Analysis of Cyberwarfare Ethics As It Pertains to Civilian Computer Networks/Infrastructures

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Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare Susan W

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 97 Article 2 Issue 2 Winter Winter 2007 At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare Susan W. Brenner Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Susan W. Brenner, At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 379 (2006-2007) This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/07/9702-0379 THE JOURNALOF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 97. No. 2 Copyright 0 2007 by NorthwesternUniversity. Schoolof Low Printedin U.S.A. "AT LIGHT SPEED": ATTRIBUTION AND RESPONSE TO CYBERCRIME/TERRORISM/WARFARE SUSAN W. BRENNER* This Article explains why and how computer technology complicates the related processes of identifying internal (crime and terrorism) and external (war) threats to social order of respondingto those threats. First, it divides the process-attribution-intotwo categories: what-attribution (what kind of attack is this?) and who-attribution (who is responsiblefor this attack?). Then, it analyzes, in detail, how and why our adversaries' use of computer technology blurs the distinctions between what is now cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare. The Article goes on to analyze how and why computer technology and the blurring of these distinctions erode our ability to mount an effective response to threats of either type.
Cognitive Warfare.Pdf

1 Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 Introduction 5 Evolution of Non-Kinetic Warfare 6 Origins 6 Psychological Warfare (PsyOps) 7 Electronic Warfare (EW) 7 Cyberwarfare 8 Information Warfare 8 Cognitive Warfare 9 Goals of Cognitive Warfare 11 Destabilization 12 Case 1: Destabilization through Confusion 13 Case 2: Destabilization by Sowing Division 15 Case 3: Destabilization as a Means to Influence 17 Influence 20 Case 1: Influencing to Recruit 21 Case 2: Influencing Policy Enactment 22 Case 3: Influencing as a Means to Destabilize 23 Future Threats 27 Looking Ahead 27 Threat 1: Ease of Selection and Virality 29 Threat 2: A New Age of Truth 30 Threat 3: Cyber-induced Institutional Discomfort and Distrust 31 Threat 4: Biological and Therapeutic Emotional Manipulation 32 Threat 5: Enhanced Recruitment of Agents 33 Strategy Recommendations 35 Threat Recognition Framework and Criteria 35 Risk Assessment 36 Organizational Implementations 37 Offensive Considerations 39 Closing Thoughts 40 Bibliography 41 2 Executive Summary Warfare has shifted dramatically over the past several decades, moving away from the physical threats of conventional warfare. War now moves towards the social and ideological threats brought about by mass media and advances in technology. The advent of this new type of warfare is different from anything we have seen before. Although it takes elements from previous types of hybrid warfare, the reach and level of impact it possesses make it far more dangerous than its predecessors. We have dubbed this new way of war cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare, although sharing various similarities to other non-conventional and non-kinetic types of warfare/operations, is ultimately unique in its execution and purpose.
Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts

Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts Susan W. Brenner* with Leo L. Clarke** ABSTRACT Civilian-owned and -operated entities will almost certainly be a target in cyberwarfare because cyberattackers are likely to be more focused on undermining the viability of the targeted state than on invading its territory. Cyberattackers will probably target military computer systems, at least to some extent, but in a departure from traditional warfare, they will also target companies that operate aspects of the victim nation’s infrastructure. Cyberwarfare, in other words, will penetrate the territorial borders of the attacked state and target high-value civilian businesses. Nation-states will therefore need to integrate the civilian employees of these (and perhaps other) companies into their cyberwarfare response structures if a state is to be able to respond effectively to cyberattacks. While many companies may voluntarily elect to participate in such an effort, others may decline to do so, which creates a need, in effect, to conscript companies for this purpose. This Article explores how the U.S. government can go about compelling civilian cooperation in cyberwarfare without violating constitutional guarantees and limitations on the power of the Legislature and the Executive. * NCR Distinguished Professor of Law and Technology, University of Dayton School of Law. ** Associate, Drew, Cooper & Anding, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan. 1011 1012 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 43:1011 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................
The Ethics of Cyberwarfare Randall R

This article was downloaded by: [University of Pennsylvania] On: 28 February 2013, At: 08:22 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Military Ethics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/smil20 The Ethics of Cyberwarfare Randall R. Dipert a a SUNY (State University of New York) at Buffalo, NY, USA Version of record first published: 16 Dec 2010. To cite this article: Randall R. Dipert (2010): The Ethics of Cyberwarfare, Journal of Military Ethics, 9:4, 384-410 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2010.536404 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and- conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 4, 384Á410, 2010 The Ethics of Cyberwarfare RANDALL R.
Cyber War Law, Ethics & Policy

The Internet in Bello: Cyber War Law, Ethics & Policy Seminar held 18 November 2011, Berkeley Law Kate Jastram and Anne Quintin1 I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 2 II. Summary of presentations and recommendations ................................................... 2 A. Significance of the issue and applicability of IHL/LOAC to cyber operations .......... 3 B. Insights on specific IHL/LOAC principles and definitions ........................................ 4 C. The need for, and obstacles to, greater U.S. engagement ..................................... 5 D. Cyber speed ............................................................................................................. 6 E. Unique role of the private sector ............................................................................. 6 F. Recommendations for further reflection ................................................................. 6 III. Opening remarks by David Caron ................................................................................ 7 IV. Preparing the Battlefield: The Best Defense ............................................................... 8 A. Comments by Michael Nacht ................................................................................. 8 B. Comments by Sir Daniel Bethlehem ...................................................................... 11 C. Comments by Abraham Sofaer .............................................................................
Controlling Cyberwarfare International Laws of Armed Conflict and Human Rights in the Cyber Realm

Controlling Cyberwarfare International Laws of Armed Conflict and Human Rights in the Cyber Realm by William James Jordan A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2021 © William James Jordan 2021 Examining Committee Membership The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. Thedeci sion of the Examining Committee is by majority vote. External Examiner: Col. David Barnes Professor, Department of English and Philosophy United States Military Academy Supervisor: W. Mathieu Doucet Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy University of Waterloo Internal Member: Brian D. Orend Professor, Department of Philosophy University of Waterloo Internal Member: Patricia A. Marino Professor, Department of Philosophy University of Waterloo InternalExternal Member: Veronica M. Kitchen Associate Professor, Department of Political Science University of Waterloo ii Author’s Declaration I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my ex aminers. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the pub lic. iii Abstract Cyberwarfare, military activities in cyberspace conducted by a state against another state and intended to disrupt or destroy computing or communica tion systems or data, is a recent addition to the warfaring arsenal. The in ternational laws of armed conflict set out an obligation for states at warto protect civilians from the effects of the conflict. As societies continue toex pand their activities in the cyber realm, the risk of cyberwarfare negatively affecting the civilian population increases.
Understanding Cyberwarfare Lessons from the Russia-Georgia War

Understanding Cyberwarfare Lessons from the Russia-Georgia War Sarah P. White March 20, 2018 Understanding Cyberwarfare: Lessons from the Russia-Georgia War Capt. Sarah P. “Sally” White is a cyberspace operations officer in the US Army. She is currently pursuing her PhD in the Harvard Department of Government, where her research interests include military innovation and comparative cyberspace doctrine. She has served in the 82nd Airborne Division and the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade (Cyber). Following graduate school, she will serve as an instructor in the West Point Department of Social Sciences. Understanding Cyberwarfare: Lessons from the Russia-Georgia War Cyberattacks had become an established tool attacks, with the highest levels of online of statecraft by the time they were used against activity coinciding with the Russian invasion of the Republic of Georgia in the summer of South Ossetia on August 8, 9, and 10.3 Even the 2008, albeit one without a legal framework and National Bank of Georgia had to suspend all 4 whose long-term implications remained poorly electronic services from August 8–19. While 1 understood. Nevertheless, the war between there is strong political and circumstantial Russia and Georgia that took place in August of evidence that the attacks were encouraged by that year was remarkable for its inclusion of a the Russian state, definitive technical series of large-scale, overt cyberspace attacks attribution—and thus definitive legal that were relatively well synchronized with culpability—have remained elusive. conventional military operations. Conducted The cyberattacks had little effect on by an army of patriotic citizen hackers, the conventional forces and were not decisive to 5 cyber campaign consisted of distributed denial the outcome of the conflict, but they of service (DDoS) attacks and website nevertheless offer significant lessons on the defacements that were similar in nature but character of modern warfare for scholars of different in method to what had occurred in conflict and military studies.
The Rise of Cyber Warfare: the Digital Age and American Decline

The Rise of Cyber Warfare The Digital Age and American Decline Hanyu Chwe In May 2007, unknown attackers de- advantages in cyberspace; the increasing clared cyberwar on Estonia. Estonians importance of cyberwarfare will accelerate woke up to find that the websites of their the relative decline of American military banks, newspapers, and government agen- power. cies had been systematically dismantled. This was one of the world’s first cyberwar- For the purposes of this paper, I define fare attacks; I argue that it won’t be the cyberwarfare as the use of computer pro- last. grams to attack, disrupt, destroy, disable, In the future, the amount of cyberwar- or steal anything of military, economic or fare will increase drastically. First, the in- general strategic value or e↵orts to defend creased value of cyberspace increases the against such attacks. I am not considering incentives to wage cyberwarfare. Second, industrial corporate espionage, cyber at- the logic of cyberwarfare nullifies several tacks meant to aid the use of conventional mechanisms that constrain territorial war. military force, or the use of internet media Finally, the o↵ensive advantage inherent to organize social action. In my definition, in cyberwarfare exacerbates the security cyberwarfare is not intentionally accompa- dilemma. The United States lacks many nied by corresponding actions in the real of its traditional military and economic world. Cyberwarfare Incentives The strategic and economic value of state needs to guard its cyberspace in order cyberspace is huge. Facebook and to ensure stability. Google were worth 200 billion dollars It’s unlikely internet reliance will de- and 400 billion dollars in 2014 respec- crease.
Introduction: Cyber and the Changing Face of War

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 4-2015 Introduction: Cyber and the Changing Face of War Claire Oakes Finkelstein University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Kevin H. Govern Ave Maria School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Computer Law Commons, International Law Commons, International Relations Commons, Internet Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons Repository Citation Finkelstein, Claire Oakes and Govern, Kevin H., "Introduction: Cyber and the Changing Face of War" (2015). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1566. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1566 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Introduction Cyber and the Changing Face of War Claire Finkelstein and Kevin Govern I. War and Technological Change In 2012, journalist David Sanger reported that the United States, in conjunction with Israel, had unleashed a massive virus into the computer system of the Iranian nuclear reactor at Natanz, where the Iranians were engaged in enriching uranium for use in nuclear weaponry.1 Operation "Olympic Games" was conceived as an alternative to a kinetic attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. It was the firstma jor offensive use of America's cyberwar capacity, but it was seen as justified because of the importance of preempt ing Iran's development of nuclear weapons.
Bitdefender: the Indelible Impact of COVID 19 on Cybersecurity

10 IN 10 STUDY THE INDELIBLE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON CYBERSECURITY WWW.BITDEFENDER.COM GRAVITYZONE™ THE SECURITY PLATFORM FOR END-TO-END BREACH AVOIDANCE 50% HAD NO PHISHING/WHALING CONTINGENCY PLAN IN ATTACKS WERE THE MOST PLACE FOR COVID-19 COMMON TYPE OF ACCORDING TO ATTACK TO SEE AN INCREASE DURING COVID- INFOSEC 19 86% ADMITTED THAT 25% ARE CONCERNED ATTACKS WERE ON THE THAT BAD ACTORS WILL PROFESSIONALS RISE DURING THIS PERIOD TARGET PEOPLE WORKING FROM HOME 81% BELIEVE THAT COVID- FOLLOWING COVID-19, 19 WILL CHANGE THE WAY NEARLY A THIRD INTEND THEIR BUSINESSES TO KEEP LEARNINGS OF OPERATE LONG-TERM INCREASING IT SECURITY TRAINING AND 24/7 IT SUPPORT GRAVITYZONE™ THE SECURITY PLATFORM FOR END-TO-END BREACH AVOIDANCE A LACK OF FORWARD PLANNING COMES AT GREAT RISK 75% Half of infosec professionals (50%) revealed that their organisations didn’t have a contingency plan in place, or didn’t know if they did, for a situation like COVID-19 or a similar scenario. Question: Did your organisation have a contingency plan in place for a situation like COVID-19 or something similar that could have resulted in a similar outcome (eg. people working from home)? GRAVITYZONE™ THE SECURITY PLATFORM FOR END-TO-END BREACH AVOIDANCE 86% of infosec professionals admitted that attacks in the most common attack vectors were on the rise during COVID-19. GRAVITYZONE™ THE SECURITY PLATFORM FOR END-TO-END BREACH AVOIDANCE BUSINESS OPERATIONS WILL CHANGE LONG-TERM 75% Infosec professionals know that strategic changes need to be made rapidly. The significant majority (81%) believe that COVID-19 will change the way their businesses operate in the long-term — a figure that jumps to 92% for those working in energy and 87% for those working in hospitality.
Cyberwarfare Conjures up Images of Information Warriors Unleashing

Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats: James A. Lewis Center for Strategic and International Studies December 2002 Cyber-warfare conjures up images of information warriors unleashing vicious attacks against an unsuspecting opponent’s computer networks, wreaking havoc and paralyzing nations. This a frightening scenario, but how likely is it to occur? What would the effects of a cyber attack be on a potential opponent? Cyber attacks, network security and information pose complex problems that reach into new areas for national security and public policy. This paper looks at one set of issues – those related to cyber-terrorism and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and their implications for national security. Cyber-terrorism is “the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, government operations) or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population.” The premise of cyber terrorism is that as nations and critical infrastructure became more dependent on computer networks for their operation, new vulnerabilities are created – “a massive electronic Achilles' heel.” A hostile nation or group could exploit these vulnerabilities to penetrate a poorly secured computer network and disrupt or even shut down critical functions. Much of the literature on cyber-terrorism assumes that the vulnerability of computer networks and the vulnerability of critical infrastructures are the same, and that these vulnerabilities put national security at a significant risk. Given the newness of computer network technology and the rapidity with which it spread into economic activity, these assumptions are not surprising. A closer look at the relationships between computer networks and critical infrastructures, their vulnerability to attack, and the effect on national security, suggests that the assumption of vulnerability is wrong.
Cyberweapons and Cyberwarfare Have Become the Most Dangerous

Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law Professor Claire Finkelstein 3501 Sansom Street Director Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204 Cyberweapons and cyberwarfare have become the most dangerous innovation of this century1, and are now considered by the FBI to be the number one threat ahead of terrorism.2 Cyberweapons bring peril to economic, political, and military systems by a single act, or by multifaceted orders of effect, creating a dreadful new total war potentiality in every dimension. Cyber-attacks put immense pressure on conventional notions of sovereignty and the moral and legal doctrines that were developed to regulate them. Unlike past forms of warfare circumscribed by centuries of just war tradition and law of armed conflict prescriptions, cyberwarfare brings new areas of ambiguity, including violation of third party sovereignty, the use of cyber attacks by non-state actors acting independently or in concert with states, and the timing, manner, place, and consequences of cyber attack that could be interpreted as acts of war.3 These legal ambiguities, in the void of moral perspective, make adherence to the rule of law a more challenging concept than in any other domain of warfare.4 In the United States, cyberwarfare technology was originally developed by the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration has further expanded its use. While Secretary of State Clinton has claimed that such tactics are used against al Qaeda5, the use of advanced techniques in cyberwarfare is most evident in recent operations against Iran. The United States 1 Beverly Head, World teeters on cyber-war brink, ITwire.com, May 22, 2012, http://www.itwire.com/business-it-news/security/54797-world-teeters-on-cyber-war-brink 2 See, e.g., FBI: Cyber attacks – America’s top terror threat, RT.com, March 2, 2012, http://www.rt.com/news/cyber-fbi-security-mueller-691/, and http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/security/232600046, J.