CHAPTER 3

Conscious and Unconscious Toward an Integrative Understanding of Human Mental Life and Action

Roy F. Baumeister and John A. Bargh

Human consciousness is one of the wonders POSSIBLE ROLES of the world. It integrates sensation, per- OF CONSCIOUSNESS ception, emotion, and interpretation, often understanding events in sequences that The relation of conscious thoughts to behav- include causal analyses and extended nar- ior has been depicted in multiple ways, run- rative structures. How inert bits of lifeless ning the full spectrum from complete con- physical matter, such as protons, neutrons, trol to complete irrelevance. Here we briefly and electrons, combine and organize so as to delineate the range of possible views. make conscious experience possible remains At one extreme is the commonsense one of the most unassailable mysteries in the impression that consciousness is in full scientific understanding of the universe. Yet control of behavior. People know they are consciousness itself is, of course, no mystery conscious. They experience their actions as for the billions of human beings who have stemming from conscious choices. Almost and use it all day, every day. by definition, they are unaware of uncon- We, the authors of this chapter, have scious influences on their behavior. (To found ourselves on opposite sides of debates borrow a metaphor from Jaynes, 1976, a about several important questions, includ- flashlight in a dark room would mistakenly ing the efficacy of conscious thought and the conclude that all the lights are on, because scientific viability of free will. Still, we have whichever way it turns to look, everything followed each other’s work over the years is illuminated!) with interest, respect, and admiration, and Concerning definitions, conscious and this has enabled our programs of research unconscious processes have been distin- to benefit and to be informed by each oth- guished historically in terms of several differ- er’s work. Moreover, we actually agree on ent features (e.g., Bargh, 1994)—awareness, far more than our periodic debates might intentionality, efficiency, and controllabil- suggest. Our purpose in this chapter is to ity, with the former two at the heart of the explore and elucidate these areas of agree- terms in common usage. However, because ment. of mounting evidence that motivations and

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goal pursuits (roughly speaking, intention- cesses have effectively zero impact on actual ality) operate unconsciously in much the behavior. The view that consciousness is same way as they operate consciously (e.g., an epiphenomenon, which is to say a side Marien, Custers, Hassin, & Aarts, 2012; effect of other processes and itself does not McCulloch, Ferguson, Kawada, & Bargh, have true causal impact, has a long history. 2008), the intentionality (purposive, goal- Thomas Huxley (1874) articulated the so- oriented) quality no longer differentiates called “steam whistle hypothesis” that com- conscious and unconscious processes. Thus, pared consciousness to the steam whistle it is the awareness and reportability of a on a train locomotive. The steam whistle’s mental process that most clearly distinguish activity is caused by what is happening in between what is considered a conscious ver- the engine and may also reveal something sus an unconscious mental process or expe- about the inner state of the engine, but it rience. Indeed, the most recent distinctions does not move or steer the train. By analogy, between conscious and unconscious pro- consciousness may be a rich subjective expe- cesses have focused exclusively on the vari- rience of one’s own life that derives from ous forms of awareness people have about unconscious processes and reveals some- their mental content (Schooler, Mrazek, thing about these inner states, but it does not Baird, & Winkielman, in press). have any influence on behavior. The view that consciousness enjoys full More recent writers have continued to control over behavior has mainly intuitive question the efficacy of conscious thoughts. appeal these days. Few serious researchers Wegner (2002) wrote of the “illusion of con- endorse it, because the case for unconscious scious will,” proposing that people’s sub- causation of behavior is overwhelming. jective awareness of deciding, controlling, Years ago, Freud (1933/1965) made a per- and initiating actions is liberally subject to suasive and extensive argument for the posi- distortion and error. Dijksterhuis and Nor- tion that people are not fully aware of many dgren (2006) proposed that unconscious causes of their behavior, including ones thought is generally superior to conscious originating in their own unconscious mind. thought, and although they conceded that Modern social psychology has repeatedly conscious thinking can sometimes cause shown that people are not aware of many behavior, its effects are not very helpful, and situational cues and stimuli that can influ- people would be well advised to minimize its ence behavior. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) influence. Wilson (2002) likewise provided showed that introspection is often unable to evidence of the fallibility of conscious think- furnish accurate accounts of the causation ing and recommended that people rely on of behavior. Wegner (2002) showed that unconscious processes rather than conscious people’s subjective experiences of initiating ones (see also Gladwell, 2004). and controlling behavior can be mistaken in In between the two extremes of seeing both directions; that is, sometimes people behavior as mainly conscious versus mainly believe they have done something when they unconscious, there are emerging new mod- have not, and sometimes they believe they els that seek to regard conscious and uncon- have not done something when they have. scious processes as complementary instead And, of course, one of us has devoted much of competing systems. One approach would of his career to demonstrating a great many accept that conscious thoughts are highly ways in which situations cause behavior by influential in guiding behavior, but that means of unconscious, automatic processes, unconscious and automatic processes can thus bypassing or circumventing any con- have considerable influence by means of scious control (Bargh, 1994, 1997, 2005). shaping the content of consciousness. This A watered- down version of the theory of position is amenable to the commonsense full conscious control holds that people are view that conscious thoughts are ultimately at least conscious of what they are doing, in charge of action, but it assigns an impor- and that unconscious processes influence tant role to unconscious processes as provid- behavior by way of influencing conscious ing support and input. thoughts. The other compromise view, which both Opposite to the theory of full conscious of us currently advocate, is that behavior is control is the view that conscious pro- normally carried out by unconscious, auto-

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matic processes, while consciousness can cesses are themselves the product of uncon- occasionally intervene to override, regulate, scious ones. We find it hard to imagine redirect, and otherwise alter the stream of where conscious thought could come from behavior— often at a distance, with uncon- if not from unconscious processes (see Mor- scious processes filling in. As Baumeister sella & Bargh, 2010). For example, a per- and Masicampo (2010) proposed, the idea son may read a poem or story and be trans- that consciousness plays a supporting (but ported into vividly imagined, emotionally nonetheless powerful) role in human func- rich responses. In order for these to happen, tioning has lacked traditional advocacy, however, the unconscious must accomplish intuitive appeal, and other advantages of the considerable work, including the transfor- rival theoretical views, but it may provide the mation of the visual stimuli into meaningful best fit to the currently available evidence. In words, the evocation of associated knowl- the next section we spell out this view. edge, and initiation of evaluative, emotional responses, perhaps complete with bodily arousal. CONSCIOUSNESS To revisit the car metaphor, therefore, we AS NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM can ask what is the appropriate metaphor for conscious thoughts. The full conscious In the 1990s, the two of us engaged in a pub- control metaphor would suggest that con- lic exchange of views that we have come to sciousness is the car’s driver, who works the remember as “the steering wheel debate.” controls so as to direct the car toward his or At this time Bargh, emboldened by early her intended destination. The steam whistle findings to move into what he later charac- view would depict consciousness as a pas- terized as his “feisty period” (e.g., 1997), senger, perhaps in the back seat. The pas- had shrugged off his initial, cautious view senger may have a rich subjective experience (e.g., 1989) that all effects of automatic of the journey but is simply seeing what hap- and unconscious processes depended on pens, without having any influence on where influencing conscious processes in order to the car goes. reach behavior. He began to speculate that In that context, our preferred metaphor the majority of behavior, and perhaps close would be that consciousness is akin to a to all of it, was the produce of unconscious fancy navigational system. Unconscious processes rather than conscious ones. processes mostly drive the car, but occasion- At the same time, Baumeister had been ally they do not know how to get where they emboldened in a different direction by his want to go, so they consult the navigational first findings about the importance of con- system, which can perform calculations that scious control in self- regulation. Although the driver cannot (see Bongers & Dijkster- his thinking about conscious control was in huis, 2009). The driver is thus better off, and a sense the opposite of Bargh’s thinking on more likely to reach the destination, because automatic, unconscious control, both were of having used the navigational system, largely in sympathy with the view that the although the navigational system does not majority of causes of behavior are in the directly move or steer the car. Its influence latter category. Baumeister and Sommer is purely advisory— but quite adaptive and (1997) proposed, however, that even if con- valuable. scious control were directly responsible for In that view, consciousness is not needed only 5% of behavior, that 5% could make for perceiving and understanding the imme- all the difference in long-term behavioral diate environment, nor is it responsible for outcomes. By analogy, they suggested that the direct execution of action. But (among although cars may be driven straight ahead other things) consciousness can mentally 95% of the time, the 5% of the time that the simulate various possible courses of action steering wheel is used to change directions is and their likely, anticipated consequences. inordinately important in enabling the car to The unconscious can use these simulations reach the driver’s preferred destination. in deciding what to do and in carrying out Contemplating the importance of a steer- these plans for action. The result may well ing wheel dodges a couple of vital questions, be superior outcomes that are more adap- including the extent to which conscious pro- tive and successful than what would have

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happened had the person simply responded duction of walking. It seems implausible that unconsciously to the situation, without con- a person would walk to the store by entirely sciously imagining various courses of action. unconscious causation even while his or her conscious mind was screaming at the feet to turn around. HOW DOES BEHAVIOR ORIGINATE? To be sure, often extensive inner process- ing mediates between the stimulus and the The question of how behavior starts has response (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Auto- been a perennial bugaboo for action theory matic stereotype effects on judgment and (see Morsella, 2009). Most theorists today behavior depend on the particular content accept that cognitions can cause behavior, of the stereotype; different stereotypes of but many cognitions occur without initiat- the same social group produce automatic ing any behavior, so the step from thinking different effects (cf. Devine, 1989; Lepore to doing remains difficult to explain. (And & Brown, 1997). Perhaps even more impor- thoughts, too, may be merely an interme- tant, motivational tendencies within the diate step between the original causes and individual may moderate the impact of stim- behavior.) ulus on response. The simple formula that The approach emphasized by Bargh and the stimulus causes the response glosses over his colleagues has been to see the origins of the fact that the organism’s attitudes and behavior as they occur in the social situation. values dictate whether any response is called External cues may activate automatic, often for in the first place. If the person has no unconscious processes that produce behav- relevant motivation— if one really does not ioral responses, for example, in the automatic care a fig either way—then the situation or tendency to mimic or imitate what others in event is unlikely to spark action. Insofar as that situation are currently doing (Chartrand the situation is relevant to the goals, values, & Bargh, 1999). Conscious thoughts may fears, and desires of the individual, it will be entirely irrelevant, or they may possibly stimulate behavioral responses. play a mediating role. This view gets past the This asymptote —apparently unreachable problem of how to leap from cognition to limit—of unconscious effects of stimuli on behavior, because the cognitions are mainly behavior and other higher mental processes active in mediating between stimulus and was recognized early on, first by Koestler response. The stimulus– response (S-R) link (1967) and Neisser (1967), then by Bargh remains paramount, although the responses (1989) and Srull and Wyer (1986): Although are driven by the particular mental represen- automatic stimulus effects could influence tations activated by that stimulus, and these perceptual interpretation, orienting of atten- representations— the meaning of the stimu- tion, and other early-stage processes, they lus for the individual— may vary from per- could not directly drive responses to the son to person, and from culture to culture. environment, because those were the pur- Situational influences can be perceived view of the particular goal active at that consciously or unconsciously. They can ini- moment. Responses back to the environ- tiate behavior. Along the way, many uncon- ment, loosely defined to include judgments, scious processes are indispensable, includ- as well as behaviors, were determined by the ing the coordination of muscle movements person’s current purposes. The classic exam- that execute walking or speech or writing. ples of automatic processes such as typing Consciousness might possibly be entirely and driving were, of course, dependent on bypassed, but probably in the majority of the person wanting to type something or cases it must at least cooperate with the to drive somewhere in the first place; once unconscious execution. For example, walk- that goal was active, then the movement ing to the corner store may be executed of the fingers to type or the complicated largely by unconscious processes— or pro- attentional– motoric processes involved in ductions (Wyer, Xu, & Chen, 2012) —that driving operated automatically. Traveling a move first one foot and then the other. But bit too fast around a curve and suddenly see- consciousness must at least be sympathetic ing a stop sign ahead causes one’s right foot to the project of walking to the store, to sup- to kick out and slam on the brakes without port the unconscious operation of the pro- need for any conscious intention or deci-

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sion. But viewing that same stop sign while pensable, except perhaps as route of input meandering on a pleasant walk along the for situational influences. Remember, behav- sidewalk does not cause one’s leg suddenly ior happens all the time in animals, without to kick out, fortunately for any fellow pedes- needing anything approaching the sophisti- trians nearby. The same stimulus (stop sign) cation of human conscious control, without has dramatically different effects depending requiring our whole, big human frontal cor- on one’s currently active goals. tex. Consciousness is not needed to originate Faced with this situation, Bargh (1989) behavior. It can perhaps intervene to change was ready to pack up shop and call it quits the course of action, to steer it, as it were, regarding the extent of automatic influences but there is no reason at all to assume that of the environment. They seemed, as Neisser actional impulses originate in conscious- (1967) had originally argued, to be limited ness. (Note, however, that consciousness is to early attentional and perceptual processes needed to understand sentences [but not sin- (pattern detection, figural synthesis) with gle words or concepts], so all meanings that an asymptotic limit at directly controlling come in by sentences require consciousness any actual responses. But one last chance first to parse them for meaning in order to of direct environmental control had to be influence behavior.) examined before he closed the books on the But this is hardly the extent of conscious potential automaticity of higher mental pro- activity, to enable the unconscious to receive cesses: What if the goals themselves could complex messages from the world. (Though be triggered and put into motion directly by it is extremely important given the use of environmental stimuli? culture as human biological strategy.) The This idea was the heart of the “auto- demonstrations of environmental prim- motive model” of unconscious motivation, ing effects on higher mental processes such which Bargh (1990) originally presented as as social perception (including stereotyp- just a hypothesis with no supporting data. ing), judgment, behavior (as in imitation or Soon, however, in collaboration with moti- emotional contagion), as well as goal pur- vational psychologist Peter Gollwitzer and suit (see reviews in Bargh, 2007), all focus then- graduate student Tanya Chartrand, on just one priming effect at a time. This is a series of studies showed that goals such the nature of laboratory research in which as achievement and cooperation, activated a single phenomenon is isolated for study. (primed) outside of awareness by goal- But in the buzzing, booming real world out relevant environmental stimuli, produced there, multiple primes are constantly pres- the same effects on judgment and behavior as ent. People are arguably constantly barraged when they were consciously pursued (Bargh by potential priming influences. Although & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bargh, Gollwitzer, this huge set of potentials is winnowed Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001; down somewhat by the currently active goal, Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). Yes, the goal which directs attention toward goal- relevant in place did determine the effects of stimuli stimuli and away from others (Neuberg, on responses, but the goal in place—akin to Kenrick, Maner, & Schaller, 2004), people the steering wheel in the earlier analogy— still face a surplus of riches regarding the itself could be automatically activated, and prediction of priming effects in busy, real- put into motion, by external environmental world environments (see Bargh, 2006). Note stimuli. This automatic goal activation was that this is the same problem of ecological argued to occur in the same way as for other validity that Skinner and his behaviorist col- mental representations, such as stereotypes leagues faced when attempting to generalize (Bargh, 1990). Conscious intent and aware- the S-R model from the extremely simple ness of the goal pursuit were not necessary rat laboratory environments to the complex to produce goal- directed behavior, extended social world of human beings (see, espe- over time, a conclusion borne out by much cially, Koestler, 1967). subsequent research (Aarts, Custers, & Not only that, but a given stimulus can Marien, 2008; Custers & Aarts, 2010; Dijk- have multiple priming effects, be relevant to sterhuis & Aarts, 2010). competing goals, and have multiple features So far, so good—and no need for con- triggering conflicting responses. Here is sciousness. Consciousness is entirely dis- where consciousness, and especially the con-

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sciousness bottleneck, comes in very handy. 1991). You might have learned the correct A prominent idea that is gaining consensus responses if there were feedback after each today regarding the purpose of conscious- trial (as there often is in the dangerous, ness is that it alone is capable of integrat- real world in which you quickly learn not ing and managing the different response to touch a hot stove), but this would likely outputs generated by the variety of sensory, take some floundering around to learn the information- processing, and motivationally rule; if someone tells you the rule instead, relevant systems housed within the human performance is nearly perfect from the get- skin (Morsella, 2005). Take as an example go (Dulany, 1968). This illustrates one huge the classic Stroop task, in which words are domain of consciousness— that people can presented in a variety of colors and one’s task share information with each other about the as experimental participant is just to name correct responses to make, and that they can the color of the word as quickly as possible. thus hand down this information generation The single stimulus word red presented in by generation. Other animals have to rein- blue ink has two task- relevant features (the vent the wheel during each lifetime and can- word meaning and the word color), both not, as humans do, build on the hard-won processed automatically (one does not con- gains of their ancestors and stand on their sciously have to figure out the meaning of the shoulders. That consciousness is needed to word red , and one immediately recognizes parse sentences is thus no small potatoes. without any deliberation that its color is In what might be a telling example of blue). So to make the correct response “blue,” ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny, young one has to manage the competing responses, children first “think aloud” before thinking select “blue” and inhibit “red.” We can all do silently to themselves (Vygotsky, 1934/1986). this (there are very few errors typically made They use their emerging skills of communi- on this task), though it takes a bit longer here cating with others to begin to communicate (compared, e.g., to the word five presented with themselves; after a few months they in blue) because of the additional effort to can do this silently. Thus, internal conscious inhibit the competing response. thought is born out of social communica- Now, what if the experimenter comes into tion, taking oneself as the object or target your cubicle and tells you from now on you of the communication instead of another are to say the word itself out loud, and not person. The phylogentic implications are its color. Again, you can do this at a near transparent, suggesting again that conscious perfect level, making few if any mistakes. thought processes emerged as a functional It might again take you longer to say “red” outgrowth of members of our species’ abil- when that word is presented in blue color, ity to communicate (especially verbally) with but you still manage to stifle the compet- each other. ing response and make the correct answers. The telling point here is that the stimulus— the word red in blue color—is identical in WHAT ABOUT FREE WILL? the two versions of the task. The stimulus alone did not drive the response. Moreover, At a 2009 conference, the two of us staged this single stimulus generated two differ- a lively debate about whether the notion of ent, competing, task-relevant responses, free will is scientifically viable. Although “red” and “blue,” yet you were able to get some in the audience seemed to have got- it right. And even more than that, the task ten the impression that our views were miles instructions were given to you verbally by apart (and even that we disliked each other!), the experimenter, not by some internal goal our respective positions were probably or motivation you had internal and private much closer than it appeared. It is perhaps to yourself. Even for such a simple experi- unfortunate that terms such as “free will” mental task as the Stroop effect, there is a and “determinism” have acquired multiple whole lot for which consciousness is abso- meanings and connotations. Although these lutely necessary and that could not be done help to attract multidisciplinary attention, without it. they can mislead and confuse, because dif- Without consciousness the experimenter ferent theorists use different definitions and could not tell you what to do (see Dennett, therefore argue past each other.

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One traditional understanding of free will Bargh believes that conscious processes are is an exemption from causality. Neither of us just as caused as are unconscious processes thinks that that view is promising, particu- (see especially Bargh & Ferguson, 2000), larly for a scientific theory. Indeed, scientific so both are equally “free” or “not free” theories are causal theories. Hence, we both depending on how one defines freedom ; yet assume that all behavior is caused. Bau- psychologists are not really as interested meister thinks free will is simply a different in the “freedom” question as much as they kind of causation, as compared to physical are interested in the question of whether or billiard- ball causation. There are many conscious states themselves are causal (see forms of causation, so having one more is Bargh, 2013). hardly a major concession or adjustment, Baumeister is interested in the social real- especially given that the behavior of humans, ity of free will, which includes how behav- unlike the deportment of inanimate physical iors such as self- control, rational choice, and objects, may be influenced by contemplation initiative are executed. The implications of of moral principles, legal constraints, antici- belief in free will are also important; as a pated future consequences, socially shared growing body of work has documented, dif- understandings, and other factors not easily ferences in beliefs about free will contribute reducible to Newtonian physics. to various behavioral outcomes. He thinks Bargh thinks similarly, that the will is that humans do have some traits that dif- caused and not “free” from causation, ferentiate them from other animals— and and that different answers are given to the that most of these, including whatever inner question of whether free will exists mainly processes commonly go by the name of free because of where people choose to cut off the will, are adaptations to facilitate culture (see causal chain. For political scientists, exter- Baumeister, 2005). Hence, his interest is in nal constraints on the individual will, such whether the behaviors associated with free as use of force or coercion (as in totalitarian will and beliefs about free will are largely regimes), are what matter, and when those conducive to the effective operation of cul- are not in play, free will (free from external tural systems (and helpful to the individuals constraint) is said to exist. (Indeed, as Han- who seek to survive, reproduce, and other- nah Arendt, 1978, once said, without the wise flourish in them). existence of free will in this sense the field of In any case, we agree that human action political science itself could not exist.) The is best explained in causal terms. For Bau- causal chain is not traced any farther back meister, the issue of free will is whether than this. For psychologists, however, inter- humans actually make choices from among nal constraints are fair game, so behavior multiple options that are genuinely possible, is considered less free, for example, in the which strict Laplacian determinism rules case of strong addictions, or difficult- to- out. (Laplace insisted that there is only one overcome compulsions such as hoarding or possible future, which is precisely the same hand washing. Provocations, too, are under- as what will actually happen, so there can- stood as mitigating circumstances, such as not be multiple alternative possibilities.) when angry behavior produced by a strong For Bargh, who believes that these choices, insult is considered as partially outside the as well as the will itself (goal pursuits), are person’s control or free will. driven mainly by unconsciously operat- The key distinction seems not to be free ing processes, the particular flavor of “free will per se but the role of conscious pro- will” that matters to psychologists and lay- cesses in producing the behavior. Conscious people alike (but seemingly not to philoso- processes are just as causal as unconscious phers) is whether choices and behaviors are processes. But for many, especially in the influenced by what is “now playing” in the field of psychology, conscious causation is conscious Cartesian theater of the mind. equated with free will and unconscious cau- Regardless of the philosophical niceties sation, with the lack of same. This is a long- and the unfortunately emotional connota- standing historical position dating back to tions of terms such as free will, we agree Watson (1912) and the rise of behaviorism; on key issues. The production of action in not for nothing was B. F. Skinner’s 1971 humans differs in some fundamental ways book titled Beyond Freedom and Dignity . from the production of action in other ani-

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mals. Human action takes into account many (as opposed to a cognition or emotion). By factors, such as man-made laws, moral prin- the logic of experimental design, such find- ciples, symbolism, expressive meaning, and ings would generally be regarded as evidence other factors that are generally presumed that conscious thoughts cause behavior. to be absent from the causation of animal That search yielded a broad variety of behavior. Humans are in crucial ways able findings. The efficacy of conscious states to conceptualize alternatives to current real- for causing behavior is difficult to dispute ity and alternative scenarios in which their in light of that evidence. The patterns of own various possible courses of action lead findings reviewed in that work include the to different (and differentially appealing) following (for full review, see Baumeister et consequences, and to use these conscious al., 2011). When people consciously imagine simulations to inform their own behavior. future actions, they become more likely to The challenge for psychology is to elucidate perform them. Mentally practicing difficult the processes that produce those actions. or skillful actions improves the quality of subsequent performance. Making specific plans improves likelihood and efficacy of DOES CONSCIOUSNESS behavior. Rehearsing, ruminating about, or CAUSE BEHAVIOR? reinterpreting recent events alters how one responds subsequently. Performance on logi- As we have said, psychology’s dominant cal reasoning tests is heavily dependent on views about how conscious thoughts influ- conscious thought. Taking other people’s ence behavior have ranged and oscillated perspective and empathizing with their feel- widely. At some points, the reigning assump- ings or desires alters how one treats them, tion has been that conscious thoughts enjoy as does imagining the constraints, pressures, extensive control over behavior, and uncon- and stereotypes that may impinge on their scious thoughts have at best indirect effects behavior. Trying to override specific auto- that depend on influencing the conscious matic or habitual responses is sometimes thoughts. At other points, conscious thought effective in altering behavior. Altering views has been regarded as a dubious side effect of of self can alter how one reacts to subse- other processes, lacking scientific viability quent challenges and opportunities. Setting and pragmatic efficacy. particular goals or interpretively framing In recent decades, one of the most influ- issues in a particular way can alter how one ential but also controversial lines of work deals with them. to impugn conscious control was provided None of this evidence contradicts the find- by Libet (1985, 2004). The experiments ings of Libet (2004)—only the (mis)inter- instructed people to decide arbitrarily when pretation that Libet’s findings disprove the to make a meaningless physical movement efficacy of conscious thoughts. Baumeister and to record the moment of that deci- et al. (2011) reported no findings that indi- sion. Findings indicated that brain activity cated direct control of muscle movements, showed an uptick about half a second before independent of unconscious processes, the movement and (more important) about which is perhaps what Libet was searching 300 milliseconds before the conscious deci- for. Indeed, Libet’s (1985) experimental par- sion. Skeptics of conscious control have used ticipants were specifically instructed not to those findings to argue that a conscious plan when to respond, which arguably elimi- decision is not a cause of behavior, because nated the only role that conscious thought the response is already in motion before the could play in that situation. conscious event. The findings are also consistent with To respond to that interpretation of Libet’s Bargh’s (1997) assertion that the direct, findings, Baumeister, Masicampo, and Vohs immediate causes of behavior are almost (2011) conducted a literature search for evi- always unconscious and automatic. They dence of conscious causation of behavior. suggest a view in which the unconscious Specifically, they sought experimental work carries out the moment- to- moment execu- in which the (manipulated) independent tion of behavior, with conscious operating variable was a conscious event or state, and at a remove but offering helpful guidance the dependent variable was genuine behavior and insights (akin to the navigational system

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model we outlined earlier). Baumeister et al. plans for future circumstances (Bargh, (2011) pointed out that none of the findings 1997). This would not be a safe thing to do they reviewed indicated causation by con- unless unconscious processes were home scious thoughts alone. Rather, they depict “minding the store” while consciousness was conscious and unconscious processes work- away in time. Conscious thoughts are there- ing together. Indeed, they speculated that fore very useful in coordinating past, pres- almost every human behavior is the result of ent, and future, such as when contemplation both conscious and unconscious processes. of future goals influences present selection There was also no evidence in all the work of actions (Trope & Liberman, 2003), or reviewed by Baumeister et al. (2011) that when interpretation or reinterpretation of behaviors originate in consciousness. They past events alters how one will respond to a cited a great deal of work, but it was all con- similar situation in the future. The literature genial to the auto- motive theory’s account review by Baumeister et al. (2011) concluded that action begins when external cues acti- that one major pattern of conscious causa- vate unconscious motivations and tenden- tion was indeed the integration of past, pres- cies. Thus, behavior starts with an interac- ent, and future. tion between the external situation and the Planning is a useful example. Behavior internal but unconscious motivational ten- does not originate with a plan, because the dencies. Still, it makes a difference whether very making of a plan is occasioned by some the possible action is first contemplated and combination of inner motivation and exter- simulated consciously. nal constraint or opportunity. One only Unconscious processes may accomplish makes a plan because one wants to reach a the specific execution of specific behaviors in goal, and reaching it is not guaranteed. For the here and now. Indeed, unconscious pro- all its powers and merits, the unconscious cesses seem to correspond to “old brain” sys- is probably not capable of making a com- tems of dealing constantly with present- time plex plan itself, so it uses consciousness in dangers and needs, just in order to survive to order to make the plan. This is probably why the next present moment. The various auto- people are often kept awake at night, against matic processes discovered in social cogni- their will and their strong desire to get back tion research over the past quarter- century to sleep, thinking about their uncompleted or so have all been found to lead directly, and tasks or the yet- unsolved major problems unconsciously, to overt behavioral responses in their life (Morsella, Ben-Zeev, Lanska, (Bargh & Morsella, 2010)—exactly what & Bargh, 2010). When the conscious mind would be expected if these processes were does form a plan to take care of these unre- selected by evolutionary processes because solved issues, the unconscious stops nagging of their adaptive value, because natural consciousness about them (Masicampo & selection can only operate on overt behav- Baumeister, 2011). ioral responses. This is why, for example, Once again, in the case of planning, internal automatic processes, such as auto- however, conscious and unconscious pro- matic attitude activation, have been found cesses are found to work most effectively to produce immediate muscular, behavioral together. When consciousness does make a predispositions to approach versus avoid the plan, it turns out that the most effective and attitude object (Chen & Bargh, 1999), and reliable plan in terms of probability of suc- automatic social perceptual activity such as cess at reaching the desired goal is to form trait concept and stereotype activation have “strategically automatic” mental associa- also been found unconsciously to produce tions concerning future behavior. Gollwit- behavioral tendencies to act in line with the zer (1999) described the most effective type content of the trait concept or stereotype. of plan (at least in terms of what has been Unconscious processes therefore evolved proven), implementation intentions, as del- to guide behavior in adaptive ways in the egation of control to the environment. Plans present moment, and this has the happy are, in essence, specification in advance of advantage of freeing conscious processes to what one wants to do given a reliable future “time- travel” into the past or future, com- event or situation. Implementation inten- paring present events to past occurrences tions work by specifying in concrete detail through memory processes, and making those future circumstances and linking one’s

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intended course of action to them, so that original causes of most actions— yet con- when the future event occurs, the intended scious thoughts do play a causal role. If behavior is triggered automatically. behavior starts with impulses originating Note in both of these scenarios, in which in the unconscious, and if it is executed by consciousness sets a goal and the uncon- unconscious processes that control move- scious works to find a path to it (as occurs ment, what does consciousness do? The in incubation or tip-of-the- tongue effects, in answer suggests that conscious thoughts which the sought- for answer pops into con- work closely with unconscious ones to pro- sciousness only much later; Koriat, 1993; or duce the optimal behavioral outcomes. a future situation– behavior contingency that Conscious thoughts can facilitate decision then unfolds unconsciously upon the future making in several ways. Conscious thoughts event), that conscious and unconscious pro- are mentally constructed simulations, and cesses are working together. Implementation as such they can simulate various courses of intentions require conscious processes to set action and their probable outcomes. These them in the first place but, once established, imagined future events are constructed produce the intended behavior efficiently, with the help of extensive unconscious reliably, and automatically. Plans require work, including retrieval of relevant knowl- conscious work to establish the desired end edge from similar past experiences. Also, state and then allow unconscious processes crucially, the selection among the various to work out a way to that goal. options is informed by comparing the affec- Another, related way that conscious and tive reactions to each scenario, and these unconscious processes work together is dem- depend on automatic activation of affective onstrated by how conscious attentional pro- associations. People learn from experience cesses are automatically directed to unusual, partly by having emotional responses to how unexpected, or (to a lesser extent) novel things turn out, and these leave emotional events, as noted early on by Mandler (1975) traces that are activated when they encoun- in his model of emotion and by Taylor and ter or imagine similar experiences later (see Fiske (1978) in their work on attentional Damasio, 1994, on somatic markers; also salience effects in social cognition, and per- see Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, haps especially in Shiffrin and Schneider’s 2007, on how emotion guides behavior). (1977) pioneering work on the interaction Conscious self- regulation (aka self- of controlled (i.e., conscious) and automatic control) is another possible mechanism by (i.e., unconscious) information processing. which conscious thoughts can influence The unconscious is continually building a behavior. Morsella (2005) argued persua- model of the world, using mechanisms such sively that inner response conflicts that as priming and concept accessibility (both involve skeletomotor muscles— thus, ones chronic and temporary) with fluent process- about physical action— prompt conscious ing (low attentional demand) given to events awareness. This suggests that consciousness that fit that model (Higgins & Bargh, 1987); is important for mediating between conflict- this leaves more of one’s limited attentional ing motivations. Several common types of capacity for those events that do not fit the motivational conflict pit a so- called “lower current model. Given these limits, the uncon- impulse,” such as that stemming from ani- scious monitoring of the world that gener- malistic needs and desires, against higher ates expectancies, explicit and implicit alike, ones, such as moral principles and long- helps conscious resources to be automati- range goals. Self- control typically operates cally directed where they are most needed in service of the higher impulse. and can be the most helpful. Self- control is typically understood as a conscious process, though there are undoubtedly some unconscious forms of FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS self- regulation (e.g., for maintaining bodily IN AN AUTOMATICALLY and even social and emotional homeostasis; DRIVEN PERSON see Bargh & Shalev, 2012, and, of course, we continue to think and insist that conscious Thus far we have argued that automatic, processes are themselves constructed by unconscious processes are the direct and unconscious ones. One way that conscious-

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ness can benefit self- control is by simulat- ior. There is no evidence that consciousness ing the long-term outcome, which can then can dispense with unconscious processes exert a motivational pull to compete with in action. There is no reason to think that the more immediately tempting stimulus for natural selection would have favored early the short-term impulse. Thus, the person is humans who were able to be more conscious tempted by the cake, the drug, the drink, the of their own actions than were their rivals. insulting provocateur, or whatever, any one In contrast, the adaptive benefits of com- of which could lead to impulsive action that munication seem uncontroversial. Sharing might be briefly satisfying but regretted in information is something humans do exten- the long run. To enable the higher impulse sively and deliberately, far more frequently, to prevail, it is helpful to imagine future out- more extensively, and more effectively than comes that would be thwarted by indulging, any other species. Early human kin-based such as the fashionably slim self, the non- groups that could communicate better than addicted self, the nonhungover self, or the others could well have enjoyed profound nonjailed self. A vivid conscious thought of advantages, so that natural selection might these desired outcomes can bolster the oth- relatively quickly have favored communi- erwise feeble wish to do the right thing. cative abilities. The idea that communica- tion was the basic human trait that set our ancestors off on their uniquely human evo- CONSCIOUS THINKING IS lutionary past can integrate much of what is FOR TALKING known. This includes the fact that upright posture (freeing the hands for gestural com- Our views about the role of consciousness munication, which preceded speech) pre- in the genesis of action have changed several ceded the increase in brain size, contrary to times and no doubt may evolve further. But early views that the emergence of the large a different approach to the question of what brain was the original basis for distinctively consciousness is for was proposed by Bau- human evolution. Our ancestors began to meister and Masicampo (2010). One crucial share information by gesturing, and the function of human conscious thought may gradual but huge increase in information be for communicating (see also Dennett, available in the social environment would 1991). Although many things can be done certainly have created a selection factor while conscious thought is directed else- favoring increases in intelligence and brain where, talking does not appear to be one of size. them (nor does writing!). Earlier we noted evidence (e.g., DeWall, Cognitive psychologists and others have Baumeister, & Masicampo, 2008) that logi- long used reportability as a methodological cal reasoning seems to require conscious indicator of consciousness. That is, to estab- thought (though, as always, in conjunction lish whether some thought is conscious, with automatic and unconscious processes). one ascertains whether the participant can The presumptive advantages of reasoning report on it. But few researchers seem to would seemingly constitute a possible expla- have seriously contemplated the possibility nation for why consciousness evolved. With that reportability may be far more than a reasoning, too, however, there is a strong handy methodological tool—that it may be case that the driving force has been inter- precisely the central purpose of conscious- personal communication and interaction ness in the first place. rather than solitary or solipsistic ratiocina- The assumption that communication is tion. Mercier and Sperber (2011 ) reviewed one central purpose of conscious thought the evidence about common lapses, errors, offers a useful solution to several thorny and flaws in human reasoning, and pointed dilemmas. The question of why humans out that these are only flaws if one assumes would have evolved their advanced capac- that the purpose of reasoning is a solitary, ity for conscious thought is vexing if one dispassionate search for the truth. Instead, seeks to use it to explain improved control they proposed that reasoning evolved pri- over behavior. As we have said, we both marily for the sake of arguing, in which case think automatic and unconscious processes many of those seeming flaws appear instead do a fine job of executing almost all behav- as helpful to the cause of survival.

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For example, the confirmation bias is a ties of life. Indeed, given the strong evidence tendency to attend more to evidence support- of the correspondence bias or fundamental ing one’s hypothesis than to evidence contra- attribution error, each of us would be likely dicting it. Many writers have deplored this to be seen as intending each of these bad as a sad lapse, and an invitation to bias and outcomes, and situational or circumstantial error. And, of course, scientists who ignore causes would tend to be dismissed by the contrary evidence will likely end up with group. Thus, we can see a clear case for the mistaken theories. But people are not intui- adaptive, survival value of being able to give tive scientists so much as they are intuitive quickly and argue effectively for a positive, lawyers who want to argue for their position pro-group version of whatever one has just (see Tetlock, 2002). In that case, supportive done. evidence is much more useful than contrary Logical reasoning and planning can also evidence. A defense lawyer who brought up be helpful in guiding behavior toward opti- evidence of her client’s guilt would be less mal, desired outcomes, and these appear to successful than one who focused on the facts require conscious thought. As one example, that supported his innocence. Mercier and most travelers engage in calculating simula- Sperber have also suggested that reasoning tions so as to get to the airport with suffi- is for evaluating the arguments made by cient time to make their plane (but without others— in which case people have a dis- so much lead time as to require sitting for confirmation bias, which is to say they look many hours in the airport). Knowing one has eagerly for flaws in the reasoning used by a 1:35 P.M. flight departure time might dic- their adversaries in an argument. tate arriving at the airport by 12:35 (earlier There would seem to be clear adaptive for big, busy airports), which in turn may advantages in being able to argue in one’s require being in the taxi by 12:15, which own defense within one’s social group, as requires being at the taxi stand by 12:05, argued in Tetlock’s (2002) model of evolved which requires being checked out of the social mindsets. Take as a starting point Gaz- hotel room and into the elevator by noon, zaniga’s (1985) prescient idea based on hyp- which requires being fully packed by 11:45 nosis, as well as early neuroscience research, in time to check the room again for poten- that impulses to action arise unconsciously tially forgotten items, which means having and are then interpreted consciously to form an early lunch, and so forth. a coherent narrative account of what one is doing and why. He noted that people’s behavior under posthypnotic suggestion, in CONCLUSIONS which they found themselves down on the floor on all fours because of the hypnotist’s Whatever we may have thought and seemed command, or getting up from the chair and to say in the past, at present we both think leaving the room, found immediate rational that most human behavior comes from a explanations and justifications (“I lost an blend of conscious and unconscious pro- earring down here”; “I’m thirsty and want cesses working together to meet the person’s to get some water”). One can imagine how critical needs and facilitate important goal helpful to maintaining one’s good graces pursuits. Baumeister et al.’s (2011) survey of with one’s group, back in the day when ostra- the literature turned up no convincing evi- cism was a certain death sentence, it would dence that any action is caused entirely by be to have readily at hand a positive spin for conscious processes, and it is doubtful that whatever one was doing or had just done. this would even be possible. In principle, a Without this ready explanation and ability few behaviors could be produced entirely to communicate it effectively, one could be independently of consciousness, and the seen as personally responsible and as having direct execution of behavior is probably the intended all of the accidental mishaps (spill- result of unconscious and automatic pro- ing the jar of water on the long walk back cesses, but in most cases, consciousness may from the well, falling asleep and letting the have some say in the matter, especially with sheep wander away, picking some poisonous regard to upstream influences such as plan- berries on a foraging run) that can occur to ning, logical reasoning, interpreting, and any of us given the vagaries and uncertain- communicating.

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