soviet Mineral Oil Administration, which had encountered economic difªculty as far back as 1948, discovered Central Europe’s largest contiguous oil ªeld in March 1949 in Matzen near Vienna. By the autumn of 1949 the drilling of additional bore holes had revealed the great potential of this ªeld, and in late September 1949, just as the negotiations on Austria were about to be concluded, Stalin was informed of this development by a senior intelligence ofªcial, Vsevolod Merkulov. Even if Soviet troops had evacuated Austria at the time, the USSR would still have had access to Austrian oil but would have been required to pay taxes on it. Moreover, the “Eastern trade” (the enforced supply of oil to Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary, which received 90 percent of the crude oil they needed from eastern Austria) would no longer have been possible.92 Subsequently the question of Austria was completely overshadowed by the German question. After a deadlock lasting two years, the Western governments prepared another Austria “initiative” in late 1951. On 13 March 1952, three days after the Stalin Note, they submitted an “Abbreviated Treaty,” which provided for the evacuation and military neutralization of Austria. The treaty, however, was not intended to serve Austria’s purposes; it was instead designed mainly to test Stalin’s willingness to enter into negotiations regarding Germany. The “offer” in the “Abbreviated Treaty” had been painstakingly formulated to be unacceptable to Stalin. Moscow was never going to forgo compensation for German property. The “Abbreviated Treaty” was closely linked to the German question and was a mere propaganda ploy of the West- ern powers.93

Austrians was no doubt shared by Stalin. It is hard to know why Stalin did not sign a State Treaty.” See Norman N. Naimark, “Stalin and Europe in the Postwar Period, 1945–53: Issues and Problems,” Journal of Modern European History, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2004), p. 56. The advantages of Austrian neutrality after the consolidation of the GDR at the end of the Battle of Notes in 1952, when Stalin was still alive, were the same as in the period after Stalin’s death. That the Battle of Notes ended the way the So- viet Union had wanted was the decisive factor that made a neutral Austria possible. Prior to the March 1952 note, Stalin was not prepared to lift Austria’s occupation. 92. Walter Martin Iber, “Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung (SMV) in Österreich, 1945–1955: Sowjetische Besatzungswirtschaft und der Kampf ums Öl als Vorgeschichte der OMV,” Ph.D. Diss., University of Graz, 2008, pp. 86–87, 107–110, 119–120, 135–136, 163–165; and Walter Martin Iber, “Wirtschaftsspionage für den Westen. Erdölarbeiter im Spannungsfeld des Kalten Krieges,” in Stefan Karner and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, eds., Stalins letzte Opfer: Verschleppte und erschossene Österreicher in Moskau 1950–1953 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), p. 177. 93. Bischof, “Karl Gruber und die Anfänge des ‘Neuen Kurses,’” pp. 143–183. See, also, Michael

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Even though the MGB was aware of the preparations under way in the West, the head of the agency failed to inform Soviet leaders.94 The West’s propaganda move therefore had no effect on the timing of the presentation of the Stalin Note. What it did achieve was to up the ante for the Soviet authorities. Stalin would have had the opportunity in 1952 to demonstrate his good will on the German question by making a “down payment” on the Austrian question. But nothing of the sort happened. It is therefore irrelevant to speculate, as Steininger does, that Stalin possibly missed “an opportunity to inºuence the West’s policy toward Germany” or to rid himself, in Naimark’s phrase, of the “burden” of Austria.95 Soviet ofªcials were concerned that neutrality for Austria in early 1952 might become a precedent for the German question. When the West sought a response from the Soviet government several months after the presentation of the “Abbreviated Treaty,” Vyshinskii wrote to Stalin in May 1952: “As I see it the most effective line to take is basically to leave the Note...ontheAbbrevi- ated Treaty unanswered for the time being in order not to deºect attention from efforts to ªnd a solution for the German question, which, as we know, is also what the governments of the USA, Great Britain and France want to achieve.”96 Stalin indeed took this approach. The Soviet Union kept mum on the subject of Austria until after the end of the Battle of Notes in the autumn of 1952. From late 1949 (at the latest) Soviet ofªcials lost all interest in the Aus- trian negotiations. The second half of 1950 saw a mere three meetings. At the instigation of the Austrian federal government the United States in early 1952 convened a meeting of the members of the Austrian Treaty Commission after a pause of more than a year; it was the 259th such meeting.97 From docu-

Gehler, “Abbreviated Treaty für Österreich? Die westliche Staatsvertrags-Diplomatie und die Stalin- Noten von 1952,” VfZ, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1994), pp. 243–278. See also Rolf Steininger, Austria, Ger- many, and the Cold War: From the Anschluss to the State Treaty 1938–1955 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp. 98–100. 94. For details on this important point, see Peter Ruggenthaler, “A New Perspective from Moscow Ar- chives: Austria and the Stalin Notes of 1952,” in Günter Bischof and Fritz Plasser, eds., The Changing Austrian Voter, Vol. XVI of Contemporary Austrian Studies (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Pub- lishers 2008), pp. 199–227. 95. Rolf Steininger, “Warten auf den Staatsvertrag,” Wiener Zeitung (Vienna), 10 July 2005, p. 4; and Naimark, “Stalin and Europe in the Postwar Period,” p. 56. 96. Vyshinskii to Stalin, 12 May 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1115, L. 110. What is interesting in this context is the interpretation that the “Abbreviated Treaty” receives in an internal memorandum of the Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir Sviridov to the VKP(b) Politburo. Sviridov calls the “Ab- breviated Treaty” an American “maneuver” that was supposed to cause the collapse of the Austrian negotiations and to confront “the country with the prospect of long-term occupation and the possibility of a division.” The “Abbreviated Treaty” was undoubtedly directed against the interests of the USSR, but in Vyshinskii’s reports to Stalin this was not the salient point. Vyshinskii even told Stalin to conªrm receipt of the proposals contained in the “Abbreviated Treaty” (L. 112). 97. Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, p. 183.

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ments prepared for internal use by the Soviet Foreign Ministry we now know that Soviet leaders privately were “not interested in speeding up the Austrian treaty for the time being.”98 The Foreign Ministry based its planning on the assumption that all unresolved articles of the treaty would be dealt with at the next meeting and therefore advised Stalin to stay away.99 Soon Moscow and the Western powers were accusing one another of delaying the treaty talks. Stalin’s willingness to engage in talks about Austria did not revive until after the Battle of Notes.100 Meetings 259 and 260 took place in London in Feb- ruary 1953, shortly before Stalin’s death.101 The Austrian authorities had already signaled that a solution involving neutral status for Austria would be acceptable.102 However, not until after the division of Germany became “ªnal” did Austria’s neutrality become a genuine option—an outcome for which Stalin’s death was not, as is so often presumed, a precondition.103 A permanent division of Austria was never an option as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. Such an outcome would have strengthened the FRG, something Moscow wanted to prevent at all costs.104 Forestalling a new

98. Gromyko to Stalin, 16 January 1952, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1115, Ll. 62–64. See also the proposals with Molotov’s remarks in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1115, Ll. 38–39, 67–69. 99. Ruggenthaler, “Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert wurde,” pp. 698–699. At this stage the Soviet leadership was still unaware of the West’s intention to launch a propaganda offensive related to the Austrian question in the shape of the “Abbreviated Treaty.” Only after the presentation of the “Abbre- viated Treaty” three days after the Stalin Note did Molotov request an intelligence report on the treaty from the MGB. Ruggenthaler, “A New Perspective from Moscow Archives.” Tellingly, the Western powers assumed that Moscow had got wind of the “Abbreviated Treaty” and surmised this was the reason the Soviet Union boycotted the London conference. See Bischof, “‘Recapturing the Initiative’ and ‘Negotiating from Strength,’” pp. 242–243. 100. Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff. Zubok notes that “the detailed analysis of Soviet plans for Aus- tria, which had long become a hostage of the German Question and Soviet military plans, also shows that Kremlin diplomacy at that time was just a camouºage for war preparations.” See Zubok, A Failed Empire, p. 83. 101. Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, p. 183. 102. For details, see Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, pp. 126–128. 103. See also Gerald Stourzh, “Der österreichische Staatsvertrag in den weltpolitischen Entscheidung- sprozessen,” in Arnold Suppan et al., eds., Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955: Internationale Strat- egie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität / The Austrian State Treaty 1955: International Strategy, Le- gal Relevance, National Identity (Vienna: Böhlau 2005), pp. 973–974. Wolfgang Mueller takes a different view. See Wolfgang Mueller, “Gab es eine verpasste Chance?” in Suppan et al., eds., Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955, p. 116. 104. In a meeting with leaders of the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) in February 1948 in Mos- cow, Andrei Zhdanov argued that the division of Austria advocated by the KPÖ was not a viable option, and he said the KPÖ should drop the idea. See Ruggenthaler, “Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert wurde,” pp. 669–673. Yugoslav leaders had encouraged the KPÖ to stick to its guns. See Leonid Gibianskii’s two-part article, “Kominform v deistvii: 1947–1948 gg. Po arkhivnym doku- mentam,” Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, No. 1 (January–February 1996), pp. 149–170, and No. 2 (March–April 1996), pp. 157–172. See also Manfred Mugrauer, “‘Teilungspläne’ und ‘Putschab- sichten’: Die KPÖ im Gedankenjahr 2005,” Mitteilungen der Alfred Klahr Gesellschaft, Vol. 4 (2005), p. 12.

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Anschluss justiªed concluding the State Treaty.105 Planting a thorn in NATO’s ºesh by interrupting its geographical contiguity (with neutral Switzerland complementing the barrier) was a welcome “side effect.”106 Economic reasons such as the unproªtability of the Soviet companies in eastern Austria, most of which were operating at a loss after 1951 and were quickly developing into a millstone around Moscow’s neck, bolstered Soviet leaders’ resolve to end the occupation after ten years.107 Nikita Khrushchev convinced his colleagues that the USSR stood to beneªt from lifting the occupation of eastern Austria.108 The improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the “new ºexibility” in So- viet foreign policy after Stalin’s death were preconditions for the State Treaty.109 However, the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in Vienna’s Belvedere Palace on 15 May 1955 had no effect on the Soviet Union’s readiness to solve the German question. The CPSU Presidium expressly forbade Molotov, who came to Austria directly from Warsaw after signing the Warsaw Pact, from taking any steps in that direction. His remit did include proposing a four- power meeting without a previously agreed agenda, but this was seen as a nec- essary step to forestall an attempt by Western leaders to turn the German question into a key issue; in all probability they would try “to reach some sort of agreement in that respect” in Vienna.110 Beyond that, Soviet ofªcials believed that “on the German question it was obvious that no rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was going to be possible in the near future.” In case the Western powers insisted on convening a four- power conference on the German question, Molotov was to state categorically “that the situation in Europe had been profoundly affected by the ratiªcation of the Paris Treaties and that the time had therefore not yet come when a debate of the German question was going to be fruitful.”111 Blame for the existing situation was again to be shifted to the Western powers. The extent to which Soviet leaders saw Austria as a model for Germany after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty was a topic explored—to negative effect—by Adolf Schärf and Bruno Kreisky, two of the Socialist members of the

105. Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, p. 463. 106. Mastny, “Die NATO im sowjetischen Denken und Handeln 1949 bis 1956,” p. 440. 107. Michail Prozumenšcikov, “Nach Stalins Tod: Sowjetische Österreich-Politik 1953–1955,” in Karner and Stelzl-Marx, eds., Die Rote Armee in Österreich, pp. 729–753; and Iber, “Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung (SMV) in Österreich.” 108. On the controversy between Khrushchev and Molotov regarding the Austrian question, see Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, pp. 455–462. 109. Ibid., pp. 464–466, 480–485. 110. Resolution of the CPSU Presidium, 13 May 1955, in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, F. 06, Op. 14, Papka 10, D. 118, L. 88. 111. Ibid.

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Austrian delegation that had come to Moscow for bilateral negotiations in April 1955. Schärf and Kreisky brought up the topic at the instigation of the Social- ists in talks with Molotov and Mikoyan. Molotov gave no indication that the Soviet Union was even remotely willing to grant concessions on the German question.112 In Kreisky’s account of the scene, Mikoyan was more explicit:

Then he said in effect that neutrality was guaranteed solely by that piece of paper on which it was declared. A small state was aware of the consequences that would result from infringement of the treaty. For a large state of the magnitude of a reunited Germany that same piece of paper might easily become obsolete. And what would then be the next move? Would we go to war?113

It has not been possible so far to corroborate this statement with Soviet documents. In the double strategy pursued by the USSR (and the GDR), Austria and the model it was supposed to provide continued to play an important propaganda role in the Eastern bloc’s attempts to shape public opinion in West Ger- many and to put pressure on Adenauer and the NATO allies.114 Austria had fulªlled its assigned role in the USSR’s policy on the consolidation of the Eastern bloc.

Reactions to Stalins großer Bluff

Numerous historians assessed the merits of my theses when they were ªrst published in a different form in German, partly endorsing them, partly raising critical questions. What follows is a brief overview of the issues raised by those reviewers who have not already been fully addressed above. Wettig endorsed my argument:

Ruggenthaler’s book is by far the most comprehensive collection of documents on the Soviet Note of March 1952. Edited and prefaced with great expertise, these ªles are so unambiguous in their content that the controversy regarding Stalin’s intentions can be considered decided.

Wettig also maintains that the book “has established the Western proposal of the ‘Abbreviated Treaty’ of 13 March 1952 as an altogether new topic in the

112. Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, p. 471. 113. Bruno Kreisky, Zwischen den Zeiten: Erinnerungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten (Berlin: Siedler, 1986), p. 461. 114. Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, p. 479; Gerhard Wettig, “Adenauers Moskau-Besuch aus sowjetischer Sicht: Wende der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik nach Stalins Tod,” Historisch- politische Mitteilungen: Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, No. 12 (2005), pp. 193–202, esp. p. 197.

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debate.”115 He concludes: “Ruggenthaler’s documents prove that [the ‘Abbre- viated Treaty’ regarding Austria] was a mere propaganda maneuver that was designed to demonstrate to the world that even in a case where the USSR was not forced to give up the GDR it refused to enter into an agreement.”116 Manfred Görtemaker recently noted that there was “hardly an alternative to the course steered by Adenauer. Gerhard Wettig’s research in the Moscow archives and Peter Ruggenthaler’s collection of documents related to the Stalin Note published under the revealing title ‘Stalins großer Bluff’ have made the intentions that underpinned Stalin’s policy toward Germany utterly transparent.”117 Bert Hoppe takes the same line, adding that “Ruggenthaler has shown conclusively” that the Stalin Note aimed “to bolster the Soviet sphere of domination and the Construction of Socialism in the GDR. . . . Sta- lin’s make-believe initiative arguably became the most effective propaganda coup of the Cold War—and it’s taken 55 years to strip it to the bones.”118 Thomas Maulucci concludes in his review: “Ruggenthaler supports his case well and, in my opinion, convincingly....Hisstudy is the most comprehensive and compelling discussion of the notes currently available and will be a valuable read for foreign policy experts, postwar historians, and Cold War specialists.”119 The review by Fritjof Meyer, the head of the Eastern Europe desk of the German periodical Der Spiegel from 1966 to 2004, is not worth lengthy discussion. Meyer has not paid sufªcient attention to the documents reprinted in the book and instead is guided by several conversations he had with Stalin’s alleged adviser on Germany, Daniil Mel’nikov, who stressed “the indubitable seriousness of the offer.”120 But Mel’nikov was hardly in a position to know such things; he was a professor at Moscow’s State University in 1951–1952 and has been called a “nobody in the Soviet hierarchy.”121 Günter Buchstab notes in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that

115. Book review by Gerhard Wettig, in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, No. 4 (Stüttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2008), p. 466. 116. Gerhard Wettig, book review, in MGZ, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2008), pp. 305–307. 117. Manfred Görtemaker, “Von Potsdam bis Kabul: Deutsche Außenpolitiken seit 1945,” Deutschlandarchiv (henceforth DA) Vol. 42, No.1 (2009), p. 26. 118. Bert Hoppe, “Ein äußerst erfolgreicher Propaganda-Coup,” Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 11 January 2008, p. 14. 119. See Thomas Maulucci, review of Stalins großer Bluff, by Peter Ruggenthaler, H-German, H-Net Reviews, November 2009, http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?idϭ25713. 120. Fritjof Meyer, “Hat Stalin geblufft? Neue Aktenfunde zur Sowjetnote von 1952,” Osteuropa, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2007), p. 160. 121. Hermann Graml, “Eine wichtige Quelle—aber missverstanden: Anmerkungen zu Wilfried Loth: ‘Die Entstehung der “Stalin-Note.” Dokumente aus Moskauer Archiven,’” in Zarusky, ed., Die Stalin- Note vom 10. März 1952, p. 122.

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Ruggenthaler has been able to prove conclusively that the consummately crafted notes were in fact equipped with something resembling a false bottom; in other words, they were indeed “Stalin’s grand bluff.” Whether the propagators of the “genuine option thesis” will be prepared now to shelve their highly speculative “Kremlinological” interpretation, which has given birth to one of historiography’s toxic legends, remains to be seen.122

Rolf Badstübner, one of the former “leading SED historians” in charge of the presentation of “the ofªcial history [of the GDR],” presents a different interpretation.123 In his review of the book he asks “what rank...should be ac- corded to Molotov’s holding of documents,”124 which constitutes the most important source for the documents in my book. That Molotov continued to play a highly signiªcant role in Soviet foreign policy even after his ofªcial re- moval from the post of Foreign Minister by Stalin is a well-established fact.125 This has been veriªed through ªrst-hand accounts in the newly published documents and is also well illustrated by Molotov’s handwriting on Soviet documents pertaining to Soviet policy toward Germany. This is not to say that the last word was left to Molotov or that Stalin did not remain in charge. Even though Stalin during the ªnal few years of his life left hardly any written evidence on which historians might base their accounts, his intentions and assessments can be reconstructed on the basis of other primary sources. Stalin was usually informed by oral reports and usually gave only oral instructions, but he remained faithful to one practice until the time of his death: Every resolution was passed by the VKP(b) Politburo. Without Stalin’s consent, no resolution would have been passed. If drafts were submitted at the Politburo meetings for discussion and if their content was signiªcantly revised before they were passed, this was in all probability because of Stalin’s comments and the give-and-take in the Politburo. Badstübner also feels that if I had dealt in my “introduction in great detail with the problem of the peace treaty . . . as it presented itself particularly

122. Günter Buchstab, “Ulbricht, Molotow und der Notenkrieg: Neue Dokumente belegen: Stalins Angebot eines demokratischen Gesamtdeutschlands war nicht ernst gemeint,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 January 2008, p. 9. 123. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, “Zwischen Pro und Contra: Die deutsche Teilungsgeschichte im gegenwärtigen Urteil einstiger SED-Historiker,” H-Solz-U-Kult, 2000, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu- berlin.de/rezensio/buecher/2000/koil0800.htm. 124. Rolf Badstübner, review of Stalins großer Bluff, by Peter Ruggenthaler, in ZfG, No. 1 (2009), pp. 93–95. 125. Filitov even wonders whether the Stalin Note would be more accurately described as the “Molotov Note.” See Filitov, “Die Note vom 10. März 1952,” pp. 159–172. Loth also emphasizes Molotov’s role in Soviet policy toward Germany in 1951–1952. See Loth, Die Sowjetunion und die deutsche Frage; and Natl’ya Egorova, “Evropeiskaya bezopasnost i ‘ugroza’ NATO v otsenkakh stal- inskogo rukovodstva,” in A. O. Chubaryan, ed., Stalinskoe desyatiletie kholodnoi voiny: Fakty i gipotezy (Moscow: Institut Vseobshchei Istorii, 1999), pp. 56–78.

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in 1946–1947,” I “might have had a chance to arrive at more differentiated conclusions.”126 His views on this matter are at odds with those of a large number of prominent historians, including Jochen Laufer, who has addressed the topic on the basis of a thorough study of Soviet sources, and Manfred Wilke, who has arrived at similar results on the basis of his research into SED ªles.127 The ªndings of both are diametrically opposed to those of Bad- stübner.128 Their ªndings also contradict the arguments of Loth, who has long insisted that “Stalin really wanted what he said: a reunited Germany independent of the Western bloc....[T]his has been...established beyond all doubt.”129 In their joint edition of Pieck’s “Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschland- politik,” Badstübner and Loth reiterate this assessment: “As far as Soviet intentions in the spring of 1952 are concerned, the totality of Pieck’s notes from the summer of 1945 onward...suggests that it was Stalin’s genuine intention to reach an agreement with the West under the conditions speciªed in the Notes or at least under similar ones.”130 Alexander Vatlin writes that because the “orthodox Western” view and the corresponding assessment of the Stalin Note “are now gradually being taken into consideration by Russian historiographers,” the signiªcance of the book arises not so much from its conclusions as from the “detailed analysis of the USSR’s foreign policy in the last years of Stalin’s life. It focuses less on events as such (these are, after all, well known) than on the so-called ‘shop ºoor’ decision-making processes leading to foreign policy resolutions.”131 Rolf Steininger, one of the most ardent critics of Adenauer and other Western leaders for not taking up Stalin’s “offer,” mentions in his review that the volume is a “remarkable piece of research” containing “interesting documents,” but he believes that my conclusions overshoot the mark.132 Bernd Bonwetsch echoes Steininger’s view.133 Because this reºects on the basic mes-

126. Badstübner, review of Stalins großer Bluff, p. 94. 127. Peter Erler and Manfred Wilke, Nach Hitler kommen wir: Das Konzept der Moscower KPD- Führung 1944/45 für Nachkriegsdeutschland (Munich: Akademie-Verlag, 1997). 128. See Jochen Laufer, “Der Friedensvertrag mit Deutschland als Problem der Sowjetischen Außenpolitik,” VfZ, No. 1 (2004), pp. 99–118. 129. Loth, Die Entstehung der “Stalin-Note,” p. 62. 130. Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth, eds., Wilhelm Pieck—Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1953, p. 41. 131. Alexander Vatlin, review of Stalins großer Bluff, by Peter Ruggenthaler, RusGermHist [website], http://www.rusgermhist.ru. 132. Rolf Steininger, review of Stalins großer Bluff, by Peter Ruggenthaler, in DA, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2008), pp. 111–112. 133. Bernd Bonwetsch, “Die Stalin-Note 1952—kein Ende der Debatte,” Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismus-Forschung (2008), pp. 106–113. Unlike Steininger, however, Bonwetsch tends to assume Stalin did not want the status of a neutral country for Germany.

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sage of the book, the points raised by Steininger deserve a somewhat lengthier response. Steininger has pored over the documentary material of the book, much of which is new, and I am therefore surprised that he continues to maintain that “the establishment of the GDR army and the Construction of Socialism.” were not discussed “in conversations...between Stalin and the GDR leadership” until after 1 April (i.e., after the arrival of the Western powers’ reply note). Without referring to the newly published documents that show precisely the opposite, Steininger maintains that a different interpretation is still possible because Pieck “had not been informed about the Note until 9 March in Berlin.”134 How such a claim can be made with the new evidence remains a mystery. This argument for many years was the mainstay of historians who believed that Stalin was sincere about Germany unity, but it can no longer be sustained in light of the newly published documents. Steininger gives the impression that SED leaders were taken by surprise when the Stalin Note was given to them. But in fact the SED was, in its own view, engaged at that time in a struggle to liberate West Germany from “American imperialism” and to prevent the FRG from rearming and from re- gaining its sovereignty.135 The documents published in the book show that Stalin had no intention of sacriªcing the GDR. If the proposal of the Stalin Note was indeed initiated by Ulbricht, he has some claim to paternity regarding the idea behind the Stalin Note and if the SED leaders in general put forward their proposals, this was the standard procedure at the time between the SED and Moscow. In no way does this imply that SED leaders coauthored Soviet policy toward Germany. Ulbricht’s proposal was grist to the mill of the campaign waged by the SED and the KPD against the Federal Republic’s orientation toward the West, a campaign that was taking place also at the behest of the Soviet side. Ulbricht was therefore moving along the line plotted by So- viet and SED propaganda, and his proposal tallied with Stalin’s own ideas. So- viet leaders regularly consulted with GDR ofªcials without actually making them privy to their decision-making processes. Molotov was the one responsible for the diction of the Stalin Notes in close coordination with Stalin himself. Nevertheless it would not be correct to presume that the SED leaders were kept in the dark by the Soviet Union about the content and intention of the Stalin Note. They were informed on 9 March that the note was going to be dispatched the following day, but they themselves had initiated the process

134. Steininger, review of Stalins großer Bluff, p. 111. 135. For further details, see Manfred Wilke, “SPD und Kommunisten in der Bundesrepublik oder die Frage des antitotalitären Konsenses,” DA, Vol. 41, No. 6 (2008), pp. 985–993.

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a year earlier and had taken part in consultations with Soviet leaders as the note was being prepared. Their views were heard and taken into consideration, a reºection of the fact that Soviet and GDR leaders were pursuing the same goals: the consolidation of the division of Germany and the Construc- tion of Socialism in the GDR. “This far-reaching conclusion” is not based, as Steininger claims, on “half a clause” but on an analysis of hundreds of documents in the ªles of the Soviet leadership, 141 of which are included in the book. Prior to the departure of the GDR troika to Moscow at the end of March 1952, Pieck cannot possibly have harbored “cautious optimism about the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.” The newly accessible documents show that he harbored no illusions about the growing bond between the Western powers and the FRG and that he wanted to take countermeasures, notably passing a resolution regarding the creation of a national GDR army.136 Steininger does not appear to take this new evidence into account and indeed does not even mention it. Nor is he right in claiming that until the GDR leaders arrived in Moscow Molotov paid no attention to the documents dealing with the preparations of the SED’s 2nd Party Congress, which East Ger- man ofªcials had previously submitted to him. Molotov had closely reviewed the SED Politbüro’s proposals. Even though he had refrained from adding comments in the margin of the 50-page attachment, this is not a sufªcient basis for Steininger’s assertion that this document was “obviously...rather un- important” in Molotov’s eyes.137 Steininger’s gaffe is a reºection of his idiosyncratic approach to Soviet documents. For instance, he says,

We know in the meantime that Walter Ulbricht suggested that the Soviet Union put forward proposals concerning Germany’s neutralization—in order, in the phrase of the day, to unmask the “American warmongers” and to impede the country’s rearmament. This idea was taken up by Foreign Minister Vyshinskii when he reached the conclusion that the Western powers were opposed to Ger- many’s neutralization, whatever the circumstances.138

But in fact the documents merely show that Vyshinskii “gave his consent to this initiative.”139 Vyshinskii was by no means the key ªgure in Soviet foreign policy (especially policy toward Germany). Stalin and Molotov were. Vyshin- skii’s remit as the immediate superior of the Soviet Control Commission in Berlin consisted in passing on all reports concerning Germany to Molotov, in-

136. Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, p. 156. 137. Ibid., p. 158; and Review of Stalins großer Bluff, by Peter Ruggenthaler, in DA, No. 1 (2008), pp. 168–170. 138. Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, p. 156. 139. Ibid., p. 25.

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cluding Foreign Ministry analyses. The diction of Vyshinskii’s reports about various matters, including the attitudes of Western governments toward a neutral Germany, shows that he merely voiced his opinions but made no decisions. Even though Stalin had no “master plan” for the construction of the East- ern bloc, Steininger is on shaky ground in arguing that this implies the lack of any coherent strategy vis-à-vis Germany. Some Soviet party ideologues did believe that Communism would spread in Europe in a quasi-evolutionary process, and they speciªed how this was to be brought about, if only in theoreti- cal terms: Communists were to be given the chance to prove themselves in national-front governments and to transform each speciªc society from inside with as little outside interference as possible.140 The general idea was that the transformation and system change were to be facilitated by Moscow, under the semblance of the expression of autochthonous democratic will. But the only place in Europe where this “recipe” worked, at least on a rudimentary scale, was Czechoslovakia. Nowhere else in Central or Eastern Europe could a Communist regime have been installed or maintained without minimum support from Soviet troops. Steininger also does not distinguish sufªciently clearly between two basic things: Soviet planning and Soviet goals, both minimum and maximum. Even if Stalin did not have—and could not have had—a detailed “master plan,” this does not mean he had no plans at all about Germany in 1951– 1952. Proceeding according to plan in this case does not amount to more than achieving basic goals and constantly adapting the “plan” to facts, formu- lating a reaction in parlous situations, assessing the risks involved, and acting with shrewdness and circumspection. In 1951–1952 Soviet leaders made use of a strategy, a miniature master plan, road map, or whatever other term seems appropriate, which proved ultimately successful. The idea behind this “plan” for the next step in the realization of Soviet policy toward Germany was conceived by Ulbricht and tallied precisely with Stalin’s long- or medium-term strategy, as Ulbricht was well aware. After the aborted blockade of Berlin in 1948–1949, which began as Stalin’s attempt to oust the Western powers from Berlin and to integrate Greater Berlin into the Soviet zone of occupation,141 Soviet strategy focused on the medium- to long-term and aimed to keep Ger- many divided and thus prevent it from ever again threatening the Soviet

140. Eduard Mark, “Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941– 1947,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 31 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, 2001). 141. Steininger also calls the blockade “one of the gravest Soviet policy blunders after 1945,” one that resulted in a shared sense of “West Germans, West Berliners and Western allies as belonging in the same camp for the ªrst time since 1945.” See Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte, Vol. 2, p. 29.

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Union. Although this was not equivalent to a master plan, it was hardly a ran- dom series of steps. Steininger is right that “no one will ever be able to answer the question of what would have happened if the parties concerned had in fact sat down at the negotiating table and Stalin had been forced to put his cards on the table.” What we do know for sure is what Stalin’s intentions were with the note of 10 March 1952—he was blufªng. He wanted neither a neutral Germany nor the sacriªce of the GDR. He hoped that the West would not take up his invi- tation and was relatively sure of his success in advance, even if he did at least once warn his subordinates of dire consequences if the ªnely spun plan were to fail.142 After Western governments, as expected, rejected the note, the So- viet Union presented itself to the Germans as the power that had their national unity at heart, whereas the Western powers were intent on preserving Germany’s division. Ruud Van Dijk notes in his review of Stalins großer Bluff that “Ruggen- thaler’s book—in particular some of its documentation—is a valuable contri- bution, but it is only one of many.”143 Van Dijk does not “disagree with the author’s basic conclusion (that the Stalin Note was not a serious attempt to re- start negotiations with the West over a united Germany)....Furthermore, the evidence Ruggenthaler presents of the cynical use in 1951/52 by Moscow and the SED of West German neutralists certainly is illuminating,” notably in regard to Soviet policy toward Austria at the time.”144 But Van Dijk argues, as does Steininger, that “there is no evidence in the documents Ruggenthaler presents that shows that there was such a ‘plan,’ not in the documents from early 1951, and not in later ones either.”145 Van Dijk fails to note that the published documents repeatedly use the terms “plan deistvii” and “plan dal’neishikh meropriyatii” in characterizing Soviet policy toward Germany in 1951–1952.146 In the context of diplomatic usage during the late Stalin era, such a plan would encompass several different strategies that were designed to attain certain objectives. This did not mean that it was impossible to depart from them if changes in the overall situation made this advisa-

142. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, p. 392 (postscript by Kvitsinskii). 143. Ruud Van Dijk, review of Stalins großer Bluff, by Peter Ruggenthaler, in Bischof et al., eds., New Perspectives on Austria(ns) and World War II, pp. 345–350. 144. Ibid., p. 346. 145. Ibid. 146. Wettig also refers, on the basis of Soviet documents, to a “Maßnahmenplan,” a program of measures. See Gerhard Wettig, “Die Lage in der Deutschland-, Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik bei den Westverträgen von 1952,” in Heiner Timmermann, ed., Deutschlandverträge und Pariser Verträge: Im Dreieck von Kaltem Krieg, deutscher Frage und europäischer Sicherheit (Münster: LIT Verlag 2003), p. 63.

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ble.147 The VKP(b) Politburo’s “action plan” in regard to the German question in 1951–1952 must not be thought of as the kind of master plan that was being touted by historians after the partial opening of Soviet archives in the 1990s. In this sense I cannot help feeling that Van Dijk as well as Steininger has misread what I am saying. The nonexistence of a comprehensive master plan in Stalin’s foreign policy does not mean that the Soviet Union had no coordinated strategy for how to proceed on the German question in 1951– 1952. Van Dijk’s charge that I was not sufªciently critical in my treatment of Soviet foreign intelligence documents is likewise unjustiªed. Speaking of these documents, he says, “Ruggenthaler uses them ably to show that the Rus- sians [sic] were aware of how determined Western leaders were to go through with West German rearmament. From this he concludes, however, that Mos- cow knew there was no chance that the Stalin Note would produce negotiations.”148 What needs to be borne in mind here is that not a single memorandum from 1951–1952 has been unearthed so far in the Soviet Foreign Ministry that points to any deliberations about how to persuade the Western powers that a “third way” (genuine neutrality) was the best option for a uniªed Germany. If Stalin had actually wanted the West to accept the “offer” contained in the Stalin Note, he would have had to take appropriate steps to prepare for genuine talks, and this would have left traces in the archives. A good example of how the decision-makers in Moscow used information supplied by the intelligence services is the procedure leading to the “Ab- breviated Treaty.” In early 1952 the United States wanted to revive the long- dormant state treaty negotiations and was about to convene a four-power meeting on Austria. The Soviet Foreign Ministry began a frantic and ultimately successful search for arguments and pretexts to justify a boycott of the meeting. Western ofªcials assumed at the time that the USSR boycotted the meeting because it had learned about the nascent “Abbreviated Treaty,” the West’s latest initiative, which Western ofªcials knew would be unacceptable to Moscow. This was not the case, however. The Soviet Foreign Ministry proceeded in early 1952 on the assumption that the Western powers meant to bring negotiations on the Austrian treaty to a successful conclusion and was unaware of the West’s impending propaganda ploy. Three days after the Stalin Note, the “Abbreviated Treaty” arrived in Moscow—out of the blue, as far as Soviet leaders were concerned. The MGB was then ordered to assess the real

147. I am indebted for this information to Ol’ga Pavlenko of the Institute for World Politics of the Russian State Humanities University. 148. Van Dijk, review of Stalins großer Bluff.

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motives behind the treaty. Shortly afterward, Valerian Zorin delivered a report to the Soviet Politburo on the purposes and goals of the West’s “Abbreviated Treaty.”149 Van Dijk contends that my attribution of the Stalin Note’s intellectual paternity to Ulbricht is dubious based on “what we know of the lord-vassal re- lationship between Moscow and its East European minions, especially the Germans.” But in fact the book stresses that Soviet leaders did not regard Ulbricht as their equal. Indeed, Birgit Laube points this out in her review: “The book and its more than 140 reprinted sources make one thing quite clear: Even as democracy was taking shape in West Germany, the men in power in East Berlin were mere puppets in the hands of their masters in Mos- cow.”150 The Soviet documents relating to the KPD that are reprinted in the book contain an additional aspect that supports the characterization of Ulbricht presented here. A month before the KPD’s “Münchener Parteitag” in Weimar in March 1951, Stalin received a report from the head of the VKP(b) Foreign Policy Department on the situation in the KPD. Grigor’yan argued that the SED had not given the KPD the kind of support that was needed and was therefore largely to blame for the failures of the KPD in 1950. Franz Dahlem, the head of the so-called Westkommission, was named the chief culprit. Grigor’yan alleged that the Westkommission had “deprived the KPD leaders of their initiative and had cut them off from the SED Politburo.”151 Not until December 1950 had the SED disbanded the Westkommission and “taken complete charge of the KPD.”152 In the future, Grigor’yan wrote, the leader of the KPD, Max Reimann, should submit all questions concerning his party to the SED politburo, which would channel all instructions to the party through him. Grigor’yan’s criticism partly mirrors the struggle for control within the SED leadership. In 1945 the USSR had assigned different spheres of activity to Walter Ulbricht and Franz Dahlem. Ulbricht was to oversee the construction of the state apparatus in the Soviet Occupation Zone, whereas Dahlem was to establish the KPD in the Western occupation zones. Dahlem’s demo-

149. For details, see Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, p. 122; and Ruggenthaler, “A New Perspective from Moscow Archives.” 150. Birgit Laube, “Das verlockende Angebot war nur rein Bluff: Stalin-Note von 1952 entpuppt sich als Störmanöver für die Westintegration der jungen Bundesrepublik,” Gießener Allgemeine Zeitung, n.d. [November 2007], p. 4. 151. Grigor’yan’s report to Stalin, “On the Status Quo in West Germany’s Communist Party,” 12 Feb- ruary 1951, in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1337, Ll. 24–31, reprinted in Ruggenthaler, Stalins großer Bluff, Doc. 2. 152. Ibid.

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tion strengthened Ulbricht as the SED General Secretary, but this meant that Ulbricht was also now responsible for the fate of the KPD. In March 1951 the KPD formally accepted at its party congress in Weimar the objectives formulated at the SED’s 3rd Party Congress, identifying the struggle against the FRG’s rearmament as its primary goal. In 1951 the leading cadres of the East European Communist parties were subjected to purges, and even Ulbricht was not beyond the reach of intrigues. The activities of the SED in carrying out its German-German policies cannot be fully understood without taking account of Ulbricht’s desire to ensure that he had Moscow’s backing at every step. His initiative was thus an attempt to give Moscow responsibility for the SED’s campaign against West Germany’s “remilitarization,” a campaign whose chances of success were not great. The Soviet Union was the only agent capable of offering a peace treaty and neutral status. This was a cornerstone of the SED’s German-German campaign, which in turn was a key part of Soviet policy toward Germany. In Van Dijk’s view, the document showing that Ulbricht was the one who ªrst proposed that the Soviet Union should offer a plan for the neutralization of Germany is “far from earth-shattering” because SED leaders in the past had often come up with ideas for Soviet policy toward Germany. This document is the earliest evidence we have of the genesis of the Stalin Note, and unless it is superseded in the future by similar evidence referring to an even earlier date, we may assume that it marks the birth of the Stalin Note. In a sense, however, Van Dijk is right. One could even go a step further: Not only is this particular document “far from earth-shattering,” the same applies to all the documents reprinted in Stalins großer Bluff. What would truly have caused a sensation are documents showing that Stalin was prepared to sacriªce the GDR. No such documents have surfaced, nor is there any likelihood that they will.

Conclusion

The Stalin Note of 10 March 1952 was a propaganda ploy—but was also more than that. Moscow beneªted from it substantially. Soviet leaders could disclaim all responsibility for the cementing of the division of Germany and shift blame exclusively to the Western powers. The Construction of Socialism in the GDR and the increasing integration of the GDR into the Eastern bloc could be depicted as no more than the inevitable reaction to the FRG’s West- ern integration. The Stalin Note was Ulbricht’s brainchild, but his initiative and propos-

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als were strictly in keeping with the templates of Soviet policy toward Ger- many. In Stalin’s eyes, Ulbricht was a model pupil. The East German leader’s proposal to exploit the neutralist movement for propaganda purposes resulted in “a mobilization of the masses” and put considerable pressure on the West- ern powers and their “Adenauer puppet government.” This is what the GDR leaders had been hoping to achieve, no more and no less. Stalin approved the ideas because they tallied perfectly with his own notions. For Ulbricht, who shared responsibility for the KPD from late 1950, this was also a bid to co-opt Moscow into the SED’s and KPD’s anti-remilitarization campaign, whose chances of success, as Ulbricht knew very well, were meager. Ulbricht assumed that rearmament would occur. For the SED in general and for Ul- bricht personally the Soviet measures in regard to Germany ultimately amounted to a consolidation of Soviet power and to a welcome deepening of the rift between the two German states. On 13 March 1952 the West presented a proposal to Moscow to neutral- ize Austria militarily. The proposal came out of the blue for Stalin. The other- wise highly proªcient Soviet foreign intelligence agency that had been capable of keeping the Soviet leadership informed of the Western powers’ every signiªcant move regarding Germany in 1951–1952 had bungled the job this time. Acting in early 1952 on the assumption that the West was ready to conclude an Austrian State Treaty, Soviet leaders had no choice but to keep mum on the subject of Austria. Vyshinskii advised Stalin to disregard the Western proposal in order not to deºect attention from the German question. The perpetuation of Germany’s division, and not simply Stalin’s death, is what paved Austria’s way to neutrality. All measures adopted by the Soviet Union toward Germany in Stalin’s ªnal two years included an exit strategy. Worst-case scenarios were prepared at the Soviet Foreign Ministry in case the FRG or the Western powers embraced one of the Soviet or East German “proposals.” This was especially apparent on the question of free elections in all of Germany. To ensure that the West Ger- man government would reject the proposed formation of a panel to discuss general elections, Soviet ofªcials told GDR leaders that they would be responsible for appointing this “German Commission for the Preparation of a Draft Electoral Law.” True pan-German elections were out of the question. On 23 January 1952 the VKP(b) Politburo forbade Chuikov from contacting the high commissioners about convening an occupation-power conference on “the issue of holding pan-German elections.” The measures implemented by Soviet and East German leaders in 1951– 1952 for the Construction of Socialism and the deepening bifurcation of Ger- many were designed to give the impression that they were reacting to unilat-

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eral measures taken by the West. Tougher Sovietization measures, the tighten- ing of the border controls, and the Construction of Socialism in East Germany could not be achieved all at once. Even though Stalin was not guided by a master plan in consolidating Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe, he did consistently stick to minimum objectives (particularly toward Poland and the Balkans).153 Stalin’s approach was often contingent on the situation, and he occasionally got what he wanted through deft timing, tactical skills, and small-scale “action plans” of the kind exempliªed by the Stalin Note. Whether the consolidation of the GDR and its ultimate integration into the Eastern bloc were a minimum or a maximum goal for Stalin is a separate question that will require much additional research. In 1951–1952, the Soviet strategy followed a subtle action plan that had been inspired by Ulbricht, as Molotov later told the writer Feliks Chuev:

So we took our time creating the GDR, our kind of Germany. If we had ex- ploited them with no holds barred, what kind of impression would that have left on the people? The Americans, the British, and the French gave West Germany a helping hand. Where did that leave us? Were we supposed to have helped our- selves in that part of Germany that is prepared to cooperate with us? Extreme caution was called for.154

The Western governments were convinced that they had won the “Battle of Notes.” Stalin and Molotov, however, believed that the Soviet Union had won. The only loser was the German people. No “missed opportunity” for reuniªcation occurred in 1952. Germans’ opportunity to live in a reunited, democratic Germany would not come until 1989. The Germans’ fate was in the hands of Stalin, who was determined to make sure that Germany would never again threaten the Soviet Union with war.

Acknowledgments

This article is a spin-off of the author’s research work at the Ludwig Boltz- mann Institute for Research on War’s Consequences and draws on his book Stalins großer Bluff: Die Geschichte der Stalin-Note in Dokumenten der sowjetischen Führung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007) as well as the joint Austrian- Russian research project “Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Sowjetische

153. See Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 21–27. 154. Feliks Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi Vlastelin (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 1999, p. 117. Chuev quotes from a letter Molotov sent him on 12 May 1976. The phrase “no holds barred” refers to repara- tions payments.

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Besatzung 1945–1955,” led by Stefan Karner and sponsored by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture. I have tried to follow up on suggestions I received from Manfred Wilke and Olga Pavlenko—suggestions for which I am deeply grateful. I also thank Mark Kramer for his advice, Otmar Binder for translating the article from the original German, and especially Stefan Karner for all his support.

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