MARCH 2020 A REPORT OF THE CSIS AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Principal Authors TODD HARRISON KAITLYN JOHNSON THOMAS G. ROBERTS TYLER WAY MAKENA YOUNG Foreword MARTIN C. FAGA MARCH 2020 SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 Authors TODD HARRISON KAITLYN JOHNSON THOMAS G. ROBERTS TYLER WAY MAKENA YOUNG Foreword MARTIN C. FAGA A REPORT OF THE CSIS AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT ABOUT CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and econom- ic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views ex- pressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). ABOUT ASP The Aerospace Security Project (ASP) at CSIS explores the technological, budgetary, and policy issues related to the air and space domains and innovative operational concepts for air and space forces. Part of the Inter- national Security Program at CSIS, the Aerospace Security Project is led by Senior Fellow Todd Harrison. ASP’s research focuses on space security, air dominance, long-range strike, and civil and commercial space. Learn more at aerospace.csis.org. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct spon- sorship contributed to this report. The authors would like to thank Martin C. Faga, Brian Weeden, Victoria Samson, Emily Tiemeyer, Jeeah Lee, and Jacque Schrag for their support of this project. © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org II SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 CONTENTS IV FOREWORD 1 INTRODUCTION 2 TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS 3 Kinetic Physical 3 Non-Kinetic Physical 4 Electronic 4 Cyber 5 Threat Characteristics 8 CHINA 10 Space Organization and Doctrine 11 Counterspace Weapons 18 Summary 19 RUSSIA 20 Space Organization and Doctrine 21 Counterspace Weapons 28 Summary 29 IRAN 31 Space Organization and Doctrine 31 Counterspace Weapons 34 Summary 35 NORTH KOREA 37 Space Organization and Doctrine 38 Counterspace Weapons 40 Summary 41 INDIA 43 Space Organization and Doctrine 45 Counterspace Weapons 46 Summary 47 OTHERS 47 France 50 Israel 51 Japan 52 United Kingdom 52 Non-State Actors 53 Summary 54 WHAT TO WATCH 56 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 57 APPENDIX I 59 ENDNOTES III FOREWORD UCH IS SAID THESE DAYS about the possibility of conflict in space during, before, or perhaps, instead of conflict on land, at sea, or in the air. Why is this the case? The subject is discussed as though it emerged in the last 13 Myears since the Chinese demonstration of a kinetic ASAT in 2007. In fact, the United States was concerned in 1957 that Sputnik represented a precursor to space-based nuclear weapons. An ASAT program started in the United States in 1958, and the Soviets did similarly. Both superpowers deployed several ASAT systems and performed orbital tests. Nonetheless, fear on both sides of a serious threat of conflict in space did not emerge until recently. Both the Soviets and the United States under- stood that the satellites of “National Technical Means” were stabilizing and were keys to de-escalation should a conflict occur. This view changed after the First Gulf War, when space systems moved from being primarily stra- tegic systems to tactical ones providing near real-time support to tactical forces. By that time, the satellites of the Department of Defense and of the Intelligence Community operated and reported almost instantly, and the military services developed the equipment and techniques to acquire, ana- lyze, and distribute space system information very quickly. Following the First Gulf War, a Russian analysis of the rapid American suc- cess noted the efficacy of precision weapons and real-time intelligence. Much of this capability depended on space systems and spurred the Rus- sians and Chinese to a sustained program to develop ASAT capabilities--not only those for physical attack but cyber and electronic attacks as well. In recent years, we have read Russian and Chinese doctrine explaining the im- portance of ASAT capabilities, and we have seen systems deployed to carry them out. The situation we confront today was inevitable. Capability is always met with counter-capability. In recognition of this need to defend and to in- crease our space power in the face of such threats, the United States has wisely created the Space Force and the U.S. Space Command. This is where the people who will design, build, and operate our military space systems reside and where personnel will be trained, careers managed, doctrine de- veloped, and a myriad other elements of a military force undertaken. Several years ago, an Army general gave a speech where he said, “every company commander depends on space, and takes it for granted.” What a challenge for our Space Force and Space Command to assure that our mili- tary is served at every level of command without failing. MARTIN C. FAGA Former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office IV SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2020 INTRODUCTION HE PAST YEAR WAS A TRANSFORMATIONAL ONE for space pol- icy in several respects. On December 20, 2019, President Trump signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, creating the Space Force and ushering in what is ar- Tguably the most significant reorganization of the U.S. military since the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. While the newly created Space Force is re- sponsible for organizing, training, and equipping space forces for the U.S. military, the newly re-established United States Space Command is the geographic combatant command responsible for space operations. France also made significant organizational changes in 2019 with the is- suance of its Space Defense Strategy. It calls for the creation of a Space Command within the Air Force and the renaming of the Air Force to the Air and Space Force. The French defense minister publicly stated that France would develop space control capabilities and active defenses, such as small bodyguard satellites and space-based laser defenses to protect im- portant space assets. Other countries continue to develop and test counterspace capabilities and conduct suspicious or threatening activities in space. India became the fourth country to successfully test a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile, as well as the only country to conduct a debris-producing test since 2008. Rus- sia continued its co-orbital activities in geostationary orbit (GEO) and caught the attention of many in the space community with its proximity operations around a classified U.S. government satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO). In commercial space, both SpaceX and OneWeb began deployment of mega constellations in LEO to deliver high-speed internet access globally. OneWeb launched its first set of six satellites in February 2019, and SpaceX launched its first batch of 60 satellites in May 2019. Both companies have conducted additional launches since then, with SpaceX beginning to deploy at a steady pace in early 2020. As of February 17, 2020, SpaceX has launched a total of 302 Starlink satellites, 297 of which are operational. In comparison, the total number of operational satellites in LEO was roughly 1,500 in 2019—a number that could double by the end of 2020. These commercial developments pres- ent both opportunities and challenges in what is already a diverse, disruptive, disordered, and dangerous space environment. The purpose of this annual report from the CSIS Aerospace Security Project is to aggregate and analyze publicly available information on the counter- space capabilities of other nations. It is intended to raise awareness and un- derstanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, and highlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should focus more attention. While the report focuses on the capabilities of China, Russia, Iran, North Ko- rea, and India, this year’s report places relatively more emphasis than previ- ous years on the counterspace capabilities of select other countries, includ- ing some allies and partners of the United States. This report is not a comprehensive assessment of all foreign counterspace capabilities because much of the information on what other countries are doing is not publicly available. The information in this report is current as of February 22, 2020. 1 COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS TYPES OF COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS PACE IS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ENABLER of economic and military power. The December 2017 United States National Security Strategy prioritizes maintaining U.S. leadership and free- dom of action in this critical domain, but it notes that: SMany countries are purchasing satellites to support their own strategic military activities. Others believe that the ability to attack space assets offers an asymmetric advantage and as a result, are pursuing a range of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.