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Foi-R--5077--Se Omvärldsanalys Rymd 2020 Fokus på försvar och säkerhet Sandra Lindström (red.), Kristofer Hallgren, Seméli Papadogiannakis, Ola Rasmusson, John Rydqvist och Jonatan Westman FOI-R--5077--SE Januari 2021 Sandra Lindström (red.), Kristofer Hallgren, Seméli Papadogiannakis, Ola Rasmusson, John Rydqvist och Jonatan Westman Omvärldsanalys Rymd 2020 Fokus på försvar och säkerhet FOI-R--5077--SE Titel Omvärldsanalys Rymd 2020 – Fokus på försvar och säkerhet Title Global Space Trends 2020 for Defence and Security Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--5077--SE Månad/Month Januari Utgivningsår/Year 2021 Antal sidor/Pages 127 ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsmakten Forskningsområde Flygsystem och rymdfrågor FoT-område Sensorer och signaturanpassningsteknik Projektnr/Project no E60966 Godkänd av/Approved by Lars Höstbeck Ansvarig avdelning Försvars- och säkerhetssystem Bild/Cover: Tre gröna lasrar från Starfire Optical Range på Kirtland Air Force Base i New Mexico, USA. Anläggningen används bland annat för inmätning av objekt i låga satellitbanor. Den allmänna uppfattningen (men ej officiell) är att lasern även kan användas som ASAT-vapen. Källa: Directed Energy Directorate, US Air Force. Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, vilket bl.a. innebär att citering är tillåten i enlighet med vad som anges i 22 § i nämnd lag. För att använda verket på ett sätt som inte medges direkt av svensk lag krävs särskild överenskommelse. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. 2 (127) FOI-R--5077--SE Sammanfattning Rapporten syftar till att ge en översikt av rymdområdets utveckling, framförallt under de senaste tre åren, och vilka trender som kan utläsas genom att studera hur omvärlden agerar inom området. Detta sätts i ett svenskt sammanhang för att lyfta fram utmaningarna och möjligheterna ur ett försvars- och säkerhetsperspektiv. Rymdområdet växer globalt i omfattning för var år som går. Statliga och privata investeringar ökar, tjänstesektorn blir större, fler företag startar upp verksamhet inom rymdområdet och antalet rymdnationer ökar. Gränserna för vad som är tekniskt möjligt förflyttas längre ut i rymden. Rymdbaserad teknologi bidrar till ekonomisk, social och kulturell utveckling. Allt fler länder blir beroende av rymden, såväl för samhällsutveckling som för modern försvarsförmåga och nationell säkerhet. Trenden är även att rymdområdet växer i betydelse inter- nationellt, såväl ekonomiskt som tjänstemässigt samt som försvars- och säkerhets- politisk domän. Flera länder har skapat eller planerar att upprätta militära rymd- kommandon eller rymdtrupper, en tydlig signal om rymdens roll som operativ domän och som en ny arena för krigföring. Rapporten belyser vikten av att Sverige hanterar rymdverksamhet ur ett helhets- perspektiv, där nationella och internationella, samt civila och militära aspekter tas i beaktande. En helhetssyn på rymdområdet är avgörande för att framgångsrikt konkretisera den nationella rymdstrategin. Nyckelord: rymden, satellit, försvar, säkerhet, omvärldsanalys, försvarspolitik, säkerhetspolitik, trender, rymdteknik, möjligheter, utmaningar 3 (127) FOI-R--5077--SE Summary This report provides an overview of the ongoing development within the space domain and covers global trends, technology, and policy developments. Placing this in a Swedish context allows us to highlight the challenges and opportunities from a national defence and security perspective. The global interest in the space domain is growing every year. Governmental and private investments are increasing, the downstream sector is growing, the number of start-ups within the space domain increases, and there are more nations involved in the developments of space. The boundaries of what is technically possible are continuously pushed further out into space. Space technology contributes to economic, social, and cultural development. More countries are becoming dependent on space, both for societal development, for modern defence capability, and for the sake of national security. The space domain development has broad impacts, on the economy as well as on security and defence policy. An increasing number of countries are planning to establish space commands or space forces within their armed forces. This report highlights the importance of these aspects when developing Swedish space policy. National perspectives and global developments, both civilian and military aspects, are crucial for a successful implementation of the Swedish national space strategy. Keywords: space, satellite, defence, security, trends, defence policy, security policy, space technology, development, opportunities, challenges 4 (127) FOI-R--5077--SE Innehåll Förkortningar ............................................................................................ 7 1 Inledning ............................................................................................ 9 2 Global utveckling inom rymdområdet med fokus på försvar och säkerhet ........................................................................................... 13 3 Rymd för försvar och säkerhet i Sverige ..................................... 21 4 En statistisk sammanfattning av satelliter och satellituppskjutningar ..................................................................... 32 5 Utvecklingen hos de stora rymdaktörerna .................................. 52 6 Rymdlägesbild - internationell utveckling och trender .............. 82 7 Teknikutveckling inom spaning och övervakning från rymden 87 8 Diskussion och slutsatser ............................................................. 98 Litteraturförteckning ............................................................................ 104 Bilaga A - Arbetsmetodik omvärldsbevakning och -analys ............ 120 Bilaga B - Databaskällor ...................................................................... 126 5 (127) FOI-R--5077--SE 6 (127) FOI-R--5077--SE Förkortningar AI Artificiell intelligens ASAT Antisatellit CSpOC Combined Space Operations Center DG DEFIS Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space DGO Doktrin för gemensamma operationer DL Djupinlärning EDA European Defence Agency ESA European Space Agency FMSI Försvarsmaktens strategiska inriktning FN Förenta Nationerna FoT Forskning och teknikutveckling FoU Forskning och utveckling GEO Geostationary orbit GIS Geografiskt informationssystem GLONASS Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema GNSS Global navigation satellite system GPS Global Positioning System HEO Highly elliptical orbit HPM High power microwave HSIM Hyper spectral imaging methods ISS International Space Station LEO Low earth orbit MEO Medium earth orbit ML Maskininlärning MSD Militärstrategisk doktrin OOS On-orbit servicing OSL Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen PNT Position, navigation och tidssynkronisering 7 (127) FOI-R--5077--SE RPO Rendezvous and proximity operations SAR Syntetisk aperturradar SDA Space domain awareness SPD Space policy directives SpOC Space Operations Command SSA Space situational awareness SSC Swedish Space Corporation (svenska Rymdaktiebolaget) SSN Space Surveillance Network STM Space traffic management SÖR Spaning och övervakning från rymden 8 (127) FOI-R--5077--SE 1 Inledning 1.1 Bakgrund FOI bedriver omvärldsbevakning och -analys inom rymdområdet med fokus på försvars- och säkerhetsfrågor. Verksamheten har pågått sedan 2003 och utförs på uppdrag av Försvarsmakten i den långsiktiga FoT-verksamheten (forskning och teknikutveckling).1 Verksamheten bedrivs i treåriga uppdrag och i slutet av varje treårsperiod publiceras en sammanfattande omvärldsanalys för rymdområdet. Det här är den tredje rapporten i serien, den första publicerades 20142 och den andra 20173. Arbetet som bedrivs är en förutsättning för att förstå och förutse hur rymdområdet påverkar och kommer att påverka militär förmågeutveckling och nationell säkerhet på både kort och lång sikt. Syftet med rapporten är därför att ge en översikt av rymdområdets utveckling, framförallt de senaste tre åren, och vilka trender som kan utläsas genom att studera hur omvärlden agerar inom området. Detta sätts sedan i ett svenskt sammanhang för att lyfta fram utmaningarna och möjligheterna ur ett nationellt försvars- och säkerhetsperspektiv. Arbetet innebär även att FOI kan stödja Regeringskansliet, Försvarsmakten och Rymdstyrelsen med underlag och synpunkter avseende de försvars-, säkerhets- och utrikespolitiska aspekterna på inriktningen av svensk rymdverksamhet och rymdpolitik. Detta avspeglas också i den här rapporten. 1.2 Förutsättningar och avgränsning Insamling av information sker uteslutande från öppna källor, med andra ord offentligt tillgänglig information. Det kan handla om bevakning via konferens- deltagande och intervjuer med relevanta aktörer, samt genom att studera media och andra typer av publikationer. Genom att använda öppna källor kan informationen och analyser spridas till berörda aktörer i Sverige och på så sätt höja den allmänna medvetenheten och kunskapsnivån om frågorna. All statistik som presenteras i rapporten skall användas med försiktighet vad gäller absoluta värden, avsikten är att illustrera vilka trender det går att identifiera. 1 Försvarsmaktens samlingsbeställning för forskning och teknikutveckling inom Sensorer och signaturanpassning (FoT SoS, AT.9220420).
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