Allen Dulles: Reluctant Manager
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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this book are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Central Intel- lig ence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of the authors’ factual statements and interpretations. Th e Center for the Study of Intelligence The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger’s desire to create within CIA an organization that could “think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best intellects available to bear on intelli- gence problems.” The Center, comprising professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons learned from past operations, explore the needs and expectations of intelligence consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence challenges. To support these activities, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence and books and monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the Agency’s Historical Intelligence Collection. Comments and questions may be addressed to: Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Printed copies of this book are available to requesters outside the US government from: Government Printing Office (GPO) Superintendent of Documents P.O. Box 391954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Phone: (202) 512-1800 E-mail: [email protected] ISBN: 1-929667-14-0 The covers: The portraits on the front and back covers are of the 19 directors of central intelligence, beginning with the first, RAdm. Sidney Souers, at the top of column of portraits in front and ending with the last, Porter Goss, on the back. On the back cover, seals representing each of the 15 organizations of the US Intelligence Community, as of 2005, surround the seal of the director of central intelligence. DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE as LEADERS of the U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY The Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication data Garthoff, Douglas F. Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946–2005/ Dr. Douglas F. Garthoff Includes bibliographic references. ISBN 1-929667-14-0 (pbk.:alk paper) 1. Intelligence—United States. 2. Intelligence history 3. Intelligence organization. 4. Intelligence policy. 5. Intelligence management. Typeset in Times. Printed by Imaging and Publication Support, CIA. DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE as LEADERS of the U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1946–2005 Douglas F. Garthoff Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 2005 The lessons to America are clear as day. We must not again be caught napping with no adequate national Intelligence organization. The several Federal bureaus should be welded together into one, and that one should be eternally and compre- hensively vigilant. Arthur Woods, 19191 Whatever he does and however he does it, the Director will be held responsible by the NSC, Congress, and the country for any failure to produce all intelligence per- taining to the national security. If he can do this only by requesting cooperation, the task is hopeless. —Lawrence Houston, General Counsel, CIA, 19482 1 Woods, police commissioner of New York City, had been involved in law enforcement and intelligence efforts to deal with German espionage and sabotage in the United States during World War I. (Thomas J. Tunney and Paul Merrick Hollister, Throttled: The Detection of the German and Anarchist Bomb Plotters in the United States (Bos- ton, MA: Small, Maynard, 1919), ix. Cited in Michael Warner, “The Kaiser Sows Destruction,” Studies in Intelli- gence 46, no. 1 (2002): 9. 2 Houston, CIA’s chief lawyer at the time, drafted these words in exasperation after a meeting in which intelligence agency representatives had refused to accept the DCI as anything more than an equal, seeking cooperation. CONTENTS LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...............................................................................................XI FOREWORD ................................................................................................................XIII ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ............................................................................ XV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... XXI NOTE ON SOURCES ................................................................................................ XXIII INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 3 FIRST FOUR DCIS: GAINING A FOOTHOLD .............................................................. 9 Intelligence Support for US World Role ....................................................................... 9 Presidential Interest ..................................................................................................... 11 Centralizing Intelligence ............................................................................................. 12 Director of Central Intelligence ................................................................................... 13 Coordination ................................................................................................................ 14 Expectations Regarding Community Role .................................................................. 15 Individual or Collective Authority? ............................................................................ 16 Correlate and Evaluate ................................................................................................ 18 Services of Common Concern and Other Functions and Duties ................................. 21 CIA: A Complicating Factor ....................................................................................... 22 Signals Intelligence ..................................................................................................... 25 Foothold Established ................................................................................................... 27 ALLEN DULLES: RELUCTANT MANAGER ............................................................... 31 Dulles as DCI .............................................................................................................. 31 Pressure for Greater Coordination Grows ................................................................... 33 New Board and New Directive ................................................................................... 34 The USIB System ........................................................................................................ 36 One Last Try ................................................................................................................ 37 JOHN MCCONE AND WILLIAM RABORN: NEW KIND OF DCI ..............................41 Embraces Community Leadership Role ...................................................................... 41 Focus on Resources ..................................................................................................... 43 National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff ........................................................ 43 Science and Technology .............................................................................................. 46 v Raborn Interlude ..........................................................................................................48 RICHARD HELMS: CORRALLING THE BEAST .........................................................53 Inheritor and Continuator .............................................................................................53 USIB-Centered Process ...............................................................................................54 Requirements ...............................................................................................................56 Working with DOD on Resources ...............................................................................57 National Intelligence Resources Board ........................................................................58 Eaton Report ................................................................................................................59 Froehlke and Fitzhugh Reports ....................................................................................60 Strategic Planning ........................................................................................................62 White House Attention ................................................................................................63 Schlesinger Study .........................................................................................................65 Reactions to Study .......................................................................................................67 Nixon’s Memorandum .................................................................................................69 DCI Response ..............................................................................................................71 Slow Progress ...............................................................................................................73