On the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious States of Mind Author(s): David H. Finkelstein Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 79-100 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009956 Accessed: 05/03/2010 11:04
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=illinois.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
University of Illinois Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 36, Number 2, April 1999
ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES OF MIND
David H. Finkelstein
Yes, I preferred the elderly and discontented doctor, surrounded by friends and cherishing hon? est hopes; and bade a farewell to the liberty, the comparative youth, the light step, leaping impulses and secret pleasures, that I had enjoyed in the disguise of Hyde. I made this choice perhaps with some unconscious reservation, for I neither gave up the house in Soho, nor de? stroyed the clothes of Edward Hyde, which still lay ready in my cabinet.
?Robert Louis Stevenson, "The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde"
An this passage from Stevenson's famous yield a set of conditions that an adequate story, Dr. Jekyll recalls a choice that he account of the distinction between con? to made but failed live by?a resolution to scious and unconscious mentality ought to never again transform himself into Edward meet. I'll then offer what I take to be such Hyde. Jekyll remarks that he "made this an account, and I'll show that it both meets choice some res? perhaps with unconscious the conditions of adequacy and helps us to ervation." What work does the word answer a number of questions that would "unconscious" do in this sentence? When appear puzzling without it. a an or a is reservation (or intention fear) Perhaps I should add that my aim is not rightly said to be unconscious? My aim in to try to convince a reader who is uncom? what follows is to explain what it is that fortable with talk about unconscious states an distinguishes unconscious state of mind of mind that it's all right to describe a per? from a one. son conscious My procedure will as, for example, unconsciously jealous be as follows. I am to sev? going present of his brother. We do characterize people eral tempting, but ultimately as subject to a wide range of unconscious unsatisfactory, views concerning that by mental states, and I'm going to take it for virtue of which a state mind of should be granted that we are often justified in doing as or con? characterized either unconscious so. I aim to elucidate what we mean by such scious. My criticisms of these views will characterizations. I will not, however, be
79 80 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
are assuming that dreams the royal road to of his conversation with his therapist. But or the unconscious that little boys are un? we can imagine that Harry holds no such consciously afraid of castration or anything conscious belief. When asked about his else that is distinctively Freudian or psy? future, Harry says, "Oh, I'm sure that even? choanalytic. We should remember that tually someone will fall in love with me, was Freud not the first to speak of uncon? even though my therapist has convinced me states scious of mind (as is evidenced not that unconsciously I believe it's impossible as only by such stories "The Strange Case that anyone should." This is a perfectly was of Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde"?which intelligible remark. What Harry's therapist first published in 1886?but also by 19th has made him aware of is not that he is in century theoretical writings about the na? some way unlovable, but only that he un? ture of the human mind1) consciously believes this to be so. The very simple view, however, cannot allow for the I. The Very Simple and Not-so-simple intelligibility of what Harry wants to say Views about himself. According to the very simple view, if someone is aware that he Let's begin by considering a very simple believes such-and-such, then his belief is way of understanding what itmeans to say conscious. But, in our is that someone's mental state is either con? example, Harry aware of his unconscious belief that no one scious or unconscious. The view be might could fall in love with him. put as follows: "Your mental state is con? The very simple view is too simple; it's scious if you know that you are in it. Your not faithful to the way we use the words mental state is unconscious if you don't "conscious" and "unconscious." There is, know that you're in it. To say that you, for however, a use of these words to which example, unconsciously believe that no one something like the very simple view is could ever fall in love with you is to say: faithful. The case of Harry demonstrates (1) that you believe that no one could ever that there is a distinction to be drawn be? fall in love with you and (2) that you don't tween two uses of the word "conscious" know?you're unaware of the fact?that you or "unconscious." First, there is a relatively believe this. Call this the very simple view.2 unpuzzling use that is generally in place A bit of reflection reveals that the very when the word "conscious" or "uncon? simple view is unsatisfactory. Imagine scious" is followed by the word "of or someone?call him Harry?who says: "My "that." Imight say, "Until the lights came therapist tells me that I unconsciously be? on, I had been unconscious of the person lieve no one could ever fall in love with in the seat next to me." Or: "Lois suddenly me, and she's generally right about such became conscious that she was the only things, so I suppose I must have this be? patent attorney in the room." In such con? lief." Let's imagine that Harry's therapist texts, the word "conscious" means, is right about him, and that Harry is justi? roughly, aware. The corresponding use of fied in that she's about him. believing right means unaware. "unconscious" Among the Harry is, then, aware of his belief that no things Imight become aware, or conscious, one could ever fall in love with him. Ac? c/are my own states of mind. But to say cording to the very simple view, we should that I am conscious of, for example, my say that Harry's belief that no one could fear of abandonment is not to say either ever fall in love with him went from being that I conscious/^ fear abandonment or? unconscious to being conscious as a result what amounts to the same thing?that my DISTINCTIONBETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 81
fear of abandonment is conscious. Describ? mechanism?the mechanism by which I out own states ing Harry as "conscious of unconsciously ordinarily find about my of to believing that no one could ever fall in love mind. It is tempting to refer this mecha? with him" (or "conscious of his uncon? nism as 'inner sense,' but perhaps we scious belief that no one could ever fall in should just call it 'mechanism M.' What it love with him") seems to involve a contra? means for one of my mental states to be me diction only if we confuse two senses of conscious (i.e., for to be conscious/y the word "conscious." It's one thing to be angry, sad, or whatever) is that I'm aware means consciously angry or jealous or believing of it via mechanism M. What it for such-and-such and quite another to be con? one of my mental states to be unconscious scious of one's own anger or jealousy or is that?although Imay be aware of it?I belief. We can think of this fact as providing am not aware of it via mechanism M." I'll us with our first constraint on an adequate call this the not-so-simple view. account of the distinction between conscious It is a good deal more difficult to state a and unconscious mentality. decisive objection to the not-so-simple view than to its I Constraint 1 :An account of the distinction very simple progenitor. I amounts to such an between conscious and unconscious mental? present what, think, but the is ity should respect the difference between: objection elsewhere,3 argument too lengthy to rehearse here. In the next someone's or be? (a) conscious/y believing couple of paragraphs, I'll merely offer a afraid, i.e., a belief or a ing conscious/y reason to be suspicious of the not-so un? fear's being conscious, rather than simple view?a reason that suggests the conscious; direction that I'll be taking later in the pa? AND per. Let us return to the case of Harry who consciously believes that someone will someone's conscious her own (b) being of eventually fall in love with him, even belief or fear, i.e., conscious that she though he is aware of his unconscious be? believes or fears such-and-such. lief that no one could. The fact that, in this A variation on the very simple view example, Harry's conscious and uncon? might appear to meet Constraint 1. The scious beliefs contradict each other helps view that I have inmind could be expressed us to see the inadequacy of the very simple as follows: "The problem with the very view. But the need to distinguish between simple view is that it doesn't take into ac? what someone is aware of believing and count the fact that there are various kinds what he consciously believes does not de? of knowledge. If my knowledge that I be? pend on there being a flat-out contradiction lieve p is based only upon the testimony between his conscious and unconscious of my therapist, then?while Imay be said beliefs. To see this, consider a variation on can? to be conscious of my belief that p?I the example. Imagine that Harry says: "I not be said to conscious/y believe p. The unconsciously believe that no one could kind of self-knowledge that the word 'con? ever fall in love with me," whereupon he's sciously' picks out is not knowledge by asked whether anyone could fall in love me con? testimony. What it means for to with him. He answers, "Maybe; I'm not sciously believe that/? (or to be consciously sure." Here too, Harry's belief that no one hopeful or afraid, etc.) is that I know my could fall in love with him is an uncon? mental state via a particular cognitive scious one of which he is aware. 82 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
not So, Harry's conscious opinions need to be suspicious of the not-so-simple view quite contradict his unconscious belief that is that it doesn't look like it will help us no one ever could fall in love with him. come to grips with what would be prob? seem to Nevertheless, there would be lematic in such an utterance. According to something wrong with Harry's saying, "I the not-so-simple view, a belief's being unconsciously believe that no one could unconscious lies in the fact that the sub? ever no one fall in love with me; moreover, ject doesn't know about it via a particular could ever fall in love with me." If Harry cognitive mechanism. But now, while there no one ever is willing to assert that could would seem to be something wrong with fall in love with him, then it's not right for most imaginable utterances of the form, "I him to say that he believes this uncon? unconsciously believe that/?; moreover,/?," sciously. We might think of this point in it's not at all clear what, if anything, would connection with Moore's paradox. Moore be wrong with someone's saying, "My pointed out that it would be absurd for knowledge that I believe /? is not based on someone a to utter sentence of the form, "I cognitive mechanism M; moreover /?." case believe that p, and it is not the that Thus, the not-so-simple view leaves /?." A number of writers have since noted Eroom's paradox looking like a mystery. that Moore's point does not hold for self Again, I don't claim that this constitutes ascriptions of unconscious belief. In other anything like a decisive objection to the words, there's nothing wrong with saying, not-so-simple view. Nonetheless, I do think "I unconsciously believe that p, and it is it provides us with a reason to seek another not case the that/?." I'm calling something account of unconscious mentality?one further to your attention: that, prima facie, that helps us to make sense of Eroom's seem to there does be something wrong paradox. with saying, "I unconsciously believe that According to both the very simple and /?, and it is the case that /?" (even though, the not-so-simple views, unconscious and as with Moore's paradox, both conjuncts conscious are, as it were, epistemic no? might be true).4 When we consider uncon? tions: on either view, to say that a mental scious mental states, we find not only the state is unconscious is to say that the sub? failure of Moore's paradox, but, as it were, ject lacks some sort of knowledge that he the inversion of it. We might call this would enjoy were the mental state con? Eroom's paradox. scious. Perhaps the difficulties that I have Although I won't call it a constraint on raised for the two views suggest that this any satisfactory account of the difference is not the best way to think about the dif? between conscious and unconscious men? ference between conscious and tality, it does seem reasonable to expect unconscious mental states. In what follows, that such an account would shed light on I'll try to show that there is a better way to Eroom's paradox. In other words, it's rea? think about this difference?one according sonable to expect that if we come to to which conscious and unconscious are understand what distinguishes unconscious not epistemic notions. states of mind from conscious ones, we'll Moore's paradox indicates that our state? also understand what would be wrong with ments about the world and our saying, "I unconsciously believe that my self-ascriptions of conscious belief hang brother has ruined my bid for reelection; together in a particular way. Eroom's para? moreover, he has ruined it." And a reason dox indicates that our statements about the DISTINCTION BETWEENCONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 83 world and our self-ascriptions of uncon? It's a mistake to understand such represen? scious belief come apart in a particular tations as akin to unconscious attitudes and way. What Eroom's paradox starts to bring emotions. It will help to introduce some of out, I think, is that when we speak of the themes that will be important later in someone's believing something uncon? the paper if I say a little bit here about the sciously, we are characterizing, not an character of this mistake. epistemic lack, but rather, a certain kind Let's stay with the example of edge of rupture in the way that a person's be? maps. According to David Marr's theory liefs (as expressed in his claims about the of visual cognition and many theories that world) and his self-ascriptions of belief have come in its wake, at an early stage in ordinarily hang together. This paper can be visual processing, a provisional map of the understood as an attempt to shed light on edges in the visual field is computed.6 This the kind of rupture that this is. is thought by some to occur in what are called the ocular dominance columns lo? II. "Unconscious Mental cated in striate visual cortex.7 Representations" Given suitable circumstances, you might want to say, "A set of my ocular dominance I have distinguished between two ways columns believes that edges X and Y meet." in which we use the words "conscious" and But it would be courting confusion if you "unconscious": it's one thing to say that were to call such a "belief one of your someone's fear or is conscious jealousy beliefs?conscious or unconscious. To see rather than unconscious (i.e., that he is the sort of confusion that would be invited conscious/y afraid or conscious/y jealous), by this way of speaking, it helps to know and quite another thing to say that some? that each eye feeds information to a sepa? one is conscious of (i.e., aware of) his own rate set of ocular dominance columns, and fear or jealousy. Now, there are other ways each of the two sets computes its own edge in which we use the words "conscious" and map. To the extent that your two sets of "unconscious" that I won't be concerned ocular dominance columns (the one domi? with. For example, we sometimes speak of nated by your left eye and the one someone's being "knocked unconscious." dominated by your right eye) can be de? This usage is connected to the "conscious scribed as "thinking" or "believing" of locution. A person who is knocked un? anything at all, their "beliefs" sometimes conscious is not conscious of anything.5 contradict each other. In such a case, there I do want to devote a few paragraphs to is no good reason to identify one of these saying a little bit about a potentially con? "beliefs," rather than the other, as what you fusing use of the word "unconscious" that unconsciously believe. has become common in certain circles. But the real problem with characterizing scientists sometimes character? Cognitive a state of a set of ocular dominance col? ize (what they call) mental representations umns as one of your beliefs does not lie in as unconscious. A cognitive psychologist the fact that you have two sets of ocular who was interested in visual object recog? dominance columns. It lies, rather, in the nition say, "When you read a book, might fact that a set of ocular dominance columns while you are thinking about what the au? is not the sort of thing that can have a full thor is saying, you are also constructing an blooded belief. If we choose to speak of a map?an unconscious mental repre? edge set of ocular dominance columns as hav? sentation of the edges in your visual field." ing beliefs at all, the content of such 84 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
"beliefs" is extremely thin. In striate vi? to distinguish unconscious mental states sual cortex, there aren't even any from subpersonal informational states object-representations. A set of ocular which (I want to say) are not conscious dominance columns has no idea, if you because they are not genuinely mental. But will, that what it's mapping are the edges the themes of this discussion?that uncon? of objects* Your beliefs, both conscious scious mental states are the states of a and unconscious, about edges (or anything person and that they make sense only in else) make sense in light of what you know light of a person's other attitudes and emo? about the world, which is a great deal. The tions?will figure prominently throughout "beliefs" of a set of ocular dominance col? the rest of the paper. umns are not your beliefs. as a The "beliefs" of a set of ocular domi? III. The Unconscious Quasi Person nance columns could be compared to the states of an immune system. An immunolo If we accept that anything subject to full say that what causes juvenile gist might blooded mental states must have the sort diabetes is the immune system's mistak? of complexity that a person has, we may enly "thinking" that the insulin-producing be tempted to draw the conclusion that cells in the pancreas are viruses. The "be? unconscious mental states should be liefs" of a set of ocular dominance columns thought of as belonging, not to a mere are no more yours than are the "beliefs" of subpersonal information processor, but to your immune system. an, as it were, inner person. A number of Indeed, the states of a set of ocular domi? considerations reinforce this conclusion. nance columns, like those of an immune Earlier, we saw that a person may be con? system, may be said to be beliefs?even scious of his belief that /? without beliefs with very thin content?only in the conscious/y believing /??indeed while most metaphorical of senses. This is con? that not-/?. How are nected to the fact that we feel no inclination consciously believing we to make sense of the idea that I might to ascribe fear, or anger to a set of ocu? joy, be conscious of a mental state that I'm not lar dominance columns.9 Genuine beliefs consciously in? One familiar example of fit, in a way to be discussed shortly, into a this phenomenon occurs when I attend to coherent pattern of actions and other men? another person's state of mind. I may be tal states of various types. Even a dog's conscious of your belief that juggling is a beliefs make sense in light of his expres? high art form without myself consciously sions of fear, anger, dissatisfaction, and joy. believing this (or believing it at all). This (Under the right circumstances, Fido's joy? suggests that we might make use of an in? ful barking might make manifest his belief terpersonal model in order to understand that one of his friends is at the door.) The how it is that I may be conscious of my informational states that are ascribed to own unconscious belief that/?. If we think items pictured in cognitive psychological of my unconscious mental states as, in flow-charts do not have this character; they some sense, the beliefs of a quasi-indepen? do not figure in a life in anything like the dent agent, then itmight start to make sense way that an organism's beliefs do. that Imay be conscious of my unconscious The lesson I would have you draw only mental states. from this little discussion of cognitive neu This for uncon? care strategy understanding ropsychology is that we should take scious mentality gains further appeal when DISTINCTIONBETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 85 we notice that there are other ways in inner space not with analogues of Boylean but with of which my unconscious states of mind seem corpuscles analogues persons? coherent clusters of belief and to be like the mental states of another per? internally desire. Each of these is, in the son. First, I can think of my unconscious quasi persons Freudian picture, a part of a single unified beliefs as false or crazy, just as I can think causal network, but not of a single person of your beliefs as false or crazy. And sec? (since the criterion for individuation of a ond, I don't speak with first-person person is a certain minimal coherence among about either your states of mind authority its beliefs and desires). (F&MR, pp. 147-148) or about my unconscious states of mind. Freud found that the propositional attitudes Thus, for a number of reasons, it is tempt? he wanted to attribute to people were ing to think of my unconscious mental inconsistent with one another. He states as, in some sense, the mental states wildly wanted to say that a. boy may, for example, of another person. In a paper called "Freud both believe and strongly disbelieve that and Moral Reflection," Richard Rorty his father is liable to castrate him. Freud credits Freud with discovering that uncon? accounted for this sort of scious mental states should be understood inconsistency by distinguishing between conscious and un? in this way?as the states of what Rorty conscious attitudes. Rorty thinks that the calls a "quasi person."101 should say at the to understand what Freud was outset that I don't think the account of un? way doing in so dividing up mental states is to see him conscious mentality that Rorty attributes as populating inner space with analogues to Freud is particularly faithful to Freud's of persons. According to this view, which writings. For this reason, I am going to re? Rorty himself endorses, a human being fer to it as Rorty's account. The merit of constitutes a single causal network, but two Rorty's account is that he tries to take very separate rational networks. Rorty writes, seriously the idea that unconscious mental "The same human body can play host to states are the states of something like a two or more persons" (F&MR, p. 147). separate person. It will help us to see just Rorty credits Donald Davidson with in? what goes wrong when we try to see things this way of what this way. spiring understanding Freud had to teach us. In "Mental Events," According to Rorty, the difference be? Davidson writes: tween Freud and Hume is that Freud no a grasped the idea that the existence of an There is assigning beliefs to person one one on intentional state presupposes a more or less by the basis of his verbal behaviour, or no consistent network of other mental states. his choices, other local signs matter how and evident, for we make sense of This led him to posit the existence of more plain beliefs as cohere with than one coherent network of mental states particular only they other beliefs, with preferences, with inten? within what we think of as a single per? tions, fears, and the rest. son?different who share a hopes, expectations, quasi persons . . . a The content of propositional attitude body. Rorty writes: derives from its place in the pattern.11 The mechanization of the self that Hume According to Davidson, propositional at? suggested, and that associationist psychol? titudes derive their contents from a.pattern ogy developed, amounted to little more than that is revealed when we interpret one an? a transposition into mentalistic terminology other as of a rather crude physiology of perception agents. What kind of a is this? It's a ra? and memory. By contrast, Freud populated pattern tional pattern?a network of states and 86 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
events that owe their location in the net? take to be its other mental states and its work to their rational (rather than, e.g., actions according to what Davidson calls one spatial or causal) relations to another. "the constitutive ideal of rationality."12 We The items in such a pattern?the beliefs, interpret the actions and mental states of a preferences, hopes, fears, and actions of a quasi person holistically so as to render person?hang together rationally. On them rationally intelligible. The mental Davidson's picture, a person's proposi? states of a single quasi person are thus un? tional attitudes and actions may be said to derstood to bear rational, internal relations bear internal, rational relations to one an? to one another. What we don't do is treat other. A particular propositional attitude is the two quasi persons together?the human what it is by virtue of its rational relations being as a whole?as a single rationally to other attitudes and actions. coherent agent. This is to say, we don't in? Rorty takes this approach to understand? terpret the mental states on one side of the ing propositional attitudes for granted, only partition line so as to be rationally coher? he understands a single human body to ent with those on the other side. The contain two independent networks of relations between mental states on one side propositional attitudes?two separate quasi of the line and those on the other side are persons. Given Rorty's view, we might pic? (like the relation between Smith's inten? ture what we'd pretheoretically call "a tion to hit Jones and Jones's subsequent human mind" as follows: feeling of pain) causal, but not internal. Ac? cording to Rorty, the intentional states that we want to attribute to a human being don't exhibit the minimal coherence that is a crite?
rion for the individuation of a single person. Along with Rorty's picture of the uncon? scious as a quasi person, there is a corresponding picture of the sort of self knowledge that can be gained through psychoanalysis. Rorty writes:
Self-knowledge will be a matter of getting one or more acquainted with crazy quasi people, listening to their crazy accounts of how things are, seeing why they hold the crazy views they do, and learning something from them. (F&MR, p. 150)
Figure 1 Rorty refers to this kind of self-knowledge as "the aim of psychoanalytic treatment" (F&MR, p. 150). The aim is, in other In this figure, C is the conscious mind, words, to learn the views of a quasi person and UC is the unconscious mind. Stars with whom one shares one's body. He goes represent mental states. C and UC are quasi on to say: persons, i.e., rationally coherent networks ... The point of psychoanalysis is to find of mental states, separated in the diagram by new self-descriptions whose adoption will a vertical partition line. We assign mental one enable to alter one's behavior. Finding states to a quasi person in light of what we out the views of one's unconscious about DISTINCTIONBETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 87
a one's past is way of getting some additional conscious. Freud was concerned to give us about how to describe suggestions (and a technique, not just for finding out about oneself in the future. change) (F&MR, p. 153) unconscious mental states, but for lifting which some One needn't know much about psycho? repressions?a technique by of a unconscious mental states analysis to understand that something has person's be made conscious.13 gone wrong in these passages. If the point might mischaracterization of the sort of of undergoing psychoanalysis were to Rorty's that is the of gather useful suggestions about how one self-knowledge goal psycho? is not unrelated to his view of what might describe and change oneself, then analysis unconscious mental states are. If we un? analysis, at least traditional analysis, would not take the form that it does?with the derstand my unconscious mental states as the states of another who shares this analyst saying so little. Here Rorty might person with then it is natural to think reply that an analysand's unconscious mind body me, that an unconscious mental state can come is liable to provide better suggestions than to consciousness in the sense that I? his analyst could; hence itmakes sense for only that the conscious mind in this the analyst to keep most of her sugges? is, tions to herself. But this would be an odd body?come to be aware of it. someone that thing to say in light of the passage Here, might reply Rorty's basic leaves the quoted above in which Rorty describes position open possibility that unconscious mind do more the unconscious as providing "crazy ac? my might than inform me of its views and counts of how things are." Moreover, feelings: "Let's that believe even if Rorty represented the unconscious say you unconsciously that father is insane. the course as a wise and sober quasi person, his posi? your During of unconscious mind tion would miss the point of psychoanalysis. your analysis, your A distinction I discussed earlier, between might convince you (i.e., convince your conscious to believe this. In such a being conscious of a mental state and be? mind) would not come to be ing conscious/y in it, is here relevant. Rorty case, you merely aware of what unconscious mind characterizes psychoanalysis as if its aim your about would come were to make the analysand conscious of thought your father; you to believe the same what he unconsciously thinks and feels thing consciously. basic we about things. In analysis, I (or anyway, my Thus, given Rorty's framework, can sense conscious mind) come to be aware of the make of the fact that mental states from unconscious to thoughts and feelings of my unconscious go being being mind via a funny sort of conversation. But conscious." aware But this to save view will becoming of, e.g., one's unconscious attempt Rorty's not work. If unconscious mind were to anger at one's mother represents a far more my convince conscious mind that fa? modest therapeutic goal than that of mak? my my ther was then at the end of the ing the anger conscious. I might be made insane, day, both unconscious mind and con? aware of the fact that I am unconsciously my my scious mind would believe that father angry at my mother via the testimony of my was insane. There would be two my therapist?or on Rorty's view, via the quasi inside me who were in testimony of a quasi person inside my body. people perfect about father. Given such a Either way, the result would be my becom? agreement my pic? it would make sense for me to "I ing conscious of my unconscious anger. ture, say, both and believe This is not the same as the anger's becoming consciously unconsciously 88 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
that my father is insane." But we don't talk as you would pity someone whose body this way about our beliefs. To say that had been inhabited by a demon. someone unconsciously believes some? But I do seem to be responsible, at least thing is at least to say that she doesn't to some degree, when I act on my uncon? believe that very thing consciously. scious desires. Imagine that because I When a mental state that was uncon? unconsciously want to harm my cousin scious becomes conscious, it seems as Larry, I, as it were, "forget" to pick him up if some sort of barrier is broken down at the airport when he comes to town. If or removed. A mental state that was in Larry were to find out that my stranding some sense blocked no longer is, and no him at the airport was motivated by an un? mental state can be both blocked and conscious desire to do him harm, he would unblocked. It will be a while before we not think: "Oh well, that's just my cousin's understand the sense in which an uncon? unconscious. My cousin isn't the slightest scious mental state is blocked. But we bit responsible. He means me no harm." can already see that Rorty's account fails No; Larry would blame me for leaving him to capture what might be called the gram? at the airport. That is, he would blame the mar of our talk about an unconscious unitary person who unconsciously wanted mental state's becoming conscious. to do him harm. (This is not to say that it Here, let's set down a second constraint on would make no difference to Larry whether an adequate account of the distinction be? I was acting on a conscious or an uncon? tween conscious and unconscious mentality. scious desire to do him harm. The point is not we to as Constraint 2: An account of the distinction that take people be respon? between conscious and unconscious mental? sible for their behavior?or responsible in the same act on un? ity should help us to understand what it is just way?when they for an unconscious mental state to become conscious desires as when they act on conscious. conscious ones. It is, rather, that we don't respond to someone whom we take to have While Rorty's account of unconscious acted on an unconscious desire as if he mental states satisfies Constraint 1, it does were into two one of not satisfy this second constraint. split people, only whom had acted at all.) I have been arguing that Rorty's account On is shared of unconscious mental states leaves no Rorty's view, my body by two independent quasi people, and there is room for an adequate understanding of the no, as it were, overall person of whom sort of self-knowledge that psychoanaly? these two quasi people are parts. If I suf? sis (or maturity) makes possible. But there fered from multiple personality disorder, is another sort of problem with his posi? this be an to de? tion. We sometimes act on our unconscious might appropriate way scribe me. A multiple's various selves desires. Given Rorty's view, acting on an can seem to be so from one unconscious desire is tantamount to hav? really separate another that it doesn't make sense to blame ing one's body temporarily taken over by one of them for the of another. But someone else. If the person writing these doings this is not how it is with me. When I act on words is my conscious self, then my un? my unconscious desires, the actions are conscious self is someone else. If my body mine in a way that Eve Black's actions acts on its (his?) intentions, / am not re? were not Eve White's. This suggests a third sponsible and should not be held constraint on an adequate account of the accountable. I should, rather, be pitied? DISTINCTION BETWEENCONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 89
distinction between conscious and uncon? real question about who is speaking, i.e., scious mentality: about which quasi person in Jill's body is its a Constraint 3: An account of the distinction expressing belief. In such circum? no between conscious and unconscious mental? stance, however, there simply would be but that Jill's remark was an ex? ity should represent my unconscious mental question states as my mental states. pression of what she consciously believed. doesn't such an he Rorty provide account; IV. A Variation on Rorty's View represents my unconscious mental states as belonging to someone else who happens We can use the case of Jill in order to me. to share a body with introduce a variation on Rorty's view of Let us consider one last difficulty for unconscious mental states. On Rorty's a will Rorty's view, difficulty that help view, Jill's mind could be represented as us a steer toward better view. Imagine shown in Figure 2 on the following page. someone?call her Jill?who consciously Both Jill's unconscious mind and her con? believes that her father is rather fond of scious mind hold the belief that Jill's father
her husband Jack, while unconsciously is alive. Given Rorty's conception of un? believing the truth: that her father dislikes conscious mentality, this belief needs to sense to at? Jack intensely. Now, it makes appear on both sides of the partition line. one tribute either of these beliefs?indeed Now, consider a different picture of Jill's any belief?to Jill only against the back? mind: Figure 3 on the following page. drop of other beliefs that rationally cohere Here, the partition line is shortened, and aware with it. Rorty is well of this.14 But there are stars immediately on either side something that Rorty doesn't seem to no? of it. There are other stars around the pe? even a an tice is that where conscious and riphery of the circle. The stars on the are unconscious belief in direct contradic? immediate left of the partition line repre? tion?as they are in Jill's case?the two sent unconscious mental states. All other beliefs typically presuppose many of the stars in the figure represent conscious men? same background beliefs.15 In order for Jill tal states. Between a mental state pictured to think either that her father is fond of Jack on the immediate left of the partition line or must that her father dislikes Jack, she and a mental state on the immediate right believe that her father is alive, that he of the line there are no internal, rational knows of Jack's existence, etc. Rorty relations. We don't make sense of such would have to say, "Jill's conscious mind mental states in light of each other as we and her unconscious mind both believe that normally make sense of a person's mental her father is alive. Jill believes that he's states in light of his other mental states. alive both consciously and unconsciously." We don't try to make mental states out to We've seen that such a statement already be consistent across the partition line. Re? in would be inconsistent with the ways lations across the partition line are, as it which we about conscious actually speak were, merely causal. a and unconscious beliefs. But there is fur? So far, all that's been said about the par? to ther point be made here. Imagine that, tition line in this figure could be said about in order to correct someone who is under the line that separates Rorty's two quasi the misapprehension that her father has persons in Figure 2. The partition line in recently died, Jill says, "My father is still Figure 3 is different from the one in Fig? alive." On there should be a Rorty's view, ure 2 in that the items immediately on 90 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
Belief that father Belief that father dislikes Jack is fond of Jack
Belief that father Belief that father is alive is alive
Figure 2
Belief that father Belief that father is fond of Jack dislikes Jack
Belief that father is alive
Figure 3 DISTINCTIONBETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 91
either side of it share a background of men? provides no explanation of what distin? tal states. The stars around the periphery guishes unconscious mental states from of the circle represent conscious mental conscious ones. Figure 3 will prove, how? states that bear internal, rational relations ever, to be a step in the direction of such to mental states on both sides of the parti? an explanation. tion line. Thus, Jill's belief that her father V Expression and Self-ascription is alive need not be represented twice in Figure 3. This belief is part of the back? Rorty follows Davidson in being sensi? ground against which we make sense both tive to the way our talk about a of her conscious belief that her father is person's makes sense as the fond of Jack and her more accurate uncon? psychology only propo? sitional attitudes of a person are understood scious belief that her father dislikes Jack. to hang together rationally. Now accord? Jill's belief that her father is alive need only ing to Davidson, it's not only the be represented once because Figure 3 propositional attitudes of a person that doesn't represent Jill as divided into two must be seen as hanging together rationally Overall, Jill completely separate persons. we if are to understand her as having a is represented as exhibiting a fair degree mind at all. Our actions must hang together of rational coherence, even though there rationally with our beliefs and desires. In is, in her mind, a local region of incoher? order to understand someone as acting at ence. Figure 3 represents a unitary person, all, or as attitudes at a with certain mental states that are having propositional person we all, need to see her actions as making rationally cut off from certain other men? sense in light of her beliefs and desires. tal states, but a unitary person nonetheless. Our beliefs and desires bear internal rela? Obviously, in interpreting Figure 3, I tions, not only to each other, but to the have been, in effect, suggesting a way of actions that they rationalize. refining Rorty's story about unconscious Thus, according to Davidson and Rorty, mental states. None of the objections that if we are to see a thing as a person, we must I raised earlier against Rorty's view cut view it as having beliefs, desires, and ac? against this refinement of it. Nonetheless, tions that hang together rationally. But it would be a mistake to claim that Figure what makes the story of a thing intelligible 3 satisfactorily elucidates the distinction as the story of a person is not that between conscious and unconscious men? merely the thing has a set of propositional attitudes tality. The figure fails us at a critical point: and actions that can be understood to be nothing in itmakes clear by virtue of what rationally coherent. Davidson tends to fo? the stars on the immediate left of the parti? cus on one way in which mental states and tion line?rather than, say, those on the behavior?the inner and the outer?must immediate right?represent unconscious hang together if we're to have mental states mental states. Figure 3 illustrates how a in view at all: actions must be rationalized single person can be understood to believe belief-desire But mental states both that her father is fond of her husband by pairs. and behavior need to in ways and that her father dislikes her husband. hang together that are not captured by the thought that The figure does not show why we should our attitudes rationalize our actions. think of either of these beliefs as uncon? Here, we should consider the notion of scious rather than conscious. Useful as Figure expression. Our actions are said to express 3 might be for representing irrationality, it the beliefs and desires that rationalize 92 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
them. If a man runs after a bus because he I have been talking about expressive re? doesn't want to be late for work, then his lations that are not reason-relations. The running expresses his desire to be on time. examples considered thus far have in? But now notice that, often, a mental state volved mental states that are expressed is said to be expressed by a bit of behavior non-linguistically. Of course, we often ex? that it does not rationalize. There are ex? press what we think and feel in what we pressive relations between the inner and the say. Imight express my anger at someone outer that are not reason-relations. To take by insulting him, or my gratitude by thank? a simple example, when someone ex? ing him. Now, one kind of linguistic presses his joy by smiling, his smile is not expression takes the form of self-ascrip? rationalized by his joy. Given the way that tion or avowal. I say, "I'm angry at you," Davidson understands reasons, smiling and in so doing, I express my anger. It is a isn't something that one typically does for distinctive feature of mental state avowals any reason. Still, someone's joy and his that they allow a person both to say that he a expressions of joy?like his reasons and is in certain mental state and to express the actions that express them?make sense that mental state. When I say that some? together, in light of one another. The ra? one else is happy, I don't express the tional relation that, as Davidson points out, happiness. When I smile, I express my hap? obtains between reasons and actions is a piness, but I don't say anything about it. as a avow special case of what we might think of When I that I'm happy, however, I more generic internal relation?a hanging both say that I'm happy and, thereby, ex? together relation?that obtains between press my happiness.16 mental states and behavior. The word "ex? Although mental state self-ascriptions pression" picks out this more generic typically express that which they are as? internal relation. criptions of, they don't always. If Harry Consider another example of a bit of be? says, "My therapist has convinced me; I'm havior that expresses a state of mind but is unconsciously angry at my mother," he not rationalized by it. A writer gets frus? does not, thereby, express his anger at his trated with her work and decides to get mother. He expresses his belief ih^i he's away from her computer for a while. She angry at his mother, but he doesn't express leaves her apartment and, in leaving, slams his anger. This is not to say that Harry's the door. Her door closing is an intentional unconscious anger at his mother goes com? action. It expresses her desire that her pletely unexpressed; his therapist probably apartment not be robbed while she is would not have come to the conclusion that gone?a desire which, along with certain he was angry at his mother unless he occa? beliefs about her neighborhood, rational? sionally expressed his anger in one way or izes the action. But the way she closes the another, e.g., by refusing to visit her. But door, her slamming it, expresses something while Harry is able to express his uncon? else: her frustration at her work. Her door scious anger, he is unable to express it slamming isn't rationalized by her frustra? simply by ascribing it to himself. tion, but it expresses it nonetheless. When I want to claim that it's a defining char? we express our states of mind, we make them acteristic of our unconscious mental states manifest in behavior to which they are inter? that we lack the ability to express them nally, though not always rationally, related. simply by self-ascribing them. Like all mental states, the unconscious ones may DISTINCTIONBETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 93 be expressed in our behavior. But what is what accounts for Eroom's paradox? What distinctive about unconscious mental states is the problem with an utterance of the is that we're unable to express them sim? form, "P; moreover, I unconsciously be? ply by self-ascribing them. If Jill lieve that p." On my view, a mental state's unconsciously believes that her father being unconscious lies in a subject's lack? doesn't like her husband, she might express ing the ability to express it simply by this belief in any number of ways. But not self-ascribing it. Thus, if Jill were to say, by saying, "I believe that my father doesn't "My father is alive; moreover, I uncon? like my husband." Jill might utter these sciously believe that he's alive," her words. She might say: "Well you've con? utterance would be true just in case her vinced me. The only way to make sense of father were alive and she lacked the abil? my behavior is by taking me to have this ity to express her belief that he's alive by crazy unconscious belief. Unconsciously, self-ascribing it. What would be strange I believe that my father doesn't like my about such an utterance is that anyone who husband." Here, Jill expresses her opinion is in a position to sincerely assert that her that she has a particular unconscious be? father is alive should be able to express her lief, but she doesn't express the belief that he was alive by self-ascribing unconscious belief; she doesn't express the it. If a person lacks the ability to express belief that her father dislikes her husband. her belief that p by self-ascribing it, then (Indeed, she expresses the opposite opin? she cannot sincerely assert that p either. ion.) The point may be put as follows: Second, in what sense is your relation to Someone's mental state is conscious if she one of your own unconscious mental states has an ability to express it simply by self like your relation to the mental state of ascribing it. If she lacks such an ability another? According to the view recom? with respect to one of her mental states, it mended here, the answer lies in this: is unconscious. Whether you say that another person is Of course, what this means for our un? angry or that you are unconsciously angry, derstanding of the distinction between you are engaged in, as it were, mere de? conscious and unconscious mentality de? scription; you do not thereby express the pends on how we think about expression anger about which you are talking. and expressive abilities. Part of what I've Earlier, I noted that we don't speak with been trying to do in this paper (especially first-person authority about our own un? in this section, but really since I began talk? conscious mental states. I should point out ing about rational, internal relations that what I've offered here is the begin? between attitudes and actions in ?111) is to ning of an explanation of first-person provide an elucidation?or, at least, the authority. A central feature of the phenom? beginning of an elucidation?of the notion enon of first-person authority is that we of expression.1718 Such an elucidation to? seem able to responsibly ascribe conscious gether with the point that I put in italics mental states to ourselves without needing at the end of the last paragraph may be any evidence in support of the ascriptions. said to constitute an account of the dis? The explanation of this lies in the fact that tinction between conscious and there is an important respect in which a unconscious mental states. typical self-ascription of, for example, hap? We are now in a position to address a piness is like a smile. Just as you might number of issues that arose earlier. First, smile and thereby express your happiness 94 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY without needing any evidence in support one's state of mind by self-ascribing it is of the claim that you are happy, you can not a sufficient condition for the state's say, "I'm so happy," and thereby express being conscious. And lacking such an abil? your happiness without needing any such ity is not a necessary condition for the evidence. By contrast, when you report state's being unconscious." someone else's mental state, or your own Reply: I said that someone's state of mind unconscious mental state, you don't ex? is conscious if and only if she has an abil? press the mental state in question, so you ity to express it simply by ascribing it to require evidence supporting your claim herself. The sort of ability that's at issue is about it; you don't speak with first-person one that enables a person to express her authority.19 state of mind in a self-ascription of it, Finally, the above considerations put us where what matters?what carries the ex? in a position to address an issue that did pressive force?isn't her tone of voice (or not come up earlier, namely, why it is that whether she is tapping her foot, or what the conscious/unconscious distinction she is wearing, or to whom she happens to doesn't seem to get a foothold when we be speaking), but simply the fact that she are talking about the mental states of non is giving voice to her sincere judgment linguistic animals. We often speak about, about her own state of mind. That some? e.g., what our dogs want and believe, but one might manage to express her anger in we don't characterize these attitudes as ei? a self-ascription of it via a clipped tone of ther conscious or unconscious. We don't voice doesn't show that she has the relevant
say things like, "Fido unconsciously sort of expressive ability. When I am con? wanted to go outside," or, "Fifi consciously sciously angry, I can say in a neutral tone believed that there was a squirrel in that of voice, "I'm furious," and thereby ex? tree." This, I think, is because expression press my state of mind. in the form of mental state self-ascriptions Objection 2: "Imagine someone?call is never an option for dogs. It is only in him Harpo?who is consciously angry at the context of a linguistic life that itmakes his brother but has a phobia about avow? sense to distinguish attitudes and emotions ing anger; he cannot bring himself to say according to whether or not they can be aloud that he's angry, even when he is expressed in self-ascriptions of them. alone. He won't write that he's angry either. Let us now consider a couple of objec? If he is asked whether he's angry, he'll deny tions. Responding to these will help to it. Although Harpo is consciously angry, a clarify the main point. he is unable to express his anger in self Objection 1: "Imagine that I occasion? ascription of it. That we can imagine such a ally express my unconscious anger at my person demonstrates that having the abil? a father by speaking in a peculiar, clipped ity to express mental state simply by tone of voice. One day, while speaking in self-ascribing it is not a necessary condi? this tone of voice, I say, 'My therapist tells tion for the state's being conscious. And a me that I'm unconsciously angry at my fa? the absence of this sort of ability is not ther, and I suppose she must be right.' sufficient condition for the state's being Through my tone of voice, I express my unconscious." anger at my father in a self-ascription of Reply: A person may be said to have an it, even though the anger is unconscious. ability, even though she is, for some rea? What this case shows is that, pace the view son, prevented from exercising it at a set out here, having an ability to express particular moment. A major league pitcher DISTINCTIONBETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 95 might have the ability to throw a 90 m.p.h. partition line marks the absence of inter? pitch even though he is, at the moment, nal, rational relations between certain handcuffed, and so not in a position to do mental states and certain other mental so. A tenor who has the ability to hit a high states. In Figure 4, the partition line marks C might not do so for a period of time be? the absence of expressive relations between cause of a neurotic fear that should he hit mental states and their self-ascriptions. a note above A, he'll die on the spot. Such The fact that a mental state is partitioned a person would have an ability to hit a C off from expressive self-ascription need not even while he was afraid to exercise it. mean that it cannot be self-ascribed at all. One way to answer the Harpo objection What it means for a star to lie behind the would be to say that, as Harpo has been partition line in Figure 4 is that if the men? described, he does have the ability to ex? tal state it represents is self-ascribed, the press his anger merely by self-ascribing it, self-ascription will not be an expression of only he is afraid to exercise it. To thus that mental state. Figure 4 represents a per? imagine Harpo is different from imagin? son who lacks the ability to express some of ing him without this ability. To see this, his mental states in self-ascriptions of them. let us imagine that in addition to his con? In Figure 5, I have combined Figures 3 scious anger at his brother, Harpo is and 4 to produce a picture of Jill (the unconsciously angry at his mother. We can woman who consciously believes that her understand the difference between the father is fond of her husband, Jack, while character of Harpo's anger toward his unconsciously believing that her father dis? brother and that of his anger toward his likes Jack). Figure 5 is meant to retain what mother to lie in this: If Harpo didn't have is right in Figure 4, while also illustrating a phobia about admitting that he was an? the fact that a person's unconscious men? gry?if he were happy to engage in sincere tal states fail to hang together rationally discussions concerning the whole range of with some of her conscious mental states. his feelings?he could express his anger As they are represented in this figure, Jill's at his brother merely by self-ascribing it, unconscious mental states are rationally but he could not express his anger at his related to one another. For this reason, it mother in the same way. makes sense to think of the area between the two partition lines as constituting a kind VI. Conclusion of subdivision of mind?something we might call "the unconscious." Even so, the Let us return to Figure 3 which, as I in? unconscious is not a person. dicated earlier, might be used to illustrate Let's now look again at our three con? certain forms of irrationality, but fails as straints on an account of the distinction an explanation of the distinction between between conscious and unconscious men? conscious and unconscious mentality. We tality. First, such an account should respect can now produce a more satisfactory fig? the difference between someone's being ure. First, we need to add marks outside conscious/y afraid (hopeful, expectant, the circle to represent various forms of and someone's conscious behavior?behavior that ex? angry,.. .) being expressive . . of her fear (hope, expectation, anger, .). presses mental states which are represented On the account that I've suggested, when by the stars inside the circle. Second, we I am consciously afraid, I'm able to express need to shift the partition line to the pe? my fear by self-ascribing it. Imay be con riphery of the circle. In Figure 3, the 96 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
UC
* * *
Figure 4
Belief that father Self-ascription of belief dislikes Jack that father dislikes Jack
Belief that father is fond of Jack
Belief that father is alive
Figure 5 DISTINCTIONBETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 97
scious of the fact that I'm afraid without there are different sorts of knowledge, which are far from . . . having this ability. equivalent psychologically. If the doctor transfers his to the Second, an account of the distinction knowledge as a of it has no between conscious and unconscious men? patient piece information, . . . result. The patient knows after this what tality should help us to understand what it he did not know before?the sense of his is for an unconscious mental state to be? symptom; yet he knows it just as little as he come conscious. On an my account, did. Thus we learn that there is more than unconscious mental state becomes con? one kind of ignorance.20 scious when a person who was once unable Freud expresses an important insight in this to express her mental state by self-ascrib? passage. It's one thing for me to know that ing it gains the ability to do so. I, for example, unconsciously fear my fa? Finally, an account of the distinction be? ther and another for fear to tween conscious and unconscious quite thing my become conscious. This insight goes want? mentality should represent my unconscious in both the very view and in mental states as my mental states. On the ing simple Rorty's view. What I've tried to do in this account I have suggested, this constraint paper is to say how it is that "Knowledge is satisfied. My unconscious mental states is not always the same as knowledge." The are not represented either as the states of sort of self-knowledge that is a goal of psy? another person with whom I share a body, choanalytic treatment is, on my view, not or as the states of a subpersonal compo? really a kind of knowledge at all, but rather nent in my cognitive architecture. a certain sort of expressive ability. The im? According to the view put forward here, distinction to which Freud is unconscious attitudes and emotions are portant calling our attention in this passage turns out to states of the unitary person who expresses be a distinction between merely them. / express my unconscious mental knowing that one is in a mental state and states in my actions?actions for which I particular having the ability to express one's mental am to a certain extent responsible. I lack state simply by self-ascribing it. the ability to express my unconscious men? Philosophers of mind have, on the whole, tal states in self-ascriptions of them, but I tended to view the distinction between con? express them nonetheless. scious and unconscious states of mind as Freud writes: an epistemic matter?a matter of whether, From what I have so far said a neurosis would or how, a subject knows something. Such seem to be the result of a kind of ignorance? views cannot do justice to the kind of rup? a not knowing about mental events that one ture in a human life that is the . . . as a signaled by ought to know of. Now it would rule word "unconscious." To have an uncon? be very easy for a doctor experienced in scious mental state is not a analysis to guess what mental impulses had essentially a matter of of it's remained unconscious in particular patient. being ignorant something; a matter So it ought not to be very difficult, either, of being unable to do something? for him to restore the patient by communi? of being unable to express one's state of his to him and so cating knowledge mind in a particular way.21 . . . remedying his ignorance. Indiana University If only that was how things happened! We came upon discoveries in this connection for we were which at first unprepared. Knowl? same as edge is not always the knowledge: 98 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
NOTES
1. See, e.g., SirWilliam Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. 1 (New York: Sheldon and Co., 1858), p. 242:
. . . [T]he supposition of an unconscious action or passion of the mind has been gravely established as a conclusion which the ph nomena not only warrant, but enforce.
2. Colin McGinn endorses the very simple view when he writes:
...... This raises the interesting problem of what makes a propositional attitude unconscious. For a desire (say) to be unconscious is for its possessor not to know or believe that he has that desire. ("Action and its Explanation," in Philosophical Problems in Psychology, ed. Neil Bolton [New York: Methuen & Co., 1979], p. 37)
3. In a paper called "Detection, Expression, and First-Person Authority," which I'm currently preparing for publication.
4. This point should not be overstated. It is possible to imagine a situation in which a sentence of the form, "I unconsciously believe that/?; moreover/?," would be intelligible. Imagine that Harry's mother, who is a terrible driver, drives Harry to work every morning. Harry wishes that he were able to drive himself because he thinks it's dangerous to be a passenger in his mother's car. He believes that his mother's inept driving is liable to result in his being injured or killed in a car accident. One day, Harry's psychoanalyst convinces him that he unconsciously believes that his mother means to murder him by poisoning his well water. In this situation, Harry could say, "I unconsciously believe that my mother is liable to harm me; moreover my mother is liable to harm me. I believe that she's liable to harm me both unconsciously and consciously."
In the face of this example, it is natural to respond that, even so, Harry doesn't really believe the same thing about his mother both consciously and unconsciously. His conscious belief is that a she's liable to harm him by involving him in car accident while his unconscious belief is that she's liable to harm him by deliberately poisoning his well water. Where it makes sense for moreover someone to utter a sentence of the form, "I unconsciously believe that p; /?" (or "I believe that p both consciously and unconsciously"), we find that the contents of the conscious and unconscious beliefs in question can be further specified so as to display a difference between them. Notice that this is not true for sentences of the form, "My friend believes thatp; moreover /?," (or "My friend and I both believe that /?"). My friend and I can be in, as it were, perfect agreement about p.
5. In his "Two Concepts of Consciousness," Philosophical Studies 49 (1986): 329-359, David M. Rosenthal writes: "Intuitively, a mental state's being conscious means just that it occurs in our stream of consciousness" (336). If this sentence is faithful to any non-philosophical use of the word "conscious," it's not a use with which I'm concerned in this paper. Pace Rosenthal, to
characterize someone's mental state as conscious is not ordinarily to commit oneself to the claim stream see a case in that it somehow figures in her current of consciousness. To this, consider or a which a question arises concerning whether not particular mental state is conscious. Imagine me. run me that your cousin, Helen, says to you: "My son wants to kill Today, he tried to over with his car. I need to hide out at your house for a while." Later, speaking on the phone with a friend, you say, "Do you remember my cousin, Helen?the one with the devoted son, Roger? Now she thinks he's trying to kill her." Your friend replies, "Do you mean that now she con? sciously thinks Roger wants to do her in, or are you talking about some unconscious belief of hers?" In answering this question, you would not need to concern yourself with the question of was were on what, if anything, in Helen's stream of consciousness while you speaking the phone DISTINCTIONBETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOF MIND / 99 with your friend. With Helen asleep on your couch, you could answer truthfully, "I'm talking about what she consciously believes now about Roger. Her conscious belief is that he wants her dead."
A related point: I won't be concerned in this paper with questions about what it's like to be this or that, or to be in this or that state. (I won't be worrying about what Ned Block calls "phenomenal consciousness." [See his "A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,"#e/i?zv/c>ra/ and Brain Sciences 18 (1995): 227-287.])
6. See David Marr, Vision (New York: Freeman Press, 1982).
7. See David H. Hubel, Eye, Brain, and Vision (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1988).
8. The drawings of edge maps that appear in cognitive psychology texts can, for this reason, be misleading. A drawing of an edge map looks like an object. In Marr's Vision, there's one that looks like a teddy bear. But as far as a set of ocular dominance columns is concerned, there aren't any teddy bears; there aren't even any objects with edges. (Thanks to Jacob Feldman for pointing this out to me.)
9. For an illuminating discussion of the way in which being subject to emotions distinguishes genuine subjects of belief from mere information processors, see Bennett Helm, "The Signifi? cance of Emotions," American Philosophical Quarterly 31, no. 4 (October 1994): 319-331.
10. Richard Rorty, "Freud and Moral Reflection" in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philo? sophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Hereafter this will be cited as F&MR.
11. Essays on Actions & Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 221.
12. Essays on Actions & Events, p. 223.
13. This is not to say that whenever an analysand's suffering is due to an unconscious state of mind, the aim (or even, an aim) of psychoanalytic treatment is to make the state of mind con? scious. If a patient suffers because he unconsciously believes some crazy claim (e.g., that if he were to succeed in business, he would thereby murder his father) the goal of analysis is not to bring him to consciously believe this claim (even for a little while). Lifting a repression is not a an an always matter of making unconscious state of mind conscious. If analysand unconsciously believes that/7?where p is inconsistent with much of what he consciously believes?then lifting the repression associated with the belief that p will probably not result in a conscious belief that p.
14. He writes:
One can only attribute a belief to something if one simultaneously attributes lots of other mostly true and mostly consistent beliefs. (F&MR, p. 147)
15. John Heil makes a similar point in his "Minds Divided," Mind 98 (October 1989): 571-583.
16. There is a tendency amongst analytic philosophers to assume that assertion and expression in a to assume an to are, way, mutually exclusive, i.e., that assertion the effect that the speaker is a in particular mental state cannot express that very mental state. This tendency (whose preva? lence may be due, in part, to the influence of emotivism in ethics) can be seen in, e.g., the following from David M. Rosenthal's "Thinking that One Thinks" (in Consciousness, ed. M. Davies and G. W. Humphreys [Oxford: Basil Blackwell], 1993):
can I communicate my suspicion that the door is open either by expressing my suspicion or by explicitly . . . telling you about it. In saying I suspect something, I report, rather than express, my suspicion. (200) 100 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
In his paper, "Expressing" (in Philosophy in America, ed. M. Black [Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Uni? versity Press, 1967]), William P. Alston rightly rejects this assumption:
I can express my enthusiasm for your plan just as well by saying "I'm very enthusiastic about your plan," as I can by saying "What a tremendous plan!" "Wonderful," or "Great!" I can express disgust at X just as well by saying "I'm disgusted," as by saying "How revolting!" or "Ugh." I can express ap? proval as well by saying "I completely approve of what you are doing" as I can by saying "Swell," or "Good show." And I can express annoyance as well by saying "That annoys me no end" as by saying "Damn."
This shows that expressing and asserting are not mutually exclusive in the way commonly supposed. (16)
17.1 offer a more extended elucidation in "Wittgenstein's 'Plan for the treatment of psychologi? cal concepts'," which I'm currently preparing for publication.
18. I have discovered three other writers who point out that while it is possible for someone to ascribe an unconscious belief to himself, he does not thereby express the belief. These are Arthur Collins ("Unconscious Belief," The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 20 [October 16, 1969]: 667 680), Georges Rey ("Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception," in Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. B. P. McLaughlin and A. O. Rorty [Berkelely: The Univer? sity of California Press, 1988]), and Richard Moran ("Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing," European Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 2 [August 1997]: 141-161). Although a discussion of the views set out in these papers will have to await another occasion, I'll say this for now: While I'm sympathetic with a good deal of what these writers have to say, it seems to me that all of them understand the notion of expression too much in terms of a distinctive feature of belief self-ascription, viz., that when someone expresses his belief by saying, "I believe that /?," he thereby commits himself to the truth of the claim that/7. While this is a noteworthy feature of one kind of expression of one kind of mental state, if we understand the very notion of expres? sion too much in terms of it, we lose our grip on what unconscious beliefs have in common with unconscious fears, wishes, and revulsions.
a 19. In both "Wittgenstein's 'Plan'" and "Detection," I argue that first-person authority is not kind of epistemic authority at all. It should not be understood as anything like the sort of author? ity with which an eye-witness speaks about what she has seen. We speak with authority about our conscious mental states, not because we know them so well, but because our self-ascriptions of are them expressions of them.
20. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York, W. W. Norton and Co: 1966), pp. 280
281, my emphasis.
21. I am very grateful to James Conant, Gary Ebbs, Martha Farah, Samantha Fenno, Kimberly Keller, Irad Kimhi, John McDowell, and Thomas Ricketts for helpful conversations about the material presented in this paper. In addition, I am indebted to Robert Almeder as well as to this on an paper's two anonymous referees for incisive comments earlier draft.