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MARCH 2020 A REPORT OF THE CSIS SECURITY PROJECT

SPACE ASSESSMENT 2020

Principal Authors TODD HARRISON KAITLYN JOHNSON THOMAS G. ROBERTS TYLER WAY MAKENA YOUNG

Foreword MARTIN C. FAGA MARCH 2020

SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020

Authors TODD HARRISON KAITLYN JOHNSON THOMAS G. ROBERTS TYLER WAY MAKENA YOUNG

Foreword MARTIN C. FAGA

A REPORT OF THE CSIS AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT ABOUT CSIS

For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and econom- ic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views ex- pressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

ABOUT ASP

The Aerospace Security Project (ASP) at CSIS explores the technological, budgetary, and policy issues related to the air and space domains and innovative operational concepts for air and space forces. Part of the Inter- Program at CSIS, the Aerospace Security Project is led by Senior Fellow Todd Harrison. ASP’s research focuses on space security, air dominance, long-range strike, and civil and commercial space. Learn more at aerospace.csis.org.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is made possible by support to CSIS. No direct spon- sorship contributed to this report. The authors would like to thank Martin C. Faga, Brian Weeden, Victoria Samson, Emily Tiemeyer, Jeeah Lee, and Jacque Schrag for their support of this project.

© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org

II SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 CONTENTS

IV FOREWORD

1 INTRODUCTION

2 TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE 3 Kinetic Physical 3 Non-Kinetic Physical 4 Electronic 4 Cyber 5 Threat Characteristics

8 10 Space Organization and Doctrine 11 Counterspace Weapons 18 Summary

19 20 Space Organization and Doctrine 21 Counterspace Weapons 28 Summary

29 31 Space Organization and Doctrine 31 Counterspace Weapons 34 Summary

35 37 Space Organization and Doctrine 38 Counterspace Weapons 40 Summary

41 43 Space Organization and Doctrine 45 Counterspace Weapons 46 Summary

47 OTHERS 47 50 51 52 52 Non-State Actors 53 Summary

54 WHAT TO WATCH

56 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

57 APPENDIX I

59 ENDNOTES

III FOREWORD

UCH IS SAID THESE DAYS about the possibility of conflict in space during, before, or perhaps, instead of conflict on land, at sea, or in the air. Why is this the case? The subject is discussed as though it emerged in the last 13 Myears since the Chinese demonstration of a kinetic ASAT in 2007. In fact, the was concerned in 1957 that represented a precursor to space-based nuclear weapons. An ASAT program started in the United States in 1958, and the Soviets did similarly. Both deployed several ASAT systems and performed orbital tests. Nonetheless, fear on both sides of a serious threat of conflict in space did not emerge until recently. Both the Soviets and the United States under- stood that the of “National Technical Means” were stabilizing and were keys to de-escalation should a conflict occur. This view changed after the First , when space systems moved from being primarily stra- tegic systems to tactical ones providing near real-time support to tactical forces. By that time, the satellites of the Department of Defense and of the Intelligence Community operated and reported almost instantly, and the services developed the equipment and techniques to acquire, ana- lyze, and distribute space system information very quickly. Following the First Gulf War, a Russian analysis of the rapid American suc- cess noted the efficacy of precision weapons and real-time intelligence. Much of this capability depended on space systems and spurred the Rus- sians and Chinese to a sustained program to develop ASAT capabilities--not only those for physical attack but cyber and electronic attacks as well. In recent years, we have read Russian and Chinese doctrine explaining the im- portance of ASAT capabilities, and we have seen systems deployed to carry them out. The situation we confront today was inevitable. Capability is always met with counter-capability. In recognition of this need to defend and to in- crease our space power in the face of such threats, the United States has wisely created the and the U.S. . This is where the people who will design, build, and operate our military space systems reside and where personnel will be trained, careers managed, doctrine de- veloped, and a myriad other elements of a military force undertaken. Several years ago, an general gave a speech where he said, “every company commander depends on space, and takes it for granted.” What a challenge for our Space Force and Space Command to assure that our mili- tary is served at every level of command without failing.

MARTIN C. FAGA Former Assistant Secretary of the for Space and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office

IV SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 INTRODUCTION

HE PAST YEAR WAS A TRANSFORMATIONAL ONE for space pol- icy in several respects. On December 20, 2019, President Trump signed into law the National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2020, creating the Space Force and ushering in what is ar- Tguably the most significant reorganization of the U.S. military since the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. While the newly created Space Force is re- sponsible for organizing, training, and equipping space forces for the U.S. military, the newly re-established United States Space Command is the geographic combatant command responsible for space operations. France also made significant organizational changes in 2019 with the is- suance of its Space Defense Strategy. It calls for the creation of a Space Command within the Air Force and the renaming of the Air Force to the Air and Space Force. The French defense minister publicly stated that France would develop space control capabilities and active defenses, such as small bodyguard satellites and space-based defenses to protect im- portant space assets. Other countries continue to develop and test counterspace capabilities and conduct suspicious or threatening activities in space. India became the fourth country to successfully test a direct-ascent anti- (ASAT) , as well as the only country to conduct a debris-producing test since 2008. Rus- sia continued its co-orbital activities in geostationary (GEO) and caught the attention of many in the space community with its proximity operations around a classified U.S. government satellite in low orbit (LEO). In commercial space, both SpaceX and OneWeb began deployment of mega constellations in LEO to deliver high-speed access globally. OneWeb launched its first set of six satellites in February 2019, and SpaceX launched its first batch of 60 satellites in May 2019. Both companies have conducted additional launches since then, with SpaceX beginning to deploy at a steady pace in early 2020. As of February 17, 2020, SpaceX has launched a total of 302 satellites, 297 of which are operational. In comparison, the total number of operational satellites in LEO was roughly 1,500 in 2019—a number that could double by the end of 2020. These commercial developments pres- ent both opportunities and challenges in what is already a diverse, disruptive, disordered, and dangerous . The purpose of this annual report from the CSIS Aerospace Security Project is to aggregate and analyze publicly available information on the counter- space capabilities of other nations. It is intended to raise awareness and un- derstanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, and highlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should focus more attention. While the report focuses on the capabilities of China, Russia, Iran, North Ko- rea, and India, this year’s report places relatively more emphasis than previ- ous years on the counterspace capabilities of select other countries, includ- ing some allies and partners of the United States. This report is not a comprehensive assessment of all foreign counterspace capabilities because much of the information on what other countries are doing is not publicly available. The information in this report is current as of February 22, 2020.

1 COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS

TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS

PACE IS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ENABLER of economic and military power. The December 2017 United States National Security Strategy prioritizes maintaining U.S. leadership and free- dom of action in this critical domain, but it notes that: SMany countries are purchasing satellites to support their own strategic military activities. Others believe that the ability to attack space assets offers an asymmetric advantage and as a result, are pursuing a range of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The United States considers unfettered ac- cess to and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest. Any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space ar- chitecture that directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a de- liberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.1 Illustration A can be used Counterspace weapons vary in the types of effects they create, and the level as a kinetic phys- of technological sophistication and resources required to develop and field ical counterspace them. They also differ in how they are employed and how difficult they are . to detect and attribute. The effects of these weapons can be temporary or permanent, depending on the type of system and how it is used. The coun- try-by-country assessments that follow this section group counterspace weapons into four broad categories: kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber.

2 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 both cases, the attacker is likely to know KINETIC PHYSICAL whether its attack is successful almost immediately because the effects would KINETIC PHYSICAL COUNTERSPACE be publicly visible through orbital debris weapons attempt to strike directly or or a damaged . detonate a warhead near a satellite or ground station. A direct-ascent ASAT weapon attempts to strike a satellite us- ing a trajectory that intersects the target NON-KINETIC PHYSICAL satellite without placing the interceptor into orbit. Ballistic and missile NON-KINETIC COUNTERSPACE weap- defense interceptors can be modified to ons, such as , high-powered micro- act as direct-ascent ASAT weapons pro- wave (HPM) weapons, and electromag- vided they have sufficient energy to reach netic pulse (EMP) weapons, can have the target satellite’s orbit. A co-orbital physical effects on satellites and ground ASAT weapon differs from a direct-ascent stations without making physical con- weapon because it is first placed into or- tact. These attacks operate at the speed bit. When commanded, the satellite then of light and, in some cases, can be less maneuvers to strike its target. Co-orbital visible to third-party observers and more ASATs can remain dormant in orbit for difficult to attribute. days or even years before being activated. High-powered lasers can be used to dam- A key needed to make both di- age or degrade sensitive satellite com- rect-ascent and co-orbital ASAT weapons ponents, such as arrays. Lasers can effective is the ability to detect, track, and also be used to temporarily dazzle or per- guide the interceptor into a target satel- manently blind mission-critical sensors lite. An onboard guidance system requires on satellites. Targeting a satellite from a relatively high level of technological so- Earth with a laser requires high beam phistication and significant resources to quality, , and advanced test and deploy.2 pointing control to steer the laser beam Ground stations are vulnerable to kinetic as it is transmitted through the atmos- physical attacks by a variety of conven- phere—technology that is costly and re- 3 tional military weapons, from guided mis- quires a high degree of sophistication. A siles and at longer ranges to small laser can be effective against a sensor on arms fire at shorter ranges. Because they a satellite if it is within the field of view of are often highly visible, located outside of the sensor, making it possible to attribute the United States, and are more accessi- the attack to its approximate geograph- ble than objects in space, ground stations ical origin. The attacker, however, will can be an easier target for adversaries have limited ability to know if the attack seeking to disrupt or degrade space sys- was successful because it would not likely tems. Even if the ground stations them- produce debris or other visible indicators. selves are difficult to attack directly, they An HPM weapon can be used to disrupt can be disrupted indirectly by attacking a satellite’s electronics, corrupt data the electrical power grid, water supply, stored in memory, cause proces- and the high-capacity communications sors to restart, and, at higher lines that support them. Kinetic physical attacks generally have irreversible effects on the satellites and ground stations targeted. These counter- space weapons are likely to be attributa- ble because the United States and others can identify the source of a direct-ascent ASAT launch or ground attack and can, Illustration A laser is an in theory, a co-orbital ASAT’s orbit- example of a non-kinetic al data back to its initial deployment. In counterspace weapon.

3 COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS

power levels, cause permanent damage range of angles on the ground.6 to electrical circuits and processors. A The technology needed to jam many front-door HPM attack uses a satellite’s types of satellite signals is commercial- own antennas as an entry path, while ly available and relatively inexpensive. a HPM attack attempts to en- Jamming is a reversible form of attack ter through small seams or gaps around because once a jammer is turned off, 4 electrical connections and shielding. communications return to normal. Jam- Because electromagnetic waves disperse ming can also be difficult to detect or and weaken over distance and the atmos- distinguish from accidental interference, phere can interfere with transmission at making attribution and awareness more high power levels, an HPM attack against difficult. In 2015, General John Hyten, a satellite is best carried out from anoth- then-commander of Air Force Space Com- er satellite in a similar orbit. Both front- mand, noted that the U.S. military was door and back-door HPM attacks can be unintentionally jamming its own commu- difficult to attribute to an attacker, and as nications satellites an average of 23 times with a , the attacker may not per month.7 know if the attack has been successful. Spoofing is a form of electronic attack The use of a in space can where the attacker tricks a receiver into be an indiscriminate form of non-kinetic believing a fake signal, produced by the physical attack. While a nuclear detona- attacker, is the real signal it is trying to re- tion would have immediate effects for ceive. Spoofing the downlink from a satel- satellites within range of its EMP, it also lite can be used to inject false or corrupted creates a high radiation environment that data into an adversary’s communications accelerates the degradation of satellite systems. If an attacker successfully spoofs components over the long term for un- the uplink signal to shielded satellites in the affected orbital a satellite, it could take control of the sat- regime.5 ellite for nefarious purposes. Through a type of spoofing called “mea- coning,” even the encrypted military GPS ELECTRONIC signals can be spoofed. Meaconing does not require cracking the GPS ELECTRONIC ATTACKS TARGET the because it merely rebroadcasts a time-de- means through which space systems layed copy of the original signal without 8 transmit and receive data by jamming decrypting it or altering the data. Like or spoofing frequency (RF) signals. jammers, once a spoofer is developed, it Jamming is a form of electronic attack is relatively inexpensive to produce and that interferes with RF communications deploy in large numbers and can be pro- liferated to other state and non-state ac- by generating noise in the same frequen- tors. cy band and within the field of view of the antenna on the targeted satellite or receiver. An uplink jammer interferes with the signal going from the Earth to a sat- CYBER ellite, such as the command and control uplink. Downlink jammers target the sig- UNLIKE ELECTRONIC ATTACKS, which nal from a satellite as it propagates down interfere with the transmission of RF sig- to users on the Earth. User terminals with nals, target the data itself omnidirectional antennas, such as many and the systems that use this data. The Illustration A truck-mounted GPS receivers and satellite phones, have antennas on satellites and ground sta- jammer is a type of electronic a wider field of view and thus are suscep- tions, the landlines that connect ground counterspace weapon. tible to downlink jamming from a wider stations to terrestrial networks, and the

4 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 user terminals that connect to satellites Counterspace weapons that are reversi- are all potential intrusion points for cy- ble, difficult to attribute, and have limited berattacks. Cyberattacks can be used to public awareness are ideally suited for sit- monitor data traffic patterns (i.e., which uations in which an opponent may want users are communicating), to monitor the to signal resolve, create uncertainty in the data itself, or to insert false or corrupted mind of its opponent, or achieve a fait ac- data in the system. While cyberattacks compli without triggering an escalatory require a high degree of understanding of response. For example, an adversary that the systems being targeted, they do not wants to deter the United States from in- necessarily require significant resources tervening in a situation may believe that Illustration to conduct. Cyberattacks can be contract- such attacks will stay below the threshold Cyberattacks can be ed out to private groups or individuals, for escalation (i.e., not trigger the very used to take control which means that a state or non-state ac- thing it is trying to prevent) while creating of a satellite and tor that lacks internal cyber capabilities significant operational challenges for the damage or destroy it. may still pose a cyber threat.9 United States that make the prospect of intervention more costly and protracted. A on space systems can re- Conversely, counterspace weapons that sult in data loss, widespread disruptions, have limited damage assessment and even permanent loss of a satellite. or that risk collateral damage may be less For example, if an adversary can seize useful to adversaries in many situations. control of a satellite through a cyberat- Without reliable battle damage assess- tack on its command and control sys- ment, for example, an adversary cannot tem, the attack could shut down all com- plan operations with the confidence that munications and permanently damage its counterspace actions have been suc- the satellite by expending its propellant cessful. Furthermore, weapons that pro- supply or damaging its electronics and duce collateral damage in space, such as sensors. Accurate and timely attribution large amounts of , run the of a cyberattack can be difficult, if not risk of escalating a conflict and turning impossible, because attackers can use a other nations against the attacker. variety of methods to conceal their iden- tity, such as using hijacked servers to launch an attack.

THREAT CHARACTERISTICS

The types of counterspace threats de- scribed above have distinctly different characteristics that make them more suitable for use in some scenarios than others. As shown in Table 1, some types of counterspace threats are difficult to attribute or have fully reversible effects, such as mobile jammers. High-powered lasers, for example, are “silent” and can carry out an attack with little public awareness that anything has happened. Other types of counterspace weapons produce effects that make it difficult for the attacker to know if the attack was successful, and some produce collateral damage that can affect space systems other than the one being targeted.

5 Table 1 TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS

Kinetic Physical Non-Kinetic Physical

High Altitude High- Ground Direct-Ascent High- Laser Dazzling Co-Orbital ASAT Nuclear Powered Station Attack ASAT Powered Laser or Blinding Detonation Types of Attack Types

Variable Can be Clear attribution attribution, Launch site can attributed by Launch site can Limited of the laser’s Limited depending on be attributed tracking previous- be attributed attribution location at the attribution

Attribution mode of attack ly known oribt time of attack

Reversible or Reversible or Irreversible or re- irreversible; irreversible; Irreversible Irreversible versible depend- Irreversible Irreversible attacker may or attacker may or ing on capabilities may not be may not be able

Reversibility to control to control

May or May or Publicly known Only satellite Only satellite Only satellite may not be may not be depending on Publicly known operator will be operator will be operator will be publicly publicly trajectory aware aware aware

Awareness known known

Limited Limited Near real-time Near real-time Near real-time Near real-time confirmation of confirmation of No confirmation confirmation of confirmation of confirmation of confirmation of success if satellite success if satellite of success success success success success begins to drift begins to drift

Assessment uncontrolled uncontrolled Attacker Damage Damage Attacker

Station may Orbital debris Higher radiation Could leave Could leave target control multi- May or may not could affect levels in orbit target satellite satellite disabled ple satellites; produce orbital None other satellites in would persist for disabled and and uncontrol- potential for loss debris similar months or years uncontrollable lable of life Collateral Damage Collateral

6 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Electronic Cyber

Uplink Downlink Data Interccept Data Seizure Spoofing Jamming Jamming or Monitoring Corruption of Control Types of Attack Types

Modest attribution Modest attribution Modest attribution Limited or Limited or Limited or depending on mode depending on mode depending on mode uncertain uncertain uncertain of attack of attack of attack attribution attribution attribution Attribution

Irreversible or Reversible Reversible Reversible Reversible Reversible reversible, depending on mode of attack Reversibility

Satellite operator Satellite operator Satellite operator Satellite operator May or may not be May or may not be will be aware; may will be aware; may will be aware; may will be aware; may known to the known to the or may not be or may not be known or may not be known or may not be known public public

Awareness known to the public to the public to the public to the public

Limited confirmation of Limited Near-real time Near-real time Near-real time No confirmation success if monitoring confirmation of confirmation of confirmation of confirmation of of success of the local RF success if effects success success success environment is are visible Assessment possible Attacker Damage Damage Attacker

Only dirupts the Only disrupts the Only corrupts the Could leave target signals targeted and signals targeted and specific RF signals None None satellite disabled possible adjacent possible adjacent targeted and uncontrollable frequencies frequencies Collateral Damage Collateral

7 CHINA Number of Successful Orbital Launches in 201910 32

CHINA

“No force will stop N THE PAST DECADE, China has been barreling toward its lofty space or shake China or its goals. In the alone, China conducted over 200 successful orbital launches.12 China’s civil, military, and commercial capabilities are rapid- people from achieving ly growing, and its 2020 plans show that the country aims to launch over its goals” I60 satellites into orbit via 40 launches over the coming year.13 PRESIDENT XI JINPING, 201911 China’s civil space program is focused on its network of BeiDou position- ing, , and timing (PNT) satellites, similar to the U.S. Global Posi- tioning System (GPS). China plans on launching two BeiDou satellites into (GEO) in 2020 as well as further developing its remote sensing . Since early 2019, Chang’e-4, the Chi- nese lunar mission that delivered a successful called -2, has been conducting an exploration mission on the far side of the . China plans to follow up this mission in late 2020 with Chang’e-5, a mission that aims to return samples from the Moon back to Earth for further study. To support its growing space capabilities, China has “built an expan- sive ground support infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions including and (SLV) man- ufacture, launch, C2 [command and control], and data downlink.”14 China also intends to send a mission to with an and probe. This mission will include 13 science and is on track for a July 2020 launch.15 Three different launch are also scheduled to make their first flight in 2020: the Long March-5B, the Long March-7A, and the Long March-8.

8 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 The Long March-5B will be China’s heavy- lift workhorse, supporting future explora- JIUQUAN SATELLITE LAUNCH CENTER Active tion missions as well as the planned Chi- nese (CSS).16 The first test Inactive TAIYUAN SATELLITE LAUNCH CENTER launch of the -5B will likely take place in Orbital April 2020. If successful, it will be used to Launch launch the first section of the modular CSS. Cumulative Launches The Long March-8 is planned to be China’s first with a reusable first stage and is 136 32 planned to support China’s growing com- 4 WENCHANG SATELLITE mercial space sector.17 Furthermore, “Chi- LAUNCH CENTER na aspires for a 2036 first human mission XICHANG SPACE CENTER to the moon.”18

China is continuing to move forward with a new modular space station. China has successfully operated two previous space labs in LEO, Tiangong 1 and Tian- gong 2, through its Project 921 program, Figure 1: Chinese National . China currently has four active spaceports, which 20 which began in 1992. The new space have collectively launched hundreds of satellites and several taikonauts, or Chinese . station will consist of three modules. space-track.org / csis aerospace security28 The core module of the CSS passed final review but is facing possible launch de- lays. Currently, it is expected to launch in SUCCESSFUL ORBITAL LAUNCHES PER YEAR BY COUNTRY (1957-2019) 2020, while the two additional modules 20 CHINA are planned for launch between 2022 INDIA and 2024.21 Three or four manned mis- 00 USA RUSSIA sions and several cargo missions are also OTHERS planned, but launch delays have caused 0 schedules to slip for the entire program.22 The station is estimated to have a 10- 0 year lifespan, with the possibility of an extension.23 0

China is also expanding its international 20 cooperation. China hosted a selection process for opportunities to host scien- 0 tific payloads on the CSS. The final selec- 0 0 0 0 2000 200 20 tion was announced in 2019 and includes nine projects, involving “23 institutions from 17 Member States of the United Figure 2: Chinese Orbital Space Launches (1957-2019). China had more successful orbital Nations in Asian-pacific, European, Af- space launches in 2019 than any other nation. rican, North American and South Amer- space-track.org / csis aerospace security19 ican regions.”24 China has furthered its space partnership with Russia through cooperating to develop “Russia’s future -26 lunar orbiter, China’s Chang’e-7 lunar polar lander, and a joint lunar and in order to keep pace with China’s grow- cial space companies grew from around deep space data center with a hub in ing national and commercial launch de- 30 in 2017 to over 100 in 2018. This growth each country.”25 mands.27 has led to the introduction of new com- China’s busiest launch site, the Xichang After a 2014 decree to allow private compa- mercial policies in 2019 in order to better Satellite Launch Center, hosted 19 of Chi- nies to develop SLVs, several new nominal- regulate the growing commercial space na’s 32 launches in 2019.26 Located in the ly private (though typically state-backed) launch sector.29 These regulations have south of China, Xichang is currently ex- Chinese companies began to develop and had a relatively positive response from panding by adding another test new launch vehicles. China’s commer- Chinese commercial companies.30

9 CHINA

This also builds on the 2015 Chinese white SPACE ORGANIZATION paper, which stated that “ AND DOCTRINE and have become new com- manding heights in strategic competition 35 The Chinese government operates sepa- among all parties.” Many scholars inter- rate civil and military space organizations. preted this statement as a formal desig- The China National Space Administration nation of both space and cyberspace as 36 (CNSA) falls within the State Council’s new warfighting domains. To this end, State Administration for Science, Tech- the PLA founded the SSF to centralize and nology, and Industry for National Defense manage the military’s space, cyber, and (SASTIND) and is the primary organization missions. Before the for China’s civil space activities. The main 2015 reorganization, responsibilities for developer of national civil space technol- cyber, space, and electronic warfare were ogies is the China Aerospace Science and scattered across at least four different Technology Corporation (CASC), a state- PLA departments. The establishment of owned aerospace corporation. Meanwhile, the SSF indicates the PLA’s prioritization 37 military space activities are run through of these critical areas of warfare. the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). How- In 2018, China published an Outline of ever, each of these entities collaborate Training and Evaluation doctrine, which with one another on developing space THE SSF emphasized training be- .31 tween the different military services fo- In July 2019, China released its first offi- HAS BEGUN cused on combating “strong military op- cial defense white paper since 2015. Prior TRAINING ponents.”38 For the space domain, this is to this four-year gap, China had released likely directed against the United States. similar white papers about every two SPECIALIZED Originally, the SSF was not assessed to years. Analysts acknowledge that the 2019 have full control over China’s ASAT ca- document “adds little to previous official UNITS WITH pabilities. Experts believed that the re- reports on the details of recent reforms.”32 sponsibility for direct-ascent ASATs may In line with how China views the space DIRECT-ASCENT lie with either the PLA’s Rocket Force, domain, the 2019 white paper references which manages China’s nuclear , “outer space, electromagnetic space and ASAT WEAPONS. or the PLA’s Air Force.39 However, recent cyberspace” all as one national defense records show that the SSF has begun aim.33 China established the Strategic Sup- training specialized units with direct-as- port Force (SSF) in 2015 to bring the man- cent ASAT weapons capable of targeting agement of these strategic areas under satellites in LEO.40 one entity. Unlike the United States and According to the U.S-China Economic even Russia, the PLA appears to view these and Security Review Commission, Beijing three domains as inherently intertwined. has “sought to leverage military-civil fu- There is only one paragraph in the 2019 sion to commercialize its existing space white paper that focuses solely on the technology.” Utilizing civil or commercial space domain. It touts China’s activity in technologies to bolster or disguise its international fora on space-related issues, military space systems is a recognizable such as the UN Office for Outer Space Af- theme throughout China’s counterspace fairs. The white paper recognizes space as weapons program. “The goal of mili- of strategic importance to the nation and tary-civil fusion in China’s space sector states that “space security provides strate- is not primarily to develop cutting- gic assurance for national and social devel- technology but to produce existing tech- opment.”34 This rhetoric is consistent with nology that meets most customers’ needs other statements and posturing that China at a lower cost and at greater commercial has demonstrated in recent years. scale and efficiency.”41

10 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 COUNTERSPACE Table 2 WEAPONS DIRECT-ASCENT ASAT OR DUAL-USE TESTS

Weapons Kinetic Type Year Comments Kinetic Physical System Impact? Failed intercept of target. China has very capable kinetic physical ASAT test 2005 SC-19 First recorded test for a No. counterspace capabilities and has proven direct-ascent ASAT. this several times with a range of direct-as- ASAT test 2006 SC-19 Failed intercept of target. No. cent ASAT weapons tests. Thus far, China’s primary focus has been Yes, and targets in LEO, but recent created ASAT test 2007 SC-19 Successful intercept of target. thousands “China continues tests indicate China also of debris development of has a direct-ascent capa- on-orbit. bility able to reach GEO. multiple counterspace Reported successful technol- Missile de- It does not appear that ogy test against a suborbital capabilities designed fense test China has successfully 2010 SC-19 target. Likely “an effort to Yes. to degrade and deny (suborbit- tested a co-orbital ASAT 48 understand the homing per- al) 49 adversary use of space- capability, although it formance of the interceptor.” based assets during a has demonstrated sever- Reported successful technol- Missile de- Possibly ogy test against a suborbital crisis or conflict.” al of the technical capa- fense test 2013 Yes. SC-1950 target. Likely another tech- bilities required to con- (suborbital) U.S. OFFICE OF THE nology demonstration test.51 struct such a weapon. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 42 China had its first suc- China declared the test as a cessful test of a kinetic high-altitude science mis- physical ASAT weapon in 2007, after two sion. U.S. military assessed ASAT test 2013 DN-2 No. previous failed tests.43 This test of a di- the test as proof Chinese rect-ascent SC-19 missile system targeted direct-ascent ASATs could reach targets up to GEO.52 and destroyed an aging Chinese - ological satellite, producing over 3,000 China claimed it was a trackable pieces of debris in LEO. Around No. Possibly land-based missile intercep- done to test 2,800 trackable pieces of debris from this ASAT test 2014 SC-1953 tor test, while the United timing ca- test remain in orbit, with 11 pieces deor- States assessed the test as a pabilities.55 biting in 2019.44 This debris threatens the non-destructive ASAT test.54 safe operation of hundreds of other sat- China claimed it was a ellites in LEO, including the International land-based missile intercep- Space Station (ISS).45 ASAT test 2015 DN-356 tor test, while the United No. States assessed the test as a China has not conducted a debris-pro- non-destructive ASAT test.57 ducing direct-ascent ASAT test since 2007. Missile de- Unsuccessful test of the DN-3 2017 DN-3 No. However, analysts believe several other ki- fense test missile interceptor.58 netic physical tests—or suspected tests— DN-3 midcourse interceptor have occurred since then.46 These suspect- Missile de- DN-3 2018 successfully intercepted its Yes. fense test ed tests have not to date produced orbital DF-21 target.59 debris or threatened any orbiting satellite.47 Table 2 summarizes several Chinese ASAT, or suspected ASAT, tests. The missile tests tests have resulted in a verifiable destructive incident. Primarily, China has are harder to judge because they could also function as a counterspace capability been testing its rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities, a during times of conflict. dual-use technology used to maneuver satellites in orbit near one another. Whether this maneuvering is for nefarious purposes, possibly making it China has also developed and launched several satellites which are testing tech- a co-orbital ASAT, or for peaceful purposes, such as for on-orbit servicing nologies that could be used for co-orbital or active debris removal missions, is unclear. Distinguishing the intent of counterspace capabilities. None of these the RPO movements is critical to determining whether or not a satellite is

11 CHINA a counterspace weapon, but determin- China has been testing these technol- be released and recovered during its mis- ing intent is almost impossible until a ogies for over a decade. For example, sion. According to official statements, the hostile action takes place. According to in 2008, a Chinese spacecraft deployed Aolong-1 was intended to test technolo- the U.S.-China Economic and Security a miniature imaging satellite, the BX- gies needed to collect and deorbit space Review Commission, “China’s testing 1, that was jettisoned from its mother debris. Experts have debated the success of RPOs has been similar to past U.S. spacecraft. It appears that the satellite of this test.69 tests, and no country has criticized RPOs was unable to be actively controlled un- The reported in carried out by China as illegal or violating til after it had passed the International 2019 about recently declassified govern- any norm.” China, Russia, and the United Space Station. It is estimated that the ment documents which showcased how States all have satellites in GEO perform- uncontrolled satellite came within 25 decade-old Chinese satellite technology ing RPO activities around other satellites kilometers of the station. Despite many has provided a base for “the development 60 in orbit. reports in the United States claiming of new weapon systems powered by arti- that this was the first co-orbital ASAT ficial intelligence.” It is unclear how AI is test from China, the maneuver appears utilized, but the article reports that the to have been unintentional.62 new small satellites can be equipped with SJ-12, a Chinese satellite in LEO, conduct- robotic arms for active debris-removal ed a series of remote proximity maneuvers missions. This technology is, of course, with an older Chinese satellite, SJ-06F, in dual-use and could theoretically be used 2010. The maneuvers appeared to be slow, on a range of objects in orbit. The declas- methodical, and intentional and occurred sified document states that China has over several weeks in the summer of 2010.63 been developing and testing this tech- Some have speculated that this mission nology since 2008. Without elaborating was designed to test co-orbital jamming further, the document claims that the ro- or other counterspace capabilities, how- botic arm technology has also been incor- ever this has not been definitively proven porated into “drones, smart weapons and in an unclassified setting.64 At one point, robots.” The article also claims that these SJ-12 made contact with SJ-06F at low satellites could remain attached to the speed; however, this incident was “unlike- debris it collects “to avoid being tracked 70 ly to have resulted in debris or significant from the ground.” damage to either satellite.”65 Testing RPO On the same mission as Aolong-1, China capabilities may have been a test run for also deployed the Tianyuan-1 spacecraft, the 2011 docking of the space which according to Chinese press ac- capsule with the Tiangong-1 space station, counts successfully tested the ability to but the SJ-12 maneuver could have serious refuel other satellites while in orbit.71 This counterspace implications as well.66 test, as well as the Aolong-1 test, received significant media coverage in the United China has also been testing satellites with States due to its potential dual-use as robotic arms, a dual-use technology that ASAT weapons. could be used as a test bed for docking op- erations for China’s future space station, While none of China’s RPO activities in active debris removal missions, or a co-or- LEO or GEO appear to have damaged bital ASAT. In 2013, China claimed that “China has engaged in dual-use activ- other satellites, these technological ad- three new satellites were “conducting sci- ities such as rendezvous and proxim- vancements in RPO have many experts ity operations (RPO)—which demon- entific experiments on space maintenance 67 concerned about China’s intent. And un- strate co-orbital capabilities—that, technologies.” However, U.S. officials re- ported that the one satellite was equipped like Russian RPO activity, China’s RPO while not prohibited, create problems with a robotic arm, which tested its ability activities have been primarily focused on for U.S. national security.” to grapple and seize another satellite.68 other Chinese satellites. U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND Three years later, in 2016, China launched China can also pose a threat to space SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION61 the Aolong-1 spacecraft, which included a systems through its ability to attack the robotic arm and a sub-satellite that would ground stations that control satellites

12 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Taking a Break, SJ-17’s with its conventional forces. China has the “The [People’s Liberation Army] largest of any nation, and is also deploying directed-energy Lack of Movement over the past decade it has significantly increased its military budget and mod- weapons, and we expect them to SJ-17, A CHINESE SATELLITE in geosta- ernized its conventional military forces.75 field a ground-based laser system tionary orbit known for its unusual be- In a conflict, China could be capable of aimed at low-orbit space sensors by havior, appears to have put a pause on striking an adversary’s satellite ground next year.” its rendezvous and proximity operations stations with ballistic missiles, cruise mis- in 2019. Compared to its first two years siles, or long-range strike . As Chi- THEN-ACTING SECRETARY OF of operation, when the satellite appears DEFENSE PATRICK SHANAHAN76 na’s military reach continues to expand, it to have performed close approaches and will be able to use its conventional forces rendezvous operations with four Chi- to hold ground stations at risk over pro- nese satellites—Chinasats 5A, 6A, 20, and 1C—the lack of movement in 2019 is no- gressively greater distances. table. According to CSIS analysis, SJ-17 restarted RPO maneuvers with another Non-Kinetic Physical Chinese satellite in GEO, 6B, in In 2018, then-U.S. Director of National In- late December 2019 and was still in an un- telligence Dan Coats assessed that China usually close orbit in late January 2020. is making advances in directed-energy In the past, SJ-17’s RPOs have lasted an- technology that can “blind or damage ywhere from a few weeks to over three sensitive space-based optical sensors, months.72 New analysis of SJ-17’s on-or- such as those used for remote sensing or bit activity also found that the satellite .”77 While this may sound spent significant time near an Indonesian like a announcement of Chinese , Telkom 3S, in capabilities, China had already demon- late 2017 and early 2018, but there has strated its ability to dazzle American sat- been no public statement from Indone- ellites in the mid-. In 2006, reports sia on SJ-17’s maneuvering within 10km surfaced that U.S. imaging satellites were of its satellite. In a 2015 paper published illuminated by lasers over Chinese territo- in a Chinese research journal, scientists ry.78 Then-Director of the National Recon- Figure 3: Chinese Rendezvous and Prox- speculated that a could be naissance Office (NRO) Donald Kerr ac- imity Operations in GEO. Publicly availa- used to approach a large satellite in GEO knowledged that U.S. imagery satellites ble orbital positioning data suggests that in order to take high-quality pictures and Chinese satellite SJ-17 has made several quickly retreat or the target satellite were dazzled while passing over China close approaches and inspections in GEO. to minimize detection.73 While SJ-17 is by but stated that it did not “damage the U.S. 79 Learn more about SJ-17’s behavior, includ- no means a small satellite, it is possible satellite’s ability to collect information.” ing a list of the satellite’s nearest neighbors. that China is developing the skills and This incident demonstrates that China at aerospace.csis.org/SJ17. technology to accomplish such intelli- had much of the technology necessary to gence-gathering missions.74 field an operational capability to dazzle space-track.org / csis aerospace security

S N 200˚E N 2020 150˚E

1 Chinasat 5A (China) ˚ 2 Chinasat 6A (China) 100˚E 3 Telkom 3S (Indonesia)          4 Chinasat 20 (China)

5 Chinasat 2C (China) 50˚E

6 Chinasat 1C (China)

7 Ekran 4 (Russia) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0˚E 8 Chinasat 6B (China) JAN 2017 JUL 2017 JAN 2018 JUL 2018 JAN 2019 JUL 2019   

13 CHINA or blind a satellite back in 2006.80 Recent affect a satellite in orbit. Furthermore, a statements indicate that China has con- top Chinese weapons firm is developing tinued to build and field more capable synthetic diamonds, also likely for use directed-energy systems. As one China in directed-energy weapons. Diamonds CHINA IS LIKELY expert highlighted, “the only fundamen- can amplify and focus energy outputs to tal barrier to learning these abstract ele- better ensure that the energy beam is in- ALREADY ments [directed-energy] and achieving tense enough to damage targets.87 DEVELOPING a practical weapon capability is effort— analysts speculated in 81 time, will, and money.” early 2019 that China had been develop- LASER Recently appointed Chief of Space Op- ing significant satellite lasing facilities.88 erations, General John J. Raymond not- Analysts speculate that China is pursu- WEAPONS AS ed in public remarks that, “we’re pretty ing these efforts in at least five different comfortable [in asserting] that they are locations across the country, due to the PART OF ITS developing directed energy weapons nature of the buildings and surrounding — probably building lasers to blind our infrastructure. One image even depicts a COUNTERSPACE satellites.”82 In early 2019, the Defense In- suspected electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) telligence Agency made a similar claim, simulator suspended between two struc- STRATEGY. stating “China likely is pursuing laser tures.89 However, no other analysts appear weapons to disrupt, degrade, or damage to have corroborated these assessments. satellites and their sensors and possibly China also announced an airborne laser already has a limited capability to employ in early 2020. While the details were con- 83 laser systems against satellite sensors.” fidential, the titles of two defense pro- Chinese military and technical writings curement bid requests may give have often referenced directed-energy on the PLA’s plans. The two bids request weapons as a key technology in a suc- the “procurement plan for airborne laser cessful counterspace strategy.84 The SSF attack pod” and a “price inquiry on pro- is comprised of both Chinese space forc- curement plan for controlling software es and electronic warfare-focused forces, module of laser attack platform.” The likely indicating that the PLA sees inter- system appears to be intended to target operability between these two areas of other aircraft or missiles, but similar tech- 90 warfare. Expert Mark Stokes testified that nology could be used to target satellites. “The PLASSF Network Systems Depart- While details from the PLA have been ment is central to China’s counterspace minimal and no public test has occurred mission.” Stokes went on to explain that on orbit, China has also shown inter- “Technical articles published . . . suggest est in developing HPM weapons for air the unit, at least in part, is responsible and missile defense. In January 2017, overseeing research, development, and Chinese media celebrated the work of acquisition of electronic counterspace expert Huang Wenhua, who developed systems.” These same units may also be a miniaturized HPM weapon capable responsible for research and develop- of being placed on a ship.91 However, ment and testing of high-powered micro- adding a mobile HPM system to a satel- wave systems.85 lite would require further reductions in In 2019, China surprisingly released an an- size, weight, and power in addition to a nouncement alongside images of a new number of other integration challenges directed-energy system. This Chinese unique to the space environment. laser gun is reportedly designed to focus As a nuclear power with intercontinental on small boats or drones.86 While not di- ballistic missiles (ICBMs), China also has rectly a counterspace weapon, some of the latent capability to launch a nuclear the technology would likely be similar weapon into LEO. The resulting EMP from for a higher-powered system that could the detonation would cause indiscrimi-

14 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 nate damage to satellites, creating a high added layer of defense, could conduct a “soft kill” by jamming level of radiation in LEO that could last for the drone’s communications and GPS.99 years.92 While China has the technology China has deployed military-grade truck-mounted jamming necessary to field a nuclear-armed ASAT equipment in its buildup of military installations in the man- weapon, it appears to be focusing its ef- made islands in the South China Sea. As of April 2018, U.S. offi- forts in other areas. cials confirmed that there are two islands in the Spratly Island chain that have been equipped with jamming systems for tar- Electronic geting communications and . This assessment was sup- In the late-1990s, China acquired foreign ported by satellite imagery that shows a suspected jamming ground-based satellite jamming equip- system on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. While China has ment from and has continued to been building military installations across the island chain since develop the technology independently in 2014, this is the first visual evidence of jamming equipment the ensuing decades.94 Currently, China there.100 Shortly after the identification of the jammers, Vietnam has the ability to jam common satellite condemned China’s continued militarization and weaponization “The PLA consid- communication bands and GPS signals, of the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands, also stating that ers EW [elec- and it has made the development and de- the jamming equipment violates international law.101 ployment of satellite jamming systems a tronic warfare] In 2018, the SSF even carried out advanced military exercises high priority.95 China is further developing simulating a complex electronic warfare environment with the capabilities jamming systems that will be able to tar- “SSF base pitted against five PLA Army, Air Force, and Rocket key assets for get a large range of frequencies of com- Force units.”102 mercial SATCOM as well as U.S. military and its doctrine protected communication bands.96 China also reportedly developed a J-16D aircraft equipped with jamming systems. This aircraft, which suspiciously looks emphasizes Chinese technical writings have been like the U.S. ’s EA-18G Growler electronic attack fighter, is outspoken on how electronic warfare using EW weap- equipped with “several new antennas and conformal electron- may increase its advantage in a conflict ons to suppress ic-warfare arrays along the fuselage.” According to the Nation- with the United States. A paper from or deceive enemy al Interest, the “D” in J-16D comes from “diànzǐ,” the Chinese the China Electronic Technology Group equipment.” word for electronic.103 Corporation proposed solutions for DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE “overcoming the high-power require- AGENCY, CHALLENGES ments for jamming U.S. millimeter wave 93 TO SECURITY IN SPACE (MMW) satellite communications by using space-based jammers hosted on small satellites, in a ‘David versus Goli- Spoofing in the Port of Shanghai ath’ attack.” The authors further identi- INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED SPORADICALLY THROUGHOUT fied U.S. satellites that would be particu- 2018 and 2019 of the GPS signals for Automatic Identification larly susceptible to such an attack, like System (AIS) transponders being inaccurate in the main port of “the Advanced Extremely High Frequen- Shanghai. AIS signals broadcast the location, speed, and direc- 104 cy (AEHF), Wideband Global SATCOM tion of a ship, as required by international maritime law. Doc- (WGS), and umented by a U.S. container ship, the Manukai, spoofing activi- (GBS) satellite constellations.”97 Another ties caused nearby ships’ signals to be misrepresented in ways that could have caused a serious disaster. For example, a nearby Chinese technical paper provides further docked ship’s signal was reported as traveling down the channel insight into how China plans to jam GPS toward the Manukai at significant speed. However, the captain of signals used by U.S. drones, such as the the Manukai could visually identify the ship in question as clearly RQ-4 Global Hawk, over the Spratly Is- docked and unmoving in a nearby slot at port. The incident did not lands and South China Sea.98 stop there throughout the day, while the Manukai was securely After the early 2020 U.S. on docked at port, its AIS signals were reporting the ship being over the Iranian general , three miles away from its actual location. The Manukai reported a Chinese military analyst commented the incident to the U.S. which determined that there that China would be able to detect an were “no known anomalies that might affect GPS signal integrity incoming strike through its early warn- at the time and vicinity of the reported problem.”105 ing and anti-access/area denial Stunning for researchers is the peculiar circular shape of the plot (A2/AD) systems. He went on to say that of the spoofed ships and other GPS receivers in the area. Dubbed China would be able to shoot down the “crop circles” by confused researchers, this shape is unusual for drone with its air defenses and, as an GPS spoofing. According to Todd Humphries, a leading authority

15 CHINA on GPS jamming and spoofing, of the Radi- onavigation Laboratory at the University of , Austin, declared “To be able to spoof multiple ships simultaneously into a circle is extraordinary technology.” It is extraor- dinary because a single attack appears to have been able to spoof several vessels simultaneously, each to a different inac- curate location.106 Furthermore, the D.C.- based research organization C4ADS also confirmed that civilian GPS was affected.

While the source of the spoofing remains unconfirmed, one expert traced the epi- center of the crop circle pattern to a non- operational smokestack near the port and speculates that it could be the origin of these GPS attacks.107 GPS jamming and spoofing requires a direct line of sight to the target receiver. Therefore, to max- imize impact and distance, many jam- ming devices are mounted on something Figure 4 (above): GPS Crop Circles Near Dalian China. Research organization Skytruth found with great height. For example, most mil- that two GPS interference locations around an oil terminal were active and had a dramatic itary-grade truck-mounted jammers are effect on scrambling vessel positions in the area on September 5, 2019. Some vessels were mounted on a tall radio tower that - even shown to be far inland. “On the water many positions are appearing with very high speeds mizes the range of the effects. (over 25 knots, red) and it’s not possible to distinguish true and false locations. However, some Who is responsible? Again, this remains slow speed positions (green) are appearing at dock where they would be expected, so some AIS unclear. Early sources speculated that the broadcasts appear to be unaffected.” attacks are actually GPS hacking caused by skytruth / ais data courtesy of global fishing watch / / spire. a non-state actor: sand smugglers.108 How- ever, the technology appears to be quite advanced, which researchers believe indi- Figure 5 (below): Map of Reported AIS Outages Depicting the Crop Circle Patterns. cates that the Chinese government may be behind these attacks. skytruth / ais data courtesy of global fishing watch / orbcomm / spire Another analyst, Bjorn Bergman, was in- trigued by the reports and found similar crop circle phenomena in at least 20 other locations along the Chinese coast. Berg- man assessed that 16 of these identified sites were oil terminals. A few of the other Japan sites were Chinese government installa- tions. Bergman assed that the oil termi- nals suggest that this could be an effort by the Chinese government to support Iran China through importing Iranian crude oil in vio- lation of sanctions.109 East China Sea Due to the proximity to oil terminals, Berg- man similarly assesses that the spoofing signals are being broadcast by the Chi- nese government.110 Similarly, Humphries believes it is unlikely that a non-state ac- Locations where GPS interference tor could have developed this highly ad- was detected in 2019 vanced technology.111

16 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 2005 Cyber U.S. Geological Survey NASA Through the SSF, NOAA China has been Indian Government integrating its LANDSAT-7 Private Industry Caused 12 minutes or more of advanced cyber interferrence capabilities with LANDSAT-7 Caused 12 minutes or more its counterspace and electronic warfare of interferrence

“The PLA unit responsible for con- operations. The U.S. Defense Intelligence JUNE ducting has sup- Agency assessed that: “The PLA could em- TERRA EARTH 2010 Took full control of the satellite ported cyberespionage against U.S. ploy its cyberattack capabilities to estab- but did not execute any lish information dominance in the early commands and European satellite and aerospace stages of a conflict to constrain an adver- OCTOBER industries since at least 2007.” TERRA EARTH sary’s actions, or slow its mobilization and Took full control of the satellite DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, deployment by targeting network-based but did not execute any commands CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE112 command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), logistics, and 113 UNIDENTIFIED commercial activities.” Attack forced NOAA to take down the system and stop transmitting Chinese hacks against secure govern- 2015 satellite images to the National ment networks to steal personal informa- Weather Service for two days tion and technical data are well known, but the country’s efforts to attack and infiltrate space systems has received VIDEO CHAT relatively less attention.114 Chinese writ- Took control of secure satellite video link for four to five minutes ings and research efforts indicate that U.S.-BASED SATELLITE & in a conflict it would attempt to conduct GEOSPATIAL IMAGERY COMPANIES cyberattacks against U.S. satellites and infiltrated satellite control ground stations.115 Specifically, “PLA mil- systems but did not execute any commands itary writings detail the effectiveness of 2020 information operations and in modern conflicts, and advocate target- Figure 6: Timeline of Suspected Chinese ing an adversary’s Command and Control Cyber Interference with Space Systems. and logistics networks to affect the adver- various sources compiled by the sary’s ability to operate during the early aerospace security project stages of conflict.”116 China has already been implicated or suspected in several cyberattacks against 117 U.S. satellites. In October 2007 and steps required to command the satellite again in July 2008, cyberattacks believed but did not issue commands.”119 to originate in China targeted a remote A 2019 NASA Inspector General report ref- sensing satellite operated by the U.S. Ge- ological Survey called Landsat-7. These erences several Chinese cyber intrusions attacks are believed to have occurred into NASA, including a 2009 Chinese cy- through a ground station in Norway.118 berattack on the Joint Propulsion Labora- Each attack caused 12 or more minutes tory (JPL) which resulted in 22 gigabytes of interference with ground station com- of data being transferred to a Chinese IP munications, but the attackers did not address. Another transfer of data to Chi- gain control of the satellite. In June and nese IP addresses occured in 2011 when October of 2008, hackers also believed “intruders gained full access to 18 servers to be from China attacked the National supporting key JPL missions, including and Space Administration’s the DSN [Deep ] and Ad- (NASA) Terra Earth observation satellite. vanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission In these attacks, the hackers “achieved all and Reflection Radiometer mission, and

17 CHINA sensitive user accounts.” The Advanced admit that “the hackers infected comput- illegal activities on its own coast or in the Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Re- ers that controlled the satellites, so that South China Sea. In 2020, it is likely that flection Radiometer mission is a joint pro- they could have changed the positions of satellite jamming and spoofing capabil- ject between NASA and Japan’s Ministry the orbiting devices and disrupted data ities will continue to be deployed and of Economy, Trade, and Industry.120 traffic.” While Symantec did not directly used in areas of gray zone conflict, such In September 2014, Chinese hackers at- blame the Chinese government for the at- as the South China Sea and perhaps even tacked National Oceanographic and At- tack, the company made it clear that the to deter protests in Hong Kong. mospheric Administration’s (NOAA) sat- well-coordinated attack originated from China’s cyberattacks against space sys- 125 ellite information and weather systems. the Chinese mainland. tems have either not been publicly dis- The attack forced NOAA to take down the Later in 2018, the United States charged cussed or did not occur in 2019. However, system and stop transmitting satellite im- two Chinese nationals for their involve- this does not mean China is incapable of ages to the National Weather Service for ment in a decade-long cyber theft pro- using cyber means to attack vulnerable two days before the organization was able gram, sponsored by the Chinese govern- space systems or has abandoned this line to seal off the vital data.121 After the attack ment. The program targeted aerospace of effort. was made public almost two months lat- industry companies, as well as NASA’s er, U.S. Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) Goddard Center and JPL. However, spe- announced that NOAA had informed him cific details of attacks by this group re- that China was responsible for the hack main classified.126 on its systems. Chinese officials denied these claims, asserting that cyberattacks are common in today’s world.122 SUMMARY sources in India leaked in October 2017 that a “high-profile govern- Overall, there appears to be an interest- ment meeting last month involving video ing shift in Chinese counterspace de- chat via satellite was compromised by velopments in 2019. Through the open- Chinese hackers”. The video was in Chi- source assessment above, it appears that nese control for four to five minutes be- China has paused, or at least slowed, de- fore Indian cybersecurity teams were able velopment and testing of its kinetic phys- to launch a counterattack and neutralize ical counterspace capabilities. This could the breach. The sources also claimed be because its kinetic ASAT capabilities that the attack was able to breach the are well developed or because kinetic nation’s “most sophisticated and secret physical counterspace weapons are overt link.” However, the sources note that the weapons that would likely draw a strong Indian response team was unable to con- international condemnation if ever used. clusively identify if the attack came from However, beginning in late December the Chinese government or non-state cy- 2019 and through early January 2020, 123 bercriminals. there is evidence that China’s inspector On June 19, 2018, several researchers at satellite, SJ-17, was moving around in Symantec—a U.S. software company— GEO, possibly signaling a return to - reported that a “sophisticated hacking tions after a hiatus of nearly a year.127 campaign launched from computers China is greatly increasing its develop- in China burrowed deeply into satellite ment, testing, and fielding of non-kinet- operators, defense contractors and tel- ic physical and electronic counterspace ecommunications companies.” The two weapons. The operational deployment targeted companies were U.S.-based of lasers capable of dazzling or blinding satellite companies, a DoD U.S. satellites seems imminent, if it has contractor, and a U.S. geospatial imag- not occurred already. Furthermore, Chi- 124 ing company. The researchers could na is growing bolder with its electronic not determine exactly which systems had jamming and spoofing capabilities and been accessed in the breach, but they did may be using these technologies to hide

18 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Number of Successful RUSSIA Orbital Launches in 2019128 25

RUSSIA

“[Russian] leader- ITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE IN 1991, ship must be re- Russia inherited both the majority of the former state’s vast space infrastructure and its place among the global space stored [in the space powers.130 Since then, Russia has maintained a leading role domain]. This is Win the global space community by operating the third-largest number of not just a question satellites on orbit, serving as a critical partner in international human of prestige, but of , and managing several of the world’s busiest spaceports—all national security.” while facing an inconsistent federal budgetary environment and claims of widespread internal corruption.131 By some metrics, Russia’s space DMITRY MEDVEDEV, FORMER activity pales in comparison to the Soviet Union, which launched more 129 RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER payloads to orbit than all other countries combined before its collapse.132 Other measurements, however, such as reliability and hu- man spaceflight achievements, describe a formidable space actor with remarkable resilience in a rapidly changing space domain. As the only ISS partner agency with a human-rated launch vehicle, Russia is responsible for ferrying all astronauts to and from the space station us- ing its rocket.133 Since the U.S. ’s final flight in 2011, Russia has launched 53 foreign astronauts to the ISS, including 34 Amer- icans.134 At over $80 million per seat, carrying passengers to orbit makes up 17 percent of the Russian space agency’s annual budget, according to leaked budget documents from 2018.135 For decades, NASA has had plans to develop a U.S. launch vehicle capable of transporting its astronauts to the ISS, lowering its dependence on the Russian Soyuz launch vehicle. With the first crewed flight test of the SpaceX Dragon capsule expected later this year as part of the U.S. , the Russian space agency may soon find itself with many fewer customers compared to the past decade.136

19 RUSSIA SUCCESSFUL ORBITAL LAUNCHES PER YEAR BY COUNTRY (1957-2019)

Despite the geopolitical tensions on 20 CHINA Earth, Russia has pursued robust inter- INDIA national partnerships in the space do- 00 USA RUSSIA main in addition to its commitments as OTHERS part of the ISS agreement. For example, 0 the Russian space agency has entered into discussions with the China National 0 Space Administration to pursue coopera- 0 tive lunar exploration missions beginning in 2020.137 Since 2011, Russia has used the 20 low- oper- ated by the to 0 launch Soyuz rockets, making it the only 0 0 0 0 2000 200 20 country in the world to launch a native or- bital launch vehicle from a op- Figure 7: Russian Orbital Space Launches (1957-2019). erated by another space agency.138 Russia has also indicated its interest in continu- spacetrack.org / csis aerospace security148 ing its partnership with the United States after the ISS retires.139 While largely successful, the Russian has also been plagued lift launch vehicle, and even land cosmo- When the Russian Ministry of Defense was with serious corruption scandals. In nauts on the Moon by 2030.144 The scale created in 1992, Russia established the 2018, Russia’s principal federal investi- of these new missions would almost cer- world’s first space force.149 Now known as gation authority discovered that fraud tainly require the country to increase its the subbranch—a cases within the country’s space and budget for space activities, likely putting part of the broader Russian Aerospace defense industry reached $1 billion.140 the space agency at odds with other fed- Forces—the Russian Space Force is re- , the Russian space agency, eral spending priorities.145 sponsible for launching military satellites, has been particularly wrought with cor- maintaining space-based assets, moni- ruption. Last year, a high-level agency toring space objects, and identifying po- official—who was likely linked to an in- tential attacks against the Russian home- ternal embezzlement scheme—fled the SPACE ORGANIZATION land from space.150 country to while he was under AND DOCTRINE Russia considers the “intention to place investigation.141 Also in 2019, 58 peo- weapons in outer space” a main exter- ple received jail sentences after $172 Most state-sponsored space activities nal military danger and describes estab- million was stolen from the Vostoch- in Russia are linked to one of two gov- lishing “an international treaty on [the] ny spaceport in the Russian Far East.142 ernment organizations: Roscosmos, the prevention of placement of any types Only a fraction of the monies lost had country’s civilian space body, and the of weapons in outer space” as a princi- been recovered as of November 2019. , the branch of pal task for the Russian state in its mil- When asked about the culture of cor- the Russian armed services tasked with itary doctrine.151 Although Russia and ruption at Roscosmos, the director of military operations in the space domain. China co-submitted the “Treaty on the the Russian Investigative Committee Roscosmos, known as the Russian Fed- Prevention of the Placement of Weap- said “there is no end in sight.”143 eral Space Agency until 2015, inherited ons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of In light of these issues, Roscosmos has significant space infrastructure from its Force Against Outer Space Objects” to announced extravagant spaceflight plans predecessor, the .146 the Conference on Disarmament in 2008, for the upcoming decade. In a presenta- Tasked with the pursuit of international the United States dismissed the propos- tion to students at University cooperation with space partners around al as a “diplomatic ploy,” and refused to in May 2019, the agency’s director an- the world, Roscosmos is one of five prin- support it.152 In 2014, Russia and China nounced the country’s plans to invest in cipal partners that support the ISS, along reintroduced the treaty, prompting a a new crewed space vehicle with flights with civilian space agencies in the United similarly chilly reaction from the United to the ISS by 2023, develop a new heavy- States, Japan, Canada, and Europe.147 States. In response to the Indian ASAT

20 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 test in March 2019, the Russian Ministry weapon when it destroyed a domestic of Defense acknowledged India’s other- satellite in LEO using a co-orbital ASAT. wise strong dedication to preventing an Called Istrebitel Sputnikov (IS), mean- in space while simultaneously ing “satellite destroyer” in Russian, the blaming the United States for creating an first Soviet co-orbital ASAT was tested 20 environment in which developing space times between 1963 to 1982, destroying actors are compelled to test anti-satel- several targets launched as part of the lite weapons on orbit—a clear jab at U.S. program.158 A follow-on version of the IS opposition to Russia and China’s failed system, known as IS-, was operational treaties.153 from 1991 to 1993.159 Although Russia’s has not Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the been publicly updated since December country began developing a much more 2014, some analysts expect a new version capable co-orbital ASAT known as the may be released later this year.154 Since the Naryad. Reportedly designed to reach al- last military doctrine was released, Dmitry titudes as high as 40,000 km and contain Rogozin—the Roscosmos director general multiple warheads in a single launch, the and former deputy prime minister for de- Naryad would likely have posed a serious fense—has stated that Russia does not use threat to satellites in GEO.160 The system satellites to damage other space objects.155 saw limited testing—with just one launch More recently, Russian military leaders in 1994—and no confirmed intercepts.161 have suggested that the Trump adminis- Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia’s kinetic tration’s support of the U.S. Space Force physical counterspace arsenal includes warrants new “reciprocal and asymmetri- ground-launched direct-ascent ASAT cal measures” from Russia in the space do- missiles. In December 2018, Russia con- main.156 In a December 2019 address, Rus- ducted its seventh test of the PL-19/Nudol sian President stated that direct-ascent ASAT system.162 The PL-19/ the creation of a U.S. Space Force requires Nudol completed its first successful flight Russia to further invest in its own military test in November 2015, after two unsuc- space industry.157 cessful attempts.163 Unclassified U.S. re- ports suggest that both this launch, and a previous test in March 2018, used a mo- bile transporter erector-launcher (TEL) COUNTERSPACE within the com- WEAPONS plex instead of a static launch pad.164 Al- though at least six of the seven launches Kinetic Physical are verified to have originated from Ple- setsk, a mobile launch system would the- Evidence suggests that Russia has in- oretically allow the ASAT to be launched vested in a sweeping range of kinetic outside of the Cosmodrome facility, en- physical counterspace capabilities over suring greater flexibility to target LEO sat- the past decade, including ground- and ellites in inclinations above 40 degrees as air-launched direct-ascent ASAT missiles they over Russian territory.165 capable of targeting satellites in LEO and Although not specifically designed as di- co-orbital ASAT weapons that could oper- rect-ascent ASAT weapons, Russian mo- ate in any orbital regime. Russia’s kinetic bile-launched S-400 surface-to-air mis- physical counterspace activities often siles—capable of reaching a maximum closely resemble previously operation- altitude of 200 km—could potentially al Soviet-era ASAT programs, suggesting reach a satellite in LEO. The follow-on that the country has benefited from dec- surface-to-air missile system, the S-500, is ades of ASAT weapons research conduct- expected to reach altitudes up to 300 km ed by the Soviet Ministry of Defense. if launched directly upward.166 Oleg Osta- On October 20, 1968, the Soviet Union be- penko, Russia’s former deputy minister came the second country in the world to of defense, once stated that the S-500 successfully demonstrate a counterspace will be able to intercept “low-orbital

21 RUSSIA satellites and space weapons.”167 First tested in 2018, the new missile’s pro- duction timeline has since slipped, and “there has been no indication of when an actual S-500 will be made availa- ble.”168 Like the PL-19/Nudol system, using the S-400 or eventually the S-500 as a direct-ascent ASAT would require a high-precision targeting capability that has yet to be demonstrated via a de- structive test.169 A modified Russian MiG-31 fighter jet was photographed in September 2018 carry- ing an unidentified missile that some re- ports suggest could be a “mock-up” of an air-launched ASAT weapon.170 Although er, likely deployed from the first as a sub- MiG-31BM “Foxhound” Aircraft on Septem- this development follows a 2013 state- satellite.175 The Russian Ministry of Defense ber 14, 2018. Photographed at the Zhuk- ment from the Russian Duma express- made a statement saying that the second ovsky airfield outside of Moscow, the aircraft ing the Russian government’s intent to is carrying what has since been identified as a satellite was designed to “inspect the state build an air-to-space system designed potential anti-satellite weapon. of a Russian satellite.”176 In October 2017, to “intercept absolutely everything that shipsash / jetphotos.com a third satellite was deployed from either flies from space,” the system depicted in the September 2018 photo would almost Cosmos 2519 or its subsatellite, resulting certainly be limited to targeting objects in three independent satellites in orbit. in LEO, due to its size.171 In 2017, a Rus- Over the course of several months, the sian Aerospace Forces squadron com- satellites engaged in a series of maneuvers mander confirmed that an ASAT missile and RPO exercises, including slow flybys, had been designed for use with the MiG- close approaches, and rendezvous. In 31BM aircraft—the same variant spotted February 2020, Chief of Space Operations 172 with the mysterious missile. Citing of the U.S. Space Force General John Ray- several sources familiar with a U.S. re- mond appeared to refer to one of these port on the new weapons system, CNBC three satellites when he said that Russian reported that the missile may become inspector satellites have “exhibited char- operational as soon as 2022.173 acteristics of a weapon.”177 Russia has not publicly announced the development of a new co-orbital ASAT Analysis published in Jane’s Intelligence program since the fall of the Soviet Un- Review used Russian procurement doc- ion. In the past few years, however, the umentation and contractor reports to Russian Aerospace Forces has launched connect Cosmos 2519, 2521, and 2523 a series of small “inspector” satellites in with the program name Nivelir.178 Con- LEO that have demonstrated some of the tracts signed in 2016 between the Nivelir technologies required to operate such a program and a Russian company known system. In 2017 and 2018, three small Rus- for developing radiation-absorbing ma- sian satellites—Cosmos 2519, 2521, and terials suggest that future Nivelir satel- 2523—engaged in RPO in LEO, prompting a statement of concern from the U.S. State lites—such as Cosmos 2535, 2536, 2537, Department.174 Although a June 2017 Rus- or 2538, all launched in July 2019—may sian Soyuz launch appeared to place just be coated with a protective film to avoid one satellite in LEO—Cosmos 2519—a sec- being tracked by optical or infrared sen- ond satellite was detected two months lat- sors from the ground or in space.179

22 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Spying on a Spy Satellite Russia’s newest co-orbital system may be designed to target satellites in GEO.186 ON NOVEMBER 25, 2019, Russia Designated Burevestnik, this program will launched a small satellite, Cosmos 2543, likely employ low-thrust but highly-effi- into what the Russian Ministry of De- fense described as a “target orbit from cient electric propulsion to maneuver which the state of domestic satellites can lightweight satellites—possibly similar to be monitored.”180 Two weeks later, the those from the Nivelir program—around ministry announced that a subsatellite, the GEO belt.187 A report published in Cosmos 2542, had been deployed from 2019 indicated that a new ground con- Cosmos 2543.181 trol center was being built for Nivelir and Three days after its deployment, Cosmos Burevestnik at the same site the Soviets 2542 performed an used to control the Istrebitel Sputnikov to synchronize its orbit with USA 245, missions in the .188 what is believed to be a U.S. National Although there is no evidence yet of light- Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite. weight Russian satellites maneuvering in Amateur satellite observers who record and share satellite observations online the GEO belt, a larger satellite has been noticed that USA 245 performed its own observed engaging in suspicious RPO ac- maneuver soon thereafter, possibly to tivity in the regime. The satellite—known steer clear of Cosmos 2542.182 In January as Olymp-K or —has attracted atten- 2020, Cosmos 2542 maneuvered toward tion for shifting its position within the geo- the American spy satellite again, this synchronous belt on a relatively frequent 183 time coming as close as 50 km. A day basis, occupying at least 19 different posi- later, USA 245 made another maneuver, tions since its launch in September 2014.189 further distancing itself from the Russian Luch first attracted attention when it inspector satellite.184 repositioned itself between two satellites In an interview with SpaceNews, Gener- operated by , a U.S. satellite com- al John Raymond, the Commander of munications company.190 Approaching U.S. Space Command and Chief of Space satellites in GEO in this manner could al- Operations of the U.S. Space Force, con- low for close inspection or potentially in- firmed the close approach, adding that terception of their communication links.191 he believed it was intentional.185 In September 2015, Luch approached a third Intelsat satellite.192 The interna- tional response escalated in September Figure 8: Orbital Trajectories for Cosmos 2542 and USA 245 on January 23, 2020. 2018, when French Minister of the Armed Since orbital parameters for classified satellites do not appear in the U.S. Space Com- Forces Florence Parly accused Russia of mand’s public catalog of space objects, analysts use observations from amateur astrono- committing “an act of ” after it mers to calculate USA 245’s orbital trajectory. approached a French-Italian military sat- nico janssen / satobs.org ellite “a bit too closely” in October 2017.

COSMOS 2542

USA 245

Antarctica

23 RUSSIA

N 75˚E N

20 70˚E

NSS 12 (SES) 1 1G (SES) ˚ 65˚E 2

3 Intelsat 606

       60˚E  4 Raduga 5 (Russia)

5 55˚E 6 Intelsat 17

7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 50˚E 8 70B JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC   

Figure 9: Luch Continues to Explore In 1962, the Soviet Union detonated “We have achieved significant the GEO Belt. The Russian satellite has three nuclear warheads about 400 kilo- in laser weapons.” stopped at 19 different positions in the meters above the Earth’s surface—near geostationary belt since its launch in the altitude of the U.S. VLADIMIR PUTIN, RUSSIAN PRESIDENT 194 2014, including those depicted here in test that same year—in a series of tests 2019. Learn more about Luch’s behavior, known as Operation K.195 As suspected including a list of the satellite’s nearest by the Soviet engineers who planned neighbors at aerospace.csis.org/luch. the tests, Operation K demonstrated space-track.org / csis aerospace security the devastating effects of an EMP weap- on in LEO. Though nuclear warheads were tested as part of the early Istrebitel Analysis of Luch’s on-orbit behavior since Sputnikov tests, the program’s success- its launch in 2014 suggests that the sat- ful intercepts used conventional war- ellite has approached 11 unique Intelsat heads instead, which lowered the risk satellites, four Eutelsat satellites, two SES of inadvertently damaging Soviet sat- satellites, and at least nine other satellites ellites on orbit during testing.196 Thirty operated by Russia, , , the years later, Vladimir Lukin, a senior Rus- United Kingdom, and the European Space sian legislator, reminded the interna- Agency.193 Although Luch appears to be tional community of Russia’s retained maneuvering around the GEO belt in a EMP capabilities when he threatened a systematic, deliberate manner, no public delegation of U.S. congressmen during an official visit in May 1999, saying: reports suggest it has damaged any of the neighboring satellites along the way. Hypothetically, if Russia really want- ed to hurt the United States . . . [it] Non-Kinetic Physical could fire a submarine launched Evidence suggests that Russia has both ballistic missile and detonate a sin- maintained its non-kinetic physical coun- gle nuclear warhead at high-alti- terspace capabilities from the Soviet era— tude over the United States. The re- including detonating nuclear weapons at sulting would high altitudes, using nano-sized obscu- massively disrupt U.S. communica- rants on orbit, and placing laser weapons tions and computer systems, shut- on aircraft—and built upon them over the ting down everything. No internet. past 10 years. Nothing.197

24 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Academic articles, government contracts, ASAT system that would most likely rely and patent documentation suggest that on a “fundamentally new aircraft [that is] Russia is sponsoring scientific research not based on the Il-76MD.”203 Regardless into on-orbit aerosol obscurants—nano- of the aircraft on which the laser weap- particles that can block radiofrequency on is mounted, such a weapon could be and optical signals to and from a satel- capable of damaging its targets’ optical lite—which could be used to hide Russian sensors and solar arrays from anywhere satellites from space situational aware- in Russia’s vast airspace. ness sensors on the ground or as part of an In a presidential address in March 2018, 198 co-orbital attack. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin an- analysis published by the website Space nounced the development of a new di- Review, Russia’s Scientific Research Insti- rected-energy weapon.204 Russian news tute of Applied Chemistry (NIIPKh), known outlets later reported that the ground- for its previous work in aerosol particle based laser weapon, known as Peresvet, development, was awarded a contract was first delivered to Russian troops in from the previously-discussed Burevest- July 2017 and had been placed on “ex- nik program in 2015. Although there is no perimental combat duty” in December evidence that particle obscurants have 2018.205 A video released by the Russian been tested on orbit, an article written by Ministry of Defense shows the weapon NIIPKh affiliates in 2016 suggested that mounted on a trailer, suggesting some the technology could be installed on sat- degree of mobility.206 Russian officials ellites, where it could be used to defend told reporters that the system is distrib- assets from kinetic physical attacks but uted over two platforms, with the second also for “disabling” satellites from a close responsible for the laser’s power source. distance.199 If deployed from a nearby sat- Yury Borisov—former Russian deputy ellite, particle obscurants could be used to minister of defense, now the country’s temporarily degrade a target satellite by deputy prime minister—commented obstructing optical sensors or interfering that Peresvet would be made more com- with radio communications to and from its pact over the next two to three years.207 “GNSS [Global ground stations. President Putin recently announced that Navigation Leaked photos, statements from Russian the weapon would be placed “on stand- 208 Satellite System] defense contractors, and Russian news by alert” in December 2019. Although Peresvet spoofing reports suggest that a Soviet-era laser the most critical details about remain unknown.209 activities in weapon from 1965 has been revived to 200 the Russian target satellites in LEO. In 2011, pho- Electronic tos of a modified Ilyushin Il-76MD cargo Federation, plane, known as the Beriev A-60, featur- The Russian government has been ac- its occupied ing what appears to be an upward-fac- cused of widespread GPS jamming and territories, and ing laser on the fuselage and a targeting spoofing since 2014, affecting civilian its overseas system built into its nose cone, were up- and military vessels near Russian terri- military facilities loaded to an online forum for Russian tory, commercial and civilian aircraft in are larger in plane enthusiasts. The system, known as the Arctic Circle, and handheld consum- scope, more Sokol Eshelon, was likely tested two years er devices in downtown Moscow and St. geographically earlier to illuminate a Japanese satellite Petersburg.211 Despite overwhelming 201 diverse, and on orbit at an altitude of 1,500 km. In evidence that Russia has employed the started earlier 2017, the general director of -An- use of mobile, ground-based electronic tey, a weapons manufacturer with ties to counterspace weapons on a regular ba- than any public the program, told a Russian news outlet sis both within its borders and abroad, reporting has that his company had been ordered to the Russian state has repeatedly denied suggested to develop a system capable of “direct func- any wrongdoing.212 date.” tional destruction of those elements de- ployed in orbit.”202 A year later, however, Since the beginning of the 2014 Crimean CENTER FOR ADVANCED Interfax reported that Almaz-Antey had conflict, Russia has used a variety of jam- DEFENSE STUDIES210 finished work on a new air-based laser ming and radio-monitoring platforms—

25 RUSSIA

exercises in the region, including a Rus- sian-Belarusian joint exercise in Russia in 2017, a NATO exercise in Norway, Swe- den, and Finland in 2018, and a nearby British exercise in 2019. After Norway an- nounced that Russia was responsible for the regional jamming incidents, the Nor- wegian Communications Authority made plans to establish a satellite signal meas- urement station to better understand the GPS jamming environment in the region.221 In 2017, over 20 ships operating in the Black Sea reported gross GPS position errors as they sailed near the Russian coast.222 The incidents were first report- The Trailer-Mounted Peresvet Laser . Some observers suspect that the ed by the U.S. Maritime Administration. A laser’s power levels will allow it to target satellites in LEO. C4ADS report from March 2019 identified russian defense ministry hundreds more “denial-of-service” occur- rences in the region from both before and after the original report where onboard including the truck-mounted R-330Zh signed for “airspace denial purposes” at GPS devices were calculating false coor- 223 jammer and the R-381T2 radio monitor- Khmeimim airbase, a Russian-operated dinates for the vessels. In many cases, ing system—to deny Ukrainian forces ac- air base in western Syria.215 GPS devices calculated ships’ positions as cess to consistent GPS and satellite com- being at a nearby Russian airport, and not Russia’s use of electronic counterspace munication services.213 in the Black Sea. The report—a collabora- weapons is not restricted to conflict tive study between C4ADS, the University Similarly, Russia reportedly deployed a zones. Starting in late 2017, civilian and of Texas at Austin, and Palantir Found- Krasukha-4 truck-mounted jamming sys- commercial aircraft operators in the ry—also suggested a specific location for tem in Syria, another conflict region, and northernmost region of Norway—Fin- at least one of the spoofing devices re- supplied the Syrian army with R-330P nmark , which borders Russia’s sponsible: “a multi-million dollar ‘palace,’ 214 radio jammers. Using sensor data Murmansk Oblast—began reporting re- formerly owned by family members of 220 from the International Space Station, curring GPS signal outages during flight. senior Federal Protective Service officers analysts at the Center for Advanced De- Analysis of notice to airmen (NOTAM) and previously reported to be built for fense Studies (C4ADS) and the University alerts distributed from September 2017 President Putin.”224 The FSO is the Rus- of Texas at Austin identified “potential to January 2019 shows a correlation be- sian counterpart of the Secret Service in military-grade EW systems” likely de- tween GPS signal outages and military the United States, a federal agency re- sponsible for senior government leaders’ personal security. A $4,000 Taxi to the Kremlin The C4ADS report suggests that the FSO’s relationship with Russia’s use of electron- IN JUNE 2016, visitors to downtown Moscow began noticing a problem with their ic counterspace weapons does not stop at mobile devices’ mapping services.216 When driving or walking near the Kremlin, at the center of the , users reported being directed to follow implausibly inefficient the seaside palace. The report identified routes. In some cases, mapping software suggested a detour of just a few blocks. In 12 occurrences in which evidence of one- others, mobile device users were directed as far away as the Vnukovo Airport, almost off PNT spoofing events corresponded 50 kilometers southwest of the Kremlin.217 Visitors were particularly affected when with the movements of Russian President using ride-sharing services, complaining on about $3,000 to $4,000 fare esti- Vladimir Putin, his senior advisers, or FSO mates due to the mapping errors.218 officers, suggesting that “some devices These map users were likely receiving false positioning signals, leading them to specific, used to conduct this activity are mobile incorrect locations away from the Kremlin. Residents of St. Petersburg began reporting and can be temporarily deployed at a similar issues during a visit from President Vladimir Putin in December 2016.219 location to create local areas of effect.”225

26 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Ukraine

Sea of Azov

ian i

Crimean Peninsula

Russia

ai

In two of those cases, the Russian presi- Figure 10: Russian President Navy Commander Ihor Voronchenko dent was visiting the newly-constructed Vladimir Putin Visiting the accused Russia of spoofing GPS signals Crimean Bridge, which physically con- Newly Constructed Crimean and jamming access to the Iridium sat- nects Crimea with the Russian mainland. Bridge Connecting Crimea to ellite communications network.226 On May 15, 2018, the second of those two Mainland Russia on May 15, In 2016, Russia announced plans to Denial-of-service reports visits, President Putin celebrated the pro- 2018. install GPS jammers on the country’s from vessels near the bridge ject’s completion by driving across the 250,000 cell phone towers.227 The sys- at the time of the visit suggest bridge in a motorcade of construction ve- tem, called Pole-21, is aimed at provid- that a spoofing device may hicles. Based on the locations of the ships ing more widespread GPS jamming to have been contained in one of experiencing GPS spoofing at the time— protect Russian assets against cruise the orange construction trucks which typically must be within the line of missiles, drones, and precision-guided that made up the president’s sight of the spoofing device feeding them munitions. In November 2019, the Rus- motorcade. false coordinates—it is possible that the sian military confirmed that the first spoofing device was contained in one of alexander nemenov / afp / units have been delivered.228 the vehicles in Putin’s motorcade. getty images Russian electronic counterspace ac- Several months after Putin’s visit, the tivities may not be limited to ground- Crimean Bridge was the site of a military based systems. Late last year, Russian conflict in which Russia was accused of news reports suggested that the Rus- using electronic weapons. In November sian Aerospace Forces may upgrade its 2018, the Russian Coast Guard opened Porubshchik electronic warfare aircraft, fire on three Ukrainian Navy ships as which could be used to jam satellite they attempted to pass underneath the signals across wider regions than a Crimean Bridge from the Black Sea into truck- or tower-mounted jamming de- the Sea of Azov, in what became known vice.229 Although there is no evidence in as the Kerch Strait incident. A month the public domain that Russia employs after the incident, which injured six space-based electronic counterspace sailors according to Ukraine, Ukrainian weapons, analysis of Russian procure-

27 RUSSIA ment documentation from 2014 points the negative attention “stage-managed to a new program called Ekipazh that propaganda campaign[s]” and “Western may feature a nuclear-powered jam- spy mania.”238 ming device on orbit.230 Early reports from the program’s manufacturers sug- gest that test flights could begin as early as 2021. SUMMARY Cyber While the Soviet Union developed weap- ons in just two of the four counterspace Foreign governments regularly accuse categories—kinetic and non-kinetic Russia of widespread international cy- physical weapons—Russia has invested 231 berwarfare. In the space domain, a in all four over the past 10 years. Evidence group of hackers with links to the Rus- suggests that Russia is developing an air- sian called launched direct-ascent ASAT missile, has Turla has been hijacking the internet already tested a ground-based direct-as- services of older commercial satellites cent ASAT, and is reinvigorating an array 232 since 2007. More recently, from 2017 of co-orbital counterspace technologies to 2019, Turla infiltrated government more than 50 years after the Soviet Un- agencies and private companies in more ion became the first and only country than 20 countries according to reports to successfully destroy a target satellite from the British National Cyber Secu- using a co-orbital ASAT weapon. Russia rity Centre and U.S. National Security has built off of the Soviet Union’s arsenal 233 Agency. During the attacks, the group of non-kinetic counterspace weapons attempted to disguise themselves as by reviving a Soviet-era air-based laser an Iranian hacking organization by first weapon and unveiling a new ground- gaining access to computer infrastruc- based trailer-mounted laser weapon. ture previously associated with Iranian In just the past few years alone, Russia cyberattack operations. In April 2015, a has become one of the world’s greatest French satellite TV network was pulled perpetrators of electronic counterspace off the air in an attack linked to another warfare, jamming and spoofing PNT and 234 Russian group known as APT 28. communications satellite signals in con- Later that year, APT 28 gained access to a flict zones, nearby territories, and with- British television station’s computer net- in its own borders. Although difficult to work, but did not tamper with any of its verify, Russia is also almost certainly ca- 235 broadcasted programming. pable of targeting satellites and associ- Russian cyberattacks on state govern- ated ground stations through vulnerable ments and international organizations computer networks. With new weapons extend well outside of the space domain, added to the Russian counterspace arse- earning criticisms from , Ukraine, nal each year since 2018, it is clear that the United States, the United Kingdom, the country has renewed its focus on France, , Kyrgyzstan, and the developing and maintaining its ability to .236 In August 2019, NATO disrupt, degrade, or destroy adversaries’ Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg spe- assets on orbit.239 cifically addressed Russia’s nefarious activities in the cyber domain in an edi- torial about NATO’s renewed cybersecu- rity efforts. No other state perpetrators were mentioned.237 Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has developed a consist- ent pattern of denying accusations of wrongdoing in the cyber domain, calling

28 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Number of Successful Orbital IRAN Launches in 2019240 0

IRAN

“The United FTEN CITED AS A THINLY VEILED COVER for its ballistic missile 242 States will not program, Iran’s space capabilities are relatively minimal. Iran’s space and ballistic missile systems are likely based on Russian allow Iran to use and North Korean programs. This analysis is supported by the its space launch Oweak aerospace industrial base in the country, suggesting that Iran is un- program as cover likely to have the technical and industrial capability to develop complex to advance its launch technology from scratch.243 In 2009, Iran successfully launched its ballistic missile first domestically-manufactured satellite on a -1 rocket, making it the programs,” ninth country at the time to have launched an indigenous satellite.244 The (ISA) continues to claim to have sent various living MIKE POMPEO, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE241 creatures into space in the last decade, including a monkey two times in 2013.245 The agency had previously aimed to put a human in space by 2025, but human spaceflight aspirations were put on hold in 2017 due to budget constraints, likely linked to U.S.-imposed sanctions. However, the ISA has continued to focus on improving its SLVs.246 Iran’s main launch facility, the Imam Khomeini Spaceport, is located in a larger domestic space facility, the Imam Khomeini Space Center, in the east of . The site is also used as one of eight mis- sile test and launch sites in the country.247 Iran had four successful launch- es from 2009 to 2015 that put various operational satellites into orbit, none of which stayed in orbit longer than a few months.248 In 2014, Iran reportedly signed an agreement with Russia for its assistance in the devel- opment and launch of Iranian satellites and possibly the training of future Iranian astronauts.249

29 IRAN

“Iran recognizes the strategic value of The U.S. Intelligence Community has experts built radars which can monitor 253 space and counterspace capabilities.” assessed that “Iran recognizes the stra- satellites in LEO. tegic value of space and counterspace Iran currently has two known launch ve- U.S. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY capabilities” and that continued work hicles, the Safir-1 and Safir-2, the latter to develop space launch vehicles will of which is commonly known as the Si- shorten the timeline to create a suc- morgh.254 While the Safir-1 has had suc- cessful ICBM.250 Iran is an unusual case cessful orbital launches, the as countries have historically construct- ed space launch capabilities from mili- has yet to complete a fully successful 255 tary ballistic missile programs, not the mission. In July 2017, Iran announced other way around.251 In addition to SLVs, a successful test launch of the Simorgh, Iran has also developed space capabili- although the success of the test has not 256 ties with military applications such as a been confirmed outside of . space monitoring center announced in For the Iraninan space program, 2019 June 2013 that uses radar, electro-opti- proved to be a difficult year, with three cal, and radio tracking.252 Iran continues failed orbital launches in January, Febru- to focus on space situational awareness ary, and August, which used alternately monitoring, announcing in 2018 that the Safir-1 and Simorgh launch vehicles.257

that the space program may be a front Failed Launch Attempt for developing Iranian ballistic missiles.261 ON AUGUST 25, 2019, the head of the Iran Days after this third failed launch attempt Space Agency was quoted in state media of the calendar year, the Trump adminis- saying that the agency planned to launch tration added the Iran Space Agency, the three satellites into orbit by March of 2020. Iranian Research Institute, The goal of these three satellites would be and the Iran Center to the to help aid civilians through improving U.S. sanctions list.262 navigational, agricultural, and environ- New satellite images surfaced in January 258 mental monitoring services. Four days 2020 which showed the launch pad be- later, on August 29, satellite imagery from ing repaired, possibly in preparation for the Earth-imaging company Maxar Tech- another launch attempt with a Simorgh nologies showed a launch pad at the Imam launch vehicle.263 This timing coincided Khomeini Space Center that appeared with statements from the Iranian Minis- to be the aftermath of a failed launch at- ter of Information and Communications tempt. Satellite imagery analysts were Technology, who announced that the pro- able to note that the pad had been recent- gram had six satellites ready to launch. He ly painted, likely for the launch itself and announced that two are communications to cover up previous damage from failed satellites, named Zafar-1 and Zafar-2, were launches, with smoke billowing from the reportedly ready for a launch in early Feb- ground, indicative of a failed launch. An ruary.264 On February 9, 2020, the Simorgh anonymous Iranian official admitted to rocket launched with a satellite on board, that the incident was caused by but the satellite did not reach high enough technical issues but would not go into fur- velocity to stay in orbit. A spokesman for 259 ther detail. the Iranian defense ministry’s space pro- President Trump tweeted a high resolu- gram claimed that the Simorgh functioned tion image of the scarred launch pad, un- properly, calling it a “remarkable” feat for derscoring that the United States was not the space program. The minister of Infor- involved.260 Although Iran has continued mation and Communications Technology to claim its space program is peaceful, that continued by saying the program is “UN- has not always been the belief of the U.S. STOPPABLE! We have more Upcoming government, whose officials often remark Great Iranian Satellites!”265

30 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 space agency had a reported budget of $1.5 million, which the minister of Com- munications and Information Technology enthusiastically reported saying “being in Smoke space is one of the key factors in the pow- er of governments.”272 In 2017, the budget for the space agency was reported to be $4.6 million.273 The space agency’s budget Probably transporter is separate from Iran’s military spending, erector which has increased by over 50 percent Paint burnt o in the last five years, swelling to 7.5 per- cent of its total national budget for 2018– 2019.274 Though Iranian leadership takes Likely post-fire runo steps to obscure the specifics of its mili- tary budget, priorities include improving domestic missile production capabilities. Because of limited domestic capability to produce reliable components, Iran con- tinues to rely on imported components and materials for their missiles. Iran is not a major space power in terms of proven space capabilities, but it continues to in- Fueling trucks vest in and develop significant counter- space capabilities.

Figure 11: Satellite Image of Iranian Launch Attempt on August 25, 2019. csis / maxar technologies COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS domestic, private, and international co- SPACE ORGANIZATION operation in space issues.268 Kinetic Physical AND DOCTRINE The Iranian Space Agency also runs the While currently available open-source Iranian Space Research Center and re- information does not indicate that Iran Iran was one of the founding members of portedly has planned to establish a “space is attempting to develop either direct-as- the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of park,” a space-themed center that focus- cent or co-orbital ASAT weapons, Iran has Outer Space in 1958; however, the coun- es on education, culture, recreation, and some of the ballistic missile technology try is one of many that has signed but amusement. The park would be run in on which a future direct-ascent kinetic 266 not ratified the . The partnership with the Sharif University of ASAT capability could be based. In ad- Iranian Space Agency was established in Technology (SUT), a well-known research dition to a diverse set of ballistic missile 2004 ostensibly to coordinate peaceful university that supports the government programs with varied ranges, Iran has 269 applications of space activities and tech- in ballistic missile-related projects. Lit- substantial conventional forces, with nology development for the country.267 tle is publicly known about Iran’s doctrine an estimated 523,000 active personnel.275 The agency is under the oversight of the for space and counterspace operations, Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities include Ministry of Information and Communi- but evidence suggests that Iran believes the Shahab-3, which is believed to be de- cations Technology, but takes direction the capability “to deny the United States rived from the North Korean No Dong-1 from the Supreme Space Council, which the ability to use space in a regional con- missile.276 The Simorgh SLV is similarly 270 is chaired by the . The flict” is critical to its security. Although based on the North Korean Taepo Dong-2, head of the space agency serves as the the country often uses aggressive rhetoric including modeling No Dong-1 engines.277 secretary of the Supreme Space Council, when discussing ballistic missile activi- Iran appears to have been able to repro- which is overseen by the president and ties, Iran consistently claims that its space duce these missiles in quantity, which led 271 focuses on making policy for peaceful program is peaceful. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to space technologies, approving state and Budgets for the Iranian Space Agency publicly assert that “Iran has the largest private space programs, and promoting have risen in the last decade. In 2010, the ballistic missile force in the Middle East.”278

31 IRAN

Iran has demonstrated the rudimentary to steer and focus a laser as (JCPOA).287 The United States pulled out ability to launch and operate primitive it passes through the Earth’s of the JCPOA in 2018, and after a series of satellites for short periods of time, and its atmosphere, is quite sophisti- international events which increased ten- space monitoring center gives it the abil- cated, indicating that Iran may sions between the two nations, Iran also ity to track objects and have better space have obtained this technology stated it would no longer adhere to the situational awareness.279 Having a relia- from Russia or China. Its ca- deal.288 The remaining countries involved ble understanding of where objects are in pabilities in this area remain in the JCPOA, including Russia and Chi- space is required for targeting many ca- highly uncertain based on the na, hope to reimplement the agreement.289 pabilities. However, there are many oth- limited publicly available infor- Despite pulling out of the JCPOA, Presi- er technological hurdles to tackle before mation. dent Trump reiterated as recently as Janu- ary 2020 that Iran would “never be allowed Iran could field a direct-ascent kinetic If Iran were to continue pursu- to have a nuclear weapon.”290 However, ASAT weapon, such as precise onboard ing a breakout nuclear capa- the aim of Iran’s nuclear program has his- sensors that could guide a warhead into bility, it is conceivable that it torically been to develop a nuclear-armed a target satellite. could launch a nuclear weap- ICBM to deter the United States, not a nu- Realistically, Iran could construct a crude on into orbit as a nuclear ASAT clear counterspace ASAT weapon. direct-ascent ASAT capability by mod- capability. In the 1990s, Iran ifying an existing ballistic missile and entered into agreements with Electronic launching it within the vicinity of a target both China and Russia to help satellite with an unguided warhead. It jumpstart its nuclear program. Jamming and spoofing are regular tools would not likely be able to hit a specific China agreed to include the in Iran’s weapons arsenal. In 2003, Voice satellite but could create a debris hazard training of Iranian personnel of America (VOA) broadcasts into Iran be- in the space environment that threatens and contribute various reactor gan to experience interference with its the safety of numerous other satellites in technologies.284 Iran has also transmissions over the Telestar-12 sat- similar orbits. entered into a bilateral nu- ellite. The uplink jamming of this com- clear cooperation agreement mercial satellite originated from the area During a military parade in late 2019, with Russia to provide nuclear around Havana, Cuba. The U.S. State Iran unveiled a new indigenous ballistic experts, information, and aid Department notified Cuba of missile kit design, the Labbayk-1, which in the completion of Iran’s first the issue, and subsequently aims to modify unguided short-range “We have been 285 determined that the source of nuclear power plant. equipped with Zelzal and Fateh-110 ballistic missiles into the jamming was from a com- 280 Recently, the program has guided weapons. This new capability pound belonging to the Irani- electronic leaned most heavily on North could lead to an increase in accuracy, as an Embassy. Cuban authori- warfare sys- Korean cooperation. In 2012, demonstrated in recent Iranian surface- ties promptly shut down the tems in order Iran and North Korea signed to-air and air-to-air missile attacks in the facility and issued a note of not to remain Middle East.281 This increased capability the Civilian Scientific and Tech- protest to the Iranian govern- just a defending may pose a threat to space systems by be- nological Cooperation Agree- 291 ment. Similar attacks ema- force, and rather ing able to more reliably attack satellite ment, which established joint nated from Bulgaria and Libya become able to ground stations throughout the Middle facilities and a “transfer [of] from 2005 to 2006. Though 282 286 East and Europe. technology” in multiple fields. Iran’s role went unconfirmed, jam the enemy’s Former Special Coordinator for “international pressure even- communication Non-Kinetic Physical the State Department’s North tually brought this to a halt systems,” There are few reports of Iranian non-kinet- Korea Group, David Asher, add- and satellite jamming against BRIGADE GENERAL AH- ic physical weapons, but the country may ed “the last time North Korea Persian-language program- MAD REZA POURDASTAN293 have acquired and used a laser dazzling signed an agreement like this ming now emanates exclu- or blinding counterspace system on a U.S. it led to the largest act of nu- sively from Iranian territory.”292 satellite. In 2011, an unnamed European clear proliferation in modern history.” Iran has also jammed several interna- intelligence source was quoted stating tional and regional television broadcasts that Iran managed to “blind” a U.S. satel- Development of Iranian nucle- in the Middle East. In 2010, Iran jammed lite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurate- ar capability was temporarily BBC and VOA satellite signals transmit- 283 ly.” The technology necessary to do this, slowed in 2015 by the Joint ting into Iran. At first, the jamming tar- particularly the adaptive optics needed Comprehensive Plan of Action

32 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 geted BBC and VOA broadcasts on the with the goal of causing 6 commercial satellite, but when ships and aircraft to “inadvertently wan- the broadcasts were moved to transmit der into Iranian waters or airspace in IRAN HAS through other commercial satellites, order to justify a seizure.” The warning the jamming targeted those satellites as also mentioned instances of “spoofed” DEMONSTRATED well.294 In the same year, the head of the communications from ships claiming to ITS CYBER Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting be U.S. or other countries’ warships. 302 publicly acknowledged that the Iranian Similar GPS interference was reported by CAPABILITIES BY government engaged in the jamming of British ships, prompting British media re- foreign broadcast satellites.295 ports that intelligence services were con- ATTACKING U.S. Al Jazeera faced targeted attacks in Janu- cerned that Iran had used Russian GPS ary 2012 after its coverage of the conflict spoofing technology to guide the vessels 303 INFRASTRUC- in Syria. The origin of the attacks was into Iranian waters. In 2019, numerous TURE. traced to two locations in Iran.296 Later oil tankers from varying regions reported that year, Iran was supported by the Syri- seizures in the Strait of Hormuz, followed an government in a coordinated jamming by an Iranian shoot-down of a remotely effort against approximately 25 interna- piloted U.S. Navy aircraft over the inter- 304 tional broadcasters, “including the BBC, national waters in the region. France 24, Deutsche Welle and the Voice Also in 2019, the commander-in-chief of of America.”297 A similar report in July the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of 2019 stated Iran International, a Lon- (IRGC) announced the creation of a new don-based TV station, believed its signals mounted hardware unit called Sepehr were being blocked via uplink jamming 110 to protect its systems from electronic originating from Iran.298 warfare.305 State media credits the system Iran has publicly claimed the ability to as being developed by IRGC experts and spoof GPS receivers. In 2011, Iran claimed “invulnerable to hacks, , to have forced a U.S. RQ-170 drone to radio jamming, and electromagnetic dis- land inside its borders by jamming its sat- turbance” but there has been no external 306 ellite communications links and spoof- verification of the system. ing the GPS receiver. An Iranian engineer Later that year, the Research and Self-Suf- was quoted at the time as saying that the ficiency Jihad Organization of the Iranian drone landed “where we wanted it to, army unveiled a portable jamming sys- without having to crack the remote-con- tem attachable to vehicles and report- trol signals and communications.”299 edly capable of detecting and disrupting Though a former Pentagon spokesper- drone flights.307 These announced up- son claimed there was “no indication the grades of counterdrone capabilities, in- drone was brought down by hostile ac- cluding a system capable of participating tivity of any kind,” President Obama did in electronic warfare and radar evasion, acknowledge that Iran had possession of have not been corroborated outside of the drone.300 If Iran’s claims of electronic state-sponsored media.308 jamming are true, they represent a signif- icant counterspace capability that could Cyber be used to thwart U.S. precision-guided Iran began developing its cyber capabil- weapons and aircraft in the future. ities through independent hackers who In 2019, there were similar reports of GPS gained notoriety in the early 2000s. The spoofing of commercial U.S. ships in the Iranian government often encourages its Gulf of Oman. Several ships reported a hackers through recruiting into its own loss of GPS signal and were captured in cyber forces or supporting independent Iranian territorial waters. After 11 report- operations against its enemies, repre- ed incidents, the U.S. Maritime Adminis- senting a somewhat unique approach.309 tration issued a warning to U.S. vessels Though initially modest, Iranian cyber to be aware of GPS interference in the ar- capabilities have grown significantly in ea.301 The advisory warned of Iranian GPS the last decade, becoming “notable play- jammers operating on an island near the ers” in the cyber realm.310 Iran has devel-

33 IRAN oped advanced offensive cyber capabil- to 500 million attempts per day globally.318 ities that could potentially target U.S. Although there are few confirmed in- space systems in the future. With three stances of Iran using cyberattacks against separate branches of the Iranian military space systems, Iran’s increasingly sophis- contributing to cyber infrastructure, Iran ticated cyber capabilities suggest that it claims over 100,000 cyberwar volunteers could employ such attacks on space sys- and recently established a Joint Chiefs of tems if needed. Staff Cyber Command to better organize its efforts.311 This increase in cyber activity has been SUMMARY mirrored in the country’s budget; in 2017, the budget of the National Center for Cy- Iran is still far from developing direct-as- berspace reportedly increased by 45 per- cent ASAT weapons, even with its in- cent in one year, swelling to $1.2 million. creased focus on launch vehicle devel- 312 Iranian willingness to employ cyber- opment and continued development of attacks against targeted defense compa- ballistic missile capabilities. Similarly, nies, media conglomerates, and adver- with only four successful satellites that 313 saries also appears to be increasing. have reached orbit and a growing string Iran has demonstrated its cyber capa- of failed launches, Iran is unlikely to de- bilities by attacking U.S. infrastructure, velop a co-orbital ASAT capability in the though it has often targeted private com- near future. To make significant progress panies as opposed to government sys- on kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace tems. In 2012, Iran launched a distributed systems, Iran would likely need to ac- denial of service (DDOS) attack against quire technology and resources from a U.S. banks and telecommunications com- major counterspace actor, such as Rus- panies, which resulted in monetary losses sia or China. However, Iran has growing in the millions.314 This particular incident electronic and cyber counterspace ca- prompted a public statement by then-Sec- pabilities and continues to demonstrate retary of Defense warning successful jamming and hacking attacks that the imminent threat of a cyberat- against foreign governments and civil- tack that could cause significant property ian systems. damage or kill U.S. citizens would be suf- ficient justification for a pre-emptive mil- itary strike.315 In 2019, the FBI was made aware of attempts, likely originating from Iran, to gain access to the systems of U.S. satellite technology companies.316 Various programs, including the destructive virus with the ability to fully wipe computer systems, have been tied to Iranian state-sponsored hacking groups. The director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Securi- ty Agency issued a warning describing a similar type of destruction, citing a “rise in malicious cyber activity” from Iranian actors. 317 As tensions rise worldwide with Iran, so do hacking attempts. In a 48-hour time period in January 2020, attacks from Iranian IP addresses were recorded at up

34 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Number of Successful Orbital NORTH KOREA Launches in 2019319 0

NORTH KOREA

“North Korea has been ORTH KOREA SUCCESSFULLY ORBITED ITS FIRST SATELLITE building new missiles, in December 2012 after three failed attempts in July 2006, April 2009, and April 2012. Its fifth attempt, in February 2016, success- new capabilities, fully placed a second satellite in orbit. Both successful orbital new weapons as fast Nlaunches from North Korea have been on the -3 SLV, whose milita- as anybody on the rized adaptation is likely the same vehicle outfitted with a reentry vehi- ,” cle in place of an orbital satellite.321 Like many other spacefaring nations around the globe, North Korea’s space capabilities are closely tied to its GENERAL JOHN E. HYTEN ballistic missile development. VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, UNITED A North Korean law journal referenced the close relationship between 320 STATES AIR FORCE space capabilities and ballistic missiles, stating “it is an undeniable truth that satellites launched into orbit by many countries around the world were made possible by rocket propulsion.” While defending the country’s satel- lite launching program, the article continued to state that the main differ- ence between a peaceful space launch and a ballistic missile is whether the launch vehicle is furnished “with a satellite or a bomb.”322 Although reaching orbit is a significant achievement, many experts doubt that the two successfully launched satellites perform all of the functions the North Korean government claims.323 In a 2016 interview with the Asso- ciated Press, the head of the North Korean space agency stated his intent

35 NORTH KOREA

Satellite Imagery of the Sohae to continue launching Earth Satellite Launching Ground observation satellites, and his Space Launch Facilities After a Test on December 7, aspirations to send a mission NORTH KOREA HAS TWO ESTABLISHED LAUNCHING AREAS for 2019. Differences include scarred to the moon around 2026. He space capabilities: the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground and vegetation and the moving of was quoted as saying, “Even the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground. The Tonghae Satellite equipment. The facility hosted though the U.S. and its allies Launching Ground is North Korea’s oldest ballistic missile and tests on December try to block our space devel- space launch facility, although a successful orbital launch has 7 and December 13, 2019. opment, our aerospace scien- never been achieved at the facility. According to December 2019 planet / beyond parallel tists will conquer space and satellite imagery, there was increased activity at the site, includ- definitely plant the flag of the ing a group of people and possibly crates, but no sign of major DPRK on the moon.”324 renovations that would have to take place to prepare the facility for a vehicle test. However, North Korea has used mobile launch- There is little indication that ing platforms for all recent land-based ballistic missile tests, North Korea is making substan- which could be conducted in the grounds of Tonghae.327 tial efforts to build or sustain a The Sohae Satellite Launching Ground showed initial steps of dis- space industrial base, but its assembly in satellite imagery in the summer of 2018, but reassem- missile program is advancing. bly began again after U.S - North Korea Summits in Singapore and There were 11 separate North Hanoi.328 In late 2019, North Korea conducted two engine tests at Korean missile tests in 2019 the Sohae Satellite Launching ground, believed to be modified alone, which involved as many liquid-fueled engines for long-range missiles.329 While the specif- 325 as 20 rockets in total. Addi- ics of the tests were unconfirmed, KCNA state media referred to tional satellite footage taken in the successful tests as “defence science achievements” that will early 2020 showed increased “have an important effect on changing the strategic position” for activity at a known missile the country.330 Although conducted at a satellite launching pad, launch site, possibly signaling experts assess that it was likely another missile test or a step to- more tests in the near future.326 wards ICBM development, rather than a space vehicle launch.331

36 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Satellite Imagery of the Tonghae Satellite on Registration of Objects Launched into Launching Ground on December 16, 2019. SPACE ORGANIZATION Outer Space of 1974.335 Four years later, Analysis shows one launch pad, a second un- AND DOCTRINE in April 2013, the country’s Supreme Peo- finished launch pad, and missile storage for ple’s Assembly established the National the No-dong medium range ballistic missile, North Korea keeps its doctrine and op- Aerospace Development Administration Taepo-dong and SLV. Both noted missiles are erational concepts largely under wraps, (NADA), the official North Korean space capable of reaching LEO. 336 including what is released about its coun- agency. Additionally, space has often / beyond parallel terspace capabilities. The absence of been included in five-year plans that the discussion about counterspace capabili- regime has put forward.337 ties that could threaten the U.S. military In October 2017, a delegate to the United is unusual given the aggressive rhetoric Nations was reported in state media as used by the regime in touting its nuclear saying “peaceful development of outer 332 and missile programs. The country con- space is actively conducted in accordance tinues to advocate internationally for its with the 2016-2020 plan for national out- 333 right to a sovereign space program. er space development.”338 As reported, When the regime has spoken about its this plan included an aim to launch a ge- space program at the , del- ostationary satellite—a much more chal- egates speak of respect of international lenging feat which would require a more norms to maintain peaceful development powerful launch vehicle.339 State media and use of outer space, including the North reported a successful ground test of a Korean space program’s right to help the new launch vehicle for this purpose, but country grow economically.334 In March it has not noted any attempts at an actual 2009, North Korea became a signatory to launch.340 The regime hopes to use satel- two major UN space treaties: the Outer lites to monitor crop and forestry growth Space Treaty of 1967 and the Convention as well as to improve communication ca-

37 NORTH KOREA

341 pabilities. The plan expressed a goal to Non-Kinetic Physical field a satellite communication system by 2019, though there is no indication that The technology necessary to develop di- goal was achieved.342 rected energy weapons, such as lasers that are able to dazzle or blind the sensors on satellites, requires a level of sophistication that North Korea likely does not possess.345 COUNTERSPACE It is possible, however, that North Korea WEAPONS could develop a crude EMP weapon for use against space assets. In 2017, North Korea successfully tested a hydrogen bomb un- Kinetic Physical derground, a claim that was confirmed by 346 Current space launch vehicles and ballis- South Korea and Japan. Officials from tic missiles demonstrated by North Korea Pyongyang released a photo of the hydro- could serve as the basis for a kinetic ASAT gen bomb and asserted that the bomb is 347 capability, but many technological hur- able to fit on an ICBM. Kim Jong-un has dles remain. To date, North Korea has not called for further improvements in nuclear tested, or indicated that it is attempting to bombs similar to this test in the “Songun” 348 develop, a direct-ascent or co-orbital ASAT , which places the military first. In January 2020, KCNA reported that Kim capability. It is unlikely that North Korea Jong-un declared the world would soon could quickly gain the technology for an see a new strategic weapon, adding that effective direct-ascent or co-orbital ASAT there will never be denuclearization on the weapon, as it has only succeeded in plac- Korean peninsula.349 ing two satellites into orbit, the operation of which are not confirmed outside state A nuclear weapon on a long range missile media. This additional capability would would theoretically give North Korea the also require onboard sensors (e.g., optical, capability to create a high-altitude EMP 350 infrared, radar) and a guidance system to effect. In 2018, The Daily NK—a South steer the weapon into a target satellite. Korean news site—obtained North Ko- rean internal propaganda documents It is conceivable that North Korea could aimed to inform citizens that the country field a crude direct-ascent ASAT capability has the capability to damage enemies’ in the near term in the form of an adapt- military and civilian electronic systems ed ballistic missile. This would be possible beyond repair as a result of a nuclear EMP with the launch of an unguided warhead attack.351 North Korea is not a signatory of set to detonate in the vicinity of a target the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the satellite. Rather than directly strike a satel- country has not tested a nuclear weapon lite, it could create a debris field that would at high altitudes.352 complicate future operations for satellites in a similar orbit. For example, the North Electronic Korean No Dong-1 medium-range ballistic North Korea has acquired and is constant- missile would likely be able to carry a 1200 ly using electronic forms of attack against kg to a maximum altitude of 600 varying space systems. In 2010, South to 750 km—well within the LEO regime.343 Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae-young Missiles launched from North Korean terri- said in a speech to parliament that “North tory could more easily be used in a conven- Korea has imported vehicle-mountable tional attack on nearby ground stations devices capable of jamming GPS signals that support satellite operations, such as from Russia.” These downlink jamming the U.S.-operated GPS monitoring station systems reportedly have an effective ra- in South Korea and other ground stations dius of 50 to 100 km. North Korea began as far away as Guam.344 using this jamming equipment against

38 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 South Korea in August 2010, but South ported goods and revenue. The Tae Yang Korean forces could not pinpoint the loca- consistently broadcasted a unique identi- tion of the jammers at that time because fication number assigned to another ves- NORTH KOREA the jamming lasted just 10 minutes in sel to disguise its own illicit movements, each instance.353 while still transmitting AIS data. Another HAS BEEN In the decade since, North Korea has report by the UN Panel of Experts has repeatedly used its GPS jamming capa- uncovered additional examples of AIS CARRYING OUT bilities against South Korea. More GPS spoofing techniques used by North Kore- 359 CYBERATTACKS jamming occurred in December 2010 an ships to avoid sanctions. and again in March 2011, which coincid- According to minutes from a 2008 meet- BY PLACING ed with a U.S.-South Korean military ex- ing about network surveillance capa- ercise. Jamming occurred again in April bilities, North Korean officials inquired INDIVIDUALS 2012, disrupting air traffic at Incheon about a satellite jamming system to two and Gimpo international airports, forcing groups of internationally contracted IN SCATTERED flights to use alternative navigation sys- engineers. The meeting ended with an tems.354 In March and April 2016, over 250 agreement that “the number of jamming FOREIGN South Korean fishing boats lost access to systems that prevents interception by sat- GPS, forcing them to return to shore.355 A ellite should be increased.” However, ana- COUNTRIES IN few days later, South Korea complained lysts believe it is possible that the inquiry AN ATTEMPT TO to the UN Security Council that North was an excuse to get imported German Korea was jamming GPS signals across cellular detection equipment, which was DISGUISE THE the border, with the jamming coming subsequently used to catch North Korean from five areas in North Korea: Pyong- citizens with Chinese cell phones.360 ORIGIN OF THE yang, Kaesong, Haeju, Yonan county, and Mount Kumgang.356 Documents state that Cyber ATTACKS. in 2016, 2,143 aircraft disclosed GPS inter- Under the Kim Jong-un regime, North ference, likely due to North Korean jam- Korea has used its cyber forces frequent- 357 ming operations. ly, first launching attacks on South Korea The South Korean Defense Ministry has and the United States, then branching said it believes the jamming attacks orig- out to others. According to CrowdStrike, inate from “a regiment-sized electronic North Korean hackers have the sec- warfare unit near the North Korean cap- ond-fastest breakout time (the time need- ital Pyongyang, and battalion-sized units ed for hackers to achieve their objectives closer to the inter-Korean border.”358 The in an attack) of any hacking organization jammers are mounted on mobile plat- in the world, behind Russia. North Korea’s forms and are operated intermittently, malicious cyber activity tends to focus on which could be difficult to locate and financial targets or inter-Korea issues. A neutralize in a conflict. North Korea ap- majority of the cyberattacks stemming pears to be gaining operational experi- from North Korea are “linked to curren- ence using these systems in peacetime. cy generation and economy-bolstering Because the GPS jammers were acquired efforts for the Kim regime.”361 from Russia, it is possible that North Ko- Experts believe there are around 6,000 - rea could also have acquired other types 7,500 conducting cy- of jamming capabilities that can target ber warfare for the North Korean state. different satellite systems, such as uplink Cybersecurity defector and founder of jammers that can disrupt military satel- North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, Kim lite communications. Hueng-kwang, said most cyber opera- Additionally, AIS spoofing has been used tions in the country are organized in a in shipping vessels during 2019 likely in unit directly under North Korea’s main an attempt to hide what is assumed to overseas intelligence agency, the Recon- be coal smuggling operations. A report naissance General Bureau (RGB).362 He details the suspicious behavior of one of emphasized that North Korea was “in- North Korea’s largest bulk ships, the Tae spired by the Chinese cyberwar units and Yang, which North Korea relies on for im- learned from them.”363 According to Kim,

39 NORTH KOREA members of an elite North Korean hack- its ICBM-class missiles, its limited num- ing group go on covert missions overseas, ber of successful orbital launches suggest generally to places with better internet that the country is far from developing than the notoriously shielded country, to the capabilities needed to pose a signif- lower the risk of being caught. South Ko- icant kinetic physical threat to foreign rea’s vice foreign minister confirmed this satellite systems. The only significant risk report, telling Reuters that North Korea of non-kinetic physical attack from North has been carrying out cyberattacks by Korea is high altitude nuclear detonation, placing individuals in scattered foreign a devastating, irreversible counterspace countries in an attempt to disguise the or- attack that would indiscriminately affect igin of the attacks. 364 systems in the target satellite’s orbital re- A leaked report sent to the UN Security gime. Importantly, North Korea is improv- Council’s North Korea sanctions commit- ing its electronic warfare capabilities, as tee stated that through 35 separate cyber- demonstrated in continued GPS jamming attacks, North Korea has stolen over $2 and spoofing operations, and is continu- billion, which has likely been used to fund ing to use cyberattacks against a variety weapons development.365 Subsequently, of targets worldwide. the U.S. Department of the Treasury an- nounced sanctions for three state-spon- sored cyber groups from the country, naming them responsible for malicious cyber activity on critical infrastructure.366 North Korean hackers have also been tied to a nuclear power plant in India and pos- sibly the Indian Space Research Organi- zation during its Chandrayaan-2 mission, although Indian space authorities deny they were compromised. 367 They are also suspected to have hacked an Israeli aero- space and defense company.368 Given its demonstrated cyber capabilities, it is con- ceivable that North Korea could initiate a cyberattack against U.S. space systems or ground stations, although there is no publicly available information to suggest this has happened to date.

SUMMARY

North Korea has demonstrated growing capabilities in two counterspace weapons categories: electronic and cyber. It is also developing some of the necessary tech- nologies to field a non-kinetic physical nu- clear EMP counterspace weapon through its nuclear program, but this does not ap- pear to be the intent of those activities. Although North Korea has demonstrated its dedication to increasing the range of

40 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Number of Successful Orbital INDIA Launches in 2019369 6

INDIA

“When India NDIA JOINED THE WORLD STAGE AS A RISING SPACE POWER by celebrates [its] launching its first satellite from the Space Center in 1980. India has since developed highly successful launch vehicles, a range of 75th year of communications, imaging, and other critical satellites, and is beginning Independence Iserious development of counterspace capabilities. While India has no over- in 2022, and if arching national yet, the is in the process possible even of creating one.371 Currently, it does have various organizations dedicated to before, an Indian the space domain in both the military and civil sectors, each with support- son or daughter will ing policies and doctrine. Among these organizations is the principal space undertake a manned organization in India, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), which space mission on is responsible for maintaining the SLVs and spaceports of India. board ‘’ Currently, India has two operational orbital launch vehicles, the Polar Satel- carrying the lite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Geosynchronous national flag.” (GSLV). These two vehicles launched six times in 2019, representing only a small portion of the 67 total Indian launches since 1980 from the Satish PRIME MINISTER 372 NARENDRA MODI370 Dhawan Space Centre. India made history in 2017 with the largest num- ber of satellites on any single mission, launching 104 satellites with one PSLV, breaking the previous record of 37 satellites held by Russia since 2014. All but three of these satellites were foreign owned.373

41 INDIA SUCCESSFUL ORBITAL LAUNCHES PER YEAR BY COUNTRY (1957-2019)

20 CHINA INDIA 00 USA RUSSIA OTHERS THE TOP 0 PRIORITIES 0 FOR THE 0 ISRO IN 2020 20 ARE A CHAN- 0 0 0 0 0 2000 200 20 DRAYAAN-3 MISSION TO THE Figure 12: Indian Orbital Space Launches (1957 - 2019). spacetrack.org / csis aerospace security374 LUNAR SURFACE AND THE GAGANYAAN The Satish Dhawan Space Center has moon and conduct a hard- for been India’s only major spaceport since the purpose of targeting and practic- HUMAN SPACE- it began launching in 1980. Howev- ing a future soft-landing.379 In 2019, the er, due to the anticipated increase in Chandrayaan-2 spacecraft was placed FLIGHT demand for national and commercial on a GSLV and launched into . space launch in the coming years, the While on approach to the lunar surface PROGRAM, Indian government has begun the land to attempt a soft-landing, the Vikram THOUGH IT IS acquisition process for the construction Lander lost contact with the ISRO and of a new spaceport.375 The proposed crashed into the lunar surface.380 After UNLIKELY THAT spaceport, to be located in the south- about a month of attempting to re-es- ern state of Tamil Nadu, is planned to tablish contact with the , EITHER WILL mainly service India’s newest launch the Indian government made an offi- vehicle, the Small Satellite Launch cial announcement that they had lost LAUNCH Vehicle (SSLV).376 A derivative of the contact and were unable to recover the PSLV, this new Indian launch vehicle is spacecraft.381 However, this failure has BEFORE 2021. rated to carry “up to 500 kilograms to only reinvigorated the Indian space pro- mid-inclination low Earth orbits and gram and public. 300 kilograms to [-synchronous or- In an announcement on January 1, 2020, 377 bit (SSO)].” The location of the pro- Chief Kailasavadivoo Sivan, head of the posed spaceport will allow for launch- ISRO, stated that the top priorities for ing southward into a polar or near-polar the ISRO in 2020 are a Chandrayaan-3 orbit, which is difficult from the Satish mission to the lunar surface and the Dhawan Space Center due to the need Gaganyaan human spaceflight pro- to maneuver around Sri Lanka. gram, though it is unlikely that either Only three countries—China, the So- will launch before 2021.382 The Chan- viet Union, and the United States— drayaan-3 mission will similarly attempt have ever “soft-landed” on the lunar to conduct a soft-landing on the lunar surface.378 In 2009, India successfully surface. When asked if a crewed mission launched the Chandrayaan-1 space- to the moon was in the near future for craft, which was designed to orbit the India, Sivan said, “definitely, but not im-

42 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 mediately.”383 Four Indian astronauts will be sent to Vikram Lander and Rover. The Vikram lander Russia for 11 months to receive training in prepa- was launched on the Chandrayaan-2 mission, but it did ration for the Gaganyaan program. Additional pro- not achieve a successful soft landing on the lunar surface. 384 gram-specific training will also take place in India. isro

ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE ization (DSRO) in late 2019 to further develop and test counterspace systems and related technologies.387 India does not have an official military department In late July 2019, India’s top strategic planners from focused on space. It instead created a separate agen- several agencies gathered to begin to establish new cy, the (DSA), to coordinate policies and doctrine for future military and non-mil- between and command the space assets of the Indian itary uses for space. Called IndSpaceEx, the strategic Army, Navy, and Air Force, including India’s new di- planners were led through a wargaming simulation rect-ascent ASAT capabilities.385 According to the two- that was meant to assess military assets of other lead- star general appointed to head the DSA, “the agency ing space powers—namely the United States, China, will eventually grow into a full-fledged Space Com- and Russia—to better assess the level to which India mand in the years ahead.”386 To date, however, there is must counter international space threats.388 The ses- no confirmed timeline for this growth. Within the DSA, sion’s conclusion was that future may be dom- India established the Defence Space Research Organ- inated by activities in the cyber and space domains,

43 INDIA leading to asymmetric advantages or dis- Given these factors, it is likely that the Indi- advantages.389 an government was attempting to limit the 392 ON MARCH 27, 2019, India successfully potential for long-lasting orbital debris. A 2019-2020 annual report released by launched a Prithvi Delivery Vehicle Mark-II Since the test, a majority of the debris has the Government of India’s Department of (PDV MK-II) missile defense interceptor at deorbited, and by the end 2019, just 18 Space detailed initial steps of an official one of its own satellites. Launched in late pieces of debris large enough to track re- space policy for the country. This policy January 2019, the target satellite, Micro- mained in orbit.393 will “support the pursuance of space activ- sat-R, was specifically placed in a low-alti- The Indian ASAT test did not receive the ities by various agencies in India including tude sun-synchronous orbit as the target same level of international outcry as the for an ASAT test. After the successful test in private sector and start-up companies in Chinese ASAT test, in part because it pro- March, independent analysts realized that the aerospace sector.”390 It is clear through duced much less orbital debris. The United an earlier attempt to intercept the satellite States, for example, only had one govern- India’s military space reorganization, re- 391 on February 12 of the same year failed. ment official speak out against the test. newed focus on commercial partners, and What was perhaps most notable about the NASA Administrator de- it’s test of a direct-ascent ASAT in March Indian ASAT test was the muted internation- cried the test because some pieces of debris 2019 that the Indian leadership views al outcry that occurred afterward. This was were pushed to a higher altitude, threat- space as a key operational domain. likely due in part to the minimal amount ening the astronauts on the International of orbital debris created—only about 400 Space Station.394 While public international pieces remained in orbit immediately after outcry was minimal, Pakistan was one of the test, compared to the over 3,000 pieces few states to openly denounce the test, urg- COUNTERSPACE of debris created during the 2007 Chinese ing all countries to “condemn India’s action ASAT test. The Indian ASAT test took place and strengthen international laws regard- WEAPONS at a relatively low altitude, and at the time ing the militarization of space.”395 Addition- of impact, the interceptor was on a down- ally, the Union of Concerned Scientists de- ward trajectory. This resulted in much of nounced the test, expressing that this test Kinetic Physical the debris having a downward trajectory, harmed international efforts to prevent The Indian government took notice of allowing it to be more quickly deorbited. further weaponization of outer space.396 China’s successful 2007 direct-ascent ASAT, causing it to shift focus to pro- tecting its vulnerable space assets from Figure 13: Depiction of Kinetic Physical ASAT Test by India in 2019. Muted international out- a Chinese threat. As one scholar noted, cry in response to this ASAT test was, in part, due to the low amount of debris created because “It suddenly reminded them that their of the slight downward trajectory of the missile on impact. diverse space assets were now at risk, aerospace security project / emily tiemeyer

MICROSAT-R

ASAT at highest altitiude

India

Bay of Bengal

44 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 hostage to the dangers emanating from their most formidable regional threat.” For years, defense planners debated the merits of conducting a sim- ilar kinetic ASAT test to signal to China and other nations that India had the ability to retaliate in kind if its space assets were attacked.397 The gov- ernment eventually concluded that India should pursue kinetic ASAT weapons. On March 27, 2019, India became the fourth coun- try—behind the United States, China, and Rus- sia—to successfully test a direct-ascent ASAT mis- sile. Named Mission Shakti, meaning “strength” in Hindi, the test was conducted with an Indian-pro- duced ballistic missile which intercepted a small target satellite in LEO.398 In a tweet, Prime Minister said this test will “have a historic impact on generations to come.”399 “In the journey India does not have any publicly known co-orbit- of every nation al ASAT capabilities. However, Defence Research there are and Development Organization Chief G. Satheesh moments that Reddy announced in April 2019—less than a month bring utmost after the success of Mission Shakti—that India was pride and have a developing co-orbital ASAT capabilities and that the details remained classified.401 India is devel- historic impact oping, in partnership with France, the technical PDV-MK II Missile Lifting Off on Track to Intercept on generations capabilities to conduct RPO on orbit as part of its Microsat-R on March 27, 2019. The missile used by to come.” efforts to develop a national space station.402 RPO India during its first ASAT test was an indigenously 409 PRIME MINISTER proficiency is a key step toward the fundamental manufactured missile. 400 capabilities of building some types of co-orbital NARENDRA MODI government of india counterspace weapons. The Indian military also has the ability to direct- ly attack satellite ground stations. Indian special In its 2018 Technology Perspective and Capability operations units are specially trained to “to carry Roadmap, India detailed investments in a two- out crippling attacks against critical enemy targets phase Tactical High Energy Laser System. The sec- miles away.”403 The newly created Armed Forces ond phase of this system is intended to play an Special Operations Division is designed and mod- “anti-satellite role from ground & aerial platform.”407 eled off of the United States Joint Special Opera- Following the Mission Shakti test, DRDO Chief Sath- tions Command (JSOC).404 eesh Reddy stated that India was in the process of Non-Kinetic Physical developing different ASAT technologies, including directed-energy weapons, lasers, and electromag- Thus far, India does not appear to have developed netic pulses.408 However, beyond these general and tested non-kinetic physical counterspace statements and reports, the government of India weapons. However, the 2010 Technology Perspec- has not divulged any details of these activities. tive and Roadmap released by the Ministry of De- fense detailed that ASAT weapons “for electronic As a nuclear-armed state, India has the ability to or physical destruction of satellites (2,000 km al- launch a nuclear warhead into space as a coun- titude above earth’s surface) and geosynchronous terspace weapon. Theoretically, in addition to orbits” are a key area of future focus.405 Following the kinetic properties of the nuclear weapon, In- this, a new Technology Perspective and Capability dia could use the EMP effect from a high-altitude Roadmap in 2013 noted a focus on developments nuclear detonation to disable satellites. However, in electronic weapons, specifically miniaturization there is no publicly available indication that India of EW elements as payloads on satellites.406 is pursuing a nuclear EMP .

45 INDIA

Electronic “India has always India’s 2018 Technology Perspective and been opposed to the Capability Roadmap also shows invest- weaponization of space ment in an integrated EW system with and an arms race in outer requirements to “detect, monitor, lo- space, and this test does cate and jam enemy cellular receivers not in any way change this 411 and satellite communication receivers.” position.” Another planned system has similar re- quirements as the integrated system and PRIME MINISTER NARENDRA MODI 410 is intended to also be able to “carry out jamming & spoofing of satellite based po- sitioning systems.”412 However, India has not yet publicly demonstrated its jam- ming or spoofing capabilities. Cyber In 2019, the government of India set up the (DCA). Similar to the Defence Space Agency, the DCA is meant “to control and coordinate joint cyber operations.”413 There have been questions as to whether India may have some kind of cyber deterrence against enemy satellites with both space- and land-based systems; however, Union Min- ister has stated that such information is sensitive and therefore is unable to be confirmed or denied.414

SUMMARY

Although India has had a recent success- ful direct-ascent ASAT test, other types of counterspace weapons are far from devel- oped. As India focuses more on building out its space assets, as well as its counter- space assets, subsequent counterspace weapons tests may occur. While the 2019 ASAT test has certainly caused great de- bate in the international space commu- nity, the muted official international re- sponse sets a different precedence from the Chinese 2007 test. With little to no repercussions, India demonstrated that a lower-altitude ASAT test may be accepted by the international community.

46 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Number of Successful OTHERS Orbital Launches in 2019415 13

OTHERS

“I’m convinced that HILE THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS HAVE BEEN DEDICATED to the countries making the largest strides in counterspace capa- in the future, if we bilities—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and India—they are were to get into not the only ones thinking strategically about the changing a conflict with a Wspace environment. This chapter includes significant discussion and devel- peer or near-peer opments related to counterspace capabilities in other countries and non- competitor, we’re state actors. going to have to fight for space superiority.” FRANCE

GENERAL JOHN RAYMOND, CHIEF OF - AS THE THIRD OLDEST SPACE PROGRAM IN THE WORLD, France has ac- TIONS AND COMMANDER OF complished much since it first established its national space agency, the U.S. SPACE COMMAND416 Centre national d’études spatiales (CNES), in 1961. France launched its first satellite in 1965, led the development of the family of launch vehi- cles, and became one of the foremost European space powers through its strong relationship with the European Space Agency (ESA).417 In 2018, the CNES was a key partner of NASA’s Mars , pro- viding the InSight (Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geod- esy and Heat Transport) mission. InSight deployed a seismometer, named SEIS (Seismic Experiment for Interior Structures), which measures “Mars’ tectonic activity to learn more about its structure, for example the size of its core and the thickness of its mantle.”418 InSight landed on Mars in 2018 for its planned two-year mission, and in April 2019, the SEIS seismometer de- tected and recorded the first “Marsquake,” allowing scientists to study the slight tremors detected on the Martian surface.419

47 OTHERS

Deployment of the SEIS Protection Dome on Mars. / jpl-caltech

Recent events have triggered changes in France’s fense Strategy in 2019. Among other things, the overall space policy. In September 2018, France French strategy calls for the creation of a Space publicly charged Russia with interfering with the Command under the Air Force and renaming the operation of one of its satellites in GEO. The Athe- Air Force to the Air and Space Force. The strategy na-Fidus, a jointly operated French-Italian military notes that “renewed analysis of the space environ- satellite, provides broadband military communica- ment and its threats, risks and opportunities, as tions. France alleged that the Russian satellite, well as the recognition of the strategic nature of known as Luch or Olymp-K, maneuvered close the space assets for France force our country to re- enough to -Fidus in 2017 to intercept mili- visit its model in order to remain a leading space 420 tary communications. power.” The Space Defense Strategy further de- Following this public denunciation of Russian clares that France will establish a “space defense space activities, France issued a new Space De- capacity” in order to “enable the armed forces to

48 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 SUCCESSFUL ORBITAL LAUNCHES PER YEAR BY COUNTRY (1957-2019)

Figure 14: Space Orbital Launches from Oth- 20 CHINA er Nations (1957 - 2019). This figure includes INDIA orbital launches from nations such as New 00 USA RUSSIA Zealand and Japan, as well as the European OTHERS Space Agency. 0 spacetrack.org / csis aerospace 0 security421

0

20

0 0 0 0 0 2000 200 20

impose a peaceful use of space, deter dazzle or blind satellites that may be unfriendly or hostile acts against our threatening French assets. space assets, and be able, as the case A laser mounted on satellites is theoret- may be, to defend our space-based in- ically possible but faces some techno- 422 terests.” France has also committed logical hurdles. Laura Grego from the to increasing its military space budget Union of Concerned Scientists ex- by 700 million between 2019 and plained that “dazzling from accompa- 2025 to support the creation of Space nying satellites (probably not ‘nano’ Command and pursue “active defense” satellites unless that definition is very satellite technologies.423 The defense of generous) or onboard might stop other space assets appears to be in response slow moving proximity operations sat- to the interference France felt was ellites from observing their satellite caused by Luch. [targets] or to make it hard for them to In a speech announcing the new strate- use lidar for getting really close.” Dr. gy, French Minister of the Armed Forces Grego went on to assert that it would be Florecne Parly spoke at length about hard to use lasers on cross-orbit attacks the changes. In some of the most direct or direct-ascent ASAT weapons.425 and specific language by a government France’s public posture toward protect- official from any nation on space de- ing its space capabilities is shifting. The fense, the defense minister said, “I want country’s leaders are indicating a move to be precise: active defence is not an toward active defense in space, which offensive strategy, what it is about is has contributed to a broader public de- self-defence.” She went on to add that, “If our satellites are threatened, we will bate on the proper use and develop- consider dazzling those of our oppo- ment of counterspace weapons. While nents. We reserve the time and means countries like China and Russia have of the response: this may involve the been extensively developing offensive use of high-power lasers deployed from counterspace weapons, such as jam- our satellites or from our patrol na- ming and spoofing capabilities, France no-satellites.”424 Through these remarks seems to be considering a different Parly sheds further light on France’s strategy: defensive capabilities on or- plans to develop and deploy “body- bit. However, the country’s policies ap- guard” or “patrol” satellites to protect pear to be in flux, and there is little pub- its space assets, as well as its plans to lic indication of how quickly France mount lasers on satellites in order to plans to pursue this new direction.

49 OTHERS

by using GPS and Maps technolo- Israeli Missile Interceptor, -3, was ISRAEL gy. The spoofing targeted the relation- tested July 2019 out of the Pacific Spaceport in ship between the Tesla Model 3’s NOA .431 Designed to intercept medium-range In July 2019, the United States and Isra- system and the GPS it relied on to main- ballistic missiles, the Arrow-3 system has been el jointly tested the Arrow-3 missile in- tain autopilot. The test itself took place speculated to also be capable of performing 432 terceptor. While not publicly listed as a on an interstate and made the car be- direct-ascent anti-satellite operations. direct-ascent ASAT weapon, “the Ar- lieve it was further along on the route, row-3 interceptor successfully demon- causing it to make an incorrect turn into strated an engagement capability a rest stop instead of the planned exit against the exo-atmospheric target further down the road.429 In response to during the test.”426 Speculation of the these claims, Tesla stated that the test Arrow-3 system being used as an ASAT was only a promotional stunt and that weapon began in 2009 when leading they have no safety concerns with the space military experts pointed out that Tesla-3’s NOA.430 “Israel’s planned Arrow-3 high-altitude ballistic missile defense system could Israel has also begun development of a relatively easily be adapted to destroy ground-based and plane-mounted high-en- Iranian spy satellites if and when Tehran ergy laser defense system designed to tar- manages to deploy high-resolution or- get threats in the air. Currently it has no stat- biting vehicles.”427 ed counterspace implications, but the The Israeli company Regulus claims to technology could be adapted to perform have spoofed a Tesla Model 3 using the some counterspace operations. With a Navigate on Autopilot (NOA) system.428 power level of 50-100kW, this airborne laser The purpose of the NOA system is to fol- could be capable of daZzling or even low a predetermined route maintained blinding satellites in LEO.433

50 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 stations necessary to conduct these de- JAPAN fense operations.437

In the past year, Japan has made progress Japan is also reportedly considering the THE JAPANESE toward setting up a new Space Domain development of active defenses to protect Mission Unit, a its space systems. Using robotic arm tech- GOVERNMENT meant to protect Japanese space assets nology developed by JAXA, the Japanese as more countries are moving to further government is debating options to devel- IS DEBATING weaponize space through the testing and op a co-orbital satellite defense system to OPTIONS TO development of kinetic and non-kinetic deter attacks on Japanese satellites. This weapons.434 Citing Japan’s need “to pro- system, which would intercept an attack- DEVELOP A tect itself from potential threats as rivals ing satellite in order to defend another develop missiles and other technology,” Japanese space asset, could be launched CO-ORBITAL Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said this new as early as the mid-.438 The govern- organization will work closely with its ment is also reportedly considering op- SATELLITE American counterpart, the United States tions to disable hostile satellites through Space Force. The Space Domain Mission electronic and cyber means.439 DEFENSE Unit will also cooperate with the newly In April of 2019, Japan deployed a Hayabu- re-established U.S. Space Command and SYSTEM. Japan’s own civil space agency, the Japan sa-2 probe system to an , Ryugu, Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA).435 which contained a small carry-on impac- With a small core established in 2020, the tor (SCI). The SCI is an explosive Space Domain Mission Unit plans to be able to be launched at the asteroid to form fully operational in 2022 to “bolster capa- an artificial crater. This explosive, which bility and system[s] in order to secure created rubble for -2 to collect space superiority.”436 After its establish- and bring back to Earth as samples, could ment, the Space Domain Mission Unit will be placed on a satellite and be used as a be responsible for operating the ground co-orbital anti-satellite weapon.440

Spoofing in the CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MARINE GPS USERS reported consistent loss of GPS signal in the Mediterranean Sea and surrounding areas throughout 2019. These outages ranged from the coast of Libya to Greece and ’s Suez Canal. The U.S. Maritime Administra- tion issued alerts that specifically mention the possibility of GPS interference in the East- ern and Central Mediterranean regions.441 The increased instances of GPS jamming have led captains to suppress their AIS data and switch to receive only. This has led to a de- crease in situational awareness on the sea.442

Greece Turkey Pireaus

East of Malta Valletta Larnaca Sabratha Field Tripoli Mediterranean Sea Damietta El Shaikh Mobarak Misurata Port Said

Alexandria

Port Suez

Libya Egypt u.s. coast guard navigation center / emily tiemeyer

51 OTHERS

   EUROPE

ASIA

Pacific

 Arabian Sea  

Atlantic Ocean Route of the container ship used to detect and record interference to GPS and other systems OCEANIA

United Kingdom is developing its own Figure 15: The Journey of the UNITED high-energy laser for anti-drone and mis- Basle Express. The Basle Ex- press was a cargo ship outfitted KINGDOM sile defense. These lasers, while not di- with GPS receivers designed to rectly cited as counterspace weapons, track and collect GPS interfer- The United Kingdom has be- have the potential to be further devel- ence. The ship travelled from gun restructuring its military oped into counterspace capabilities.445 Germany to Singapore tracking and detailing many instances of space organization, although GPS interference. it does not plan to create a separate for space. The current restructur- NON-STATE ACTORS ing effort should result in a In 2019, reports emerged of position, two-star be- navigation, and timing (PNT) jamming in coming the director of Space northeastern China, disrupting civilian within the Ministry of Defence, supported by policy and capa- aircraft flying over the area. Authorities bilities teams.443 This comes were able to trace the jamming origin to after the U.K. government de- a farm in Heilongjiang province near the clared space as part of its criti- city of Harbin. Frustrated by a local cal national infrastructure in gang’s hijinks of using drones to suppos- 2015 and more recently as a edly infect local farmers’ pigs with Afri- warfighting domain.444 While can swine fever—a disease deadly to the UK has not explicitly en- pigs, but harmless to —the farm- dorsed the development of er used PNT signal jamming to protect space defense systems and his herd. The gangs were infecting local counterspace weapons, the pigs to force farmers to lower the prices requisite technology is within and then would resell the pork to the its reach. For example, the public as “healthy” for the full price.446

52 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 In 2018, at Hong Kong’s 10-year celebra- tion of the Wine and Dine Festival, a drone light show over Victoria Harbor was disrupted by GPS jamming, which caused 46 drones to fall from the sky, re- sulting in $127,500 in damages.447 In re- sponse to questions about the incident, the board’s executive director, Anthony Lau Chun-hon, said that “the [jamming] signals were so strong that many of them just dropped from the air.”448 In April of 2017, a commercial container ship, the Basle Express, left Hamburg, Germany on a research mission equipped with receivers designed to pick up on in- terference. The Basle Express mission was designed to sense levels of jamming and spoofing in different areas of the world.449 While travelling around Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and , the ship’s crew detected strong interference “at some of the world’s largest seaports, including Jeddah in , Singa- pore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, and less often, on the open sea.”450 With many commercial vessels poorly suited to op- erating in a world where GPS is not guar- anteed, some experts are recommend- ing that new anti-jamming systems will need to be created to ensure that com- mercial shipping can continue unthreat- ened in an increasingly technology-de- pendent world.451

SUMMARY

In the last year, more states are consider- ing the development of offensive and de- fensive counterspace capabilities to pro- tect space systems from attacks. Nations are moving to reorganize their national security space enterprise, as the United States did in 2019, to better address the growing uncertainty and threats in the space domain. Jamming and spoofing technologies are also being used around the world by non-state actors in both conflict zones and thriving seaports, to gain military and economic advantage. Collectively, these developments are making the space environment more dy- namic and uncertain—a trend that is likely to continue in the coming years.

53 WHAT TO WATCH

WHAT TO WATCH

HIS YEAR’S EDITION OF THE CSIS SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT finds that threats to space systems are growing as more countries and non-state actors acquire counterspace capabilities and, in some cases, employ them in more ways. While this report primari- Tly details the developments in counterspace weapons that have occured in the last year, some of these developments have been ongoing for several years. This section highlights the types of threats and counterspace activi- ties where more developments are expected to occur in the coming months and years. Electronic counterspace weapons continue to proliferate at a rapid pace in both how they are used and who is using them. Satellite jamming and spoof- ing devices are becoming part of the every-day arsenal for countries that want to operate in the gray zone—i.e., below the threshold of overt conflict. The jamming and spoofing of satellites has become somewhat common, and without strong repercussions these adverse activities could gradually become normalized. The fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to travel with GPS jamming devices in his motorcade and that China ap- pears to be spoofing GPS signals to conceal illicit activities in its own ports demonstrate how important and integrated these capabilities have become at all levels. One should expect that the rate of satellite jamming and spoof- ing incidents will only increase as these capabilities continue to proliferate and become more sophisticated in the coming years.

54 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 One of the most significant counterspace as an independent military service for developments in the past year was the In- space, many things are in flux within the dian test of a direct-ascent ASAT weapon. military space community. While there is This incident proved that a kinetic test great in this reorganization done in a way that minimizes orbital de- process, there are many risks as well. A bris may not generate the same degree of chief concern is that an excessive focus diplomatic backlash as the Chinese ASAT on building bureaucracy (and attempts test in 2007. Moreover, the Indian test to limit bureaucracy) could distract sen- and how it was received could incentivize ior leaders’ attention from the evolving other nations, such as Pakistan, to devel- threats to space systems and the U.S. op and demonstrate ASAT capabilities of military’s efforts to counter these threats. their own. Key developments to watch within the Russia also continued to step up its co-or- United States are updates to space doc- bital activities in the past year. The Rus- trine, strategy, and policy and invest- sian Luch satellite continued its close ments in new space capabilities and inspection of satellites in geostationary missions. Developments in these areas orbit, despite international denuncia- would be a clear indication that the reor- tion of its activities. Russia also placed a ganization efforts put in place in 2019 are widely-reported inspector around a clas- part of a fundamental shift in the U.S. mil- sified U.S. Government satellite in low itary’s overall approach to making space Earth orbit. Both the Indian ASAT test and more defendable. Russia’s co-orbital activities may provide further incentive for nations to develop and deploy defensive counterspace capa- bilities of their own, as France announced it intends to do. Nations may also seek to draw distinctions between offensive and defensive counterspace weapons in order to justify the latter while delegitimizing the former. As nations reevaluate the threats to their space systems, some have moved to reor- ganize existing space organizations or cre- ate new military organizations to better focus on space as a warfighting domain. France is creating a Space Command within its military and renaming its Air Force the Air and Space Force, while the United Kingdom may not be far behind in reorganizing its space forces. In the com- ing years, more nations may continue to reorganize and elevate space forces with- in their both to focus attention internally and to signal externally. A final area to watch in the coming year is how the United States continues to adapt to face threats in the space domain. The U.S. military is in the midst of what is ar- guably the most significant reorganiza- tion since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. With the re-establishment of United States Space Command as a geographic combatant command for space and the new establishment of the Space Force

55 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

TODD HARRISON is the director of the Aerospace Security Project and the director of Defense Budget Analysis at CSIS. As a senior fellow in the International Security Program, he leads the Center’s efforts to provide in-depth, nonpartisan research and analysis of space security, air power, and defense funding issues. Mr. Harrison joined CSIS from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, where he was a senior fellow for de- fense budget studies. He previously worked at Booz Allen Hamilton where he consulted for the U.S. Air Force on satellite communications systems and supported a variety of other clients evaluating the performance of acquisition programs. Prior to Booz Allen, he worked for a small startup (AeroAstro Inc.) developing advanced space technologies and as a management consultant at Diamond Cluster International. Mr. Harrison served as a captain in the U.S. Air Force Reserves. He is a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with both a BS and an MS in aeronautics and astronautics. KAITLYN JOHNSON is an associate fellow and associate director of the CSIS Aerospace Security Project. Ms. Johnson manages the team’s strategic planning and research agenda. Her research specializes in topics such as space security, military space sys- tems, commercial space policy, and U.S. air dominance. Previously, Ms. Johnson has written on national security space reorganization, threats against space assets, the commercialization of space, escalation and deterrence dynamics, and defense acqui- sition trends. Ms. Johnson holds an MA from American University in U.S. foreign policy and national security studies, with a concentration in defense and space security, and a BS from the Georgia Institute of Technology in international affairs. THOMAS G. ROBERTS is an adjunct fellow with the CSIS Aerospace Security Project, a graduate researcher at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Space Systems Laboratory, and an SM candidate in MIT’s Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Technology and Policy Program. His research interests include , astrodynamics, and international space policy. Previously, Mr. Roberts has written on space-based missile defense, threats against space-based assets, and human space- flight programs. His work has appeared in The Atlantic, War on the Rocks, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and other publications. Mr. Roberts holds a BA in astrophysical sciences with honors and an undergraduate certificate in Russian studies from Prince- ton University. In 2015, he was named a Harry S. Truman Scholar. TYLER WAY is a research intern for the CSIS Aerospace Security Project. His research focuses on the applications of space within national security as well as the role of space in socioeconomic development. He is currently a graduate student at George Washington University’s Elliott School, pursuing an MA in International Science and Technology Policy in the Space Policy Institute. Tyler holds a BA in International Stud- ies from Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. MAKENA YOUNG is a research associate with the CSIS Aerospace Security Project. Her research interests include international collaboration, space security, and orbital de- bris. Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Young worked for the Federal Aviation Administration as an aerospace engineer, focusing on automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast cer- tification and integration in small aircraft. She holds a BS in aeronautical and astronau- tical engineering from Purdue University with minors in international relations and environmental engineering.

56 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 APPENDIX I LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial AEHF Advanced Extremely AIS Automatic Identification System APT 28 Russian ASAT Anti-Satellite BBC British Broadcasting Corporation C4ADS Center for Advanced Defense Studies C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4), Intelligence, Surveil- lance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) CASC China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation CHEOS China High-resolution Earth Observation System CNES National Centre for Space Studies (France) CNSA China National Space Administration CSS Chinese Space Station DCA Defence Cyber Agency (India) DDOS Distributed Denial of Service DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DoD U.S. Department of Defense DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DSA Defence Space Agency (India) DSN Deep Space Network DSRO Defence Space Research Organization (India) EMP Electromagnetic Pulse ESA European Space Agency EW Electronic Warfare FSO Federal Protective Service GBS Global Broadcast Service GEO GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System (Russia) GPS Global GSLV Launch Vehicle HPM High Powered Microwave ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IS Istrebitel Sputnikov (Russia) ISA ISRO Indian Space Research Organization ISS International Space Station

57 JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory JSOC Joint Special Operations Command KCNA Korean Central News Agency (North Korea) LEO MEO MMW Millimeter Wave NADA National Aerospace Development Administration (North Korea) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NIIPKh Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry (Russia) NOA Navigate on Autopilot NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration NOTAM Notice to Airmen NRO U.S. National Reconnaissance Office PDV-Mk II Prithvi Delivery Vehicle Mark-II (India) PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) PNT Positioning, Navigation, and Timing PSLV Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle RF Radio Frequency RGB Reconnaissance General Bureau (North Korea) RPO Rendezvous and Proximity Operations State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry SASTIND for National Defense SATCOM Satellite Communications SCI Small Carry-On Impactor SEIS Seismic Experiment for Interior Structures SLV Space Launch Vehicle SSF Strategic Support Force (China) SSLV Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (India) SSO Sun-Synchronous Orbit TEL Transporter erector-launcher UH UK United Kingdom VOA WGS Widespread Global SATCOM (Satellite Communications)

58 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 ENDNOTES

TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS 1 Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: December 2017), 31, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 2 Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1985), 7, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a335693.pdf. 3 Brian Garino and Jane Gibson, “Space System Threats,”. in AU-18 Space Primer (: Air University Press, September 2009), 277, http://space.au.af.mil/au-18-2009/au-18_chap21.pdf. 4 David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Acad- emy of Arts and Sciences, 2005), 131-132, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/publication/downloads/Physics_of_Space_ Security. pdf. 5 Steven James Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 123. 6 Garino and Gibson, “Space System Threats,” 274-275. 7 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “US Jammed Own Satellites 261Times; What If Enemy Did?,” Breaking Defense, December 2, 2015, http:// break ­ingdefense.com/2015/12/us-jammed-own-satellites-261-times-in-2015-what-if-an-enemy-tried/. 8 Richard B. Langley et al., “Innovation: GNSS Spoofing Detection,” GPS World, June 1, 2013, http://gpsworid.com/innovation-gnss -spoofing-detection-correlating-carrier-phase-with-ra pid-antenna-motion/. 9 Allie Sanchez, “Cyber Attacks Available for Hire,” Insurance Business America, April 3, 2017, https://www.insurancebusinessmag. com/us/ news/cyber/cyber-attacks-available-for-hire-64287.aspx.

CHINA 10 “Space Environment: Total Launches by Country,” Aerospace Security Program, last updated January 2, 2020, https://aerospace.csis.org/ data/space-environment-total-launches-by-country/. 11 Dave Makichuk, “China’s Bold Space Program Flourishing: Article,” Asia Times, November 5, 2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/11/ article/chinas-bold-space-program-flourishing. 12 “Space Environment: Total Launches by Country,” Aerospace Security Program. 13 “China reveals space plan for 2020,” , January 17, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/17/c_138713906.htm. 14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2019 (Washington, DC: U.S. De- partment of Defense, May 2019), 49, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF. 15 Andrew Jones, “China’s First Mars Spacecraft Undergoing Integration for 2020 Launch,” SpaceNews, May 29, 2019, https://spacenews.com/ chinas-first-mars-spacecraft-undergoing-integration-for-2020-launch; Andrew Jones, “Rocket Nears Spaceport for Chinese Space Station Test Launch,” SpaceNews, , 2020, https://spacenews.com/rocket-nears-spaceport-for-chinese-space-station-test-launch/. 16 Xinhua News Agency “China’s Long March-5B carrier rocket arrives at launch site,” China.org, February 6, 2020, http://www.china.org.cn/ china/2020-02/06/content_75677139.htm. 17 Jones, “Rocket Nears Spaceport for Chinese Space Station Test Launch.” 18 Namrata Goswami, “China’s Future Space Ambitions: What’s Ahead?,” Diplomat, November 4, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/chi-� nas-future-space-ambitions-whats-ahead/. 19 “Space Environment: Total Payloads Launched by Country,” accessed February 12, 2020. 20 “What’s driving China’s race to build a space station?,” ChinaPower, CSIS, December 7, 2016, https://chinapower.csis.org/chinese-space-station/. 21 Andrew Jones, “Chinese Space Station Core Module Passes Review but Faces Delays,” SpaceNews, September 12, 2019, https://spacenews. com/chinese-space-station-core-module-passes-review-but-faces-delays/. 22 Ibid.; Yamei Liwei Yang, “China readying for space station era,” Xinhua News Agency, July 8, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/en-� glish/2018-07/08/c_137310103.htm. 23 Ludovic Ehret, “China Unveils New ‘Heavenly Palace’ Space Station as ISS Days Numbered,” Phys.org, November 6, 2018, https://phys.org/ news/2018-11-china-unveils-heavenly-palace-space.html. 24 Office of Outer Space Affairs, “The United Nations/China Cooperation on the Utilization of the China Space Station,” United Nations, June 19, 2020, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/psa/hsti/chinaspacestation/1st_cycle_2018.html. 25 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “2019 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Com- mission” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019), 368, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019%20 Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf; Andrew Jones, “China, Russia to Cooperate on Lunar Orbiter, Landing Missions,” Space News, September 19, 2019, https://spacenews.com/china-russia-to-cooperate-on-lunar-orbiter-landing-missions/. 26 Thomas G. Roberts, Spaceports of the World, Aerospace Security Project, CSIS, accessed February 12, 2020, https://aerospace.csis.org/data/ spaceports-of-the-world/. 27 Andrew Jones, “China Creates Commercial Space Alliance, Expands Launch Complex,” SpaceNews, December 20, 2019, https://spacenews. com/china-creates-commercial-space-alliance-expands-launch-complex/.

59 28 Roberts, “Spaceports of the World.” 29 Meng Jing, “China Rolls out Rules on Commercial Space Rocket Development,” South China Morning Post, June 12, 2019, https://www. scmp.com/tech/science-research/article/3014157/china-rolls-out-rules-guide-development--style. 30 Jing, “China Rolls out Rules on Commercial Space Rocket Development”; Andrew Jones, “Chinese Commercial Launch Sector Regulations Released, New Launch Vehicle Plans Unveiled,” SpaceNews, July 2, 2019, https://spacenews.com/chinese-commercial-launch-sector-regu-� lations-released-new-launch-vehicle-plans-unveiled. 31 Marco Aliberti, When China Goes to the Moon... (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015), 7-19, https://www.springer.com/cda/ content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9783319194721-c1.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1513274-p177396349. 32 Dennis J. Blasko, “Steady as She Goes: China’s New Defense White Paper,” War on the Rocks, August 9, 2019, https://warontherocks. com/2019/08/steady-as-she-goes-chinas-new-defense-white-paper. 33 Li Jiayao, ed., “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, Xinhua News Agen- cy, July 24, 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2019-07/24/content_4846443.htm. 34 Ibid. 35 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s (Beijing, China: People’s Republic of China, May 2015), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm. 36 Kevin Pollpeter, Michael Chase, and Eric Heginbotham, The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Mili- tary Space Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 3-4, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/ RR2000/RR2058/RAND_RR2058.pdf. 37 Ibid., 7. 38 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2019,” 13. 39 , U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Military Reforms and Modernization: Implications for the United States, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 15, 2018, 40, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/Hear-� ing%20Transcript%20-%20February%2015%2C%202018.pdf. 40 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Competing in Space (Wright Patterson Air Force Base: Ohio, December 2018), 21, https://media. defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF. 41 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2019 Report to Congress, 375. 42 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2019, 49. 43 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “2015 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2015), 294,https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_re-� ports/2015%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.PDF. 44 Independent analysis by Kaitlyn Johnson; data from “Space-Track,” Space-Track, www.space-track.org. 45 Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, eds., Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment (Broomfield, : Secure World Foundation, 2018), 1–11, https://swfound.org/media/206118/swf_global_counterspace_april2018.pdf. 46 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, (Washington, DC: 2018), 43, http://www.dia.mil/ Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_ 5MB_20190103.pdf. 47 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report to Congress, 294. 48 “SC-19 Anti-Ballistic Missile Interceptor,” GlobalSecurity.org, last updated July 25, 2016, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/chi-� na/sc-19-abm.htm. 49 Li Bin, “What China’s Missile Intercept Test Means,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 4, 2013, https://carnegieendow-� ment.org/2013/02/04/what-china-s-missile-intercept-test-means-pub-50833. 50 Brian Weeden, “Anti-Satellite Tests in Space - The Case of China,” Secure World Foundation, updated May 18, 2015, https://swfound.org/ media/115643/china_asat_fact_sheet_may2015.pdf. 51 “China Tests Missile Intercept System,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 28, 2013, https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/china-tests-missile-inte-� cept-system; Bin, “What China’s Missile Intercept Test Means.” 52 Mike Gruss, “Pentagon Says 2013 Chinese Launch May Have Tested Antisatellite Technology,” SpaceNews, May 14, 2015, https://spacenews. com/pentagon-says-2013-chinese-launch-may-have-tested-antisatellite-technology. 53 Weeden, “Anti-Satellite Tests in Space - The Case of China.” 54 Gruss, “Pentagon Says 2013 Chinese Launch May Have Tested Antisatellite Technology.” 55 Mike Gruss, “U.S. State Department: China Tested Anti-Satellite Weapon,” SpaceNews, January 30, 2015, https://spacenews. com/41413us-state-department-china-tested-anti-satellite-weapon. 56 Bill Gertz, “China Tests Anti-Satellite Missile,” Washington Free Beacon, November 9, 2015, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/chi-� na-tests-anti-satellite-missile/. 57 Ibid. 58 Bill Gertz, “China Carries Out Flight Test of Anti-Satellite Missile,” Washington Free Beacon, August 2, 2017, https://freebeacon.com/nation-� al-security/china-carries-flight-test-anti-satellite-missile. 59 Ankit Panda, “Revealed: The Details of China’s Latest Hit-To-Kill Interceptor Test,” Diplomat, February 21, 2018, https://thediplomat. com/2018/02/revealed-the-details-of-chinas-latest-hit-to-kill-interceptor-test. 60 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2019 Report to Congress, 382.

60 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 61 Ibid. 62 Brian Weeden, “China’s BX-1 microsatellite: a litmus test for space weaponization,” The Space Review, October 20, 2008, http://www.thes-� pacereview.com/article/1235/1. 63 Weeden and Samson, eds., Global Counterspace Capabilities, 1-2. 64 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report to Congress, 295. 65 Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the dark: The orbital rendezvous of SJ-12 and SJ-06F,” The Space Review, August 10, 2010, http://www.thespa- cereview.com/article/1689/1. 66 Pollpeter, et al., The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force, 10. 67 “China Successfully Launches Three Satellites,” Economic Times, July 20, 2013, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/china-successful-� ly-launches-three-satellites/articleshow/21187532.cms. 68 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report to Congress, 295; Weeden and Samson, eds., Global Counterspace Capabilities, 1-2. 69 Ibid.; “China’s new Orbital Debris Clean-Up Satellite raises Space Militarization Concerns,” Spaceflight 101, June 29, 2016, http://space-� flight101.com/long-march-7-maiden-launch/aolong-1-asat-concerns/. 70 Stephen Chen, “How China’s Scavenger Satellites Are Being Used to Develop AI Weapons,” South China Morning Post, April 22, 2019, https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3007186/how-chinas-scavenger-satellites-are-being-used-develop-ai. 71 “China announces success in technology to refuel satellites in orbit,” Xinhua News Agency, June 30, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2016-06/30/c_135479061.htm. 72 Internal CSIS analysis by Thomas G. 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Fisher, Jr., “China’s Progress with Directed Energy Weapons,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 23, 2017, 9, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Fisher_Combined.pdf. 92 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report to Congress, 298.

61 93 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 20. 94 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Washington, DC: U.S. De- partment of Defense, May 2018), 21, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT. PDF. 95 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report to Congress, 297-298. 96 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 20; Lin Jinshun et al., “Study on Countermeasure against Satellite Adaptive Null-Steering Technique,” Aerospace Electronic Warfare 26, no. 3 (March 2010): 1-4, http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFD- Total-HTDZ201003000.htm; and H. Wang, “Analysis on Anti-jamming Measures of Mobile User Objective System,” Radio Communica- tions Technology 35, no. 2 (2009): 46-49. 97 Lin Jin-shun, et al., “Countermeasure Technology for MMW Satellite Links,” Aerospace Electronic Warfare, October 2012, 20–22, http:// en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTotal-HTDZ201205006.htm, as quoted in David D. Chen, “Opening Statement of Mr. David Chen,” 82. 98 Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: China targets Global Hawk drone,” Washington Times, December 11, 2013, https://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2013/dec/11/inside-the-ring-china-targets-global-hawk-drone/. 99 Liu Xuanzun, “China Capable of Defending against Deadly Drone Attacks: Experts,” Global Times, January 5, 2020, https://www.globaltimes. cn/content/1175804.shtml. 100 Michael R. Gordon and Jeremy Page, “China Installed Military Jamming Equipment on Spratly Islands, U.S. Says,” Journal, April 9, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-installed-military-jamming-equipment-on-spratly-islands-u-s-says-1523266320. 101 “Vietnam Demands That China Remove Military Jamming Equipment from Spratly Islands,” VnExpress International, April 26, 2018, https://e. vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnam-demands-that-china-remove-military-jamming-equipment-from-spratly-islands-3741545.html. 102 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 23 and 49. 103 Sebastien Roblin, “Why China’s J-16D Electronic Warfare Plane Is a Really Big Deal,” National Interest, November 20, 2019, https://nation-� alinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-chinas-j-16d-electronic-warfare-plane-really-big-deal-97677. 104 Dana Goward, “GPS Jamming and Spoofing Reported at Port of Shanghai,” Maritime Executive, August 13, 2019, https://www.maritime-ex-� ecutive.com/editorials/gps-jamming-and-spoofing-at-port-of-shanghai; Mark Harris, “Ghost Ships, Crop Circles, and Soft Gold: A GPS Mystery in Shanghai,” MIT Technology Review, November 20, 2019, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614689/ghost-ships-crop-circles- and-soft-gold-a-gps-mystery-in-shanghai; Joseph Trevithick, “New Type Of GPS Spoofing Attack In China Creates ‘Crop Circles’ Of False Location Data,” The Drive, November 18, 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/31092/new-type-of-gps-spoofing-attack-in-china- creates-crop-circles-of-false-location-data. 105 “GPS Problem Report Status,” U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, accessed February 13, 2020, https://navcen.uscg.gov/?Do=GPS ReportStatus#definition. 106 Harris, “Ghost Ships, Crop Circles, and Soft Gold: A GPS Mystery in Shanghai.” 107 Tyler Rogoway, “China’s Mysterious Spoofed GPS ‘Crop Circle’ Has Something Interesting At Its Center,” The Drive, November 19, 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/31098/chinas-mysterious-spoofed-gps-data-crop-circle-has-something-interesting-at-its-center. 108 Harris, “Ghost Ships, Crop Circles, and Soft Gold: A GPS Mystery in Shanghai.” 109 Bjorn Bergman, “Systematic GPS Manipulation Occuring at Chinese Oil Terminals and Government Installations,” SkyTruth, December 16, 2019, https://skytruth.org/2019/12/systematic-gps-manipulation-occuring-at-chinese-oil-terminals-and-government-installations. 110 Ibid. 111 Harris, “Ghost Ships, Crop Circles, and Soft Gold: A GPS Mystery in Shanghai.” 112 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 21. 113 Ibid., 20-21. 114 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing, China: People’s Republic of China, May 2015), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm. 115 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report to Congress, 296. 116 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, 46. 117 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report to Congress, 296. 118 Sui-Lee Wee, “China Denies It Is behind Hacking of U.S. Satellites,” Reuters, October 31, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-china-us-hacking/china-denies-it-is-behind-hacking-of-u-s-satellites-idUSTRE79U1YI20111031. 119 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015 Report to Congress, 296. 120 NASA Office of the Inspector General, Cybersecurity Management and Oversight at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory Washington, DC: 2019), 8-9, https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-19-022.pdf. 121 Ibid. 122 Mary Pat Flaherty, Jason Samenow and Lisa Rein, “Chinese hack U.S. weather systems, satellite network,” Washington Post, November 12, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/chinese-hack-us-weather-systems-satellite-network/2014/11/12/bef1206a-68e9-11e4-b053- 65cea7903f2e_story.html. 123 Yatish Yadav, “Hackers from China Break into Secret Indian Government Video Chat,” New Indian Express, November 19, 2017, http://www. newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/nov/19/hackers-from-china-break-into-secret-indian-government-video-chat-1705010.html. 124 Chris Bing, “Chinese Hacking Group Resurfaces, Targets U.S. Satellite Companies and Systems,” Cyberscoop, June 19, 2018, https://www. cyberscoop.com/symantec-thrip-satellite-hacking-trojans/.

62 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 125 Joel Schectman and Christopher Bing, “UAE Used Cyber Super-weapon to Spy on IPhones of Foes,” Reuters, January 30, 2019, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-spying-karma-exclusive/exclusive-uae-used-cyber-super-weapon-to-spy-on-iphones-of-foes-idUSKCN- 1PO1AN. 126 Sean O’, “Chinese Hackers Charged with Stealing Data from NASA, IBM, and Others,” The Verge, December 20, 2018, https://www. theverge.com/2018/12/20/18150275/chinese-hackers-stealing-data-nasa-ibm-charged. 127 Internal CSIS analysis by Thomas G. Roberts; data from “Space-Track,” Space-Track, www.space-track.org.

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63 151 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, press release, December 25, 2014, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 152 “Militarization, Weaponization, and the Prevention of an Arms Race,” Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/ fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space. 153 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Russia Puts Onus on US for Early Outer Space Rules after India’s Test,” Economic Times, March 29, 2019, https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/russia-puts-onus-us-for-early-outer-space-rules-after--test/articleshow/68626644. cms?from=mdr. 154 Dara Massicot, “Anticipating a New Russian Military Doctrine in 2020: What It Might Contain and Why It Matters,” War on the Rocks, September 9, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/anticipating-a-new-russian-military-doctrine-in-2020-what-it-might-contain-and-why-it-matters/. 155 “Рогозин: Россия не использует спутники для повреждения космических аппаратов других стран,” TASS, October 1, 2018, https:// tass.ru/kosmos/5624853. 156 Jason Lemon, “Russia Will ‘Respond’ to ‘New Threats’ Created by Trump’s Space Militarization, Russian Army Official Warns,” Newsweek, March 4, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-respond-threats-trump-space-militarization-1350861. 157 “Putin Urges Greater Attention to Strengthening Orbital Group of Satellites,” TASS, December 4, 2019, https://tass.com/science/1095757. 158 Asif A. Siddiqi, “The Soviet Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite System: A Synopsis,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 50, no. 6 (1997): 225- 40, http://faculty.fordham.edu/siddiqi/writings/p7_siddiqi_jbis_is_history_1997.pdf. 159 Anatoly Zak, “IS Anti-Satellite System,” Russian Space Web, July 31, 2017, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html. 160 Anatoly Zak, “Naryad Anti-Satellite System (14F11),” Russian Space Web, November 30, 2017, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/naryad.html. 161 Ibid. 162 Note: “PL-19” is a Western identifier (corresponding to the 19th system in its category observed from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome), while “Nudol” is a Russian identifier; Amanda Macias and Michael Sheetz, “Russia Conducted Another Successful Test of and Anti-satellite Mis- sile, According to a Classified US Intelligence Report,” CNBC, January 18, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/russia-succeeds-in-mo- bile-anti-satellite-missile-test-us-intelligence-report.html. 163 Bill Gertz, “Russia Flight Tests Anti-Satellite Missile,” Washington Free Beacon, December 2, 2015, https://freebeacon.com/national-securi- ty/russia-conducts-successful-flight-test-of-anti-satellite-missile/. 164 “Russia’s ASAT Development Takes Aim at LEO Assets,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2018, 1 https://www.janes.com/images/as-� sets/591/81591/Russias_ASAT_development_takes_aim_at_LEO_assets.pdf. 165 Ibid. 166 “S-500 ,” Missile Threat, CSIS, September 28, 2017, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/s-500-prometheus/. 167 Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy,” RealClearDefense, April 28, 2017, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/04/28/ russian_nuclear_weapons_policy_111261.html. 168 Steve Lambakis, Foreign Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. National Security (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, National Institute for Public Policy, 2017), http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Foreign-Space-Capabilities-pub-2017.pdf; “Russia Tests S-500 Air Defense System,” Missile Threat, CSIS, September 28, 2017, https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-successfully-tests-s-500-air-defense- system/; and Leonid Khayremdinov, “Обрести Навык Атак в Стратосфере,” Красная Звезда, March 1, 2019, http://redstar.ru/obresti-na- vyk-atak-v-stratosfere/, quoted in Julian Cooper, “Russia’s ‘Invincible’ Weapons: An Update,” Changing Character of War Centre, March 27, 2019, http://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/blog/2019/3/27/russias-invincible-weapons-an-update-by-julian-cooper. 169 “Russia’s ASAT Development Takes Aim at LEO Assets,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1. 170 “Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-31BM Foxhound,” JetPhotos, September 14, 2018, https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/9074544; Amanda Macias, “A Never-before-seen Russian Missile Is Identified as an Anti-satellite Weapon and Will Be Ready for Warfare by 2022,” CNBC, October 25, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/25/russian-missile-identified-as-anti-satellite-weapon-ready-by-2022.html. 171 James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Febru- ary 9, 2016, 10, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf. 172 Alexander Zudin, “Russia to Deploy Anti-satellite Weapon on MiG-31BM,” IHS Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, February 22, 2017. 173 “Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-31BM Foxhound,” JetPhotos; and Amanda Macias, “A Never-before-seen Russian Missile Is Identified as an Anti-sat- ellite Weapon and Will Be Ready for Warfare by 2022.” 174 Mike Wall, “‘Very Abnormal’ Russian Satellite Doesn’t Seems So Threatening, Experts Say,” Space.com, August 16, 2018, https://www.space. com/41511-weird-russian-satellite-not-so-abnormal.html. 175 Jonathan McDowell, “International Space Station,” Jonathan’s Space Report, No. 752, August 17, 2018, http://planet4589.org/space/jsr/ back/news.752.txt. 176 Bart Hendrickx, “Russia Develops Co-orbital Anti-satellite Capability,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 27, 2018, 2. 177 Sandra Erwin, “Raymond calls out Russia for ‘threatening behavior’ in outer space,” SpaceNews, February 10, 2020, https://spacenews. com/raymond-calls-out-russia-for-threatening-behavior-in-outer-space/. 178 Hendrickx, “Russia Develops Co-orbital Anti-satellite Capability,” 3. 179 Bart Hendrickx, “OSINT Snapshot: New Russian satellites likely to have inspection role,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 25, 2019, 1; Bart Hendrickx, “Russia’s Secret Satellite Builder,” Space Review, May 6, 2019, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3709/1. 180 “Orbital Launches of 2019,” Gunter’s Space Page, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_chr/lau2019.htm; and Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “Russian Aerospace Forces successfully launches Soyuz-2 lanch vehicle from Plesetsk Cosmodrome,” Russian Federa- tion, November 26, 2019, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12263690@egNews.

64 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 181 Anatoly Zak, “Soyuz-2-1v Launches Classified Payload,” Russian Space Web, January 29, 2020, accessed on February 2, 2020, http://www. russianspaceweb.com/cosmos-2542.html. 182 Ibid. 183 Jonathan McDowell, Twitter post, January 31, 2020, 8:37 p.m., https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1223420130576818176. 184 Michael Thompson, Twitter post, January 31, 2020, 11:40 p.m., https://twitter.com/M_R_Thomp/status/1223466202967760896. 185 Erwin, “Raymond calls out Russia.” 186 Hendrickx, “Russia Develops Co-orbital Anti-satellite Capability,” 1. 187 Ibid., 6. 188 Hendrickx, “Russia’s Secret Satellite Builder.” 189 “Космический аппарат ‹Луч› выведен на расчетную орбиту,” Aviation Explorer, September 29, 2014, https://www.aex.ru/ news/2014/9/29/125060/. 190 Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the dark redux: Recent Russian rendezvous and proximity operations in space,” Space Review, October 5, 2015, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2839/2. 191 Ibid.; Laurence Peter, “Russia Shrugs off US Anxiety over ,” BBC News, October 20, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-34581089. 192 “Luch (Olimp-K),” Gunter’s Space Page, 2019, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/olimp-k.htm. 193 Thomas G. Roberts, “Unusual Behavior in GEO: Luch (Olymp-K),” Aerospace Security Project, CSIS, accessed March 01, 2020, https://aerospace. csis.org/data/unusual-behavior-in-geo-olymp-k/. 194 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” (speech, Manezh Central Exhibition Hall, Moscow, Russia, March 1, 2018), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. 195 Asif A. Siddiqi, “The Soviet Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite System: A Synopsis,” Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 50, no. 6 (1997), 225- 40, http://faculty.fordham.edu/siddiqi/writings/p7_siddiqi_jbis_is_history_1997.pdf. 196 William R. Graham and Peter Vincent Pry, “Statement for the Record,” U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcom- mittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency, October 12, 2017, 6, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM09/20171012/106467/HHRG- 115-HM09-Wstate-PryP-20171012.pdf; Jerry Emanuelson, “Soviet Test 184: The 1962 Soviet Nuclear EMP Tests over ,” Future�- science LLC, http://www.futurescience.com/emp/test184.html; and ibid., 230. 197 “Transcript On Vienna Conference,” House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Congress, May 2, 1999, quoted in Peter Vincent Pry, “Nuclear EMP Attack Scenarios and Combined-Arms Cyber Warfare,” Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, July 2017, 3, https://michaelmabee.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2017-Nuclear-Electromagnetic-Pulse-At�- tack-Scenarios-and-Combined-Arms-Cyber-Warfare.pdf. 198 Bart Hendrickx, “Self-Defense in Space: Protecting Russian Spacecraft from ASAT Attacks,” Space Review, July 16, 2018, https://www.thes- pacereview.com/article/3536/1. 199 A. Antonov et al., “История и перспективы развития низкотемпературных пиротехнических генераторов,” Известия Тульского государственного университета, 2016, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/istoriya-i-perspektivy-razvitiya-nizkotemperaturnyh-piroteh-� nicheskih-generatorov, quoted in ibid. 200 “Наука и Техника: Россия Создаст Лазер Для Подавления Разведки Противника,” Lenta.ru, August 8, 2010, http://lenta.ru/ news/2010/08/19/laser. 201 Pavel Podvig, “Russia Has Been Testing Laser ASAT,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, October 8, 2011, http://russianforces.org/ blog/2011/10/russia_has_been_testing_laser.shtml. 202 “В РФ Разрабатывается Противоспутниковая Система РЭБ,” Военное Обозрение, April 25, 2017, https://topwar.ru/114285-v-rf-razraba-� tyvaetsya-protivosputnikovaya-sistema-reb.html, quoted in Patrick Tucker, “Russia Claims It Now Has Lasers To Shoot Satellites,” Defense One, February 26, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/02/russia-claims-it-now-has-lasers-shoot-satellites/146243/. 203 Patrick Tucker, “Russia Claims It Now Has Lasers To Shoot Satellites,” Defense One, February 6, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/ technology/2018/02/russia-claims-it-now-has-lasers-shoot-satellites/146243/; “Источник узнал о перспективах создания в РФ нового самолета с лазерным оружием,” Interfax, February 25, 2018, translation by author, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/601331. 204 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” 205 Anton Nikitin, “Боевые Лазеры «Пересвет» Заступили На Опытно-Боевое Дежурство,” Взгляд, December 5, 2018, https://vz.ru/ news/2018/12/5/953800.html. 206 “Peresvet combat laser system,” Russian Ministry of Defense, YouTube video, 0:42, Russian Ministry of Defense, July 19, 2018, https://www. .com/watch?v=ghDvDFb3lM0. 207 Iskander Batyrov, “Добьет Ли «Пересвет» До Цели,” Независимая, December 5, 2018, http://www.ng.ru/armies/2018-12-05/2_7456_ target.html. 208 Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” (speech, Gostiny Dvor, Moscow, Russia, February 20, 2019), http://en.krem- lin.ru/events/president/news/59863. 209 Julian Cooper, “Russia’s ‘Invincible’ Weapons: An Update,” Changing Character of War Centre, March 27, 2019, http://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/ blog/2019/3/27/russias-invincible-weapons-an-update-by-julian-cooper. 210 Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), Above Us Only Stars (Washington, DC: March 2019), 3, https://www.c4reports.org/aboveusonlystars. 211 Dana Goward, “Mass GPS Spoofing Attack in Black Sea?” Maritime Executive, July 11, 2017, https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/ mass-gps-spoofing-attack-in-black-sea#gs.QGC4kZ8; Alexandra Coultrup, “GPS Jamming in the Arctic Circle,” Aerospace Security Project,

65 CSIS, April 4, 2019, https://aerospace.csis.org/data/gps-jamming-in-the-arctic-circle/; and ibid., 14. 212 “Russia Denies Role in Israeli Airport GPS Jamming,” BBC News, June 27, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48786085; Thomas Nilsen, “Norway Tired of Russia’s Electronic Warfare Troubling Civilian Navigation: ‘Unacceptable and Risky’,” Barents Observer, January 20, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/01/norway-tired-russian-military-gps-jamming-unacceptable-and-risky; and “Russia Denies Disrupting GPS Signals during Nato Arctic Exercises,” Guardian, November 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2018/nov/12/russia-denies-blame-for-arctic-gps-interference. 213 Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Between Real and Imaginable,” RealClearDefense, May 26, 2017, https://www. realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/26/russian_electronic_warfare_in_ukraine_111460.html; “It is official, Russian army deployed R-330Zh jammer in the battle of Debaltseve,” Inform Napalm, May 14, 2016, https://informnapalm.org/en/r-330zh-jammer-battle-debalt-� seve/; and “Russian R-330Zh jammer detected 7 km from the contact line in Donbas,” Inform Napalm, November 16, 2017, https://inform-� napalm.org/en/russian-r-330zh-jammer-detected-7-km-from-the-contact-line-in-donbas/. 214 Groll, “Spy Planes, Signal Jammers, and Putin’s High-Tech War in Syria,” Foreign Policy, October 6, 2015, http://foreignpolicy. com/2015/10/06/spy-planes-signal-jammers-and-putins-high-tech-war-in-syria; and David Stupples, “How Syria is becoming a test bed for high-tech weapons of electronic warfare,” The Conversation, October 8, 2015, https://theconversation.com/how-syria-is-becoming-a-test- bed-for-high-tech-weapons-of-electronic-warfare-48779. 215 C4ADS, Above Us Only Stars, 3. 216 Ibid., 14. 217 Dmitry Krilov, “Кремль Продолжит Искажать,” Газета.ru, December 19, 2016, https://www.gazeta.ru/auto/2016/12/16_a_10430909. shtml. 218 “Moscow Taxi Users Confusion amid GPS Meddling Claims,” BBC News, January 10, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42633024. 219 “St. Petersburg Drivers Report Strange GPS Problems in City Center,” Moscow Times, December 27, 2016, https://www.themoscowtimes. com/2016/12/27/drivers-in-st-petersburg-report-gps-problems-in-city-center-a56653. 220 Coultrup, “GPS Jamming in the Arctic Circle.” 221 Mark Episkopos, “Russia Jammed GPS Signals During a NATO . That’s a Really Big Deal.”, National Interest, December 1, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-jammed-gps-signals-during--military-exercise-thats-really-big-deal-37682; and Harald Tomassen and Allan Klo, “Monterer Målestasjon for å Oppdage GPS-Jamming,” NRK, March 11, 2019, https://www.nrk.no/finnmark/ monterer-malestasjon-for-a-oppdage-gps-jamming-1.14467017. 222 “Ships Fooled in GPS Spoofing Attack Suggest Russian ,” New Scientist, August 10, 2017, https://www.newscientist.com/arti- cle/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/. 223 C4ADS, Above Us Only Stars, 20. 224 Ibid., 3. 225 Ibid., 18, 23. 226 Patrick Tucker, “US and Russia Regard Each Other Warily in the Baltic and Black Seas,” Defense One, January 24, 2019, https://www. defenseone.com/threats/2019/01/us-and-russia-eye-each-other-warily-baltic-and-black-seas/154404/; and Andrew Roth, “Kerch strait con- frontation: what happened and why does it matter?,” Guardian, November 27, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/27/ kerch-strait-confrontation-what-happened-ukrainian-russia-crimea. 227 Brian Wang, “Russia will place GPS jammers on 250,000 cellphone towers to reduce enemy and drone accuracy in the event of large scale conventional war,” Next Big Future, October 18, 2016, https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/10/russia-will-place-gps-jam-� mers-on-250000.html. 228 “Latest jamming system arrives for electronic warfare troops in central Russia,” TASS, November 13, 2019, https://tass.com/de-� fense/1088451. 229 Michael Peck, “Why Russia’s New Anti-Satellite Plane Is Very Bad Idea,” National Interest, October 20, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/ blog/buzz/why-russias-new-anti-satellite-plane-very-bad-idea-89716. 230 Bart Hendrickx, “Ekipazh: Russia’s top-secret nuclear-powered satellite,” Space Review, October 7, 2019, https://www.thespacereview. com/article/3809/1. 231 James Landale, “Russia Cyber-Plots: US, UK and Netherlands Allege Hacking,” BBC News, October 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-45746837. 232 Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, International Security and Estonia (: 2018), 53, https://www.valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport- 2018-ENG-web.pdf; Ellen Nakashima, “Russian hacker group exploits satellites to steal data, hide tracks,” Washington Post, Septem- ber 9, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hacker-group-exploits-satellites-to-steal-data-hide- tracks/2015/09/08/c59fa7cc-5657-11e5-b8c9-944725fcd3b9_story.html?utm_term=.43d8b0ed4c7f; and “Turla: Spying tool targets governments and diplomats,” Symantec Security Response, August 7, 2014, https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/turla-spy-� ing-tool-targets-governments-and-diplomats. 233 Jack Stubbs and Christopher Bing, “Hacking the Hackers: Russian Group Hijacked Iranian Spying Operation, Officials Say,” Reuters, Octo- ber 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-cyber/hacking-the-hackers-russian-group-hijacked-iranian-spying-operation-offi-� cials-say-idUSKBN1X00AK. 234 Gordon Corera, “How France’s TV5 Was Almost Destroyed by ‘Russian Hackers’,” BBC News, October 10, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/ technology-37590375. 235 Natasha Lomas, “UK Says Russia’s GRU Was behind a Spate of Chaotic Cyber Attacks between 2015 and 2017,” TechCrunch, October 4, 2018, https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/04/uk-says-russias-gru-was-behind-a-spate-of-chaotic-cyber-attacks-between-2015-and-2017/.

66 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 236 Damien McGuinness, “How a cyber attack transformed Estonia,” BBC News, April 27, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/39655415; Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Between Real and Imaginable,” RealClearDefense, May 26, 2017, https://www.real-� cleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/26/russian_electronic_warfare_in_ukraine_111460.html; David E. Sanger, “Putin Ordered ‘Influence Campaign’ Aimed at U.S. Election, Report Says,” New York Times, January 6, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/politics/ russia-hack-report.html; and James Landale, “Russia Cyber-Plots: US, UK and Netherlands Allege Hacking,” BBC News, October 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45746837. 237 Jens Stoltenberg, “Nato Will Defend Itself,” Prospect Magazine, December 27, 2019, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/na-� to-will-defend-itself-summit-jens-stoltenberg-cyber-security; and Michael Imeson, “Russia Cyber Aggression Fuels Tensions with West,” Financial Times, October 14, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/0aa7a6e0-ca52-11e9-af46-b09e8bfe60c0. 238 James Landale, “Russia Cyber-Plots: US, UK and Netherlands Allege Hacking,” BBC News, October 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-45746837. 239 Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2018 (Washington, DC: CSIS, April 2018), https:// aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment_FULL_WEB.pdf; Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Thomas G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2019 (Washington, DC: CSIS, April 2019), https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/up-� loads/2019/04/SpaceThreatAssessment2019-compressed.pdf.

IRAN 240 Thomas G. Roberts, Spaceports of the World (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2020) https://aerospace.csis.org/data/spaceports-of-the-world/. 241 Mike Pompeo, “United States Imposes New Sanctions Designations on Iran’s Space Program as Tehran Continues to Use Civilian Space Agencies to Advance Its Ballistic Missile Programs,” U.S. Department of State, press release, September 13, 2019, https://www.state.gov/ united-states-imposes-new-sanctions-designations-on-irans-space-program-as-tehran-continues-to-use-civilian-space-agencies-to-ad- vance-its-ballistic-missile-programs/. 242 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Accuses Iran of Using Space Launch as Cover for Missile Program,” New York Times, January 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/world/middleeast/iran-spacecraft-pompeo.html. 243 Kevjn Lim and Gil Baram, “Iran Is Mastering the Final Frontier,” Foreign Policy, March 14, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/14/iran- is-mastering-the-final-frontier/. 244 Fredrik Dahl, “Iran Launches Satellite; U.S. Expresses Concern,” Reuters, February 3, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-satel-� lite-idUSTRE5120NN20090203. 245 “Iran ‘Sends Monkey to Space for Second Time’,” BBC News, December 14, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25378313. 246 Farzon Nadimi, “Iran’s Space Program Emerges from Dormancy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 1, 2017, https://www. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-space-program-emerges-from-dormancy. 247 “Iran Missile Sites,” CIA, n.d. https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/9B/9BF2B1E1B6F60BF4889BE25391570BEB_iran_mis-� sile_sites.pdf. 248 “Iran,” , February 11, 2012, https://www.zarya.info/Diaries/Iran/Iran.php. 249 “Russia Signs Deal to Build & Launch Iran Satellites,” Iran Times, May 14, 2014, http://iran-times.com/russia-signs-deal-to-build-launch- iran-satellites/. 250 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power (Washington, DC: 2019), https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military Power Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf; and Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Communi-� ty,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 13, 2018, p. 10, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimo- nies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf. 251 Stephen M. McCall, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs,” Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2020, https://fas.org/ sgp/crs/nuke/IF10938.pdf. 252 “Iran Announces Security-Oriented ‘Space Tracking Center’,” RT International, June 9, 2013, https://www.rt.com/news/iran-space-monitor-� ing-center-429/. 253 “Iran Claims To Have SSA Radar Capable of Detecting Satellites in LEO,” Spacewatch, 2018, https://spacewatch.global/2018/12/iran-claims- to-have-ssa-radar-capable-of-detecting-satellites-in-/. 254 “Missiles of Iran,” Missile Threat, CSIS, Accessed February 5, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/iran/. 255 “Simorgh,” Missile Threat, CSIS, June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/simorgh/. 256 Tyler Rodgers, “Iran’s Simorgh Rocket Test in Perspective,” Arms Control Association, January 17, 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/ blog/2017-07-27/iran-simorgh-rocket-test-in-perspective. 257 Geoff Brumfiel, “Iranian Rocket Launch Ends In Failure, Imagery Shows,” NPR, August 29, 2019, https://www.npr. org/2019/08/29/755406765/iranian-rocket-launch-ends-in-failure-images-show; Stephen Clark, “Second Iranian Satellite Launch Attempt in a Month Fails,” Spaceflight Now, February 11, 2019, https://spaceflightnow.com/2019/02/11/second-iranian-satellite-launch-attempt-in- a-month-fails/; and Geoff Brumfiel, “Satellite Imagery Suggests 2nd Iranian Space Launch Has Failed,” NPR, February 6, 2019, https://www. npr.org/2019/02/06/692071812/satellite-imagery-suggests-second-iranian-space-launch-has-failed. 258 “Iran Space Agency to Launch Three Satellites by March 2020,” , August 25, 2019, https://financialtribune.com/articles/sci- tech/99569/iran-space-agency-to-launch-three-satellites-by-march-2020. 259 Geoff Brumfiel, “Iranian Rocket Launch Ends In Failure, Imagery Shows.” 260 Geoff Brumfiel, “Trump Tweets Sensitive Surveillance Image Of Iran,” NPR, August 30, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/08/30/755994591/

67 president-trump-tweets-sensitive-surveillance-image-of-iran; and , Twitter Post, August 30, 2019, 1:44 pm, https://twitter. com/realDonaldTrump/status/1167493371973255170 261 Matthew Lee, “US Hits Iran Space Agency with Sanctions over Missile Work,” , September 4, 2019, https://apnews. com/99a41d1896c94d9e967e581b3c2e2d83. 262 “Iran-related Designations; Non-proliferation Designations; Kingpin Act Designations Update,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 3, 2019, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190903_33.aspx. 263 MJ Azari Jahromi, Twitter Post, January 29, 2020, 1:26 am, https://twitter.com/azarijahromi/status/1222405725651075072 264 2379, “Iran Makes Six Satellites to Put into Orbit,” IRNA English, January 26, 2020, https://en.irna.ir/news/83648264/Iran-makes-six-satel- lites-to-put-into-orbit. 265 Amir Vahdat and Jon Gambrell, “Iran Again Fails to Put Satellite into Orbit amid US Worries,” Associated Press, February 9, 2020, https:// apnews.com/7c8247674c294c23d408b034e9d4ee5a?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP. 266 “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Membership Evolution,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, https://www. unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/members/evolution.html; and “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-� ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial bodies,” U.S. Department of State, Accessed February 5, 2020, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm#signatory. 267 Parvis Tarikhi, “More Significant Role for Iran’s Space Administration,” Parviztarikhi’s Blog, November 22, 2010, https://parviztarikhi.word- press.com/features-2/more-significant-role-for-iran’s-space-administration/. Iranian Space Agency, July 9, 2016, https://www.isa.ir/find.php?item=1.66.10.fa; and “Space Industry Development ”,ایران فضایی سازمان“ 268 Requires National Willpower: Minister,” Tehran Times, May 26, 2018, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/423935/Space-industry-develop-� ment-requires-national-willpower-minister. 269 “Iran Space Research Center,” Iran Watch, October 31, 2019, https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/iran-space-research-center; and “Sharif University of Technology,” Iran Watch, November 18, 2019, https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/sharif-university-technology.; and “Iran Enjoys High-Tech in Building Space-Based Parks,” IRNA English, September 29, 2019, https://en.irna.ir/news/83496207/Iran-en- joys-high-tech-in-building-space-based-parks. 270 Stephen Lambakis, Foreign Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. National Security (Fairfax, VA: National Institutes Press, August 2017), 31, https://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Foreign-Space-Capabilities-pub-2017.pdf. 271 Geoff Brumfiel, “Iran Is Preparing A Launch. But Is It For A Space Rocket Or A Missile?” NPR, January 14, 2019, https://www.npr. org/2019/01/14/684467347/iran-is-preparing-a-launch-but-is-it-for-a-space-rocket-or-a-missile. /Aftabir.com, March 26, 2010, https://www.aftabir.com/news/view/2008 ”,آفتاب اخبار. “اختصاص ۳ هزار و ۹۶۰ میلیارد تومان برای سازمان فضایی ایران “ 272 feb/20/c2c1203499802_economy_marketing_business_information_technology_mobile.php. 273 “Cuts and Extensions in Iran’s ICT 2017/18 Budget,” Financial Tribune, December 13, 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20161220150555/ https://financialtribune.com/articles/sci-tech/55397/cuts-and-extensions-in-irans-ict-201718-budget. 274 Jennifer Chandler, “Decoding Iran’s defence spending: pitfalls and new pointers,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 13, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/11/decode-iran-defence-spending. 275 “Iran Attack: How Strong Is Iran’s Military?” BBC News, January 9, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50982743. 276 “Shahab-3,” Missile Threat, CSIS, August 9, 2016, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahab-3/. 277 Robert Einhorn, Vann H Van Diepen, and Kate Hewitt, Constraining Iran’s Missile Capabilities (Washington, DC: Brookings, March 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FP_20190321_missile_program_WEB.pdf. 278 Tom O’Connor, “U.S. Warns ‘Iran Has the Largest Ballistic Missile Force in the Middle East’ and Can Target Europe,” Newsweek, December 13, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/us-iran-missile-force-middle-east-target-europe-1255834. 279 “Iran Opens New Space-Tracking Center,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, June 9, 2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-space-tracking-cen- ter/25011651.html. 280 Michael Peck, “Bad News for Israel: Iran Has a New Missile,” National Interest, November 1, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/ bad-news-israel-iran-has-new-missile-92556; and Jeremey Binnie, “Iran displays guidance for rockets,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 4, 2019, https://www.janes.com/article/91703/iran-displays-guidance-upgrade-for-artillery-rockets. 281 Ian Williams, “When Iran Attacks,” Missile Threat, CSIS, February 4, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/when-iran-attacks/. 282 “Missiles of Iran.” Missile Threat, CSIS, Accessed February 5, 2020. https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/iran/. 283 Scott Peterson and Payam Faramarzi, “Exclusive: Iran hijacked U.S. drone, says Iranian engineer,” Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer. 284 “Iran’s Nuclear Program Timeline and History,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated January 2020, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/ iran/nuclear/ 285 Ibid. 286 United Against a Nuclear Iran, Iran & North Korea - Nuclear Proliferation Partners (New York, NY: February 2019), https://www.unitedagain-� stnucleariran.com/north-korea-iran; and Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, “Iran and North Korea: The Nuclear ‘Axis of Resistance’,” The Daily Beast, January 31, 2014, https://www.thedailybeast.com/iran-and-north-korea-the-nuclear-axis-of-resistance. 287 Zachary Laub and Kali Robinson, “What Is the Status of the Iran Nuclear Agreement?” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated January 7, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-status-iran-nuclear-agreement. 288 John Haltiwanger, “Here’s What’s in the 2015 Nuclear Deal with Iran That the Country Withdrew from amid Heightened Tensions with the US,” Business Insider, January 14, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-nuclear-deal-explained.

68 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 289 Holly Ellyatt, “Europe Stands by Iran Nuclear Deal for Now, Defying US Calls to Abandon It,” CNBC, January 13, 2020, https://www.cnbc. com/2020/01/13/jcpoa-europe-stands-by-iran-nuclear-deal.html. 290 Uri Friedman, “A New Nuclear Era Is Coming,” The Atlantic, January 9, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/01/solei- mani-iran-north-korea-new-nuclear-age/604618/. 291 Safa Haeri, “Cuba blows the whistle on Iranian jamming,” Asia Times, August 22, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ EH22Ak03.html. 292 Small Media Foundation, Satellite Jamming in Iran: A War Over Airwaves (London, UK: Small Media Foundation, 2012), 21, https://smallme- dia.org.uk/sites/default/files/Satellite%20Jamming.pdf. 293 Yeganeh Torbati, “Iran says capable of jamming foes’ communication systems,” Reuters, January 15, 2013, https://in.reuters.com/article/ iran-military/iran-says-capable-of-jamming-foes-communication-systems-idINDEE90E0DF20130115. 294 Michel de Rosen, “Letter to Eutelsat Regarding Iranian Government’s jamming of satellite broadcasts,” Human Rights Watch, , 2010, https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/25/letter-eutelsat-regarding-iranian-governments-jamming-satellite-broadcasts. 295 Ibid. 296 Regan Doherty, “Iran Jamming Al Jazeera Broadcasts: Document,” Reuters, January 10, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-ja-� zeera/iran-jamming-al-jazeera-broadcasts-document-idUSTRE80918520120110. 297 Robert Briel, “Syria in Frame on Eutelsat Jamming,” Broadband TV News, October 22, 2012, https://www.broadbandtvnews. com/2012/10/22/ syria-believed-to-jam-eutelsat/. 298 “London-Based Persian TV To Lodge Complaint Against Iran For Satellite Jamming.” Radio Farda, November 23, 2019, https://en.radiofar-� da.com/a/london-based-persian-tv-to-lodge-complaint-against-iran-for-satellite-jamming-/30288280.html. 299 Peterson and Faramarzi, “Exclusive: Iran hijacked U.S. drone, says Iranian engineer.” 300 Lee Feeran, “Obama: Hey Iran, Can We Get Our Drone Back?” ABC News, December 12, 2011, https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/obama-asks- iran-rq-170-sentinel-drone-back/story?id=15140133. 301 “2019-012-Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea-Threats to Commercial Vessels by Iran and Its Proxies.” MARAD, July 8, 2019, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2019-012-persian-gulf-strait-hormuz-gulf-oman-arabian-sea-red-sea-threats- commercial-vessels. 302 Reuters and Haaretz, “Iran Reportedly Jamming Ships’ GPS in Attempt to Trick Them Into Iranian Waters for Seizure,” Haaretz, August 8, 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/iran-reportedly-jamming-ships-gps-in-attempt-to-trick-them-into-iranian-wa- ters-1.7652352. 303 Tzvi Joffre,“U.S. Warns of GPS Interference, Communications Spoofing in Persian Gulf.” Jerusalem Post, August 8, 2019, https://www.jpost. com/Middle-East/US-warns-of-GPS-interference-communications-spoofing-in-Persian-Gulf-597998. 304 Tracy Cozzens, “Iran jams CPS on ships in Strait of Hormuz,” GPS World, August 9, 2019, https://www.gpsworld.com/iran-jams-gps-on- ships-in-strait-of-hormuz/. 305 Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran Claims to Pioneer New Electronic Warfare Unit,” Jerusalem Post, July 7, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/ Iran-claims-to-pioneer-new-electronic-warfare-unit-594858. 306 “IRGC Unveils Military Communication System - Defense News,” Tasnim News Agency, July 7, 2019, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/ news/2019/07/07/2048683/irgc-unveils-military-communication-system. 307 Alain Henry de Frahan, “Iran unveiled armored vehicle, jamming system, drones, smart robot and more,” Army Recognition, October 4, 2019, https://www.armyrecognition.com/october_2019_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/iran_unveiled_armored_vehicle_ jamming_system_drones_smart_robot_and_more.html; and Shi Yinglun, “Iran Unveils New Homemade Military Gears: Report,” Xinhua, October 3, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/03/c_138446473.htm. 308 “New Prototype ‘Farpad’ UAV given to Military Units,” IRNA English, October 30, 2019, https://en.irna.ir/news/83535778/New-prototype- Farpad-UAV-given-to-military-units; and “Iran’s New Hand-launched Drone has Electronic Warfare Capability,” DefenseWorld.net, October 31, 2019, https://www.defenseworld.net/news/25749/Iran_s_New_Hand_launched_Drone_has_Electronic_Warfare_Capability#.XjqAGxd-� KiRu. 309 Dorothy Denning, “Iran’s Cyber Warfare Program Has Reached a Critical Point,” Newsweek, December 12, 2017, https://www.newsweek. com/irans-cyber-warfare-program-now-major-threat-united-states-745427. 310 Keith Breene, “Who Are the Cyberwar Superpowers?” World Economic Forum, May 4, 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/ who-are-the-cyberwar-superpowers/. 311 James A. , “Iran and Cyber Power,” CSIS, Commentary, June 25, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-and-cyber-power; and Seth G. Jones, Containing Tehran, (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2020), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200110_ Jones_ContainingIran_WEB_v2.pdf?MiOEbYgRpCYPIeM5sivMoNWJIhFDxrN5. 312 Ibid 313 Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, Iran’s Cyber Threat: Espionage, Sabotage, and Revenge (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2018) 47, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iran_Cyber_Final_Full_v2.pdf. 314 “The Invisible U.S.-Iran Cyber War,” U.S. Institute for Peace, The Iran Primer, updated January 7, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/ blog/2019/oct/25/invisible-us-iran-cyber-war. 315 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.S.,” New York Times, October 11, 2012, https:// www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html. 316 “The Invisible U.S.-Iran Cyber War,” U.S. institute for Peace.

69 317 “CISA Statement on Iranian Cybersecurity Threats,” Department of Homeland Security, October 30, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/ news/2019/06/22/cisa-statement-iranian-cybersecurity-threats. 318 Brian Fung, “Hacking Attempts Originating in Iran Nearly Triple Following Soleimani Strike, Researchers Say,” CNN, January 9, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/08/tech/iran-hackers-soleimani/index.html.

NORTH KOREA 319 Thomas G. Roberts, Spaceports of the World (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/spaceports-world. 320 “A Conversation with General John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (public event, CSIS, Washington, DC, January 17, 2020), https://www.csis.org/events/conversation-general-john-hyten-vice-chairman-joint-chiefs-staff. Filmed [January 17, 2020]. Youtube video, 18:38. Posted [January 17, 2020], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1v9fpcfi78. 321 “Taepodong-2 (Unha-3),” Missile Threat, CSIS, August 8, 2016, last modified June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ taepodong-2/. 322 Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea Defends ‘‘Peaceful’’ Satellite Launches, Report Says,” UPI, January 6, 2020, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/ World-News/2020/01/06/North-Korea-defends-peaceful-satellite-launches-report-says/7681578311980/. 323 Robert E. Mccoy, “What are the real purposes of Pyongyang’s new satellites?” Asia Times, December 19, 2017, http://www.atimes.com/arti-� cle/real-purposes-pyongyangs-new-satellites/. 324 Eric Talmadge, “AP Exclusive: North Korea Hopes to Plant Flag on the Moon,” Associated Press, August 4, 2016, https://apnews.com/88fa-� 76909dec40b299658a34b489dc1a/AP-Exclusive:-North-Korea-hopes-to-plant-flag-on-the-moon. 325 “North Korean Missile Launches & Nuclear Tests: 1984-Present,” Missile Threat, CSIS, December 3, 2019, https://missilethreat.csis.org/ north-korea-missile-launches-1984-present/. 326 Barbara Starr and Zachary Cohen, “Satellite Imagery Shows Activity at Critical North Korean Missile Site,” CNN, January 26, 2020, https:// www.cnn.com/2020/01/26/politics/north-korea-satellite-imagery-missile-site/index.html. 327 Joseph Bermudez, Victor Cha, and Dana Kim, “December 2019 Update: Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground,” Beyond Parallel, CSIS, De- cember 17, 2019, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/december-2019-update-tonghae-satellite-launching-ground/. 328 Alex Ward, “Why North Korea’s restored rocket site isn’t cause for worry — yet,” Vox, March 7, 2019, https://www.vox. com/2019/3/7/18254589/north-korea-rocket-site-launch-space-trump-vietnam. 329 “North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Post-Engine Test Activity Observed,” 38 North, December 17, 2019, https://www.38north. org/2019/12/sohae121619/. 330 Spokesman for Academy of Defence Science of DPRK Issues Statement,” KCNA Watch, December 15, 2019, https://kcnawatch.org/new-� stream/1576486826-622749970/spokesman-for-academy-of-defence-science-of-dprk-issues-statement/; “Statement of Spokesman for Academy of National Defence Science Issued,” KCNA Watch, December 9, 2019, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1575882057-292334499/ statement-of-spokesman-for-academy-of-national-defence-science-issued/. 331 Heekyong Yang, “North Korea Conducts New Test at Rocket Site, Aims to ‘Overpower U.S. Nuclear Threats’,” Reuters, December 14, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/north-korea-conducts-new-test-at-rocket-site-aims-to-overpower-us-nuclear- threats-idUSKBN1YI05E. 332 Weeden and Samson, eds., Global Counterspace Capabilities (Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, April 2019), 5–1, https://swfound. org/media/206408/swf_global_counterspace_april2019_web.pdf. 333 “North Korea Finishes Advanced Recon Satellite,” Space Daily, December 27, 2017, https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/North_Korea_fin-� ishes_advanced_recon_satellite_999.html. 334 “Stronger Rules Must Guarantee Outer Space Remains Conflict-Free, First Committee Delegates Stress, Calling for New Laws to Hold Perpe- trators Accountable,” United Nations, October 17, 2017, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/gadis3583.doc.htm. 335 “KCNA Report on DPRK’s Accession to International Space Treaty and Convention,” KCNA Watch, March 12, 2009, https://kcnawatch.org/ newstream/1451888128-747969205/kcna-report-on-dprks-accession-to-international-space-treaty-and-convention/. 336 “Seventh Session of 12th SPA of DPRK Held,” KCNA, April 1, 2013, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&-� source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwj-3cPX3dnnAhVDKH0KHffLCg0QFjAAegQIARAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kcna.co. jp%2Fitem%2F2013%2F201304%2Fnews01%2F20130401-23ee.html&usg=AOvVaw10gT0npAmRPomIQ9hBgp6b. 337 Lotto Persio, “North Korea Is Reaching for the Stars with Plans to Conquer Space,” Newsweek, October 30, 2017, https://www.news- week.com/star-wars-north-koreas-unveils-5-year-plan-conquer-space-695896Y. 338 “DPRK Delegate Speaks at UNGA Session.” KCNA Watch, October 21, 2017, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1508666429-52873364/dprk- delegate-speaks-at-unga-session/. 339 Morris Jones, “North Korea’s Space Program Aims Higher,” Lowy Institute, , October 31, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/ the-interpreter/north-korea-space-program-aims-higher. 340 “Space Will Bring Greater Well-Being to Mankind: Minju Joson,” KCNA Watch, , 2017, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/273151/ space-will-bring-greater-well-being-to-mankind-minju-joson/. 341 “‘Sanctions Won’t Stop Our ’: North Korea Sets Sights on the Moon,” Guardian, August 4, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/aug/04/sanctions-wont-stop-our-space-race-north-korea-sets-sights-on-the-moon. 342 Ibid.; Persio, “North Korea Is Reaching for the Stars with Plans to Conquer Space.” 343 “No Dong 1,” Missile Threat, CSIS, June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/no-dong/; and Wright, Grego, and Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, 77.

70 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 344 National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, “Control Segment.” 345 Wright, Grego, and Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security, 125-130. 346 Elise Hu, “North Korea Claims Successful Hydrogen Bomb Test.” NPR, September 3, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thet- wo-way/2017/09/03/523913820/north-korea-possibly-conducts-sixth-nuclear-test-south-korea-says. 347 Emma Bowman, “North Korea Brandishes What It Says Is A Missile-Ready H-Bomb.” NPR, September 3, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sec-� tions/thetwo-way/2017/09/03/548201793/north-korea-brandishes-what-it-says-is-a-missile-ready-h-bomb. 348 “Kim Jong Un Advances Tasks for Effecting Drastic Turn in Implementing Decision of 7th Congress of WPK,” KCNA Watch, January 1, 2017, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1483266680-358842164/kim-jong-un-advances-tasks-for-effecting-drastic-turn-in-implementing-deci- sion-of-7th-congress-of-wpk/. 349 “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK,” KCNA Watch, January 1, 2020, https://kcnawatch.org/new-� stream/1577869229-462791867/report-on-5th-plenary-meeting-of-7th-c-c-wpk​/. 350 Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,“Assessing the Threat from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 2017), http://www.firstempcommission.org/uploads/1/1/9/5/119571849/exec-� utive_report_on_assessing_the_threat_from_emp_-_final_april2018.pdf. 351 Mun Dong Hui, “North Korean Propaganda Promotes EMP Attacks Using Nuclear Weapons,” Daily NK, January 17, 2020, https://www.dai- lynk.com/english/north-korean-propaganda-promotes-emp-attacks-using-nuclear-weapons/. 352 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm. 353 “N. Korea’s jamming of GPS signals poses new threat: defense minister,” Yonhap News Agency, October 5, 2010, http://english.yonhap-� news.co.kr/national/2010/10/05/67/0301000000AEN20101005005900315F.HTML. 354 Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea: North accused of sending jamming signals to disrupt GPS,” New York Times, May 3, 2012, http://www.ny- times.com/2012/05/03/world/asia/south-korea-accused-north-accused-of-jamming-signals.html. 355 Ian Wood and Stella Kim, “North Korea Jams GPS Signals to Fishing Boats: South,” NBC News, April 1, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/ news/world/north-korea-jams-gps-signals-fishing-boats-south-n548986. 356 “South Korea tells U.N. that North Korea GPS jamming threatens boats, planes,” Reuters, April 11, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-northkorea-southkorea-gps/south-korea-tells-u-n-that-north-korea-gps-jamming-threatens-boats-planes-idUSKCN0X81SN. 357 Mun Dong Hui, “North Korean Propaganda Promotes EMP Attacks Using Nuclear Weapons,” Daily NK, November 23, 2018, https://www. dailynk.com/english/north-korean-propaganda-promotes-emp-attacks-using-nuclear-weapons/. 358 “Massive GPS Jamming Attack by North Korea,” GPS World, May 8, 2012, http://gpsworld.com/massive-gps-jamming-attack-by-north-korea/. 359 Catherine Dill et all., “On the Trail of the Tae Yang,” Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies and Middlebury Insti- tute of International Studies at Monterey, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2019, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/proj-� ect_sandstone_on_the_trail_of_the_tae_yang_final_for_web_4.pdf. 360 Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, Tereza Novotna, and Kenneth B. Dekleva, “North Korea’s Koryolink: Built for Surveillance and Control” 38 North, August 12, 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/07/mwilliams072219/. 361 CrowdStrike. 2019 Global Threat Report: Adversary Tradecraft and the Importance of Speed(Sunnyvale, CA: 2019), https://www.lufsec.com/ wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CrowdStrike_GTR_2019.pdf. 362 Kim Jaewon, “A Cybersecurity Defector Warns of North Korea’s ‘Hacker Army’,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 25, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics/A-cybersecurity-defector-warns-of-North-Korea-s-hacker-army. 363 Steve Miller, “Where Did North Korea’s Cyber Army Come From?” Voice of America, November 20, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/ east-asia-pacific/where-did-north-koreas-cyber-army-come. 364 Ju-min Park, “Exclusive: North Korea’s Unit 180, the Cyber Warfare Cell That Worries the West,” Reuters, May 22, 2017, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-cyber-northkorea-exclusive/exclusive-north-koreas-unit-180-the-cyber-warfare-cell-that-worries-the-west- idUSKCN18H020. 365 “North Korea ‘Stole $2bn for Weapons via Cyber-Attacks’,” BBC News, August 7, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49259302. 366 “Treasury Sanctions North Korean State=Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups,” Department of the Treasury, press release, September 13, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774. 367 Elizabeth Shim, “North Korean Hackers Suspected in India Space Agency Cyberattack,” UPI, November 7, 2019, https://www.upi.com/ Top_News/World-News/2019/11/07/North-Korean-hackers-suspected-in-India-space-agency-cyberattack/7371573053505/. 368 Sean Lyngaas, “Lazarus Rises in Israel with Attempted Hack of Defense Company, Researchers Say,” CyberScoop, June 7, 2019, http://www. cyberscoop.com/lazarus-rises-israel-attempted-hack-defense-company-researchers-say/.; and Sherisse Pham, “Here’s a new North Korean hacking threat to worry about,” CNN Business, February 20, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/20/technology/north-korea-hack- ers-reaper-fireeye/index.html.

INDIA 369 “Orbital Launches of 2019,” Gunter’s Space Page, February 11, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_chr/lau2019.htm. 370 Chethan Kumar, “India to launch first manned space mission by 2022: PM Modi,” Times of India, August 15, 2018, https://timesofindia.india-� times.com/india/india-to-launch-first-manned-space-mission-by-2022-pm-modi/articleshow/65410373.cms. 371 Indian Space Research Organization, “Annual Report 2019-2020,” , 2020, 94, https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/

71 files/flipping_book/annual_report_2019-20_english/files/assets/common/downloads/Annual%20Report%202019-20%20(English).pdf. 372 Note: Data limited to total launches from 1980 to 2019; Thomas G. Roberts, Spaceports of the World (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/spaceports-world. 373 “India launches record 104 satellites in single mission,” BBC News, February 15, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-in-� dia-38977803. 374 “Space Environment: Total Payloads Launched by Country,” accessed February 12, 2020. 375 Staff Writers, “ISRO’s Second Spaceport, for New SSLV Rocket, to Come up in Tamil Nadu,” The Wire, December 1, 2019, https://thewire.in/ space/isro-kulasekarapattinam-thoothukudi-sdsc--sslv-pslv-gslv-antrix. 376 Surendra Singh, “India to get its second spaceport, and acquisition work begins in Tamil Nadu,” Times of India, December 2, 2019, https://time-� sofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-to-get-its-second-spaceport-land-acquisition-work-begins-in-tamil-nadu/articleshow/72323869.cms. 377 Jeff oust,F “Spaceflight purchases first commercial flight of new Indian small launcher,” SpaceNews, August 6, 2019, https://spacenews. com/spaceflight-purchases-first-commercial-flight-of-new-indian-small-launcher/. 378 Connor Simpson, “China Becomes Third Country to Ever ‘Soft-Land’ on the Moon,” The Atlantic, December 14, 2013, https://www.theatlan-� tic.com/international/archive/2013/12/china-becomes-third-country-ever-soft-land-moon/356151/. 379 Elizabeth Howell, “Chandrayaan-2: India’s Orbiter-Lander-Rover Mission,” Space.com, October 8, 2019, https://www.space. com/40136-chandrayaan-2.html. 380 Ibid. 381 Chelsea Gohd, “India Admits Its Moon Lander Crashed, Cites Problem with Breaking Thrusters,” Space.com, November 25, 2019, https:// www.space.com/india-admits-moon-lander-crash.html. 382 Jeff oust,F “India confirms plans for a second lunar lander mission,” SpaceNews, January 1, 2020, https://spacenews.com/india-confirms- plans-for-second-lunar-lander-mission/. 383 Staff Writers, “Indian astronauts to begin training in Russia for country’s first manned space mission,” SpaceDaily, January 23, 2020, http:// www.spacedaily.com/reports/Indian_astronauts_to_begin_training_in_Russia_for_countrys_first_manned_space_mission_999.html. 384 Ibid. 385 Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India to launch a defense-based space research agency,” Defense News, June 12, 2019, https://www.defensenews. com/space/2019/06/12/india-to-launch-a-defense-based-space-research-agency/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_ campaign=Socialflow+DFN. 386 Rajat Pandit, “India to hold first simulated exercise next month,” Times of India, June 8, 2019, https://timesofindia.india-� times.com/india/india-to-hold-first-simulated-space-warfare-exercise-next-month/articleshow/69697289.cms. 387 Raghuvanshi, “India to launch a defense-based space research agency.” 388 Pandit, “India to hold first simulated space warfare exercise next month.” 389 Ajay Banerjee, “India plans policy to tackle space threats,” Tribune, July 29, 2019, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/india-plans- policy-to-tackle-space-threats-809330. 390 Indian Space Research Organization, “Annual Report 2019-2020,” 94. 391 Ashley J. Tellis, “India’s ASAT Test: An Incomplete Success,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 15, 2019, https://carneg- ieendowment.org/2019/04/15/india-s-asat-test-incomplete-success-pub-78884. 392 Ibid. 393 Jonathan McDowell, Twitter Post, December 27, 2019, 8:54 PM, https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1210786046943739904. 394 Sarah Lewin, “India’s Anti-Satellite Test Created Dangerous Debris, NASA Chief Says,” Space.com, April 1, 2019, https://www.space.com/ nasa-chief-condemns-india-anti-satellite-test.html. 395 Chitranjan Kumar, “India tests ASAT: China calls for peace, Pakistan urges international community to condemn,” Business Today, March 27, 2019, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-tests-asat-china-calls-for-peace-pakistan-urges-international-com-� munity-to-condemn/story/331703.html. 396 Doris Elin Urrutia, “India’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Is a Big Deal. Here’s Why.,” Space.com, March 30, 2019, https://www.space.com/in-� dia-anti-satellite-test-significance.html. 397 Tellis, “India’s ASAT Test.” 398 Shaan Shaikh, “India Conducts Successful ASAT Test,” Missile Threat, CSIS, March 28, 2019, https://missilethreat.csis.org/india-con-� ducts-successful-asat-test/. 399 Narendra Modi, Twitter Post, March 27, 2019, 12:08 AM, https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1110800868058660864. 400 Ibid. 401 Rajat Pandit, “Satellite-killer not a one-off, India working on armoury,” Times of India, April 7, 2019, https://timesofindia.india-� times.com/india/satellite-killer-not-a-one-off-india-working-on-star-wars-armoury/articleshow/68758674.cms. 402 Pearl MAria D’Souza, “French Agency CNES to aid ISRO’s space station project,” New Indian Express, January 27, 2020, https://www.newind-� ianexpress.com/nation/2020/jan/27/french-agency-cnes-to-aid-isros-space-station-project-2094922.html. 403 Snehesh Alex Philip, “India gets new Special Ops Division that can cripple targets miles inside enemy territory,” ThePrint, May 15, 2019, https://theprint.in/defence/india-gets-new-special-ops-division-that-can-cripple-targets-miles-inside-enemy-territory/235786/. 404 Amrita Nayak Dutta, “New tri services special ops division, meant for surgical strikes, finishes 1st exercise today,” ThePrint, September 28, 2019, https://theprint.in/defence/new-tri-services-special-ops-division-meant-for-surgical-strikes-finishes-1st-exercise-today/298445/.

72 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 405 Rajat Pandit, “After -V Launch, DRDO’s New Target Is Anti-satellite Weapons,” Times of India, April 20, 2012, https://timesofindia.india- times.com/india/After-Agni-V-launch-DRDOs-new-target-is-anti-satellite-weapons/articleshow/12763074.cms. 406 Headquarters , Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) (New : India Ministry of Defence, April 2013), 6-7, 32-33, https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/TPCR13.pdf. 407 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) - 2018 (New Delhi: India Ministry of Defence, 2018), 21-22, https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/tpcr.pdf. 408 Rajat Pandit, “Satellite-killer not a one-off, India working on star wars armoury,” Times of India, April 7, 2019, https://timesofindia.india-� times.com/india/satellite-killer-not-a-one-off-india-working-on-star-wars-armoury/articleshow/68758674.cms. 409 Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson, “India’s ASAT test is a wake-up call for norms of behavior in space,” SpaceNews, April 8, 2019, https:// spacenews.com/op-ed-indias-asat-test-is-wake-up-call-for-norms-of-behavior-in-space/. 410 Daniel Oberhaus, “India’s Anti-Satellite Test Wasn’t Really About Satellites,” Wired, March 27, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/india-an-� ti-satellite-test-space-debris/. 411 Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) - 2018, 63. 412 Ibid., 64. 413 PTI, “Govt approves setting up of defence cyber agency,” Times of India, November 27, 2019, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ govt-approves-setting-up-of-defence-cyber-agency/articleshow/72264836.cms. 414 Ibid. 415 “Orbital Launches of 2019,” Gunter’s Space Page, February 11, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_chr/lau2019.htm 416 John Raymond and Kathleen Hicks, “A Conversation with General Raymond” (public event, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.: November 2019) 18, https://www.csis.org/analysis/conversation-general-raymond. 417 Louis de Gouyon Matignon, “The Birth of the ,” Space Legal Issues, February 2, 2019, https://www.spacelegalissues. com/space-law-the-birth-of-the-french-space-program/. 418 “Insight,” CNES, November 27, 2018, https://insight.cnes.fr/en/INSIGHT/index.htm. 419 “World First French SEIS Instrument Detects ‘Marsquake’,” CNES, April 23, 2019, https://presse.cnes.fr/en/world-first-french-seis-instru-� ment-detects-marsquake. 420 Kyle Mizokami, “France Accuses Russia of Space Satellite Espionage,” Popular Mechanics, September 10, 2018, https://www.popularme-� chanics.com/military/a23067892/france-charges-russia-with-space-satellite-espionage/. 421 Space Environment: Total Payloads Launched by Country,” accessed February 12, 2020. 422 “Defense Space Strategy Summary,” French Ministry of Defense, DICoD Publishing Office, July 2019, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/ download/563617/9727377/synthe%CC%80se%20strate%CC%81gie%20spatiale%20de%20de%CC%81fense.pdf. 423 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Lasers for Satellite Defense Top New French Space Strategy,” Breaking Defense, July 26, 2019, https://breaking-� defense.com/2019/07/france-envisions-on-orbit-lasers-for-satellite-defense/. 424 Florence Parly, “Presentation of the Defense Space Strategy,” SatelliteObservation.net, July 25, 2019, English translation from: https://sat-� elliteobservation.net/2019/07/27/frances-new-space-defense-strategy/. 425 Hitchens, “Space Lasers for Satellite Defense Top New French Space Strategy.” 426 Jen Judson, “US, Israel’s Arrow-3 missile put to the test in Alaska,” Defense News, July 28, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/penta-� gon/2019/07/28/us-israels-arrow-3-missile-put-to-the-test-in-alaska/. 427 Ibid. 428 “Tesla Model 3 Spoofed off the highway - Regulus Navigation System Hack Causes Car to Turn On Its Own,” Regulus, n.d., https://www. regulus.com/blog/tesla-model-3-spoofed-off-the-highway-regulus-researches-hack-navigation-system-causing-car-to-steer-off-road/. 429 Ibid. 430 Josh Petri, “How Hackers Can Take Over Your Car’s GPS,” Hyperdrive, June 19, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-� cles/2019-06-19/threat-of-gps-spoofing-for-autonomous-cars-seen-as-overblown. 431 Ibid. 432 “ (Israel),” Missile Threat, CSIS, August 11, 2016, last modified June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/arrow-3/. 433 “2020: The Year of Sustainability,” AviationWeek & , January 2020, 17, https://aviationweek.com/sites/default/ files/2020-01/AW_200113_0.pdf.

OTHERS 434 Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan reveals plan for space defense unit,” Defense News, January 21, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/ space/2020/01/21/japan-reveals-plan-for-space-defense-unit/. 435 Mari Yamaguchi, “Abe says new unit will defend Japan from space tech threats,” MSN, January 20, 2020, https://www.msn.com/en-us/ news/world/abe-says-new-unit-will-defend-japan-from-space-tech-threats/ar-BBZ8kfk#image=BBZ8kfk_1|2. 436 Yamaguchi, “Japan reveals plan for space defense unit.” 437 Yomiuri Shimbum, “Satellite interceptor sought by mid-2020s,” Japan News, August 19, 2019, https://the-japan-news.com/news/arti-� cle/0005948349. 438 Ibid.

73 439 Ibid. 440 Euan McKirdy, “Hayabusa mission: Japanese attempts to ‘bomb’ asteroid,” CNN, April 5, 2019, https://www.cnn. com/2019/04/05/asia/hayabusa-crater-operation-sci-intl/index.html. 441 Allied Maritime Command, “Electronic Interference in Mediterranean,” December 12, 2019, https://shipping.nato.int/nsc/operations/ news/2019/electronic-interference-in-mediterranean. 442 Ibid. 443 Alexandra Sticklings, “UK Ministry of Defence Announces Ambitious Plans for Space,” Royal United Services Institute, July 30, 2019, https:// rusi.org/commentary/uk-ministry-defence-announces-ambitious-plans-space. 444 Sandra Erwin, “As satellites become targets, UK military seeks closer ties with space industry,” SpaceNews, November 6, 2018, https://spa-� cenews.com/as-satellites-become-targets-u-k-military-seeks-closer-ties-with-space-industry/. 445 Andrew Chuter, “UK shoots for new laser weapons against drones, missiles,” Defense News, July 9, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/ global/europe/2019/07/09/uk-shoots-for-new-laser-weapons-against-drones-missiles/. 446 Mandy Zuo, “China flight systems jammed by pig farm’s African swine fever defences,” South China Morning Post, December 20, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3042991/china-flight-systems-jammed-pig-farms-african-swine-fever. 447 Editor, “GPS Signal Jamming Destroys China Drone Show - Again,” Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, November 1, 2018, https:// rntfnd.org/2018/11/01/gps-jamming-destroys-china-drone-show-again/. 448 Simone McCarthy, William Zheng, and Denise Tsang, “HK$1 million in damage caused by GPS jamming that caused 46 drones to plummet during Hong Kong show,” South China Morning Post, October 29, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/arti-� cle/2170669/hk13-million-damage-caused-gps-jamming-caused-46-drones. 449 Katherine Dunn, “The long ocean voyage that helped find the flaws in GPS,” Fortune, January 24, 2020, https://fortune.com/2020/01/24/ gps-disruption-test-voyage/. 450 Ibid. 451 Ibid.

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