Conscious and Unconscious Toward an Integrative Understanding of Human Mental Life and Action
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CHAPTER 3 Conscious and Unconscious Toward an Integrative Understanding of Human Mental Life and Action Roy F. Baumeister and John A. Bargh Human consciousness is one of the wonders POSSIBLE ROLES of the world. It integrates sensation, per- OF CONSCIOUSNESS ception, emotion, and interpretation, often understanding events in sequences that The relation of conscious thoughts to behav- include causal analyses and extended nar- ior has been depicted in multiple ways, run- rative structures. How inert bits of lifeless ning the full spectrum from complete con- physical matter, such as protons, neutrons, trol to complete irrelevance. Here we briefly and electrons, combine and organize so as to delineate the range of possible views. make conscious experience possible remains At one extreme is the commonsense one of the most unassailable mysteries in the impression that consciousness is in full scientific understanding of the universe. Yet control of behavior. People know they are consciousness itself is, of course, no mystery conscious. They experience their actions as for the billions of human beings who have stemming from conscious choices. Almost and use it all day, every day. by definition, they are unaware of uncon- We, the authors of this chapter, have scious influences on their behavior. (To found ourselves on opposite sides of debates borrow a metaphor from Jaynes, 1976, a about several important questions, includ- flashlight in a dark room would mistakenly ing the efficacy of conscious thought and the conclude that all the lights are on, because scientific viability of free will. Still, we have whichever way it turns to look, everything followed each other’s work over the years is illuminated!) with interest, respect, and admiration, and Concerning definitions, conscious and this has enabled our programs of research unconscious processes have been distin- to benefit and to be informed by each oth- guished historically in terms of several differ- er’s work. Moreover, we actually agree on ent features (e.g., Bargh, 1994)—awareness, far more than our periodic debates might intentionality, efficiency, and controllabil- suggest. Our purpose in this chapter is to ity, with the former two at the heart of the explore and elucidate these areas of agree- terms in common usage. However, because ment. of mounting evidence that motivations and 35 Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 35 1/2/2014 12:56:50 PM 36 THE BASICS goal pursuits (roughly speaking, intention- cesses have effectively zero impact on actual ality) operate unconsciously in much the behavior. The view that consciousness is same way as they operate consciously (e.g., an epiphenomenon, which is to say a side Marien, Custers, Hassin, & Aarts, 2012; effect of other processes and itself does not McCulloch, Ferguson, Kawada, & Bargh, have true causal impact, has a long history. 2008), the intentionality (purposive, goal- Thomas Huxley (1874) articulated the so- oriented) quality no longer differentiates called “steam whistle hypothesis” that com- conscious and unconscious processes. Thus, pared consciousness to the steam whistle it is the awareness and reportability of a on a train locomotive. The steam whistle’s mental process that most clearly distinguish activity is caused by what is happening in between what is considered a conscious ver- the engine and may also reveal something sus an unconscious mental process or expe- about the inner state of the engine, but it rience. Indeed, the most recent distinctions does not move or steer the train. By analogy, between conscious and unconscious pro- consciousness may be a rich subjective expe- cesses have focused exclusively on the vari- rience of one’s own life that derives from ous forms of awareness people have about unconscious processes and reveals some- their mental content (Schooler, Mrazek, thing about these inner states, but it does not Baird, & Winkielman, in press). have any influence on behavior. The view that consciousness enjoys full More recent writers have continued to control over behavior has mainly intuitive question the efficacy of conscious thoughts. appeal these days. Few serious researchers Wegner (2002) wrote of the “illusion of con- endorse it, because the case for unconscious scious will,” proposing that people’s sub- causation of behavior is overwhelming. jective awareness of deciding, controlling, Years ago, Freud (1933/1965) made a per- and initiating actions is liberally subject to suasive and extensive argument for the posi- distortion and error. Dijksterhuis and Nor- tion that people are not fully aware of many dgren (2006) proposed that unconscious causes of their behavior, including ones thought is generally superior to conscious originating in their own unconscious mind. thought, and although they conceded that Modern social psychology has repeatedly conscious thinking can sometimes cause shown that people are not aware of many behavior, its effects are not very helpful, and situational cues and stimuli that can influ- people would be well advised to minimize its ence behavior. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) influence. Wilson (2002) likewise provided showed that introspection is often unable to evidence of the fallibility of conscious think- furnish accurate accounts of the causation ing and recommended that people rely on of behavior. Wegner (2002) showed that unconscious processes rather than conscious people’s subjective experiences of initiating ones (see also Gladwell, 2004). and controlling behavior can be mistaken in In between the two extremes of seeing both directions; that is, sometimes people behavior as mainly conscious versus mainly believe they have done something when they unconscious, there are emerging new mod- have not, and sometimes they believe they els that seek to regard conscious and uncon- have not done something when they have. scious processes as complementary instead And, of course, one of us has devoted much of competing systems. One approach would of his career to demonstrating a great many accept that conscious thoughts are highly ways in which situations cause behavior by influential in guiding behavior, but that means of unconscious, automatic processes, unconscious and automatic processes can thus bypassing or circumventing any con- have considerable influence by means of scious control (Bargh, 1994, 1997, 2005). shaping the content of consciousness. This A watered- down version of the theory of position is amenable to the commonsense full conscious control holds that people are view that conscious thoughts are ultimately at least conscious of what they are doing, in charge of action, but it assigns an impor- and that unconscious processes influence tant role to unconscious processes as provid- behavior by way of influencing conscious ing support and input. thoughts. The other compromise view, which both Opposite to the theory of full conscious of us currently advocate, is that behavior is control is the view that conscious pro- normally carried out by unconscious, auto- Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 36 1/2/2014 12:56:51 PM Conscious and Unconscious 37 matic processes, while consciousness can cesses are themselves the product of uncon- occasionally intervene to override, regulate, scious ones. We find it hard to imagine redirect, and otherwise alter the stream of where conscious thought could come from behavior— often at a distance, with uncon- if not from unconscious processes (see Mor- scious processes filling in. As Baumeister sella & Bargh, 2010). For example, a per- and Masicampo (2010) proposed, the idea son may read a poem or story and be trans- that consciousness plays a supporting (but ported into vividly imagined, emotionally nonetheless powerful) role in human func- rich responses. In order for these to happen, tioning has lacked traditional advocacy, however, the unconscious must accomplish intuitive appeal, and other advantages of the considerable work, including the transfor- rival theoretical views, but it may provide the mation of the visual stimuli into meaningful best fit to the currently available evidence. In words, the evocation of associated knowl- the next section we spell out this view. edge, and initiation of evaluative, emotional responses, perhaps complete with bodily arousal. CONSCIOUSNESS To revisit the car metaphor, therefore, we AS NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM can ask what is the appropriate metaphor for conscious thoughts. The full conscious In the 1990s, the two of us engaged in a pub- control metaphor would suggest that con- lic exchange of views that we have come to sciousness is the car’s driver, who works the remember as “the steering wheel debate.” controls so as to direct the car toward his or At this time Bargh, emboldened by early her intended destination. The steam whistle findings to move into what he later charac- view would depict consciousness as a pas- terized as his “feisty period” (e.g., 1997), senger, perhaps in the back seat. The pas- had shrugged off his initial, cautious view senger may have a rich subjective experience (e.g., 1989) that all effects of automatic of the journey but is simply seeing what hap- and unconscious processes depended on pens, without having any influence on where influencing conscious processes in order to the car goes. reach behavior. He began to speculate that In that context, our preferred metaphor the majority of behavior, and perhaps close would be that consciousness is akin to a to all of it, was the produce of unconscious fancy navigational system. Unconscious processes